ASRXXX10.1177/0003122416643758American Sociological ReviewEidlin 6437582016

American Sociological Review 2016, Vol. 81(3) 488 –516 Why Is There No Labor Party © American Sociological Association 2016 DOI: 10.1177/0003122416643758 in the United States? Political http://asr.sagepub.com Articulation and the Canadian Comparison, 1932 to 1948

Barry Eidlina

Abstract Why is there no labor party in the United States? This question has had deep implications for U.S. politics and social policy. Existing explanations use “reflection” models of parties, whereby parties reflect preexisting cleavages or institutional arrangements. But a comparison with Canada, whose political terrain was supposedly more favorable to labor parties, challenges reflection models. Newly compiled electoral data show that underlying social structures and institutions did not affect labor party support as expected: support was similar in both countries prior to the 1930s, then diverged. To explain this, I propose a modified “articulation” model of parties, emphasizing parties’ role in assembling and naturalizing political coalitions within structural constraints. In both cases, ruling party responses to labor and agrarian unrest during the Great Depression determined which among a range of possible political alliances actually emerged. In the United States, FDR used the crisis to mobilize new constituencies. Rhetorical appeals to the “forgotten man” and policy reforms absorbed some farmer and labor groups into the New Deal coalition and divided and excluded others, undermining labor party support. In Canada, mainstream parties excluded farmer and labor constituencies, leaving room for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) to organize them into a third-party coalition.

Keywords class conflict, political parties, trade unions, organizations, social movements, labor, working class, agrarian protest

Why is there no labor party in the United 1989; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens States? The question anchors historic debates 1992). about the “exceptional” nature of U.S. politics Traditional explanations for the absence of (Engels 1969a, 1969b; Sombart [1906] 1976; a U.S. labor party embody a “reflection” model Tocqueville [1835] 2004). For Marxists, it challenges theories that the economic contra- dictions of capitalism would drive workers to aMcGill University form their own political party (Kautsky [1892] 1910; Marx and Engels [1848] 1906). For Corresponding Author: many welfare state scholars, the lack of a U.S. Barry Eidlin, Department of Sociology, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Room labor party is key to explaining the high levels 820, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7 of poverty and inequality in the country (Korpi E-mail: [email protected]

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 489 of parties, whereby parties reflect preexisting support in the United States did not impede political cultures, institutions, and cleavages. ILTPs as much as would be expected. And Such accounts contend that a combination of despite conditions favoring ILTP support in individualist political traditions, presidentialist Canada, such parties’ efforts were largely electoral institutions, and intra-class divisions frustrated. undermined U.S. labor party efforts (Katznel- I argue that a modified articulation model son 1981; Lipset and Marks 2000; Lowi 1984). of parties, focused on parties’ active role in This article shows the limits of reflection assembling and naturalizing political coali- models as applied to the U.S. case. It does so tions within structural constraints, better by comparing trajectories of labor party sup- explains ILTP divergence in the United States port in the United States and Canada. Despite and Canada. Specifically, ILTP divergence both countries’ many socioeconomic similari- resulted from different ruling party responses ties, the United States has no mass-based to labor and agrarian protest sparked by the labor party, whereas the Canadian New Dem- Great Depression. Parties forged new politi- ocratic Party (NDP) is well established (Kauf- cal coalitions in both countries, but with dif- man 2009; Lipset 1989). ferent results. In the United States, FDR and Existing explanations for different levels the Democrats adopted a co-optive response of labor party support in these two countries to farmer and labor insurgency. They used the also deploy reflection models of parties. Depression to broaden their coalition with These hold that, compared to the United appeals to the “forgotten man” and policy States, Canada’s parliamentary system, com- offerings that absorbed some working- and bined with its more British, “Tory-touched” agrarian-class fractions. Simultaneously, New liberal political tradition and more ethnically Deal labor and agricultural policies accentu- homogeneous working class, ensured labor ated intra-class divisions and diverted energy party success (Horowitz 1968; Lipset 1989). from ILTP organizing, leading to ILTP col- If reflection models offered an adequate lapse. In Canada, the Liberal and Conserva- explanation, we would expect to see consist- tive parties shared a coercive response. ent differences in labor party support in both Workers and small farmers were excluded, countries over time: that is, lower support in leaving room for the Cooperative Common- the United States, and higher support in Can- wealth Federation (CCF), an NDP precursor, ada. However, newly compiled data compar- to articulate an independent farmer–labor alli- ing vote shares for independent left third ance. The result was ILTP takeoff. parties (ILTPs) in the United States and Can- ada over 140 years paint a different picture. Rather than consistent difference over time, CASE SELECTION, DATA, we see divergence. Prior to World War I, ILTP AND METHODS support was higher in the United States than To examine the causes of ILTP divergence, I in Canada (see Figure 1). From the end of use primary sources from government, union, World War I through the early 1930s, Cana- and employer archives, extensive secondary dian ILTP support was volatile, whereas U.S. sources, and a unique dataset I compiled of support remained within historical ranges.1 ILTP vote shares in the United States and The decisive, divergent shift occurred in the Canada from 1867 to 2009. I define “inde- 1930s: ILTP support collapsed in the United pendent left third party” (ILTP) as any party States and took off in Canada. competing for electoral votes that was (1) Why did ILTP support diverge in the organizationally unaligned with mainstream 1930s? Even if culture, electoral systems, and parties (Democrats and Republicans in the class cleavages shaped possibilities for ILTP United States, Liberals and Conservatives in development, their effects were not fully evi- Canada); and (2) had a programmatic com- dent until then. Before, barriers to ILTP mitment to socialism or another left-wing

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U.S. Canada

Figure 1. Independent Left Third Party (ILTP) Vote Shares, United States and Canada, 1867 to 2009 Source: United States: Hirano and Snyder 2007. Canada: see Part B of the Appendix. ideology, or, for agrarian parties, emphasized had they been different, could plausibly have collective, redistributive policies, as opposed led to that alternative outcome. Empirically, to individualist policies of self-reliance. I use this approach advances a nondeterministic the broader term “ILTP” instead of “labor understanding of history open to “possibili- party” because of the long and fluid inter- ties . . . obscured . . . by the deceptive wisdom relationship in both countries between agrar- of hindsight” (Moore 1978:376), while ian, labor, and socialist political organizing, remaining sensitive to the role of past events making it difficult and analytically counter- in constraining the set of possible outcomes productive to draw strong distinctions (Mahoney 2000). Methodologically, it offers between them (Hild 2007; Kealey and War- a means of assessing competing hypotheses rian 1976). This results in a less ideologically and constructing adequate explanations using coherent analytic unit, but better captures the a small number of cases. By positing counter- political spectrum to the left of the ruling factual scenarios where potentially causal parties. factors are present or absent, scholars can Answering the question, “Why is there no assess the degree to which those factors did or labor party in the United States?” entails ana- did not contribute to the outcome in question lyzing the “suppression of historical alterna- (Fearon 1991; Weber 1949; Zeitlin 1984). tives” (Moore 1978). It implies asserting a The central challenge of counterfactual counterfactual scenario where a labor party analysis involves specifying plausible counter- did take root, then identifying factors that, factual scenarios (Elster 1978). Comparative

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 491 cases lend plausibility to counterfactual sce- REFLECTION MODELS AND narios by serving as “real counterfactuals”: U.S.-CANADIAN POLITICAL similar to the case under examination, but dif- DIVERGENCE ferent in terms of the critical outcome. The success of the comparison hinges on establish- Existing explanations for differing levels of ing cases’ initial similarity, making it easier to ILTP support in the United States and Canada identify factors that contributed to the different share a reflection model of parties. They view outcomes and assess their causal significance. party support as reflecting underlying fac- Canada serves as a useful comparative tors, including differences in political cul- case because it is similar to the United States tures and ideologies, electoral institutions, but different in small but significant ways and intra-class divisions. Without dismissing (Card and Freeman 1993; Kaufman 2009; these differences, they cannot adequately Lipset 1989). Its similarity offers analytic explain the diverging ILTP support observed advantages over comparisons with European in Figure 1. Reflection models fall short on countries, the traditional reference point for three counts. First, many focus on long- studies of American exceptionalism (Hartz standing cross-national differences in politi- 1955; Jacoby 1991; Sombart [1906] 1976; cal cultures and electoral systems, but these Tocqueville [1835] 2004; Voss 1993). Both alone cannot explain ILTP divergence. Sec- are largely English-speaking, former British ond, some rely on explanations that only hold settler colonies. Both are “liberal” welfare in one country, not both, such as ruling par- regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Both share ties’ ability to absorb insurgent party chal- comparable levels of economic development. lengers, or the role of critical elections in Each serves as the other’s largest trading part- realigning political coalitions. Third, some ner, many U.S. and Canadian firms operate on overstate cross-national differences in levels both sides of the border, and many of the of intra-class conflict that blocked indepen- same labor unions represent workers in both dent working-class organization. countries (Card and Freeman 1993). Figures 2, 3, and 4 show that urban popula- Difference, not Divergence tion, non-farm employment, and union den- Many explanations for why ILTPs took root sity2 all tracked each other closely in both in Canada but not the United States point to countries leading up to the Great Depression. cross-national differences in political cultures It would be difficult to argue that either coun- and electoral systems. Cultural explanations try had a deeper structural base for ILTP sup- contrast the individualist “Lockean” liberal- port. Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that patterns ism in the United States with Canada’s more of ILTP support were similar in both countries collectivist, “Tory-touched” liberalism, osten- prior to the 1930s: generally low levels punc- sibly more hospitable to socialist ideas tuated by periodic spikes. These patterns did (Horowitz 1968; Lipset 1989). Electoral sys- not diverge until the 1930s, with ILTP takeoff tems explanations contend that the U.S. presi- in Canada, and ILTP collapse in the United dentialist system was more hostile to multiple States. parties than was Canada’s parliamentary sys- In focusing on this critical period of diver- tem (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1999; Lowi gence in the 1930s and 1940s, the analysis 1984), and the particularly open, ideologi- deploys an “eventful temporality,” highlight- cally flexible U.S. two-party system allowed ing the role of specific, often contingent for “full inclusion” of labor, an option not events in transforming structures. The analy- available in Canada (Lipset and Marks 2000; sis is sensitive to the importance of event Vössing 2012:5). These differences subsumed order and sequence in shaping historical out- the political expression of class divisions comes (Griffin 1992; Isaac 1997; Kimeldorf within catch-all parties in the United States 1988; Sewell 1996). but not in Canada.

