A History of the Botswana Defence Force, C. 1977-2007

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2021-01-11 Thebe ya Sechaba: A History of the Botswana Defence Force, c. 1977-2007

Mocheregwa, Bafumiki

Mocheregwa, B. (2021). Thebe ya Sechaba: A History of the Botswana Defence Force, c. 1977-2007 (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/112986 doctoral thesis

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Thebe ya Sechaba: A History of the Botswana Defence Force, c. 1977 – 2007

Bafumiki Mocheregwa

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JANUARY, 2021

The protracted liberation struggles of Southern Africa that began in the 1960s, particularly in

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe today) eventually prompted the Botswana government to establish its own defence force in 1977. Due to budgetary constraints and relative internal political stability,

Botswana had relied on a small paramilitary force called the Police Mobile Unit (PMU) since the early 1960s for all defence – related issues. By the late 1970s, the sharp escalation of the struggle for Zimbabwe resulted in cross – border incursions by Rhodesian security forces who were pursuing armed freedom fighters. In these numerous violations of Botswana’s territorial integrity, many Batswana who lived in towns and villages adjacent to the Rhodesian border lost their lives while other were abducted, women raped, children maimed, and houses set ablaze by Rhodesian forces. This study explores the circumstances around the establishment of the Botswana Defence

Force (BDF) in April 1977 in reaction to the Rhodesian war.

This study also traces the development of the defence force into a professional military between the time it was established and the early 2000s taking into account internal and external factors that determined this evolution. Internally, the lack of funds during the BDF’s formative years meant that the government could only acquire limited equipment and manpower but the discovery of diamonds and economic stabilization beginning in the 1980s resulted in more expansive budgets and the acquisition of lethal hardware. Externally, it was regional contentions in the 1980s, mainly aggression from apartheid South Africa, that largely shaped the development of the BDF. After the end of apartheid, the BDF adopted a more aggressive expansion policy that was supported by the strong diamond – based economy of Botswana. It was in this period that the

BDF started to participate in international peacekeeping operations which not only taught valuable lessons to it personnel but highlighted Botswana as a democratic country that helped restore peace

2 and stability in fellow African nations. The decisions to professionalise its officer corps in the late

1990s and early 2000s as well as the recruitment of women into the force were important indicators of growth. These represented necessary steps that the leaders of the BDF took to mould it into a professional apolitical military.

3 Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ...... 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... 7

DEFINITION OF TERMS ...... 10

INTRODUCTION: THE UNIQUE STORY OF THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE IN AFRICA .. 12

CHAPTER 1: OUR BOYS AT THE BORDER; THE PARAMILITARY FORERUNNER OF THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE ...... 43

CHAPTER 2: OUR BOYS IN THE BUSH: A NEW MILITARY VERSUS AN OLD FOE ...... 72

CHAPTER 3: OUR BOYS FLOUNDER: THE BDF AND THE GROWING REGIONAL CONTENTIONS OF THE 1980S ...... 123

CHAPTER 4: OUR BOYS REGROUP: THE BDF’S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND APARTHEID AGGRESSION ...... 161

CHAPTER 5: OUR BOYS COME OF AGE: THE BDF IN THE POST – COLD WAR ERA ...... 186

CHAPTER 6: OUR BOYS RESTORE HOPE: THE BDF IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ACROSS AFRICA IN THE 1990S ...... 219

CHAPTER 7: A TRANSFORMATION COMPLETE? BDF EXPANSIONS IN THE 2000S...... 262

CHAPTER 8: THE BDF AND THE SOCIETY OF BOTSWANA ...... 296

CONCLUSION: FROM POLICEMEN TO SOLDIERS ...... 323

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 335

4 Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible without funding from the Department of History and the Faculty of Graduate Studies (FGS) at the University of Calgary. The International Research

Excellence Award which I received in 2018 funded my trip to Botswana to conduct critical field work for this study.

Throughout my doctoral studies, including the time spent home in Botswana conducting the field research as well as writing, I have come across a lot of incredible people who have helped me shape this study in one way or another. First among them is Dr. Tim Stapleton whose tireless efforts cannot go unnoticed. Not only did he spend endless hours reading and advising me on the chapters presented in this work, he has also shaped my academic and professional development over the years. As a supervisor and mentor, Dr. Stapleton has always believed in me and demonstrated great enthusiasm for this study which would have been completely lost had it not been for his vision and expertise on the history of Africa.

The members of my dissertation committee beginning with my secondary field supervisor

Dr. Paul Chastko, Dr. Rowland Apentiik and Dr. Alexander Hill provided critical feedback and assistance whenever needed. There was never a time they were unavailable to answer questions or give me advice, and for that I appreciate their efforts. I also owe a lot of gratitude to Lori Somner who also helped me a million times throughout my doctoral studies at the University of Calgary.

I owe yet another debt of gratitude to the staff at the Botswana National Archives and

Records Services (BNARS) for the excellent service they rendered to me while I was in Botswana fishing through archival material. I am also grateful for the men and women of the Botswana

Defence Force, current and retired, who found the time in their busy schedules to speak to me about their experiences in the military. Their stories helped shape this research. In particular, I am

5 grateful for the assistance I received from Colonel Christopher Mbaakanyi, Brigadier Mukani

Mokobi, Lieutenant Colonel Fana Maswabi and Captain Losika “Six” Keatlholwetse (Rtd.) while

I was running around Botswana conducting oral interviews.

I would also like to thank the members of the Department of History at the University of

Botswana who welcomed me while I was conducting my field research. They offered me invaluable and critical input that helped mould the early stages of this research. I am also eternally grateful to my family members who despite the distance between us, have always found a way to show me love and unwavering support. Lastly, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my fellow graduate student colleagues as well as personal friends whose humour, advice, support and counsel kept me grounded throughout my doctoral studies. Simon Bayani, Gorata Sello, We-

Bathu Kwele, Samuel Plaatjie, my good friend Nathan Gardiner, his mother Sue Hutchison and

Katelyn Morishita all deserve a special mention.

6 List of Abbreviations

AAPC – African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps

AFZ – Air Force of Zimbabwe

ANC – African National Congress

APC – Armoured Personnel Carrier

APLA – Azanian People’s Liberation Army

BAe – British Aerospace engineering

BDF – Botswana Defence Force

BDF XI FC– Botswana Defence Force XI Football Club

BFA – Botswana Football Association

BNARS – Botswana National Archives and Records Services

BNFA – Botswana National Football Association

BNF – Botswana National Front

BOLEAS – Botswana Lesotho and South Africa (peacekeeping operation)

BPP – Botswana People’s Party

BSAC – British South Africa Company

BSAP – British South Africa Police

CAF – Central African Federation

CARS – Central African Relay Station

CENTCOM – United States Central Command

CISM – International Military Sports Council

CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility

DCSC – Defence Command Staff College

7 DD MAO – Deputy Director Military Assistance Office

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

FCO – Foreign Commonwealth Office (UK)

FTS – Flying Training School

FTW / FTE – Force Training Wing / Establishment

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

FRELIMO – Mozambican Liberation Front

GSWA – German South West Africa (South West Africa after 1919)

HCT – High Commission Territories

MOD UK – Ministry of Defence United Kingdom

MPLA – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

OAU – Organisation of African Unity

ONUMOZ – United Nations Mission in Mozambique

PAC – Pan Africanist Congress of Azania

PMU – Police Mobile Unit

RAF – Royal Air Force

RENAMO – Mozambican National Resistance

SAAF – South African Air Force

SACU – Southern African Customs Union

SADC – Southern African Development Committee

SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SADF – South African Defence Force

SANDF – South African National Defence Force

8 SSKB – Sir Seretse Khama Barracks

SWAPO – South West Africa People’s Organisation

TNA – The National Archives, United Kingdom

TPDF – Tanzanian People’s Defence Force

TTS – Technical Training School

UDF – Ugandan Defence Force

UDI – Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UKMTAS – United Kingdom Military Training Assistance Scheme

UNITAF – Unified Task Force

UNOSOM – United Nations Mission in Somalia

WAFF – West African Frontier Force (RWAFF after 1928)

ZANU – Zimbabwe African National Union

ZANLA – Zimbabwe National Liberation Army

ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union

ZDF – Zimbabwe Defence Force

ZIPRA – Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army

ZNA – Zimbabwe National Army

9 Definition of Terms

Batswana – two or more people from the country of Botswana

Bamangwato, Bakgatla, Bakalaka / Kalanga – ethnic groups in Botswana

Botho – a Setswana term or teaching for common humanity

Botswana – the country

Emang basadi – a Setswana term for “stand up / arise women” derived from the national anthem

Kgosi – a chief (plural dikgosi)

Kgotla – a traditional court

Motswana – a person from the country of Botswana

Pula – the currency of Botswana / also means rain

Setswana – the language of the people of Botswana

Thebe ya Sechaba – shield of the nation (the BDF is the shield that protects the country)

10 Map of Southern Africa showing Botswana and neighbouring countries.1

1 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Botswana (Washington DC.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2003) https://www.loc.gov/item/2003629804/ Accessed 28 November 2020.

11 Introduction: The Unique Story of the Botswana Defence Force in Africa

Modern African militaries have often been characterised by lack of professionalism and the tendency to mutiny and engage in coups. The same militaries also tend to have arrogant and aggressive personnel who are abusive towards local communities which usually results in the erosion of civil trust and a breakdown of peace and stability. The reasons for those instances are multifarious and vary case – by – case whether it is a country’s colonial legacy that has fostered an environment of ethnically biased militaries, or some instances of highly ambitious and power- hungry officers or economic corruption that has permeated into the very fibre of the army as an institution of government. Herbert Howe’s scathing analysis of post-independent African militaries identifies the armies of Nigeria, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Ghana and

Zimbabwe, amongst many others as having fallen into this trap of corruption and an overall lack of professionalism. He paints a very grim picture of the trajectory that these militaries have followed while suggesting that the political instability that took place in Africa following the Cold

War was self – inflicted. The problems of security, or lack thereof in Africa, according to Howe, have been directly caused by what he calls military mercantilism or “a regime’s use of its military for financial gain as a growing cause of African conflict.”2 In a similar vein, a 2016 study by

Godfrey Maringira closely examined the nature and extent to which the Zimbabwe National Army

(ZNA) has become highly politicised to serve the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National

Union – Patriotic Front, (ZANU – PF). Using 44 interviews of former soldiers of the ZNA,

Maringira revealed how some high – ranking officers used different methods of coercion to

2 Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order, Military Forces in African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 1 – 26. Several other historians had made similar arguments. See for instance Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990): Chuka Onwumechili, African Democratization and Military Coups (Westport: Praeger, 1998); A. B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex Assensoh, African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions, 1900 to Present (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

12 victimise the men who joined the army after independence in 1980 eventually leading them to desert and flee to neighbouring South Africa. His invaluable study takes aim at the ZNA’s lack of professionalism and exposes how its entire structure helped the ZANU – PF government maintain power in Zimbabwe by pushing those who do not share the same political views out of the army.3

Though Howe and Maringira’s respective case studies are compelling, this work argues that the

Botswana Defence Force (BDF) deviates from the generalisation that African militaries are often unprofessional by meticulously exploring the local and regional variables that led to its establishment in 1977 in response to Southern Africa’s liberation struggles. Unlike most other

African nations that had older military traditions and longer exposure to political violence, the lack of a modern warrior culture amongst the people of Botswana fostered an environment that allowed the BDF to become exemplary in promoting peace and stability instead of becoming corrupt and predatory. The BDF also differs from other militaries of post – independence Africa because its officer corps and rank – and – file do not have the same deep rooted ethnic divisions seen in the post-colonial history of the armies of Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda amongst others. It also did not have highly ambitious officers who envisioned themselves as leaders of military regimes and launched coups to seize government, which was remarkable in a continent rife with such instances.

Since its establishment, the BDF has remained subservient to the elected civilian government and maintained military professionalism and ethical behaviour. The BDF therefore became a direct reflection of the social, political and economic stability in Botswana. Furthermore, considering that the numerous armed struggles for liberation that took place in Southern Africa from the 1960s to 1980s were fuelled by the Cold War, the study sees the hasty establishment of the BDF as directly connected to the global competition between the world superpowers.

3 Godfrey Maringira, “Politicization and Resistance in the Zimbabwean National Army” African Affairs, 116, no. 462 (2016): 18 – 38.

13 As a British protectorate between 1885 and 1966, colonial Botswana did not have a locally recruited military. This was mainly due to the shortage of funds but also reflected the anxiety of white minority-ruled South Africa, the major regional power, about arming blacks which may have had a strong bearing on the lack of a military within the High Commission Territories of

Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Swaziland (Eswatini). At independence,

Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world with a small population so establishing a military did not become a priority for the new democratic government until after the mid – 1970s when the liberation struggle in Rhodesia spilled beyond its borders. Because the BDF was established 11 years after independence, the study argues that it was a homegrown military even though its development was made possible by loans from various British government organisations. Despite British funding, influence and military culture, Botswana’s quasi – neutral foreign policy during the Cold War allowed the BDF to acquire military hardware from any willing nation regardless of ideology. Not leaning towards either side gave the BDF the latitude to grow more freely without Soviet or Western pressure.

Cold War affairs in Southern Africa were not only important in the establishment of the

BDF, but also dictated its transformation throughout the 1980s. The growing relationship between the Botswana government and Western countries resulted in the BDF becoming one of the most western – oriented militaries in the region, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union 1990s.

The study demonstrates that the region’s biggest economic and military power, apartheid South

Africa and its numerous attempts to eliminate communist - backed liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) which had bases in Botswana, strongly influenced the development of BDF military capabilities. This does not mean that the BDF leadership during the

1980s lacked a policy for developing the military but instead suggests that the threat of apartheid

14 was too strong to ignore. BDF policy in this period is best understood as pragmatic and flexible as it largely acquired military hardware in response to South African attacks. Arguably then, its evolution during the late 1970s and 1980s took place while Southern Africa was experiencing war between the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa, exiled liberations movements from those countries and majority black ruled states. An important point here is that the process of decolonisation in Africa was not monolithic. The people of Botswana did not arm themselves to expel a clinging colonial or settler power but instead established armed forces to defend their borders against external aggression.

As an organ of government, the BDF in later years extended Botswana’s foreign policy by actively participating alongside other militaries in the world in various international peacekeeping missions that took place in the 1990s. As a relatively new army in that period, being invited to take part in these missions meant that world bodies such as the United Nations recognised the BDF’s professionalism and reputation which represented a major milestone in its evolution. Working alongside other militaries in Somalia, Mozambique and Lesotho attempting to restore order and peace contributed towards the growth of the BDF but also put it on the map in terms of a reputable and reliable organisation that mirrored the democratic principles of Botswana. Participating in these missions meant that the peaceful country of Botswana recognised the plight of other African nations and contributed personnel to help promote peace elsewhere in the continent. From a small core of poorly - equipped policemen in the 1970s to a well-trained and armed western – style military, the story of the establishment and transformation of the BDF is a unique one in Africa.

While some militaries in postcolonial Africa spiralled into chaos and caused political instability and bloodshed, the BDF focused on building professionalism and improving its image on the local, regional and world stages. This uniqueness is therefore worth studying.

15 A Note on Sources, Style and the Limitations of the Study

This study relies mainly on primary source documents accessed at the Botswana National Archives and Records Services (BNARS) in Gaborone, and the UK National Archives in London as well as a series of oral interviews conducted in Botswana. Though the BDF appears not to have an institutional archive, or one that is open to the public, those two major depositories in Botswana and the United Kingdom provided a significant number of rich sources. These mainly consisted of official government communication, Hansard Parliamentary debates in Botswana, a small number of post 1977 files from the BDF as well as newspapers. However, historical sources are normally marred with gaps, bias and ambiguities. Great care has, therefore, been taken when reading and interpreting these sources in order to present an accurate and balanced historical narrative of the

BDF. The state – run Botswana Daily News for instance, became a vital source for this study which is reflected in the frequency in which it is cited. This is because it is the oldest newspaper in

Botswana and its daily publication meant that it had many reports on the BDF. Local private newspapers such as Mmegi Wa Dikgang or simply Mmegi (the reporter) and the Botswana

Guardian also provided key information on topics that were not necessarily covered in the

Botswana Daily News. These newspapers also tend to present stories differently from the government operated news outlet which was vital in recognising bias and corroborating stories.

Furthermore, as a study of events that took place during the Cold War era and subject to some conflicting narratives, it is important to note that the sources cited in this work were scrutinised.

While writing a recent history such as this one should be easy when compared to researching earlier periods, a major limitation for this study lay in finding people within the BDF willing to be interviewed. There is a strong tendency amongst current and former members of the

BDF towards secrecy about their work and lives which did not help the study. This was

16 compounded by the fact that the researcher has no affiliations to the military itself, so being an outsider made it more difficult to conduct interviews despite the granting of a research permit by the Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security of Botswana. However, some former and serving

BDF members understood the significance of this work and willingly participated in oral interviews. Although the events discussed in this study took place between the late 1960s and early

2000s, or within living memory, some of the interviewees struggled to recall certain specific dates which presented a minor obstacle that the researcher had to remedy by cross-checking other sources.

Whenever addressing the public during the late 1960s and 1970s, Botswana’s first president, Sir Seretse Khama, referred to the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), the paramilitary forerunner of the BDF, as “our boys,” which appears to have been his attempt to rally Batswana parents behind the effort of defending the country’s borders. His constant use of this term of endearment also meant that the soldiers comprised the children of the nation who were putting their lives on the line to defend it. This seemingly diminutive but affectionate rhetoric continued with reference the BDF and was also adopted by some members of parliament in the late 1970s and early 1980s including Philip Matante who had long implored Khama to establish a military prior to independence. Some chapter titles in this study use the phrase “our boys” in a way that tries to acknowledge the important and momentous task of defending the border by the sons of the nation, the BDF, during its formative years. This phrase also reflected an all – male orientation of the military at the time.

“Thebe ya Sechaba” is the BDF motto. In English, it translates to “the shield of the nation” denoting that the BDF is the shield that protects the country of Botswana. It expresses the BDF’s firm commitment to defending Botswana’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and national interests.

17 By adopting this phrase into its title, this study recognises the value of the past, present and future sacrifices by the members of the BDF.

18 A Historical Overview of Military Formations in sub-Saharan Africa

Before the arrival of Europeans on the continent, most African societies had vastly different military structures based on their culture and environment. The vast plains of the Sahel were easier to navigate on horseback and more likely to see mobile warfare as compared to the dense forests in other parts of the continent.4 Between the 1200s and 1400s, the Mali Empire which was located on the Sahel and mostly in modern – day Mali, was one of the strongest in precolonial West Africa.

At the height of its power, it had a strong cavalry of some 10 000 horses and a standing army, that conquered other smaller kingdoms and effectively increased the size of the empire.5 An important part of this army was the use of enslaved people who at first were forbidden from fighting but over time evolved into a light infantry unit armed with bows and arrows.6 As the Mali Empire declined in the late 1400s, it broke up into several polities that adopted similar military structures which primarily revolved around the use of horses in warfare. Songhay, which became the prominent empire on the Sahel in the years following the decline of the Mali Empire employed a formidable and sophisticated cavalry. Historian Robert Smith suggests that “in some armies, cavalrymen were accompanied by additional horses … led by dismounted squires whose duties were to keep such spare horses fresh.”7 Over time, the adoption of firearms, though slow at first, revolutionised warfare in some parts of precolonial West Africa though it did not necessarily reduce the potency of mace and sabre – wielding cavalrymen such as the Bambara.8

4 John Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500 – 1800 (London: UCL Press, 1999), 30; see also Robert Sydney Smith, Warfare and Diplomacy in Precolonial West Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 4 – 5. 5 Robin Law, The Horse in West African History; The Role of Horses in the Societies of Pre-Colonial West Africa (New York: Routledge, 1980), 10 – 12. 6 Timothy Stapleton, A Military History of Africa: Volume 1 - The Precolonial Period From Ancient Egypt to the Zulu Kingdom (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2013), 73. 7 Smith, Warfare and Diplomacy, 50; see also George E. Brooks, Landlords and Strangers: Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000 – 1630 (New York: Westview Press, 1993). 8 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 45.

19 In other highly forested coastal areas of West Africa such as the Gold Coast, cavalry was not used because of the thick vegetation. Instead of cavalry, the armies of the forest states such as the Asante and Akyem in the 1700s predominantly comprised infantry forces and had far fewer men when compared to the cavalrymen of the Sahel. According to John Thornton, the armies in the forest typically operated in smaller bands and were likely to engage in small – scale skirmishes than large battles due to the restrictive environment within which they operated.9 The introduction of firearms to these African coastal kingdoms by Europeans facilitated warfare and slave raiding though according to Robert Smith, did not initially result in increased casualties. This was because of the overall lack of skill, and the wet climate that did not allow gunpowder to spark with ease amongst other reasons.10

Some precolonial armies also adopted marine warfare particularly in areas around the

Niger Delta as well as the Great Lakes of East Africa. Supported by extensive waterways, West

Africa’s Allada navy in the late 1700s built large canoes specifically to attack areas that could only be reached through rivers. In a similar manner, the military of the Buganda Kingdom in East Africa possessed a considerable number of large canoes that it used to transport hundreds of troops across

Lake Victoria to conduct attacks against rival groups and to control trade in the area.11

In other instances, the decentralised precolonial pastoralists such as the Turkana and

Maasai who lived in today’s Kenya organised their forces in age groups. According to Nene

Mburu, they had a strong military tradition even though they seemed not to have a centralised

9 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 87. 10 Smith, Warfare and Diplomacy, 50; This is echoed by W. A. Richards who suggests that firearms only dramatically changed warfare and slave raiding in the region after the late 1600s. see W. A. Richards, “The Import of Firearms into West Africa in the Eighteenth Century” Journal of African History 21, no. 1 (1980): 45. https://www.jstor.org/stable/181483. 11 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 84; Stapleton, A Military History of Africa Vol. 1, 135 – 6. See also Semakula Kiwanuka, A History of Buganda: From the Foundation of the Kingdom to 1900 (London: Longman, 1971) and Richard Reid, Political Power in Pre-colonial Buganda (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).

20 government. Their army “was tailored for pastoral raids and predatory expansion that suited their social and physical environment.”12

Warfare in precolonial Southern Africa was defined by numerous factors such as the natural environment. Before the arrival of European settlers at the Cape of Good Hope in what is now South Africa in 1652, different African groups with iron working knowledge, lived in largely centralised states where they survived by herding cattle and cultivating crops. In the Highveld where Sotho - Tswana groups lived, the overall lack of rains and grazing land forced them to adopt large settlements or chiefdoms.13 Wedged between the Indian Ocean and the Drakensberg mountains were the Nguni people from whom groups such as the Zulu, Swati, Ndebele and Xhosa hail. Their environment comprised rich fertile soils which received significant amounts of rainfall and therefore sustained population growth through cultivation and livestock raising.14 In the

Northern and Western Cape, the Khoisan people, who unlike the other groups in the region, were not familiar with Iron Age technology, lived largely nomadic lives and survived through hunting and gathering.15 Most of these African groups employed different organised military structures used for conquering smaller states, and raiding for cattle. In the era of European imperialism, the

African militaries defended their territory against the Boers (Dutch descendants) as well as the

British who arrived in 1795 and 1806.16

12 Nene Mburu, “Firearms and Political Power: The Military Decline of the Turkana of Kenya, 1900 – 2000” The Nordic Journal of African Studies 10, 2 (2001): 148; see also John Lamphear, The Scattering Time: The Turkana Responses to Colonial Rule (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992). 13 Martin Legassick, The Politics of a South African Frontier, The Griqua, The Sotho – Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780 – 1840 (Klosterberg: Besler Africa Bibliographien, 2010), 15 – 16. 14 Timothy Stapleton, Faku: Rulership and Colonialism in the Mpondo Kingdom, c. 1780 – 1867 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2001), xiii. 15 Timothy Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, From the Dutch – Khoi Wars to the end of Apartheid (Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishers, 2010), 164. 16 Maurice Boucher, Britain at the Cape, 1795 – 1803 (Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Press, 2001), 11 – 12; see for example John Laband and Paul Thompson, Battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift (Durban: University of Natal Press, 1999); John Laband, Kingdom in Crisis, Zulu Reponses to the British Invasion of 1879 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 4.

21 The Khoisan’s lack of metallurgy and largely nomadic lifestyle meant that they did not have distinct military structures or strong weapons. Their military vulnerability was displayed in the series of wars they fought against the Dutch settlers from the mid-1600s to late 1700s where they usually employed guerilla tactics such as hit and run attacks and ambush. Though some had managed to acquire a small number of firearms in this period, the Khoisan did not create formidable military structures and were eventually absorbed into Dutch colonial society.17

Towards the end of the 1700s, the west of the Highveld, which bordered the Kalahari

Desert, experienced increased cattle raiding by independent Griqua groups (descendants of

Khoisan and Europeans). The Griqua had ongoing trade relations with the Boers at the Cape that included the exchange of cattle and enslaved children for firearms, gunpowder and horses which made them a superior fighting force with high mobility.18 In other parts of the Highveld were Sotho

– Tswana groups such as the Barolong, Batlhaping, and Bakgatla whose militaries were organised in age regiments. From a young age, usually around puberty, boys were grouped together to undergo a process of initiation which introduced them to adulthood and familiarised them with duties such as hunting and warfare.19 Over time, these age sets became infantry fighting organisations that were tasked with either defence of homesteads or raiding other smaller groups for cattle.20

17 Richard Elphick, The Khoi Khoi and the Founding of White South Africa (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985), 42; Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 1. 18 Stapleton, A Military History of Africa, 216 – 17; Tim Keegan, Colonial South Africa: Origins of the Racial Order (London: Leicester University Press, 1996), 177. 19 Elizabeth Eldredge, “Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa c. 1800 – 1830, The Mfecane Reconsidered” in The Mfecane Aftermath, Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History ed. Carolyn Hamilton (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 123; Legassick, The Politics of a South African, 23 – 24. 20 Fred Morton, “Mephato: The Rise of the Tswana Militia in the Pre-colonial Period” Journal of Southern African Studies 38 no. 2 (2012): 390. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266578

22 As one of the most well-known Nguni groups, the nineteenth century Zulu Kingdom organized its army in age regiments similar to those of the Sotho – Tswana communities discussed above. While younger and unmarried men lived together in regimental settlements comprising a standing army, older married men living in family homesteads represented a military reserve with their regiments called together during wartime. According to John Laband, the Zulu army became tactically stronger under the leadership of Shaka who ruled from c.1815 to 1828. The young men in their age sets or amabutho, remained single until about 35 years old because their main duty was to serve their king in the Zulu army.21 This institution of creating organised sets of warriors from a very young age amongst the various Sotho – Tswana and some Nguni groups, created formidable precolonial militaries in Southern Africa. Of course, not all pre-colonial societies in

Southern Africa organized their militaries around age sets as such structures did not exist among groups like the Xhosa who based their armies on contingents from specific communities.22

Colonial Armies

During the colonial period in Africa, European officials created different locally recruited armed forces that followed western organisational models in order to maintain colonial rule and sometimes provide soldiers for wars in other parts of Africa and the world. They were made up of an African rank – and – file commanded by European officers reflecting broader colonial racial hierarchies. Not only was it cheaper to recruit Africans into these forces but tropical diseases in some parts of the continent rendered European troops ineffective. Some of the main examples of

21 John Laband, Zulu Warriors, The Battle for the South African Frontier (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 210; Bruce Vandevort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830 – 1914 (London: UCL Press, 1998), 20; Ian Knight, The Anatomy of the Zulu Army, From Shaka to Cetshwayo, 1818 – 1879 (London: Green Hill Books, 1995), 30 – 36. 22 Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 3; see also Jeff B. Peires, The House of Phalo, A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of their Independence (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981), 22 – 23.

23 western – style colonial forces were the Tirailleurs Senegalais established by the French in West

Africa, the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), which became the Royal West African Frontier

Force (RWAFF) after 1928, and the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in British West and East Africa respectively, the Force Publique in the Belgian Congo and the Schutztruppe in German East Africa.

The French established a massive colonial armed force made up of black Africans under the command of white officers though very rarely, some Africans became officers owing to the policy of assimilation. Established in 1857, the Tirailleurs Senegalais were an important aspect of colonial authority yet unlike the British, Germans, and Belgians, the French relied heavily on the conscription of black African men in order to boost the number of troops, particularly between

1918 and the end of the Second World War.23 About 175 000 Africans served in France during the

First World War while more than 200 000 were recruited for the Second World War to serve directly in the battlefields of Europe. Originating in the early twentieth century writing of French officer Charles Mangin, the French policy of employing large numbers of African colonial troops to defend the metropole related to ideas about declining French birthrates and imagined martial abilities of black soldiers.24

The British in West and East Africa recruited men into the RWAFF and KAR using a martial race myth where they imagined certain groups of people within their territories to possess warrior – like traits and therefore more fit to become soldiers. Both the RWAFF and the KAR were established during the colonial period by British officials to maintain their authority in the

23 Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857 – 1960 (London: James Currey, 1991), 4 – 5. 24 Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts 45 – 46; see also Joe Lunn, Memoirs of a Maelstrom, A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1999); Gregory Mann, Native Sons, West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 257; see also Richard Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914 – 1918 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 160 – 64; Ruth Ginio, The French Army and its African Soldiers, The Years of Decolonisation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2017), 4 – 5.

24 colonies and modelled primarily after the British Army which means that they adopted the rank, structure, uniform, and weaponry from the colonial power. The WAFF was established at the end of the 1890s as a consolidation of different regiments from the British West African colonies of

Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and the Gambia. Its initial function was to deter French encroachment on British territories in West Africa but over time this changed according to the needs of the colonial power including providing additional manpower for the First and Second

World Wars.25 According to former British colonial officer FAS Clarke, the British recruited only the best African men, who usually came from the northern parts of each of their colonies such as the Nigeria Regiment which only had Hausa troops because they were believed to have natural warrior – like traits. However, Stapleton’s recent article on the Nigerian colonial military revealed that the notion of martial based recruiting was more nuanced than previously thought. He argues that the British idealized the martial myth of the northern Hausa Muslim soldier but in practise recruiting produced a diverse force.26 The Gold Coast Regiment also comprised men primarily from the northern region of the territory. During the First World War, the British recruited more than 60% of Gold Coast manpower from northerners.27 Similarly, the KAR of British East Africa was established in the early 1900s as a merger of regiments from colonial Uganda, Nyasaland

(Malawi today), and Kenya. Recruitment into the force was also based on British preconceived notions of martial peoples where mostly northerners were believed to make obedient soldiers.

Historian Timothy Parsons states that the during the First World War, the KAR was dramatically

25 FAS Clarke, “The Story of the West African Frontier Force” Royal United Service Institution 97: 586, (1952): 224 – 225. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071845209428814 Col. Austin Haywood and Brig. Frederick A. S. Clarke, The History of the West African Frontier Force (Aldershot: Gayle and Polden, 1964). 26 Clarke, “The Story of” 229. Timothy Stapleton, “Martial Identities in Colonial Nigeria c. 1900 – 1930” Journal of African Military History 3 (2019): 1 – 32. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/24680966-00301003 27 Ashley Jackson (ed.) The British Empire and the First World War (Oxon: Routledge, 2016); Kwabena O- Akurang – Parry, “African agency and Cultural initiatives in the British Imperial military and labour recruitment drives in the Gold Coast (colonial Ghana) during the First World War” African Identities 4:2, (2006): 213 – 234.

25 increased to include specialised support units such as medical, transport and signal corps. This was because white South African soldiers and Indian troops suffered greatly from tropical disease in

East Africa. This made the KAR one of the most effective forces during the East Africa campaign of the First World War. When the war ended, the KAR was reduced in size owing to financial issues and the nervousness of white settlers about arming blacks. When the Second World War broke out, the British were forced to rapidly rebuild the KAR while abandoning martial – based recruiting. The same issue happened in British West Africa where they also had to move from martial – based recruiting in order to enlist as many Africans as possible.28 Other western style colonial forces included the Force Publique which was established in 1885 in King Leopold II’s

Congo Free State and the Schutztruppe of German East Africa formed in 1895.29 Both these colonial forces were established for reasons similar to those of the British WAFF and KAR. The

Schutztruppe, according to historian Michelle Moyd, also recruited troops from Africans who had a long history of warfare with the hope that they would make good and obedient soldiers under the command of German officers.30 In essence, the forces that were established by European powers across Africa during the colonial period followed western military models though some initially lacked key elements such as logistics. Most were well trained and proved efficient particularly during the World Wars. During peacetime, they were usually reduced in strength and helped subdue local populations. In settler colonies such as Rhodesia and South Africa, Europeans worried about arming Africans as they thought they would rebel or use military service to claim civil rights. Nevertheless, small white minorities found it difficult to maintain exclusively white

28 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King’s African Rifles, 1902 – 1964 (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 1999), 54 – 55, 89 – 90. 29 Mario Draper, “The Force Publique’s Campaigns in the Congo – Arab War, 1892 – 1894” Small Wars and Insurgencies 30: 4-5, (2019): 1020; Michelle R. Moyd, Violent Intermediaries; African Soldiers, Conquest and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), 60 – 62. 30 Moyd, Violent Intermediaries, 67.

26 militaries leading to, for instance, Southern Rhodesia’s temporary establishment of the primarily black Rhodesia Native Regiment for service in the East Africa campaign of the First World War.31

Postcolonial Armies

During the 1960s, most African colonies gained their independence and therefore needed to establish their own militaries. Given that the colonial officer corps comprised Europeans, there was a need to accelerate the commissioning and promotion of African officers. As a result, the militaries of newly independent African states were commanded by African officers who had previously served in the colonial armies though in some places, European officers remained with

African forces for a few years after independence. In most cases, these new national armed forces maintained close relationships with their former colonial masters though some adopted different military models altogether.

In West Africa, the Nigerian Army was established at independence in 1960 after the rapid promotion of lower – ranking yet generally more educated southern officers into leadership positions. This was at the expense of the longer serving but less educated Hausa men whom the

British believed to be martial people only fit to serve in the rank – and – file which created a massive rift between the northerners and the southerners. The army itself was established as an apolitical entity and continued to follow British military models in terms of its rank structure and training, however, the deep-rooted ethno – regional divisions within the officer corps gave rise to a series of coups and a bloody civil war that claimed millions of lives.32 In Guinea, following the

31 Timothy Stapleton, No Insignificant Part, The Rhodesia Native Regiment and the East Africa Campaign of the First World War (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 59 – 60. 32 See for example Norman J. Miners, The Nigerian Army, 1956 – 1966 (London: Methuen, 1971); Claude E. Welch (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972); Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture, 1966 – 1976 (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 33 – 35.

27 withdrawal of French colonial officials and troops in 1958, the leader of the most prominent independence movement and the country’s first president Ahmed Sekou Toure, created a highly politicised military. Toure handpicked men loyal to him and his political organisation, the Guinea

Democratic Party (PDG) from those who previously served under the French colonial forces to become part of the new People’s Army of Guinea. His cautious approach to building the new army was driven by his belief that some of the returning men remained loyal to France and would eventually depose him. Though it was a politicised entity of the government, the military of Guinea avoided a coup until 1984 when Colonel Lansana Conte seized power following Toure’s death.33

The East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania after independence from

Britain witnessed serious upheavals that influenced how the newly elected presidents of those countries shaped their armed forces. Historian Timothy Parsons argues that these three militaries were troubled by the transition from KAR service to armed forces of independent states including the collective grievance of being ignored by their new leaders. In 1964, they all mutinied forcing reactions from Presidents Milton Obote of Uganda, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya respectively.34 These mutinies therefore defined how the militaries in these three countries would be shaped. In the case of Kenya, Kenyatta chose to continue a British model of a well – trained, professional and apolitical military that abandoned martial recruiting in order to have a good balance of ethnicities in the army as a national institution. Obote of Uganda also tried to follow a British military model like Kenyatta, but he failed to address the issues that caused the mutiny in the first place. This weakened his rule and gave rise to one of Africa’s most brutal dictators, Idi Amin whose military was predatory and poorly disciplined. Nyerere, on the other

33 Stapleton, A Military History of Africa, Vol. 3, 46 – 47; See also Guy Martin, African Political Thought (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 39. 34 Timothy Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003).

28 hand, deviated entirely from the British model because he saw British influence within his army as a gateway to praetorianism and neo – colonialism. He established a highly politicised military called the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) which comprised part of his one-party state but one that tried to balance foreign relations by accepting aid from different parties including

Canada, China and the Soviet Union.35

In the former settler colonies of Rhodesia and South Africa, and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique where nationalist struggles and civil wars lasted for a very long time, the establishment of new militaries was the result of integrating two or more combatant forces to create unified national armies. For instance, after the end of the long war of independence against the racist Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith, the establishment of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) in the early 1980s resulted from amalgamating the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army

(ZIPRA), the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Rhodesian security forces.

The new army was established with the guidance of the British Military Assistance Training Team

(BMATT) whose task was to provide officer training and advise on integration and selection of personnel while directly consulting with newly elected prime minister Robert Mugabe.36

Following the collapse of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, a new majority government led by Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) was elected to power. The predominantly white South African Defence Force (SADF) which had been an arm of the racist government was dissolved to make way for the new South African National Defence Force

35 Parsons, The 1964 Army Mutinies, 169 – 71; see also Christopher Kilford, The Other Cold War, Canada’s Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945 – 1975 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Force Academy Press, 2010), 171 – 74; Charles Thomas, “The Tanzanian People’s Defence Force, An Exercise in Nation Building” (PhD diss., University of Texas, 2012), 32. 36 Paul Jackson, “Military Integration: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe” in Roy Licklider (ed.) New Armies From Old, Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 56 – 58; see also Blake H. Whittaker, “The ‘New Model’ Armies of Africa? The British Military Advisory and Training Team and the Creation of the Zimbabwe National Army” (PhD diss., Texas A & M University, 2014); and Maringira, Politicization and Resistance, 22.

29 (SANDF). This was basically a merger of about 90 000 SADF personnel, two rebel armies, uMkhonto We Sizwe (MK) and the Azania People’s Liberation Army (APLA) as well as the militaries of the Ciskei, Transkei, Venda and Bophuthatswana homelands.37 Although this integration was ought to produce a military with equal race representation, most of the high ranking white officers from the SADF retained top positions within the new SANDF because they were more familiar with conventional structures and possessed formal military qualifications than the leaders of the former rebels groups but also because they were not ready to be commanded by non- whites. Eventually, former liberation movement officers gained training and were promoted to high positions in the SANDF.38 This creation of the SANDF was made possible by another

BMATT which played the same role as the one deployed to establish the ZDF in 1980.39

This type of amalgamation of formerly opposing armed forces became a defining feature of the national militaries of some countries in post – Cold War Africa. Following the Second

Congo War that took place between 1998 and 2003, a new government under Joseph Kabila established the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) through integrating former combatants into a single national military. The process of merging different armed groups that previously opposed each other was extremely complicated and contentious but by 2005, the

FARDC had started to take shape with more than 15 integrated brigades.40 Essentially, the militaries of post-independence sub-Saharan Africa adopted western models in terms of training, rank structure and equipment.

37 Stapleton, A. Military History of South Africa, 191. 38 Roy Licklider, “South Africa” in Licklider (ed.) New Armies from Old, 123; Tom Lodge, Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2002), 202. 39 John Kabia, Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa, From ECOMOG to ECOMIL (London: Taylor and Francis, 2009), 185. 40 Christoph Vogel, Operation Stalemate or Politically Induced Failure: On the Dynamics Influencing Humanitarian Aid in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Marburg: Tactum Verlag, 2012), 31 – 33; Michael Diebert, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2013), 1977; See also Stapleton, A Military History of Africa, 209 – 10.

30 A Historiography of African Military Developments

The literature on African militaries, whether colonial or postcolonial, has evolved a greatly over the years. In most cases, the works published by military historians and political scientists fall within certain classifications highlighted, usually, by the period in which they are published.

Colonial Literature

Colonial military histories related to Africa were written by former colonial army officers who focused on big military campaigns and ignored the experience of the African troops. Examples of this type of literature are works that were published between the 1900s and 1950s by former colonial officials such as W. Lloyd-Jones on the KAR and a personal memoir by Lord Esme

Lennox, on the WAFF.41 Though these works may be read as primary sources, they promulgate an imperialist approach which was prominent at the time and served to highlight the perception amongst Europeans that they civilised Africans. They do not focus on African troops, yet they try to describe colonial armed forces that had an African rank – and – file. Even during the 1950s and

1960s when Pan – Africanist and liberation literature was becoming prominent across the continent, and when the study of African history became a professional discipline using historical sources, some former colonialists such as Moyse - Bartlett, Austin Haywood, and FAS Clarke still published regimental histories that completely ignored African perspectives.42 Perhaps these works were aimed at responding to the growth of African nationalism by reminding readers about

41 It was common for colonial officers like Lennox to publish personal memoirs that celebrated their work in the military. See Captain Lord Esme Gordon Lennox, With the Western African Frontier Force in Southern Nigeria (London: H.J. Ryman Printers, 1905) and W. Lloyd-Jones, K.A.R. Being an Unofficial Account of the Origins and Activities of the King’s African Rifles (London: Arrowsmith, 1926). 42 See in general, H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles, A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1945 (Aldershot: Gayle & Polden, 1956); Haywood and Clarke, The History of the West African.

31 the importance of Europe’s civilising mission in Africa and celebrating colonial forces which were being disbanded in the era of independence.

Postcolonial African Military Literature

The literature on African military formations published by historians remained thin during the

1970s and 1980s though some political scientists tried to examine the transition from colonial to independent militaries in Africa as well as the socio - political aspects that led to coups and mutinies after independence. In the 1970s, Norman Miners, Samuel Decalo, and Robin Luckham published works that address these issues. The growth of this literature was largely in response to the chaos that had befallen some parts of the continent in mainly East and West Africa. Miners, who had lived in Nigeria between 1957 and 1966, published a relatively short book in 1971 that examined the establishment and downward spiral of the Nigerian Army, one of Africa’s largest militaries. Though his book does not explore every detail of the daily lives of officers and rank – and – file, it represents an early attempt to tell the story of the Nigerian Army. Miners argues that the coups that followed the country’s independence were rooted in martial based recruiting that the British practiced for a long time.43 Samuel Decalo’s 1976 work, Coups and Army Rule in Africa examines the socio – economic roots of coups in four African countries; Dahomey (Benin today),

Togo, Congo – Brazzaville and Uganda. According to Decalo, these countries shared some commonalities such as weak states, ethnically biased militaries and power hungry officers who overthrew their elected civilian governments.44 In some ways, Miners and Decalo shared similar explanations for the causes of coups in recently independent African states and their works led to

43 Miners, The Nigerian Army, ix, 17 – 20. See also Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960 - 67 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971) and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria; A Documentary Source Book, 1966 – 70 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 3-4. 44 Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, 76 – 77.

32 more research in later years by Omatayo Olaniyan, Chuka Onwumechili, Adeyeke Adebajo, Max

Siollun and Yvette M. Alex Assensoh who emphasized the idea that coup culture in West Africa was embedded within the nature of the colonial armies and therefore inherited.45 This argument highlights the difficulty of separating postcolonial armed forces from their colonial past, except for countries like Botswana that did not have militaries until well after independence.

Over the years with the rise of social history within African history, some historians published works that thoroughly examined the lives of African soldiers who served in colonial militaries such as the Senegalese Tirailleurs, KAR and WAFF. Most of this literature appeared in the 1990s from historians such as Timothy Parsons, Myron Echenberg, Nancy Ellen Lawler and

Joe Lunn whose works addressed issues that had been ignored by many military historians.

