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Souhrnná Terirotální Informace Írán SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Írán Souhrnná teritoriální informace Írán Zpracováno a aktualizováno zastupitelským úřadem ČR v Teheránu (Írán) ke dni 22. 6. 2018 15:20 Seznam kapitol souhrnné teritoriální informace: 1. Základní charakteristika teritoria, ekonomický přehled (s.2) 2. Zahraniční obchod a investice (s.9) 3. Vztahy země s EU (s.16) 4. Obchodní a ekonomická spolupráce s ČR (s.20) 5. Mapa oborových příležitostí - perspektivní položky českého exportu (s.24) 6. Základní podmínky pro uplatnění českého zboží na trhu (s.26) 7. Kontakty (s.43) 1/46 http://www.businessinfo.cz/iran © Zastupitelský úřad ČR v Teheránu (Írán) SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Írán 1. Základní charakteristika teritoria, ekonomický přehled Podkapitoly: 1.1. Oficiální název státu, složení vlády 1.2. Demografické tendence: Počet obyvatel, průměrný roční přírůstek, demografické složení (vč. národnosti, náboženských skupin) 1.3. Základní makroekonomické ukazatele za posledních 5 let (nominální HDP/obyv., vývoj objemu HDP, míra inflace, míra nezaměstnanosti). Očekávaný vývoj v teritoriu s akcentem na ekonomickou sféru. 1.4. Veřejné finance, státní rozpočet - příjmy, výdaje, saldo za posledních 5 let 1.5. Platební bilance (běžný, kapitálový, finanční účet), devizové rezervy (za posledních 5 let), veřejný dluh vůči HDP, zahraniční zadluženost, dluhová služba 1.6. Bankovní systém (hlavní banky a pojišťovny) 1.7. Daňový systém 1.1 Oficiální název státu, složení vlády Islámská republika Írán • persky: Džomhúrí-je eslámí-je írán • anglicky: The Islamic Republic of Iran Níže je uvedeno složení vlády a hlavních postav v administrativě íránského prezidenta (bez transkripce jmen z anglického jazyka): Prezident Hassan Rouhani První viceprezident Eshaq Jahangiri Viceprezident a šéf Íránské organizace pro atomovou Ali Akbar Salehi energii Sorena Sattari Viceprezident pro vědu a technologie Masoumeh Ebtekar Viceprezidentka pro životní prostředí Šéf kabinetu Mohammad Nahavandian Ministr zemědělství Mahmoud Hojjati Ministr komunikací Mahmoud Vaezi Ministr práce Ali Rabei 2/46 http://www.businessinfo.cz/iran © Zastupitelský úřad ČR v Teheránu (Írán) SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Írán Ministr kultury Seyed Reza Salehi Ministr obrany Hossein Dehghan Ministr finance a ekonomiky Masoud Karbasian Ministr školství Fakhredin Danesh Ashtiani Ministr energetiky Hamid Chitchian Ministr zahraničních věcí Mohammad Javad Zarif Ministr zdravotnictví Hassan Hashemi Ministr obchodu a průmyslu Mohammad Shariatmadari Ministr zpravodajství Mahmoud Alavi Ministr vnitra Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli Ministr spravedlnosti Mostafa Pourmohammadi Ministr ropného průmyslu Bijan Namdar Zanganeh Ministr vědy a výzkumu Mohammad Farhadi Ministr dopravy Abbas Ahmad Akhondi Ministr tělesné výchovy a sportu Masoud Soltanifar 1.2 Demografické tendence: Počet obyvatel, průměrný roční přírůstek, demografické složení (vč. národnosti, náboženských skupin) Celkový počet obyvatel podle Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) je nyní 80,4 milionů (nový údaj k 11/2017). Roční přírůstek je kolem 1,43 %. Ekonomicky aktivního obyvatelstva ve věku od 10 let výše je podle odhadu za III.