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80%

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0% 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 193019351940 19451950 19551960 1965 1970 1975 1980

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Figure 2. Urban Percentage of Population, United States and Canada, 1880 to 1980 Source: Carter and colleagues 2006; Leacy, Urquhart, and Buckley 1983.

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Figure 3. Non-farm Employment, United States and Canada, 1890 to 1971 Source: Carter and colleagues 2006; Leacy and colleagues 1983.

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10.0 Union Membership as Percent of Non-agricultural Workforce

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Figure 4. Union Density Rates, United States and Canada, 1911 to 1964 Source: See Part C of the Appendix.

In line with reflection models, cultural and same organizations suggests cross-national electoral systems explanations see parties as differences were not as stark as cultural reflecting underlying social or institutional accounts would imply. structures. This leads each to focus on long- Similarly, although electoral system differ- standing cross-national differences to explain ences may have reinforced U.S.-Canadian ILTP support, but how might long-standing ILTP divergence after it got underway, they differences explain the divergence in ILTP cannot explain the timing of divergence. support reported in Figure 1? Despite presidentialism and ruling parties’ Defenders of the political cultures perspec- flexibility, U.S. ILTPs enjoyed significantly tive might argue that Figure 1 masks a qualita- more support prior to the mid-1930s than tive difference between U.S. and Canadian afterward. Likewise, despite parliamentarian- socialist traditions (Horowitz 1968). How- ism and more rigid parties, Canadian ILTPs ever, this fails to explain the timing of ILTP took root only after the mid-1930s. Addition- divergence. Did something change about the ally, electoral system explanations downplay cultures of U.S. and Canadian socialism in the U.S. electoral structures, such as federalism, mid-1930s? If so, what, and especially why? that might have provided more hospitable Additionally, emphasizing cross-border differ- ground for ILTP development. The smaller ences ignores the extent to which Canadian scale of state-level government could have ILTPs often affiliated with U.S. movements incubated nascent ILTPs by allowing them to (Cook 1984; Glazer 1937; Kealey and Palmer build in areas where they enjoyed greater sup- 1982; Laycock 1990; McCormack 1977; port.3 Federalism, for example, is often used Wiseman and Isitt 2007). Certainly, Canadian to explain policy innovation in the United affiliates were independent from their U.S. States (Ikenberry and Skocpol 1987) and the counterparts, but the fact that they were in the success of the CCF/NDP in Canada (Wiseman

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 494 American Sociological Review 81(3) and Isitt 2007). All told, comparative argu- in the 1930s, absorption strategies were also ments that rest on enduring national features risky after World War I. Additionally, the U.S. cannot explain sudden changes in the direc- ruling party faced a severe threat in the 1930s tion or trajectories of individual cases. and did pursue an absorption strategy. Why did the Democrats, but not the Liberals, seek to absorb the left challenge? Explaining One Case, Not Both Party characteristics offer an explanation. Other explanations for differences in U.S.- The socialist CCF was more ideologically Canadian ILTP support rely on factors that coherent than previous left-party challengers, explain one case, not both. For example, some and thus more threatening and less open to co- see the collapse of U.S. ILTP support in the optation (Smith 1975). Also, the Liberals saw 1930s as part of a broader U.S. tradition of rul- better political opportunities to their right. As ing parties absorbing independent challengers. the ruling Conservatives collapsed in the mid- According to this argument, Roosevelt’s New 1930s, the Liberals positioned themselves not Deal coalition stole ILTPs’ thunder by selec- as a progressive alternative, but as the party of tively adopting dissident movements’ rhetoric order against chaos (Whitaker 1977). This left and policies (Lipset and Marks 2000). The space for the CCF to build. Great Depression exacerbated existing inequal- Another common explanation for U.S. ILTP ities within Canada’s more conservative, strati- collapse focuses on the critical election of 1932 fied class structure, which, combined with the (Burnham 1970; Key 1955; Sundquist 1983). rigidity of the Canadian party system, paved Proponents argue that this election realigned the way for the CCF (Horowitz 1968; Lipset the party system to accommodate escalating 1963). social tensions, precluding the need for a new Again, parties here reflect underlying cul- party. In this approach, critical elections reflect tural or structural factors. Without denying the abrupt shifts in underlying social structures. very real tradition of U.S. ruling parties absorb- Critical elections certainly happen, and do ing independent rivals, Figure 1 challenges such reflect social and structural shifts, as the 1932 explanations. First, it shows that prior to the U.S. election suggests. But the explanation New Deal, ruling party absorption suppressed does not work for Canada. There, although ILTP support only temporarily. Within a few voters decisively repudiated governing par- years it would rebound. Why did the New Deal ties in 1929 and 1935, neither election trig- put an end to this pattern? Second, although the gered party realignment. Instead, ruling party argument assumes that a similar thunder-steal- intransigence left room for the CCF to ing move was impossible for Canadian ruling develop. Why did the tensions of the Great parties, Canada’s Liberal Party had a track Depression trigger a critical realignment in record of absorbing left challengers prior to the the United States, but not in Canada? 1930s (Heron 1984, 1998; Morton 1950). Why did the Liberals fail to absorb the CCF? One possibility is that the left political Overstating Differences climate was more threatening in the 1930s, Still other explanations for U.S.-Canadian making an absorption strategy more risky for ILTP divergence overstate cross-border dif- the Liberals.4 However, the previous instance ferences in intra-class conflict. Scholars of of absorption was in the aftermath of World the United States contend that exceptional War I, just a few years after the Russian state and employer hostility toward labor, Revolution sparked fears of communism racial and ethnic divisions, and religious and around the world, two years after a general socialist sectarianism blocked independent strike paralyzed the city of Winnipeg, and working-class organization (Archer 2007; amid a major agrarian revolt (Heron 1998). Hattam 1993; Katznelson 1981; Voss 1993). Without diminishing the severity of the threat By contrast, scholars of Canada argue that a

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 495 more ethnically and religiously homogenous, radically constructed nature of political identi- less politically sectarian working class was ties and coalitions, but it risks overstating par- better able to build ILTPs (Horowitz 1968). ties’ role. Laclau and Mouffe (1985:141), for Such divisions undoubtedly suppressed example, conceive of political identities as ILTP support in the United States, but Cana- “floating signifiers,” which parties can con- dian workers were also divided along lines of struct and oppose to each other discursively. craft, skill, religion, region, and ethnicity, and For Laclau and Mouffe, the idea of agents or their organizations also experienced consider- interests prior to politics must be discarded. able internecine conflict (Heron 1996; Even more recent formulations of political Jamieson 1968; Kealey 1981; Palmer 1983). articulation, such as that of de Leon and col- Additionally, characterizing the Canadian left leagues (2015:26), contend that no “class, as predominantly British obscures its ethnic religious community, [or] ethnic group . . . has heterogeneity (Naylor 2006).5 Without deny- an internal self-reproducing logic that would ing each country’s distinctive character of automatically bind its so-called members intra-class divisions—particularly the differ- together.” In this view, no cleavage exists out- ent structure of racial divisions—these side of political articulation; any existing impeded ILTP development in both countries cleavage that might constrain political behav- up until the 1930s. What changed in the ior is the artifact of past hegemonic projects. 1930s to exacerbate divisions in the United Although de Leon and colleagues caution States and mute them in Canada? that parties rarely create identities and coali- In summary, the central problem with tions from whole cloth, statements like the reflection models is that they predict long- above veer close to a voluntarist conception standing difference in ILTP support, but the of parties. While emphasizing parties’ cen- evidence shows a pattern of divergence start- trality, articulation models must also recog- ing in the 1930s. Differences in U.S. and nize that parties’ actions are constrained by Canadian cultures, ideologies, and institu- prior political identities, cultures, and institu- tions, while real, cannot explain this diver- tional arrangements. These establish a range gence. An adequate explanation starts from of possible identities or coalitions that exist the idea that parties actively shape social prior to parties. But there is a gap between cleavages and political coalitions: an articula- this range and the coalitions/identities that tion model of parties. actually develop. Parties’ actions bridge the gap between possible and actual outcomes. In diminishing the importance of parties’ struc- POLITICAL ARTICULATION tural constraints, recent articulation models Articulation models focus on parties’ role in deny that such a gap exists (Riley 2015). “naturalizing” certain cleavages and coali- My approach tempers existing articulation tions as the basis for political hegemony (de models by re-integrating elements of reflec- Leon 2014; de Leon, Desai, and Tuğal 2009, tion models’ structuralist emphasis. It recog- 2015; Desai 2002; Gramsci 1972, 1978; Prze- nizes the existence of identities, economic worski 1985; Riley 2003; Sartori 1969). Their relations, and institutional arrangements prior central premise is Gramsci’s (1978:71) claim to parties. These factors set limits on parties’ that “politically, the broad masses only exist scope of action, which constrain, but do not insofar as they are organized within political determine, the range of possible outcomes. parties.” That is, parties actively condition the Analyzing parties’ actions as they negotiate nature and degree to which different cleav- these constraints—the process of political ages gain political salience, and which politi- articulation—is essential to explaining actual cal coalitions are possible. outcomes. This scholarship offers an important cor- The mechanisms involved in explaining rective to reflection models, in stressing the U.S.-Canadian ILTP divergence are among the

