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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs December 17, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048 Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Summary Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. In 2014, a common enemy emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran’s economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement (“Joint Plan of Action,” JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the JPA expiration,but agreement was not reached and the parties extended the JPA until June 30, 2015. The parties stated intent to reach a political outline of the agreement by March 1, 2015. The main outstanding issue continues to be the size and scope of Iran’s program to enrich uranium. A final nuclear agreement could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations. Senior level U.S.-Iran talks are held regularly, primarily on the nuclear issue but also including regional issues such as how to defeat the Islamic State organization. The nuclear negotiations have eased tensions between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region—all allies of the United States. However, the Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states express concern that an Iran that is reintegrated into the region and the international community would give Iran additional resources to support movements and regimes that oppose U.S. and U.S.-allied interests. State Department reports on international terrorism assert that Iran continues to provide funds and arms to a wide range of movements, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria, Iraqi Shiite militias, and rebels in Yemen and Bahrain. On the other hand, Iranian support to Iraqi forces fighting the Islamic State organization largely furthers U.S. efforts to degrade and ultimately defeat that group. Rouhani’s unexpected election win—a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results—demonstrated strong support not only for reducing Iran’s isolation but for domestic reform. Rouhani has sought to satisfy this constituency, in part by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran’s judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43333, Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. Congressional Research Service Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Contents Political History ............................................................................................................................... 1 Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition .................................................................................... 2 Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council ...................................................................................... 2 Council of Guardians and Expediency Council .................................................................. 3 Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections ................................................................................................ 8 The Presidency .................................................................................................................... 8 The Majles ........................................................................................................................... 9 The Assembly of Experts .................................................................................................... 9 Recent Elections and Their Implications ............................................................................. 9 Human Rights Practices ................................................................................................................. 13 Iran’s Defense Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs .................................... 17 Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force ....................................................... 17 Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy .......................................................... 19 Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities ............................................................................ 20 Early International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program ..................... 23 Developments During the Obama Administration ............................................................ 25 Missiles and Chemical/Biological Weapons............................................................................ 31 Chemical and Biological Weapons .................................................................................... 31 Ballistic and Cruise Missiles and Warheads ...................................................................... 32 Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups .......................................................................... 34 Support for International Terrorism ......................................................................................... 34 Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States ........................................................... 35 Yemen ................................................................................................................................ 37 Iranian Policy in Iraq and Syria/ Islamic State Crisis .............................................................. 38 Iraq .................................................................................................................................... 38 Syria .................................................................................................................................. 39 Al Qaeda .................................................................................................................................. 40 Militant Anti-Israel Groups ..................................................................................................... 41 Iran and Hamas.................................................................................................................. 42 Iran and Hezbollah ............................................................................................................ 43 The Caucasus and Central Asia ............................................................................................... 44 South and East Asia ................................................................................................................. 44 East Asia ............................................................................................................................ 44 South Asia: Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 45 Pakistan ............................................................................................................................. 46 India ................................................................................................................................... 47 Latin America .......................................................................................................................... 47 Africa ....................................................................................................................................... 49 Sudan ................................................................................................................................. 50 U.S. Policy Approaches and Additional Options ........................................................................... 51 Obama Administration Policy: Pressure Coupled with Engagement ...................................... 52 2009-2013: Emphasis on Pressure .................................................................................... 53 Response to Rouhani ......................................................................................................... 53 Congressional Research Service Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Containment and Military Options: U.S. Posture in the Gulf .................................................. 54 Military Action: Pros and Cons ........................................................................................
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