Section 15.1 Civilian Personnel
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SECTION 15.1 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................. 245 Civilian outreach event .......................................................................................... 245 Pre‑invasion planning and preparation ........................................................................ 246 ORHA ..................................................................................................................... 247 DFID humanitarian advisers .................................................................................. 249 The British Embassy Baghdad .............................................................................. 250 MOD civilian support to Op TELIC ......................................................................... 252 UK civilian presence during the Coalition Occupation of Iraq ...................................... 255 UK civilian deployments to ORHA ......................................................................... 255 The CPA and the return to a “war footing” ............................................................. 263 The impact of deteriorating security ....................................................................... 272 The British Offices in Baghdad and Basra ............................................................. 291 Preparations for the transfer of sovereignty ........................................................... 294 The post‑CPA UK civilian presence in Iraq .................................................................. 301 Departmental reviews of staffing levels ................................................................. 310 The Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team ........................................................... 314 Reassessment of risk and duty of care .................................................................. 317 The move from the Basra Palace site to Basra Air Station .................................... 326 Sustaining the UK civilian presence during 2007 .................................................. 331 The Charge of the Knights and the UK military drawdown .................................... 339 Attracting volunteers .................................................................................................... 343 Seniority ....................................................................................................................... 351 Skills ............................................................................................................................. 355 Tour length and continuity ............................................................................................ 360 Learning operational lessons ....................................................................................... 363 Staff welfare ................................................................................................................. 365 The Iraq Reconstruction Service Medal ....................................................................... 378 243 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Locally engaged staff ................................................................................................... 383 The Locally Engaged Staff Assistance Scheme .................................................... 386 UK civilian deployments to Iraq: statistics .................................................................... 391 The UK civilian deployment during the CPA period, May 2003 to June 2004 .............................................................................................................. 394 The post‑CPA UK civilian deployment, July 2004 to July 2009 ............................. 397 UK share of the Coalition civilian deployment ....................................................... 401 UK civilian contractors ........................................................................................... 404 244 15.1 | Civilian personnel Introduction 1. This Section addresses: • planning and preparation for the deployment of UK civilian personnel to Iraq; • the recruitment and deployment of civilian personnel between 2003 and 2009; • duty of care and protective security measures; • recognition of service; • support to locally engaged (LE) staff; and • skills and seniority. 2. This Section does not consider: • the recruitment, deployment or impact of UK police officers in Iraq, addressed in Section 12; • the contribution of civilian personnel to the reconstruction of post‑conflict Iraq, addressed in Section 10; • the funding of civilian deployments, including the cost of protective security measures, addressed in Section 13; or • the Government’s review of the UK approach to post‑conflict reconstruction and stabilisation, and the creation of a deployable UK civilian standby capability, addressed in Sections 10.3 and 10.4. Terms used in this Section UK‑based staff. UK Government employees deployed to Iraq for a defined period, usually between six months and one year. Locally engaged (LE) staff. Staff recruited and employed in Iraq by the UK Government. Sometimes referred to as “locally employed staff” or “locally engaged civilians”. Contractor. Used in this report for all personnel hired by UK (and US) government departments on fixed‑term contracts, including those referred to in contemporary documents as “consultants”. Consultant. Usually refers to contractors providing specialist technical advice. Widely used in contemporary documents and by witnesses to the Inquiry in place of “contractor”. Personnel. All staff and contractors. Secondee. An individual deployed temporarily to another organisation. Civilian outreach event 3. In June 2010, the Inquiry held an outreach event for civilians who had served in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. A total of 48 people took part from a range of departments, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID). No contractors responded to the invitation. 245 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 4. Participants were divided into three working groups: • the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period (18 participants); • mid‑2004 to mid‑2007 (21 participants); and • mid‑2007 to mid‑2009 (nine participants). 5. Each working group discussed two themes: “Strategy and Delivery” and “Support to Staff”. 6. Views expressed during the event appear where appropriate in this Section. Pre‑invasion planning and preparation 7. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 address the shortcomings in the UK Government’s planning and preparation for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq. 8. When the invasion of Iraq began overnight on 19/20 March 2003, there had been no systematic analysis of the availability of civilian personnel to meet the UK’s likely obligations in post‑conflict Iraq. 9. Factors shaping the Government’s pre‑conflict approach to civilian deployments included: • inadequate planning machinery; • the absence of a comprehensive strategy for post‑conflict Iraq, which could have informed a cross‑Whitehall assessment of the civilian requirement; • an assumption that, after a short transitional phase led by the US, the post‑conflict administration and reconstruction of Iraq would be run and staffed by the international community, led by the UN, allowing the UK to limit its contribution to provision of financial resources and targeted advice delivered by a small number of civilian specialists;1 • DFID’s limited operational capacity; • concerns about the legal status of UK secondees working for the US‑led Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in Iraq; and • failure to decide whether the UK should assume overall responsibility for a geographical sector of Iraq. 10. In the months before the invasion, the UK Government made preparations for civilian deployment to Iraq in four areas: • cross‑government support to ORHA; • DFID humanitarian support to the UK military and international organisations; • FCO staff for the British Embassy Baghdad; and • MOD civilians supporting Operation (Op) TELIC.2 1 Paper FCO, [undated], ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’; Letter Chilcott to Ward, 24 February 2003, ‘ORHA’. 2 Operation TELIC was the codename for the involvement of UK Armed Forces in the military campaign in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. 246 15.1 | Civilian personnel ORHA 11. ORHA was created by the US in January 2003.3 It was led by retired US Lieutenant General Jay Garner and reported to the Department of Defense (DoD). 12. The UK’s approach to ORHA in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq is described in Section 6.5. UK concerns during that period included: • DoD’s assumption of responsibility for all US post‑conflict planning and the marginalisation of the State Department; • the limited time available to ORHA to plan and prepare for the post‑conflict phase of operations; • persistent shortcomings in those preparations; • legal concerns, in the absence of a UN mandate for the administration and reconstruction of Iraq, about the compatibility of certain post‑conflict activities with the rules of military occupation, and the implications for any UK secondees serving with ORHA; and • a shortage of information about ORHA’s staffing requirements and, as a consequence, the contribution that should be made by the UK. 13. The UK Government’s response to those concerns and the evolution of its policy towards ORHA during March and April 2003 are addressed in Sections 6.5 and 10.1. 14. In