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“means of articulation” that de Leon and col- Similarly, Canada was predisposed toward leagues (2015:27) hold are uniquely at parties’ stronger ILTP support. Prior to the 1930s, how- disposal: the incorporation of new constituen- ever, those differences were muted, with low cies, and the use of policy to reshape social but significant ILTP support in both countries. divisions. Where my analysis differs from This changed in the 1930s: ILTPs collapsed in theirs is that it hinges on the prior existence of the United States and took off in Canada. farmer and labor groups as constituencies How does an articulation model explain available for parties to incorporate—or alien- this shift? Focusing on parties’ central role in ate. Instead of assuming these groups are articulating political coalitions, it highlights solely the effects of party projects, I argue that how parties politically incorporated farmer their members had already bound themselves and labor groups in both countries. “Political together in ways that limited parties’ range of incorporation” refers to the process whereby options. ILTP divergence resulted from parties’ workers, farmers, and their organizations success or failure in reshaping the preexisting switched from being a problem for the state to bonds and tying them to similarly autonomous police, to being a constituency for the state to groups in novel political coalitions. address and administer (Collier and Collier This conception of political articulation 1991). Incorporation differs from articulation most closely resembles that of Przeworski in referring to the entry of new actors into the (1985), who frames parties’ actions within political arena, as opposed to the reconfigura- material constraints. However, Przeworski tion of existing actors. Incorporation can hap- conceptualizes material constraints too broadly, pen as part of an articulation process, as in including elements that are more politically this case. malleable than he perceives. In particular, his In both countries, the political incorpora- overly restrictive conception of the relation tion of workers’ and farmers’ groups occurred between class structure and class identity, lim- as a result of ruling party strategies to address iting the working class to manual laborers, labor and agrarian protest sparked by the underestimates parties’ capacity to articulate Great Depression. Those parties had managed broader conceptions of the working class. The such challenges in the past using a mix of articulation model I develop allows for a more repression and accommodation. As a result, fluid relation between occupational structures up until that point both the United States and and possible class identities. Canada had been exceptional among capital- Empirically, this conception of political ist democracies as countries that had not articulation advances our understanding of the politically incorporated their respective work- historical development of American excep- ing and agrarian classes. All others had done tionalism. Theoretically, it enhances our under- so three or four decades prior (Davis 1980a; standing of the interplay between culture, Laslett 1967; Penner 1977). institutions, and politics by offering a way to Farmer and labor groups were incorpo- explain how lasting cross-national differences rated in both the United States and Canada express themselves differently at specific his- over the course of the 1930s and 1940s, but in torical moments. It integrates an understanding different ways: U.S. farmer and labor groups of the persistence of culture and institutions were incorporated into the Democratic Par- with the contingency of history and politics. ty’s New Deal coalition, whereas their Cana- dian counterparts forged an independent alliance within the CCF. The result in both Political Articulation and cases was a farmer–labor coalition, but in the ILTP Divergence United States, the coalition undermined ILTP Given U.S. political history, traditions, and support, whereas in Canada it strengthened it. institutions, the country was predisposed Understanding why this happened requires toward virtually nonexistent ILTP support. examining parties’ role in shaping political

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 497 alliances. In the United States, Democrats The United States adopted a co-optive response to farmer and Roosevelt and the Democratic Party used the labor protest, incorporating these constituen- crisis of the Great Depression to mobilize cies into the New Deal coalition. In Canada, working-class voters. Through invocations of both mainstream parties adopted a coercive the “forgotten man,” FDR appealed to a response, leaving these constituencies politi- working-class identity and positioned the cally excluded and available for an independ- Democratic Party as the “natural” home for ent left coalition. The parties’ different such voters. In turn, workers identified the approaches manifested in two ways: Democratic Party as their party, viewed Roo- sevelt as their “friend and protector,” and 1. The structure of partisan conflict. In voted accordingly. The result by 1940 was “a the United States, FDR used the Great class-conscious vote for the first time in Depression to reconfigure the Demo- American history” (Lubell 1941:9). cratic Party coalition, creating an open- Figure 1 shows a long if limited tradition ing to incorporate labor. In Canada, the of class-conscious voting in the United States Liberal and Conservative parties’ responses to the crisis differed only in prior to the New Deal. But the real change their degree of repressiveness toward was the form that class-conscious voting took. farmer and labor groups. This fore- Instead of being expressed through support closed the possibility of incorporation. for ILTPs, it was expressed via support for the Democratic Party. In identifying the Demo- 2. The political use of policy. In the United cratic Party as the appropriate vehicle for States, New Deal labor and agricultural policy offered material benefits to some expressing workers’ class interests, FDR’s farmer and labor constituencies, while New Deal coalition eroded ILTP support in also undermining their independent the United States. political power by accentuating intra- The link between labor and the Demo- class divisions. In Canada, the Liberal cratic Party was not a foregone conclusion; and Conservative parties’ repression rather, it was a political project whose out- and neglect of farmer and labor constit- come was anything but certain. In hindsight, uencies left them excluded and availa- to say that the Democratic Party used the ble for an independent left coalition. Great Depression to mobilize working-class voters seems obvious. Similarly, FDR’s New THE STRUCTURE OF Deal is often seen as a necessary response to the Great Depression. What is forgotten is the PARTISAN CONFLICT degree to which these actions were contingent Articulation models hold that parties forge outcomes of political battles, and the degree political coalitions by emphasizing certain to which historical alternatives were sup- issues and identities over others. At the same pressed (Davis 1980a). time, as reflection models maintain, existing At the outset of the Great Depression, the cultural and institutional traits constrain par- Democratic Party was not the obvious home ties’ scope of action and possible coalitions. for working-class voters. Groups of workers The case of U.S. and Canadian politics in the were reliable sources of Democratic Party 1930s illustrates this interplay. votes, but not as labor voters. Party allegiances While the major social, economic, and polit- were based on neighborhood, ethnic, or reli- ical issue of the 1930s in both countries was the gious ties (Katznelson 1981; Shefter 1986). Great Depression, how the mainstream parties Union leaders, such as American Federation of framed the Great Depression, and how they Labor (AFL) head Samuel Gompers, often used it to mobilize voters, differed significantly. supported Democratic Party candidates, but This shaped the structure of political coalitions this support was instrumental, based on a vol- and possibilities for ILTP organizing. untarist philosophy of “reward your friends

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 498 American Sociological Review 81(3) and punish your enemies” (Greene 1998). It forge a winning coalition remained. They had was not uncommon for union leaders to be to unite urban progressives, Southern con- lifelong Republicans, as was Mine Workers servatives, and Western populists within the head and Congress of Industrial Organizations existing party, while also attracting new con- (CIO) founder John L. Lewis (Dubofsky and stituencies. Some in the party thought Van Tine 1977). Labor had not yet forged the Roosevelt could do this. In a memo from May alliance to the Democratic Party that was evi- 19, 1932, Roosevelt strategist Raymond dent in the postwar years (Draper 1989; Green- Moley advised the candidate to present a stone 1969). clear alternative to Hoover by proposing to Additionally, working-class voters prior to lead a party of “liberal thought” and “planned the 1930s had a wider array of political choices. action” to fight the Depression (Moley 1932). Granted, some were the orthodox Marxist Rhetorically, the memo built on a Moley- groups that ostensibly made socialist politics penned April 7 speech, in which Roosevelt “alien” in the United States (Horowitz 1968). appealed to “the forgotten man at the bottom At the same time, many were part of a home- of the economic pyramid” (New York Times grown “labor republican” tradition, which drew 1932b). In terms of policy, it advocated a on classic American themes of liberty and inde- contradictory mix of centralized economic pendence to argue that wage labor undermined planning and budget cutting. The goal was to workers’ ability to exercise their rights as citi- attract independents and progressives from all zens in a democratic republic (Gourevitch parties, while remaining vague enough not to 2014). Even though that tradition had waned by alienate conservative Democrats. the turn of the century, its imprint remained in Roosevelt did alienate some conservative the distinctly U.S. socialism of Eugene Debs party leaders, including Raskob and 1928 (Salvatore 1982) and the farmer–labor parties presidential candidate Al Smith. They rejected of the early twentieth century (Montgomery what they saw as Roosevelt’s class-laden 1980; Oestreicher 1988). rhetoric. Responding to Roosevelt’s “forgot- Such efforts were often weak and frag- ten man” speech, Smith declared, “I will take mented, but they represented a real alternative off my coat and fight to the end against any form of working-class political organization candidate who persists in any demagogic that enjoyed small but significant levels of sup- appeal to the masses of the working people of port through the 1930s. U.S. labor’s absorption this country to destroy themselves by setting into the New Deal coalition suppressed this class against class and rich against poor” alternative, but that was not preordained. (New York Times 1932a). Smith soon chal- Similarly, the idea that the Democratic lenged Roosevelt for the presidential nomina- Party would use the Great Depression to tion. This made the Democrats’ stance toward mobilize working-class voters was not obvi- the Great Depression a key point of intra- ous.6 Much of the party leadership was politi- party conflict, even as some Roosevelt sup- cally to the right of President Hoover. They porters hoped his “forgotten man” appeals attacked Hoover’s handling of the Depression would be short-lived (Krock 1932). by accusing him not of inaction, but of waste- Roosevelt withstood Smith’s leadership ful deficit spending. Democratic National challenge at a hard-fought convention, accept- Committee chair John Raskob sought to ing the Democratic nomination with his downplay economic issues and focus on Pro- promise of a “New Deal” for the U.S. people. hibition. The party remained fractured along Building on Moley’s strategy, Roosevelt regional, religious, and urban/rural lines. blended social welfare liberalism with a con- With Republican support crumbling amid servative defense of states’ rights and bal- the deepening economic crisis, Democrats anced budgets in the general election. The knew the 1932 election was theirs to lose. But contradictory mix confused Hoover, who after decades of defeat, the question of how to accused FDR of being as changeable as “a