čtvrtletí 2017, 41,0 % populace, nezaměstnáno je pak 11,7 % aktivního obyvatelstva. Celkově je 49,5 % zaměstnáno v sektoru služeb (49,0 % mužů a 51,0 % žen), 31,4 % v průmyslových odvětvích (33,0 % mužů a 24,4 % žen), a 19,1 % v zemědělství (18,0 % mužů a 23,8 % žen). 3/46 http://www.businessinfo.cz/iran © Zastupitelský úřad ČR v Teheránu (Írán) SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Írán Írán je mnohonárodnostní stát obývaný třemi základními etnickými skupinami: • íránská – indoevropská: většina populace hovoří "íránskými jazyky", které tvoří podskupinu jazykové skupiny indoevropské; patří sem zejm. Peršané, Kurdové, Balúčové, Arméni a dal. • turkická: Azerové, Turkmeni, Kaškajové • semitská: Arabové, Asyřané Přesné etnické složení populace však není známé, dostupné jsou pouze odhady. Největší skupinou obyvatelstva jsou podle nich Peršané (61-65 %), Azerové (16 %) a Kurdové (7-10 %). Státním náboženstvím je šíitský islám. Přes 99 % obyvatelstva tvoří muslimové, z toho 90 % jsou šíité a 9 % sunnité. Sunnitský islám převládá mezi etnicky kurdskou a balúčskou populací. Zbytek tvoří ostatní náboženské komunity: křesťané – hlavně Arméni a Asyřané, dále zoroastrijci (původní náboženství Íránu z předislámské éry), židé a Baháí. Poslední zmíněná náboženská komunita není na rozdíl od ostatních oficiálně uznána a její příslušníci jsou vystaveni systematické perzekuci. 1.3 Základní makroekonomické ukazatele za posledních 5 let (nominální HDP/obyv., vývoj objemu HDP, míra inflace, míra nezaměstnanosti). Očekávaný vývoj v teritoriu s akcentem na ekonomickou sféru. 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 (2013-14) (2014-15) (2015-16) (2016- 17) (2017-18) CPI 169,8 203,2 227,8 244,9 109,6* (index spotřebitelských cen) (1390=100) Inflace (%) 15,5 12,1% 11,9 9,4 9,2 Nezaměstnanost 10,5 10,8% 11,0 12,4 11,9 (%) HDP bez ropného 74,45 71,26 76,53 80,36 86,7 sektoru (mld.USD) ve fixních cenách Oficiální směnný 26 500 28 500 29.970 31.000 33.000 kurz (IRR/USD) Z 3,14 mil. nezaměstnaných je 10,1 % mužů (2,14 mil.) a 19,1 % žen (0,999 mil.). Nejvyšší nezaměstnanost je v provincii Chaharmahal-Bakhtiari (21,1 %) a nejnižší pak v provincii Hormozgan (7,5 %). Nezaměstnanost v hlavním městě Teheránu 4/46 http://www.businessinfo.cz/iran © Zastupitelský úřad ČR v Teheránu (Írán) SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Írán je pak 11,2 %. *index spotřebitelských cen se začal od 21. března 2017 porovnávat s rokem 2016 (1395=100) Pro rok 2018-19 (1397) byl stanoven oficíální směnný kurz 35 000,- IRR/USD Zdroj: CBI (Íránská centrální banka), ISC (Íránský statistický úřad) Sektorové rozdělení ekonomiky (2017): zemědělství 11,9 %, ropný průmysl 12,3 %, průmyslová výroba a hutní průmysl 21,6 % (z toho samotný průmysl 12,0 %, důlní průmysl 0,7 %, výroba el.energie a plynu 4,3 %, stavebnictví 4,6 %). služby 54,2 % (z čehož hotely a restaurace 12,7 %, bankovnictví 3,2 %, realitní služby 14,2 %, služby v dopravě 10,1 %, veřejné služby 10,5 %, sociální služby 3,5 %). Nejrychlejší nárůst v loňském roce zaznamenal potravinářský průmysl a to především v oblasti nápojů (nárůst o 18,9 %), následovaný automobilovým průmyslem (↑13,8 %), papírnickým průmyslem (↑9,9 %), tabákovým průmyslem (↑9,9 %) a výrobopu plastů s 8,6% nárůstem. Naopak nejvýraznější