2016 Country Review

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2016 Country Review Iran 2016 Country Review http://www.countrywatch.com Table of Contents Chapter 1 1 Country Overview 1 Country Overview 2 Key Data 4 Iran 5 Middle East 6 Chapter 2 8 Political Overview 8 History 9 Political Conditions 13 Political Risk Index 235 Political Stability 250 Freedom Rankings 265 Human Rights 277 Government Functions 280 Government Structure 282 Principal Government Officials 292 Leader Biography 294 Leader Biography 294 Foreign Relations 298 National Security 446 Defense Forces 448 Chapter 3 450 Economic Overview 450 Economic Overview 451 Nominal GDP and Components 454 Population and GDP Per Capita 456 Real GDP and Inflation 457 Government Spending and Taxation 458 Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment 460 Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate 461 Data in US Dollars 462 Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units 463 Energy Consumption and Production QUADS 465 World Energy Price Summary 466 CO2 Emissions 467 Agriculture Consumption and Production 468 World Agriculture Pricing Summary 471 Metals Consumption and Production 472 World Metals Pricing Summary 475 Economic Performance Index 476 Chapter 4 488 Investment Overview 488 Foreign Investment Climate 489 Foreign Investment Index 492 Corruption Perceptions Index 505 Competitiveness Ranking 517 Taxation 526 Stock Market 526 Partner Links 527 Chapter 5 528 Social Overview 528 People 529 Human Development Index 530 Life Satisfaction Index 534 Happy Planet Index 545 Status of Women 554 Global Gender Gap Index 557 Culture and Arts 566 Etiquette 568 Travel Information 570 Diseases/Health Data 580 Chapter 6 586 Environmental Overview 586 Environmental Issues 587 Environmental Policy 588 Greenhouse Gas Ranking 589 Global Environmental Snapshot 600 Global Environmental Concepts 611 International Environmental Agreements and Associations 625 Appendices 649 Bibliography 650 Iran Chapter 1 Country Overview Iran Review 2016 Page 1 of 662 pages Iran Country Overview IRAN Known as Persia until 1935, Iran was one of the greatest empires of the ancient world. Iran became a unique Islamic republic in 1979, when the monarchy was overthrown and religious clerics assumed political control under supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Since then, Iran has experienced an eight-year (1980-1988) war with Iraq, internal political struggles and unrest, economic disorder, and severe human rights violations. Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was appointed for life as the supreme leader. Since 1979, Iran has been led by conservatives who have kept reformers at bay. The elections of June 2005 dealt a blow to the reformists when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran's ultra- conservative mayor, became president. Ahmadinejad's controversial re-election in June 2009 further widened the rift between conservatives and reformists. However, there were high hopes that the political climate might be shifting in Iran in 2013 with the election of the reformist President Hassan Rouhani. Meanwhile, Iran remained subject to United States, United Nations, and European Union economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and its nuclear weapons ambitions.* The United Nations Security Council has passed a number of resolutions calling for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. Iran has an abundance of energy resources. It is OPEC’s second largest oil producer and holds about 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. It also has the world’s second largest natural gas reserves (after Russia). However, heavy government control, corruption and inefficiency have weighed down the economy. *Editor's Note on Iranian Nuclear Negotiations -- The international community has been focused on aggressive multilateral negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, aimed at arriving at a landmark nuclear deal. At issue was the goal of arriving at an accord that would regulate Iran's nuclear program, its stockpile of enriched uranium, and curtail Iran's ability to develop a nuclear bomb. For Iran, the objectives were twofold. First, Iran hoped to prove that its nuclear development was for peaceful purposes and not aimed at weaponization, Iran Review 2016 Page 2 of 662 pages Iran as charged by the West. Second, Iran was keen to end a painful international sanctions regime that has badly damaged Iran's economy. Going back to January 2014, an interim Iranian nuclear deal went into force. Under the terms of that interim agreement, Iran began the process of diluting its stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent, with all such uranium expected to be eliminated within a six-month period. There were also provisions for inspections at the Arak heavy water reactor and the Fordo uranium enrichment site close to Qom. While the interim deal constituted only a first step in the diplomatic