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 499 chameleon on plaid” (quoted in Kennedy election on a wave of dissatisfaction with 1999:102). However, this strategy worked, their handling of the crash, he wrote in his positioning the Democrats, according to a diary that “the country was happy and con- contemporary observer, as “the liberal party, tented, [manufacturers] & labour alike but for the party which will restore the balance of the election propaganda” (King 1930). power between the rich and the poor and Conservative leader R. B. Bennett capital- bring prosperity to the ‘forgotten man’ as well ized on dissatisfaction with King to take the as to the Wall Street banker” (Brown 1932). Prime Minister’s office, but he did not chan- This created an opening for Roosevelt to nel that dissatisfaction into a mandate for incorporate labor into the Democratic Party. policy reforms. Instead, Bennett framed the U.S. labor was not yet incorporated by crisis as a problem of law and order. Seeing 1932, but the process was underway. worker and farmer protest as a communist Roosevelt’s efforts to reconfigure the Demo- threat, he vowed to crush it under the “iron cratic Party coalition created an opening for heel of ruthlessness” (quoted in Jamieson labor, but that move was not preordained. 1968:217). He had prominent organizers Rather, it was the outcome of factional chal- jailed or deported, the Communist Party lenges within the party that were amplified in banned, radical literature censored, and meet- the general election. Those challenges ensured ings disrupted. Idled workers were rounded Roosevelt’s victory was perceived as a victory up and shipped to remote work camps (Hewitt for the “forgotten man,” creating the condi- 1995; Petryshyn 1982; Roberts 1986). tions to absorb labor into a broadened liberal In a desperate attempt to stay in office, Democratic Party coalition. Bennett proposed an economic relief package in 1935 that he labeled a “New Deal.” But it Canada was too little, too late, and King’s Liberals In Canada, neither the Liberal nor the Conser- were returned to office that year. Even then, vative Party used the Great Depression to neither party sought to invoke “forgotten mobilize new constituencies. Both excluded man”-style class appeals, or propose a new farmer and labor groups, leaving political space course for the country. Neither party reached for the CCF to establish a new party around a out to farmer and labor groups; to the con- socialist tradition that ran deep in Canada, but trary, they tamped down protest. There was had not taken root organizationally. space for new parties to advance an alterna- Key to the CCF’s success was its ability to tive vision (Brodie and Jenson 1988; Brown articulate an independent farmer–labor alli- 2007; Horn 1984; Owram 1986). ance. Prior to the CCF, worker and agrarian The CCF emerged in this uncertain envi- movements had foundered due to internal ronment. The initial 1932 Calgary meeting strife and political repression, or had been consisted of four groups. First were agrarians absorbed into mainstream parties. Distrust from the United Farmers movement. They between and within farmer and labor groups had tired of ruling party inaction in the face of had prevented an alliance of both forces the farm crisis and sought an independent (Anderson 1949; Brodie and Jenson 1988). political voice (Anderson 1949; Lipset 1950). At the outset of the Great Depression, nei- Second was labor, represented by rail union ther major party grasped the depths of the leader Aaron Mosher. They did not formally crisis nor proposed policy solutions. Both affiliate but remained sympathetic (McHenry remained ideologically opposed to govern- 1950). Third were representatives of local and ment intervention in the economy (Horn provincial labor party organizations, along 1984; Owram 1986; Whitaker 1977). So with a rump “Ginger Group” of Progressive oblivious was Prime Minister William Lyon and Independent Labour MPs. They saw new Mackenzie King to the magnitude of the cri- opportunities to expand their numbers sis that, when his Liberals lost the 1930 ( Anderson 1949). Fourth was a group of

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 500 American Sociological Review 81(3) socialist intellectuals, primarily from McGill The United States and the University of Toronto, organized as Roosevelt took office in 1933 amid labor and the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR) agrarian unrest, with capital in disarray (Bern- (Horn 1980). In the United States, these intel- stein 1970; Gilbert and Howe 1991; Milton lectuals would likely have been drawn to the 1982; Shover 1965). Frustrated with both New Deal coalition, but in Canada the ruling major parties’ response to the crisis, farmer parties had no room for their ideas, leaving groups were turning to independent parties. the CCF as a better option (Neatby 1972). They built on a tradition of agrarian political Each group had disparate interests, but the organizing (Brody 1983; Clemens 1997; Pos- Great Depression, and Canadian ruling par- tel 2007; Sanders 1999), but they also had ties’ failure to respond to it, left them all promising contemporary examples. In Min- aggrieved and politically excluded. This cre- nesota, the Farmer–Labor Party regularly ated the “common foe” necessary to unite won state and federal office throughout the them (McHenry 1950; Penner 1977; Thomp- 1920s and claimed the governorship in 1931 son and Seager 1986). (Gieske 1979; Haynes 1984; Valelly 1989). Unlike in the United States, neither Canadian Other agrarian populist parties were gaining mainstream party used the Great Depression to traction across the upper Midwest and Pacific mobilize new constituencies. Demonized by Northwest (Backstrom 1956; Lovin 1975; the Conservatives and ignored by the Liberals, Morlan 1955). Industrial workers remained farmer and labor groups were pushed aside, politically up for grabs. There was little sign leaving them available for an independent that either major party would address labor’s class-based political project. grievances. Roosevelt did not mention unions or collective bargaining rights during his 1932 campaign (Bernstein 1970). THE POLITICAL USE FDR’s initial policy solutions to the farm OF POLICY and industrial crises, the Agricultural Adjust- The articulation model holds that parties ment Act (AAA) and the National Industrial advance new policies, or leverage existing Recovery Act (NIRA), profoundly shaped policies, to incorporate new constituencies agrarian and industrial class relations, along and weaken challengers. This shapes possi- with ILTP organizing possibilities. bilities for different coalitions, which affects levels of ILTP support. Agriculture.7 The core of the AAA In the United States and Canada, the struc- involved production controls in exchange for ture of partisan conflict shaped possibilities farm subsidies, financed through a tax on for different political coalitions. But it was agricultural processors. The goal was to the political use of policy that cemented dif- increase farm prices. The focus on farm prices ferent outcomes. In the United States, New privileged agrarian elites, consolidating a Deal labor and agricultural policy offered conservative agrarian bloc within the New enough material benefits to secure Demo- Deal. At the same time, relief subsidies8 and a cratic Party loyalty among certain farmer and farm foreclosure moratorium appeased family labor constituencies. Simultaneously, those farmers. Reporting on an unsuccessful Farm- policies undermined independent farmer and ers Holiday strike, an aide to Federal Emer- labor political organizing by exacerbating gency Relief Agency (FERA) head Harry intra-class divisions. As a result, ILTP sup- Hopkins reported that “one thing that is con- port collapsed. In Canada, the Liberal and tributing largely to its failure is the arrival of Conservative parties’ repression and neglect wheat allotment checks” (quoted in Lowitt of farmer and labor constituencies left them and Beasley 1981:97). Groups representing excluded, pushing these groups toward the smaller farmers, such as the National Farmers CCF. As a result, ILTP support increased. Union (NFU), backed away from their past