Collectively, their works adopted a war and society approach to demonstrate the contributions made by Africans to reinforcing European rule across the continent. Timothy Stapleton, Ronald

Lamothe, Gregory Mann, Eric Mann and Michelle Moyd are amongst historians who published works after the 1990s that also examine previously ignored topics on African military service.

Stapleton’s No Insignificant Part recognises the agency of African migrant workers who mainly came from Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia and Mozambique and joined the Rhodesia

Native Regiment (RNR) that fought against the Germans in the East Africa Campaign of the First

World War.46 Gregory Mann’s 2006 work also explores the agency and experiences of Malian

Second World War veterans through a wide array of archival sources and extensive oral interviews.

45 R. Omatayo Olaniyan, Foreign Aid, Self-Reliance and Economic Development in West Africa (Westport: Praeger 1996); Onwumechili, African Democratization; Adeyeke Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau (London: Lyne Reinner Publishers, 2002); Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture, 1966 – 1976 (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009) see also Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (New York: Nova Publishers, 2001), 12. and Assensoh and Assensoh, African Military History and Politics, 1-2. 46 Timothy Stapleton, No Insignificant Part, 21-22; see also, Timothy Stapleton, “The Composition of the Rhodesia Native Regiment During the First World War: A Look at the Evidence,” History in Africa 30 (2003): 283 – 295. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3172093 Accessed December 28, 2016.

33 His work offers insights on the contentious relationship between France and Mali where he argues that the African ex - combatants fought alongside the French but were neglected by the former colonial power thereafter.47 In 2011, Stapleton published a book that examines the experiences and roles of black African police and soldiers in white minority ruled Southern Rhodesia. Stapleton explores how that the lack of white manpower forced the Rhodesian government to employ a significant number of Africans to perform military operations and police the territory despite the fear that they would mutiny.48

Eric Mann and Moyd’s works focus on African colonial military service in German East

Africa. Mann examines the social and political dynamics of East African communities before and during German colonisation while focusing on the origins of the Schutztruppe (German colonial forces). Mann explains that eventually German officials decided to recruit troops from within the colony.49 On the other hand, Moyd’s work offers a new understanding of the experiences of the

African men recruited into the Schutztruppe in the late 1800s. She explains that being soldiers offered them agency and recognition within their societies.50 In a similar vein, Lamothe’s Slaves of Fortune offers new insights into the lives of Sudanese slave soldiers whom the British relied on for their invasion of Sudan from 1896 to 1898. Not only does Lamothe explain the effectiveness of the enslaved Sudanese in the war but he also examines how their military service shaped their lives as free men thereafter.51 Considering that colonial forces such as the KAR and RWAFF

47 Mann, Native Sons, 1 – 4. 48 Timothy Stapleton, African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923 – 1980, (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011), 7. 49 Eric Mann, Mikono Ya Damu, African Mercenaries and the Politics of Conflict in German East Africa, 1888 – 1904 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), 17 – 19. 50 Moyd, Violent Intermediaries, 179 – 80. 51 Ronald M. Lamothe, Slaves of Fortune, Sudanese Soldiers in the River War, 1896 – 1898 (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2011), 10 – 12.

34 became the national armies of newly independent states, these works also provide valuable insights on how Africans were introduced to western-style military culture.52

There are other notable works that examine the roles of Africans during the World Wars through the war and society approach to rectify previous distortions or introduce new aspects that were ignored by previous historians. Cultural historian Albert Grundlingh’s work, for instance, brings to light the importance of black South Africans who enlisted to serve alongside white South

Africans during the First World War. He examines how black South Africans responded to the war effort with the hope of gaining some political freedom in return for serving their country.53 In

2000, Melvin Page published The Chiwaya War which examines a wide range of archival records to look at the impact of the Great War on Malawians. Page’s main argument is that the outbreak of the war which resulted in the accelerated recruitment of soldiers and porters as well as the demands for crops and taxes, represented the first national experience for Malawians.54

Raffael Scheck and David Killingray’s works closely assess the lives of African soldiers who served in French and British colonial forces during the Second World War. Scheck’s work,

Hitler’s African Victims tells a harrowing story of French colonial conscripts who were captured and suffered terrible human rights abuses at the hands of German soldiers. Killingray, on the other hand uses a wide array of oral evidence and letters written by soldiers to their loved ones to construct a history from below that dives deep into the feelings and motivations of Africans for joining the effort to defend Britain from axis aggression. Killingray pays particular attention to

52 Parsons, The African Rank and File; Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts; Nancy Ellen Lawler, Soldiers of Misfortune; Ivorien Tiralleurs of World War II (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992); Joe Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1999). 53 Albert Grundlingh, Fighting Their Own War: South African Blacks and the First World War (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 10 – 13. 54 Melvin Page, The Chiwaya War: Malawians and the First World War (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).

35 how army life changed the lives of these African men in terms of their social and political standing in their respective countries at the end of the war.55

Literature on Botswana and the BDF

Unlike most other African colonies that had militaries who fought in the First and Second World

Wars, the High Commission Territories (HCTs) comprising Bechuanaland (Botswana),

Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland (eSwatini) provided uniformed men who served as military labour carrying ammunition, building infrastructure and deploying smoke screens. Very few publications look at Batswana’s experience of the First World War. Deborah Ann – Schmitt examines how the involvement of Batswana, particularly the Bakgatla and Bangwato in the Second

Anglo - Boer War (1899 – 1902), helped prove their readiness to help their British overlords. The firm conviction of the dikgosi, (chiefs) to send their men in large numbers to provide logistical support to British forces that were fighting the Boers, proved that the people of Bechuanaland would be valuable. Schmitt suggests that the Second Anglo - Boer War experiences served as a stepping-stone for Batswana who were recruited to serve in the British support units of the First

World War owing to manpower shortages. Ashley Jackson and Frederick Perry state that these

Batswana formed part of the South African Native Labour Corps and Coloured Labour Corps that were established in 1916.56

55 Raffael Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David Killingray, Fighting For Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War (Rochester, N.Y.: James Currey, 2010). 56 Deborah Ann Schmitt, The Bechuanaland Pioneers and Gunners (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 65 – 67; see also Frederick William Perry, The Commonwealth Armies, Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 190 and Ashley Jackson, “Bechuanaland, the Caprivi Strip and the First World War” War and Society, 19 no. 2 (2001): 109 – 142. https://doi.org/10.1179/war.2001.19.2.109

36 Schmitt, Jackson and Hamilton Simelane pay close attention to the roles played by

Batswana men who became part of the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (AAPC), a British military support unit established in 1940 to remedy manpower shortages during the Second World War.

Though they were not armed, Schmitt adds that the pioneers from Bechuanaland underwent similar training to combat troops.57

The earliest known work that focuses exclusively on the BDF was published by political scientist Richard Dale in 1984 and examines the formative structure and importance of the military to the sovereignty of Botswana. Dale’s article essentially serves as a preliminary survey of the new military and links the late establishment of the BDF to the country’s relative internal political stability. It also poses important questions and key considerations for future studies on the BDF.58

After Dale’s work, the literature appears to become stagnant until the 2000s when a series of BDF

– specific publications from Botswana historians, political scientists as well as uniformed military personnel from within the organisation and abroad were published. Major Mpho Mophuting,

Brigadier Paul Sharp and former commander General Louis Matshwenyego Fisher, and historian

Christian Makgala all published articles and book chapters that examined some aspects of the BDF during this time. Mophuting’s master’s thesis from the US Naval Postgraduate school examines the challenges of introducing women to the BDF by comparing the roles played by armed female personnel in the US Army, Canadian Armed Forces and SANDF. Though not necessarily historical in nature, his work offers insights on how the BDF could learn from these armed forces in

57 Ashley Jackson has mentioned Bechuanaland pioneer companies a few times, see for example War and Empire in Mauritius and the Indian Ocean (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 94; Jackson, “Motivation and Mobilisation for War: Recruitment for the British Army in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1941 – 42,” African Affairs 96 No. 384 (1997): 399 – 417. http://www.jstor.org/stable/723186, Accessed December 28, 201; Jackson, Botswana, 1939 – 1945; An African Country at War (New York: Claredon Press, 1999). See also Hamilton Sipho Simelane, “Labour Mobilisation for the War Effort in Swaziland, 1940 – 1942,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 26 No. 3 (1993): 541 – 574. http://www.jstor.org/stable/220478, Accessed December 28, 2018. 58 Richard Dale, “The Creation and use of the Botswana Defence Force” The Round Table 73, no. 290 (1984): 218. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358538408453637

37 recruiting Batswana women into the force.59 In 2005 Sharp and Fisher published a joint chapter that briefly examines the BDF from a military officer’s perspective. Sharp and Fisher’s work is important because it relies on insider knowledge to trace how the military in Botswana was established and evolved over the years.60 Fisher then published an article with Makgala that examines the impact of the Rhodesian liberation struggle on Botswana and, in particular, how the

Lesoma ambush of 1978 informed BDF policy from then onwards.61

In 2007, former US military attaché in Botswana Dan Henk became the first person to publish a book on the BDF though his work focused on its role in environmental preservation and anti – poaching activities in the national parks of Botswana. Henk, who researched this work while serving as a military diplomat, suggests that the BDF learned from some of its neighbouring countries that long had militarised anti – poaching operations to protect endangered wildlife species that were being killed for their horns and tusks. Henk also suggests that the experiences of the BDF in their numerous anti-poaching campaigns helped the troops hone their fighting and tracking skills.62 Henk’s work is highly detailed and relies on extensive archival research and numerous oral interviews of people within the BDF’s high command. He may have been given preferential access because he was a military attaché.

Apart from Henk, some other non-Batswana historians and military sociologists including

Zoltan Barany and Sherene Razack have dedicated a few paragraphs in their respective works to discuss the BDF. Razack stated that the Botswana contingents that took part in the U.N.

59 Mpho Mophuting, “Expanding the Shield and Facing the Challenges: Integration of Women in the Botswana Defence Force” (MA Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, 2003). 60 Paul T. Sharp and Louis M. Fisher, “Inside the Crystal Ball – Understanding the Evolution of the Military in Botswana and Challenges ahead” in Martin Rupiya (ed.) Evolutions and Revolutions, A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa (Pretorian, Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 43 – 62. 61 Christian Makgala and Louis M. Fisher, “The Impact of the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle on Botswana: The Case of Lesoma Ambush, 1978” New Contree 57 (2009): 160. 62 Dan Henk, The Botswana Defence Force in the Struggle for an African Environment (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

38 peacekeeping mission in Somalia between 1993 and 1994 were very courteous in dealing with

Somali locals which contributed in a positive way to their successes when compared to other military units. Similarly, Barany’s 2012 work echoed Razack’s message but goes further to link the successes of the BDF with the political and economic stability within Botswana.63

Other historians from Botswana including Maitseo Bolaane, Part Mgadla and Boipelo

Oitsile have mentioned the situation around the formation of the BDF in their respective works.

They correctly argue that the BDF was established in response to the escalation of the cross-border violence caused by the Rhodesian War (1966 – 1979).64 This research builds on this line of thinking but provides more nuanced and detailed explanations of how Botswana established its own military and traces its evolution over the years taking into consideration the local, regional and global contexts. Despite the BDF’s distinctiveness in Africa, the literature on it remains relatively limited in comparison to others that deal with the militaries of neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe.

*****

63 Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights, The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004), 42; Zoltan D. Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 275 – 296. 64 Boipelo Winnie Oitsile, “Botswana and the Liberation in South Africa and Zimbabwe: The Government and the People against White Racist Rule, (M.A. diss, Trent University, 2010) 94 – 95; Maitseo Bolaane, “Cross-Border Lives, Warfare and Rape in Independence- Era Botswana,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39 No. 3 (2013): 558, see also Part Mgadla, ‘“A good measure of sacrifice”: Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa, 1965–1985’, Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies, 34, 1 (2008): 5–16.

39 This study represents the first full attempt to trace the historical roots, establishment and growth of the BDF beginning with its small paramilitary forerunner, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), which operated from the 1960s to 1977. It takes into account the circumstances around the decision by the government of Botswana to not establish a military at independence only to turn around and hastily create the BDF eleven years later. Formed in response to the regional contentions that were taking place throughout the 1970s particularly around the war in Rhodesia, the new BDF then evolved largely due to external threats that emanated mainly for South Africa in the 1980s. By the

1990s, following the collapse of apartheid and a spike in Botswana’s diamond sales, the BDF enjoyed the latitude to expand more freely and become a major player in the peace and security of not only Botswana but also Southern Africa. During the early 2000s, the BDF continued its evolution by recruiting women which reflected the changes around gender in broader Botswana society.

The eight chapters that follow tell the story of the growth of one of Africa’s most unique militaries. The opening chapter lays the foundation of the study by focusing on the BDF’s paramilitary forerunner, the PMU which was established in the 1960s for internal security. It argues that the paramilitary force which was the closest entity to an army in colonial Botswana, was hurriedly militarised during independence in 1966 despite financial constraints to defend the country’s borders against Rhodesian aggression. The second chapter considers the regional and local contexts around the Botswana government’s decision to abruptly establish the BDF by act of parliament in April 1977 drawing its nucleus of men from the already militarised but small PMU.

It relies on new evidence to discuss the many perils that the BDF faced from early on which were largely a product of the liberation struggle in Rhodesia that lasted until 1979. The third chapter examines the role and function of the BDF in defending Botswana against South African

40 aggression in the 1980s. It demonstrates that the BDF presence was not strong enough to deter the

South African Defence Force (SADF), which on numerous occasions throughout this period, undertook deadly bombing campaigns in Botswana that culminated in the 1985 Gaborone raid that claimed a number of Batswana lives. This represented a turning point for the BDF which started acquiring better equipment to create new lethal capabilities to meet the South African threat.

Chapter 4 explores the politics around the acquisition of the lethal capabilities and how they improved the military effectiveness of the BDF. This chapter also uses new historical evidence to demonstrate how the strength and sway of the apartheid state in the region hindered the BDF’s attempts to build its air wing. The end of the Cold War era and the subsequent collapse of apartheid in South Africa opened new avenues for the expansion of the BDF. This theme is explored in

Chapter 5 which shows that the BDF could now expand more freely as seen with the brigade grouping exercise as well as its astronomical budget increases in the 1990s that came as a result of the growth in Botswana’s diamond revenues. Chapter 6 offers an examination of the roles played by the BDF in international peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Mozambique and Lesotho. These missions provided valuable lessons for the BDF but also allowed Botswana to help restore peace and stability in other African nations. Chapter 7 looks at recent changes within the BDF including the important decision in 2007 to finally recruit women into the force. It demonstrates that the

BDF high command produced a plan to introduce women to the military in the late 1980s though they did not implement it at that time. This delay was due to internal BDF attitudes and the lack of equal rights for women in the country which was eventually changed in the 1990s through tireless work of pressure groups such as Emang Basadi, making room for women to join the force.

Chapter 8 examines the diverse ways in which the BDF interacts with the society of Botswana in comparison to some postcolonial militaries across Africa. Though some of the social and public

41 programs such as the participation in various sports and band performances are not necessarily unique, they serve to present the BDF in a positive light in the eyes of the community and in many ways act as recruitment mechanisms. The conclusion then summarises the main points of this study and re-emphasises the argument that the BDF as an organisation deviates from the stereotype that most postcolonial African militaries are corrupt and unprofessional. While many African nations after the independence period descended into chaos with ethnically charged coups and civil wars, as well as general socio – economic strife, Botswana took steps in the opposite direction to build a steady democracy and implemented measures that ensured the economic welfare of its people.

The findings of this study demonstrate that the stable social, economic and political conditions that existed in Botswana created a conducive environment that allowed the BDF to grow into the professional military it is today.

42 Chapter 1: Our Boys at the Border; the Paramilitary Forerunner of the Botswana Defence Force

Introduction

Unlike most British territories in Africa, Bechuanaland (today’s Botswana) did not have a permanent military during colonial times. Today, many people incorrectly believe that since some

Batswana served in British imperial forces during both world wars then Bechuanaland must have had a colonial military. After both these wars, the uniformed but generally unarmed military labourers and pioneers from Bechuanaland were demobilized and returned to their normal lives in rural areas and as migrant workers in the mines of South Africa.65 The British colonial administration policy in Bechuanaland was that of minimal occupation, that is, they never intended to invest a lot of resources or funds in a country that they described as barren and that merely served as a passage to the north. Because of this colonial policy, the country that became Botswana at independence in September 1966 was one of the poorest in the world with only 11 kilometres of tarred road, non-existent health and education systems, and its administrative capital was located outside of its border in Mafeking, South Africa.66 Due to this minimal colonial presence coupled with a small population and relative stability within the territory, there was no reason for the British colonial government to create a western style military structure. To maintain control of the masses and enforce the rule of law, the British administration instead relied on small constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police and later the Police Mobile

Unit (PMU). Furthermore, this lack of a locally recruited military in Bechuanaland may have been informed by the fact that for many years there had been a possibility that the High Commission

65 Ashley Jackson, Botswana, 1939 – 1945: An African Country at War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 128. see also Schmitt, Bechuanaland Pioneers. 66 See for example, Anthony Sillery, Botswana: A Short Political History (Suffolk: Methuen & Co. LTD, 1976), Schmidt, Bechuanaland Pioneers, 6-7.

43 Territories would be incorporated into the Union of South Africa which, as a white minority state, had an exclusively white defence force.67

The PMU was the paramilitary force of Bechuanaland created between 1961 and 1963. In its early days, it had several functions that included VIP protection, and conducting ceremonial parades but its most important role, one which this chapter addresses exclusively, was its border defence duties that began in late 1966. Given the serious lack of historical literature on the PMU, this chapter becomes the first to use oral and written primary sources to construct a holistic account of the creation and function of this paramilitary unit in colonial Botswana. Amongst other points, it demonstrates that unlike similar police mobile units in other British colonies in the region such as Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi today) that were created in the

1950s in response to uprisings by colonised Africans, the PMU of Bechuanaland was founded much later owing to financial constraints in the territory. Apart from that, there had been a general reluctance by the colonial administrators to create the PMU and they emphasised that the existing police force ought to be re-trained in order to hone their intelligence gathering skills simply because there were no funds to create and arm a paramilitary force in colonial Botswana at the time. This underscores the colonial administration’s lack of enthusiasm to invest in developing

Bechuanaland. There were major changes in the political climate of the British colonies that started to take place in the 1950s which led to the creation of police mobile forces or units. Initially, the

African uprisings of the 1950s were generally localised and had limited objectives but by the 1960s the context for these uprisings had changed drastically into armed resistance particularly in neighbouring Rhodesia, South Africa South West Africa (Namibia). This forced the colonial

67 See for example Ian Van Der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015) and Richard Dale “The Politics of National Security in Botswana: 1900-1990” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 12 no. 1 (1993): 41 – 42. DOI: 10.1080/02589009308729547

44 government of Botswana to create the PMU in anticipation of more domestic unrest as well as external influence from these wars of national liberation. Created on a very tight budget, the small, undertrained and poorly equipped PMU suddenly became militarised in late 1966, that is, it acquired military grade weapons and training in the wake of struggles for liberation in neighbouring countries therefore becoming Botswana’s only means of defence. It continued performing border defence duties until 1977 when the BDF was finally created.

The Roots of the PMU – 1948 ‘Communist inspired Native Rebellions’

When historians examine post-colonial African militaries, they usually begin with an evaluation of the colonial origins of those forces where they compare different factors such as the functions of those militaries in society, the makeup of the rank and file, as well as details about training, uniform and conditions of services. These comparative studies often try to track the changes that took place during the transition from the colonial period to independence.68 The BDF however, deviates from this norm as it does not have a direct colonial history but instead grew out of the

PMU which was created to respond to unrest and riots in the territory and help quell African disturbances in the other High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Basutoland (today’s Lesotho) and Swaziland. Despite its relatively late creation, the origins of Bechuanaland’s PMU can be traced back to rebellions that took place in Basutoland in the late 1940s. The British colonial officials, as a result of those uprisings, grew uneasy about the ripple effects they might have on

Bechuanaland but lacked the funds to arm the police.

68 See amongst others, Miners, The Nigerian Army; see also John V. Clune, The Abongo Abroad: Military- Sponsored Travel in Ghana, the United States, and the World, 1959-1992 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2017); Parsons, The African Rank and File and Moyd, Violent Intermediaries.

45 Colonial policing was an essential part of maintaining order within British territories both in Africa and elsewhere. Between the late 1940s and the 1960s, there was a rise in nationalism and nationalist protests which eventually led to the initial stages of decolonisation.69 Because of varying colonial policies, the role of the colonial police forces differed greatly as well. In some cases, Bechuanaland for instance, decolonisation was peaceful and resulted from negotiation while in other countries such as Rhodesia, it resulted from a protracted armed struggle that spanned the

1960s and 1970s. The introduction of police mobile units in some British colonies was generally in response to nationalist uprisings against colonial authority though some had been created prior.

In the Gold Coast, today’s Ghana, the British officials created the Police Mobile Force (PMF) in

1947 in anticipation of growing discontent amongst locals. On 28 February 1948 many African ex

– servicemen in Accra launched a protest to try and get the colonial administration to listen to their grievances about unpaid pensions and compensations. This peaceful protest turned violent when the colonial police was called in to quell it which resulted in the death of several protestors.70

At around the same time of the Accra riots, a group of Africans in Basutoland who were dissatisfied by the colonial administration organised a protest that the local police force managed to supress after some struggle. Some HCT officials saw a connection between the Gold Coast uprising and the ones in Basutoland and called for better equipped and trained African police forces.71 Though not as widespread as the Gold Coast rebellion, the Basutoland uprisings of 1948

69 David Killingray and David M. Anderson, “An orderly retreat? Policing the end of empire” in Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917 – 65, ed. David Killingray and David M. Anderson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 2 – 3. 70 Richard Rathbone, “Political Intelligence and Policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s” in Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917 – 65, ed. David Killingray and Anderson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 84. 71 The National Archives of the UK hereafter (TNA) TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from Acting Commissioner of Police to Government Secretary titled “Internal Security” dated 4 September 1948. See also in the same file, a letter dated 13 September 1948 from Anthony Sillery to H.E. Priestman regarding British fears of Africans learning about Malayan and Cold Coast uprisings.

46 presented a new major challenge for policing the HCTs. The Basutoland colonial police had in fact struggled to contain the uprisings so the Bechuanaland administrators began to press the issue of containing the spill over of communist ideas that might lead to unrest in the territory. However, because of the tight budget the colonial officials aimed to bolster the local police intelligence networks which would work well in detecting dissidents before they inspired other Africans to rebel. 72 The officials were generally concerned with the fact that the existing police lacked tactical skills to use when responding to such riots. Furthermore, when the Second World War broke out, the colonial police had been drawn into the war effort which left policing in Bechuanaland to new and untrained officers:

The present state of military efficiency of the [police] force leaves much room for improvement. The tendency in recent years has been to concentrate on the civil police aspects of training and reduce to a minimum instruction in military subjects. This was necessitated by the exodus of a large proportion of experienced policemen and their replacement by untrained men after the late war … it is [therefore] essential to arrange for instruction in tactical subjects and not drill to be given to officers and other ranks. Much of this can be done at the Police Training Depot but arrangements should also be made with the Union Defence Force for certain officers and subordinate officers to attend appropriate courses of instruction at the Military College.73

To bolster their tactical responses, it was recommended that the Bechuanaland police also acquire radio equipment, and light machine guns which included two Lewis machine guns and two Bren guns possibly to be used as deterrents but also to increase firepower when needed. The colonial officials also expressed a dire need to improve police mobility because during the colonial period, the administration of Bechuanaland was based in Mafeking in South Africa which made it

72 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports – Letter from Acting Commissioner to Government Secretary titled “Internal Security” dated 4 September 1948. In his mind ‘communist motivated’ political activities had been rife in Basutoland and needed to be contained before they spilled over to Bechuanaland 73 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from Acting Commissioner of Police to Government Secretary titled “Internal Security” dated 4 September 1948.

47 extremely difficult to address local uprisings when they took place.74 By 1948 there was some consensus amongst colonial officials, though not all, that the existing police was insufficient and needed to be bolstered against possible uprisings. Despite the fact that the Resident Commissioner,

Anthony Sillery also agreed with this need to improve the police, he made other officials aware that these efforts would greatly cripple the already weak economy of the territory. He highlighted the importance of intelligence gathering instead of funding the training of hand-picked Africans to form a special unit of the police.75 Sillery seemed to believe that the police force, which was made up of 38 European commissioned officers as well as 214 Africans, was adequate to deal with internal unrest therefore there was no need to be panicked by the Accra uprisings.76

Generally, most of Southern Africa and indeed the majority of the continent experienced nationalist protests and destabilisation in this period. This situation was worsened by the existence of white minority governments in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia that refused to afford civil rights to Africans. For instance, the results of the May 1948 elections in South Africa marked the beginning of an entrenchment of apartheid but also led to further discontent by black South

Africans who knew that this meant a total loss of political rights. As a result, colonies that did not have specialised units of their police forces rushed to create them with combat or paramilitary roles in mind. The police Mobile Unit (MU) of Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) was created at the end of 1949 drawing from the regular police force as a response to numerous occurrences of unrest

74 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from Acting Commissioner of Police to Government Secretary, Mafeking titled “Internal Security” dated 4 September 1948. 75 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from Anthony Sillery to H.E. Priestman dated 13 September 1948. See also TNA: FCO 141/1176, Letter from Walter Harragin to Philip Noel-Baker dated 24 November 1948. The colonial officials ruled out the influence of these uprisings on Southern Africa. 76 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter dated 13 September 1948 from Anthony Sillery to H.E. Priestman regarding British fears of Africans learning about Malayan and Cold Coast uprisings.

48 in the country’s copper producing region.77 The uprisings started in the Nkana copper mines in

Kitwe due to poor working conditions, marginal pay and the general lack of effort from the mining administration to improve the living conditions of the African miners.78 In Nyasaland in 1954, the colonial officials drew men from the regular police force to create a Police Mobile Force (PMF).

This was done hastily to subdue African unrest resulting from dissatisfaction with Nyasaland’s inclusion in the new Central African Federation (CAF) (1953 – 1963) that was dominated by the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia.79 The PMF’s role was to stamp out nationalist protest and maintain order within Nyasaland.

Contrary to these regional developments, the Bechuanaland administrators delayed in creating a police mobile unit. As a matter of fact, the strength of the Bechuanaland Protectorate

Police was reduced in 1949 due to the country’s poor economy.80 This was a disastrous decision because between 1950 and 1952 violent riots broke out in the Bamangwato reserve. Because the strength of the police had been reduced, it was unable to deal with the uprisings summarily.81 At the end of the 1951 riots, the rank and file of the Bechuanaland police was slightly increased by

23 men in order to meet the demands of policing in the territory but this was not enough.82

Furthermore, the British officers were sent for training at the Maseru training depot in Basutoland for an undisclosed period where it was hoped they would improve their riot control skills to

77 Tim B. Wright, The History of the Northern Rhodesia Police (Bristol: BECM Press), 20. 78 Samson Zimba, “Mobile Unit” Zambia Police Service, http://www.zambiapolice.gov.zm/index.php/advanced- stuff accessed February 5, 2019. 79 John McCracken “Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police Force” The Journal of African History 27, No. 1 (1986): 39-40 see also Philip Murphy “A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, 4, (2010): 779 80 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Report by W. C. Johnson, Inspector General of Colonial Police to the High Commissioner, Sir Evelyn Baring dated 30 October 1950. 81 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from J.H. Le Rougetel to Lord Ismay – Commonwealth Relations Officer, dated 4 December 1951. 82 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Report by W. C. Johnson, Inspector General of Colonial Police to the High Commissioner, Sir Evelyn Baring dated 30 October 1950.

49 effectively address any future uprisings. Some officers had also attended “specialist training courses in the United Kingdom at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore … particularly while on leave”83 Other improvements to the police in 1951 included the acquisition of new radio equipment as well as transportation.84 These efforts to bolster the police in this period were however not enough to contain riots by Africans because the following year, 1952 saw even bloodier uprisings in Serowe and Mahalapye.

Since 1950, there had been the lingering issue of the Bamangwato succession in which the colonial administration barred Seretse Khama from his rightful position as the future paramount chief because while studying in the United Kingdom, he met and fell in love with a white English woman, Ruth Williams. This did not sit well with Bamangwato traditionalists led by Tshekedi

Khama, Seretse’s uncle, who were also favoured by the colonial administration. Khama however had a strong following that vowed to stand by him regardless of his marriage to Miss Williams.85

Though the colour bar was not as strong in colonial Botswana as compared to neighbouring apartheid South Africa, it was somewhat taboo for an African to have relations with a white woman let alone marry her. By that token, race had found its way into the Bamangwato political structure and divided them. It put them at odds with each other and against the colonial administration eventually leading to violent uprisings.

The accounts of the riots differ but what is known is that Keaboka Kgamane and Peto

Sekgoma (likely spelled Pheto) were part of Seretse’s followers who had been denied the rights to hold traditional kgotla meetings and rallied other followers of Seretse to riot against the colonial

83 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from J.H. Le Rougetel to Lord Ismay – Commonwealth Relations Officer, dated 4 December 1951. 84 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from J.H. Le Rougetel to Lord Ismay – Commonwealth Relations Officer, dated 4 December 1951. 85 Neil Parsons “The Serowe Kgotla riot of 1952, popular opposition to Tshekedi Khama and colonial rule in Botswana” Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth Studies 40 (1990): 24.

50 administration.86 The lot were also unhappy with the barring of Seretse from his position among the Bamangwato leadership. The small but recently re-trained Bechuanaland police showed weaknesses in their overall response to the Serowe riots which prompted the administration to call in a contingent of 20 European and 100 African British South Africa Police (BSAP) from Southern

Rhodesia to subdue the rioters by any means necessary.87 The clashes between the rioters and the police resulted in the deaths of three African members of the BSAP while twelve were seriously injured.88 It is important here to highlight the logistical nightmare the Bechuanaland police experienced during these riots. Because the garrison headquarters of the police was in Mafeking, it was easier for the BSAP to be deployed from Southern Rhodesia to quell this riot in the

Bamangwato reserve. Furthermore, the BSAP African Police Platoon had more appropriate training and equipment to effectively counter a riot than the Bechuanaland Police so it was best to call them in as reinforcements during uprisings. Though Bechuanaland was not immune to this type of unrest that plagued most of colonial Africa in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the financial constraints and to some extent, the availability of the BSAP, contributed largely to the lax attitude that the colonial officials had towards creating the PMU at that time.89

Armed Liberation Struggles and the PMU: early to mid 1960s

The 1960s brought a wave of changes to the political climate of the colonies as Africans started to ramp up their pursuits for national liberation through violent means. In Southern Africa, the turn to armed struggle was because the white supremacist governments in the region started using

86 Parsons “The Serowe Kgotla riot of 1952,” 25. 87 “Riots at Serowe: BSA Police Flown from Salisbury,” The Rhodesia Herald, 3 June 1952, .1, “Thirty-Eight Native Leaders Arrested in Serowe” The Rhodesia Herald, 4 June 1952, 1 see also “Firm Action Quells Bamangwato – Determined Police Meet No Resistance” The Rhodesia Herald, 6 June 1952, 1 and Stapleton, African Police and Soldiers, 194. 88 “Riots at Serowe: BSA Police Flown from Salisbury,” The Rhodesia Herald, 3 June 1952, 1. 89 Dan Henk erroneously pointed out that the PMU was created in 1952. See Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 33-34.

51 deadly force against African protestors. African nationalist movements in white minority ruled

Rhodesia and South Africa, South African occupied South West Africa (Namibia) and Portuguese colonies Angola and Mozambique that had initially tried to gain independence through negotiations started acquiring arms and some military training in order to respond to the violence from the white minority and colonial governments. In South Africa for instance, the massacre of protesting Africans in Sharpeville in March 1960 and the banning of both the African National

Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) that same year eventually led to an armed struggle against the apartheid government.90 Further north within the same period, the

CAF was also on its last days and finally collapsed in 1963 mainly due to prolonged nationalist protests against it.91 Ultimately, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed faction of the ANC and

Poqo the armed wing of the PAC were both formed in 1961 with the aim to spearhead the armed struggle against apartheid.92 This was, however, a very difficult task because the exiled bases of both movements were outside of South Africa as far as Tanzania, while some of their cadres were trained abroad in the Soviet Union and China by 1964.93 Within this period, Bechuanaland served as a passage for MK cadres leaving South Africa for training in Zambia and those returning to join the fight. A report prepared by the Central Intelligence Committee (CIC) in Botswana noted in

1966 that there had been a steady flow of freedom fighters since the early 1960s from “Rhodesia

90 Bernard Magubane et al “The Turn to Armed Struggle” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol 1. 1960 – 1970, ed. Bridget Theron (Johannesburg: UNISA Press, 2005), 53 – 54, see also Kwandile Kondlo In The Twilight of the Revolution: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa), 1959 – 1994 (Switzerland: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2009), 113-115. 91 See amongst others John McCraken, A History of Malawi, 1851 – 1966 (Suffolk: James Curry Press, 2012); Andrew Cohen, The Politics and Economics of Southern Africa: The Failed Experiment of the Central African Federation (London: I. B. Tauris and Co., 2017); Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa – The Making of Malawi, 1873 1964 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Larry W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia – White Power in an African State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 92 Rendani Moses Ralinala et al “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol 1. 1960 – 1970, ed. Bridget Theron (Johannesburg: UNISA Press, 2005), 435. 93 Ralinala et al, “The Wankie”, 437.

52 into Zambia en route to their training centres … so it should also be anticipated that when African states finally resort to the use of organised military force against Rhodesia, various influences and stresses would thereby be exerted upon Bechuanaland which would probably call for the military defence of her northern areas.”94 It was within this political context that the PMU was formally set up though it took the colonial administrators about three years to officially launch the PMU which drew men from the regular African police force. An official report states that:

The establishment of a PMU, or Auxiliary Force as it was termed, was originally recommended in January 1961 by the DIGCP Mr. Morris. The Bechuanaland Government formulated proposals to this end in March 1962. For various reasons formal and detailed proposals were not sent to London until January 1963. In July 1963 … the High Commissioner for BB & S [HCTs], pressed the need for early approval for these proposals and illustrated it by reference to “recent Swaziland disturbances” … the battalion was sent unexpectedly to Swaziland as an emergency measure.95

This illustrates the hasty nature in which the PMU came into existence. It was established to respond to internal unrest and to augment other HCT police forces in responding to what the colonial administrators assumed were communist inspired uprisings. According to the now retired

Major General Bakwena Oitsile who joined the PMU in 1967, the PMU was established to maintain internal security in the territory though it had several other functions. Domestically,

Botswana faced some minor threats of secession and inter-tribal disputes between a group of

Bakalaka / Kalanga people in the Northeast District and their Bamangwato overlords in the Central

District. An official document described the Bakalaka / Kalanga as a “belligerent and cohesive group who were tougher than other tribes in the territory and more likely to seek their independence from the rest of the country which would cause a serious security threat”.96 The PMU, as a riot

94 The Botswana National Archives, hereafter (BNARS) BNARS OP 58/2 – Defence: Police Mobile Unit, Report from Central Intelligence Committee dated 5 August 1966. 95 BNARS OP 58/2 – Defence: Police Mobile Unit, File Note regarding the history of the PMU from Deputy Commissioner dated 11 August 1966. 96 BNARS OP 58/2 – Defence Police Mobile Unit, Report prepared by the Central Intelligence Committee (CIC) dated 5 August 1966.

53 control and paramilitary unit, had to be more vigilant in some parts of Francistown where these belligerent Bakalaka / Kalanga usually gathered. Furthermore, the opposition political parties such as the Botswana People’s Party (BPP) and the Botswana National Front (BNF) were described as pro-communist because their leadership had travelled to both the Soviet Union and China in the

1960s.97 The CIC deemed them a threat to national security and also had their gatherings watched closely by the police in case their followers rioted. In essence, Botswana in the late 1960s also experienced some political shifts even though no major politically inspired incidents took place.

The PMU and the CIC had been monitoring these domestic developments from early on.

Generally, the PMU was smaller and less equipped when compared to the police mobile units of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia for instance. At its formation it was divided into companies A and B, with the latter focusing mainly on protection of VIPs in the new capital,

Gaborone, while the Francistown based A Company later conducted border patrols mostly on foot as they had limited transport.98 A company also guarded the Central African Relay Station (CARS) that had been built by the British government to broadcast messages of support to the liberation movements into Rhodesia.99 The unit mirrored British police culture in their training and paramilitary tactics. This also applied to the drills they performed, their rank structure as well as uniform.100 Although the PMU was part of the police and overseen by a police superintendent,101 it wore a distinctive military-like uniform to match their paramilitary tasks. That is to say they looked more like soldiers and less like the regular police.102 From its formation in 1963, the PMU

97 Ibid 98 Oitisle, Interview. 99 Richard Dale, “The Creation and use” 218. 100 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 74. Oitsile confirmed that they kept the same ranks that they had used in the regular police. 101 Mompati Sebogodi Merafhe, The General; In the Service of my Country – The Autobiography of Mompati Sebogodi Merafhe (Gaborone: Diamond Education Publishers, 2015), 31 102 Oitsile, Interview.

54 received substantial training “from the British … reinforcing already strict police standards of discipline and high regard for legal protocol.”103 The biggest difference from the regular police was its mobility that enabled it to get to various points of friction quicker using motor vehicles, horses, bicycles and motorcycles and perhaps camels.104

The PMU and the Struggle for Zimbabwe

In 1965, the minority government of Southern Rhodesia under Ian Smith went rogue and unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from the British crown. Following the breakup of the

Central African Federation and the independence of Malawi and Zambia in 1964, this move was a desperate act by this white minority government to cling to power and not afford civil rights to black Rhodesians. Earlier in the 1960s, black Rhodesians had founded political movements such as the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union

(ZANU) to protest for civil rights, but these were dealt a huge blow by the Smith’s government.

Following the UDI, both these liberation movements armed themselves and started a guerrilla war against white Rhodesian forces. When their war against the Smith regime started, the Zimbabwe

African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) the armed wing of ZANU and the Zimbabwe

People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the armed wing of ZAPU operated from exile in

Zambia.105 By 1965, the exiled South African ANC had opened an office in Zambia that facilitated the training of its MK cadres who between 1967 and 1968, joined forces with ZIPRA guerrillas to

103 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 74. 104 TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports, Letter from Walter Harragin to Philip Noel-Baker, dated 24 November 1948. 105 The literature on this is vast. See for example Eliakim M. Sibanda The Zimbabwe African People’s Union – 1961 – 87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia, (Trenton: Africa World Press Inc. 2005); see also Bolaane, “Cross-Border Lives”: 558 and Mgadla, “A good measure of sacrifice:” 5. See also Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin The Rhodesian War, A Military History (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008), 31-31; David Martin and Phylis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe – The Chimurenga War (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), 9 – 10.

55 try and establish recruiting bases and launch attacks near Victoria Falls in Rhodesia. These bases would also be used to prepare for what came to be called the Wankie Campaign.106 MK had originally planned to infiltrate South Africa through Botswana, but this plan failed after its guerrillas were encountered and arrested by the PMU. In one of the Wankie battles against

Rhodesian forces, “47 of the insurgents were killed … more than 20 were captured and the survivors, many of them wounded, escaped into Botswana, where they were imprisoned but subsequently released into the care of Zambian authorities.”107 The fact that the PMU did not send them back into Rhodesia where they would face imminent death suggests that the government of

Botswana was sympathetic to the liberation struggle. The MK-ZIPRA military efforts spilled into the Chobe area of northern Botswana and resulted in the involvement of South African forces who after this, frequently entered Botswana in pursuit of cadres of the liberation movements of ZAPU and ANC. The Wankie campaign marked the beginning of cross border ‘hot pursuits’ by

Rhodesian and South African forces into Botswana to try and kill or capture MK-ZIPRA guerrillas.108 Botswana’s economic relationship with South Africa and Rhodesia forced the PMU to keep arresting any freedom fighters that entered Botswana illegally. In most cases, the guerrillas were apprehended while carrying weapons, so this added a charge of smuggling them into the country. The Botswana government after independence became pressed to end the use of its territory as a conduit by liberation fighters to and from South Africa. In October 1966, President

Seretse Khama, addressing the National Assembly of Botswana, stated:

My government will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and will not tolerate interference in Botswana’s affairs by other countries. In particular, we will not permit Botswana to be used as a base for the organisation or direction of violent activities

106 Ralinala et al, “The Wankie”, 436; Moorcraft and McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War, 31 – 32. 107 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War, 32. 108 Bongani Gumbo “Economic and Social Change in the Communities of the Wetlands of Chobe and Ngamiland, with Special Reference to the Period since 1960” (PhD diss., University of Cape Town, 2010), 167.

56 directed against other states and we will expect reciprocal treatment from our neighbours.109

This decision was driven by economic factors centred around the Mafeking-Bulawayo railway line which linked the economies of Southern Rhodesia, Botswana and South Africa.110 Khama’s government also feared harsh reprisals by Rhodesian security forces who by 1966 had started their illegal cross-border incursions to pursue freedom fighters from neighbouring Rhodesia.111 Despite being economically reliant on both countries, the Botswana government expressed sympathy towards the liberation struggles in its neighbouring countries by granting asylum to legitimate political refugees from South Africa while armed liberation fighters crossing into Botswana illegally would be apprehended. MK, having no choice but to transit through Botswana, adopted tactics such as disguising themselves as fishermen to avoid detection by the PMU though some were still arrested numerous times throughout this period. 112

The government of Botswana in August 1967 went a step further and prosecuted MK-

ZIPRA freedom fighters who had fled into Botswana following the Wankie campaign for weapons smuggling and handed them lengthy prison sentences.113 Following an Organisation of African

Unity (OAU) intervention in 1968, the insurgents were released and it was at this point that

Botswana started to adopt a more lenient policy towards foreign freedom fighters though this

109 Gwendolyn Carter and Philip E. Morgan, ed. From the Frontline: Speeches of Sir Seretse Khama (London: Rex Collins, 1980), 66 – 68. 110 Ralinala et al, “The Wankie”, 439, see also Christian Makgala & Bakang Seabo, “‘Very Brave or Very Foolish’? ‘Gallant Little’ Botswana’s Defiance of ‘Apartheid’s Golden Age’, 1966–1980 The Round Table (2017): 7; Mgadla, “A good measure of sacrifice”1: 5. 111 BNARS Hansard 57, National Assembly, Second Meeting, Third Session, Third Parliament, Sittings from 29 November to 17 December 1976 – Address by Dr. Q. K. J. Masire, p. 247. 112 Wazha Morapedi “The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwean Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960–1979” Journal of Southern African Studies, 38 no. 1 (2012): 75. See also Dale “The Politics”: 43. 113 Ralinala et al, “The Wankie”, 529.

