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Notes Chapter 1 1. In short, the frustration-aggression thesis says that “the occurrence of aggres- sive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrari- wise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” (Dollard et al. 1939, cited in Draman 2003, 9. 2. See also Luckham et al. 2001. 3. For research on the relationship between security and the environment, see Homer-Dixon 1991, 1999; Dabelko 1999; and Dokken 1997. 4. The classification is based on a similar classification done by Luckham et al. 2001 (4 ff). 5. The Derg (or Dergue) was a military junta that came to power after the oust- ing of Haile Selassie I. The Derg ruled the country from 1974 to 1987. 6. See, for instance, Bayart et al. 1999 on the criminalization of the state in Africa, and Reno 1998 on the increasing convergence between warlords and certain types of African government. 7. Transnationalism is a kind of interaction across international borders between both state and nonstate actors. The interaction is relatively regular and often (but not necessarily) hierarchically organized. Both formal and informal transnational processes have considerable influence on security politics within and between African states. Chapter 2 1. For a discussion of self-determination, territorial integrity, and the African state system, see Young 1991. 2. See Chazan et al. 1992 for more details on Cold War politics in Africa. 3. Reno’s approach is very similar to the one developed in Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999. 4. Bokassa and his regime were also referred to by Linz as an example of a sul- tanistic regime (Chebabi and Linz 1998, 16–17). 5. “Big Men” or “Strong Men” are defined by Sandbrook (1985, 90): “The Strongman, usually the president, occupies the centre of political life. Front and centre stage, he is the centrifugal force around which all else resolves; 208 NOTES not only ceremonial head of state, the president is also the chief political, military and cultural figure: Head of government, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, head of the governing party (if there is one) and even chancellor of the local university. His aim is typically to identify his person with the ‘nation.’” 6. Jackson writes that “[t]he state in Africa is [ ...] more a personal- or primordial- favouring political arrangement than a public-regarding realm. Government is less an agency to provide political goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain of privilege, wealth and power for a small elite who control it [ ...] Many governments are incapable of enforcing their writ throughout their territory. In more than a few countries [ ...] some regions have escaped from national control [ . ] [and the states] are fairly loose patchworks of plural allegiances and identities somewhat reminiscent of medieval Europe” (Jackson 1987, 527–528). 7. That is the case in the reports of the so-called State Failure Task Force from 1998, led by Ted Robert Gurr (cf. Gurr et al. 1998). 8. These are a slightly revised version of questions posed by Milliken and Krause 2002, 759. 9. See also Cramer and Goodhand 2002, particularly 899–900. 10. Economic globalization can be defined as “a set of economic transformations that increase the relative power of mobile factors of production—capital or, to a lesser extent, labour—and whose benefits are distributed in widely unequal fashion across a population” (Milliken and Krause 2002, 761–762). 11. See, for instance, Hyden 1999. 12. In a special issue of Development and Change (33, no. 5 [2002]) devoted to state collapse, all the case studies refer to international and global dimensions of the phenomenon. 13. Another concept describing these features is Jackson’s concept “negative sover- eignty.” A state holding negative sovereignty does not have control over terri- tories outside the most central parts of the country, and its regime only has limited control over the use of armed forces (Jackson 1990). Chapter 3 1. These states are the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola. 2. Doe came to power through a military coup in 1980, and he used his position as the leader of the military government to win the elections in 1985. 3. For more information about Charles Taylor and his role in Liberia, see Huband 1998. 4. Tubman and Tolbert are both former presidents of Liberia. 5. For further analyses of this kind of economic questions, see Duffield 2001. 6. We do not know for sure, however, how far up in the UK Ministry of Foreign Affairs the activities stretched. Robin Cook, the former minister of NOTES 209 foreign affairs, denies any knowledge of Sandline ‘s activities in Sierra Leone. 7. See, for instance, Fleshman 2001; Musah (undated); and Global Witness 2003b and 2004. 8. An area bordering Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. 