pokles zaznamenala oblast nakladatelství a tiskařský průmysl (pokles o 14,5 %), výroba nábytku (↓12,6 %), oděvní průmysl (↓11,9 %) a sector výroby / produkce farmaceutických výrobků na bázi léčivých rostlin (↓ 5 %). HDP (2017) – 427,7 mld. USD HDP/obyv. (2017) - nominální: 5 319 USD HDP/obyv. (2017) - PPP: 20 273 USD 1.4 Veřejné finance, státní rozpočet - příjmy, výdaje, saldo za posledních 5 let 1392 (2013-14) 1393 (2014-15) 1394 (2015-16) 1395 1396 (2016-17) (2017-18) Celkový objem 7 277 8 033 9 785 10 850 11 949 zdrojů a výdajů (bilióny IRR) Oficiální směnný 26 500 28 500 29 970 31 000 33 000 kurz (IRR/USD) 5/46 http://www.businessinfo.cz/iran © Zastupitelský úřad ČR v Teheránu (Írán) SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Írán Zdroj: CBI, ISC 1.5 Platební bilance (běžný, kapitálový, finanční účet), devizové rezervy (za posledních 5 let), veřejný dluh vůči HDP, zahraniční zadluženost, dluhová služba Zahraniční zadluženost, dluhová služba: Celkový hrubý zahraniční dluh Íránu za rok 2017 dosáhl 8,8 mld. USD (2 % HDP země). Veřejný zahraniční dluh vůči HDP tvořil 1,3 % (dle odhadů r. 2017), Írán splácí své přímé závazky ze zahraničních úvěrů. Přístup k úvěrům a poskytování úvěrů a úvěrových linek jsou pro Írán obtížné. Devizové rezervy: Devizové rezervy tzv. National Development Found. Do tohoto fondu se od íránského roku 1390 (2011-12) ročně odvádí cca 20% příjmu z ropných produktů. Za rok 2017 dosáhly devizové rezervy 111,7 mld. USD. Předpoklad pro 2018 je 119 mld. USD. Zdroj: IMF, FRED 1.6 Bankovní systém (hlavní banky a pojišťovny) I když po oznámení uvolnění sankčního režimu ze 14. července 2015 a implementace JCPOA z 16.1.2016, došlo k řadě oznámení o bezproblémovém převodu finančních prostředků do / z Íránu, v praxi se banky z EU stále bojí spolupracovat s jakoukoliv íránskou bankou (státní či soukromou) v oblasti kteréhokoliv sofistikovanějšího bankovního nástroje (L/C, PG, Bid Bond apod.) z obav možných sankcí ze strany USA v případě dolarové transakce. Íránský bankovní sektor tvoří celkem 42 bank a úvěrových institucí rozdělených následujícím způsobem: Centrální banka: Central Bank of I.R. Iran (také pod názvem Bank Markazi) Státem vlastněné obchodní banky: 1. Bank Melli Iran 6/46 http://www.businessinfo.cz/iran © Zastupitelský úřad ČR v Teheránu (Írán) SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Írán 2. Bank Sepah 3. Post Bank of Iran Specializované státem vlastněné obchodní banky: 1. Keshavarzi Bank (zemědělství, vodohospodářství, zpracovatelský průmysl) 2. Bank Maskan (bytová výstavba) 3. Bank of Industry and Mine (průmyslová výroba a hutnictví) 4. Export Development Bank of Iran (služby a obchod se zahraničím) 5. Cooperative Development Bank/Tose'e Ta'avon Bank (výzkum a vývoj) Soukromé banky: 1. EN Bank (Eghtesade Novin Bank) 2. Parsian Bank 3. Karafarin Bank 4. Saman Bank 5. Bank Pasargad 6. Sarmayeh Bank 7. Sina Bank 8. Ayandeh Bank 9. City Bank (Shahr bank) 10.DayBank 11.AnsarBank 12.TejaratBank 13.RefahBank 14.BankSaderat Iran (exportní banka) 15.BankMellat 16.HekmatIranian Bank 17.TourismBank (Gardeshgari Bank) 18.IranZamin Bank 19.MiddleEast Bank 20.TTBank Soukromé úvěrové instituce a úvěrové banky (Gharzolhasane) – celkem 5 institucí + Mehr Iran Bank, Resalat Bank
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