57 meant that the South African and Rhodesian forces had an even bigger reason for crossing into

Botswana to conduct their illegal raids.114

The threat of cross border incursions was not only isolated to eastern Botswana despite the fact that a majority of them took place there. To the west was South West Africa (today’s Namibia), a former colony of Germany that had been under white minority rule of apartheid South Africa since the end of the First World War. Like other Africans in the region at the time, South West

Africans also created political parties that later fought a bloody war for independence. The more successful nationalist movement was the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) which was founded in 1960. In its initial days SWAPO pursued a diplomatic or non-violent approach to liberate the country from South African rule but as this dragged on, it moved towards armed struggle by the mid 1960s.115 Despite Khama’s October 1966 address, freedom fighters from the region still made their way into Botswana. SWAPO guerrillas on 21 March 1967 crossed into Botswana and made their way on foot to Seronga, a village in Northwest Botswana located about 100 km from the Caprivi border. According to a Botswana Daily News report, the Botswana police encountered the 10 heavily armed SWAPO guerrillas after a few days of tracking them. The insurgents managed to evade capture and flee back towards the Caprivi border “leaving behind eight Chinese carbines, two Bren guns and 2500 rounds of ammunition, plus food and medical supplies.”116 Because the country did not have a military of its own, border patrol duties fell to the

PMU and despite being spread thinly across the country, the paramilitary force managed to make numerous arrests of armed insurgents entering Botswana between 1966 and 1977. This was made

114 Ralinala et al, “The Wankie”, 529. 115 Lauren Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960 – 1991: War by other means (Klosterberg: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 1998), 27 – 28. See also Johann Alexander Muller, The Inevitable Pipeline into Exile: Botswana’s Role In the Namibian Liberation Struggle (Klosterberg: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2012) and Peter Katjavivi A History of Resistance in Namibia (Woodbridge: James Currey Publishers, 1988), 43 – 45. 116 “Botswana Police Encounter with Police” The Botswana Daily News, 21 March 1967.

58 possible by villagers in border areas who would report any sight of guerrillas to the nearest police stations. The absence of a physical border between Botswana and Rhodesia also made it easy for

SWAPO, MK and ZIPRA freedom fighters to stroll into Botswana. In major hubs such as

Francistown, the PMU work was aided by district intelligence committees that kept a close eye and made frequent written reports on Rhodesian freedom fighters some of whom by the 1970s had settled there as legitimate political refugees.117

The PMU conducted patrols in border areas including Siviya, Senyawe, Maitengwe,

Matsiloje, Francistown, Seronga and Kasane among others. According to former PMU member

General Oitsile, “the greater part of the job was on foot patrol where we would be given an area from which to establish our bases and it was from those bases, we would then have to take patrols to certain given distances along the border.”118 A typical PMU border patrol lasted for one or two weeks and consisted of a 10-man section mounted in a British-made Landrover. It was during these missions that they would encounter armed guerrillas within Botswana borders.119 In most cases, the freedom fighters surrendered their weapons willingly to the PMU after crossing into Botswana.

General Oitsile recalls one such occurrence in 1968 when about 24 ZIPRA guerrillas crossed into

Botswana. After some time on their trail, a PMU section finally caught up with the guerrillas and even though the ZIPRA insurgents far outnumbered that PMU section, they chose not to engage but rather simply handed their weapons over and surrendered into PMU custody.120 This was possibly because they knew that the Botswana government would send them to Zambia and not to

Rhodesia. A significant number of the PMU’s Francistown based A-Company were Batswana who

117 BNARS OP 28/10: District Intel Reports – Francistown, A series of meeting reports of the Francistown District Intelligence Committee held on 27 April 1971. 118 Oitsile, Interview. 119 Interview with Major Gabatlhokwe (Rtd) and Lt. Col. Mooketsi (Rtd), 29 November 2018, Gaborone. 120 Oitsile, Interview.

59 fluently spoke the Kalanga language common on both sides of the Botswana – Rhodesia border.

This enabled the PMU to communicate with ZIPRA freedom fighters.121 Furthermore, the

Batswana in this area not only shared a language with the people in the Plumtree area of Rhodesia, which was close to Francistown, they also had relatives there which made it easy for the freedom fighters to blend in with the Batswana particularly in larger and busier places like Francistown. By that token, Batswana in the Northeast felt that Rhodesia’s liberation struggle was theirs to a certain extent. 122

The PMU not only had to deal with armed insurgents from Rhodesia and the pursuing

Rhodesian forces but at some point, during the war they had the task of chasing after a certain

Georges Geib, commonly known as Rennie Less in Botswana. He was a Belgian born international criminal and illegal arms dealer who had built a reputation around terrorising villagers across

Botswana in the mid - 1970s. He was a wanted man in various Europeans countries in connection to various crimes including common theft, identity theft, illegal arms trade and numerous other offences. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Less surfaced in Egypt, Sudan, Malawi, Tanzania, and

South Africa but was eventually shot and killed by a PMU detachment in 1975.123 His reasons for being in Botswana are not clearly known except that he was selling weapons to South African freedom fighters. While in Botswana, Less also killed several people including members of the police which made him a highly wanted man.124 The mission to eliminate the terrorist Less was a matter of national security that had to be done as swiftly as possible and the PMU, being the better equipped and trained organisation, assumed that role.125 In some way, the PMU was carrying out

121 Oitsile, Interview 122 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 160. 123 “Confirmation of Identity of Rene Less, November 21, 1975 https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975GABORO01598_b.html Accessed March 27, 2019. 124 Oitsile, Interview. 125 Captain Losika Keatlholetswe, Interview with author, December 1, 2018, Gaborone.

60 a duty that would otherwise be handed to a military because there was no one better suited for the task.

Independence without a Defence Force and Cross-Border Raids: late 1960s – early 1977

While Smith’s UDI led to a protracted armed struggle in Rhodesia, Bechuanaland was well on its way towards independence. Between 1965 and 1966 the country had a taste of autonomy with a temporary self-government under Seretse Khama, who become the first president of independent

Botswana on 30 September 1966. In this period, the administration of the country moved from

Mafeking in South Africa to the new capital, Gaborone in Botswana. The militarisation of the

PMU followed later that year in response to the ongoing threat of liberation struggles spilling over into Botswana.

The PMU was also tasked with providing security for the VIPs of the territory who were mainly the Resident Commissioner towards the end of the colonial period and later the Prime

Minister, Seretse Khama between 1965 and 1966. 126 Its VIP protection function lasted until 1977 when the BDF was formed and assumed that role. The PMU was also tasked with performing ceremonial parades during official visits.127 As time went on and as liberation struggles in neighbouring countries grew, it took up the task of defending the borders of Botswana between

1966 and 1977, as there was no army to do so. This became one of its most important functions which eventually led to the PMU becoming the nucleus of BDF.

Instead of creating an army at independence, the government of Seretse Khama chose only to slightly bolster the PMU. In parliament, the new president resisted the idea of creating an army even after numerous motions by members of the opposing political parties such as T. W.

126 Oitsile, Interview. 127 Oitsile, Interview. See also Merafhe, The General, 31

61 Motlhagodi and Philip Matante. For instance, on 16 March 1966, prior to independence,

Motlhagodi raised a motion to parliament that there should be extensive military training for the

PMU as the country was moving towards independence. His reason was that other countries at independence had some sort of armed force and he implored Bechuanaland to follow suit.

Motlhagodi strongly felt that the PMU’s military training was insufficient to defend the country should an attack occur. He knew that ANC freedom fighters were using Botswana as a transit route which would bring war to Botswana.128 Khama quickly dismissed Motlhagodi’s fears and stated that there was no need to create an army at that time. Matante had also previously motioned several times to parliament about the need to create an army prior to independence but to no avail. The northeast of Botswana was the stronghold for Botswana opposition political parties and so Matante and Motlhagodi naturally had fears of what would happen to Batswana living in those areas should there be attacks by Rhodesian and South African security forces. Khama, on the other hand, seems to have strongly believed that the PMU was sufficient to perform any military duties should that happen and that is why he dismissed Matante and Motlhagodi’s assertions. In January 1968, member of parliament Mr. Nwako, then Minister of State told parliament that the government had

“embarked upon a very active training for [the] members of the Police Force, almost placing them on a paramilitary basis” with the hope that they would satisfy the security requirements of the time.129 It is clear that Khama’s government had legitimate financial concerns that restricted the formation of the army at independence. The only thing they could do was try and improve the

PMU using financial aid from the British Commonwealth Office after independence.130

128 ANC and PAC by 1966 had used Botswana as a transit route to and from their training centres in Zambia. See BNARS OP 58/2 “Defence: Police Mobile Unit, Report prepared by the Central Intelligence Committee, dated 5 August 1966, 8 – 9. 129 BNARS BNB 832 – Hansard 11, National Assembly, Sittings from, 8 – 17 January 1968 – Address from Mr. Nwako, Minister of State on readiness of the PMU 130 BNARS OP 58/2 – Defence: Police Mobile Unit, Secret Telex from HMC Bechuanaland to Commonwealth Office, dated 11 August 1966.

62 Furthermore, the militarisation of the PMU could only happen after R372 000, that had been originally set aside for famine relief, was used to pay for acquiring modern weapons in 1966.131

To meet the demands of policing the borders, the government was also forced to adjust the police budget by an additional “R254 000 to cover the cost of providing modern weapons for three existing platoons and the capital cost of one additional platoon.”132 The infantry weapons of choice were acquired from Belgium and they included the self – loading rifle, FN FAL and some general- purpose machine guns or GPMGs, in this case the FN MAG.133 These were the same weapons used by the British Army at the time and the acquisition of these weapons points to a continued

British military culture within the PMU. As time went on, Botswana had to rely on Britain to secure more funds for the overall development and expansion of the PMU, particularly after

1967.134 It was unusual for a country surrounded by white minority governments at war with nationalist movements to not create a national armed force to defend its borders. Botswana seemed to follow the example of Costa Rica, a country that abolished its army in 1948 and chose to rely on a paramilitary force to perform its military duties.135 In West Africa, the Gambia Regiment had existed during colonial times as part of Britain’s West African Frontier Force but was disbanded in 1958. Owing to the relatively small size of the country, lack of funds to sustain the military and a general lack of security concerns, Gambia’s defence duties were handed to a paramilitary unit

131 BNARS OP 58/2 – Defence: Police Mobile Unit, Correspondence between H. A. Arthington-Davy of the British High Commission and J. A. Allison, Senior Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, Gaborone, 21 November 1966. 132 BNARS OP 58/2 – Defence: Police Mobile Unit, Correspondence between H. A. Arthington-Davy of the British High Commission and J. A. Allison, Senior Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, Gaborone, 21 November 1966. 133 Gabatlhokwe and Mooketsi, Interview. 134 Dale, “The Creation and use”: 219. 135 Robert H. Holden, Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821 – 1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 97 – 99, 217 – 18. See also Judith Lipton and David Barash, Strength through Peace: How Demilitarisation led to Peace and Happiness in Costa Rica and what the rest of the world can learn from a tiny Tropical Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

63 called the Field Force which at the time had less than 200 men.136 Like Costa Rica which had long disbanded its army and the Gambia, Botswana did not have a military at independence and chose to continue with its own paramilitary armed unit. Financial reasons were behind this decision, but it is possible that the government of Botswana by September 1966 had seen a succession of coups take place in some West African countries in the 1960s137 that underscored the decision not to set up an armed force.

As the Rhodesian war escalated, so did the cross-border raids by Rhodesian security forces.

Between the late 1960s and 1976, the Botswana government recorded more than 30 such incursions.138 ZANLA’s access to Mozambique’s Tete corridor in the early 1970s and the subsequent decolonisation of Mozambique in 1975 effectively gave them an upper hand in the struggle for independence. As a result, ZANLA guerrilla operations in eastern Rhodesia expanded dramatically.139 In response to ZANLA’s increased incursions in Rhodesia, the Zambia-based

ZIPRA opened a new front of the war by moving into south-west Rhodesia, an area that shared a border with north-eastern Botswana. Desperate to gain strong footing in the war, ZIPRA in 1977 was alleged to have abducted 400 black students from the Manama Mission School in

Matebeleland and transited them through Botswana. The Rhodesian forces, surprised by this, came to believe that ZIPRA wanted to send the students to Zambia to have them trained as guerrillas but above all that the government of Botswana was involved in the abduction.140 This was not true

136 Maggie Dwyer, “Fragmented Forces: The Development of the Gambian Military,” African Security Review 26: 4 (2017): 362 – 364. See also Omar Touray, The Gambia and the World, A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa’s Smallest State, 1965 – 1995 (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2000), 17 – 20. 137 See Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, 12 – 13. 138 BNARS Hansard 57, National Assembly, Second Meeting, Third Session, Third Parliament, Sittings from 29 November to 17 December 1976 – Address by Dr. Q. K. J. Masire, 247. 139 Sibanda, The Zimbabwe,163 – 164. See also Stephen Emerson, The Battle for Mozambique 1977 – 1992 (West Midlands: Helion and Company LTD, 2014), 41 and J.K. Cilliers, Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia (London: Croon Helm), 193. 140 Rhodesians declare Shashe strip “no-go area,” The Botswana Daily News, February 18, 1977, .2.

64 however as those students stated that they had fled to Botswana out of their own free will. Only about 50 of them returned to Rhodesia in February 1977 while the rest chose to remain in Botswana as political refugees.141 In response to this, the Rhodesian government declared a 30 km strip of land in Rhodesia that bordered the Shashe Tribal Trust of Botswana, a no – go area for civilians because it was known to be frequented by ZIPRA fighters. It was a common feature of the war to establish such no – go areas but they had been restricted to the Mozambique – Rhodesia border where ZANLA was operating. This however signalled an escalation of the Rhodesian cross-border raids into Botswana.142

The earlier spillover of the Wankie campaign into Botswana effectively gave the PMU a new role of defending the border against Rhodesian forces who after 1968 started to believe that

Botswana was harbouring ZIPRA freedom fighters. By 1977 the PMU was basically fighting a border war to protect Batswana as well as the Rhodesian political refugees. During their raids into

Botswana, the Rhodesian security forces did not distinguish between civilians and freedom fighters. Botswana’s lack of solid borders and its role as a safe haven for refugees and fleeing guerrillas made it an easy target for the Rhodesian and South African forces who on numerous occasions would rape innocent Batswana women, bomb, burn houses, as well as abduct both

Rhodesians and Batswana.143 The small PMU was no match for these forces and as a contingency measure, the government of Botswana chose to relocate the Batswana civilians who lived in border areas where raids were rife in the north east.144 While many people fled to places such as Serowe,

Tonota, Borolong and Palaye in the interior of Botswana, a few who had their farms in the border

141 Parents sob as only 51 children return – Government of Botswana Thanked, The Botswana Daily News, 8 February 1977, 1. See also Officials interview the runaway children – Kidnap claim denied, The Botswana Daily News, 3 February 1977, 1. 142 Morapedi “The Dilemmas of Liberation” 81 – 82. 143 Bolaane, “Cross-Border Lives”: 558 144 “Border Crisis Shift” The Botswana Daily News, 7 February 1977, 2

65 areas would return after the raids had passed.145 One of the villagers who dared to return was Mrs.

Tebogo Kgosietsile who explained to the Botswana Daily News that she only did that because there was a PMU patrol in her now desolate village. Mrs. Kgosietsile however returned to a displeasing scene of charred houses, scattered furniture, walls riddled with bullets and gaping holes from rocket propelled grenades.146

Direct Recruitment and Limited Diplomacy

As the Rhodesian war intensified in the mid 1970s, the PMU stepped up its efforts by recruiting new troopers from the general society. In 1977, the government invited able bodied men to enlist in the unit in an effort to increase its manpower and ‘properly’ respond to the precarious border situation. This effort was proof that the border war was more serious than ever. Of more than 500 men who showed up to enlist at various places in the country, a mere 200 would end up in service as the other 300 were rejected for various reasons including poor health and a lack of basic education.147 According to the now retired Captain Losika Six Keatlholetswe, who joined the PMU in 1975, the men who enlisted during this time were expected to possess a certain level of reading and writing as they had to successfully complete 4 months of law courses before they could advance to paramilitary training.148 This direct recruitment from the general public instead of the existing police force suggests that the PMU was more of a military than a law enforcement organisation though it required the recruits to study law. For the rest of 1976 and leading to 1977, the government made other failed attempts to recruit more men into the war effort. From the

Kgatleng district in the south east of Botswana, more than 400 Bakgatla men gathered at the Kgotla

145 “Border Crisis Shift” The Botswana Daily News, 7 February 1977, 2 146 “Uneasy Life on Botswana’s Border Area” The Botswana Daily News, 10 February 1977, 3 – 4. 147 “500 respond to PMU recruitment”, The Botswana Daily News, 19 January 1976, 1. See also “More Joining Police Mobile Force” The Botswana Daily News, 12 January 1977, 1. 148 Keatlholetswe, Interview.

66 to urge Kgosi Lentswe (anglicised as Linchwe) to let them join the fight at the borders.149 These men also asked their kgosi (chief) to urge the government to scrap its age and educational standards and recruit as many of them as possible into the PMU as they also wanted to defend their country.

Their wishes however did not come true as the PMU could only recruit a limited number of men.

Though recruitment into the PMU started to increase in the 1970s, its numbers remained small compared to neighbouring forces.

With ZIPRA activities in southwest Rhodesia trickling into Botswana after the mid - 1970s, the Rhodesian forces responded with harsher reprisals particularly in some places in Botswana that they believed harboured insurgents. On the morning of Wednesday 12 January 1977 Batswana woke up to news that the PMU was under attack at the border and Smith’s army were believed to have fired the first shots unprovoked. Reports like this became very common during this period and many parents all over the country encouraged their sons to join the fight.150

The escalation of attacks was overwhelming the already small PMU, so the government of

Botswana sent the Minister of External Affairs, Archie Mogwe in January 1977 to the United

Nations to protest Rhodesian aggression.151 The following month, a UN team arrived in Botswana on a fact-finding mission which left the country after a few days’ tour of north eastern villages that had been attacked. Soon after this mission, the UN made several futile attempts to bring the Smith regime to task. The UN had never recognised the Rhodesia government after UDI, so it was likely difficult to establish a channel of communication with the Smith regime. In the same month,

Mogwe left for Togo and Egypt to address OAU and Afro-Arab summits respectively with a strong

149 “428 Bakgatla ready to take up arms” The Botswana Daily News, 12 January 1977, 1; Keatlholetswe also confirmed this in an interview that hundreds of Bakgatla gathered at their Kgotla in Mochudi with an array of weapons to inform Kgosi Lentswe that they were ready to join the war effort at the border. 150 “PMU under attack at the N.E. border” The Botswana Daily News, 12 January 1977, 1. Keatlholetswe, Interview. 151 “Mogwe addresses United Nations, The Botswana Daily News,13 January 1977.

67 message for these organisations. He implored them not only to become more involved in helping the growing refugee crisis in Botswana but help find a resolution to the Rhodesian war.152

Unfortunately, the government’s diplomatic efforts failed to inspire immediate assistance and resulted in further deterioration of the border situation eventually leading to the ambush at Lesoma in 1978 – a critical point in the history of the BDF that will be discussed in the following chapter.

Originally created to quell riots in the territory, the PMU after 1966 started to rely on

Batswana in order to effectively perform its tasks of detecting and arresting armed insurgents.

Unlike the colonial Nyasaland PMF of the 1950s and early 60s which used terror tactics and sheer brutality to stomp out any dissent, the PMU behaved with courtesy towards Botswana civilians which resulted in a strong and positive relationship between the PMU and Batswana. For instance, while on long border missions for days and sometimes weeks, they often found themselves parched and starved only to be given food by villagers in areas they patrolled. Batswana would offer them goat meat and beef and fetch them potable water in order for them to continue their duties.153 These selfless gestures by Tswana communities were common and could even be regarded as part of the tradition of Botho which loosely translates to compassion. The truth is that these villagers had borne the brunt of the war: they had lost relatives and property, some had been raped and maimed and so they, through this support of the PMU, also joined the fight.

For eleven years after Botswana’s independence, the PMU represented the country’s only means of defence. It was much smaller than the Rhodesian or South African security forces that invaded the country on numerous occasions. The men who served in the unit had significantly less military training, even fewer weapons and vehicles to properly patrol the Botswana – Rhodesia border. In

152 “Mogwe leaves today for meeting” The Botswana Daily News, 16 February 1977. 153 Gabatlhokwe and Mooketsi, Interview.

68 discussing the general determination among young Batswana men to enlist for service, Captain

Keatlholetswe added that “it was a big contribution for parents to have a son serving in the PMU more so that the president of the country had his son in the unit. Everyone wanted to be involved.”154 The PMU continued to patrol the borders and continued to arrest guerrillas from

Rhodesia fleeing into Botswana despite the Rhodesian threat. “The people who served in the PMU at the time had a lot of courage and commitment despite the lack of resources. The cross-border incidents inspired them to keep defending the country.”155 By the late 1970s, the paramilitary unit had to ramp up its border patrols and use of intelligence as some members of the Rhodesian security forces were trying different means to infiltrate Botswana disguised as regular civilians.

One such incident took place in February of 1977 where three members of the Rhodesian security forces, two white and one black, who identified themselves as D. H. Cockburn, R. S. Gale and

Burn Ncube respectively, entered Botswana at the Ramokgwebana border dressed in civilian clothing. A vigilant PMU detachment noticed that they hid an FN rifle and live ammunition in their vehicle and acted promptly to arrest them. The trio claimed that they worked for the

Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation and that they carried the weapons for personal protection but as it was later revealed, they were indeed part of the Rhodesian forces and were on a mission to detect ZIPRA guerrillas who were possibly stationed at Francistown. They were later charged with smuggling weapons into Botswana and prosecuted at the Francistown Magistrate Court.156

The government of Botswana in 1977, seeing no end in sight for the Rhodesian war, proposed a bill to parliament to create the Botswana Defence Force. This was a direct response to the ongoing and escalating struggles for national liberation in the region. Though South Africa’s

154 Keatlholetswe, Interview. 155 Oitsile, Interview. 156 “Three held on gun charges,” The Botswana Daily News, 8 February 1977, 1.

69 struggle against apartheid also played a role, the BDF’s creation was a direct response to the numerous border invasions that were carried out mainly by Rhodesian security forces. Chapter

21:05 of the BDF Act reads “any person who enlisted in that part of the Botswana Police Force known as the Police Mobile Unit after 1 January 1977, shall be deemed to be a member of the

Defence Force and to be enlisted therein in terms of this act.”157 Though this act did not take effect until April of the same year, the BDF was born out of Botswana’s border war with Rhodesia. Since colonial Botswana did not have a military to transform into a national defence force at independence, the already militarised PMU became the nucleus of the BDF from where the first

132 cadres were drawn and trained as the first members of the BDF. Mompati Merafhe, who was then the Deputy Commissioner of the police, was promoted to Major General and appointed commander of the BDF with Ian Khama, son of Seretse Khama as his second in command. As soon as he was appointed, Merafhe stated that his aim was to transform the PMU into the defence force of the country with the required training, uniform and equipment needed for the task at hand.158 The discovery of diamond deposits in Botswana in the early 1970s also gave the government a lifeline. By 1972, industrial diamond mining operations had begun in Orapa with some of the revenue from the sales allowing more expansive military budgets.159

Conclusion

The PMU has a history that has not been well documented by historians despite its importance in the formation of the BDF. The PMU’s development was determined by changing internal and regional circumstances. The 1948 uprisings in Gold Coast and Basutoland had a bearing on the

157 Botswana Defence Force Act 1977, Volume III, Part XII, Chapter 21:05a 158 “The Man who will head Botswana Army – Major General Merafhe; tough and disciplined” The Botswana Daily News, 22 April 1977 2. 159 Richard Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1995), 130

70 creation of police mobile units in British territories such as Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s where people protested against the Central African Federation but for Bechuanaland, limited financial resources forced the colonial administration to focus on a budget friendly approach of intelligence gathering. The colonial officials believed that detecting unrest and illegal public gatherings by the people of Bechuanaland before they rioted was the best approach. During the Bamangwato uprisings, the colonial officials had relied on police forces from neighbouring territories to control riots that were not necessarily aimed at establishing independence but rather at regaining the freedom to hold kgotla meetings as they had done in the past. The fact that the

Bamangwato rioters had limited objectives may have been another reason for the reluctance to create the PMU at this time. By the 1960s however, the context for uprisings had changed significantly. The revolts that took place in the region and indeed the rest of the continent had become more radical, more widespread and more violent as Africans now wanted to free themselves from the colonial yoke. By this time, colonial officials in Bechuanaland had run out of options and were forced to create the PMU with the primary aim of containing nationalist protests in the territory. The turn to armed resistance by Africans in the mid-1960s led to a rushed militarisation of the PMU as freedom fighters found themselves on numerous occasions having to illegally cross into Botswana with their weapons. Because of the economic reliance on both South

Africa and Rhodesia, the government of Botswana had to demonstrate that it was not harbouring guerrillas. The PMU’s role during the early period of struggles for national liberation was therefore to apprehend and disarm fleeing MK-ZIPRA and SWAPO guerrillas in a bid to appease both the

Rhodesian and South African governments.

At independence in 1966, Bechuanaland became Botswana but still suffered a great deal from lack of financial resources. Drought and famine were also common, so the new government

71 prioritised socio-economic developments over defence related issues. MK had started preparations for its struggle against apartheid much earlier in the 1960s, but its activities in Botswana were limited to illegal border crossings. As a result, the independent government of Botswana saw no pressing need to create an army with the belief that the PMU would provide sufficient defence should cross-border attacks ensue. Initially created as a riot control organisation, the PMU was later armed with infantry weapons to assume a paramilitary role particularly after the Wankie campaign of the late 1960s. By the late 1970s, ZIPRA expanded its warfront to southwest Rhodesia which subsequently led to an escalation of illegal cross-border incursions and attacks by Rhodesian

Security Forces into Botswana. It was at this point that the PMU had to deal not only with arresting guerrillas but also defending the border against ruthless invasions by pursuing Rhodesian forces.

Despite the fact that it was heavily outgunned, outnumbered and out skilled, the PMU had to perform its task as the country’s only means of defence. When the Rhodesian war escalated in the late 1970s, so did the efforts to recruit more men into the PMU. Throughout the period of liberation struggles in Southern Africa, the PMU performed duties that would naturally fall to a defence force and when it was finally founded in 1977, the BDF drew its first recruits from the PMU.

Chapter 2: Our Boys in the Bush: A New Military versus an Old Foe

Introduction

The BDF was created in 1977 with its core as the already militarised and active Police Mobile

Unit. This was a direct response to the deteriorating border situation particularly after 1975 but it was also part of a greater militarisation in the region. Wars of national liberation were taking place in Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa.

Botswana found itself as the only country without a military within a contentious Southern Africa and therefore needed to build its own military. The period between 1966 and 1977 had been

72 marked by constant escalation of cross-border raids into Botswana by the Rhodesian security forces in pursuit of fleeing guerrillas that resulted in abduction, rape, arson and loss of innocent

Batswana lives. Up to 1977, Botswana only had the PMU to defend its borders but the unstable situation in Southern Africa dictated the need to create a full military. Internally, the political climate of Botswana also played a role in the decision to form the BDF, but financial difficulties stood in the way of this. This chapter addresses the varying contexts around the rushed formation of the BDF in order to paint a wholistic picture that has been lacking from historical accounts. The chapter argues first that the already weak economy of Botswana stood to lose a lot if the Khama government had cut its economic ties to the Rhodesian and South African regimes. This created a precarious situation where Botswana had to create a military to defend itself against the same countries it was economically dependent on. However, the opening of more diplomatic missions by European and Asian countries in Botswana in the late 1970s handed Botswana the economic lifeline it needed to slowly move away from its dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia. Using oral and written primary as well as secondary sources, the chapter examines some of the key figures involved in the setting up of the different bodies of Botswana’s armed force arguing that it was their collective efforts that eventually led to the success of the BDF in later years.

After 1977 the economy of Botswana started growing slowly owing to discoveries of large diamond deposits in Orapa, Letlhakane and later Jwaneng. These fiscal gains allowed the government, particularly after 1982 to expand its military budget in order to meet the threat of apartheid that still gripped South Africa and South West Africa. The chapter argues that the decision makers of the time acted coherently for the greater good of the military and the country.

The chapter also addresses the early set up of the BDF going into some detail about the development of its infantry and air wing from early on through funding from various sources in

73 the United Kingdom and other European nations. These developments were carried out successfully through the continued presence of some former British military personnel and the introduction of Indian Army officers who were heavily involved in the training of new BDF cadres.

In addressing the changing social, political and economic contexts, the chapter opens up avenues for subsequent arguments but also paints a picture of how the BDF would evolve from a small force that drew men from the PMU into the well-armed professional military that it is today. The

BDF was founded within the Cold War, particularly towards the end of Détente, a period of de- escalation of Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union so alliances of the time played a key role in the direction that the defence force would take.160 The chapter also examines the impacts of the Cold War on the BDF’s procurement of military hardware.

Botswana’s Fateful Economic Ties and a Late Mineral Revolution

Following the completion of the Mafeking – Bulawayo railway in 1897, the economy of

Bechuanaland (Botswana) became overly dependent on both South Africa and Rhodesia.

Constructed by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), the railway was owned and run by the

Rhodesian government since the completion of its construction until well after Botswana’s independence.161 In order to access local, regional and international markets, Bechuanaland had to keep it open and fully functional even during the period of nationalist struggles.162 The Mineral

Revolution of the 19th century was the biggest motivation behind the rapid colonisation of Southern

160 Anne Hesing Cahn, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 17-18; see amongst others, Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente: The United States, The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969 – 1973 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969 – 1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 161 Dale, Botswana’s Search, 99. 162 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/ Botswana Defence Force, “Brief for Secretary of State’s visit to Southern Africa, 4 April 1977. See also Part Mgadla, “‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice:” 5.

74 Africa. Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) had some promising gold deposits from early on, but a more successful South Africa had by far the largest mineral resources and would go on to have the most prosperous mining industry in the continent.163 Bechuanaland’s lack of domestic industries meant that the availability of the railway turned the territory into a pool of cheap migrant labour for the mines of South Africa. Bechuanaland therefore became an economic hostage and a client of its two, white minority-ruled neighbours. At independence in 1966, Botswana’s economy was still very weak and “based largely on foreign aid and remittances from migrant labor and livestock— the latter anchored in the country’s history and indigenous culture.”164 By 1976 however, the long period of prospecting for diamonds that began earlier in the 1950s had made significant kimberlite discoveries in Letlhakane and Orapa in the Central District.165 De Beers, a South African mining powerhouse that had led the prospecting projects for a long time in Botswana, began operations in both areas. However, during the development of its mining industry, Botswana still had to turn to

South Africa which had the technical skills and training for successful mining operations.166 It would not be until the early 1980s that Botswana started seeing significant diamond revenues which means that the BDF was initially built on loans acquired from friendly European countries such as Britain167 with the thinking that the diamond revenues would be used to reimburse those

European nations.

163 Jade Davenport, Digging Deep: A History of Mining in South Africa (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2013). 164 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 15. 165 Dale, Botswana’s Search, 129. See also Abdil Ismail Samatar An African Miracle: state and class leadership and colonial legacy in Botswana Development, (Portsmouth: Heinemann Publishers, 1999); Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State, 246 – 247. 166 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana – Botswana Defence Force, “Brief for Secretary of State’s visit to Southern Africa, 4 April 1977. 167 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana – Botswana Defence Force, “Brief for Secretary of State’s visit to Southern Africa, 4 April 1977.

75 President Seretse Khama had resisted the idea of creating an armed force for a long time because there were bigger development priorities for Botswana after independence.168 Another key reason lay in the economic reliance on both Rhodesia and South Africa. Khama seemed not to want to displease these two regional powers that controlled a large portion of Botswana’s economy. When the BDF was created in 1977, Botswana was still reliant on both nations so it would be inaccurate to assume that this move symbolised a break in the economic relationship.

The formation of the BDF simply meant that the government had run out of options and was put under immense domestic and external pressure. Internally, Batswana, specifically those who lived in the troubled border areas had become disgruntled that the government, despite training and arming the PMU, was doing very little to defend their lives. The opposition political parties, particularly the left-wing Botswana People’s Party (BPP) vocally criticised the Khama government’s slow response to cross-border raids. Externally, as the PMU was no match for the

Rhodesian security forces and the SADF, the cross-border raids escalated and so did the level of violence that accompanied them. In essence, the unstable political atmosphere in the region as well as Batswana’s calls for action forced the hand of the government. The BDF was therefore formed hurriedly out of necessity.

Act No. 13 of 1977: Formation of the BDF

The mounting of pressure on the government from opposition political parties, residents of border areas and the escalation of cross-border raids since the mid-1970s created conditions for the

Botswana parliament to table a motion for the creation of the BDF in April 1977. By mid- April

Act. No. 13 of 1977 passed unimpeded and created the BDF.169 An examination of this act reveals

168 Merafhe, The General, 49. 169 Merafhe, The General, 49

76 certain key factors about the intended function of the armed force. Part II of the Act states that the

BDF would be made up of a regular force as well as a defence force reserve which may include a volunteer force. As was the case in other countries, the Act established that the president of

Botswana was the Commander in Chief of the armed force, and he would be responsible for defining some of its duties from time to time, including overseas work and training.170 This provision for overseas work was one of the most fundamental in the act in that it echoed

Botswana’s need for external aid to train and equip members of the BDF. It enabled the first 15

BDF officer cadets to go for training in Zambia between 1977 and 1978 and other countries thereafter. It also envisioned that the BDF would play some roles in external operations in the future.

According to the Act, Force Headquarters (Force HQ) exercised overall command, control and supervision of the new force. During the formative years, it was housed in a very small building that had about 8 main offices located next to the prisons building in Village, Gaborone.

Force HQ had a clear structure outlined in the Act which included the Commander, at the time,

40-year-old Major General Mompati Sebogodi Merafhe, his deputy, 24-year-old Brigadier Ian

Khama, son of President Khama who had completed his military training at Sandhurst in Britain a few years prior, and other key branches such as administration, finance, logistics and operations.

In terms of ranks and promotions, the language in the Act is ambiguous. It suggests that ‘any officer’ regardless of rank could be promoted to lieutenant general and therefore become the commander of the armed force. From there, the Act also vaguely mentions that the president was responsible for promoting any officer to the rank of lieutenant colonel and above while ranks below that of major were appointed by the commander of the armed force.171 At inception, several of the

170 BDF Act, Chapter 21:05, Government Printer, Gaborone, p 21:177. 171 Botswana Defence Force Act, Chapter 21:05, Government Printer, Gaborone,

77 men who transitioned from the PMU held ranks above major.172 Part III of the Act dealt with the formation of the defence council, a responsibility that fell to the president. It would be tasked with control, direction and general supervision of the armed force or oversight of the military.173 The size and the general composition of the defence council is not clear, but the Act states that the

President has control over who is appointed to serve in it. The commander of the BDF would serve in the council by virtue of his position or as an ex-officio member. Sections 10, 19 and 131 of the

Act provide further details of the duties of the council which include prescribing the order or rank and seniority of officers and soldiers. Furthermore, the council has the responsibility to extend the service of soldiers who are supposed to retire when the country is at war.174 The defence council was one of the mechanisms established to provide civilian oversight of the BDF in order to prevent abuse of power.

The country’s poor economic situation in the late 1970s meant that recruiting for the force would be easy and indeed as soon it was established it became one of the country’s top employers.

By May 1978, Force HQ had expanded to include a Provost Section (which later became the

Military Police) under the command of a 2nd lieutenant, Force Troops Headquarters which included an engineer platoon, the Air Wing, armoured car platoon, a signals company, a support company, a mortar platoon, an anti-tank platoon as well as an air defence platoon. All these units had different commanding officers with different ranks ranging from 2nd lieutenant to captain. Other units in

Force HQ included the Force Training Wing (FTW) which was responsible for transforming

p 21:177. 172 BNARS C/HQ/4/3/b – Botswana Defence Force Headquarter Structure – from Brigadier S. K. I. Ian Khama, 11 May 1978 in Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee Publication celebrating 40 years of the BDF (Gaborone, 2017), 27. 173 Botswana Defence Force Act, Chapter 21:05, Government Printer, Gaborone. p 21:177. 174 BNARS OP 28/13 – Ref L2/7/242 – Defence Council Duties, From Principal Legal Draftsman to Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, 28 November 1977.

78 civilians to soldiers through basic military training, the Band Wing (discussed in Chapter 8), a medical unit, the Force Workshop company, as well as general staff and administration.175 The first officer cadets of the BDF were only commissioned on 16 June 1978 after spending a year training in Zambia though at the same time Force HQ already had a functioning structure that included commissioned and non-commissioned officers. This is because Force HQ was made up of those soldiers who had transitioned from the PMU and had received promotions to serve in those capacities. A majority of the first true BDF intake of officer cadets only joined the military in 1978. From this we can draw certain conclusions about the general mindset of the decision makers when forming the BDF. For instance, in Botswana, the military was apolitical unlike other post-independent militaries in some parts of Africa such as the Tanzania People’s Defence Force

(TPDF), Ugandan Defence Force (UDF) amongst others.

In the late 1970s, the TPDF was a highly politicised military that served as instrument of

President Julius Nyerere’s ruling party while Idi Amin’s UDF lacked a civilian oversight mechanism.176 In Botswana, “the legal instruments are flexible enough to allow the three principal actors – the President, the Defence council, and the commander of the BDF to define goals and deployment of forces in a way that … maximizes military professionalism.”177 The provision of sending BDF members for overseas training was important as it highlighted the lack of expertise at home to carry out the required training. It also enabled the BDF to act as an extension of

175 BNARS C/HQ/4/3/b – Botswana Defence Force Headquarter Structure – from Brigadier S. K. I. Ian Khama, 11 May 1978 in Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 27. 176 There are numerous examples of politicised militaries that took power in post-colonial Africa. See amongst others, Timothy Stapleton, A Military History of Africa, Volume 3 – The Era of Independence (From the Congo Crisis to Africa’s World War (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2013), 88 – 89; Joshua B. Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda: Pax Musevenica (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Dennis Austin and Robert Luckham, ed. Politicians and Soldiers of Ghana, 1966 – 1972 (London: Routledge, 1975); Assensoh and Assensoh, African Military History and Politics; Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa; Simon Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah’s Ghana (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 177 Dale, “The Creation and Use” 27.

79 Botswana’s foreign policy as would be seen in its participation in future joint military exercises, and United Nations and Southern African Development Committee (SADC) peacekeeping operations in other parts of Africa. Since gaining independence in 1964, Zambia grew close to

Moscow throughout the Cold War period and hosted many liberation movements including ZAPU and its armed wing ZIPRA. During its formative years, the BDF benefitted from the cordial relationship between Presidents Seretse Khama and Kenneth Kaunda by sending its first stream of officer cadets for training in Zambia.178

British Military Advisory Team and the Establishment of the Ground Forces Command

Combined with the provision to send troops abroad for training was the fact that the new BDF needed to bring in military experts to conduct initial assessments of what would be needed to defend the country’s borders. The Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom (MOD UK) had expressed its willingness to help Botswana in this regard as soon as they heard news about the formation of the BDF.179 However, Merafhe specifically requested that the advisory team be kept small which President Khama endorsed perhaps to avoid overly relying on Botswana’s former colonial master. In July 1977, an agreement was reached between the Botswana government and

MOD UK that Brigadier John Gray and Major Jonathan Swann would arrive in Botswana the following month and stay for about 3 weeks. They were asked not to wear their military uniforms while in Botswana because their visit was seen as a sensitive political matter.180 This could be because the Botswana government did not want details about the development of the BDF being

178 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force – Letter from President Khama to Dr. Kenneth Kaunda thanking him for all the assistance his country had given to Botswana, 30 June 1978: Carol B. Thompson Challenge to Imperialism – Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe (New York: Routledge, 2018). 179 TNA FCO 45/2026 – Botswana Defence Force, Formerly PMU – Correspondence between Ministry of Defence and Maj. Gen Merafhe, 17 July 1977. 180 TNA FCO 45/2026 – Botswana Defence Force, Formerly PMU – Foreign Commonwealth Office Files – Correspondence between David Sprague and Turner, 4 July 1977.

80 known to the public or South Africa and Rhodesia. Their task was to review the daily operations of the newly formed BDF, examine the Rhodesian threat to Botswana and advise the BDF command on the best way to respond to it. They also focused on the types of training and equipment needed to bolster the new military. Their visit to Botswana had been the result of long negotiations between President Khama, General Merafhe and the British officials at United

Kingdom Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS) and the Foreign Commonwealth

Office (FCO) that began earlier in the year.181 UKMTAS was a program that accorded military assistance to former British colonies which appears to have been set up in the decolonisation era of the 1960s though the British started providing some military training to Indian, Malayan and

Pakistani students in 1959.182 It was formally run by the FCO together with MOD UK and grew to include newer members of the British Commonwealth after 1960. Between its establishment and 1973, UKMTAS membership grew significantly as more countries gained their freedom while its operational budget also increased. However, following a financial review in 1974, UKMTAS funds were cut which meant that the FCO had to become strategic with the aid it provided to more than 40 former colonies.183 In the 1977/78 financial year, UKMTAS had only £1.68 million to use on aid. Though Botswana did not have a formal allocation of that budget, the FCO was aware of its security needs and was prepared to offer anything between £15 000 and £135 000.184 Generally, distribution of those funds rested solely on countries’ security needs as well as political ties to

Britain. In most situations, countries that had generally been peaceful such as Botswana did not

181 TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Files – “Correspondence regarding British military aid for Botswana Defence Force,” 24 June 1977. 182 Sarah Stockwell, The British End of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 81. 183 Mathew Ford, “Building Stability Overseas: Three Case Studies in British Defence Diplomacy, Uganda, Rhodesia – Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, 3: 594. 184 TNA FCO 45/2026 – Botswana Defence Force, Formerly PMU – Ministry of Defence – UK, Military Charges for Overseas students – correspondence between D. Willcocks, Defence Department and Mr. J F R Martin, 27 June 1977.

81 need a UKMTAS membership though by 1977 this had changed and allocated a small portion of its funds to the British Military Advisory Team to Botswana.185

The British team that visited Botswana comprised an experienced brigadier supported by a staff officer. Brigadier Gray who was 50 years old at the time, had a long and illustrious career and experience in infantry administration and logistics as well as foreign military service and advising. He had served in the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, the Malay Regiment, had been responsible for the formation of the Abu Dhabi Defence Force as its first commanding officer and numerous other appointments.186 Major Jonathan Swann on the other hand was 15 years younger than Gray. He was commissioned in the Royal Artillery regiment in 1965 with which he served until he was promoted to major in December 1974. When he came to Botswana with Gray, he was a General Staff Officer.

By the end of August, Gray and Swann had completed their visit and the following month issued his and recommendations.187 Gray’s report created a framework that the early BDF adopted though not all their recommendations were implemented. According to Gray’s report the basic duties to be performed by the BDF included acting as a deterrent to any potential aggressor, patrolling, maintaining surveillance over selected parts of the Botswana border, and apprehending or eliminating any armed or unarmed infiltrators in areas where the BDF has been given operational responsibility by the government. Other roles included carrying out certain ceremonial duties, providing support to the police and other civil authorities of Botswana while allowing the

185 TNA FCO 45/2026 – Botswana Defence Force, Formerly PMU – Correspondence from HMS Reid to B H Cousins, Esq regarding trip to be made by Gray and Swann, 21 July 1977. 186 TNA FCO 45/2026 – Botswana Defence Force, Formerly PMU – Ministry of Defence – UK, Correspondence between JC Swann and Miss A. Francis, 6 July 1977. 187 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force, – Letter from Major General Merafhe to Brigadier Gray, 27 October 1977.

82 government to pursue peace through regional and international diplomatic channels.188 These were basic duties that could be performed by any military so we cannot say that they were Gray’s invention. When the advisory team arrived in Botswana, the BDF already had the two companies that had transitioned from the PMU. “A Company (A-Coy) stationed in Francistown was responsible for border patrols while B Company (B-Coy) was stationed in Gaborone and charged with presidential guard duties.”189 Gray recommended the introduction of three more companies including a new company to reinforce the existing one at Francistown and two new ones stationed at Kasane and Selebi-Phikwe (or Phikwe) in order to properly respond to cross-border raids.190

Kasane was only 11 kms from Kazungula, the quadripoint where Botswana shared borders with

South West Africa’ Caprivi Strip, Zambia, and Rhodesia. Gray had been made aware of some

Rhodesian activity in the area and he saw it as a critical location to station troops. Phikwe, on the other hand, was home to one of the refugee transit camps and a copper-nickel mine and was also in close proximity to the Botswana-Rhodesia border. Gray saw these three factors as a point of interest for the Rhodesians.191 By the end of 1977, the BDF had adopted Gray’s proposed model and stationed men in those areas though it took longer to construct the infrastructure needed. C

Company (C-Coy) was stationed at Selebi Phikwe while D Company (D-Coy) began work in

Francistown.192 According to the report, the BDF’s five companies would be sufficient to perform the required tasks of border patrols in various areas, VIP protection and training of new cadres.