9. Amos Sawyer (2004) has several examples based on personal interviews, show- ing that the mercenary system is quite widespread in the region. See also Hoffman 2004. 10. For an elaboration of the relationship between refugees and security, see, for instance, Dokken 1997. 11. The UN recognized the integral role natural resources played in the Liberian conflict by first sanctioning the export of Liberian diamonds in 2001 and later sanctioning the Liberian logging industry in May 2003. 12. The HRW refers to Stephen Ellis 1999 (160–164). See also Sawyer 2004 (446n5, 460). 13. For an elaboration of the relationships of the West African warring parties, see also Sawyer 2004. 14. These numbers are rough estimates derived from the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2006, annex (cf. UNHCR 2006). 15. Lumumba was also nonaligned in relation to geopolitical and Cold War questions. As such, he was not considered favorable by the United States. 16. See UNSC 2002a (paragraphs 25–34) for their names. 17. See also David Kinsella 2002. 18. See also Bråten 2006. 19. For a general elaboration of war making as state making, see Chapter 2 of this volume. 20. Ayoob is partly influenced by the works of Antonio Gramsci.“Subaltern” (mean- ing “of inferior rank”) is a term adopted by Gramsci to refer to those groups in society that are subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes. Subaltern classes are groups denied access to “hegemonic power” (cf. Gramsci 1971). 21. I am also indebted to Thea Martine Ottmann for this method of applying Ayoob’s ideas. 22. The explanation for Uganda’s continued presence in Congo after the regime change may well be different. See Chapter 3 for a discussion. Chapter 4 1. See Dokken 1997. 2. See, for instance, Adler and Barnett 1998. 3. See, for instance, Ngoma 2003. 4. For a thorough presentation of this development within neofunctionalism, see Dokken 1997 (128–156). 5. See also Hegre 2000. 6. See also Söderbaum 2003. 210 NOTES 7. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Risse-Kappen 1995. 8. Trans-state regionalism is, in this way, seen as a part of the general reduction of formal state roles in economies and politics, a result of changes in creditors’ conditions for loans. See, for instance, Reno 1998. 9. Theories of new regionalism are usually divided into three main contribu- tions, namely, the World Order Approach, the New Regionalism Approach, and the New Regionalism/New Realist Approach. 10. Grant and Söderbaum write that the NRA “[…] obviates the artificial separa- tion of state and non-state actors associated with traditional or conventional regional approaches and recognizes that formal and informal aspects of regionalization are often intertwined” (2003, 5). Here they seem to be unaware of the fact that neofunctionalism as presented by Haas also pays attention to the possible role of nonstate actors in the process of integration. See Haas 1964. 11. For a theoretical introduction to this phenomenon, see Andrew Moravcsik 1993. 12. See, for instance, Berman and Sams 2000. 13. The number of UN observers actually deployed was even smaller. For part of 1996, UNOMIL’s strength ranged from five to ten observers (Berman and Sams 2000, 103). 14. The number is based on interviews in the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, 2000. 15. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Risse-Kappen 1995. 16. See, for instance, Leander 2005. 17. See also Sawyer 2004 (445). 18. African institutional development, like humanitarian interventions and theo- retical treatments of the continent, often suffers from importation of strategies and models discerned from elsewhere. See also Hoffman 2004 (226). 19. The first part of the following presentation is based on Bøås and Dokken 2002. 20. In addition to the SADC, the region has several other IGOs—Southern African Customs Union and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 21. According to Nathan, Mugabe even foresaw the Organ developing into a kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nathan 2004b, referred to in Liisa Laakso 2005, 6). 22. See Laakso 2005 and Nathan 2006b. 23. The three countries made this decision without consulting South Africa, which had emphasized conflict resolution through mediation. 24. An elaboration of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola’s intervention in the war in Congo is given in Chapter 3 of this book. 25. For an extensive analysis of the SADC intervention in Lesotho, see Southall 1998. 26. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and SIPO have been described by the SADC as two complementary “road maps” (Fisher and Ngoma 2005, 4). 27. See also Markakis 1998. 28. For scholarly articles on political Islam in Somalia, see, for instance, Menkhaus 2002. NOTES 211 Chapter 5 1. The Abuja agreement, officially named the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on May 5, 2006, by the government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army faction led by Minni Minawi.