SECTION 10.1 RECONSTRUCTION: MARCH 2003 TO JUNE 2004 Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3 UK post-conflict objectives and planning assumption ...................................................... 4 Humanitarian assistance .................................................................................................. 7 Coalition-building ............................................................................................................ 18 Post-conflict reconstruction and ORHA .......................................................................... 22 Responsibility for reconstruction .............................................................................. 22 UK concerns over participation in ORHA ................................................................. 28 Decisions to increase UK support for ORHA ............................................................ 43 Reconstruction strategy and funding ........................................................................ 60 Concerns over the scale of the reconstruction challenge and ORHA’s response .... 62 Resolution 1483 ....................................................................................................... 70 The return to a ‘war footing’, June 2003 ......................................................................... 72 Advice on the UK’s responsibilities as an Occupying Power ................................... 83 The first UK plan for reconstruction in the South, 12 June ....................................... 86 Making CPA(South) a model .................................................................................... 92 Establishing a British Fiefdom in the South, July 2003................................................... 99 CPA’s ‘Vision for Iraq’ and ‘Achieving the Vision’ implementation plan .................. 101 Sir Hilary Synnott arrives in Basra, 30 July ............................................................ 106 Responding to deteriorating security ............................................................................ 109 Pressure to provide additional funding for reconstruction ...................................... 122 Staffing the CPA and new structures in London ..................................................... 131 First cross-Whitehall Strategy for Iraq .................................................................... 134 Lobbying for a level playing field for UK businesses .............................................. 136 Madrid Donors Conference, 23 and 24 October 2003 ................................................. 136 Priorities for the last six months of Occupation ............................................................ 141 Responding to the new, shorter timetable for the transfer of sovereignty .............. 145 DFID’s Interim Country Assistance Plan ................................................................ 156 1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Planning and preparing for the transfer of sovereignty ................................................ 163 UK Transition Plan for Iraq ..................................................................................... 166 UK Transition Plan for Southern Iraq ..................................................................... 173 Reports from Iraq ................................................................................................... 175 Resolution 1546 ..................................................................................................... 185 The state of Iraq on the eve of transition ...................................................................... 188 Sir Hilary Synnott’s assessment ............................................................................. 191 Resources available for reconstruction ........................................................................ 191 UK funding for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction .................................. 193 UK support for the CPA .......................................................................................... 193 Reflections on the level of resources available for reconstruction ......................... 194 2 10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004 Introduction 1. Section 10 addresses the UK contribution to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq between 2003 and 2009: • This Section (10.1) covers the period between March 2003 and the end of the Occupation of Iraq in June 2004. • Section 10.2 continues the story from July 2004 to 2009. 2. Sections 10.1 and 10.2 consider: • humanitarian assistance; • the development and implementation of UK reconstruction policy, strategy and plans; • the UK’s engagement with the US on reconstruction, including with the US-led Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); and • the UK’s engagement with successive Iraqi governments on reconstruction. 3. Section 10.3 addresses five issues in more detail: • UK policy on Iraq’s oil and oil revenues; • the Government’s support for UK business in securing reconstruction contracts; • debt relief; • asylum; and • reform of the Government’s approach to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation. 4. Those issues are addressed separately from the main reconstruction narrative, in order to provide a clearer account of the development of the UK’s engagement. 5. This Section does not consider: • planning and preparing to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, which is addressed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5; • the financial and human resources available for post-conflict reconstruction, addressed in Sections 13 and 15 respectively; • de-Ba’athification and Security Sector Reform (SSR), addressed in Sections 1 and 12 respectively; and • wider UK policy towards Iraq in the post-conflict period, addressed in Section 9. 6. During the period covered by the Inquiry, the Government used a number of different terms to describe post-conflict activity in Iraq, including “reconstruction”. It did not 3 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry generally define those terms. The Inquiry uses the term “reconstruction” in line with the Government’s common usage: • to include work to repair and build infrastructure, deliver essential services and create jobs; • to include work to build the capacity of Iraqi institutions and reform Iraq’s economic, legislative and governance structures; and • to exclude SSR. UK post-conflict objectives and planning assumption 7. Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, issued a Written Ministerial Statement setting out the UK’s strategic objectives for Iraq on 7 January 2003.1 The objectives included a definition of the UK’s desired end state for a post-Saddam Iraq: “We would like Iraq to become a stable, united and law abiding state, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective and representative government to its own people.” 8. The development of the UK’s objectives for post-conflict Iraq is addressed in detail in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. 9. The ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ issued by Mr Blair, President Bush and Mr José María Aznar, the Prime Minister of Spain, at the Azores Summit on 16 March, included a number of specific commitments on post-conflict reconstruction.2 The three leaders declared: “We will work to prevent and repair damage by Saddam Hussein’s regime to the natural resources of Iraq and pledge to protect them as a national asset of and for the Iraqi people. All Iraqis should share the wealth generated by their national economy … “In achieving this vision, we plan to work in close partnership with international institutions, including the United Nations … If conflict occurs, we plan to seek the adoption, on an urgent basis, of new United Nations Security Council resolutions that would affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq. eW will also propose that the Secretary-General be given authority, on an interim basis, to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people continue to be met through the Oil-for-Food program. 1 House of Commons, Official Report, 7 January 2003, column 4WS. 2 Statement of the Atlantic Summit, 16 March 2003, ‘A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’. 4 10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004 “Any military presence, should it be necessary, will be temporary and intended to promote security and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the delivery of humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstruction of Iraq. Our commitment to support the people of Iraq will be for the long term.” 10. On 25 March, Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), sent a draft paper to senior officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID) setting out “British Post-Conflict Objectives”.3 11. The draft included Mr Straw’s formulation of 7 January, adding: “Our objective is to create conditions for a future Iraqi government which will act to make this aspiration a reality. We will work with the Iraqi people, the UN and other international organisations, and the wider international community