Theoretically, this was how things would work but, on the ground, events dictated the course of

188 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977 189 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 32. 190 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977 191 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977 192 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 32.

83 action. For instance, instead of creating a new company at Kasane, the BDF opted to station two small platoons there due to a lack of resources or manpower. Gray’s report also called for the introduction of support companies, and mortar, anti-tank and air defence platoons.193 These were introduced between late 1977 and early 1978 but it is fair assume that at that time, financial constraints stood in the way of developing them according to his recommendations.

British Military Hardware and the Development of Support Units

The ground forces served (and still serve) as the core and oldest element of the BDF. According to Gray, it was important to provide the overall ground forces with three specialised support units

(or SU) that would be later named 1 SU, 2 SU and 3 SU stationed at Gaborone, Francistown and

Phikwe, respectively.194 Each SU comprised 4 sub-units which included the air defence platoon which became more significant in 1988, anti-tank, mortar and armoured platoons. These SU’s introduced mechanised components to the existing units which they augmented with British-made

Shorland armoured vehicles as well as soft skinned Landrovers that had been delivered from

Britain towards the end of 1977.195 The purchase of these types of vehicles was undoubtedly necessary to traverse the tough terrain of Botswana as by that time only a few tarred roads had been constructed. The introduction of anti-tank elements to the BDF was a good idea despite the fact that the Rhodesians never used tanks during their cross – border incursions. These anti-tank weapons could however be very effective against Rhodesian armoured cars like the Ferret and

Eland and even the mine-resistant APCs. Gray recommended that 5 sections, each with two anti-

193 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977, p.11. 194 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977, p.10; see also Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 32. 195 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 32.

84 tank weapons should be made ready to deploy to any of the companies across the country should the need arise.196 Gray’s recommendations were guided by the equipment that the BDF possessed as well as those that it had ordered from its suppliers. For instance, the mortar platoon according to him was supposed to be divided into 5 sections each armed with two medium mortars of which the BDF had already acquired in April from China. On the other hand, the mechanised platoons were to use Shorland trucks, some of which had been ordered but not yet delivered.

In May 1977, Merafhe undertook his first official visit to Britain that was sponsored in part by UKMTAS, spending 10 days meeting with various defence stakeholders including the members of the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Sales Organisations, and weapons and aircraft manufacturers such as Britten Norman.197 During this visit, Merafhe expressed that he was generally content with the growth of BDF personnel as it would be supplemented by bigger recruitment drives during the rest of 1977. His main reason for visiting the UK was to gather information about how best to build up the defence force including securing hardware that would facilitate logistical support for the BDF. This included rugged vehicles that would be suited for bush transportation and aircraft to be used for troop transport and reconnaissance.198 He had the

Shorland armoured trucks in mind and Landrovers as he would order several of these upon his return to Botswana.199 This was also the same vehicle used by the Rhodesians, the British and the

Nigerians amongst others. It was also the same vehicle that the Rhodesians set aside in favour of early mine-protected vehicles – in other words, these were simply conventional 4x4s and likely

196 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977, 11. 197 President Khama also mentioned the need to continue the relationship between the two countries in TNA FCO 45/2025, Foreign Commonwealth Files - “Correspondence between Mr. Graham and Mr. Mansfiled” 3 May 1977. 198 TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Files – Correspondence between Mr. Mansfield and HMS Reid, 10 June 1977. 199 The BDF started ordering significant military hardware from the British including aircraft. TNA FCO 45/2027 – “Botswana Defence Force” General Merafhe to JW Gray, 27 October 1977.

85 the cheapest military vehicle on the UK market. Merafhe also went on to request some training in the UK for the cadres who were transitioning from the PMU to the BDF with courses focusing primarily on communications, motor transport and the maintenance of the Shorland.200 Merafhe left Britain a delighted and optimistic man. The numerous demonstrations put up by British manufacturers and defence personnel gave him the hope that he would be able to secure the equipment and training needed for his new military. However, the British officials and representatives of some of the organisations he met were left with doubts because he failed to disclose his budget which meant that it was difficult for them to suggest which hardware would be best for the BDF.201

After Merafhe’s return to Botswana, Brigadier Ian Khama, the deputy commander of the

BDF, travelled to the UK to secure 3 BN2 Defender aircraft made by Britten Norman valued at

£100 000 each, five Shorland armoured patrol vehicles with spares valued at £101 825 total, military grade Landrovers and internal security equipment that included water cannons, anti-riot gear, smoke grenades and Belgian GPMGs.202 It is not clear what the internal threats existed to warrant the purchase of anti-riot equipment but perhaps they were meant to augment police responses to possible unrest within Botswana. By September 1977, most of this equipment had been delivered while two of the three BN 2 Defender aircraft arrived in December. Due to some logistical difficulties, the third and last plane was delivered in January 1978.203

200 TNA FCO 45/2024 - Police Force of Botswana/Botswana Defence Force, “Foreign Commonwealth Office Correspondence from M.J. Maconn, Overseas Police Advisor to D.K. Sprague, 1 May 1977. 201 TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Files – “Proposed assistance to Botswana Defence Force” 16 May 1977. 202 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force, “Arms sales to Botswana and Potential Arms sales” ND. 203 TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) Files – “Correspondence between Defence Sales Department and FCO” A series of letter dated between 11 November 1977, 3 January 1978. – The delivery of this airplane caused considerable worry among the BDF, the FCO as well as the supplier, Britten Norman. On its way to Botswana, it appears that the company charged with its delivery became bankrupt and it was stranded in Nigeria for some time until an American pilot Captain “Slim Bird” was finally hired to deliver it.

86 The prompt acquisition of British military hardware by the end of the 1977 proved useful to the BDF as they were constructing observation posts as far as the Kazungula quadripoint. The

Shorland light armoured vehicles were used to patrol that area as it was frequented by the SADF boat patrols.204 On numerous occasions the South Africans crossed the unmanned sections of that border on the Botswana side of the river proceeded on foot to search for MK and possibly SWAPO insurgents and interrogated local Batswana fishermen.205 The Rhodesian security forces simultaneously infiltrated Botswana at the quadripoint in their vehicles and sometimes on foot in pursuit of ZIPRA insurgents. As the situation worsened, the BDF responded by building more observation posts and provided light armoured Shorland vehicles to support the troops deployed in that area.

In the early hours of Saturday 5 November 1977, the BDF observation post at the

Kazungula border was hit with two rockets fired by the Rhodesian forces. This disabled the post causing mass hysteria among the troops stationed there. The Rhodesians then fired more rockets at a nearby police station that also housed the Botswana immigration office in charge of border crossings at Kazungula. Before the debris from the buildings had settled, the Rhodesians opened fire with their rifles while advancing on the BDF post in their armoured turreted vehicles. Their plan was not clear but at the time, these kinds of attacks had become a common occurrence along the border. Because it happened early in the morning before business began, no civilians were seriously harmed in the skirmish. The fast-acting BDF at the post managed to return fire and somehow drive the Rhodesians away. Soon after this, the Rhodesian command issued a false statement claiming that it was the Zambian Army that had attacked and that they had nothing to

204 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Two New Observation Posts at Kazungula Ferry, Correspondence between District Commissioner, Kasane and Office of the President, Gaborone, 8 November 1977. 205 Gumbo, “Economic and Social Change”, 178

87 do with the incident. However, there had never been any such tensions between Botswana and

Zambia to warrant such an unprovoked attack.206 This was a clear sign that the Rhodesians believed in the strength of their security forces that would overwhelm the new BDF in any encounter. The

BDF of course was only a few months old but ready for their task. They returned fire and proved to the Rhodesian detachment that they were no pushovers. Attacks in that region were quite common and came from both the SADF and the Rhodesians. They would culminate in the Lesoma ambush the following year where 15 BDF soldiers perished.

Development of the Air Wing and the BDF’s First Four Pilots

The command of the air has been described as fundamental to victory in modern wars. According to Giulio Douhet, the Italian air power strategist, militaries that use aircraft to bombard enemy installations have an added advantage as the air space is unlimited. Air power can be used to break the enemy’s morale.207 By 1977, the Rhodesian Air Force was one of the most advanced and strongest in the region. It had a wide array of fighter jets, attack helicopters, bombers and many other aircraft in its arsenal.208 Though the BDF could never match the strength of the Rhodesian

Air Force, it was necessary for it to build up its own air wing with reconnaissance, communications, reinforcement or troop transport, and evacuation among its top priorities.209 The

BDF air wing was developed simultaneously with other units in 1977 drawing from Gray’s recommendations. This was no easy task as it had no aircraft to work with coupled with the hefty

206 “Rhodesians Attack Botswana Again” The Botswana Daily News, 8 November 1977, 1. 207 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Strathford: Ayer Publishing Company Inc. 1976). 208 “An Evaluation of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force” Labour’s Independent Weekly Tribune, 20 September 1963. See also Bryl Salt, Pride of the Eagles, A History of the Rhodesian Air Force (Durban: 30 South Publishers, 2000) and Darlington Mutanda, The Rhodesian Air Force in Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation, 1966 – 1980 (Jefferson: MacFarland and Company Inc, 2017). 209 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977, 13.

88 funds required to build up an air wing. The Air Wing started as a component of the Special Support

Unit (SSU), an element of the Force Troops that also included smaller elements like the signals and combat engineers. Prior to the acquisition of the Britten Norman Defender, BDF pilot training was conducted by Kalahari Air Services, a local company in Botswana. In the beginning there were only four Batswana pilots; Tebogo Masire, Ezekiel Rakgole, Jagamang Seduke and Albert

Scheffers who were also the core of the unit’s command structure. Fortunately, when they enlisted, they had some prior experience in the civil aviation industry. Masire, for instance, was an air traffic controller in the Civil Aviation department while Scheffers had already graduated from flying school and was undergoing training to become an assistant flying instructor with Kalahari Flying

Club.210 Masire, who would lead an illustrious military career and go on to become the fourth commander of the BDF between 2006 and 2012, stated that their first 40 hours of flight training was conducted on a civilian Cessna 172 aircraft provided by Kalahari Air Services.211

Because the BDF did not have instructors of its own, despite the fact that Brigadier Khama had graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst as a trained pilot, they looked to the

British to provide those services. It was retired Royal Air Force (RAF) squadron leader Anthony

Maurice Durrant, commonly known as Tony Durrant who was hired to conduct operational training of these first four pilots and develop the BDF’s Air Wing.212 Durrant had used the BN

Defender during his days in the RAF and was familiar with its operation so it was no coincidence that the BDF opted to purchase them. In fact, Britten Norman had a policy where they offered a certain amount of pilot training with the sale of their aircraft. They were involved in Durrant’s

210 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 47. 211 Interview with Lt. Gen. Tebogo Masire (Rtd), Gaborone, January 16, 2019. 212 Masire, Interview.

89 contract negotiations with the BDF and recommended him specifically.213 Furthermore, Gray supported the decision to purchase the rugged Britten Norman BN 2 Defender arguing that it was one of the most affordable and best suited to perform the required duties.214 Durrant had built a strong reputation while in the RAF. Apart from being a squadron leader, he had been involved in the formation of the Ghanaian Air Force some years prior to his appointment in Botswana. His contract began in January 1978 and ran for 12 months with the option to renew it for subsequent years.215 Following his appointment, the BDF needed a second experienced pilot with similar credentials but struggled to find one. Evidence suggests that that the BDF looked at hiring David

Stewart Morton who had considerable expertise in the RAF between 1939 and 1973 but ended up not choosing him.216 Instead, Durrant later informed the BDF that he knew of a former colleague who could fill that position. That colleague was Harry Haines, another retired squadron leader in the RAF who later signed a contract with the BDF to assist Durrant with training of the new pilots.217 The two instructors then went on to develop a meticulous flight training program that included numerous flying hours in the Cessna, lectures, as well as ground training for the first four

BDF pilots with the assumption that the Defender aircraft would arrive on time. As soon as the first two Defenders were delivered, Masire, Seduke, Scheffers and Rakgole immediately started

213 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Pilot Training, Botswana Defence Force, 27 October 1977 and Correspondence regarding the possible sale of Britten Norman Defender to Botswana between Mr Rowlands, CSAD, Mr Graham, Defence Department, and Mr Mansfield, 2 May 1977. 214 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977, p.13. 215 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Contract signed by Anthony Maurice Durrant and Maj. General Merafhe, 30 December 1977. 216 It is not clear if ever Morton was appointed to be Mr. Durrant’s aide. There is no indication that he was as files don’t show that he signed a contract with the BDF. BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Ground Instructor – BDF” Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President” 8 February 1978. 217 Masire, Interview.

90 training on them as they would become their main aircraft until the purchase of other air assets in the following years.218

Soon after their pilot training was complete, the first four pilots joined the 11 other cadets that had completed officer training in Zambia and were commissioned as second lieutenants in

1978. The new pilots then split, two remained in Gaborone where they were stationed at the

Notwane airbase while the other two went to Francistown where they were operating from a hangar owned by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA). It is not clear when the

Notwane Airbase was built but it appears to have been an airstrip used previously by colonial officials for scheduled flights in and out of Gaborone. The move of the Air Wing to Francistown was very important because the BDF now had its own air service that could conduct much needed aerial reconnaissance of the Botswana-Rhodesia border. Given that the BDF was eager to contain the border situation, it started construction of gravel airstrips in more remote places like Senyawe,

Gobojango, Matiloje, Mapoka, Ramokgwebana, and Maitengwe in the north-east of Botswana before they had ordered any aircraft. This was a necessary move and one that proved very helpful in facilitating logistical air support to troops deployed in these areas.219

The economics of building a new air force from the ground up should not be overlooked as European aircraft manufacturers such as Britten Norman, Scottish Aviation and Swedish giant

SAAB were competing for clients around this time. In fact, between 1970 and 1977, these companies had all jockeyed to supply African militaries including those of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,

Zaire and Zambia.220 Because Brigadier Khama was a trained pilot, he had more knowledge than

Merafhe regarding the type of aircraft that could be acquired at a reasonable price. Having recently

218 Masire, Interview. 219 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “BDF Air Strips”, 20 September 1977. 220 TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Files – Correspondence between Palman Sales and Raftery 15 July 1977.

91 completed the Britten Norman deal, Khama was in the market for smaller trainer aircraft to augment the BN Defender. In July 1977, while the first four BDF airmen were undergoing their flight training, SAAB invited Brig. Khama to Sweden for a demonstration of their Safari trainer aircraft with the hope that he would order a few of them. Upon learning of this invitation, the

British officials persuaded him to stop in the UK and view a demonstration of their B. 125 Bulldog trainer aircraft.221 By September he had completed his visit and stated clearly that he was more impressed by the Safari over the Bulldog. He claimed that the former performed extremely well in all conditions while the Bulldog’s “handling for landings was cause for anxiety at some stages.”222

It is not clear if he flew both trainer aircraft but despite him favouring the Safari, the BDF later purchased a number of Bulldog trainer aircraft possibly because it was easier to maintain compared to the Safari.223 It is also highly likely that the BDF’s purchase of the Bulldog was connected to

Botswana’s strong relations with the British government which used military programmes and funding to keep close ties with its former colonies.

Cold War Neutrality and Arms Acquisition

Botswana officially declared itself neutral during the Cold War. This was expressed on numerous occasions by President Khama and his cabinet when they stated that Botswana would seek funds, weapons and training from any friendly nation despite Cold War alliance.224 This was not only a sensible policy because the two hostile neighbours, Rhodesia and South Africa were pro-Western, but it had pragmatic functions as well. It meant that Botswana, despite being a democratic state,

221 TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Files – Ministry of Defence – UK correspondence files, 15 July 1977. 222 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Report by Brigadier S.K.I Khama on Swedish/British Trip from 3rd to 21st September 1977. 223 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Application for release of information or Sale of Defence Equipment Overseas. The BDF agreed to purchase a total of 15 of this trainer aircraft with an initial 3 being delivered early in 1978. 224 “The man who will head Botswana Army,” The Botswana Daily News, 22 April 1977, 1.

92 could turn to whichever country at any given time to acquire the means to defend its borders. In this period, Botswana had relationships with NATO members such as Britain, Belgium and the

United States but it also imported arms from China, and later the Soviet Union. Botswana neutrality would be reiterated in 1978 when the BDF requested help from the Indian Army, a country that spearheaded the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War.225

The creation of the BDF meant that Botswana became one of the many countries to benefit from the Cold War rivalry. It not only opened avenues for weapon manufacturers around the globe to compete to supply armaments but also extend their influence. After he took over as Soviet premier in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev shifted Soviet policy from that of peaceful coexistence with the West to supporting liberation movements in the colonised world.226 From that time onwards,

Soviet funds were channelled towards independence and revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Though Botswana did not fight a war to gain independence, late in 1976, the

Soviet government made it clear that it was ready to help Khama defend his country against

Rhodesian aggression.227 Vassily Solodovnikov, the Soviet ambassador in Lusaka, the capital of

Zambia noticed Botswana’s dire border situation with Rhodesia and offered military aid to Khama.

Though there was no formal response from the president of Botswana, it was reported that he was willing to accept the Soviet aid.228 Solodovnikov made this announcement after some opposition members of the Botswana parliament who belonged to the leftist Botswana People’s Party (BPP) publicly raised their concerns about the deteriorating border situation. They further implored

225 Oitsile, Masire, Mothlhatlhedi, interviews. See also Jurgen Dinkel The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organisation and Politics, 1927 – 1992 (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 123. 226 Bryan R. Gibson, Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds and the Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 34. See also Harry Hanak, “Foreign Policy” in Khrushchev and Khrushchevism, ed. Martin McCauley (London: Macmillan Press, 1985): 180 – 193. 227 TNA FCO 44/2025 Foreign Commonwealth Files – Arms for Botswana Defence Force, 20 April 1977. 228 “Russia ready to protect Khama” Times of Zambia, 18 December 1976; TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/ Botswana Defence Force, “Foreign Commonwealth Office Files – “Correspondence between Mr. Graham, Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Leahy of the FCO” 20 April 1977.

93 Khama to seek military assistance from the Cubans who had been providing military assistance and direct military support Angola’s ruling party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of

Angola (MPLA) which was embroiled in a civil war since 1975.229 The BPP membership continued to pressure Khama to seek Soviet and Chinese assistance even after the BDF was formed. This perceived Communist encroachment worried British officials so much that they started thinking about sending more help to the BDF to close all possible channels from Botswana to Moscow.230

By the 1970s, Botswana had an existing relationship with Belgian weapon manufacturers FN

Herstal but at the same time decided to procure 400 Armalite AR 18 rifles and 70 000 rounds of live ammunition and a further 20 000 rounds of blanks from the British based Sterling Armament

Company which also had a branch in the USA. It is not clear why the Botswana government switched to Sterling when the Belgians had for a long time supplied them with FNs that used standard 7.62 mm NATO ammunition. This move was perhaps prompted by the fact that the AR

18 used 5.56mm NATO calibre which was developed in Belgium by FN Herstal though the ammunition was supplied by the American based arms dealer, Winchester International.231 The

Sterling company had built a reputation for the manufacture and supply of small arms in most of independent Africa during this period but due to logistical difficulties, this order of AR 18 rifles did not arrive as planned. The details of the order indicate the difficulties that the BDF encountered

229 BNARS Hansard 61, Second Meeting, Fourth Session, Third Parliament, sittings from 20 February to 23 March 1978. Statement by Mr. Nkhwa – Member of the Botswana People’s Party p. 103. 230 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/ Botswana Defence Force, “Correspondence between D. K. Sprague of Central and Southern African Department and P. A. Rafter, British High Commission, Gaborone, 27 April 1977. 231 TNA FCO 45/2024 - Police Force of Botswana – Botswana Defence Force, “Arms supply for the BDF and TNA FCO 45/2025 – Further Help for Botswana – Correspondence between HMS Reid and M. Mansfield, 7 April 1977. TNA FCO 45/2024 - Police Force of Botswana – Botswana Defence Force, “Arms supply for the BDF”; See also James Edmiston, The Sterling Years: Small Arms and the Men (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 103 – 104 and https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976STATE165674_b.html accessed September 12, 2019

94 in acquiring the weapons. The rifles were delivered but the ammunition from the United States took much longer as it had to be routed through Britain and Lusaka eventually landing in

Francistown.232 This handling of the deal with Sterling displeased the Botswana government and resulted in them blaming the British government for the belated manner in which the ammunition was delivered.233 More problems arose in November when the BDF reported that numerous units equipped with the AR 18 reported that the butts of the rifles were breaking off while some of the magazines were failing to clip on and stay in place.234 This was extremely unsafe but also undermined the combat effectiveness of these units. After this, the government of Botswana ceased business with James Edminston, the founder of Sterling and opted instead to rely on Belgian FN rifles.235

Early in 1977, President Khama’s office wrote to Donald Norland, the US ambassador to the former HCTs between 1976 and 1979 asking for military aid in the form of vehicles, small arms and ammunition.236 Washington did not provide a direct response to Khama’s request but deferred to the US embassy in Britain to assess Botswana’s military needs. By doing this,

Washington was willing to offer aid but wanted it to look like it was the British sending military equipment directly to Botswana.237 It was common for the US to avoid being directly involved

232 TNA FCO 45/2024 - Police Force of Botswana – Botswana Defence Force, Correspondence between Alec Ibbott and R B R Hervey, 5 January 1977. 233 A series of correspondences from British officials in the Ministry of Defence mention that the Botswana government was unfairly blaming them for the late delivery of the ammunition. See TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/ Botswana Defence Force – Brief to Secretary of State’s visit to Southern Africa, 7 April 1977. 234 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Letter from JMS Edminston to Philip Steenkamp regarding the dysfunctional rifles. 8 November 1977. Sterling tried to remedy the problem by offering to pay for a few of the BDF members to go for courses in the UK where they would learn how to properly use the rifles. It is not clear how the BDF responded to this. 235 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Letter from JMS Edminston to Philip Steenkamp regarding the dysfunctional rifles. 8 November 1977. 236 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/Botswana Defence Force, “Foreign Commonwealth Office Correspondence between EJ Emery and Alec Ibbott Esq relating to formation of the BDF” 27 April 1977. 237 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/Botswana Defence Force, “Foreign Commonwealth Office Correspondence between EJ Emery and Alec Ibbott Esq relating to formation of the BDF” 27 April 1977.

95 when a former European colony asked for aid because they believed that former colonial powers and US allies like Britain and France were capable of handling such requests.238 Evidence suggests that before 1977, the United States had supplied some arms and ammunition to Botswana but this changed when the Jimmy Carter administration started to favour a foreign policy that promoted peace and curbed US arms sales to other nations.239 For instance, instead of providing weapons, the US preferred to give funds to Botswana for infrastructure development. In the same year, the

US invested about P 7 million or (about US $700 000 today) to build a road between Nata and

Kazungula but the pragmatic Norland tried to get some of those funds diverted towards a cash – strapped BDF.240 Apart from Carter’s foreign policy effectively blocking the sale of arms to countries such as Botswana, the order from the US was never delivered because it was too large.

It included about 17 million rounds of ammunition for different weapons including rifles, GPMGs,

HMGs etc. It also mentioned about 30 000 firearms of different calibres as well as 45 APCs among many others.241

Following the AR 18 fiasco, the Botswana government turned to China from whom they purchased a large consignment of weapons which included automatic rifles, light machine guns, sub machine guns, mortars and anti-armour weapons such as recoilless rifles.242 This shipment of weapons was one of the most significant for the embryonic BDF as it symbolised that they were

238 Peter J. Shcraeder, United States Foreign Policy towards Africa, Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 26 – 27. 239 Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter and Africa, Race and Cold War (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2016), 294 – 296; Alexander Moens, Foreign Policy Under Carter; Testing multiple advocacy decision making (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) see also John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency – A re-evaluation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). 240 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/Botswana Defence Force, “Foreign Commonwealth Office Correspondence between EJ Emery and Alec Ibbott Esq relating to formation of the BDF” 27 April 1977. 241 BNARS OP 28/2 – Arms and Ammunition – Order of Arms from the United States – ND. 242 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/Botswana Defence Force, Chinese weapons to Botswana, 29 April 1977. A series of correspondences in this file relate to the worry that the British had towards Chinese arms sales to Botswana

96 anticipating a full-scale war with the Rhodesians and were willing to straddle the so-called Cold

War alliances to acquire the means to win any encounter. With Solodovnikov publicly declaring

Moscow’s readiness to help Botswana in 1976 and the acquisition of weapons from China the following year, the British grew wary that their former colony might be falling into the communist sphere. They then quickly offered military aid to Botswana that had been a problem up to that point because the country was not yet a member/recipient of the UKMTAS.243

The FCO’s objectives for helping fund the formation of the BDF were listed as follows:

“To help maintain the status quo in Botswana and to help preserve democracy and stability [where] an ill-founded, organised and well trained army could have the opposite result.”244 Another objective was to leave no openings for the Russians and Chinese who were already growing closer to the Botswana government.245 This makes it appear that helping the BDF was a priority for the

British government because they wanted to cut all possible communist ties that Botswana might have had but that was not the only factor. It should be understood that UKMTAS had in fact been set up to provide military aid but equally important was that its role in the post-colonial era was to help maintain a British presence in Commonwealth countries. British assistance meant securing a significant continuation of commercial interests because at that time their global arms exports were being challenged by other European countries such as France, Belgium and Germany. UKMTAS was therefore set up with an economic principle in mind though its initial budget was small. The

British believed that the provision of financial and technical training to budding Commonwealth armies using British military hardware, would ensure the continuity of British military presence in

243 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/ Botswana Defence Force, “Correspondence between D. K. Sprague of Central and Southern African Department and P. A. Rafter, British High Commission, Gaborone, 27 April 1977. 244 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/Botswana Defence Force, “Foreign Commonwealth Office Correspondence between EJ Emery and Alec Ibbott Esq relating to formation of the BDF” 27 April 1977. 245 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/Botswana Defence Force, “Foreign Commonwealth Office Correspondence between EJ Emery and Alec Ibbott Esq relating to formation of the BDF” 27 April 1977.

97 its former colonies.246 It would also ensure that these militaries would continue to buy British equipment on which they had been trained. This means that UKMTAS can also be viewed as an extension of British neo-colonialism despite the fact that former British colonies such as Botswana and Ghana had explained that they would acquire military aid wherever it was available.247 Though

Botswana never adopted a communist ideology, it maintained a pragmatic foreign policy during the Cold War mainly for financial reasons. The then Minister of Public Service and Information,

Daniel Kwelagobe, reiterated in 1977 that Botswana would acquire the means to fight the

Rhodesian threat from any country despite their ideology as long as they offered weapons at a reasonable price.248 Chinese manufactured weapons and ammunition were easier and cheaper to acquire than Belgian, British or American made ones even though the BDF later labelled them as outdated and impractical because they broke down easily.249 From 1977 onwards, the FCO and

UKMTAS rolled out their plan to help the government of Botswana with funds, weapons, military training as well as education for a few BDF cadres.250 Evidence suggests that by the end of 1977,

UKMTAS had paid for Sergeant Mpala’s courses at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst which ran from 5 September 1977 to March 1978.251 He was the first of many BDF cadres to benefit from the sponsorship because from that time, MOD UK offered more course placements for Batswana soldiers.252 Upon completion of his course at Sandhurst, Mpala may have become an officer in the BDF.

246 Stockwell, The British, 87. 247 Stockwell, The British, 87 – 88. 248 “The man who will head Botswana Army,” The Botswana Daily News, April 22, 1977, p. 1. 249 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Purchase of arms and ammunition” Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President, 19 December 1977. 250 TNA FCO 44/2025 Foreign Commonwealth Files – Correspondence from HMS Reid to BH Cousins Esq. Explains that they had offered their services to Merafhe during his visit to the UK. 21 July 1977. 251 TNA FCO 44/2025 Foreign Commonwealth Files – Sandhurst Course for Botswana NCO, 14 February 1977. 252 TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force – Correspondence From HMS Reid to Mr Rowlands regarding funds for BDF students at Sandhurst, 27 September 1977.

98 The British government maintained a strong relationship with Botswana since independence. Between 1967 and 76, the British provided Botswana with capital aid amounting to

£11.5 million and technical assistance of £5 million. That continued between 1976 and 1979 with general funding up to £10 million in total aid.253 While the BDF relied on this aid, the British in return needed the goodwill of the Botswana government, to facilitate its protection of refugees from Rhodesia. The British government continued to provide funding, training and equipment needed to set up the BDF, so it is clear that it adopted British military tradition. For instance, in

April 1977 Brigadier Khama requested instructional videos from the British Ministry of Defence to help train the PMU core of the BDF on their new military duties. Khama specifically requested videos that focused on drill, ceremonial drill, fieldcraft, night patrols, day reconnaissance patrols, use of night visual aids, riot control and counter revolution operations.254 The British officials were more than delighted to supply those videos and any other material that the BDF would request as it was also economically and diplomatically important for them. Above all, the BDF continued to rely on the British as they preferred NATO standardised weapons and ammunition that the PMU had become familiar with including Belgian manufactured FN rifles.255

In the midst of the BDF honing its relationship with the British through UKMTAS and the

FCO, President Seretse Khama was being true to his word that Botswana would pursue diplomatic relations with any friendly nation despite Cold War affiliations. By the end of 1977, Botswana had opened diplomatic relations with South Korea, while Belgium and Italy also vowed to assist in helping to resolve Botswana’s border situation by finding the means to end the political tensions

253 TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/ Botswana Defence Force – Brief to Secretary of State’s visit to Southern Africa, 7 April 1977. 254 TNA FCO 45/2024 - Police Force of Botswana – Botswana Defence Force, “Botswana Defence Force Training” 27 April 1977. 255 “The man who will head Botswana Army,” The Botswana Daily News, 22 April 1977, p. 1.

99 in Rhodesia.256 The Belgian government had by then already supplied weapons and ammunition to the PMU for border defence, so it was necessary for Botswana to solidify its existing relationship with the European country.257 At around the same time, Botswana’s ties with Sweden were strengthened when the European country vowed to cancel the development debt that Botswana owed. In October, the Swedish Prime Minister Mrs. Karin Soder visited Botswana and promised

President Khama a further P 5 million (US$500 000.00 today) for new developments some of which included the BDF in order to bolster its response to an aggressive neighbour.258 The Swedish government had maintained its Cold War neutrality since 1949 and continued to help countries such as Botswana with foreign aid.259 Early BDF arms purchases also indicate that they were only concerned with fighting a limited war with Rhodesia. The US had refused the massive order of arms earlier and by December 1977 the BDF had turned to the Belgians yet again but were only prepared to ask for 1000 rifles and 1 million rounds of ammunition from them.260 It is not clear why they only requested a fraction of the order they had made to Washington a few months prior.

The poor financial situation in the country as well as the lack of a highly educated population to recruit from meant that the first commander, Merafhe had to be pragmatic in shaping the BDF. At the time of his appointment, Merafhe was a 40-year-old tough disciplinarian who had a largely successful career in the police. Despite the lack of formal education, he rose rapidly

256 “South Korean Mission is here” The Botswana Daily News, 23 June 1977, 1. Though the arrival of the Korean Delegation made up of Mr. Young-Il Sunwoo, Mr. U-ki Sung, Mr. Young-Bae Park, Ui Sup Shim, and Mr. Byung Joo Kim was economic and aimed to establish trade relations with Botswana, it reiterates the country’s open-door policy to any friendly country regardless of Cold War lineage. 257 “We have Italian Support” The Botswana Daily News, 14 November 1977, 1. “Botswana can count on Belgian Support”, The Botswana Daily News, 12 September 1977, 1. 258 “Sweden remits poor development debts” The Botswana Daily News, 19 October 1977, 3 259 Aryo Makko, Ambassadors of Realpolitik (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 80 – 81, see also Gorata B. Sello, “The Role of Scandanavian aid in the development of Postcolonial Botswana, 1966 – 2000” (MA Thesis, University of Calgary, 2019) 40-41. 260 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Purchase of arms and ammunition” Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President, 19 December 1977.

100 through the ranks until he was appointed deputy commissioner of police, a post he held for seven years until he was offered a new position as Botswana’s first Major General and commander of the BDF on 18 April 1977.261 Merafhe’s vison of the BDF was to not only to be able to meet the

Rhodesian aggression but also set a standard that the new defence force would follow in the subsequent decades. In order to achieve this, he had to rely on the already trained PMU core to become role models for the new cadres who enlisted after 1977. While it is difficult to understand his intentions during the formative years of the BDF, it is obvious that he wanted to build a capable military and he was convinced that he could achieve this without overly relying on other nations including Britain.262 This is why he insisted on a small military advisory team from the British.

Perhaps he thought they had already invested enough through their funding. While he was in the

UK, the Ministry of Defence suggested that he could invite either Nigerian or Zambian officers to

Botswana to help in training of which Merafhe refused. He knew that Nigeria had recently come out of a civil war and was under a military government that had taken power by force. He also may have recognized that Zambia was already embroiled in the regional conflict as it hosted liberation movements, received Soviet assistance and suffered numerous attacks by Rhodesian forces.263 The

British officials described him as a sharp and focused individual while at the same time indicated that he seemed vague on the difference between a military and the PMU. They stated that Merafhe had no idea that building a military from scratch would require a lot more investment and commitment than that required for maintaining the PMU.264

261 Merafhe, The General, 45 262 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Purchase of arms and ammunition” Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President, 19 December 1977. 263 TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Files – “Correspondence from M.J. Maconn, Overseas Police Advisor to D.K. Sprague, 11 May 1977. See also Sibanda, The Zimbabwe, 176 and Hugh Macmillan, The Lusaka Years, The ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963 – 1994 (Sunnyside: Jacana Media, 2013), 1 – 7. 264 TNA FCO 45/2025 - Foreign Commonwealth Files – “Proposed assistance to Botswana Defence Force” 16 May 1977.

101

Early Recruitment and Infrastructure Predicaments

The lack of a large educated population in Botswana contributed to the BDF’s modest recruitment requirements. Men were needed in large numbers and the educational restrictions that had been put in place a few years earlier when recruiting for the PMU were loosened. After his appointment as commander, Merafhe went on a tour of both the Gaborone and Francistown PMU bases to personally inform the men that they were now members of the newly formed military. He told them that this transfer was voluntary and that they had the option to refuse and remain in the police.265 The men reacted differently to this; some were welcoming while some were not as enthusiastic about it. He believed that those who were reluctant were perhaps “unnerved by the skirmishes they had already had with Ian Smith’s Rhodesian forces and thought the formation of a regular army would escalate tensions.”266 This overall lack of enthusiasm among all the PMU drove Merafhe and the government to launch a more expansive recruitment drive. The government was in a hurry to create and field this new military so able-bodied men aged 18 and above with at least a Standard Seven (Grade 7) certificate could become a soldier starting at the lowest rank of private. Those who had gone further and had their Form 5 Cambridge O-Level certificate enlisted into the officer cadet stream. They would train for a year before being commissioned as second lieutenants and thus began the two recruitment schemes that the BDF retained to today though the educational standards have been increased in recent times.

Despite the ongoing wars in neighbouring countries when the BDF was formed, many

Batswana were enthusiastic to join the military. Most of the men who enlisted during its formative years including Lt. Gen. Tebogo Masire, Captain Losika Keatlholetwe and Colonel Lesego

265 Merafhe, The General, 50. 266 Merafhe, The General, 50.

102 Motlhatlhedi stated that they had always desired to join the military and managed to receive permission from their parents. Motlhatlhedi’s father, for instance, had served in the Second World

War so he embraced the idea.267 On the other hand, a large number of the new recruits of 1977 joined without their parents’ consent. Some in fact fled their homes to sign up and later told their family members prior to the beginning of their training.268

The rapid formation of the BDF on a small budget meant that the decision makers had to find a delicate balance between buying arms and equipment as well as providing food and shelter for these men. In most cases because the border war with Rhodesia was ongoing, the accommodation of men had to come second because as Merafhe put it on numerous occasions

“botshelo ja lesole ke ja sekgwa” meaning that “the life of a soldier is in the bush.”269 In the beginning, as exemplified by a small Force HQ office there were little funds to allow the construction of proper camps. As one early recruit said, “We had nothing; everything was in tents, but we performed our duties as expected.”270 Between the end of 1977 and early 1978, the BDF put together plans to improve the living situations of their soldiers in Kasane, Francistown and

Phikwe as well as the construction of their new Force HQ in Mogoditshane, Gaborone. Their estimated budget for these projects in 1978 was a modest P 27 million (or US$2.7 million today).271

This can be interpreted in two ways; the first is that despite serious financial difficulties that the

BDF faced, they still managed to implement some infrastructure improvements from early on though it took a lot of time to reach the levels that the soldiers and their commanders preferred. It

267 Mothlathledi, Interview. 268 Most of my informants including Ret. Major Gabatlhokwe, Lt. Col. Mooketsi and Brigadier D K. Mokgwathi confirm that the new recruits of the time joined without prior parent consent. 269 “Botshelo ja Lesole ke ja sekgwa – Merafhe kalosong ya masole” Dikgang tsa Gompieno 31 Hirikgong (January) 1978. 270 Masire, Interview. 271 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Botswana Defence Force – Expenditure” 28 February 1978.

103 was also a reflection of the economic troubles that the country faced at the time despite the discovery of diamonds a few years earlier. Botswana started benefitting from diamond revenues in the early 1980s.

The Indian Army Training Team (IATT): 1978 and beyond

The relationship between India and Botswana dates back to the late 1800s after the completion of the Mafeking-Bulawayo railway. Many enterprising Indians migrated to villages in eastern

Botswana such as Mahalapye, Lobatse and Francistown from Gujarat via Natal, South Africa.

Through time, their entrepreneurship introduced Batswana to modern capitalist ideas thus becoming an important aspect of the economy of Botswana. They also brought with them their ways of life including various religions, style of dress, food and numerous other aspects of their culture. By the time Botswana gained independence, the Indian population was significant enough for the Indian government to commence diplomatic relations with Botswana though they only formally opened an office in 1987.272 Since the 1950s, the Indian government under Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru officially chose neutrality during the Cold War and later took a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement even though on many occasions, it drew some of its policies from

Moscow.273 From that period well into the 1960s and 70s, neutrality informed India’s foreign policy even though it tried to take advantage of the bipolar global conflict and create its own sphere of influence among the developing nations of the world.274 However, despite being labelled

272 Ministry of External Affairs, India-Botswana Relations, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Botswana_15_01_2016.pdf Accessed 23 August 2019. 273 Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State, 271. 274 Poorvi Chitalkar & David M. Malone “Democracy, Politics and India’s Foreign Policy” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 17, no. 1 (2011): 77-78; Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, “India’s Foreign Policy” Foreign Affairs, 34:3 (April 1956): 435.

104 imperialistic by some,275 India’s agenda was always aimed at promoting peace and goodwill in that it became one of the most active contributors to international peacekeeping operations around the world including in Africa from the 1960s.276 Not only that but the Indian Army in 1963 offered

8 places to Nigerian officers at its Defence Academy in Dehra Dun. The following year it helped set up the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna.277 With its expansive anti – colonial foreign policy, a much longer history of military involvement outside of its borders, as well as a neutral approach to Cold War affairs, it was no surprise to see Merafhe in April 1978 travel to India to start a long-lasting military partnership. Also because of its Anglophone personnel and similar

British-style military culture, the Indian Army seemed to be the perfect partner or mentor for the

BDF. On his tour, he visited the Indian Military Academy and other establishments and realised that his budding defence force would learn a lot from the training that the Indians were conducting at the time.278 Up to this point, Merafhe had been reluctant to request extensive training from nations that had more military experience as reflected by his earlier refusal to invite instructors from both Nigeria and Zambia. However, the escalation of cross-border skirmishes led to the need for better training and responses which Merafhe felt could be obtained from the India which was a democracy and never experienced a military coup, so it was a good model for Botswana, and it was far from the troubled Southern Africa region. Initially, India formally agreed to send a small team of officers with wide ranging technical expertise to help train the BDF but later, the

275 See for example Chitalkar and Malone, “Democracy, Politics” 75 – 91; B M Jain, Global Power: India’s Foreign Policy, 1947 – 2006 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008); Harish Kappor, India’s Foreign Policy 1947 – 1992, Shadows and Substance (Dehli: Sage Publishers, 1994). 276 Alan James Bullion, “India” in The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood (London: Frank Cass, 2005): 196 – 212; Norrie MacQueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (London: Routledge, 2014). 277 Raj Verma, India and China in Africa: A Comparative Perspective of the oil Industry (London: Routledge, 2014)2014 see also Dan Agbese, Ibrahim Babangida, The Military, Politics and Power in Nigeria (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2012), 47 – 48. 278 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Training in India for Botswana Defence Force Personnel” Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President of Botswana, 19 April 1978.

105 agreement saw some members of the BDF being sent in the opposite direction for different courses.279 The initial contingent of army officers in the IATT included Virender Kumar, Davand

Bhangui, Abnash Chander, Balkar Singh Randhawa, Shyan Lal Barolia and Charan Singh who arrived in October 1978.280 By 1981 a team from the Indian Air Force made up of engineers, instructors, and technicians also arrived to take over from Durrant and Haines.281

Having secured the partnership with India, Merafhe then looked to use it to add key competencies to the BDF by coming up with a list of courses aimed at the overall improvement of his embryonic military. This included courses for officer cadets, platoon commanders, physical training, and engineering with a focus on construction of obstacles, bridges as well as the laying of mines. Other courses in his list focused on non-combat roles such as mechanical and electrical engineering, catering, administration and management for the advancement of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers.282 The now retired Lt. Col. Molefe Mooketsi who joined the BDF in June 1977 as a private benefitted from this military partnership as the courses he took in India led him to become a commissioned officer later in his career.283 The agreement remained in place for 25 years and helped the BDF become self-sufficient.284

The BDF and the Rhodesian War to 1980: Refugees and Repercussions

279 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Correspondence from Maj. Gen Merafhe to Immigration pertaining to exemption of these individuals from getting work permits as they were contracted by the BDF, 24 October 1978. 280 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Correspondence from Maj. Gen Merafhe to Immigration pertaining to exemption of these individuals from getting work permits as they were contracted by the BDF, 24 October 1978. “BDF benefits from Indian Personnel Training, Sunday Standard, 3 April 2018 http://www.sundaystandard.info/bdf-benefits-indian-personnel-training Accessed 3 March 2019. 281 “BDF Officers benefit from ITEC programme”, Mmegi Tuesday March 28, 2017; Masire, Interview. 282 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Training in India for Botswana Defence Force Personnel” Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President of Botswana, 19 April 1978. 283 Mooketsi, Interview. 284 Masire, Interview.