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 501 support for independent farmer–labor politics galvanized the labor movement (Bernstein in favor of a moderate “agrarian liberalism” 1970; Milton 1982). When the NIRA was and integration into the New Deal coalition declared unconstitutional in 1935, Roosevelt’s (Flamm 1994; McMath 1995:531). By 1938, advisors argued that a replacement policy farmer groups were wary of breaking from “seems absolutely essential . . . if the country the Democrats. As a Wisconsin farmer leader is not to fall into political chaos between who had previously backed independent poli- discordant groups of extremists” (Dickinson tics editorialized, “I don’t believe the rank 1935). That policy was the National Labor and file of the farmers are going to give up Relations Act (NLRA), or Wagner Act, what they have, no matter how little it is, passed in July 1935. It resembled the NIRA unless they are cocksure of something better” but added enforcement mechanisms and (Hones 1938). banned company-dominated unions. Union AAA policy incorporated some agrarian membership exploded under the NLRA groups but excluded others. Farm subsidies (Carter et al. 2006). went only to landowners, leaving out tenant The Wagner Act’s perceived benefits drew farmers, sharecroppers, and farmworkers. labor toward Roosevelt. Simultaneously, Given that Southern sharecroppers and tenant business elites were abandoning him amid farmers, both black and white, were subject to opposition to his proposed “Second New Jim Crow-era voting restrictions, and Western Deal” reforms. Deprived of business support, farmworkers were often immigrant nonciti- FDR embraced labor as a key source of funds zens, they were largely disenfranchised and and votes for his 1936 re-election campaign could not serve as a viable base for a farmer– (Bernstein 1970; Milton 1982; Rubin, Griffin, labor party.9 Furthermore, planter and grower and Wallace 1983). violence and dynamics of Southern share- The Wagner Act and the 1936 election cropper dependency impeded class-based strengthened labor’s ties to the Democratic political organizing (Alston and Ferrie 1993; Party, weakening its traditional voluntarist Auerbach 1966; Grubbs 1971; Kelley 1990; position (Derber and Young 1961; Greenstone Southworth 2002). 1969; Stark 1936; Washington Post 1936). Key Overall, FDR’s agricultural policies privi- labor figures, like Clothing Workers President leged agrarian elites, provided enough bene- Sidney Hillman and Teamsters President Dan- fits to placate small farmers, and excluded iel Tobin, rose to prominence as Democratic tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and farmwork- Party advisors and officials (Bruner 1936; ers. This undermined the agrarian constitu- Fraser 1991; New York Times 1936). Although ency for ILTP organizing and encouraged some labor leaders continued to voice support absorption into the Democratic Party. At the for an independent party, the new era of gov- same time, the AAA’s consolidation of a con- ernment access dampened that support in prac- servative agrarian bloc within the New Deal tice. As Hillman10 (1936) explained: coalition limited the reform possibilities of the farmer–labor alliance that did emerge in the The position of our organization is known: United States that we are for a labor party. . . . But in the last two years things have happened. . . . We Industry. Section 7(a) of the National have participated in making the labor pol- Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), enacted in icy of this administration. . . . We know that [NIRA] meant the revival of our organiza- June 1933, asserted unions’ right to organize tion. . . . We know that the defeat of the and bargain collectively. Roosevelt resisted Roosevelt Administration means no labor this provision but his advisors convinced him legislation for decades to come. . . . The re- otherwise. Although Section 7(a) had no election of Roosevelt will not solve all our enforcement mechanism and employers problems, but it will give us a breathing vociferously opposed it, its symbolic value spell.

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As with New Deal agricultural policy, FDR’s an independent farmer–labor party (Lewis industrial policy incorporated labor constitu- 1937; Manly 1937; McCoy 1957; New York encies into the Democratic Party coalition. At Times 1937). the same time, it exacerbated intra-class divi- Amid growing dissatisfaction with Roose- sions that hampered class-based organization velt, Wisconsin Governor Philip LaFollette outside that coalition. The NLRA crystallized announced his plan for a new group, the National differences between the AFL and CIO by pit- Progressives of America (NPA) (LaFollette ting rival federations against each other over 1938). But this group went nowhere, folding the Act’s implementation and interpretation. after the 1938 elections. Most state-based ILTPs This drew organizational energy away from and Amlie’s organization also collapsed. ILTP organizing and sabotaged cross-union Roosevelt ran with strong labor support in 1940, political collaboration, particularly at the solidifying the labor–Democrat alliance over the local level. Paradoxically, these divisions course of his third term (Gieske 1979; Lichten- solidified the labor–Democrat alliance at a stein 1982; Lovin 1971; McCoy 1957; Rosenof moment when labor seemed poised to organ- 1974; Valelly 1989). ize for independent class politics. To understand this ILTP collapse at a Frustrated with the disconnect between moment when support for independent politi- Democratic Party rhetoric defending labor cal action was increasing, we must examine rights and the reality of Democratic gover- the NLRA’s role in crystallizing and exacer- nors using state troops to break strikes, work- bating intra-class divisions. Both labor feder- ers began organizing local labor parties across ations benefited organizationally from the the country in the mid-1930s (Davin and NLRA, growing tremendously in this period Lynd 1979). At the same time, state-level (Tomlins 1979). However, certain provisions, ILTPs were gaining traction, particularly particularly those granting the National Labor across the Midwest and West (Acena 1975; Relations Board (NLRB) the power to deter- Backstrom 1956; Gieske 1979; Haynes 1984, mine appropriate bargaining units,11 created a 1986; Lovin 1975; Mitchell 1992; Valelly focal point that amplified divisions between 1989). Aiming to create a national farmer– the AFL and CIO. AFL leaders complained labor party movement, Wisconsin Progres- the Act was biased in the CIO’s favor, and sive Congressman Thomas R. Amlie vice versa. In their efforts to defeat the CIO at organized the Farmer–Labor Political Federa- all costs, the AFL allied with employers and tion in 1933, then the American Common- conservative farm interests to weaken key wealth Federation in 1935 (Lovin 1971, 1975; provisions of the NLRA and the proposed Rosenof 1974). Fair Labor Standards Act (Davis 1980b; Her- Workers backed FDR in 1936, but labor rick 1946; Milton 1982). support for ILTPs grew as post-election frus- These inter-federation attacks spurred tration with Roosevelt set in. His overly even- organizational growth but hampered political handed response to the Flint auto strikes of organizing. Rival federations had to defend 1936 to 1937 and then the “Little Steel” their turf, distracting from efforts to channel strikes in May, 1937, prompted John L. workers’ dismay with the Democrats into Lewis’s (1937) remark that “it ill behooves ILTP support. The internecine conflict para- one who has supped at labor’s table and who lyzed local labor councils, one of labor’s has been sheltered in labor’s house to curse main political vehicles. The AFL purged all with equal fervor and fine impartiality both CIO affiliates from the councils and withdrew labor and its adversaries when they become support from CIO-sympathetic candidates. locked in deadly embrace.” Many also com- This defunded many local and state-level plained of Roosevelt’s foot-dragging with key labor party movements. The combination of labor legislation in the new Congress. By that inter-organizational conflict and resource point Lewis was hinting strongly at forming diversion undermined the base for ILTP

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 503 support. The Democratic Party was now the Greater organizational unity. The only game in town, decisively suppressing Conservative and Liberal parties’ policies not ILTP organizing in the United States (Davis only excluded farmer and labor constituen- 1980b; Fraser 1989; Lovin 1971). cies, but also unified them. Unlike in the United States, there were no policy reforms to divide agrarian and working-class fractions, Canada creating an opening for the CCF. The Great Depression radicalized Canadian While farmers’ political organizing contin- workers and farmers, sparking increased ued throughout the 1920s, agrarian radicali- labor and agrarian militancy. But unlike in the zation accelerated in the face of the global United States, increased militancy did not win wheat market collapse in 1929, combined concessions from the state, nor did it lead rul- with ruling parties’ inability to cope with the ing parties to propose labor or agrarian policy ensuing Great Depression (Anderson 1949; reforms (Heron 1996). To the contrary, Lipset 1950; Solberg 1987). Unlike in the increased militancy provoked further state United States, Canadian agricultural policy violence and harassment. Canadian ruling failed to placate any farm constituencies. parties’ repression and neglect of labor and Instead, farmers turned away from the ruling agrarian constituencies foreclosed the possi- parties and sought an independent political bility of absorbing them, and created an open- voice (McMath 1995). However, past experi- ing for the CCF to articulate an independent ence had shown that a farmer–labor coalition farmer–labor alliance. was necessary for success (Anderson 1949; Brodie and Jenson 1988). Policy of repression and neglect. Unlike The problem was that Canadian workers’ in the United States, Canadian ruling parties’ organizations remained weak following a response to the Great Depression excluded wave of violent state and employer repression farmer and labor constituencies. For farmers, throughout the 1920s. Union density stood at the National Policy12 continued to aggravate. Its 13.1 percent in 1930, fragmented among protective tariffs and railroad subsidies bene- competing federations (Labour Canada 1980; fited Eastern industrialists, bankers, and railroad Leacy et al. 1983). As their U.S. counterparts magnates, while leaving farmers indebted and explored new forms of political action, most vulnerable to international price fluctuations. Canadian labor leaders hewed to the old vol- Prime Minister Bennett’s policies of increased untarist model (Fudge and Tucker 2001). tariffs and meager farm subsidies closed off The upsurge in class conflict in the mid- more markets to Canadian farmers but did little 1930s revived Canadian labor. Inspired by the to bolster collapsed farm prices (Brodie and U.S. CIO, Canadian workers organized under Jenson 1988; Horn 1984; Neatby 1972). the CIO banner, even though CIO officials As for labor, Bennett and his provincial were largely unaware of Canadian efforts counterparts offered paltry unemployment (Abella 1973). Despite lacking any equiva- relief along with ample state repression. lent to the Wagner Act, Canadian union mem- Police and troops broke up strikes, and pro- bership spiked by 37 percent between 1935 vincial and federal leaders jailed and deported and 1937 (Leacy et al. 1983). union organizers and seized union property. The lack of labor rights hampered Canadian King reversed some of Bennett’s most egre- unions’ growth relative to their U.S. counter- gious anti-labor policies upon returning to parts. But the struggle for state recognition office in 1935, but he rebuffed calls for a also unified Canadian labor. While U.S. AFL Canadian Wagner Act. Provincial and federal and CIO unions traded accusations of govern- governments enacted some labor regulations, ment favoritism as they fought over implemen- but nothing approaching the NLRA (Abella tation and interpretation of the NLRA, 1973; Fudge and Tucker 2001; Petryshyn Canadian unionists united to protest their lack 1982; Whitaker 1986). of labor rights. Leaders of the Trades and