track, it was certainly a significant step in that process aimed at establishing an enduring accord. Indeed, it represented a sea change in Iran's relationship with the United States, which was actively evolving from one marked by hostility to one of engagement. Now, with a final nuclear deal at stake, it was to be seen if that engagement would be ultimately deemed productive. At the end of March 2015, the P5+1 multilateral talks with Iran were set to end, with all eyes on a framework for a long-term agreement. But the negotiations were mired by various sticking points, prompting the parties to extend the negotiating process. Finally, on April 2, 2015, after marathon talks in Switzerland, the P5+1 countries and Iran announced that the hard work of negotiations and diplomacy had yielded results, and that a framework agreement on Iran's nuclear program had been reached. The agreement presaged a long-term deal, which would have to be made by the final "hard" deadline on June 30, 2015. The prevailing question continued to dominate: Can a final accord on Iran's nuclear program be forged? The answer to that question remained the same at the time of writing: It was yet to be determined if the nuclear negotiations would actually end in a viable and enduring deal; however, the successful framework agreement reached on April 2, 2015, marked a massive breakthrough in the realm of international diplomacy for the purpose of global security. Political resistance from hardliners in the United States Congress and from Iran itself could upend the deal. Nevertheless, new rounds of nuclear negotiations commenced later in the spring of 2015 with an eye on forging a sustainable final accord. Iran Review 2016 Page 3 of 662 pages Iran Key Data Key Data Region: Middle East Population: 81824272 Climate: Mostly arid and semi-arid; subtropical along the Caspian Sea Persian and Persian dialects Turkic languages Kurdish Languages: Luri Balock Arabic Turkish Currency: 10 Iranian rials = 1 toman Islamic Republic Day is 1 April (1979), No Ruz (Iran's New Year) is 21 Holiday: March Area Total: 1648000 Area Land: 1636000 Coast Line: 2440 Iran Review 2016 Page 4 of 662 pages Iran Iran Country Map Iran Review 2016 Page 5 of 662 pages Iran Middle East Regional Map Iran Review 2016 Page 6 of 662 pages Iran Iran Review 2016 Page 7 of 662 pages Iran Chapter 2 Political Overview Iran Review 2016 Page 8 of 662 pages Iran History Archeological findings have placed knowledge of Iranian prehistory at middle Paleolithic times. The earliest sedentary cultures date from 14,000 to 18,000 years ago. By the sixth millennium before the common era, or B.C.E, a fairly sophisticated agricultural society and proto-urban population had emerged. As a part of the third wave of migration from Europe, Aryan tribes traveled across the Caspian Sea and settled the area of Iran around 1500 B.C.E. After centuries of inhabitation and peaceful co-mingling with the indigenous population, two major civilizations emerged out of these peoples, the Persian and the Medes. By the sixth century B.C.E., the two ancient civilizations were united under Cyrus the Great. Cyrus subverted neighboring kingdoms of Babylonia, Palestine, Syria and Asia Minor and consolidated all the territories into the great Persian Empire. The following dynasty that ensued was called the Achaemenian Dynasty, in deference to Cyrus' respect for his ancestors. The ancient name of the actual territory remained as Persia until 1935 when it was officially changed to Iran. In 521 B.C.E., dominion of the Persian Empire shifted to Darius, who came to be known as "King of Kings." Under Darius I, the Achaemenian Dynasty developed a sophisticated social system and infrastructure within the empire. Darius' son, Xerxes, fought against the Greeks-the only people in the region that the Persians did not subjugate. Xerxes managed to capture the city of Athens, but the Greeks were able to resist the Persians, and eventually, under the leadership of Alexander the Great of Macedon, the Greeks defeated the Persians. Greek influence in Persia was intense during the following Hellenistic period, especially from 330 to 275 B.C.E. For his part, Alexander had great respect for the Persians and even married the daughter of a Persian nobleman. The resulting cultural integration gave rise to the Seleucid Dynasty, most famous for its fascinating artistic contributions. By around 250 B.C.E., however, the Seleucids gave way to the Parthians. Iran Review 2016 Page 9 of 662 pages Iran The Parthians were originally a nomadic people with a feudal style of government. Over time, they came to respect the culture of the people they had conquered, and as such, they allowed the Greco-Persian languages, culture and system of administration to prevail. The Parthian dynasty lasted from about 250 B.C.E. to approximately 226 in the common era, or C.E., when they were toppled by one of their own vassals, Ardeshir Parsa, a Sassanian.
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