106 Botswana has a history of accepting political refugees dating back to the 1900s when large numbers of Herero people fleeing a genocide in German South West Africa settled in Ngamiland and Mahalapye. The British colonial government never made efforts to repatriate these refugees who later became naturalised citizens of Botswana.285 By the 1960s, colonial Botswana had become a safe haven for freedom fighters and legitimate political refugees, many of whom were granted asylum even though the country’s formal refugee policy was announced in 1974. Between

1976 and 1978, during the height of the Rhodesian war, refugees entering Botswana rose from

5,712 to 25,300. In some cases, 1000 refugees a week were received in Francistown and Selebi

Phikwe transit centres.286 These transit centres soon became overcrowded as more refugees flooded into Botswana in the following years leading to the decision to build a larger and permanent refugee centre in Dukwi, some 100 kilometres west of Francistown in 1978.287

In the late 1970s refugee transit centres and major towns in eastern Botswana became targets of numerous attacks because earlier Rhodesian operations in these areas had identified some ZIPRA operatives in Botswana who had disguised themselves as ordinary members of the society. 288 In May 1977 Mophane Club in Francistown for instance, a place where more than 400 revellers had gathered for a concert was attacked by a grenade that killed two people and injured more than forty civilians.289 Soon after this, the Rhodesians launched an airborne and ground attack on a BDF camp at Mapoka. A local newspaper reported that, “The Rhodesian soldiers numbered more than 150 while members of the BDF were 15. BDF reinforcements were sent but when they arrived at the scene of the fighting, the forces had withdrawn.”290 The savagery of these attacks

285 Dale, Botswana’s Search, 31. 286 Morapedi, “The Dilemmas of Liberation,” 76. See also, Merafhe, The General, 53. 287 Morapedi, “The Dilemmas of Liberation,” 76. 288 Jackie Cillers, Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia (London: Routledge Publishers, 1985), 182 – 83. 289 Morapedi, “The Dilemmas of Liberation,” 82 290 “Rhodesians attack again”, The Botswana Daily News, 18 May 1977, 1, see also, Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 170.

107 cannot be emphasised enough, and it should be made clear that Botswana’s territorial integrity meant nothing to the Rhodesians as they bullied their way across the border on numerous occasions despite the BDF’s presence. In the late 1970s, Rhodesian “teams of Selous Scouts and Special Air

Service were now operating in Botswana virtually on a permanent … basis”291 which justified the hasty procurement of aircraft by the BDF as well as the construction of various airstrips in the

North East of Botswana to facilitate troop support.

Speaking in Cape Town during the war, Lieutenant General George Peter Walls, the head of the Rhodesian armed forces stated that they conducted operations outside of the borders of

Rhodesia every single day of the year.292 His statement was not only referring to Botswana but the entire region. After the Portuguese colonies, Mozambique and Angola gained independence in

1974 – 1975, the Rhodesian security forces had no choice but to expand their search, kill and capture missions in a desperate bid to eliminate both ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas. As

Mozambique became independent, ZANLA which was stronger in the east of Rhodesia, suddenly had the space to expand its infiltration across the eastern border. It was within this context that the

Mozambican National Resistance or RENAMO, which undermined the new FRELIMO state in

Mozambique, was formed with the clandestine support of Rhodesia and later South Africa.293

Rhodesian counterinsurgency campaigns therefore left no stones unturned in an effort to eliminate guerrillas. As the Rhodesian war reached a climax in the late 1970s, Rhodesian cross-border raids increased dramatically.

291 Cillers, Counterinsurgency, 195. 292 Cillers, Counterinsurgency, 196. 293 Numerous accounts of this. See for example, Emerson, The Battle for Mozambique; Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Carrie L. Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992 - 2002 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 84 – 87; Willian Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

108 Aside from military operations, Rhodesian soldiers used the railway through Botswana to undertake personnel trips between Rhodesia and South Africa. On the morning of 11 October

1977, a mail train from South Africa en route to Salisbury slowly steamed into the Francistown railway station. Inside one of the cars were four white men aged between 22 and 39 years old.

Though it was common for white people, not only in Botswana but the entire region, to use this railway, what roused the locals’ suspicions was the fact that one of them wore full Rhodesian

Army uniform. Luckily a local spotted them and quickly alerted the police who called in the BDF stationed nearby for backup.294 They were taken into custody without much struggle, but the incident was witnessed by a massive crowd. At the station, three of the four men revealed that they had served in the SADF and were recruited by the Rhodesians but unfortunately for them, they did not have another route to take to Rhodesia except through Botswana. The three, Rene Beyleveld,

Ian Keith Sole and Peter Bezuidenhout had Rhodesian uniforms, Selous Scouts application forms with their pictures attached to them as well as army duffel bags with serial numbers on them so there was little doubt about their intentions. The fourth man, Edward Fallen, turned out to be a UK citizen and denied knowing the trio at all apart from meeting them on the train. He later stated that he had lost his job in South Africa and was on his way to Rhodesia to find a better life so he could relocate his family.295 Fallen was later released and proceeded to Rhodesia. Perhaps it was a stroke of luck for the men to be noticed by the local, but this case became one of the most publicised in

Botswana as the three were facing the death penalty if convicted for trespassing through Botswana with the intent of aiding the enemy. “In February 1978, Beyleveld was sentenced to 15 years’

294 “Caught: Rhodesian Army Recruits – Drama at Francistown Station” The Botswana Daily News, 11 October 1977, 1. 295 “Caught: Rhodesian Army Recruits – Drama at Francistown Station” The Botswana Daily News, 11 October 1977, 1.

109 imprisonment but the sentence was set aside on appeal a month later and he was released.”296 The remaining two of Beyleveld’s accomplices were later released into South African custody, but their transit through Botswana painted a picture of the level of arrogance that the South Africans and Rhodesians had at the time.

At around the same time, the government of Botswana was also prosecuting another group of young South African soldiers, Ivan Godfrey Bernado, Petrus Andries Liebenburg, George

Fraught and Brian Kenneth van Zyl who had illegally entered the country form South Africa after a drinking spree and ended up raping an eight-month pregnant Motswana woman. They were each handed 2-year prison sentences.297 These two unrelated incidents demonstrate the troubles caused by both Rhodesian and South African forces even when they were not on formal missions.

Apart from claiming innocent lives, the Rhodesian cross-border skirmishes changed the way of life of some Batswana. In some cases, small business owners suffered the brunt of attacks because guerrillas were known to frequent local shops in border villages for provisions thus turning the shop owners into targets.298 The Rhodesian soldiers would loot the shops leaving the owners empty handed and without options but to close. Some managed to close before any looting could take place after being tipped off by locals that Rhodesians might be in the area.299 Kasane,

Botswana’s bustling tourist centre was another area that suffered due to the cross-border raids as hotels and lodges in the area became unsafe. By December 1977, it had laid off more than 60% of its workforce. Companies such as Chobe Game Lodge retrenched 40 of its 52 employees while

Chobe Safari Lodge closed entirely though it reopened later but only re-hired 12 members of staff

296 Bolaane, “Cross-Border Lives,” 566. 297 “Sentence Passed on four who raped Motswana” The Botswana Daily News, Monday, 31 October 1977, 1. See also Bolaane, “Cross-Border Lives,” 563 – 564. 298 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 165. 299 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 165.

110 instead of the original 30.300 These numbers are modest compared to Grove International, a construction company based in Kasane that lost more than 300 employees because it was no longer safe for builders to work in the open as attacks could occur anytime. At this time, Grove

International had been tasked with the construction of the Nata – Kazungula road and it was common for such a company to hire foreign nationals which made it a primary target for

Rhodesians. Generally, people were no longer free to live as they were used to as they had to take extra measures and be more vigilant to avoid encounters with either Rhodesian or South African security forces. In May 1978 a major shopping mall in Phikwe’s business district was paralysed by a bomb scare in a book shop. Upon hearing of this, customers scrambled for safety though it was later declared to be a false alarm.301

Building a new military and recruiting able-bodied men in the midst of the ongoing cross

– border skirmishes with Rhodesia was not without its problems. This was reflected in some overzealous actions of the men who were on border duties. Three white men were shot and killed by the BDF in May 1978 while driving in the Tuli area. It appears that the men were suspected of being in prior contact with the Rhodesian forces as they were making their way from a farm known to be frequented by Rhodesian security personnel.302 One of the unnamed men had also been identified and connected to a party that had killed Jonathan Mamalilala, a Motswana cattle herder in November 1977.303 Then on June 6, the following month Peter Quinn, an engineer from England and Brixton Kgoboko, a Motswana veterinary guide and their small team were halted by 14-man

BDF patrol with their guns drawn “because there was a white man driving their Landrover.”304

300 “Rhodesian war evokes Kasane employment cut” The Botswana Daily News, 28 March 1977, 1. 301 Bomb scare causes panic in S. Phikwe, The Botswana Daily News, 7 June 1978, 1. 302 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Post-mortem reports: De Beer and Arden” 13 June 1978. 303 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Letter from Seretse Khama to James Callaghan, ND. 304 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Ambush of Veterinary Staff by BDF” 22 June 1978.

111 Quinn and his team had been tasked with constructing a cordon fence for the control of cattle movement between the Mabolwe Border area and Gobojango in easter Botswana. In Kgoboko’s report, an unnamed BDF sergeant charged towards their vehicle and yelled in Setswana that they could have opened fire on the veterinary staff Landrover as it was BDF policy to shoot white men driving in that particular border area on sight.305 Responding to this incident, Merafhe called it absurd for the sergeant to suggest that it was BDF policy to shoot white men on sight. This was the case of an overzealous sergeant who acted on his own and likely twisted the rules of engagement. Merafhe also stated that he would investigate the matter but made it clear that this report might have been blown out of proportion to tarnish the reputation of the new military.306

Quinn was not exempt from the security checks that the BDF was conducting, but it was the forceful manner in which the BDF sergeant conducted it that didn’t sit well with him. He believed that it was racially charged as he was also aware of the shooting that had taken place in the same area just a month prior.

“Our Boys Died For Us:” The Lesoma Ambush of 1978

The Rhodesian ambush that resulted in the deaths of 15 BDF soldiers together with a 16-year-old boy, Gure Kelisitswe in Lesoma in 1978 was major turning point for the military. It not only justified the need to procure more arms but also to rapidly and comprehensively improve the structure of the BDF.307 This incident represented another one of the countless cross-border raids, but it was also a retaliation by the Rhodesians on Botswana for taking in refugees who were

305 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Ambush of Veterinary Staff by BDF” 22 June 1978. 306 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “Incidents involving veterinary staff in the Vakaranga/Tuli Circle Area” Correspondence from Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Permanent Secretary to the President 18, July 1978. 307 There are numerous accounts of this ambush but the most nuanced of them all is in Makgala and Fisher, “The impact of” 158 – 179. See also Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 2; Bolaane, “Cross-Border Lives” 557 – 576.

112 suspected ZIPRA guerrillas. For Batswana, this incident is remembered as one of the most devastating and ruthless attacks on Botswana soil but for the Rhodesians it was just another day of the war. Cross border raids comprised a common feature of their counterinsurgency campaigns against both ZIPRA and ZANLA particularly after the mid 1970s. Compared to its majority-ruled neighbours, Rhodesia was a military powerhouse that had the secret backing of an even bigger nation, South Africa so it fought its brutal war across Southern Africa borders almost unchecked.

In early the morning of 27 February 1978, villagers in Lesoma heard gunfire in the distance which turned out to be a skirmish between Rhodesian soldiers and ZIPRA guerrillas resulting in the latter fleeing across the border into Botswana towards Lesoma.308 In hot pursuit, the

Rhodesians crossed into Botswana with their troop carriers and armoured vehicles and advanced towards the village. This caused hysteria among the locals including the headman who then ordered two boys to cycle as fast as they could to inform the nearby BDF camp of what was happening. By chance, the boys met a BDF patrol who then advised them to jump into the back of their soft skinned Landrover so they could direct them to where the Rhodesians had been spotted.

Platoon Commander Lieutenant Sennenyane who was at base at the time, was informed of this and quickly put together a 35 man platoon to go and investigate.309 Perhaps it was the manner in which the BDF responded to this incident that gave them away but it is important to note that the

Rhodesians had long established a spy network in Botswana that likely tipped off the Rhodesians about BDF activities in the area.310 By the time the BDF arrived at the scene, the reported

Rhodesians had vanished and all the BDF did was search the area for the guerrillas.311 While

308 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 171. 309 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 171. 310 “The memory of Lesoma Lives”, The Botswana Daily News, March 9, 1978. The Botswana Daily News, 4 January 1977. A series of files relating to the expansive spy network that the Rhodesians had established within Botswana is in BNARS OP 28/13 “Border Security Incidents – 1974 – 82”; BNARS OP 28/12 “Border Incidents” and BNARS OP 28/10 “District Intel Reports – Francistown” 311 “The memory of Lesoma Lives”, The Botswana Daily News, 9 March 1978.

113 conducting a two-hour search of the area that resulted in the capture of two guerrillas, the BDF detachment was covertly observed by the Rhodesians. Since the days of the PMU, Botswana had put forward a policy of apprehending all guerrillas that had crossed into Botswana, so it is highly likely that the Rhodesians interpreted it as harbouring hostiles. On their return to base with the apprehended guerrillas in their Landrovers, the BDF appears to have relaxed their guard on the assumption that Rhodesians had left the area. The fact that they used the same route they had taken to the reported scene speaks volumes about the lack of preparedness by the BDF. It also appears that the chain of command in the Kasane base became muddled during this incident. Of the two platoons stationed there, it had been the task of No. 4 Platoon to respond to reports of Rhodesians but on this particular occasion, members of No. 2 Platoon also jostled for some action and joined the responding team. The three BDF Landrovers unfortunately fell into a deadly Rhodesian ambush as a barrage of bullets from machine guns hit the vehicles. Caught completely unaware, the BDF platoon panicked as they could not see who was shooting at them. According to Christian

Makgala and Louis Fisher, none of the BDF soldiers returned fire “except Private Mathe who was found dead with an expended magazine next to his rifle.”312 As more bullets pierced the soft skin of the Landrovers, the vehicles caught fire and the unfortunate soldiers trapped inside burned to death while a few managed to escape.313 Locals claimed that the Rhodesian party soon charged on the already burning vehicles “and stabbed some with bayonets to confirm if dead or alive. Those found still alive were thrown into the flames of the burning vehicles.”314 This was a direct violation of numerous Geneva Convention articles and treaties.315 Hearing gun fire, the remaining BDF

312 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 173. 313 “The memory of Lesoma Lives”, The Botswana Daily News, 9 March 1978. 314 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 173. 315 More than 10 articles and treaties that are governed by the Geneva Conventions make it a war crime to destroy property belonging to an individual or a state unless necessitated by act of war. See https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule50 accessed 29 August 2019.

114 soldiers rushed to the scene of the ambush where they encountered some of those who were lucky enough to flee despite serious injuries and lived to talk about their horrid encounter.316

Events at Lesoma shattered the entire nation as condolences soon poured in from all corners of Botswana as this incident represented and still represents the single worst loss of life by the

BDF. 2 March 1978 was declared a day of national mourning while parliament began a debate of how better the BDF could respond to such acts of aggression. This incident meant that the BDF had to revise its internal operations policy. Lesoma “galvanized a determination among

Botswana’s national leaders to improve the country’s combat capabilities, and they set about immediately to assure that future foes would pay a high price for violating the country’s sovereignty.”317 One of the policies that resulted from this incident regarded the fate of the family members of a BDF soldier killed in action. In the middle of 1978, the BDF Act was amended to include clear language on the various ways that the military would be obligated to help the families of the deceased.318 Major General Oitsile also stated that the incident inspired those who remained in the BDF to be more vigilant in their continued efforts against the Rhodesians.319 Besides benefits for military dependants, the BDF moved towards better training and acquiring better arms and equipment that improved the lethal capabilities of the force which became useful in the 1980s against South African aggression.

After the Lesoma tragedy, people in all corners of Botswana came together to express their sorrow. Numerous letters of condolences were sent to the BDF through the Office of the President.

Other Batswana filled the Botswana Daily News editorials with letters of anger and frustration but

316 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 173 – 74. 317 Henk. The Botswana Defense Force, 32. Henk’s views are emphasised by the Retired Major Gabatlhokwe and other informants. 318 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, “BDF Act, Statutory Instrument and Amendment of Regulation 42 of SI 72 of 1977” 319 Oitsile, interview

115 also expressed their unwavering support for BDF efforts.320 More than 11 villages and towns across the country continued mourning to emphasise the tragic situation.321 In April 1978, the

Molepolole based Association for the Relief Fund for the Victims of External Aggression

(AFRVEA) together with the Botswana Business and Professional Women’s Association in

Gaborone launched fundraising campaigns aimed at helping the victims of Rhodesian and South

African aggression.322 The success of the campaigns despite the lack of government involvement prove just how united Batswana were in finding some solution to helping those who had lost loved ones and property during the war. In his Christmas message to the country President Khama noted that:

It has been a year during which we struggled together as a people, perhaps more than ever before, to preserve our democratic ideals against all manner of adversity. Consequently, we remain a strong nation, if not stronger, united by a common purpose and sustained by a common belief in a common future ... we must remember that we enjoy peace in our country because of the sacrifices they (the BDF) are making to defend us and to ensure that we remain a free and peaceful nation in this troubled part of our continent.323

Merafhe reiterated these sentiments the following year when he stated that border areas were the places where death was the price for ignorance. He urged Batswana who lived in those places to remain vigilant at all times.324

While the country was still mourning the fallen soldiers of Lesoma, more clashes took place. Later in June 1978, the Rhodesians published a communique that stated that suspected guerrillas had opened fire on one of their patrols from inside Botswana’s border which prompted a series of retaliatory attacks on BDF patrols.325 It had become quite common for the Rhodesian

320 “They donate to BDF” The Botswana Daily News, 4 August 1978, 2. 321 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of” 174. 322 “Politics must not pollute our stand – relief fund is launched” The Botswana Daily News 19 April 1978, 1. 323 “1978: a year we struggled more than ever before” The Botswana Daily News, 27 December 1978, 1. 324 “Lesoma Ambush: A serious setback” The Botswana Daily News, 7 June 1978, .1 325 “Rhodesia fires on BDF Patrol” The Botswana Daily News, 28 June 1978, 1.

116 command to issue such statements and they used them to justify their raids. There was a serious exchange of fire near Mathathane village that started at around 11am. By 4:40pm, BDF reinforcements had arrived. A Rhodesian helicopter then fired two rockets that barely missed a

BDF aircraft that was conducting aerial surveillance of the area. By the end of the day, two

Rhodesian fighter jets had flown over the BDF soldiers in what seemed to be a display of military prowess. It is not clear how the encounter ended but there were no reported casualties on either side.326 Then in September 1978, the Botswana Office of the President announced that there had been yet another exchange of fire at Kazungula between the BDF and the Rhodesians. Similar to the attack a year earlier, the Rhodesians opened fire on the BDF who this time returned fire killing

4 Rhodesians.327 By August 1979, in yet another Selous Scout raid into Botswana, one of the BDF

Defenders was shot down by a Rhodesian Alouette III helicopter with a mounted 20mm ground attack cannon.328 Despite the fact that there were countless cross-border incidents that took place throughout the period of the Rhodesian war, not all resulted in bloodshed. In some cases, it was the BDF that pounced on unsuspecting Rhodesians who had set up overnight camps within

Botswana.329

By the end of 1979, the white minority government of Ian Smith finally ran out of options and was forced to sign the Lancaster House cease-fire agreement that ended the war. This was the result of numerous diplomatic efforts involving ZANU, ZAPU, the British government, Moscow, the United States, and South Africa as well as the Frontline States, a coalition between Angola,

Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia between the 1960s and 1990s. Signed in 21

December 1979 the Lancaster House agreement set Rhodesian elections for February the following

326 “Rhodesia fires on BDF Patrol” The Botswana Daily News, 28 June 1978, 1. 327 “BDF Kills four rebel soldiers” The Botswana Daily News, 13 September 1978, 1. 328 Moorcraft, The Rhodesian War, 97. 329 “BDF captures Rhodesian Army War Equipment” The Botswana Daily News, 2 August 1979, 1.

117 year which ultimately ushered in a new era of black majority rule in what then became independent

Zimbabwe.330 What this meant for Rhodesia’s neighbouring countries was the end of cross-border raids that had haunted them since the late 1960s. President Khama and Major General Merafhe could now take a deep sigh of relief even though much work was still to be done. Unfortunately for the still new BDF, as the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe chapter was closing, another one in apartheid

South Africa remained open and would haunt Botswana well into the late 1980s.

330 See amongst other, Henry Wiseman & Alastair M. Taylor, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, the Politics of Transition (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 15; see also Moorcraft and Mclaughlin, The Rhodesian, 171-72; Josiah Brownwell, The Collapse of Rhodesia, Population Demographics and the Politics of Race (London: IB Tauris & Co. LTD, 2011), 94.

118 Conclusion

This chapter focused on various aspects and circumstances surrounding the formation of the BDF in 1977 particularly the Rhodesian war. However, the formation of Botswana’s military also fell within a period of all out conflict within Southern Africa. In Angola, for instance, what was a struggle for national liberation had suddenly turned into a civil and conventional warfare struggle to capture Luanda that involved the Soviet Union, United States, Cuba and South Africa. In South

West Africa (Namibia), there was a struggle for independence where SWAPO engaged in a guerrilla war with the apartheid regime from South Africa that had dominion over the country. In

South Africa, the forces of MK and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army, (or APLA) formerly known as Poqo were also engaged in their own struggle against the racist government that lasted until the end of the Cold War period. In Rhodesia, as demonstrated, ZANLA and ZIPRA were also fighting against Ian Smith’s forces from neighbouring Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and

Botswana. The liberation movements in the region had sanctuaries in neighbouring countries.

Globally, the Eastern Bloc powers sponsored these liberation movements with armaments, training and funds which allowed the guerrillas to fight protracted battles while western powers supported the white minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. Within this highly contentious region was Botswana, a country that had gained independence in 1966 without bloodshed. This made it a safe haven for fleeing guerrillas who also violated Botswana laws by entering the country unlawfully with their weapons. It was within this context that the BDF was formed in April 1977

– with the primary aim of defending the country against armed incursions. Since the colonial period until well after independence, Botswana had been economically reliant on both South Africa and

Rhodesia. However, this relationship would soon change as those two neighbouring countries turned hostile toward Botswana under suspicions of harbouring freedom fighters.

119 As a former British colony and a member of the Commonwealth, it was a natural choice for Botswana to turn to the British for military assistance though this happened on a small scale.

The reasons behind that decision included the fact that the BDF leadership wanted to continue the existing British military training and culture and the use of NATO standardised weapons and ammunition. On the other hand, the British had always expressed their willingness to help

Botswana defend itself not only because it was a former colony but also because they wanted to help maintain peace and democracy in the country and keep it out of the Soviet/Chinese orbit.

Economically for the British, UKMTAS funds would ensure that Botswana became a customer of their military hardware and training. While UKMTAS and the FCO were the main sources of funding for the new BDF, the government of Botswana maintained a neutral policy during the

Cold War which was essential in making sure that they did not excessively rely on one nation for military supplies. The Botswana government by 1977 had received arms from the United States,

Belgium and Britain and were in communication with the United States to acquire more when

President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy effectively blocked that. This caused some anxiety and discomfort among the BDF leadership because cross-border invasions were on the rise and so was the need for more arms. As a result, the BDF turned to China for weapons which caused even greater worries among British officials. Considering Solodovnikov’s public announcement about

Moscow’s readiness to help Khama, UKMTAS was prompted to open its doors to Botswana.

Diplomatically, the Khama government also took significant strides to build relationships with other European nations that were allies of the West and managed to secure loans for general development and for the BDF with the assumption that diamond revenues would later be used to reimburse those countries. The strengthening of those diplomatic ties would also result in less economic reliance on South Africa and Rhodesia.

120 The BDF Act of 1977 represented the framework for the military but it needs to be noted that Brigadier Gray and Major Swann also played a role in the shape of the early force structure.

As will be seen throughout this study, the BDF Act would get amended numerous times to accommodate the growth of the military. Recruiting for the BDF was not unlimited due to budgetary issues but the country’s poor economy also meant that a lot of able-bodied men enlisted for service. Generally, the Botswana society knew about the border situations and felt the need to send men defend their country. From then onwards, the BDF, despite financial difficulties, grew by acquiring military hardware including weapons, armoured Shorland trucks, soft-skinned

Landrovers and aircraft from countries that were friendly towards the Botswana government.

However, the military hardware the BDF acquired in its early days was generally not lethal and did not match up to what the neighbouring countries had which could be interpreted in two ways.

First, the financial difficulties experienced by the BDF presented a major obstacle in developing the full capabilities of the military. Secondly, Botswana did not want to be seen as taking an aggressive stance towards its neighbours, so it only procured modest equipment.

The opening of relations with the Indian Army which at the time was helping some African countries such as Nigeria with military training, also gave the BDF access to new courses pivotal to the future development of the new military. This relationship with the Indian Army, together with the development of the BDF Air Wing through ex-RAF members Durrant and Haines were indications that the BDF aimed to continue British military models.

The ambush at Lesoma served as a wakeup call for the BDF. Not only did it prompt a thorough review of the BDF’s operational strategy, it resulted in better training and the acquisition of better equipment throughout the 1980s. By the end of 1979 however, the Rhodesian war was over and so were the cross-border invasions from the eastern side of the country. This meant that

121 the BDF had to shift their attention to apartheid South Africa whose cross-border invasions were taking place simultaneously with the Rhodesians but outlasted the Rhodesian War and escalated after 1981.

122 Chapter 3: Our Boys Flounder: The BDF and the Growing Regional Contentions of the 1980s

Introduction

The end of the Rhodesian War in 1979 brought only a small sigh of relief to the BDF in that its leadership thought they no longer had to deploy men to defend the eastern border. It necessitated an immediate and major strategic shift as the troops now had to switch their attention to apartheid

South Africa, a much stronger military power than Rhodesia. Up to the early 1980s, the South

African Defence Force (SADF) had made limited cross-border raids into the north of Botswana in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas but by the mid-1980s this situation had changed dramatically owing to Botswana’s continued clandestine support of the ANC that had been expelled from South Africa and forced to operate from bases in neighbouring countries. By 1984, the ANC cell in Botswana had switched from using the country as a clandestine recruiting area to a more aggressive approach of grenade attacks on various targets across the border in South Africa. This led the SADF to launch a series of retaliatory bombings in Botswana’s capital, as well as the fateful 1985 raid which left several exiled South Africans and some Batswana dead. The 1980s therefore presented the biggest challenges for the recently formed BDF which had to stretch its resources and grow largely in response to these dangers.

123 Strange Bedfellows: Botswana and Soviet Union Relations from 1967

The relationship between the Soviet Union and Botswana dates back to the late 1960s but it became more important for the BDF in the early 1980s when Moscow supplied it with a significant shipment of military equipment. Since its creation in 1977, the BDF maintained a close relationship with Britain through funding and military hardware, sending candidates for training at RMA Sandhurst, and hosting British instructors. The basic framework on which the BDF was structured was designed by British officers Brigadier John Gray and Major Jonathan Swann. This partnership continued to grow and seemed not to be threatened by the opening of official channels of communication between the Soviet Union and Botswana in the early 1970s.331 Throughout this period, the government of Botswana had maintained a pragmatic and neutral foreign policy – that it would seek aid from any foreign power regardless of Cold War ideology. Even though the BDF had acquired arms from communist China in the past and Soviet Ambassador Solodovnikov had openly expressed his country’s willingness to aid President Khama, up to this point, channels between Botswana and the Soviet Union largely appeared closed. In reality, however, Moscow had been trying to make its way into Botswana since 1967 when it applied to open an embassy in

Gaborone.332 For Moscow, this was important to facilitate the opening of trade relations but the conservative Seretse Khama strongly objected to this proposal opting to rely on the “Zambian embassy in Moscow, Botswana’s high commission in London and the Soviet Union embassy in

Lusaka” to perform any consular related duties for the two countries.333 His reason was that there were no Soviets living in the country but some members of Botswana’s left-leaning opposition

331 “Moemedi wa Russia on nna mono” Dikgang tsa Botswana tsa Gompieno, 9 Tlhakole (February) 1978, 1 (this is the now discontinued Setswana version of the Botswana Daily News) 332 BNARS OP 36/1, ‘Application for Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union’ March 3, 1967. 333 Kwante MC Kwante and Boga Thura Manatsha, “Origins and Dynamics of the Botswana – Soviet Union Relations, 1960 – 1990” Botswana Notes and Records, 48, (2016): 91.

124 political parties such as Philip Matante, Obonetse Menyatso and Motsamai Mpho were at the time studying in Moscow. It was not until 1976 that Botswana finally agreed to the Soviets’ request to open an embassy in the country but even then it was not fully operational until 1978.334 Khama made sure he placed conditions on the Soviet presence that included strict monitoring of Soviet personnel in Botswana as well as limiting the number of people manning the embassy.335 The decision to open this embassy raised concerns among South African officials who feared that the

Soviet Union would begin to use Botswana as a venue for assisting exiled ANC members.336

Despite the new Soviet presence in Botswana, Seretse Khama’s government and the BDF chose to continue relying on the British and their NATO allies for the majority of their arms acquisition before 1981. During the 1960s, the BDF’s predecessor, the PMU had procured weapons from FN Herstal, a Belgian company, United States weapons manufacturers as well as the British so it was important to maintain those ties. Another reason why Botswana did not turn to the Soviet Union for military aid earlier had to do with the fact that it was largely British funds that had made the creation of the BDF possible. Given Cold War tensions, UKMTAS and FCO money could not be used to buy arms and military hardware from the Soviet Union. By 1980, however, this situation was rapidly changing as the government of Botswana had started reaping the benefits of its diamond production.337 The country was becoming more self-reliant and open to other options as it could now afford to purchase arms away from the usual UKMTAS channels.

The BDF’s budget then expanded from an initial $4 million in 1977/78 to $25 million by 1983

334 “Moemedi wa Russia on nna mono” Dikgang tsa Botswana tsa Gompieno, 9 Tlhakole (February) 1978, 1 see also Kwante and Manatsha, “Origins and Dynamics” 93. 335 BNARS OP 24/38 – Presentation of Credentials by the Russian ambassador Mr. Belokolos, 23 November 1970. See also Africa Research Bulletin, Botswana – USSR – D Z Belokolos presents his credentials to President Khama, p. 1967 336 “Gaborone Spy Base Reports exaggerated”, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 23 January 1985. 337 “Future is Bright for our diamonds” The Botswana Daily News, 21 August 1979, 1.

125 though in 1980 alone, BDF spending was estimated at $29.3 million.338 This means that it was consuming about 3% of the country’s gross national product (GNP) and more than 7% of total government expenditure.339 This type of spending was not without its critics. The then governor of the Bank of Botswana, Festus Mogae, who later became the president of the country between

1998 and 2008, complained that the BDF had become a monster consuming more of the country’s national wealth than the state could afford. He felt that some of those funds could be diverted to more worthwhile development projects.340 Mogae’s criticism was not unfounded because the BDF budget had grown quite significantly in this period while Botswana was fraught with constant drought and famine, poor healthcare and an overall lack of infrastructure development. In some ways, it was necessary for the military to grow in view of the threat from Botswana’s southerly neighbour but also because it had not inherited military equipment or infrastructure from the former colonial power.

The growing military budget between 1978 and 1981 allowed the BDF to construct its new headquarters, the Sir Seretse Khama Barracks (SSKB) located at Mogoditshane which was fully operational in 1981 and allowed the military to function more efficiently.341 Simultaneously, it allowed the BDF to expand its Force Training Wing (FTW), which was responsible for training recruit privates and officer cadets, to move to the new and bigger HQ. Soon after this relocation, the BDF realised that it could not fully train its recruits in the city as it was noisy and required more space. It also needed to train recruit privates and officer cadets separately. By the mid –

338 John Keegan, World Armies – Second Edition (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 64. 339 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985. Publication no. 123 (Washington, DC, 1985), p. 55. See also Dale, “Not Always” 86. 340 Evelyn Groenink, Global Investigative Journalism Network, Letter from William Turner, British High Commission in Botswana and Michael J. Long, Southern African Department, 16 January 1981. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2718956-UK-Letter-Expressing-Concerns-Over-Khama-s-Army.html 341 Initial survey of land for the new offices began early in 1978 whereas construction commenced later that year. BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Land Allocation, Mogoditshane – Correspondence from Director of Water Affairs to Secretary of the [Kweneng] Land Board, 31 May 1978.

126 1980’s, it opened two new institutions at Pandamatenga and Paje to train recruit privates and officer cadets respectively. Apart from basic military training, the Pandamatenga camp offered training programs related to combat leadership, warrant officer and non – commissioned officer instructors’ courses while the Paje base camp groomed officer cadets for leadership positions within the military.342

Botswana and South Africa’s Struggle for Freedom: 1960s – 1980s

Botswana’s role in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa goes back to the 1960s when both the ANC and PAC were forced into exile and had to use Botswana as a covert passage for their cadres escaping into exile.343 This was because these liberation movements had been banned by the apartheid government of South Africa and forced to find bases outside of the country in places such as Zambia, Tanzania, and later Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, Botswana was a key member of the regional collective known as the Frontline States which worked hard to seek solutions to the liberation of Southern Africa.344 This meant that Botswana became intertwined with the struggle against apartheid on two fronts; diplomatically and militarily. After independence in 1966, the Seretse Khama government reiterated numerous times that it would not allow exiled liberation movements of neighbouring countries to use Botswana as a springboard for launching

342 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 82 – 83. 343 Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, “The ANC Political Underground in the 1970s” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970 – 1980], ed. Bridget Theron (Pretoria: SADET, 2006), 413. See also Stephen Ellis, External Mission, The ANC in Exile, 1960 – 1990 (London: Hurst & Co., 2012), 121. 344 Carol B. Thompson, Challenge to Imperialism – The Frontline States and the Liberation of Zimbabwe (New York: Routledge, 2018).

127 attacks back into their countries.345 Despite these statements, ANC/MK cadres were not discouraged and continued to operate clandestinely within Gaborone.346

While the ANC/MK received formal recognition and military assistance from Angola,

Zambia and Tanzania, the South African exiles never created similar relations with Botswana’s

Seretse Khama and Masire administrations. This was because Botswana maintained its “no springboard” policy towards liberation movements in order to protect both its territorial integrity from South African attacks as well as its economic ties with South Africa. By openly declaring support for the ANC/MK, Botswana would jeopardize both. The Southern African countries that supported ANC/MK were also geographically further away from South Africa and had strong communist ties to both the Soviet Union and China. During the Cold War, they received direct military training, equipment and funds from both communist powers which gave them the ability to openly support the ANC. In Angola the MPLA government in 1976 provided bases which became crucial for MK training and external operations the price for which was MK participation in the Angolan Civil War.347 The Pan-Africanist President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, hosted numerous African liberation movements including the ANC and gave them support through his connections with Russia and China.348 In a similar vein, Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda who had close ties to the Soviet Union also developed good relations with the ANC leadership and allowed them to train openly at some bases that previously belonged to ZAPU in his country.349

345 “We Are Not Launch Pad, says Masire”, Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 13 August 1984. See also Richard Dale, “Not Always a Placid Place – Botswana Under Attack” African Affairs 86: 342 (1987): 77. 346 Thami ka Plaatjie, “The PAC in exile” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970 – 1980], ed. Bridget Theron (Pretoria: SADET, 2006), 720. 347 W. Martin James III, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974 – 1990 (London: Transaction Publishers, 1992),60 – 61; see also Ellis, External Mission, 54. 348 Horace Campbell, “Julius Nyerere: Between state-centred and people-centred Pan Africanism” in Africa’s Liberation, The legacy of Nyerere, ed. Chambi Cachage and Annar Cassam (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 47. 349 Stephen R. Davis, The ANC’s War against Apartheid, Umkhonto We Sizwe and the Liberation of South Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 9-10; see also Ellis External Mission, 56.

128 South African aggression against Botswana was particularly difficult to deal with because of Botswana’s long-standing economic reliance on South Africa which hosted more than 25 000 migrant workers from Botswana.350 South Africa also held significant sway in the Southern

African Customs Union (SACU), a trade agreement between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (commonly referred to as the BLS countries) that had existed since the incorporation of the Union of South Africa in 1910.351 Furthermore, Botswana only developed its currency, the Pula (rain) in 1976 having previously used the SA Rand since its creation in 1960.352

In its early days, SACU was representative of the dependency of other members on South Africa.

Botswana, for instance, could not survive without the South African market for its beef, which was its main export at independence. After South Africa banned the ANC and PAC, the members of which then fled to neighbouring countries, it used SACU as a bargaining chip to try and coerce

Botswana into cooperating with Pretoria to hand over suspected freedom fighters.353

Though President Seretse Khama maintained his stance against the use of Botswana as a springboard for launching attacks into neighbouring countries, he secretly sympathised with the

ANC. In 1973, Oliver Tambo, the exiled president of the ANC, met in secret with Seretse Khama to discuss the use of Botswana as an ANC recruitment area and soon after this, Thabo Mbeki, a top level ANC member who later became the president of post-apartheid South Africa was spotted on a number of occasions around Gaborone.354 Even though Khama had portrayed a tough stance

350 Quett Ketumile Masire, Very Brave or Very Foolish: Memoirs of an African Democrat (Gaborone: Macmillan Botswana, 2006), 251. 351 P M Landell – Mills, “The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement” The Journal of Modern African Studies 9, no. 2 (1971): 263. 352 Michael Niemann, “Diamonds are a State’s Best friend, Botswana’s Foreign Policy in Southern Africa” Africa Today, 40: 1, (1993): 27 see also Francis d’A Collins et. al, “The Rand and the Monetary Systems of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland,” Journal of Modern African Studies 16 no. 1 (1978): 98. 353 Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours; Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986), 221 354 Macmillan, The Lusaka Years, 108 – 9.

129 against freedom fighters, his government “dealt primarily with three people in the leadership of the liberation movements in South Africa: Oliver Tambo, Alfred Nzo and Thabo Mbeki of the

ANC.”355 It was important for Khama to maintain this “no springboard” policy publicly to reassure

South Africa that he was doing everything in his power to block the ANC yet he secretly allowed them to operate in the country. This was the reason why Botswana law enforcement agencies could not do much about ANC activities which at the time were limited to recruitment amongst university students and spreading propaganda. After the Soweto Uprising of June 1976, where hundreds of black South African youth were killed by state security forces and thousands more fled the country, the exiled ANC stepped up its armed struggle against the apartheid government.356

By 1979, MK operatives such as Isaac Makopo, Dan Tloome, Peter Ntithe and Sparepare

Maropeng formed an ANC cell in Botswana.357 Initially, the cell was tasked with mobilising South

African youth and some Batswana who were sympathetic to the plight of black South Africans. In the early 1980s, the cell switched tactics and conducted armed propaganda in the “Western Front” which was mainly Northern Transvaal and Bophuthatswana, one of several semi-independent homelands created for black people by the apartheid government between 1977 and 1986.358 The

Botswana cell quickly grew by enlisting other experienced freedom fighters including Elliot

Shabangu, Sam Pholoto and Samson Ndou who by the end of 1979 had been given so much leeway by Khama’s government that they turned the University of Botswana (then called University of

Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland or UBLS) into their main recruitment ground. This was because a significant number of South African youth studied there.359 The cell also strategically established

355 Masire, Very Brave, 271. 356 Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 164. 357 Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, “The ANC’s Armed Struggle in the 1970s” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970 – 1980], ed. Bridget Theron (Pretoria: SADET, 2006), 454. 358 Bernard Mbenga and Andrew Manson, “Resistance and Repression in the Bantustans” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970 – 1980], ed. Bridget Theron (Pretoria: SADET, 2006), 800. 359 Houston and Magubane, “The ANC” 414.

130 contacts in Johannesburg, the Northern Transvaal and Cape Town to facilitate communication between other ANC units in South Africa and those in Botswana through couriers who also smuggled weapons and ammunition from Zambia through Botswana and eventually into South

Africa. These arms had to be held in Botswana for some time at an ANC safe house in Bontleng,

Gaborone that eventually turned into a massive cache of weapons.360 The cell’s recruitment drives, usually done through word of mouth, had to be as discreet as possible to avoid rousing suspicion because the Botswana Police was placed on high alert and tasked with arresting freedom fighters operating within Botswana. Meanwhile, “South Africa’s security police built up an extensive informer network among ANC people in Botswana in the late 1970s and were said to have agents inside Botswana’s own Special Branch”361 that was commanded by a British officer, which made it easy for the freedom fighters to be detected and tracked.

The MK presence in Botswana became more visible after a clash between MK cadres from

Botswana and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force supported by some SADF units in 1978.362

From that point onwards, Botswana became a more difficult place for the ANC/MK to operate even though high-level members such as Chris Hani, who had been arrested in Botswana in the

1960s after the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns, were on rare occasions spotted in the country thereafter. He was known to visit Fish Kietseng’s house in Lobatse, the same town that Nelson

Mandela had found refuge earlier in the 1960s.363 Keitseng was a retired member of the ANC who had been a defendant at the 1950s treason trial in South Africa along with Mandela and other prominent anti-apartheid activists. 364

360 Houston and Magubane, “The ANC” 500. 361 Ellis, External Mission, 247. 362 Ellis, External Mission, 250. 363 Diana Wylie, Art and Revolution, The Life and Death of Thami Mnyele (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 194 364 Masire, Very Brave, 266.

131 Due to the extent of covert South African surveillance of MK cadres in Botswana, the ANC headquarters in Gaborone was disguised as a leather tannery, but it is not clear where it was located within the city or when it started to operate. Khama’s government had granted some of the ANC cadres hunting licenses which allowed them to process hides for sale but importantly also possess hunting rifles. This allowed them to move frequently around the country disguised as salesmen but also gave them access to remote cattle posts that were used as ANC recruitment and training areas.365 These remote locations were harder for South African intelligence operatives to trace because of the overall lack of tarred roads accessing them. This allowed the ANC cadres to conduct most of the training they needed without much disruption. Other ANC members in the capital,

Gaborone, lived in regular houses in neighbourhoods such as Bontleng and Broadhurst while others including South African artist Thami Mnyele rented small one-bedroom houses in

Tlokweng, a village adjacent to the capital.366 Though all these operatives tried to cover their tracks, South African intelligence officials often knew about them.367

In July 1980, President Seretse Khama passed away and was succeeded by his vice president Sir Quett Ketumile Joni Masire who the British believed to be more lenient and sympathetic towards liberation movements than his predecessor.368 Though he did relax his attitude towards the ANC in Botswana, Masire proved to be not much different than Khama.

Officially, he followed his predecessor’s “no springboard” policy but on the ground, he made more room for the MK cadres to recruit and spread propaganda.369 It was during the early years of his tenure and perhaps due to Masire’s leniency that MK switched tactics from peaceful clandestine

365 Houston and Magubane, “The ANC” 498. 366 Wylie, Art and Revolution, 189 – 194. 367 Wylie, Art and Revolution, 193, 368 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK - Correspondence from DJ Gordon to Sir. L. Allison, July 1982. 369 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK – Correspondence from DJ Gordon to Sir. L. Allison, July 1982. See also Wylie, Art, 177.

132 recruiting to a stronger approach of armed propaganda against the Pretoria government with the

Soweto Uprising in the back of their minds. Masire also worked closely and tirelessly with other members of the Frontline States to try and find an end to apartheid in South Africa.370

MK operations in Botswana were small compared to those in neighbouring Angola,

Zambia and Mozambique. This was because MK members had more freedom of movement and were given military training by the governments and allies of those countries. In Angola, for instance, they were trained by Cuban forces in Katengue that were there to help the MPLA government fight against South African supported UNITA rebels led by Jonas Savimbi, while in

Zambia, they received specialised military training in former ZAPU/ZIPRA camps after 1980.

Because the ANC had long been exiled from South Africa, it had to seek refuge in friendly neighbouring countries that supported its cause. ANC connections in Angola, Mozambique and

Zambia had proven to be the most helpful in providing military training but also consequently entrenched Communist ideology among the MK cadres through those countries’ connections with the Soviet Union and China. Once their training in those countries was complete and they were battle-ready, some MK operatives infiltrated South Africa through Botswana.371

The Southern African countries discussed above also created the core of what became the

Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that was founded in April

1980 in Lusaka, Zambia that can also be viewed as an offshoot of the Frontline States coalition.