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Labour Congress (TLC), which included AFL- rights. However, the order was advisory, and and CIO-affiliated unions, viewed the U.S. employers ignored it. Labor was also excluded split with concern, even inserting themselves from any wartime planning agencies, despite as mediators in an attempt to reconcile the repeated entreaties for inclusion (Fudge and feuding parties. The TLC only expelled its Tucker 2001). CIO unions in 1939, two years after the U.S. This exclusion politicized wartime class split, and then only under direct pressure from conflict. State repression of strikes exposed the AFL. Importantly, the TLC did not conduct the gap between the promises of stated gov- AFL-style purges of local labor councils when ernment policy and the reality of steadfast it expelled CIO affiliates, allowing local coun- government intransigence. At their 1941 con- cils to affiliate with the CCF.13 Also, unlike in vention, as the AFL and CIO agreed to no- the United States, Canadian CIO unions sought strike pledges for the duration of the war, the reunification with the TLC from the start. The CCL chose a different path: TLC rebuffed these overtures, but the Cana- dian CIO did increase labor unity by merging The [CCL] believes in the observance of with the All-Canadian Congress of Labour contracts, and is therefore opposed to any (ACCL) to form the Canadian Congress of strike where it is clearly and definitely Labour (CCL) in 1940 (Abella 1973; Galenson established that such a strike is unjustified. 1960). The Canadian state’s refusal to recog- The Congress desires to point out, however, that the refusal of employers to accept the nize labor rights did not dissolve inter- Labour policy of the Government with federation rivalries, but it did mute their regard to the right to bargain collectively political significance. often creates situations beyond the control of the Congress, but for which the Govern- Opening for CCF. Ruling party intransi- ment has the remedy through the enforce- gence to Canadian labor’s demands prevented ment of its stated policy. (Canadian labor’s absorption into the ruling party coali- Congress of Labour 1941:23) tion, pushing supporters of political volunta- rism toward official support for the CCF.14 Escalating industrial conflict across Canada in While some CCL officials, like Canadian Steel 1942 and 1943 created many situations beyond Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) head the control of the CCL leadership. The number Charles Millard, sought closer ties with the of strikes nearly doubled between 1941 and CCF, others, led by Secretary-Treasurer Pat 1943 (Labour Canada 1977). King’s response Conroy, maintained a nonpartisan stance. The was a series of Orders-in-Council further voluntarists were assisted in their efforts to restricting picketing and strikers’ civil liberties resist CCF affiliation by the Communists, led (Fudge and Tucker 2001; Jamieson 1968). by United Electrical Workers (UE) Canadian Spiraling class conflict spilled into the President C. S. Jackson (Abella 1973). political arena, as the CCF surged in industrial World War II brought the question of Ontario. The party took 34 seats in Parliament labor’s political affiliations to the fore. Unlike in the 1943 provincial election, enough to in the United States, where Roosevelt’s war- form the Official Opposition (Caplan 1963). time labor policy successfully absorbed the By uniting their agrarian Western base and labor leadership and tightened the labor–Dem- industrial workers in Ontario, the CCF was ocratic Party alliance (Lichtenstein 1982), now a much more serious threat to the Liber- King’s wartime labor policy further alienated als (King 1943). Their success also showed Canadian labor. Recognizing the need to voluntarist labor leaders that a class-based secure labor’s cooperation to ramp up produc- political party could be viable. tion, King’s war cabinet issued Order-in- Declaring that he was “sick and tired of Council PC 2685, stating that workers in war going cap in hand to Mackenzie King to get industries should have collective bargaining Labour policies adopted,” Conroy backed a

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 505 resolution at the 1943 CCL convention recog- important, but they cannot by themselves nizing the CCF as the “political arm of explain this divergence. labour” (Canadian Congress of Labour To develop an explanation of ILTP diver- 1943:53–56). Conroy supported the CCF gence that acknowledges constraints imposed reluctantly, only firmly deciding in favor of by cross-country differences in political cul- independent political organization at the 1946 tures, institutions, and intra-class divisions, I convention. The Liberals’ intransigence proposed a modified articulation model of toward labor pushed Conroy and his support- parties, which holds that parties actively ers toward CCF affiliation (Abella 1973; shape political conflict by “naturalizing” cer- Canadian Congress of Labour 1946). The rul- tain cleavages and coalitions within structural ing parties’ policies of repression and neglect constraints. Existing articulation models often prevented labor’s absorption. Instead, they deny the possibility of identities and coali- allowed the CCF to articulate an independent tions prior to parties, whereas my approach farmer–labor alliance, paving the way for shows how these set limits on parties’ scope ILTP support to take root in Canada. of action, which shape, but do not determine, the range of possible outcomes. Parties’ actions in negotiating structural constraints— CONCLUSIONS the process of political articulation—are Few facts of U.S. political life appear more essential to explaining actual outcomes. over-determined than the failure of a mass In the case at hand, the Great Depression labor or socialist party to take root. And few sparked labor and agrarian militancy in both political traits have been as enduring and con- the United States and Canada. The upsurge sequential for the “exceptional” shape of U.S. reshaped politics, as farmers and labor forged politics. As a result, the question, “Why is political alliances in both countries. But those there no labor party in the United States?” alliances affected ILTP support differently. In remains as relevant as when it was first posed the United States, farmer and labor groups more than a century ago. were absorbed into the Democratic Party’s Existing answers to this question generally New Deal coalition, undermining ILTP sup- adopt a reflection model of parties, wherein port. In Canada, the Liberals’ and Conserva- parties reflect preexisting cultures, cleavages, tives’ failure to absorb those groups left space and institutions. In this article, I compared for the CCF (precursor to the NDP) to articu- independent left third-party (ILTP) develop- late an independent farmer–labor alliance, ment in the United States and Canada to chal- bolstering ILTP support. lenge reflection models. Whereas the United In both countries, ruling party responses to States has no mass-based labor party, the New the Great Depression played central roles in Democratic Party (NDP) is well established articulating these political coalitions. In the in Canada. United States, FDR and the Democratic Party Reflection models explain this difference pursued a co-optive approach. They used by highlighting long-standing differences in class-inflected appeals and policy offerings to political cultures and institutions. But an incorporate certain farmer and labor constitu- examination of newly compiled electoral data encies while marginalizing and dividing oth- for ILTP vote shares in both countries between ers. In Canada, the mainstream parties 1867 and 2009 shows that, instead of long- pursued a coercive approach. Neither used the standing cross-national difference, there was Great Depression to mobilize new constituen- a divergence. Prior to the 1930s, ILTP support cies, and their policies of repression and was low but significant in both countries. neglect foreclosed the possibility of absorb- After that, ILTP support collapsed in the ing farmer and labor protest. United States and took off in Canada. The These shifts in ILTP support also signaled a differences that reflection models identify are shift in the structure of political representation:

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U.S. workers’ and farmers’ incorporation into the CCF-NDP’s claim to representing farmers the Democratic Party consolidated an interest- and workers has often been more tenuous group form of political representation; Cana- than that of their European counterparts. dian workers’ and farmers’ alliance in the CCF Many farmer groups remained with the ruling consolidated a class form of political represen- parties after the CCF was formed, and it took tation. Political articulation did not simply a great deal of political work to convince naturalize the link between labor, farmers, and labor to cast its lot with the CCF. Understand- the Democratic Party in the United States; it ing the specific non-hegemonic character of also naturalized the interest group as the domi- the CCF-NDP farmer–labor alliance is critical nant, nearly exclusive form of group political to understanding the social democratic-tinged representation. Likewise, political articulation liberalism of Canadian politics. did not simply naturalize the link between More broadly, this analysis enhances labor, farmers, and the CCF in Canada; it also understanding of U.S. politics and compara- naturalized a system of group political repre- tive political economy. Studies of U.S. poli- sentation more attuned to class divisions. tics have long operated with an assumed Empirically, this challenges arguments pluralist model of politics, whereby the politi- that the New Deal forged a liberal–labor cal process involves competition between alliance, in which the Northern wing of the narrow, overlapping interest groups. Plural- Democratic Party served as the functional ism, while at times disorderly, maintains sta- equivalent of European social-democratic bility by ensuring that no durable social parties (Harrington 1972; Mann 2012). cleavages form, and no one group can retain a Even if Northern Democrats and European dominant position (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1963). social democrats resembled each other The pluralist model of politics has been politically, the fact that the Northern Demo- extensively criticized (Bachrach and Baratz crats were yoked into a coalition with rac- 1962; Gaventa 1980; Lukes 1974), but its ist, conservative Southern Democrats had basic categories have been assimilated into profound consequences for their scope of the assumptions of political scholarship, par- political action (Katznelson 2013). Under- ticularly interest groups. My analysis extends standing the distinctive characteristics of scholarship showing that interest groups, far the New Deal coalition is essential to under- from being the fundamental building blocks standing its implications for postwar poli- of U.S. politics, are themselves a product of tics. Instead of leading to more expansive the political process. Existing accounts find European-style social democracy, labor’s that interest-group politics developed out of incorporation into the Democratic Party Progressive Era protest movements (Clemens decisively blocked the possibility of a more 1997; Hansen 1991), but my account suggests social democratic postwar settlement, as it it was the New Deal that naturalized interest drew labor away from corporatist class- groups as the basic unit of U.S. political based negotiation toward interest-group organization. Although ILTPs were never bargaining (Lichtenstein 1989). widespread, they were a real alternative for Likewise, the analysis shows the limits of marginalized worker and farmer groups prior characterizing the CCF-NDP as a Scandina- to the New Deal. ILTPs’ incorporation into vian-style farmer–labor alliance (Esping- the New Deal coalition left narrow pluralist Andersen 1990). First, the CCF-NDP has politics as the only option (Katznelson 2013). never achieved the hegemony of its European For its part, comparative political economy social democratic counterparts. The CCF- has under-theorized the relationship between NDP formed governments in a few provinces, parties and classes. Whether analyzing varia- but until 2011 they retained perennial third- tion in political regimes (Luebbert 1991), mar- party status at the federal level amid Liberal ket economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), or and Conservative Party dominance. Second, welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990),

Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on May 26, 2016 Eidlin 507 parties either serve as proxies for cleavages Detroit, Michigan; and Robert F. Wagner and class alliances, or are virtually absent. Papers, Georgetown University Special Col- Such analyses offer powerful and parsimoni- lections, Washington, DC. ous explanations for variation across capitalist states, but critics charge that they are better suited for explaining continuity rather than Part B. Electoral Data Sources crisis and change. Furthermore, the typologies All data used in compiling Figure 1 are avail- at the heart of these approaches mask impor- able upon request from the author. The figure tant cross-category similarities and within- presents statistical evidence from two sepa- category differences, while fitting important rate sources. The first dataset comprises data cases poorly (Howell 2003). My analysis sug- on all votes cast for the U.S. House, Senate, gests that integrating a more autonomous con- and all statewide offices between 1876 and ception of parties into political economy can 2004. It was compiled by Stephen Ansolabe- better explain institutional change and varia- here, Shigeo Hirano, and James M. Snyder , Jr., tion. Not only do parties forge and reshape and forms the basis of Hirano and Snyder’s political coalitions, but parties’ actions and (2007) paper analyzing the decline of third- attributes can lend very different characteris- party voting in the United States. The data tics to the resulting coalitions. presented in Figure 1 comprise only vote Building off insights gained from this re- shares for third parties that the authors identi- examination of a classic question in political fied as left-wing parties. According to the sociology, further research could delve into authors, “based on the historical literature and the broader implications of different struc- sources such as the Biographical Dictionary tures of political representation. Once parties of the American Left, we classified each party create systems of interest-group bargaining or as Left or Other (non-Left)” (p. 2). These data class representation, how does this affect sub- exclude presidential votes to better focus on sequent policy development? What are the third-party movements as opposed to indi- consequences for other political and eco- vidual candidates (p. 2, note 6). I thank nomic actors, such as social movements, Hirano and Snyder for providing access to the labor unions, and employers? Re-envisioning underlying data. political articulation to include rhetoric, pub- The second dataset comprises data on all lic policy, and the dynamics of political incor- votes cast in Canadian federal and provincial poration raises these and other important new parliamentary elections between 1867 and questions for the study of state and society. 2009. I compiled this dataset from the sources listed in Table A1. Data from British Columbia begins in APPENDIX 1903, the first election in which candidates Part A. Archival Data Sources were identified by party affiliation. Data for Archival data for this project were collected Newfoundland are excluded, as Newfound- over the course of 14 months between Sep- land did not join Confederation until 1949. tember 2008 and November 2009, plus brief Data for New Brunswick are also excluded subsequent visits. Archives consulted include because candidates in that province did not George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver have party affiliations until 1935; I thus could Spring, Maryland; Hagley Library, Wilming- not demonstrate any shift before and after the ton, Delaware; Hoover Institution Library formation of the CCF. Similarly, the Yukon and Archives, Stanford, California; Kheel and Northwest Territories are excluded Archives, Catherwood Library, Cornell Uni- because candidates only began having party versity, Ithaca, New York; Library and affiliations in the 1970s. Nunavut is excluded Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario; National because it only became a territory in 1999. Archives, College Park, Maryland; Walter P. Using 1951 population data from Statistics Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Canada, the first date that includes

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Table A1. List of Sources for Votes Cast in Canadian Federal and Provincial Elections, 1867 to 2009

Jurisdiction Source

Federal History of Federal Ridings Since 1867 (http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parlia ment/FederalRidingsHistory/HFER.asp). Alberta A Century of Democracy: Elections of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, 1905–2005 (Legislative Assembly of Alberta, 2006) and Elections Alberta (http://www.elections.ab.ca/Public%20Website/730.htm). British Columbia An Electoral History of British Columbia, 1871–1986 (Elections British Columbia 1988), Electoral History of British Columbia Supplement, 1987–2001 (Legislative Library of British Columbia 2002), and Elections British Columbia (http://www.elections.bc.ca/index.php/resource-centre/ reports/). Manitoba Historical Summaries, 1870 to 2006 (Elections Manitoba 2007) and Elec- tions Manitoba (http://www.electionsmanitoba.ca/downloads/Historical Summary.pdf). Nova Scotia Nova Scotia Provincial Elections 1867–2010 (Elections Nova Scotia 2011) (http://electionsnovascotia.ns.ca/electionsstatistics.asp). Ontario Electoral History of Ontario, Candidates and Results, with Statistics from the Records, 1867–1982 (Office of the Chief Election Officer, Province of Ontario, 1984) and Elections Ontario (http://www.elections.on.ca/en/ resource-centre/elections-results/official-past-elections-results.html). Prince Edward Island Historical data obtained directly from Chief Election Officer Lowell Croken (e-mail dated September 8, 2010) and Elections PEI (http://www.election spei.ca/provincial/historical/results/index.php). Quebec Drouilly, Pierre, Statistiques Électorales du Québec, 1867–1989 (Québec: Bibliothèque de l’Assemblée Nationale 1990) and Élections Québec (http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/francais/provincial/resultats-elector aux/elections-generales.php). Saskatchewan Provincial Elections in Saskatchewan, 1905–1986 (Chief Electoral Office, Province of Saskatchewan, 1987), Report of the Twenty-Second General Election, October 21, 1991, Report of the Twenty-Third General Election, June 21, 1995, and Elections Saskatchewan (http://www.elections.sk.ca/ election-results/).

Newfoundland, the excluded provinces and socialists”). Selecting which agrarian- based territories comprise 6.4 percent of Canada’s parties to include in the measure presented cer- total population, meaning that, in the critical tain challenges, as agrarian populism had both period around the takeoff of the CCF, the right- and left-wing manifestations. The best- provinces included in the analysis represented known example of right-wing agrarian pop- 93.6 percent of Canada’s population. ulism was the Social Credit Party, which was a Figure 1 reports Canadian vote shares major presence from the 1930s through the using a six-year moving average. This smooths 1980s in Alberta, British Columbia, and Que- out data from small off-year elections while bec, as well as at the federal level. To distin- preserving overall trends. The figure reports guish between the two, I used secondary only vote shares for left-wing third parties. As sources to examine the parties’ platforms. I with Hirano and Snyder (2007), I used historical included agrarian parties in the group of ILTPs sources to distinguish left parties from other to the extent that they advocated redistributive third parties. I selected these parties based on a policies and cooperative forms of economic range of criteria. First, I included parties that organization. I excluded parties that primarily explicitly identified as “labor,” “socialist,” made appeals to religion, family, or individual “Marxist,” or “communist” (excluding “national self-reliance, as well as parties linked to the