SADCC’s core aim stemmed from a need for more economic integration of newly independent

Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe with those countries that had experienced some levels of autonomy since the 1960s including Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho and

370 Dale, “Not Always” 75 – 76. 371 Houston and Magubane, “The ANC” 500.

133 Swaziland.372 The creation of a cohesive economic climate in Southern Africa was crucial in detaching the rest of the region from South Africa’s dominant economy though this was no easy task. In essence, the creation of SADCC sought to reduce the region’s economic dependence on

South Africa so that its member states could more directly confront the apartheid regime.

The Nkomati Accord and MK Grenade Squads: 1984

The MK incursions, usually comprising small bands of 3 to 5 men armed with grenades, from

Botswana into Bophuthatswana / South Africa were initially sporadic but gradually gained momentum in the early 1980s. The morale amongst MK cadres was generally high despite occasional clashes with the SADF and Bophuthatswana forces. After training in different neighbouring countries, MK cadres would lay low in safehouses around the Botswana towns of

Gaborone, Mochudi and Lobatse, and then proceed into South Africa armed with grenades that they would throw at the homes and offices of perceived government collaborators.373 After these attacks, the ANC cell in Botswana had to find ways to return the cadres before they were traced by South African officials though a few of them were apprehended.374 The grenade attacks were not necessarily aimed at the apartheid government, instead they were meant to garner support from black South Africans and encourage them to oppose the apartheid regime.375 Towards the end of

1984, these attacks became frequent and somewhat random which was a great risk to the MK cell in Botswana. Masire remarked that the ANC leadership “would apologise profusely, blame it on

372 Betty J, Harris and Alain Nadai, The Political Economy of the Southern African Periphery; Cottage Industries, Factories and Female Labour in Swaziland Compared (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 194 – 95; see also Masire, Very Brave, 263. 373 Wyllie, Art and Revolution 169; see also Howard Barrell, Conscripts to their Age: African National Congress Operational Strategy, 1976 – 1986 (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1994), 328 – 330. 374 Houston and Magubane, “The ANC” 500. 375 Wylie, Art and Revolution, 170. Similar and more successful attacks had taken place from Mozambique and Swaziland before the Nkomati Accord.

134 their `boys’ and stop for a while … sometimes Oliver Tambo would go so far in his praise for our role in helping with liberation that I’d have to say … if Pik Botha heard you, he’d conclude we are providing you with bases and all kinds of other help, and then he would come after us.”376 Masire knew that the BDF would not be a match against an SADF attack into Botswana but unfortunately,

South African foreign minister Pik Botha already knew about the attacks and dated them to late

1984. He stated that more than 30 such attacks had been launched from Botswana.377

Apart from Botswana, the exiled ANC also enjoyed significant freedom of movement in independent Mozambique until 1984 when the liberation movement’s war against apartheid suffered a heavy blow. Mozambican President Samora Machel was forced to sign the Nkomati

Accord with South Africa, an agreement that stipulated that Mozambique would expel ANC activists and South Africa would end its sponsorship for the rebels of the Mozambican National

Resistance (RENAMO). It was no surprise that Machel quickly signed this accord because he was desperate to end the war between his FRELIMO government and RENAMO that had been going on since the mid-1970s.378 Mozambique held to the agreement ceasing its support for the ANC and removing all ANC operations from the country except a small diplomatic office in Maputo.379

With the loss of Mozambique, ANC/MK infiltration routes into South Africa narrowed mainly to

Botswana and Swaziland though there were some instances in which MK cadres crossed from

Zimbabwe. As a result, after 1984, Botswana experienced a rise in ANC activity within its borders.

The Pretoria government was eager to close all remaining avenues that the liberation movements could use. It put together a draft non – aggression pact similar to the Nkomati Accord for Botswana

376 Masire, Very Brave, 272. 377 Wylie, Art and Revolution, 193. 378 Emerson, The Battle for Mozambique, 73 – 75. 379 Caroline A. Gross, “War Stopping and Peace Making in Mozambique” in Stopping Wars and Making Peace, Studies in International Law, ed. Kristen Eichensehr and W. Michael Reisman (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 194. See also Macmillan, The Lusaka Years, 159 – 60.

135 but Masire refused to sign it stating that there was no need for such an agreement because

Botswana had maintained its “no springboard” policy.380 He further mentioned that if his government entered into that agreement with Pretoria, it would be admitting that it was indeed hosting MK cadres thereby opening the country up for SADF attacks.381 Later that year, speaking to the Washington Post during a state visit to the United States, Masire criticised Machel calling his regime weak because he was coerced to sign the accord. Soon, South African Foreign Minister

Pik Botha’s desperation to get Botswana to sign this pact grew more visible. He even started verbally threatening Archie Mogwe, Botswana’s Foreign Minister, at various meetings.382

Furthermore, on different occasions between 1984 and 1985, South Africa tried other methods to coerce Botswana into signing the pact. For instance, Botswana had just invested P300 million (US$30 million today) into building Sua Pan, a Soda Ash producing area in the Central

District in a bid to become one of the region’s top suppliers of salt with South Africa as its main buyer.383 However, at the end of 1984, South Africa tried to use its Soda Ash buying power as leverage to coerce Masire into signing the non-aggression pact and Masire’s refusal almost ruined

Botswana’s Soda Ash hopes.384 Other examples of extensive pressure from Pretoria included the delayed customs union payments that were due to Botswana in 1984. At trade meetings between the two countries, South African representatives hinted that delays were linked to the unsigned

380 “We Are Not Launch Pad, says Masire”, Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 13 August 1984; Dale, “Not Always”, 77; Wyllie, Art and Revolution, 194; Merafhe, The General, 68; Masire, Very Brave, 271 – 72; “Botswana rejects Military pact” Sunday Express (South Africa), 2 April 1984; “Botswana – SA Pact unlikely” Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 26 March 1984; “Botswana sees no need for peace accord” The Botswana Daily News, 14 May 1984. 381 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives – Record of World Events, Volume XXXI, 1985, 33445; Dale, “Not Always” 80; “SA Bullied Mozambique into Signing Pact”, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 16 March 1984; Botswana, SA Pact Unlikely, Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 26 March 1984. 382 Masire, Very Brave, 270; Merafhe, The General, 68. 383 “The Brines of Sua Pan” feasibility report prepared by the government of Botswana in Conjunction with the US government, November 4, 1980. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAY142.pdf Accessed September 26, 2019. 384 Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours; Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986), 221

136 pact.385 Botswana, however, remained firm and refused to sign despite all the threats from its hostile neighbour. Tensions grew to an all-time high early in 1985 when the Soviet embassy in

Botswana was expanded which South Africans believed was to accommodate KGB and GRU personnel. To them this was enough proof that there was indeed espionage being conducted there.386 Though these fears were dismissed by Masire as exaggerated, they did not stop South

Africans from attacking Botswana.

Despite the numerous threats made by Pik Botha that raised the spectre of an attack, the economic coercion, the Nkomati accord with Mozambique and the failed non – aggression pact with Botswana, the BDF seemed not to implement any significant presence along the South

African border. BDF manpower had increased since the end of the Rhodesian War and thus it was expected to conduct extensive patrols in southern border areas such as Lobatse, Tlokweng and

Ramotswa in the same way it did in Kazungula in the northeast and on the eastern border. This inaction along the southern frontier might have been due to the belief among the BDF leadership that Botswana’s “no springboard” policy was enough to keep South Africa at bay. It is also very likely that the BDF knew about South Africa’s plans to attack Botswana but chose to do nothing because the SADF was far stronger than Botswana’s military and therefore it would be pointless to mount border patrols as they would be outgunned.

385 Hanlon, Beggar 221; Merafhe, The General 68. 386 Vannemann, Soviet Strategy, 73; Dale, Not Always, 86.

137 SADF Reprisals on Botswana: 1985 – 1989

The Nkomati Accord imposed a major strain on the ANC that led to it ramping up activities in

South Africa from Botswana. Pik Botha had also tried numerous times throughout the end of 1984 to get Masire to sign a Nkomati type of agreement but to no avail. This frustrated the Pretoria government that used its secret police to gather intelligence on movements of MK cadres stationed in Botswana. On 5 February 1985 Masire’s office issued a statement that Bophuthatswana, the

South African homeland spanning the Botswana border, had threatened to invade Botswana if his government did not cease the use of its territory to host ANC bases. The statement from

Bophuthatswana added that “the Republic of South Africa reserves the right to march into any neighbouring country through which they believe ANC cadres pass into Bophuthatswana … whether such neighbouring country approves or knows about such infiltration.”387 Though

Bophuthatswana never invaded Botswana, this threat should have been taken seriously by Masire’s government and the BDF because soon after this, the SADF began planting bombs in vehicles and homes of known ANC members who lived in Gaborone. The first to be hit was Nat Serache’s house in the Gaborone neighbourhood of Broadhurst. He had been under the surveillance of South

African intelligence operatives for months and by February 1985, the SADF had determined that he was responsible for some of the MK operations in Bophuthatswana and Northern Transvaal.388

On the night of the 13 February they bombed his house though he managed to survive and escape with minor injuries. After he recovered, Serache followed the advice of Masire’s government, and left Botswana for Zambia in fear for his life.389 In April, one of the houses rented by ANC operatives in Gaborone was discovered to be holding a large arms cache by the Botswana Police.

387 “Botswana Under threat of Invasion” The Botswana Daily News, 5 February 1985, 1. 388 Wyllie, Art and Revolution, 193. 389 “Bomb blast reduced Jinja house to rubble” The Botswana Daily News, February 14, 1985; “Bomb blast rocks capital kills one” The Botswana Daily News, 15 May 1985, 1.

138 It contained different types of weapons including RPGs, mines, pistols, rifles and a significant number of grenades. Most of these weapons were Soviet produced which led the Pretoria government to believe that Botswana was falling under the Communist sphere.390 Then on 15 May a car bomb placed in a Datsun belonging to Vernon Rogers Nkadimeng, a South African refugee and MK cadre, exploded killing him instantly behind a primary school in Gaborone. The blast was so strong that it sent his car engine flying up and it landed on top of a two-storey building.

Neighbours within a 300-metre radius also reported that their windows had shattered due to the blast.391 The severity of this blast reflected just how serious the South African forces were in trying to send a message to both the Botswana government and MK cadres abroad.

Operation Plecksy and BDF Responses: 1985

In the 1980s, Botswana’s diamond revenues not only allowed the BDF to acquire a wide range of military hardware, but they also created incentives for enlistment by new recruits. Salaries, free accommodation and vehicle advances were becoming attractive to young Batswana men, some of whom were abandoning their mining jobs in South Africa to return home to enlist in the military.392

Due to this, recruitment was easier than in previous years though factors like physical tests and educational requirements checked the number of new recruits. The military that started with about

1000 men in 1977 had grown to about 2850 troops, enough to form 3 infantry battalions by 1980 with its defence expenditure at $29 million in that same year.393 By 1985 the brigade – size BDF

390 Wylie, Art and Revolution, 193. 391 “Bomb blast rocks capital kills one” The Botswana Daily News, 15 May 1985, 1. 392 BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Salaries Review – Botswana Defence Force. Correspondence from J R Hobbs to Permanent Secretary to the President, 12 June 1978; BNARS OP 28/1 – Salaries Review – BDF Correspondence from M S Merafhe, 7 June 1978. 393 John Keegan, World Armies – Second Edition (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 64.

139 was arguably strong enough to mount serious defence against the South African cross – border incursions but it failed to do so.

After the numerous grenade attacks by MK cadres in South Africa, the SADF put together a plan for an incursion into Botswana to neutralise MK operatives there. As early as April 1985, high level South African officers including Anton Pretorius, Johannes Meyer and General Willem

Timol Coetzee met and discussed ways to successfully conduct their military operation with minimal casualties on their side.394 South Africa had become notorious for conducting such destabilizing acts in the region. In addition to its conventional operations in southern Angola, the

SADF had staged numerous incursions into Mozambique and Lesotho between 1981 and 1983.395

As soon as a plan was formulated to eliminate 12 targets in and around Gaborone, an SADF operational unit was assembled and placed under the command of General Constand Viljoen and began its training at a farm in Nietverdiend some 40 kms from the Botswana border with South

Africa.396 On 13 June 1985 a day before the raid took place, 11 SADF members of the operation’s clandestine reconnaissance team legally crossed into Botswana at different border crossings.397

They then proceeded to check themselves into various hotels around the city under different names from the ones on their passports and all stated bogus reasons for being in Botswana. The task of the reconnaissance team was to check the target houses to ensure that they indeed belonged to MK dissidents and report back via radio to their base across the border.398 BDF intelligence, according to BDF commander, General Merafhe, had managed to gather information about the impending raid, codenamed ‘Operation Plecksy’, but due to lack of foresight by Merafhe, the BDF could not

394 Wyllie, Art and Revolution, 198 – 199. 395 See the TRC reports for a thorough list of these operations. http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/reportpage.php?id=11158&t=plecksy&tab=report 396 Wyllie, Art and Revolution, 200; Merafhe, The General, 68. 397 “Hotel residents had SADF Vehicles” Mmegi (wa dikgang) 17 August 1985. See also Wyllie, Art and Revolution, 200. 398 Wyllie, Art and Revolution, 200

140 do much to stop it from occurring the next morning.399 It is not clear how much the BDF leadership knew about the impending SADF attack because since creation, the BDF did not appear to have a unit dedicated to intelligence gathering though this may have changed in the 1980s. Before this, the BDF is likely to have relied on the intelligence reports collected by the Special Branch of the

Botswana Police. Generally, it was difficult to detect some of the clandestine SADF members who crossed Botswana borders legally for bombing operations. In most situations, the BDF was playing catch-up with SADF members who had entered Botswana to either place car bombs or kill ANC operatives. Merafhe, however, dismissed the reports of the impending raid stating, “the South

Africans were merely rattling their sabres and did not intend to follow through with an actual attack. They did not have a valid reason to attack us in the first place.”400 Merafhe’s initial response to the intelligence reports reflects a lax attitude towards a possible raid which is worrying because he knew of the numerous strong – armed efforts that the South Africans had made to get rid of all

ANC support systems in neighbouring countries. In 1981, for instance, the SADF launched an incursion into Mozambique that killed 12 MK cadres and abducted three. The following year in

December, South African operatives raided Lesotho’s capital, Maseru where they killed 42 more suspected MK members.401 Merafhe, nonetheless, reluctantly decided that it was best for the BDF to take some precautions lest there was truth in the reports of the upcoming attack. According to

Merafhe, the BDF identified possible entry points along the border with South Africa and sealed these off with a sizeable military presence and in addition, a full kitted, combat ready unit under the command of a sergeant was stationed in the neighbourhood of Tsholofelo in Broadhurst.402

399 Merafhe, The General, 68. 400 Merafhe, The General, 69. 401 Toyin Falola, Adebayo Oyebade, Hotspot Sub-Saharan Africa (California: Greenwood Press, 2010), 127; Kader Asmal et al, Reconciliation Through Truth: Reckoning of Apartheid’s Criminal Governance (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1997), 174. 402 Merafhe, The General, 69.

141 When the incursion took place in the early hours of 14 June, a “detachment of SADF commandos drove past the Tsholofelo unit in full unobstructed view. Unbelievably, instead of the sergeant instantly ordering his troops to open fire at the SADF infiltrators … he froze in terror and let them go past.”403 The size of this particular BDF unit is not clear but the fact that it was placed under command of a sergeant suggests that it was a 10 – 12-man section and not more than a 30-man platoon. This was too small to have done much to repel the SADF raiding party that comprised 63 heavily armed commandos, each with 5 kg charges of plastic explosives, 9mm pistols, stun grenades, automatic rifles with high-beam flashlights, grenades and masks. Considering that 11 more operatives had entered Botswana a day prior, the SADF was on a serious shoot to kill mission of which the BDF could do very little about. The fact that Merafhe had previously downplayed the reports of the impending attack and the small size of the unit that he placed at Tsholofelo shows that he was out of his depth as the commander of the military. He was, after all, a policeman by training with very little military expertise. The SADF raid could have been deterred had Merafhe deployed BDF patrols along the South African border from around the same time Bophuthatswana issued its threat to Botswana. The SADF raiding party would not have crossed the border undetected which would have nipped Operation Plecksy at the bud. The SADF was a formidable military that had the backing of the strongest economy in the region but what made this raid more menacing was the arsenal that lurked at their Nietverdiend base in case the BDF retaliated. The

South Africans had assembled a sizable unit of tanks, attack helicopters and some APCs to carry more men into Botswana.404 Gaborone would have gone up in flames had all these support units been called into action. Though there no evidence, Merafhe possibly knew of this and opted for a safer option of letting the SADF complete its raid unimpeded.

403 Merafhe, The General, 69. 404 Wylie, Art and Revolution, 201.

142 Just after 1:30am on 15 June 1985, the raiding parties simultaneously made their approaches on the target houses around Gaborone, breaking down doors and killing suspected MK dissidents. The raid was very quick and highly coordinated. It lasted for about 40 minutes and within that short period, the South Africans killed 12 people, injured several others including women and children, blew up 4 houses and severely damaging a few others.405 In addition to the lives they took, the SADF raiding party seized several computers belonging to Solidarity News

Service (SNS), a South African news outlet based in Gaborone, believed to have been part of the

ANC propaganda machine. SNS workers found their printers, plate makers, and typewriters riddled with bullet holes.406 The SADF units regrouped along the Tlokweng border highway after their raid was complete, “put up their own roadblocks, and crossed back over the border to their military base, avoiding the roadblocks that the BDF and the Botswana Police Force (BPF) had erected.”407 The BDF watched and did nothing as the South African commandos drove away.

Merafhe later justified BDF inaction saying that they realised that engaging the South Africans would have resulted in massive casualties as the raid took place in residential areas.408

Operation Plecksy left Botswana in shock and many fingers pointed towards the leadership of the BDF for failing to deter the SADF incursion. There were accusations that the BDF had been pre-warned about the attack by the South Africans and chose to cooperate with the raiding party.

This inspired public doubts about the BDF’s commitment to protect the lives of Batswana as well as those who had been given refugee status from South Africa within the country.409 At a press conference on 19 June, Merafhe categorically denied that there had been any collusion between

405 “Who are the terrorists?” Mmegi (wa dikgang), 22 June 1985, 1. 406 “SNS Offices Raided” Mmegi (wa dikgang), 22 June 1985, 2. 407 Dale, “Not Always” 78. 408 “BDF reviews operational strategy” The Botswana Daily News, 19 June 1985, 1. 409 “President calls on nation to remain calm” The Botswana Daily News, 17 June 1985, 1

143 the BDF and SADF. He pointed to the fact that the Botswana – South Africa border was long and the BDF could not be put on constant alert status.410 This was a surprising statement given that the

BDF had been patrolling Botswana’s long border with Rhodesia just a few years prior to this invasion and had occasionally clashed with Rhodesian forces. Although South Africa represented a bigger military threat to Botswana than Rhodesia, the SADF had mounted only a few raids across the southern border up to that time. Prior to the 1980s, most altercations between the BDF and

SADF had been restricted to the North and North West of Botswana along the border with South

African-occupied South West Africa. On several occasions, South African patrols that had entered

Botswana illegally from South West Africa were fired upon by the BDF.411 Merafhe also stressed that there were no ANC bases in Botswana and called the attack unprovoked and merciless. He added that “no professional soldiers would rejoice at killing defenceless people while they are asleep.”412 This might have been a propaganda statement aimed at rousing global attention to the raid or it reflected Merafhe’s weak decision-making.

Botswana’s Diplomatic Responses

Despite the internal questions and accusations, all elements of Botswana society expressed outrage over South African aggression. Locals asked if it was possible for the raiders to be legally prosecuted since some of them had entered the country legally and committed crimes during their stay.413 Botswana had no option but to launch a diplomatic riposte through its Foreign Minister

Dr. Gaositwe Chiepe who wrote to her South African counterpart demanding reparations for the

410 Merafhe, The General, 70. “BDF reviews operational strategy” The Botswana Daily News, 19 June 1985, 1. 411 BNARS OP 28/12 – Border Incidents, Correspondence from Minister of Foreign Affairs South Africa and Office of the President, 1983. 412 “BDF reviews operational strategy” The Botswana Daily News, 19 June 1985, 1. 413 “Can SA Raiders be Charged?” Mmegi (wa dikgang), 24 August 1985, p. 2.

144 unjust attack.414 In her message, Chiepe stated that the raid had cost more than R25 million (about

US$ 1.7 million today) which she claimed was to cover the cost of reconstruction of demolished buildings as well as compensation for loss of lives.415 Pretoria denied Chiepe’s claim and instead justified the raid by displaying an array of weapons supposedly seized from MK houses in

Botswana.416 Masire found it strange that it took the South Africans over a week to display the said weapons and called it a feeble attempt to mislead the global community into believing that there were indeed ANC military bases in Botswana.417 It turned out that some South Africans also reacted negatively to the raid so much that the organisers of the operation had to come up with hoax stories in newspapers to persuade the public. The weapons put on display had in fact been borrowed from a South African Police (SAP) armoury supervised by Eugene de Kock, a police death squad and counterinsurgency leader during the apartheid era.418 In the Botswana parliament, other groups such as the Botswana National Front (BNF), the strongest opposition political party in Botswana at the time, echoed Masire’s calls for unity during this trying time. The BNF implored

Masire to call an all-party caucus to discuss national security issues but at the same time asked that the BDF conduct constant night patrols around the city in case the South Africans decided to hit a second time.419

414 Message from the Hon Dr G. K. T. Chiepe, Botswana Minister for External Affairs, the Hon. Mr R. F. Botha, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 18 June 1985' cited from Richard Dale, “Not Always” 80. 415 "Neighbour states claim SA's cost them R25 000 - m", Weekly Mail (South Africa) 1985; “Pretoria disputes compensation for Gaborone raid” Weekly Mail (South Africa), 25 September 1985. https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/pretoria-disputes-compensation-gaborone-raid Accessed Thursday 17 October 2019. 416 “The Guns of Gaborone” Sunday Times, 16 June 1985. 417 “Botswana rejects SA’s fresh claims to justify raid” The Botswana Daily News, 26 June 1985, 1. 418 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 2, Subsection 42, para 442 – 463. http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/reports/volume2/chapter2/subsection41.htm?t=%2BGaborone+%2Braid&tab=report Accessed Thursday October 17, 2019. See also Eugene De Cock, A Long Night’s Damage, Working for the Apartheid State (New York: Contra Press, 1998), 191 – 95; see also Nancy L. Clark and William Worger, South Africa, The Rise and fall of Apartheid (London: Routledge, 2004), 150, 169. 419 “BNF on raid” Mmegi (wa dikgang), 24 August 1985, 2.

145 The BDF was, therefore, put under enormous pressure and criticised for failing to perform its duties of protecting the territorial integrity of the country and the lives of Batswana against external forces. Despite its high military spending in anticipation of the South African threat and increased recruitment, it was failing to deter numerous acts of SADF subversion taking place. Even though Batswana called for night patrols, Merafhe remained reluctant about putting his troops in a battle – ready state.420

After the raid, condolences and offers of support poured in from Botswana’s allies including Britain, China and the Soviet Union who condemned South African aggression.

Furthermore, Chiepe submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council that implored them to dispatch a team to Botswana to inspect the damage inflicted by the South Africans and also take the Pretoria government to task. In the draft, Chiepe stated that the South Africans did not find a single training base belonging to the ANC but instead bombed regular houses within the city. She further stated that some of the houses that were raided were next to police quarters which would have made it difficult for armed MK cadres to move around easily. UN Security Council

Resolution 568 of 1985 passed unanimously. Despite the diplomatic response, SADF bombings in

Botswana did not cease. They continued throughout the rest of that year with more targeted car bombs around Gaborone though these did not include coordinated military incursion. In November

1985, for instance, another car bomb went off in Gaborone West killing all 4 occupants who were

ANC exiles including 2 children.421

Operation Leo: 1986

420 “BDF reviews operational strategy” The Botswana Daily News, 19 June 1985, 1. 421 List of SADF incursions in neighbouring countries, https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/list-sadf-raids- neigbouring-countries Accessed 19 October, 2019 see also in general, Macmillan, The Lusaka Years.

146 During 1986, relations between Botswana and South Africa worsened when what looked like a repeat of the June 1985 raid took place just outside the BDF HQ in Mogoditshane. The SADF had identified five houses deep in Mogoditshane, some 5 kms from the BDF HQ, which they asserted to be ANC transit stations and plotted to raid them. Just after dawn on 19 May 1986, an SADF spotter plane supported by 8 helicopters flew over the barracks and opened fire on unsuspecting

BDF members while simultaneously attacking the identified cluster of houses. The BDF promptly returned fire on the helicopters but did very little damage to them. One of the SADF targets of the

10-minute raid was Ernest Pule, a key member of the ANC Special Operations unit but in a case of mistaken identity they ended up killing a Motswana footballer Jabulani Masalila who also lived in the target area. The raid also seriously injured three members of the BDF and several other

Batswana while causing extensive damage to property.422 No casualties were reported on the

SADF side. Soon after this air assault on Botswana, it was discovered that similar attacks had taken place simultaneously in Zambia and Zimbabwe in an attempt to destabilise a Commonwealth

Eminent Persons Group (EPG) meeting that was set to take place in South Africa that same morning.423 The aim of the EPG was to encourage a political dialogue between the apartheid government and the ANC and try to set a path towards allowing political freedoms for blacks in

South Africa.424 The frequency of these raids reflected how apartheid South Africa belittled the territorial integrity of its neighbours. Subsequently, the government of Botswana created its first

National Security Act of 1986 which provided a framework of how the country would deal with

422 Dale, Botswana’s Search, 57 – 58; Edward Kwakwa, “South Africa’s May 1986 Military Incursions into Neighbouring African States” Yale Journal of International Law, 12: 2, (1987): 425. 423 Kwakwa, “South Africa’s” 425; Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 2, Subsection 41, para 449. http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/reportpage.php?id=11052&t=eminent+persons+group+BDF&tab=report 424 Stuart Mole, “Negotiating with Apartheid: The Mission of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group 1986” The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 101 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2012.690968 Accessed 19 October 2019.

147 issues relating to foreign destabilisation of Botswana.425 The Act stipulated that any person found guilty of threatening the national security of Botswana shall be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 years. Prior to this, it had been difficult for Botswana to prosecute foreign nationals such as Rene Beyleveld, the South African arrested in Botswana wearing full Rhodesian uniform as well as the four South African soldiers who had raped a Motswana woman in 1977.426

Unrelenting SADF Bombings in Botswana: 1987 – 1989

Despite increasing its capability through major arms purchases discussed in the next chapter, the

BDF between 1987 and 1989 was still struggling to contain SADF attacks in Botswana. The South

Africans, clearly unfazed by the BDF’s increased firepower and mobility, continued to conduct their targeted attacks around the capital, Gaborone. In April 1987 for instance, a car bomb went off at 2am killing three Batswana occupants in Gaborone west. In perhaps a case of mistaken identity, the victims were an elderly woman and two children; a 9-month-old infant and a 7-year- old believed to have been South Africans.427 This attack took place after Pik Botha issued yet another warning to Botswana stating that his government knew about armed MK guerrillas who had left Botswana on their way to disrupt the May 6 elections in South Africa. He added that he had instructed security forces to take steps to protect his country’s borders.428 In March the following year, “SADF Special Forces attacked a house at Phiring, near Gaborone, Botswana. Four people were killed in the raid. The primary target was Patrick Sandile Vundla (aka Godfrey

425 Botswana National Security Act of 1986 – Section 10, http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Botswana/BW_National_Security_Act.pdf Accessed, September 2019; see also Dale, Botswana’s Search, 59. 426 “Why Beyleveld was released” The Botswana Daily News, 13 September 1978, 1. 427 “Bomb blast kills three in Botswana” The Washington Post, 10 April 1987. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/04/10/bomb-blast-kills-three-in-botswana/6fcbcc0d-6b05- 4db3-a5f9-0d4baadcb4ad/ Accessed 20 October 2019. 428 Ibid

148 Mokoena and Charles Naledi) whom the security police had identified … as the overall MK commander for Botswana.”429 This was one of the most brutal attacks to take place in Botswana because after killing the suspects, including three Batswana women, the SADF doused the bodies with petrol and set them on fire.430

More killings took place throughout the winter of 1988 when South African soldiers struck in Broadhurst eliminating three Batswana women and one South African man suspected to be an

ANC member operating within Botswana. Then, in the early hours of 21 June that same year, yet another car bomb exploded near the Gaborone home of a building contractor, Allison Seeketso.

When the police and the BDF responded to the explosion, they discovered that this was part of a bigger SADF plot to bomb several other houses in the capital. Fortunately, the explosion was not strong enough to cause significant damage to Seeketso’s house. He and his family of five were unharmed in the incident. In Seeketso’s case, the BDF responded by mounting roadblocks on the highways leading to the borders and were able to arrest two of the South African commandos as they attempted to flee back to their country.431 Upon questioning, they were identified as Corporal

Johannes Basson, a 25 - year - old and South African national serviceman Theodore Hermansen.

The two were later handed 10-year prison sentences by the Botswana government.432

429 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 2, Subsection 41, para 457. http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/reportpage.php?id=11052&t=eminent+persons+group+BDF&tab=report 430 Ibid 431 “Botswana says it foiled a commando raid” AP News, 21 June 1988. https://apnews.com/f0299ea06ef4031be9c694e1f678fee6 Accessed 19 October 2019. 432 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, Volume 2, Chapter 2, Subsection 39, para 409. http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/reportpage.php?id=11154&t=Theodore+Hermanhen&tab=report Accessed 19 October 2019.

149 Too Little Too Late? BDF Curfews and an Undeclared State of Emergency

In light of the seemingly never-ending attacks on Botswana, Masire’s government and the BDF came under more scrutiny because it appeared that both were incapable of protecting the country.

Up to this point, the BDF had been expanding rapidly in terms of personnel and military capability but it had failed time and again to deter these attacks. Public outcry was on the rise and from the end of 1986 to the beginning of 1987, the BDF started placing roadblocks and imposing curfews around Gaborone and Francistown perhaps to regain the confidence of Batswana. This undeclared state of emergency was a new phenomenon to locals who soon grew impatient and disgruntled at these new security measures. It is not clear what the BDF was trying to achieve with the patrols, but their roadblock vetting processes were reportedly aggressive which resulted in tensions between the military and the people which did not help the image of the BDF.433 The soldiers were put on constant battle readiness from the end of 1986, perhaps to demonstrate and prove to

Batswana that they were capable of protecting them. The BDF’s show of force caused them to make several mistakes including the killing of innocent civilians at one of their roadblocks. On 7

May 1987, Raymond Archibald, a white British national and his family were returning by car from

Harare to Gaborone via Francistown when they pulled over at a BDF roadblock. Private Wabuya

Pihelo attended to the Archibalds and proceeded to order them out of their vehicle in order to search it. As he went to the boot (trunk) of the car to search their luggage, tempers flared, and an agitated Raymond struck Pihelo with his fists knocking him down. When he got back to his feet,

Pihelo fired three fatal shots at Raymond in front of his family.434 There was public outcry as some

433 Lekoko Kenosi, “The Botswana Defence Force and Public Trust: the military dilemma in a democracy” in R. Williams et al, ed. Ourselves to Know, Civil - Military relations and defence transformation in Southern Africa, (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 191. 434 “Roadblock killing, Police arrest Soldier” The Botswana Gazette, 13 May 1987, 1. See also Merafhe, The General, 75

150 believed the killing of Raymond was racially motivated. Two years after the incident, Raymond’s widow Catherine sued the government for damages though the cased dragged on until August

1989.435 Catherine was, however, dissatisfied with the sum she received and escalated the matter to the Court of Appeal which later more than doubled it.436 Pihelo was discharged from the force after this incident. The Archibald episode eventually caused an end to the BDF curfews, but it had damaged the BDF’s reputation. It was an army that had failed to protect its citizens on numerous occasions and when it tried to demonstrate its ability to do so, it killed innocent civilians. The

Archibald incident was not the first nor the last example of excessive use of force by the BDF under pressure to demonstrate their usefulness to the society. A similar incident took place in 1990 when some BDF members at another roadblock opened fire on a bus that resulted in the death of another innocent civilian.437 Though there was no state of emergency at that point, this incident blemished the BDF’s reputation.

The BDF and Zimbabwe’s “Dissident” War

During the early and mid-1980s, the BDF was forced to fight a two-pronged border war. While contending with South African attacks on the capital in the south, the BDF had to deal with incursions by the newly formed ZDF pursuing so-called Ndebele dissidents in the east. The ensuing skirmishes between BDF patrols and Zimbabwean forces also played a key role in the build-up of the BDF in the late 1980s. After Zimbabwe’s independence, President Mugabe’s

ZANU-PF state used its control of the military to crush the Matabeleland-based ZAPU which represented Zimbabwe’s only effective opposition party. The crisis began in 1981 when former

435 “Archibald awarded over P 200 000” Mmegi (wa dikgang), 8 – 14 September 1989, 1. 436 Merafhe, The General, 77. 437 Kenosi, “The Botswana Defence Force” 191.

151 ZAPU/ZIPRA insurgents, frustrated with the slow pace of their integration into the new ZANU-

PF dominated military, staged an uprising at Entumbane near Bulawayo. South African sponsored rumours that ZAPU planned to overthrow the ZANU-PF government spread like wildfire causing major unrest. The situation was worsened by the attempted creation of Super – ZAPU, a small group of South African trained dissidents that tried to destabilize Zimbabwe to hinder its support of exiled South African liberation movements.438 In 1983, President Mugabe sent the North Korean trained 5th Brigade to Matabeleland to maintain order in the region. In reality the Brigade targeted innocent Ndebele villagers who did not support Mugabe’s ZANU – PF subjecting them to rape, torture and murder. This resulted in a mass exodus of those Ndebele villagers into neighbouring

Botswana seeking refuge, but they were subsequently pursued by the ZDF who labelled them as dissidents.439 As early as November 1983, for instance, a unit of Zimbabwean troops entered

Botswana and clashed with the BDF.440 The incident occurred at about 7 am when a BDF patrol near the village of Maitengwe located along the Botswana – Zimbabwe border, found footprints crossing from Zimbabwe into Botswana. After tracking the footprints for a short distance, the BDF patrol came under heavy fire from 30 Zimbabwean soldiers.441 Subsequently, the Zimbabwean

Ministry of Defence denied that its forces had clashed with Botswana troops but contradicted themselves by adding that “in the past, sizeable gangs of anti-government guerrillas had tried to infiltrate Zimbabwe” and that they acted accordingly to secure their country against the dissidents.442 A similar incident followed on 20 December when a Zimbabwean soldier was killed

438 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe & The Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands, 1980 – 1988, A Summary Report, (Harare, 1997). http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/breaking-the-silence.pdf Accessed November 2019. 439 Sibanda, The Zimbabwe, 258. 440 Tillema, International Armed, 84 441 “Zimbabwe accused of border raid” Times (Johannesburg), 10 November 1983. 442 “Zimbabwe accused of border raid” Times (Johannesburg), 10 November 1983.

152 in a clash between ZDF and BDF units.443 These skirmishes, though they occurred less frequently compared to the earlier cross-border incursions by the Rhodesian forces, justified the need to increase BDF personnel in the Francistown and Selebi – Phikwe military base camps. The BDF came under increased pressure to defend both the eastern and southern border.

The Development and Uses of a BDF Anti – Poaching Unit

At independence in 1966, Botswana’s economy was based almost entirely on beef production which did not bring many returns due to numerous natural disasters such as drought, famine and cattle diseases were common in the semi-arid country. Before its mineral boom, Botswana was eager to hone alternative sources of income other than beef and agricultural production though the latter never brought significant revenue. National parks in Botswana, on the other hand, had been established during the colonial period but up to independence, were largely a foreign concept to locals. For the government of Botswana, tourism did not become a major economic focus until the late 1960s.444 During the Rhodesian war period, many of the tourist attractions in the north of the country, particularly the Chobe National Park, the Okavango Delta, hotels and game reserves were hard hit and forced out of business because of the lack of safety for tourists. At the end of the war in 1980, however, Botswana’s wildlife industry saw a steady incline in tourist visits every year that by the mid 1980s tourism was bringing in an average of P 40 to 50 million annually. This was,

443 Dale, Botswana’s Search, 59. 444 Large South African hunting parties in the 1890s were threatening the wildlife in the north of Botswana which prompted the colonial government to create the Chobe and Moremi Game Reserves. BNARS S/ 568/13/12 – Establishment of Northern Game Reserves, Correspondence from Philip Korwe, 1960. See also Jane Carruthers, The Kruger National Park, A Social and Political History (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995), 47 – 48; see also Carruthers, National Park Science: A Century of Research in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Bongani G. Gumbo, “Economic and Social Change” 153; Joseph E. Mbaiwa “Tourism Development, Rural Livelihoods and Biodiversity Conservation in the Okavango Delta, Botswana” in Tourism Strategies and Local Responses in Southern Africa, ed. Petri Hottola (Wallingford: CAB International, 2009), 90 – 104. “Rhodesian War evokes Kasane Employment Cut” The Botswana Daily News, Monday, 28 March 1977, 1.

153 however, a modest growth which could have been more substantial had it not been for the rise of poaching syndicates that operated from Namibia’s Caprivi Strip and Angola.445 (see Map 1 below).

Map showing the Chobe and Ngamiland districts of Northern Botswana where most poaching took place.446

445 “Warning goes to Caprivi poachers” The Botswana Daily News, 23 September 1977, 3. 446 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Botswana (Washington DC.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995) https://www.loc.gov/item/95686082/ Accessed 30 October 2019.

154 Though organised poaching in this area began in the late colonial period, it grew exponentially during the time of liberation struggles in the region.447 This was because after the expansion of the

Angolan Civil War and the Cuban intervention in 1975, small arms became widely accessible and penetrated the Caprivi Strip and northern Botswana. In most cases, poachers were being supplied with these small arms and paid by wealthy South African middlemen to procure ivory that would be later sold for massive profits in the Asian black markets of Hong Kong and China.448 These heavily armed poachers not only threatened Botswana’s wildlife and tourism industry but they robbed and killed local citizens living near the wildlife conservation areas.449 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, armed poachers were roaming the Ngamiland and Chobe districts at night killing elephants for their tusks and rhinoceros for their horns. Residents of Ngamiland and Chobe pleaded with the government to control the rampant poaching but the Department of Wildlife and National

Parks (DWNP), responsible for the protection the country’s national parks and game reserves, was severely understaffed and lacked the proper resources, including weapons and training to track down and eliminate armed Caprivi poachers.450

It would be unfair to suggest that the Caprivi poachers were the only ones killing wild animals in the area. In fact, some Batswana were also poaching in the parks as it was a highly lucrative enterprise. In most cases, these young unemployed Batswana were recruited by South

African middlemen who were part of larger poaching syndicates by offering them weapons and substantial compensation for ivory. This was common in the 1980s and soon it became difficult to

447 BNARS OP/41/11 Colonial Office Files – Reports on poaching activities in Ngamiland – Correspondence from Dep Commissioner Osborne to K Osborne, 8 June 1966, see also Gumbo, “Economic and Social Change,” 157. 448 “Warning goes to Caprivi poachers” The Botswana Daily News, 23 September 1977, 3. see also Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 49 and Keith Sommerville, Ivory, Power and Poaching in Africa (London: C. Hurst and Co. 2016), 269 – 270. 449 Dan Henk, “The Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) Transfrontier Conservation Area Project,” in African Environmental and Human Security in the 21st Century, ed. Helen E. Purkitt (New York: Cambria Press, 2009), 229. 450 “Warning goes to Caprivi poachers” The Botswana Daily News, 23 September 1977, 3.

155 tell the difference between Batswana and foreign poachers as all were equally armed. Despite numerous stern warnings by the Khama and Masire administrations, poaching continued to rise in the early 1980s.451 It became so rampant that in 1985, the government was forced to reintroduce up to 83 rhinoceros in the Chobe National Park to repopulate the area.452 This was proof that the government needed to find tougher solutions to control poaching.

At its formation in 1977, the BDF became immediately embroiled in the Rhodesian struggle so poaching did not take precedence over the border war in the east of the country.

Coincidentally, as the Rhodesian War came to an end, the economic importance of tourism in

Botswana grew and it became crucial for the government of Botswana to find means to curb armed poaching and preserve its megafauna. The Deputy Commander of the BDF, Ian Khama, was also a staunch environmentalist who believed that the best way the country could preserve its wildlife was to deploy a small unit of the BDF in the national parks to counter the growth of poaching, a suggestion that the government agreed to in 1987.453

The militarisation of anti-poaching was, however, not a new approach in Africa. It had a history dating back to the 1950s in Kenya where gamekeepers who had developed counterinsurgency skills during the Mau Mau uprising (1952 – 1960) later applied this expertise to post-colonial anti-poaching operations.454 Zambia, under President Kaunda, also made similar efforts to militarise anti-poaching.455 At around the same time the BDF was looking to create an anti-poaching unit, former operatives of Koevoet, the police counterinsurgency unit of South West

Africa (Namibia), were similarly being re-deployed in game parks to use their skills to combat

451 “Poaching on the increase in Chobe” The Botswana Daily News, 4 February 1985, 3; See also Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 50. 452 “Poaching on the increase in Chobe” The Botswana Daily News, 4 February 1985, 3. 453 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 50. 454 Timothy Stapleton, “Gamekeepers and Counter-insurgency in Kenya and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1952 – 1980, International Journal of African Historical Studies 49,2 (2016): 219 – 20. 455 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 51.

156 poaching syndicates in the north of the country.456 Botswana, therefore, had numerous examples of militarised anti-poaching to learn from. Anti-poaching was seen as a type of counterinsurgency war because the poachers knew the terrain better than the soldiers, and they were armed and usually operated in small, hard to trace, bands that were spread out across vast national parks and game reserves. The BDF then turned to its Commando Squadron, an elite unit within the military that conducted special operations such as tracking, patrolling and ambush under the command of then

Major Otisitswe Tiroyamodimo to conduct anti-poaching operations.457 Though this unit had been trained for bush tracking, they needed the expertise of San trackers (commonly and pejoratively referred to as Bushmen) who at the time were Botswana citizens employed by the SADF in South

West Africa (Namibia) to track SWAPO insurgents.458 Eventually, the BDF engaged about 50 of these San trackers to work with the Commando Squadron which had established a small base in

Maun, a town located about 60 kilometres south of the Moremi Game reserve and the Chobe

National Park.459 By the end of 1987, the BDF anti-poaching and tracking teams began their duties.

Initially, the Commando Squadron deployed along the Caprivi-Botswana border, just south of the

Kwando River that also created a barrier between Botswana and the Caprivi Strip.460 Within months, the unit had killed dozens of poachers which sent a strong message to the Caprivi syndicates.461 In 1989, the anti-poaching unit was bolstered by the procurement of 5 Bell-412 helicopters from the United States mainly to support its reconnaissance efforts while some infantry

456 Stephen Ellis, “Of Elephants and Men: Politics and Nature Conversation in South Africa” Journal of Southern African Studies, 20, 1 (1994): 65; Stapleton, “Gamekeepers and Counter-insurgency, 215. 457 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 51. 458 Henk. The Botswana Defense Force, 53. 459 Tim Stapleton, Warfare and Tracking in Africa, 1952 – 1990 (London: Routledge, 2015), 134. 460 Dan Henk, “The Botswana Defence Force and the War against poachers in Southern Africa” Small Wars and Insurgencies 16, (2005): 178 – 79. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079924 Accessed November 16, 2019. 461 “Poaching on the increase in Chobe, The Botswana Daily News, 4 February1985, 3; Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 54.

157 companies were added to improve its overall effectiveness.462 The introduction of an anti-poaching unit was important in that armed poachers were also non-state actors violating Botswana’s borders.

This was the reason behind tasking the Commando Squadron, that possessed the skillset required to counter poaching in this area of northern Botswana. The BDF had built observation posts in

Kazungula during the Rhodesian War then followed this up with base camps in Shakawe and

Kasane that were used to facilitate border patrols in the 1980s. These allowed other BDF units in the area to focus on border patrols while the Commando Squadron conducted anti-poaching operations from its own base just south of the Kwando River.463

Generally, the response by locals to BDF anti-poaching was positive though their shoot to kill approach has been criticized across the region by human rights groups. This policy was enacted because the BDF considered poaching an act of war so it became important to send a clear message to Caprivi poachers that if they crossed into Botswana armed, they might not return to their countries alive.464 This policy, however, raised many questions around the morality of extra- judicial killing of poachers, whom in most cases were from neighbouring countries. The “shoot to kill” policy was not unique to the BDF as other countries in the region such as Zimbabwe, for instance, had used it since the early 1980s.465 In Botswana, it was implemented with the legal framework of the country in mind. Section 4 (2) (d) of the Constitution of Botswana states that a person is not considered to be deprived of their life if they die as a result of a lawful act of war. 466

462 Stapleton, Warfare and Tracking, 134; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, hereafter referred to as SIPRI “Transfer of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made from 1980 to 1991” Arms Purchases by Botswana, accessed Saturday 28 December 28, 2019. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 463 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 54. 464 Goemeone EJ Mogomotsi and Patricia Madigele, “Live by the gun, die by the gun – Botswana’s shoot to kill policy as an anti-poaching strategy” SA Crime Quarterly 60 (June 2017): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413- 3108/2017/v0n60a1787 465 Stapleton, Gamekeepers and Counter – Insurgency, 232. 466 Constitution of Botswana, Chapter II, Section 4 (d). https://www.parliament.gov.bw/images/constitution.pdf Accessed November 2019.

158 This reiterates the country’s position towards poaching that it was an act of war. Despite the growing pressure from international human rights groups, BDF anti-poaching operations were regarded as successful in light of the declining number of poaching incidents since the unit began patrolling the area.467 The anti – poaching operations were putting more pressure on the BDF in the 1980s as it had to also deal with cross – border incursions by South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

The growing regional contentions, which had begun earlier, became more pronounced during the

1980s and presented extremely complex problems for the burgeoning BDF. This resulted in a more reactionary response rather than a preventive one in that the BDF had to rush to increase its lethal capabilities. For instance, the biggest military in the region, the SADF and its extensive network of spies were conducting numerous acts of destabilisation in pursuit of ANC/MK cadres stationed within Botswana. Between 1985 and 1986, the relationship between Botswana and apartheid South

Africa was at its lowest owing to the SADF bombings as well as the raids of operations Plecksy and Leo. On the many occasions that these incidents occurred, the BDF’s lack of action reflected an overall weakness both in its leadership and training. The growth of public outcry in this period was based on the fact that the budding military had been constantly expanding and increasing its capabilities, yet it was usually failing to deter SADF attacks. The institution of apartheid made

South Africans believe that anyone who supported the ANC was their enemy and had to be attacked. This is what happened to Botswana and other neighbouring countries in the region and so the BDF responded by building its military arsenal.

467 Henk, The Kavango – Zambezi, 229.

159 Another key contention of the 1980s that also had links to the apartheid government was the wealthy South African middlemen who were cashing in on the illegal trade of ivory across the world. These middlemen, who had access to automatic weapons in the era of the Angolan Civil

War funded the poachers from the Caprivi Strip to hunt elephants and rhinoceros inside

Botswana’s northern national parks. As a result, armed poaching became rife during the 1980s but at times, they also targeted and killed Batswana living in areas adjacent to national parks. This not only resulted in the sharp decline in numbers of big game but also hurt Botswana’s tourist industry which at the time was contributing significantly to the growth of the country’s GDP. With armed poaching on the rise, the government of Botswana was left with no options but to militarise anti- poaching efforts copying practises already in operation in other African countries such as Kenya,

Zimbabwe and Zambia. The establishment of this anti-poaching unit symbolised another key development of the BDF that took place in the 1980s. In this case, the recently formed military demonstrated its effectiveness and ability to respond to some external threats.

While grappling with the SADF attacks in the south and the growth of poaching in the north, the BDF also had to channel some of its limited resources to combat the newly formed ZDF that undertook a series of cross border intrusions in the east that looked like a repeat of those that had taken place in the late 1960s and 1970s. Though less frequent than the South African attacks, these intrusions forced the BDF to deploy more men on the eastern border which effectively created a new war front that the military was not prepared for. In particular, the SADF attacks in

Botswana acted as a catalyst for the swift increase in military personnel and lethal capability throughout the 1980s. The BDF went on a massive but necessary spending spree to acquire military hardware intended to deter SADF attacks.

160 Chapter 4: Our Boys Regroup: The BDF’s Military build-up and Apartheid Aggression

Introduction

Most of the BDF’s attempts to improve its firepower and lethal capabilities that took place between

1980 and 1990 were in reaction to the growing regional contentions, in particular threats from

South Africa. Throughout this period, the apartheid government went to great lengths to eliminate

ANC/MK support from neighbouring countries including Botswana. Although Botswana’s recently formed military grew steadily, it was the looming threat of apartheid that accelerated the

BDF’s acquisition of military hardware to bolster its lethal capabilities. This threat forced the BDF leadership to implement a massive expansion acquiring arms from the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States amongst others. Moreover, this was a period of great peril in Southern Africa as the region was fast militarising in light of both the Cold War proxy war in Angola and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia today). It was no coincidence that the growth of the BDF dramatically sped up in the 1980s.

Soviet Armaments to Botswana in the early 1980s

BDF experiences during the Rhodesian War, including the Lesoma Ambush of 1978 that resulted in the death of some of its personnel, and the rough terrain in the north-eastern border along which the troops were deployed exposed weaknesses within the military’s mechanised infantry. Up to the end of that war, the BDF relied on a small fleet of Landrovers and Shorland trucks (a lightly armoured version of the Landrover) for most of its ground logistics and transport, but these proved insufficient, so it became crucial to bolster the BDF’s mobility. More importantly, it was the growing threat of apartheid aggression in the 1980s that pushed the BDF leadership to be more proactive and source equipment that gave them the lethality they did not possess before.

161 One of the main principles of winning a war according to British interwar era military theorist J F C Fuller is the army’s ability to move its troops to outmanoeuvre its enemy. Fuller was an enthusiast of mechanized warfare, particularly using the tank, but his theory also explains the need for militaries to deploy armoured personnel carriers when manoeuvring their troops on the battlefield.468 For Fuller, mechanized units enhanced an army capability in terms of logistics and during the offensive and withdrawal.469 The BDF was seeking to acquire the same flexibility when it opened talks with the Soviet Union to acquire bigger and better armoured personnel carriers for its troops. This purchase was made possible by the growing relationship between Botswana and the Soviet Union that began in the late 1960s but also key was the steady rise in Botswana’s diamond revenues. In 1980, Botswana’s military budget expanded to allow a $2.4 million purchase of Soviet armaments. This purchase included 28 second-hand Brone Transporter BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and two BTR-40 armoured and turreted trucks or infantry military vehicles (IMVs). The Soviets also supplied the BDF with 60 units of Strela 2/SA-7 surface to air missiles (SAMs) later used to form of an Air Defence Unit. The lethality and significance of the SAMs cannot not be understated because they meant that the BDF could now counter the dominance of the South African Air Force (SAAF).470 During this period, the SAAF had the most advanced military in the region including a formidable air force that was challenged only by the arrival of Cuban forces in Angola in 1975. On numerous occasions, the SAAF violated Botswana’s

468 J F C Fuller, The Foundations for the Science of War (London: Hutchison and Co Publishers, 1926), 144. The static trench warfare of the First World War had inspired many military theorist such as Guderian and Triandafillov to become advocates of mechanised warfare. See Heinz Guderian, Achtung – Panzer, The Development of Tank Warfare trans. Christopher Duffy (London: Casell Books, 2001); V K Triandafillov, The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies trans. William A. Burhans (Portland: Frank Cass LTD, 1994). 469 Fuller, The Foundations, 169. 470 “Soviet Sam Missiles on Botswana SA Border”, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 3 October 1982 See also Dale, Botswana’s Search 53; Peter Vanneman, Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa – Gorbachev’s Pragmatic Approach (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990),72-73; Richard Dale, “Not Always a Placid Place – Botswana Under Attack” African Affairs 86. 342 (1987): 86.

162 air space during their flights to and from South West Africa from where they were fighting a border war in southern Angola against Cuban and Angolan state forces.471 The frequency of these violations indicated that the SAAF knew about the BDF’s lack of air defence capabilities that could protect Botswana’s air space. The SA-7s were a necessary addition that would also protect the newly purchased APCs against aerial attacks. When the Soviets delivered these weapons and APCs in 1981, the South Africans who had been weary of Botswana – Soviet relations since 1978 grew even more displeased by this military build-up. To the apartheid government, this was striking evidence that Botswana was being used as a meeting point between the Soviets and MK who were plotting attacks on South Africa.472 Moreover, the aggressive government of South Africa did not want neighbouring countries that were led by black majority governments to be armed as this could facilitate their aid and refuge to the ANC. The diplomatic tensions between South Africa and

Botswana escalated in the 1980s not only due to the Botswana government secretly hosting some

ANC/MK cadres but also because of the BDF’s military build-up throughout this period. These two important factors gave the South African government enough reason to destabilise Botswana with cross – border raids and the bombing campaigns that took place in the 1980s.

Until Botswana’s acquisition of Soviet armaments, the British government had been the

BDF’s main sponsor through funding, training and supply of equipment. In fact, despite

Botswana’s Cold War neutrality, the BDF had not acquired any significant military hardware from

Eastern Bloc countries up to this point. Surprisingly, the traditional sponsor of the BDF, the British government, was not concerned by the opening of doors to some Soviet influence. The British had

471 Between 1980 and 1983, BDF patrol units stationed in the north of the country adjacent to the Caprivi border made more than 10 reports of air space violations. BNARS OP 28/12 - Border Incidents, Correspondences between Major General Merafhe and Permanent Secretary to the President, 22 July 1983. 472 Numerous publications started appearing throughout the South African media calling Botswana a springboard for imminent ANC attacks. “Botswana Springboard?”, South African Digest, 1982, 17; “Russians Monitor SA from Botswana”, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 25 March 1978, 3; “Gaborone Spy Base Reports exaggerated”, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 23 January 1985. 3.

163 anticipated that such an arms deal would be made at some point as they had witnessed the growth of the Botswana – Soviet relationship since the late 1960s.473 British officials believed that

Merafhe and Ian Khama’s new relationship with the Soviets was inevitable and there was nothing they could do about it because other former British territories in Africa including Egypt, Nigeria and Tanzania had also purchased weapons from the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War.474

As with most military purchases, the Soviets sent a team of military advisors to Botswana to train the BDF on the use and maintenance of the APCs and SAMs who arrived in Gaborone prior to the delivery.475 British officials then started to shift their attitude towards the deal and express their worries about how much influence the Soviet advisors would have on the BDF leadership and how this would be interpreted by an aggressive South Africa. The Soviet team consisted of 11 military advisors which was an unusually large number of training personnel considering that a few years prior, during the formation of the BDF the initial British training team comprised only four personnel including two retired RAF officers.476 The large size of the Soviet team perhaps symbolised the amount of work that had to be done to train BDF personnel but the nervous apartheid government interpreted their presence to mean that Botswana had fallen under the Soviet sphere of influence which would mean that the ANC/MK would have direct help to launch their war against apartheid. This growth of nervousness and mistrust from South Africa influenced the numerous attacks on Botswana that took place in the following years. The apartheid government was always eager to choke any lifeline that the ANC/MK might have had. By 1982

473 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK - Correspondence from L. Allison to Wilfred Jones Esq, 18 March 1982. 474 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 47 – 49. 475 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK - Correspondence from DJ Gordon to Sir. L. Allison, July 1982. 476 National Intelligence Estimate (NIA) 11/70-85 issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “Soviet Policies in Southern Africa,” p.15; TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK - Correspondence from L. Allison to Wilfred Jones Esq, 18 March 1982

164 however, the BDF was reportedly dissatisfied with the service it had received from the Soviets and thus did not renew most of their training contracts.477 After that, the Soviet team was reduced to only 5 members who continued training some BDF personnel on the use and maintenance of the

SA-7s.478 This, however, did very little to ease tensions or South African suspicions that Botswana was being used to channel Soviet assistance to ANC/MK cadres. At this point nothing would convince the apartheid government that the ANC was not getting aid from the Soviets in Botswana.

To them, the Khama government had crossed a boundary that could not be undone and had to bear the brunt of the ensuing attacks.

For the BDF, its purchase of these arms from the Soviet Union symbolised an awareness of this threat from apartheid South Africa that became a primary concern after the end of the

Rhodesian War. The BDF leadership knew that they were facing a bigger threat that possessed an even stronger air force than the Rhodesians. During this time, the SADF was also growing in response to its ongoing border war in South West Africa against SWAPO guerrillas who were receiving military aid from the Cuban and Soviet forces that had been in Angola helping the MPLA government since 1975.479 Botswana’s diamond profits could therefore not have come at a better time as they provided the financial flexibility necessary for the procurement of SA-7s and BTRs and other pieces of hardware thereafter.480

An important factor in the rush to acquire better military hardware was the criticism of the older equipment that the BDF had been using. In the early 1980s, some members of the BDF

477 NIA 11/70-85 issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “Soviet Policies in Southern Africa,” p.15. 478 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK - Correspondence from DJ Gordon to Sir. L. Allison, July 1982. 479 See for example Leopold Scholtz, The SADF in the Border War, 1966 – 1989 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013); Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington and Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976 – 1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 90 – 92 and Gary Baines, South Africa’s Border War” Contested Narratives and Conflicting Memories (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 110 – 112. 480 “DeBeers report indicates booming diamond production” The Botswana Daily News, 18 June 1979, 1.

165 Engineering Platoon and Force Workshop unit, both of which had been created in 1978 and tasked with general upkeep and readiness of vehicles, complained about the effectiveness of British made

Shorland armoured trucks and Landrovers.481 They made some critical remarks about the lack of spare parts and their constant break downs.482 Owing to this dissatisfaction and the rate of growth of the military, it became crucial to procure appropriate armoured personnel carriers APC that would mark the beginning of the BDF’s first official mechanised infantry battalion. The Soviet eight-wheel BTR that had been designed anticipating World War 3 in Europe, became the BDF’s primary APC.483 These were in a different league compared to the Shorland; they were fully armoured and could sustain small arms fire as well as splinters from heavy artillery shells.

Representing the mainstay combat vehicle for Soviet motor rifle regiments, a BTR could carry up to a section of 8 soldiers who would utilize its firing ports and the mounted heavy machinegun.

These were perfectly suited for Botswana’s rough bush terrain, particularly in border areas.

Although their wheels were less effective than tracks in the bush, they allowed the APCs to travel quickly and operate efficiently on normal tarred roads. It is not clear how the BDF ground forces element distributed these APCs amongst its various bases, but it is likely that they were concentrated at their headquarters in Gaborone in order to respond more promptly to any incursion along the South African border with Botswana. After the end of the Rhodesian War, the BDF no longer focused a lot of attention on the Eastern border until the beginning of the Dissidents War in

Zimbabwe. Almost all of the effort turned towards apartheid South Africa so one could rightfully

481 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 27. 482 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK - Correspondence from DJ Gordon to Sir. L. Allison regarding the worries that Merafhe’s procurement of Soviet arms caused them, July 1982. 483 The Soviet BTR 60 had been in use widely around that time in Angola, Algeria, Grenada, Cuba amongst other countries. See Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola 1961 – 1995, from Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 153, 244; Leo J. Dugherty III and Rhonda L. Smith-Daugherty, Counterinsurgency and the United States Marine Corps, Volume 2, An Era of Persistent Warfare, 1945 – 2016 (North Carolina: MacFarland & Company Inc, 2018), 308.

166 assume that most of the big military hardware made its way to the capital.484 The BTRs gave the

BDF a new mechanized combat capability though this did not come close to what the South

Africans had which was an array of APCs including the mine protected Casspir and Buffel as well as the Ratel IFV.485 Ian Khama and Merafhe stressed the financial and practical aspects of choosing

Soviet military hardware stating that “it was cheaper and delivery time was quicker than western equivalents.”486

Western Armaments to the BDF

Throughout this period of great unrest in Southern Africa, British officials remained committed to helping Botswana defend its borders against external aggression. Since the BDF was established in 1977, there had been constant visits from British officers such as Colonel Henshaw who was stationed at Harare as well as Brigadier Brian Marciandi, the Deputy Director of the Military

Assistance Office (DD-MAO) that worked under the Ministry of Defence UK (MOD-UK). On various intervals, usually every six months, they would ‘check in’ with the BDF leadership and ensure that everything was running smoothly which means that they acted as intermediaries between the BDF and the British officials in the UK to ensure continuity and the strengthening of military ties between the two countries.487 This reliance on the British government for aid accrued some neo-colonial connotations though for practical reasons, it was important for the BDF to maintain direct contact with the DD-MAO which eliminated the need to go through many channels to request military assistance from the British government. The structure of the BDF was, after all,

484 Gabatlhokwe and Motlhatlhedi, Interview. 485 Kyle Harmse and Simon Dunstan, South African Armour of the Border War 1975 – 89 (London, Osprey Publishers, 2017), 14 486 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK – Report prepared before Merafhe’s arrival to the UK by Miss D J Gordon, Southern African Department, 25 June 1982. 487 TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK - Correspondence from L. Allison to Wilfred Jones Esq, 18 March 1982

167 modelled after the British Army and Ian Khama himself had close ties to the British through his mother and his time at Sandhurst.

There was no better indicator of Botswana’s neutrality than its ability to procure arms from both ends of the Cold War spectrum. In most cases, as expressed by Merafhe and Ian Khama, whereas the price and delivery of arms were important, the BDF was mostly after the effectiveness of those arms over anything else. This was seen particularly when the tensions with South Africa escalated after the 1985 raids on Gaborone. The BDF turned to the United States to order 14 fully amphibious Cadillac Cage Commando V-150 armoured personnel carriers.488 The BDF could have gone back to the Soviet Union to purchase the BRDM-2 APC which was comparable, in size and capability, to the V-150. The reasons for this lay not only in the growth of the BDF arsenal but the need for more urban-oriented APCs to possibly patrol the streets of Gaborone. Usually deployed in tandem with the Soviet BTRs, the V-150 added another layer of strength and mobility to the

Mechanised Infantry Battalion of the BDF. Whereas it was much smaller and carried less troops than the BTR, it had the advantages of speed, agility and fuel efficiency which was what was needed in response to the numerous bombings around Gaborone. The V-150 could reach speeds of up to 100km/h on tarred roads but was equally effective in bush terrain and boasted various weapons with the two most common being a 12.7mm heavy machine gun as well as a 20 mm cannon.489 In essence, they were better suited to urban warfare than the larger BTRs.

Though the BDF acquired weapons from both the East and the West during the Cold War, the more sophisticated ones came from western allies. Earlier in 1981, the BDF had turned to its traditional British sponsors to procure 6 L – 118 105mm towed howitzers that provided formidable

488 SIPRI – “Arms Purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday December 28, 2019. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 489 “Cadillac Cage Commando fact file” https://weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/CC01%20-%20Commando.html Accessed Saturday December 28, 2019.

168 firepower to the artillery regiment of the BDF. The 105mm howitzer was also the weapon of choice for both the British and US militaries amongst others and had a firing range of up to 17km490 which meant that the BDF now possessed the capability to fire at enemy formations from a fair distance.

This indirect fire capability was a serious boost to the BDF ground forces. The expansion of these capabilities continued throughout this period of great instability. By 1989, the BDF spent about $8 million through procurement of 100 BGM – 71c TOW anti-tank missiles and 4 launchers from the

United States.491 The TOW provided formidable anti-armour abilities that could destroy the Olifant

MK-I tank that the SADF operated. These procurements were an indication that the BDF was aware of the armour capabilities possessed by the SADF and utilized in the war in Angola. Aside from the fact that these anti – tank weapons signified the overall growth of the BDF, there was no other enemy in the region that had deployed tanks outside of its borders except South Africa. Given the context of the time, the BDF acquired them to defend Botswana’s borders against the SADF.

The Politics of the BDF Air Wing Expansion

Though it was a natural institutional progression for the BDF to acquire more military hardware and increase its personnel and capabilities, the numerous South African raids that took place in the

1980s served as a wakeup call to its leadership who saw a necessity for a thorough overview of their operational methods, the second of its kind after the Lesoma incident of 1978. Since its formation, the BDF had operated on a modest budget that was based largely on foreign loans provided by the British. It had managed these limited funds fairly well and used them to procure equipment, recruit and train more manpower and build necessary infrastructure. Generally, the

490 SIPRI - “Arms purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday December 28, 2019. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 491 SIPRI - “Arms purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday December 28, 2019. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

169 BDF saw a steady growth in the years immediately following its formation until the mid-1980s when there was a visible spike in its spending. This was due to several local and regional variables including the growth of Botswana’s diamond revenues which brought in more than US $400 million between 1984 and 1985 – Botswana was one of the top 3 diamond producers, by quality and quantity in the world.492 Furthermore, the deterioration of the political atmosphere and spread of warfare in the region, particularly in Angola, South Africa, South West Africa and Mozambique represented a major factor in the rush to bolster the BDF.

By 1985, the BDF had grown to about 4000 men, though its annual recruitment drives and quick turn-around of newly trained cadets were increasing this number.493 Furthermore, the educational requirements for officer cadets were not stringent at the time with the only requirement being a Cambridge certificate, equivalent to a high school diploma in the west. Most of the men who enlisted in the 1980s were abandoning their university degrees for the military and did so mostly for the benefits like salaries and pensions that came along with working for the BDF.494 As a result, the military now had slightly better educated personnel compared to those who joined in its formative years. A few degree holders who joined the service in this period were later sent for various courses that set them up for leadership roles. In this period, it became visible that all aspects of the BDF were expanding including the Air Wing that had grown slightly to 15 trained pilots.495

After adding the larger British - made Skyvans to its fleet and creating a transport squadron in

1981, the Air Wing established Z21 Squadron which was a small helicopter unit that used the AS

492 Diamonds earn Botswana P554m” The Botswana Daily News, 18 January 1985, 1. 493 Keegan, World Armies, 64. Numerous ads placed throughout the Botswana Daily News during this year also indicate a rise in recruitment. 494 Interview with Brigadier Mukani Mokobi, Air Wing and Director of Research and Development in the BDF, November 28, 2018 495 Defence Intelligence Agency, “Military Intelligence Summary, Vol. IV, Africa South of the Sahara” 1984. https://www.dia.mil/FOIA/FOIA-Electronic-Reading-Room/FOIA-Reading-Room-Africa/FileId/178704/ Accessed October 19, 2019.

170 350 B Squirrel built by the French Aviation giant Eurocopter.496 This squadron began as a

Helicopter Training School (HTS), a small section of the Air Wing that was established by the

IATT based at Notwane, possibly at the beginning of 1981. After procuring the Squirrel, the squadron became the first organised Air Wing unit to use helicopters which were more versatile than fixed wing aircraft as they did not need runways to land and take off. This versatility allowed them to be used for various roles including providing logistical support for ground forces and civil authorities, anti-poaching patrols, casualty and medical evacuations as well as VIP transportation.497 At this point also, British Air Wing trainers, Durrant and Haines departed at the end of 1982 and were replaced by an Indian Air Force squadron leader, Colonel A S Joshi, who joined the IATT that had arrived earlier in 1978.498 This move was inspired largely by the fact that

Durrant and Haines were ex-RAF and the BDF needed a bigger and fully uniformed commitment which they would get from the Indians.

As the Air Wing expansion continued, largely in response to SADF raids, the rise of poaching in the north and border incursions by the ZDF, it became necessary for the BDF to acquire fighter jets in order to gain some air attack capability. Regional politics, in particular, the threat that the BDF jets would pose to SAAF air superiority made their acquisition very difficult.

As early as 9 January 1986, British Aerospace Engineering (BAe), formerly British Aircraft

Corporation or BAC, submitted an application to the Defence Sales Department of the MOD-UK that would allow them to market and sell the Hawk 60, 100 and 200 series of light attack jets to the BDF though the mass production and sale of the 200 had not yet begun.499 BAe was confident

496 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 54. 497 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 55. 498 Masire, Interview. 499 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, Application for the release of information and marketing of BAe Hawk series 60, 100 and 200 – Multiple, to Botswana, submitted on 9 January 1986, acknowledged on 15 December 1986.

171 that the sale of the Hawks to the BDF was imminent and could give Botswana some air attack advantage over South Africa.500 Clearly BAe saw the rising tensions between Botswana and South

Africa as a business opportunity while the MOD-UK, on the other hand, did not want this sale to happen at all stating that they wished to avoid an increase in tensions between the two countries.

Though they were committed to facilitating the growth of the BDF Air Wing through supplying them with equipment, one of the major political objectives of the British government in Southern

Africa was to ease tensions between Botswana and South Africa that had seen a sharp rise in the mid 1980s. In essence, BAe’s financial objectives clashed head – on with MOD-UK’s political goals for Southern Africa as the latter felt that the BDF’s possession of the Hawk might spark an arms race in the region.501 The British government therefore blocked BAe from advertising and selling the Hawk jets to the BDF. This was purely to appease the already aggressive apartheid government of South Africa. British officials also suggested that it would be best for BAe to wait until the outcome of the 1987 South African general elections, before they could be allowed to market the Hawks to Botswana.502 Perhaps they were hoping that the National Party of South

Africa, that controlled the apartheid government, would somehow be defeated in those elections, though this did not happen. BDF arms purchases did not exist in a vacuum – they were governed by how much money the Botswana government was able to allocate to the military which was often far less than what South Africa spent on its arms purchases. After the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, Western countries tried to impose stricter rules on the sale of military hardware to South

Africa, but these largely failed because the apartheid government had been one of the biggest

500 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, Correspondence between A Pocock and Mr. Humfrey, Defence Sales Department, 5 February 1987. 501 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, Correspondence between A Pocock and Mr. Humfrey, Defence Sales Department, 5 February 1987. 502 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, Correspondence between A. Pocock and Mr. C T W Humfrey, 5 February 1987.

172 clients of British arms manufacturers such as BAe.503 Simply put, the British could not afford to lose the business they had with South Africa which far outweighed what the BDF was spending.

In a time when there was a plethora of military hardware manufacturers such as those in France and Belgium ready to take up new clients, the British grappled with balancing the moral and financial implications of losing its fifth highest purchaser of war materiel. According to Mark

Pythian, British public opinion which was openly critical of the relationship between the British government and an openly racist regime that wanted to control an entire region was overshadowed by the financial implications of continuing to sell weapons to South Africa.504 This means that despite the strong sanctions and an arms embargo against South Africa since the 1960s, Margaret

Thatcher’s close ties with the apartheid regime is likely to have allowed the UK to keep selling them weapons albeit on a limited scale.505

The BDF and Limited Lethal Air Capability

After over a year of delaying BAe from advertising the Hawks to Botswana, British officials at

MOD-UK came up with a compromise that involved the sale of refurbished Strikemasters which to them was enough to give the BDF some limited air attack capability. The BDF did not receive any detailed information about the Hawks from BAe though Merafhe and Ian Khama had some knowledge about their availability as some were being operated by the Air Force of Zimbabwe

(AFZ). MOD-UK officials were more concerned with making sure that South Africa retained the air advantage so the sale of the Hawk to the BDF was out of the question.506 This meant that BAe

503 Mark Pythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 5. 504 Pythian, The Politics, 5-6. 505 Hennie Van Vuuren, Apartheid, Guns and Money, A Tale of Profit (London, C. Hurst and Co., 2018), 351; see also David Thackeray, Foraging a British World of Trade: Culture, Ethnicity and Market in the Empire – Commonwealth, 1880 – 1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 162. 506 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, C T W Humfrey to Mr. Ferguson, 27 February 1987.

173 lost a lucrative business opportunity but more importantly, the BDF was forced to be content with receiving and relying on second-hand trainer jets that had been flying since 1967 instead of the recently built ones. Furthermore, to hasten the deal and to pressure the BDF into purchasing the jets, MOD-UK informed Merafhe that the Strikemasters were in demand and countries such as

New Zealand were in line to purchase them if they did not.507 British officials became especially eager to finalise the deal because they had received news that the Chinese wished to market their refurbished Chengdu F7/J-7 interceptor jets to the BDF.508 The F7/J-7 was a Chinese variant of

Soviet Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21, one of the most lethal interceptor jets that was built in large numbers since 1966 which the Cubans were using against the SAAF in Angola.509 It was much faster, it had a better climb rate and could also carry a bigger payload than the Strikemaster. This lethality caused serious worries to British officials who did not want the BDF to have a strong Air

Wing as they feared it would deteriorate Botswana’s relations with South Africa.510 However, the

Chinese appeared to not have made serious attempts to sell the F7/J-7 because they neglected to contact the Botswana officials until 1988, a few months after the Strikemasters had been delivered.

The Chinese military attaché in Lusaka made a lukewarm approach towards P. Sekwababe, the ambassador of Botswana to Zambia, informing him about Chinese wishes to sell the BDF some units of the F7/J-7 at reasonable prices.511 Sekwababe then repeatedly urged Merafhe to consider

507 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, From British High Commission, Botswana to MOD-UK and FCO, 11 March 1987. 508 At this point Merafhe and Ian Khama had already committed to purchasing the Strikemaster, BAe were confident that the deal would be completed on their next meeting with the BDF leadership. The British were nonetheless still worried by Chinese approaches to the BDF. TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, Correspondence between CTW Humfrey and Mr Ferguson, Defence Sales Department, 6 February 1987. 509 Holger Muller Motorbuch, The MiG 21: The legendary fighter interceptor in Russian and Worldwide Use, 1956 to present (Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, 2019). See also Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 165 – 1991, From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (New York: Frank Cass LTD, 2005) 66. 510 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, Correspondence between CTW Humfrey and Mr Ferguson, Defence Sales Department, 6 February 1987. 511 BNARS OP 58/6 Import of Arms and Ammunition, Correspondence from PS Sekwababe to Major General Merafhe, 21 April 1988.

174 the Chinese offer in an effort to diversify the BDF’s inventory because it had purchased most of its equipment from Western powers who were also suppliers of South Africa.512 Because the BDF had just completed the Strikemaster deal, they could not take up the Chinese offer despite relatively good relations between China and Botswana at this time.513

From the beginning of the deal, Merafhe and Khama had expressed their worries about the age of the Strikemaster but BAe officials told them a blatant lie that the aircraft would enjoy a 20- year life span which was enough to close the deal by the end of 1987. The 9 refurbished

Strikemasters were ordered and delivery was set for early 1988.514 Two of the 9 had been used by the Kenya Air Force and returned to BAe while the rest had been previously used by the Air Force of Kuwait.515 Ironically, the Kuwaitis had recently signed a deal with BAe to replace the

Strikemasters sold to Botswana with 12 brand new Hawk aircraft.516 To them, the Strikemaster was not good enough. The British government therefore knew that the Strikemasters would not last long and forced BAe to turn Botswana into a dumping ground for the old fighter aircraft.

Despite these shady dealings, the South African media pumped out propaganda that the purchase of the Strikemaster by the BDF was aggressive and meant to send a strong message to the apartheid government.517 MOD-UK, BAe and the South African government, however, knew that the old jets would not be a match for the SAAF which operated far more sophisticated fighter aircraft.

512 Ibid 513 “Botswana – China discuss trade cooperation” The Botswana Daily News, 8 July 1985, 1; “Masire happy about ties with China” The Botswana Daily News, 8 January 1985, 1. 514 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana – Sales of Arms to Botswana – Internal MOD-UK communique, 26 February 1987. 515 “Jet fighters beef up strike capability of air force – Botswana arms against future border violations” The Star (Britain) 12 May 1988; “Britain Arms Botswana” The Observer (South Africa), 1 May 1988. 516 Pythian, The Politics, 239. 517 “Botswana arms against future border violations” The Star, (South Africa), 2 May 1988, 1; “Britain arms Botswana” The Observer, (South Africa), 1 May 1988, 3.

175 The SAAF boasted 16 French built single seater Mirage F1-CZ jet fighters which outmatched the Strikemaster in almost every way. The Mirage’s maximum speed was 2555 km/h compared to the Strikemaster’s meagre 834km/h. The SAAF Mirage also boasted a formidable attack capability with its 12 different weapons which included two 400kg bombs, a 30 mm cannon and missiles while the Strikemaster could only be equipped with two underwing 20 mm guns but could be modified to carry smaller bombs as well.518 The Mirage fighter jets together with other

SAAF aircraft were deployed in the ongoing border war in northern South West Africa and southern Angola.519 The only advantage that Strikemaster had was its range. It could cover up to

2224 km while the Mirage could only go as far as 1200 km because it had a smaller fuel tank.520

Both the Hawk 100 and 200 variants that BAe wished to market to the BDF could challenge the

Mirage in some of these capabilities though they were nowhere near as fast. The Hawk 100, for instance, had a maximum speed of 950km/h while the more sophisticated Hawk 200 could reach up to 1040km/h.521 The Hawk 200 also had two fuel tanks that gave it a combined 4000 litres, which meant that it had a range of 3610km with a full payload. This capability was much more significant than both the Strikemaster and the Mirage. BAe weapons systems were also significantly better in the Hawk 200 than the older Strikemaster. The Hawk had up to 9 possible configurations including 450kg bombs, cluster bombs, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.522

This made the 200 a significant competitor that could challenge the superiority of the Mirage. The

518 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 57; The South African Air Force – Mirage F1CZ, Specifications. https://www.saairforce.co.za/the-airforce/aircraft/34/mirage-f1cz. Accessed November 2019. 519 Dick Lord, From Fledgling to Eagle, the South Air Force During the Border War (Johannesburg: 30 South Publishers, 2008), 205 – 7. 520 The South African Air Force – Mirage F1CZ, Specifications. https://www.saairforce.co.za/the- airforce/aircraft/34/mirage-f1cz. Accessed November 2019. 521 TNA FCO 105/2583 – Arms Sales to Botswana – enclosed Hawk 100 and Hawk 200 brochures prepared by BAe. ND 522 TNA FCO 105/2583 – Arms Sales to Botswana – enclosed Hawk 100 and Hawk 200 brochures prepared by BAe. ND

176 South Africans knew about these lethal capabilities when their agents bombed 13 warplanes including 3 newly purchased BAe Hawks that belonged to the Air Force of Zimbabwe in July

1982.523 British officials, knowing about this bombing incident did not allow the Hawk to be marketed or sold to the BDF.

Despite the Strikemaster’s weaknesses in comparison to the Mirage, the Chengdu F7/J-7 and the Hawk, its acquisition gave the BDF Air Wing its first lethal air attack ability and signalled the birth of its Z28 Fighter Squadron.524 Early twentieth century Italian military theorist Giulio

Douhet suggested that a military with a strong air power had the advantage and flexibility to choose the point of attack hundreds of miles from the field of action. Douhet believed that air forces had become the primary means for militaries to conduct war where the aerial bombing of enemy instalments could demoralise them and lead to a decisive victory.525 By acquiring the Strikemaster jets, despite their weakness against the SAAF Mirage, the BDF Air Wing could now strategically bomb SADF ground units that were on route to conduct raids in Botswana. This lethal air capability forced the South Africans to think twice about marching their troops across the border as they could be easily intercepted by the BDF jets. Although it could not measure up to the Hawk, the

Strikemaster acquisition represented one of the key developments in the 1980s that boosted to the

BDF’s firepower significantly. It was no surprise that British officials had a problem with BAe marketing the Hawk to the BDF as they feared that it would spark a war with South Africa.

As soon as the Strikemaster jets were delivered to Botswana, BDF pilots started training on them and generally the leadership appeared satisfied with their overall progress. According to

523 “Zimbabwe tries 6 officers as saboteurs” New York Times, 24 May 1983. https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/24/world/zimbabwe-tries-6-officers-as-saboteurs.html Accessed November 2019. 524 Masire, interview. Essentially, the justification given for the purchase was that they were only meant to be temporary, but this is surprising given that the BDF later wanted to send the jets back to BAe. 525 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari, (Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 16 – 17.

177 the now retired Lt. Gen. Tebogo Masire, the jets were intended to familiarise the pilots with fighter aircraft that the Air Wing did not have before. The reliability of the Strikemaster was, however, soon thrown into doubt as three of them crashed in 1989. The first one crashed on 29 April during an air manoeuvre over the Botswana National Stadium killing the pilot instantly. The Strikemaster was part of a 6-plane formation flying over the packed stadium during the annual BDF anniversary celebrations when it suddenly went into a nosedive.526 Later that year, in November, due to what looked like pilot error, two Strikemaster jets collided mid-air but both pilots managed to eject before impact and escaped with minor injuries. BAe and the BDF investigated the causes of both crashes but the findings were never made public.527 The crashes could have been due to poor pilot training or the age of the jets that the BDF leadership had expressed concern about to BAe before purchasing them.

In 1989, Merafhe retired from the BDF and was appointed Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Service, a portfolio that included government sectors administered through the Office of the President at the time. These were the police, the BDF, public service, broadcasting, printing and parliament. In 1990, he made an official visit to the UK where he met with M. J. Turner, the

Executive Vice President of Defence Marketing for British Aerospace, to discuss pertinent issues relating to the ill-fated Strikemaster. He made it clear that the BDF wished to return the remaining

6 aircraft immediately given the three crashes in 1989.528 He was adamant and stated that regardless of the outcomes of the inquiries, the BDF no longer had confidence to fly the jets and

526 “Botswana Plane crashes outside stadium” UPI News, 29 April 1989. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/04/29/Botswana-plane-crashes-outside-stadium/8364609825600/ Accessed Tuesday October 29, 2019. 527 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort, 14 March 1990. 528 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort, 14 March 1990; “Botswana Plane crashes outside stadium” UPI News, 29 April 1989. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/04/29/Botswana-plane-crashes-outside-stadium/8364609825600/ Accessed Tuesday October 29, 2019.

178 were willing to return the Strikemasters and operate without fighter jets until replacements could be acquired. He added, that “apart from the crashes, their general performance was poor and the

BDF had constant difficulties in servicing them which threw in question the claim [that] the plane would have a useful life of twenty years.”529 Turner was worried that his company would not find another buyer for third-hand jets so as a compromise he offered Merafhe and the BDF to double their product support team from 2 to 4 people at no extra charge which was surprisingly enough to calm Merafhe down.530 This was yet another questionable decision Merafhe made concerning the

BDF. One would assume that after three jets had crashed in the same year, he would be firm about returning the remaining 6 aircraft. Agreeing that the addition of extra mechanics by BAe would suffice was another blunder as they would not improve the overall performance of the jets, a key concern that Merafhe raised with Turner. Merafhe then pressed Turner on the issue of possibly replacing the Strikemaster with the Hawk at which point he was not clear on which of the 90, 100 or 200 variants the BDF Air Wing preferred. He was surprised to learn that the costs associated with training a single pilot for the Hawk was an astronomical £ 3 million as well as an added £1,7 million fee that did not include airfares and accommodations for the instructors.531 Moreover, at another meeting during his visit to the UK, this time with General Michael Walker, a highly decorated British Army officer and General Solomon Mujuru of the ZDF, he was cautioned against the purchase of the Hawk by Mujuru who cited Zimbabwe’s bad experiences with the aircraft.532

It is not clear if Mujuru was referring to those that had been bombed by the South Africans earlier

529 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort, 14 March 1990. 530 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort, 14 March 1990 531 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort. 14 March 1990. 532 TNA FCO 105/3651 - Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Merafhe – General Walker meeting report prepared by Lt. Col. A M Mason. 30 January 1990.

179 in 1982 or just their general use. Perhaps he, like the South African and British governments did not want to see a relatively small and new military such as the BDF armed with an advanced fighter jet like the Hawk. This misdirection from Mujuru might have been deliberate so that the BDF could not acquire the same air power as the AFZ which continued to use its remaining Hawks.

They made numerous sorties over eastern DRC during the Second Congo War (1998 – 2002) against Rwanda and Burundi forces.533 Nonetheless, Merafhe seemed to take heed of Mujuru’s advice and ended the idea of procuring the Hawks for the BDF who now had to look elsewhere to replace the Strikemaster.

The Thebephatswa Airbase and the Air Defence Unit

The purchase of the Strikemaster jets took place almost simultaneously with the construction of the BDF’s Thebephatswa airbase at Mapharangwane, a village some 80 kilometres northwest of

Gaborone. Its development was necessitated by the expansion of the Air Wing but more importantly, the need to move out of the smaller Notwane Airbase which was very close to the

University of Botswana and some residential areas. BDF planes took off and landed there several times during the day so it was not conducive to the students and communities living in the area.

Its close proximity to the urban areas also posed serious security issues as it was likely to be attacked by the South Africans. Additionally, the Thebephatswa Airbase was built to be a diversion landing strip for the Sir Seretse Khama Airport International (SSKIA) in Gaborone though its construction was not without controversy. Many Batswana wrongly believed that it was sponsored by the American government, but it should be understood that the airbase was financed by the

533 Tom Cooper, The Great Lakes Conflagration: Second Congo War, 1998 – 2003 (Pinetown: 30 Degrees South Publishers, 2013).

180 Government of Botswana to support the expansion of the BDF Air Wing.534 Both the American and British governments were approached by the BDF to help with construction, but they refused.

The reasons behind their refusal are not known but because both these great powers had maintained stronger relations with a South African government that was at odds with Botswana, it is perhaps not farfetched to assume that as the main cause. British officials had previously stated that they did not wish to fuel a war between the two countries, so their reasons for refusing are likely to have stemmed from this and the fact that they had stronger ties to South Africa. However, French construction companies agreed to provide the required expertise to construct the airbase.535 Plans for the airbase are likely to have been penned between 1986 and 1987, in the period when the BDF was negotiating the Strikemaster deal, but its construction did not begin until the end of 1988. One of the BDF’s first four airmen, the now retired Lt. Gen. Tebogo Masire, was promoted to Air Wing

Commander in 1989 and took over the supervision of the construction of the base until it was completed in 1994.536

In response to the 1986 South African helicopter raid on its headquarters at Mogoditshane, the BDF created its Air Defence Unit. When the raid took place the BDF did not have the radar equipment to detect the South African helicopters as they entered Botswana airspace hence the necessity to set up this unit. Consequently, the BDF founded its Command-and-Control Centre of air defence operations in 1987. It procured the required air defence sensor systems which included

Westinghouse Surveillance TPS radars, as well as the Watchman radar and Thorn EMI Skymaster early warning systems from BAe.537 These were the same systems used around the world including

534 Mokobi, Interview 535 Mokobi, Interview 536 Masire and Mokobi, Interviews; Mpho G. Molomo, “The Trajectory of Civil-Military Relations in Botswana” in Civil and Military Relationships in Developing Countries, ed. Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi et. al (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 140-41 537 TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana, Sales of Arms to Botswana, A J M Dunlop, Southern African Department to Mr. Humfrey, 6 February 1987; Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 54.