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Social Credit Party, either as predecessor or (2006) (http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/ offshoot parties. Table A2 lists all included toc/tableToc.do?id=Ba4783-4791). parties. Table S1 in the online supplement (http:// U.S. non-agricultural employment. asr.sagepub.com/supplemental) provides the Data for U.S. non-agricultural employment dates of the elections included in the Canadian come from Carter and colleagues (2006), data for Figure 1, and whether the elections Table Ba470-477 (http://hsus.cambridge.org/ were general elections or by-elections (special HSUSWeb/toc/tableToc.do?id=Ba470-477). elections held in a single riding). Because Can- ada operates under a parliamentary system, Canadian union membership. Data general elections are not held according to a set for union membership come from the Direc- timetable, as in the United States. Rather, gen- tory of Labor Organizations in Canada, as eral elections are held either when the leader of reported in Leacy and colleagues (1983) the ruling party calls for Parliament to be dis- (http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/access_acces/ solved, usually every four to five years, or archive.action?l=eng&loc=E175_177-eng when the ruling party loses the confidence of .csv). Parliament, usually by losing a critical vote. Based on my own research and consulta- Canadian non-agricultural employ- tion with data archivists, I believe this to be ment. Data for non-agricultural employment the first-ever compilation of electronic data between 1921 and 1964 come from Eaton and regarding ILTP voting patterns in Canada and Ashagrie (1970) Table VI-A. Because Labour the United States at both the federal and state/ Canada did not start collecting data on non- provincial levels. agricultural employment until 1921, there is a 10-year period from 1911 to 1920 with annual Part C: Union Density Data Sources data on union membership but not non- agricultural employment. To create union Figure 4 reports union density measures for density statistics for this period, I used 1911 the United States and Canada between 1911 census data on “gainfully employed” persons and 1964. The starting date is the earliest date (subtracting agricultural employment) to cre- for which union membership statistics are ate a union density data point for 1911. I then reported for both countries. I chose 1964 as generated estimates for the years between the cutoff date for Figure 4, because that is the 1911 and 1921 by linearly interpolating point at which union density rates in both between the 1911 data point and the first countries diverged starkly. I examine the Labour Canada estimate of the paid non- causes of that divergence in other writings but agricultural workforce in 1921. I obtained the did not want to make that a focus of this arti- 1911 census data from Historical Statistics of cle. For the purposes of this article, the rele- Canada, Series D8-85. vant data refer to the period prior to the divergence in ILTP support in the 1930s. For both the United States and Canada, this Acknowledgments involved combining data on union member- The author would like to thank Kim Voss, Dylan Riley, ship and non-agricultural employment from a Julia Adams, Maria Akchurin, Robin Archer, David variety of sources. Camfield, Anthony Chen, Elisabeth Clemens, Cedric de Leon, Fred Eidlin, Ivan Ermakoff, Neil Fligstein, Chad U.S. union membership. Data for union Goldberg, Jeff Haydu, Richard Lachmann, Mara Love- membership come from the Bureau of Labor man, Michael McCarthy, Erin McDonnell, James Naylor, Ann Orloff, Michael Schwartz, Dan Slater, Adam Slez, Statistics’ series reporting “Union Member- Cihan Tuğal, Margaret Weir, Reg Whitaker, Nick Wilson, ship, 1880–1999,” which can be found in Erik Olin Wright, five anonymous ASR reviewers, and Table Ba4783-4791 of Carter and colleagues the participants in the Northwestern University Political

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Table A2. List of Canadian Independent Left-Wing Third Parties

Abbreviation Full Name

CLAB Canadian Labour CCF Co-operative Commonwealth Federation CPC Communist Party of Canada FARM Farmer FL Farmer Labour FUL Farmer–United Labour CCFIND Independent Co-operative Commonwealth Federation LABIND Independent Labor PROGIND Independent Progressive LAB Labour LF Labour Farmer LPP Labour Progressive Party MLP Marxist-Leninist Party NATLAB National Labour NDP New Democratic Party NPL Non-Partisan League OUVIND Ouvrier indépendent PDE Parti de la démocratisation économique POC Parti ouvrier canadien PATRON Patrons of Industry PROG Progressive PWM Progressive Workers Movement SOC Socialist SOCLAB Socialist Labour UF United Farmers UFA United Farmers of Alberta UFO United Farmers of Ontario UFOL United Farmers of Ontario-Labour UFL United Farmers-Labour UNPROG United Progressive UNREF United Reform UNREFM United Reform Movement UNITY Unity

Parties Working Group, the UC-Berkeley Center for Notes Culture, Organizations, and Politics colloquium, and the 1. Figure 1 might suggest that ILTP support diverged UC-Berkeley Labor Transformations Working Group for after World War I, but the postwar spike marked a helpful comments and criticisms. I also acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Suresh Naidu and Jon Stiles in period of volatility in the Canadian party system, compiling the electoral data presented in Figure 1, and not a lasting shift in ILTP support. It represents Kevan Harris for archival research assistance on the 1932 the meteoric rise of the Progressive Party at the U.S. presidential campaign. federal level and the United Farmers movement at the provincial level. These agrarian parties’ impres- sive electoral gains proved fleeting (Heron 1998; Access to Underlying Data Morton 1950). In no case were Progressive/United All statistical data used in this article were compiled by Farmer parties able to establish a lasting political U.S. or Canadian government agencies, most of which presence, and none survived past 1935. It was only are accessible online. Data from Figure 1 on U.S. and in the 1930s with the CCF’s emergence that ILTP Canadian ILTP vote shares are available from the author support took hold in Canada. upon request. Relevant archival data are available from 2. Union density is the percentage of non-agricultural the author upon request. workers who are union members.

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3. Many ILTPs were in fact state-level parties. References 4. I thank an anonymous ASR reviewer for raising this Abella, Irving M. 1973. Nationalism, Communism and issue. Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party 5. The Canadian left overall was heterogeneous, but and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935–1956. the CCF had distinctly British influences. This Toronto: University of Toronto Press. impeded CCF growth among non-British immigrant Acena, Albert A. 1975. “The Washington Common- workers, particularly in Quebec (Naylor 2006). wealth Federation: Reform Politics and the Popular 6. Accounts of the 1932 campaign taken from con- Front.” PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, temporaneous newspaper accounts and Cohen Seattle, WA. 2009; Craig 1992; Freidel 1990; Kennedy 1999; Alston, Lee J., and Joseph M. Ferrie. 1993. “Paternal- Leuchtenburg 1963; Moley 1932; and Schlesinger ism in Agricultural Labor Contracts in the US South: 1957. Implications for the Growth of the Welfare State.” 7. Discussion of New Deal agricultural policy draws American Economic Review 83(4):852–76. on Clemens 1997; Finegold and Skocpol 1995; Gil- Anderson, Frederick W. 1949. “Some Political Aspects of bert and Howe 1991; Hansen 1991; Hardin 1952; the Grain Growers’ Movement, 1915–1935, with Par- McConnell 1953; Saloutos 1969, 1974; Sheingate ticular Reference to Saskatchewan.” MA Thesis, Uni- 2000; and Young 1993. versity of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. 8. Subsidies were offered through the Federal Emer- Archer, Robin. 2007. Why Is There No Labor Party in gency Relief Agency (FERA), not the AAA. the United States? Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- 9. Nonetheless, Southworth (2002) shows that South- sity Press. ern tenant farmers and sharecroppers successfully Auerbach, Jerold S. 1966. “Southern Tenant Farmers: organized to demand relief, and support for Social- Socialist Critics of the New Deal.” Labor History ist and Communist Party candidates was an impor- 7(1):3–18. tant part of their protest. Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. “Two 10. Hillman’s Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review America (ACWA) was the primary backer of the 56(4):947–52. New York-based American Labor Party (ALP). Backstrom, Charles H. 1956. “The Progressive Party of 11. A bargaining unit is a group of workers eligible to Wisconsin, 1934–1946.” PhD Dissertation, Univer- bargain collectively and be represented by the same sity of Wisconsin, Madison. union. AFL unions defined bargaining units by Bernstein, Irving. 1970. The Turbulent Years: A History craft; the CIO defined them by industry. of the American Worker, 1933–1941. Boston: Hough- 12. The National Policy was the Canadian govern- ton Mifflin. ment’s economic development policy from Con- Brodie, M. Janine, and Jane Jenson. 1988. Crisis, Chal- federation through the early twentieth century. lenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada Revis- It sought to unite the northern colonies, create a ited. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. domestic market, and facilitate development of a Brody, David. 1983. “On the Failure of US Radical Poli- resource extractive, export-based economy. Its key tics: A Farmer-Labor Analysis.” Industrial Relations: features were railroad building, settlement incen- A Journal of Economy and Society 22(2):141–63. tives, and a tariff on imported manufactured goods Brown, E. Francis. 1932. “The Presidential Campaign.” (Brodie and Jenson 1988). Current History 37(2):197–205. 13. Few local labor councils and local unions actually Brown, Lorne A. 2007. “The Early CCF in Saskatchewan affiliated with the CCF (Forsey 1958). The impor- as the Political Vehicle of Left Agrarian Populism.” tant point is that the question of affiliation, as well Pp. 169–200 in The Prairie Agrarian Movement as the councils’ political activity, was less of a flash- Revisited, edited by K. M. Knuttila and R. M. Stirling. point of contention between the TLC and CCL than Regina: University of Regina Press. it was between the AFL and CIO, where conflict Bruner, Felix. 1936. “Labor’s Napoleon.” Washington crippled the councils. Post, October 10, p. X9. 14. This section focuses solely on the CCL’s affilia- Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the tion with the CCF. The TLC remained nonpartisan, Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Nor- although its leaders were sympathetic toward the ton. CCF. At the time of the 1956 TLC–CCL merger Canadian Congress of Labour. 1941. Proceedings of the to form the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the Second Annual Convention, September 8–12. Hamil- federations left the question to the discretion of ton, Ontario. each union and subordinate bodies. When the CCF Canadian Congress of Labour. 1943. Proceedings of the became the NDP in 1961, the CLC officially affili- Fourth Annual Convention, September 13–19. Mon- ated itself with the new party (Forsey 1958; Horow- treal, Quebec. itz 1968).

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