181 by the UK and United States and were capable of determining the range of flying objects some

200 km away.538 The role of the Command and Control Centre was to carry out constant surveillance of Botswana airspace and coordinate all BDF aircraft that were landing and taking off. The following year in 1988, the BDF formed an Air Defence Unit comprising one regiment at

Francistown and another at Gaborone working in tandem with the Command-and-Control

Centre.539 Both these regiments were armed with the Soviet SA – 7s but were supplemented in

1989 by 8 Vulcan M-167 anti-aircraft guns from the United States.540 This purchase was likely planned in 1986 – 1987 when creating the Air Defence unit. This was a period in which the conventional war between South Africa and Cuban forces in Angola was at its peak.541

The potency of the air defence regiments reflected Botswana’s ability to arm itself against future aerial incursions such as the one that took place three years prior. There was a strong link between this new lethal capability and the building of the new airbase. The BDF had to protect

Botswana’s airspace and the new air assets against possible attacks from the South African military which despite growing economic sanctions and an arms embargo remained amongst the strongest powers in the region. Towards the end of the Cold War the weight of these sanctions, military defeat in southern Angola and growing internal unrest amongst the South African public eventually led to the independence of South West Africa which became Namibia in 1990. A few years after

538 BAe Watchman Radars, https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/update-to-watchman-radars. Accessed 19 November 2019. 539 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 36. 540 SIPRI – “Arms purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday December 28, 2019. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php This was part of the $8 million deal that supplied the BDF ground forces with anti-tank missiles. 541 Dick Lord, From Fledgling to Eagle, The South African Air Force During the Border War (Johannesburg: 30 Degrees South Publishers, 2008), 20.

182 that, negotiations led to the end of apartheid in South Africa and the rise of a democratic black majority government led by Nelson Mandela.542

Conclusion

In the 1980s, Botswana faced with numerous threats that stemmed mainly from the aggressive government of South Africa. The BDF leadership was, in most cases, cornered into making equipment purchases that would simply respond to SADF aggression in Botswana and the rest of the region. This was certainly the case with the purchase of the Soviet BTRs though one could rightly argue that they were acquired to help the military grow to regional and international standards. On one hand, the Soviet and American APCs, the anti-tank weapons, SAMs, the

Strikemaster and all other arms purchases that took place during the 1980s were a sign of a natural progression of a burgeoning military. On the other hand, it would be wrong to suggest that the

BDF was blindly purchasing weapons as if there were no acts of aggression from South Africa that spurred those purchases. The growth of the BDF in this period was rapid but not smooth in any way. It was not part of a comprehensive plan but a reactive one dictated by regional circumstances.

With Cold War tensions on the rise in the 1980s, particularly South Africa’s war in Angola and its hold over South West Africa while at the same time fighting the ANC/MK who were operating from outside its borders, the Botswana government had to be pragmatic about arming the BDF to protect its citizens. Cold War neutrality came as an advantage as it allowed arms to be purchased from any willing nation including the Soviet Union even though it meant that South Africa would interpret BDF arms purchases in a way that suited their racist anti – ANC agenda. The SADF then

542 Hennie van Vuuren, Apartheid, Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit (London: C. Hurst & Co. 2018), 354 – 55; See also Anton David Lowenberg and William H. Kaempfer, The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 107; Richard Dale, The Namibian War of Independence, 1966 – 1989: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Campaigns (Jefferson: Macfarland and Co. INC, 2014), 121.

183 used that as an excuse to raid Botswana to take out suspected ANC/MK operatives on numerous occasions throughout the 1980s. Seeing that there was no end in sight to these raids, the BDF subsequently and rapidly increased its lethal capabilities to deter further attacks.

It should be emphasised that because South Africa was a bigger and richer client for

Western arms manufacturers, it played a major role in how much the BDF could arm itself which created a dilemma for the British. The Strikemaster deal, which was a compromise for the Hawk deal, was evidence of this. BAe’s wishes to market the more sophisticated Hawk fighter jets to the

BDF were put on hold because officially, the British stated that they did not wish to increase tensions between Botswana and South Africa but there were economic reasons at play also. The controversial relationship between Britain and apartheid South Africa played a key role in the acquisition of older Strikemaster jets that would be retired after only 6 years of service. To keep the BDF content, the British created an illusion that the Strikemaster jets would be best suited for

Botswana’s military, yet they knew that they were turning the BDF into a dumping ground for soon to be decommissioned aircraft. The same political manipulation was later seen when

Botswana pleaded for financial aid to the British and American governments for the construction of the Thebephatswa Airbase. American President Ronald Reagan also refused knowing that South

Africa was a major buyer of American war materiel until the late 1980s. It is not farfetched to assume that South Africa in the late 1980s, despite the economic sanctions imposed by major powers, was still dictating terms to the British who did not want to be seen to have a conflict of interest by funding the BDF’s airbase.

Despite the political troubles caused by South Africa in the region, the BDF grew into a formidable military in this period. In 1980, the embryonic BDF comprised a primarily light infantry force with limited combat support and ground transport, and a very small Air Wing.

184 Between 1980 and 1989, it went from not having any infrastructure to a small but formidable military that would later be called by the United Nations for various peacekeeping missions in the

1990s. It went from Shorland trucks to proper APCs which provided significantly better troop protection and battlefield manoeuvrability. The howitzers created an indirect fire support capability, and the TOWs countered the armour threat. The SA-7s and Vulcans enabled air defence and protection of ground assets, while the Strikemasters created a lethal air strike capability even though it could not match that of the South Africans. In addition, to the equipment, the BDF expanded its rank and file significantly all of which were the result of a steady growth in

Botswana’s diamond revenues.

185 Chapter 5: Our Boys Come of Age: The BDF in the Post – Cold War era

Introduction

The end of the Cold War represented yet another turning point in the evolution of the BDF. It ushered in a new era of exponential growth that was signalled first by the independence of South

West Africa which became Namibia in March 1990. Soon after that, the new South African government of F W De Klerk faced immense local, regional and international pressure which eventually pushed it toward negotiations that created a democratic system under a black majority government. This shifted the dynamics in the region and in South Africa particularly for the SADF that suddenly stopped wars in neighbouring countries. With Southern Africa’s regional superpower undergoing radical transition, the Botswana government and the BDF now had the political freedom to procure the weapons it wanted. Military spending in Botswana in the early

1990s began to outgrow all other government sectors but it was supported by the growth of diamond revenues as well as the sudden availability of weapons around the world as global weapons manufacturers offloaded their arsenal to developing countries.

From Merafhe to Ian Khama: A Slippery Slope?

The first visible development for the BDF in the 1990s was its change of leadership as Merafhe retired at the end of 1989 and was replaced Ian Khama. The former commander had taken the BDF from a small band of men from the PMU and worked hard to create a well-disciplined armed force that served the elected government. Over his years as commander, Merafhe came across some hardships that tested his leadership skills including the Lesoma ambush, the skirmishes with the

ZDF and the SADF raids in Gaborone. Some of the decisions he made proved costly but generally

Merafhe left as a highly decorated leader who joined politics as the Minister of Presidential Affairs

186 and Public Service. He was appointed by President Ketumile Masire who believed that he would be a capable cabinet minister.543 A year before Merafhe retired from the BDF, he signed an agreement with the British Army that culminated in the establishment of a British Army Training

Team (BATT in Botswana).544 The British had a similar military agreement with the government of Zimbabwe called the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) since 1980 to help amalgamate former ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces into one new national military.545

In Botswana, BATT was funded exclusively by the MOD-UK with more than £400 000 between

1989 and 1990. Its objectives differed from that of Zimbabwe in that it aimed to provide training to some sections of the BDF in exchange for using BDF facilities to train some British forces that could deploy in Southern Africa if needed.546 Merafhe had realised the importance of this arrangement and hoped that the British would improve upon training that the BDF soldiers had received from the Indian Armed Forces. Ian Khama initially endorsed the view that the BDF could get better training from the BATT deal.547 However, things would not go according to plan because when Khama took over he immediately began to steer the military in a direction that differed in many ways from his predecessor. The first sign of this was getting rid of the BATT altogether. At the end of an initial two-year contract in December 1990, Ian Khama informed the British High

Commission in Botswana that BATT training services would no longer be needed as he felt that the BDF had become too reliant on foreign assistance and it was now time for the military to chart

543 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort, 14 March 1990; Masire, Very Brave, 270. 544 Some evidence also suggests that this team or agreement was called British Army Assistance Team (BAAT). See TNA FCO 105/3651 - Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Merafhe – General Walker meeting report prepared by Lt. Col. A M Mason held on 30 January 1990. 545 Whitaker, “The New Model Armies of Africa?” 236 – 238 546 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe – Lt. General Merafhe’s Meeting with Mr. Weldgrave, 20 January 1990. 547 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Internal D-MAO, FCO and MOD-UK communique January 1990

187 its own direction.548 BATT officers were shocked by this abrupt decision as they had been making considerable progress with the belief that they would increase their military training personnel to the BDF by bringing in an RAF squadron leader to supplement the training of the Air Wing as it prepared for the opening of the Thebephatswa airbase.549 Moreover, on 17 January the BDF Chief of Staff Brigadier Moeng Pheto, who became Ian Khama’s second in command between 1991 and

1994 replacing the seasoned veteran Major General Pule Motang had informed the British officials

“that he wanted BATT to take over platoon commander training from the Indian Training Team with immediate effect and was ready for BATT to look at recruit training.”550 This was clearly not what Ian Khama had in mind and shows some inconsistency among BDF leadership on this issue.

British officials then concluded that Khama was misguided and acting alone without consulting his subordinate officers.551 The BATT – BDF issue prompted some criticism of Khama’s leadership style where he was accused of treating the military as his own personal object while alienating other key personnel. To some British officials, the BDF was on a slippery slope under the command of Ian Khama and would continue to deteriorate but they couldn’t have been more wrong.552

Despite this however, the new commander was lauded as a capable leader and revered by many amongst the BDF rank and file. Like his predecessor, he was a tough disciplinarian who also had a higher social standing as the Chief of the Bangwato people, Botswana’s largest ethnic group

548 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Merafhe’s Office call to Mr. Weldgrave, 20 January 1990. 549 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Botswana Military Assistance – British High Commissioner to MOD-UK, January 1990. 550 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Priority communique from British High Commission in Botswana to MOD-UK Secretary and FCO, January 1990. 551 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Priority communique from British High Commission in Botswana to MOD-UK Secretary and FCO, January 1990. 552 TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe, Priority communique from British High Commission in Botswana to MOD-UK Secretary and FCO, January 1990.

188 and son of the country’s first president. During his time as the Deputy Commander, Ian Khama had always demonstrated pragmatism and hands – on capabilities required in the setting that the

BDF found itself. He had made numerous trips across the world on behalf of the BDF and was instrumental in the purchase of numerous pieces of military technology that the BDF now boasted including personally testing some of the Air Wing’s trainer aircraft. Furthermore, he met with

Minister Merafhe on numerous occasions to lobby for the improvement of the welfare of his troops, particularly their housing and access to world class health services. This helped his reputation and made him popular among the rank and file.553 As a new commander, one who had perhaps itched to be at the helm of the military, he had his own priorities and objectives to achieve throughout his tenure. Ian Khama paid a lot of attention to building professionalism and discipline within the

BDF. Overall, his efforts were aimed at increasing the stability of the relatively new military that could act efficiently to “thwart and halt threats from organised external aggression.”554 Despite the easing of tensions with South Africa in the 1990s, the BDF’s modus operandi was still dictated by a perceived external threat though this time it was from newly independent Namibia which disputed Botswana’s claims over territory in the Chobe area. Anxieties between the two countries escalated in the late 1990s when a small group of Namibian militants within the Caprivi Strip tried to secede from the rest of the country which resulted in a sizeable military build – up in the area and an exodus of some refugees into Botswana whom the Nujoma government of Namibia believed to be insurgents.

553 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 38 554 Seretse Khama Ian Khama’s foreword, quoted in Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 1.

189 New Neighbour, New Problems: Botswana – Namibia Border Disputes of the 1990s

Tensions over border demarcations between what became Botswana and Namibia date back to the colonial period when officials from the two territories, Britain’s Bechuanaland Protectorate and

German South West Africa (GSWA) bickered over ownership of the Caprivi Strip. This area was of strategic importance to the Germans as it connected their colony to the Zambezi river. The disagreement stemmed from the Anglo – German Treaty (also known as the Heligoland – Zanzibar

Treaty of 1890) which temporarily settled territorial disputes between Germany and the British

Empire. The treaty recognised GSWA territory as fully inclusive of Caprivi which made some officials in Bechuanaland unhappy. They felt that part of the territory should have been given to

Bechuanaland as some of its people also used it for fishing. After the treaty was signed however, the issue went unresolved until the post – independence era.555 Over time, the people of

Bechuanaland as well as colonial officials grew content with the idea that Caprivi was indeed part of GSWA and then South African administered South West Africa which effectively ended the minor border dispute. After Namibia’s independence from South Africa in 1990, President Masire entered into a Joint Commission on Security and Defence with Botswana’s new neighbour which was ought to usher in collective security and defence protocols between the two nations.556 This was geared towards the recognition of Namibian passport holders who could travel to and from

Botswana without many restrictions amongst other things. The agreement may have also contained clauses related to joint defence force exercises because the two countries were now SADC partners. Initially relations between the two countries remained cordial until they were blemished by new border disputes over small but important islands in the Chobe River and Eastern Caprivi area.

555 Dale, Botswana’s Search, 26. 556 Dale, Botswana’s Search, 26.

190 Conflict over Sidudu / Kasikili Island

The first of these border disputes pertained to Sidudu Island (also known as Kasikili). The island is approximately 3. 5 sq. km in size and located in the Chobe River, 16 km west of Kazungula and is an important part of Botswana’s natural environment as it hosts a wide array of wildlife being an extension of the Chobe National Park.557 In 1991, Namibian officials approached the Chobe district commissioner at Kasane to lay claim over the island stating that since 1907 it had been an integral part of the livelihoods of South West African fisherman across the river. To them this was enough to claim it as part of Namibian territory and go to the extent of threatening that they would do anything in their power to defend it.558 It was of course an undiplomatic move by the Namibians which then sparked a long stand-off between the two countries that led to a small-scale military build-up and exchange of fire between the BDF and Namibian Defence Force (NDF).

In response to Namibian assertions, the government of Botswana took pre-emptive action and deployed a contingent of the BDF in the area to set up two observation posts similar to those that had been used at Kazungula during the Rhodesian War. The BDF went a step further by hoisting the Botswana flag on the island which the Namibians interpreted as provocative as the dispute was ongoing. BDF patrols around the island became frequent because just across the Chobe

River in Namibian territory, the NDF had also deployed its own contingent to counter the BDF.559

The situation grew tense by the day as both defence forces seemed ready to open fire at any moment should provocation ensue. Fortunately, this dispute did not lead to an all – out war, but from the time the military build – up started, several minor exchanges of fire did occur. For

557 Merafhe, The General, 129. 558 “Relations cordial despite border disputes” The Botswana Daily News, 29 January 1998, 1. See also Merafhe, The General, 129 – 30. 559 “Army denies press reports” The Botswana Daily News, 7 December 1992, 1. See also Merafhe, The General, 132.

191 instance, on 2 December 1992 at around 11am, a BDF patrol boat on its usual route was suddenly met by sustained fire from what was described as a rifle forcing the men aboard to scramble for safety until the shooting stopped. According to a press report from Botswana’s Office of the

President, this was only the beginning of several related incidents that day. At around 6pm, the

NDF is reported to have crossed into Botswana territory and opened fire towards BDF positions until around 7:10pm when the BDF patrol commander instructed his men to fire back which halted the Namibians. It is not clear what the NDF unit was trying to achieve in this instance, but it resulted in increased BDF presence in the area.560

Diplomatically, the governments of Botswana and Namibia worked hard to reach an amicable solution in order to avoid a serious conflict. Between 1992 and 1996, both countries explored various avenues to settle the border dispute which all failed. Robert Mugabe, the then president of Zimbabwe and leader of the Frontline States was one of the key people invited to mediate in the affair but after several meetings by all three heads of state, there was still no tangible solution. The case moved higher to a delimitation committee that included expert panellists from different fields including geology, border officials and historians assembled by the respective governments. After about six meetings between 1993 and 1995, there was still no conclusive ruling on who should rightfully claim Sidudu Island. Meanwhile, the delays meant more limited skirmishes but the BDF remained firmly on the island throughout. Seeing that all other options had failed, the government of Botswana decided to escalate the issue to the International Court of

Justice at the Hague which ruled in favour of Botswana in December 1999.561 Namibia accepted the ruling and ended the dispute.

560 “Army denies press reports” The Botswana Daily News, 7 December 1992, 1 561 Merafhe, The General, 132 – 33; ICJ Ruling on the Kasikili/Sedudu case involving the governments of Botswana and Namibia, Press Release, 13 December 1999. Accessed 8 May 2020, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case- related/98/098-19991213-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf

192 Conflict over Situngu Island

While tensions over Sidudu were on the rise, another border dispute emerged over Situngu Island a few kilometres east of Sidudu which was being used by absentee landlord crop farmers from

Namibia. In October 1997, another BDF contingent arrived on the island to stop the landlords from crossing back without passports as that was Botswana territory.562 When the farmers complained to their authorities about their alleged harassment by the BDF, the Namibian government responded by sending its overzealous Minister of Defence, Erikki Nghimtina in a civilian helicopter accompanied by an NDF motorised unit, and one attack helicopter to try and intimidate the BDF into letting the farmers back onto the island. This effort was unsuccessful as the BDF wouldn’t budge. Not a single shot was fired but this show of force by the NDF and Nghimtina did not sit well with President Masire who promptly raised the issue to his Namibian counterpart.563

President Masire pursued a diplomatic resolution to this issue. Both he and Sam Nujoma decided to establish an extraordinary joint commission that would decide the ownership of the island which by April 1998 had ruled in favour of Botswana. The Namibian farmers whose crops were still growing were allowed to continue tending to their lands on the island until harvest time but instructed to leave thereafter.564

The Caprivi Separatist Attempt

Yet another diplomatic rift between Botswana and Namibia occurred in 1998/99 when a portion of Namibian nationals who lived in the Caprivi Strip attempted to secede from the rest of the country because they felt their voices were not being represented in the capital. Dissent amongst

562 C J B le Roux, “The Botswana Namibia Boundary Dispute, Towards a Diplomatic Solution of Military Confrontation?” New Contree 44, (1998): 82 – 83 563 “Relations cordial despite border disputes” The Botswana Daily News, 29 January 1998, 1. 564 “Latest border incident causes grave concern” The Botswana Daily News, 3 February 1998, 1.

193 the Caprivians had been growing and by 1998 they had organised themselves into a small guerrilla movement called the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA). The radicalisation and eventual militarisation of this area was most likely connected to the ongoing civil war in Angola. One of the separatist training camps in the Caprivi was soon discovered by NDF patrols who proceeded to arrest the armed dissidents.565 Fearing reprisals, persecution and death, about 2500 Caprivians fled into Botswana where they were taken into the Dukwi refugee camp.566 Given the tense atmosphere created by both the Sidudu and Situngu questions, Namibian officials grew impatient and argued that Botswana was undermining their authority by harbouring rebels in their refugee camps. They demanded the government of Botswana to repatriate the so-called rebels but to no avail.567

It is important to understand that though Botswana and Namibia clashed over territory during this period, there was never any long – lasting bad blood between the two countries. These points of friction only existed for a short period and were resolved without any bloodshed unlike most territorial disputes that took place elsewhere in the continent. The political history of the two countries is also worth understanding. Namibia was led by Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, which had led the armed struggle for independence since the 1960s while Botswana had always been under a democratic civilian government. Though it may appear that the demise of apartheid in the region led to the rise of a new enemy, it would not be entirely accurate to assume that Namibia became a mortal adversary of Botswana over a dispute that was eventually resolved through negotiation.

565 Henning Melber, Understanding Namibia, the trials of independence (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 74. 566 “UNHCR starts repatriating Namibian refugees in Botswana” accessed 10 May 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2002/8/3d5935ac4/unhcr-starts-repatriating-namibian-refugees-botswana.html; “Namibian refugee status revocation postponed” The Namibian, 6 April 2016. Accessed 10 May 2020, https://www.namibian.com.na/148116/archive-read/Namibian-refugee-status-revocation-postponed 567 Ibid

194 The absence of more clashes and the development of amicable relations between the two neighbours after this period indicate that there was no animosity between them.

What made the relations between the two countries more interesting particularly to international media was the BDF’s attempts to build its arsenal while these disputes were taking place. The BDF went on a serious military shopping spree which included German and British tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, and surface-to-air missiles amongst a plethora of war materiel. To the media, Botswana was preparing for an inevitable war with Namibia which played a key role in the types of equipment that the BDF would procure. In reality, the military acquisitions that were taking place represented a planned modernisation of its inventory some of which had been in service since the force’s creation in 1977.

The Brigade Grouping Process

In 1988 the BDF began a major process of restructuring its components in order to become more efficient. However, because the BDF was always evolving since its formation, it may be inaccurate to point to this year as the beginning of this process. Amongst those who led the BDF’s Ground

Forces, Major Generals Oitsile and Pius Mokgware suggest 1988 as the beginning of the restructuring of the force because by that time, the military comprised over five battalions as well as numerous supporting elements. 568 Its manpower numbered well over 5000 and with an ever- growing inventory of hardware, expansive training of troops both locally and abroad, it became necessary to decentralise the functions of the BDF command in order to improve flexibility and efficiency. Owing largely to infrastructure constraints, this process was slow and took about 15 years to complete but even beyond 2004, the BDF was still adding newer capabilities and

568 Interview Major Gen Oitsile, Ground Forces Commander (1999 – 2004) & Pius Mokgware, Ground Forces Commander (2004 – 2010).

195 expanding. In 1988, the BDF had only just implemented plans for the construction of its airbase, and it had just received the Strikemaster fighter jets. Other key organs such as Defence Logistics

Command and armour units had either not been established or only functioned as extensions of larger units. Following the opening of the Thebephatswa Airbase in 1995, the new BDF structure became clearer in terms of a seamless, well-coordinated force that had semi – independent brigades. Prior to this, the entire military was concentrated under the direction of the commander at SSKB.

The objective of brigade grouping was to make sure that all sections of the BDF, that is, the ground forces, logistics and air wing had all the support elements they required in-house which eliminated the need to go through the commander to request such elements which was similar to how other major militaries in the world operated. At the end of this exercise for example, the Air

Wing which was commanded by one of the first four airmen, Albert Scheffers since 1981 not only had its own personnel, but it had moved from being an element of Force Troops to an independent entity. By 1990, it was placed under the command of the recently promoted Brigadier Tebogo

Masire and received several supporting ground force units, such as transport, logistics, and health to improve its efficiency.569 This was the new way in which the BDF would operate from that time until today.

The new structure or chain of command created by the brigade grouping exercise could best be understood as an expansion of the older BDF HQ configuration from 1977. This included a Provost section, that became the Military Police under the command of a 2nd Lieutenant, the

Force Troops HQ which housed the Engineering Platoon, the Air Wing, Armoured Car and Mortar platoons, the Signals and Support Companies as well as the Anti – tank and Air Defence Platoons.

569 Masire, Interview.

196 Other units in this older structure included the Administration, General Staff, Logistics Troops,

Composite Supply Sompany, Force Workshop Company, the Medical Unit as well as the training and BDF band wings.570 All these units had different commanding officers of whom the highest rank was a Major meaning that they were all at the Company level. To an outsider, the chain of command was not entirely clear but what is known is that the various commanding officers all reported directly to the BDF commander regardless of rank. This was problematic because the

BDF commander had to find a way to balance the 23 or more commanding officers of different elements and give directions to all of them.

When the brigade grouping process started, some of these initial units were merged with others while some such as the Air Wing eventually became entirely independent or self – contained though they still took their orders from the BDF commander. Brigade grouping in essence created a nuanced structure that was less tedious to deal with. As time went on, the BDF commander at the rank of lieutenant general was still in charge of the overall operations of the force, but he had fewer commanding officers to direct meaning that it was easier and clearer for the military to function effectively. Below the commander was the deputy commander at the rank of Major

General, and the Chief of Staff who was in command of all the ground force units. This new structure seemed to follow what Giulio Douhet prescribed in his discussion pertaining to the technical means of warfare. He suggested that the main faucets of the army, the navy and air force should possess some elements of land forces to help them successfully carry out their mandates in the same way that the land forces could also have an air force unit to augment its functions.571

570 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 27 571 Douhet, The Command, 5 – 6.

197 Big Budget Spending

The brigade grouping exercise not only coincided with the growing capabilities of the BDF but two other important factors; growing revenue from diamond sales and readily available weapons around the world that had been manufactured during the Cold War. In some instances, Eastern

Bloc weapon manufacturers were faced with financial ruin at the end of 1989 and consequently became desperate to offload huge numbers of armaments to militaries in the developing world such as Botswana in order to generate some revenue. Data from the Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that between 1985 and 1989, global arms trade averaged $42.1 billion a year with Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for about $11 billion each year in that period.

After the Cold War ended, global arms sales averages dropped to about $26 billion with Sub-

Saharan African nations accounting for about $8.9 billion between 1992 and 1996.572 Though globally this represented a steep decline in the movement of arms, Sub – Saharan Africa was still spending significantly on arms despite the fact that its yearly average was about $2 billion less than the 1984 – 88 period. However, not all countries that sold armaments at the end of the Cold

War were desperate to do so, some were actually in good fiscal shape and only offloaded what they considered obsolete weaponry in order to modernise their inventory. Developed nations such as Canada, Austria and Germany all played an important role in arming the developing world including Botswana at the end of the Cold War period.573

Between 1992 and 1999, Botswana’s military budget experienced a sharp increase where it surpassed all other government organs. With Merafhe now the minister in charge of defence

572 SIPRI - “Military expenditure by region in constant US Dollars” generated 12 May 2020, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex; Rachel Stohl, Suzette Grillot, International Arms Trade (Malden: Polity Press, 2009), 21 – 22. 573 See in general, Christopher Kilford, The Other Cold War, Canada’s Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945 – 1975 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010), 69 – 77; Richard F. Grimmet, “Conventional Arms Trade in the Post-Cold War Era” Congressional Research Service, (23 September 1993): 2 – 3 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/transfers-pcw.pdf Accessed 12 May 2020.

198 amongst other things, he drove parliament to sharply increase funding for the BDF as he usually based his arguments from his experience as the former commander. Merafhe justified the enormous budget on the fact that Botswana after all did not inherit a military or its infrastructure from a colonial power so spending had to increase in order to meet the demands of a growing army. In the 1990/91 financial year, the total budget for BDF personal emoluments stood at P 159 million in contrast to about P 61 million set aside for the Botswana Police Service in the same year.574 The following financial year, this part of the BDF budget decreased slightly to P 135.5 million which was 56% of the total for Merafhe’s ministry that had 5 other departments.575 To some members of parliament this astronomical budget was alarming given the decline of regional tensions in the early 1990s.576 Merafhe strongly stated that the BDF needed to maintain readiness and procure equipment that would be used to help maintain the security of the country. Between

1993 and 1995, financial figures rose sharply to P 220 million which was almost double of what it had been in the two previous financial years.577 One of the top priorities for the BDF leadership in the 1990s was to improve the housing situation for the troops who had been living in poor conditions across the country. In fact, in 1993 and 1994, the BDF earmarked P 164 million for housing but only P 12 million for defence equipment.578 The BDF had become the country’s highest funded institution mainly because it was the second largest employer after the civil service but also due to the nature of the work that the soldiers did on a daily basis. On average, military spending in Botswana in this period stood at 3.8% of GDP per annum while in 1994 alone, that

574 BNARS Hansard 103, Part 1, Second Meeting, Second Session, Sittings from February 11 to March 7, 1991, pp. 487 – 501. 575 BNARS Hansard 106, Part 1, Second Meeting, Fourth Session, Sittings from February 10 to March 9, 1992, p.420. 576 “Security will continue to improve” The Botswana Daily News, 3 March 1992, 4. see also BNARS Hansard 110, Part 1, Fifth Meeting, Fifth Session, Sittings from February 8 to April 1st, p.154 577 BNARS Hansard 110, Part 1, Fifth Meeting, Fifth Session, Sittings from February 8 to April 1st, 154 578 BNARS Hansard 110, Part 1, Fifth Meeting, Fifth Session, Sittings from February 8 to April 1st, 154

199 figure rose sharply to 4.93 % of GDP per annum.579 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

(IISS) and SIPRI, however, estimated BDF spending figures to be a lot higher considering the growth of equipment and manpower in this time. Considering the personal emoluments, IISS estimated that BDF spending stood at an estimated P 415 million in 1993, P 615 million in 1994 and P 625 million by 1995.580 SIPRI data also shows a steady increase from P 291 million in 1990 to P 765 million in 1998 estimating that the BDF spent P 450 million, P 458 million and P 460 million in 1993, 1994, and 1995, respectively.581 Though these are only estimates, the overall idea is that there was a lot of money being pumped into the Botswana military in the 1990s. Despite its enormous budget, the BDF remained smaller than other regional militaries such as the ZDF and the SADF which became the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) during South

Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994.582 No matter how much Botswana could spend on its military, the strength of the BDF could never match that of Zimbabwe and South Africa with larger economies and populations.

Forming the Armoured Unit

At its creation and throughout the 1980s, the BDF did not have an armour unit amongst its fighting components. The role of armour was loosely delegated to its Mechanised Infantry battalion that started using the Shorland trucks and later acquired the Soviet BTR followed by the Cadillac Cage

V-150s. It was not until 1995 that the BDF created its first armoured unit which was the size of a

579 Military Expenditure % of GDP – Botswana https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=BW Accessed Friday 1 May 2020. See also Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 46. 580 Africa South of the Sahara, 24th Edition (London: Europa Publishers, 1995). 581 SIPRI - “Military expenditure by country, in local currency, 1988 – 2019,” accessed 4 May 2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20i n%20local%20currency.pdf 582 Timothy Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 192.

200 company drawing some men from the Mechanised Infantry battalion.583 First, the BDF ordered 20 second-hand Scorpion Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) or CVR (T) and 6 FV-103

Spartan APCs from the British government in 1994 which were delivered between 1995 and

1996.584 The Scorpion, which became the BDF’s first ever tank, was built by the British manufacturer Alvis Car and Engineering Company beginning in 1973 and was one of the smallest tanks from their assembly line and produced in large numbers for use by the British Army and other militaries across the globe.585 Its small size and aluminium armour which weighed a lot less than reinforced steel gave the Scorpion an advantage of mobility and air transport capability over larger tanks. Alvis built the Scorpion so that two can easily fit into a Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. This may have been one of the reasons why the BDF Air Wing later acquired two of these aircraft from the United States. Furthermore, the Scorpion is amphibious and carries a crew of 3 including the driver and two gunners who operate the main Cockerill Mk III M-A1

90mm main gun and a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun in some variants.586 Forming the armoured unit with a nucleus from the Mechanised Infantry gave the BDF some advantages as the men had some prior experience though the operation of a tank was completely different. The British manufacturers, as they had done in previous years, are likely to have sent a team to train some

BDF personnel on the use and maintenance of the Scorpion. The Spartan APC, on the other hand, was built entirely the same way as the Scorpion but without a turret though it had a mounted machine gun and it served mainly as a reconnaissance vehicle. As more men underwent training, the armoured unit grew rather quickly that by 1996 a second armoured unit was created. The

583 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 34 584 SIPRI - “Arms purchases by Botswana,” accessed 2 May 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 585Alvis FV 101 Scorpion, https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=185 Accessed 2 May 2020. 586 Alvis FV 101 Scorpion, https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=185 Accessed 2 May 2020.

201 purchase of smaller refurbished Scorpions from the British was a wise decision by the BDF who used them to create a new capability and train men in tank operations before procuring more lethal weapons systems. The Scorpion, in this case, served mostly as a trainer for the armoured unit as it could not be used for close combat against the region’s stronger militaries that operated larger tanks.587 Because of its size and maneuverability in comparison to larger tanks, the Scorpion could have also been procured by the BDF for armoured reconnaissance purposes and low intensity warfare. This was a similar practice to when they procured the Strikemaster fighter aircraft – to train men in preparation for more advanced jets.

By 1997, rapid training had reinforced the two armoured units but also resulted in the creation of the Armoured Brigade Headquarters in Gaborone which at the time was under the general direction of the Ground Forces along with mechanised infantry, artillery and light infantry among others.588 In the same year, the BDF procured the more lethal SK 105 Kuraissier light tanks that are usually referred to as tank destroyers from Austria which were delivered between 1998 and 2000.589 This purchase drew significant media speculation which created controversy about

Ian Khama’s personal connection to BDF arms deals.590 However, these allegations were largely unproven. The Kuraissier was twice the size and weight of the Scorpion at 20 tons. Its 105mm rifled main gun was capable of destroying larger enemy tanks on the battlefield hence its description as a tank destroyer but it could also perform other roles including troop support and reconnaissance. Like the Scorpion, it was also equipped with a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun and

587 Major General Pius Mokgware (Rtd) BDF Ground Forces Commander, 2004 – 2010), Gabane, 7 January 2019. 588 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 38 – 40. 589 SIPRI - “Arms deals with deliveries or orders made for 1985 to 2000,” accessed Saturday 2 May 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 590 Tshireletso Motlogelwa and Matteo Civillini, “Military Millionaires: Presidential arms dealers and securocrats rule in Africa’s success story” Chronicle 20 (2016). https://www.zammagazine.com/chronicle/chronicle-20/317- military-millionaires Accessed 7 January 2021.

202 carried a crew of 3.591 Compared to the militaries of the region, the Kuraissier put the BDF amongst the top in terms of armoured warfare capability. The SANDF used the Olifant MK 1A which was essentially an upgraded British Centurion tank that they had been using since the early 1950s while the militaries of Zimbabwe and Angola used old Soviet made T-55s which were no match for the

Kuraissier.592

The development of BDF armour capabilities coincided with the end of regional contentions that mostly concluded with the fall of apartheid despite the fact that war in Angola between the MPLA government and UNITA rebels lingered until the early 2000s. Though this war never posed a significant threat to the sovereignty of Botswana, it contributed to a tense security situation in the region. Procuring armaments during peacetime was not only ideal because the economy supported it but also because it was an investment for the future of the country.593

However, despite the flexibility provided by the end of apartheid, the BDF still ran into troubles increasing its capabilities. One such problem was the attempt to reinforce the armoured unit.

Between the acquisition of the Scorpion and the Kuraissier, the BDF took steps to add to their arsenal one of the most lethal battle tanks ever seen in Europe, the West German built Leopard

Mk2. The BDF had placed a $ 14.2 million order of 54 units from the Netherlands government whose military was offloading the 180 that had been in service with the Royal Netherlands

Army.594 For several weeks in the Dutch parliament, opposition political parties including the

People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Labour Party (PVDA) questioned the government about whether the impending sale was not contradictory to their recently enacted arms

591 Jagdpanzer SK 105 Kuraissier https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=167 Accessed 2 May 2020. 592 Alexander Ludeke, International Tank Development from 1970 (Bansley: Pen & Sword Books, 2018), 100. 593 “Airbase finally named” Mmegi, April 7 – 13 April 1995, p. 2 594 “BDF Arms deal sparks debate” Mmegi 20 – 26 October 1995, 1. See also https://www.army- technology.com/projects/leopard/ Accessed Saturday May 2, 2020.

203 export policy which placed restrictions on the export of military hardware to developing countries such as Botswana. The order also included more than 200 5-ton DAF trucks as well as 50 84 mm

Carl Gustav recoilless guns.595 The debates were not only warranted by the size of the order but also by the fact that some economic observers in Botswana had recently published articles questioning the BDF’s excessive spending.596 The debates around the deal dragged for months until eventually the German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl personally appealed to the Dutch

Prime Minister Wim Kok to cancel the sale. There were other reasons behind this decision but the biggest one was the fact that Germany had once committed a genocide against the Herero in 1904.

German guilt from its colonial atrocities against Namibians, even by 1996 contributed to its delicate relationship with its former colony. The Namibians undoubtedly had a big issue with this deal given the ongoing border disputes and they put immense pressure on German Foreign

Minister Klaus Kinkel who in turn pressured Kohl to cancel it.597 The underlying issue here was the fear that German manufactured tanks should be sold to the BDF only to be used against the

NDF over the Sidudu / Situngu issues.598 Dutch officials described the move to block the sale as purely paternalistic but according to the contract they signed when they purchased the Leopards from Germany, they could not sell them without the manufacturing country’s approval.599 Ian

Khama had tried to justify Botswana’s position and how the BDF was a professional military that had recently completed two separate UN peacekeeping mandates in Somalia and Mozambique in a bid to show that the tanks would not be deployed against a neighbouring country. This, however, fell on deaf ears. Unfortunately, some members of the BDF had already travelled to Vlieland Island

595 “Botswana buys bundle of ex-Dutch equipment” Jane’s Defence Weekly Journal, 9 December 1995, 17. 596 “BDF Arms deal sparks debate” Mmegi 20 – 26 October 1995, p. 1. 597 “Namibian Pressure on Germany” Media Monitor: Diplomatic Bulletin, Tuesday 23 July 1996, 2. 598 “Dutch government accuses Bonn of hypocrisy in veto of tank deal with Botswana” Media Monitor: Diplomatic Bulletin, Wednesday 4 July 1996, 1 – 4. 599 “Germany puts foot down on Botswana tanks” The Namibian, 5 July 1996, 1 – 2; “Germany wont “ok” Botswana tank deal” The Citizen (Johannesburg) 10 July 1996.

204 in the Netherlands to begin preliminary training on operating the tanks in the hopes that they would be using them in Botswana.600 Owing to political pressure, the Dutch government was cornered into cancelling the deal and had to refund the Botswana government who then turned to the

Austrians to purchase the SK 105 Kuraissier.

Considering the number of units requested and the nature of the Leopard itself, the order would have placed the BDF’s armour capabilities amongst the top in the region. Weighing in at

62 tons, the Leopard was fully equipped with different electronic devices including rear mounted cameras and state of the art night vision and target identification technology. Most variants of the

Leopard boasted a 120 mm L-55 gun turret with a firing range of 5 km with a velocity in excess of 1 750 m/s. It was also developed with mine protection to shield the crew of 4 that operated the tank as well as modern navigation systems. Other western militaries including Spain, Canada and

Sweden added it to their inventory in the first decade of the 2000s, so it was no surprise that the

BDF had hopes of bringing it to Botswana.601

In armoured warfare, J F C Fuller and the Soviet General Giorgii S. Isserson agree about the invaluable nature of tank formations in both attack and defence. For Fuller, tanks not only form the core of the fighting forces but are particularly important in open country where there are no barriers such as roads and buildings. In this case, because they have their own armour and carry devastating weapons, they serve better than infantry to demobilise enemy formations.602 Isserson, one of the primary thinkers of Soviet Deep Operations, argued that without tanks armies could not effectively defend themselves against advancing enemy tanks that have penetrated defensive lines.

600 “Botswanan tanks crop up in Bonn” The Namibian, 21 June 1996 1 – 2. 601 Michael Jerchel, Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank, 1979 – 85 (London: Osprey, 1998), 7 – 8 See also https://www.army-technology.com/projects/leopard/ Accessed Saturday May 2, 2020. 602 Colonel JFC Fuller, The Foundations of Science of War (London: Hutchison & Co., 1926), 255.

205 Thus, the defending army’s tanks ought to be tank destroyers instead of light tanks.603 Though the

BDF would not deploy their tanks against enemies because the region was becoming stable politically, it was seeking to add the same lethal capabilities that Fuller and Isserson discussed in their writings. The purchase of the Leopard 2 would mean that the BDF had both light tanks for reconnaissance as well as tank destroyers but because this deal fell through, they opted for the smaller Kuraissier from Austria, a country that did not have colonial ties with any of Botswana’s neighbours. In some ways, this tank compromise could be looked at the same way as the

Strikemaster deal of the late 1980s because Botswana was still not able to buy the weapons it wanted owing to external political pressure that forced the BDF to settle for less lethal equipment.

The Billion Pula Airbase and Air Arm Developments

BDF efforts to expand its capabilities in this period including the acquisition of tanks caused a major stir in the political sphere of Botswana. Opposition politicians and economists alike grew vocal and cautioned against excessive spending in the advent of a stagnating diamond economy.

Some Batswana felt that the BDF funds could be used for social projects as the region had since become stable. Besides this growing pressure, the BDF continued its facelift by developing its Air

Wing further which caused an even bigger stir in the country and the region. The first of these developments was the Thebephatswa Airbase, a project that commenced in 1989 and lasted until late 1994. It was the biggest and most expensive venture that the BDF had undertaken since its creation in 1977 with an estimated cost of about P 1 billion (c. US$ 100 million today). When construction started in 1989, the Air Wing came to be known as the Air Arm, which meant that it had evolved into a larger and more significant element of the BDF. It now had more trained

603 Giorgii S. Isserson, G S Isserson and the war of the Future, Key Writings of a Soviet Military Theorist trans. Richard W. Harrison (Jefferson: MacFarland and Co., 2016), 248 – 9

206 personnel including aircraft engineers, pilots of different types of aircraft, as well as instructors.

Above all, it possessed a larger aircraft fleet that provided the BDF with an array of capabilities.

Prior to this, the Air Wing was only big enough to be commanded by a brigadier but when this transitioned took place, Tebogo Masire became the first major general to lead the department under its new name.604 While construction was ongoing, the Air Arm acquired two CASA – 212 light transport aircraft from Spain to add to the two CASA – 235 it had procured from the same suppliers in 1988.605 The 212 was older having been in production since 1971 while the larger 235 was brand new and only went on sale in 1988.606 These were natural replacements for the older BN 2

Defender and Skyvan that the BDF had operated since 1978 and 1981 respectively and opened new avenues for the Air Wing, mainly airborne operations including paradropping, troop transport and increased logistics capacity. The CASA 235 would later be deployed to service the BDF with regular flights from home to the various international peacekeeping missions in 1990s.607 When

Thebephatswa was opened in 1995, it served as the nerve centre for the Air Arm and several other related units including the Technical Training School (TTS) and the Flying Training School (FTS).

TTS was established in 1981 as an extension of the Air Wing and its primary function was to teach aircraft mechanics and maintenance to a select few in the BDF. 608 FTS, on the other hand, was established and run by Tony Durrant and Harry Haines who trained the first four airmen and evolved slowly through time until 1990 when its leadership was fully localised. The opening of

Thebephatswa was one of the most significant factors of the growth of the BDF. The Air Arm now

604 Masire, Interview. 605 SIPRI - “Arms purchase by Botswana,” accessed Saturday May 2, 2020. http://armstrade..org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 606 Louis J. Williams, Small Transport Aircraft Technology (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001), 18 607 Masire, Interview. 608 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 85, 87.

207 had a properly equipped base that allowed it to operate more efficiently unlike the old Notwane airbase which was in an urban area.

Following the opening of Thebephatswa, more defence equipment including fighter jets known as the CF-5 Freedom Fighter previously used by the Canadian Air Force as well as two

Hercules C-130 tactical airlift aircraft commonly referred to as the Fat Albert by the US military were procured. These two categories of aircraft greatly multiplied the capabilities of the Air Wing.

In 1995, Botswana signed a contract with the Canadian government for the procurement of 13 refurbished Canadair CF-5 fighter aircraft with a 14th one designated for parts salvage.609 This deal was completed smoothly aside from a technical hiccup caused by Bristol Airspace, a Canadian aerospace firm located in Winnipeg, Manitoba. The company was contracted by the Canadian

Commercial Corporation (CCC) to refurbish the CF-5 to BDF specifications and provide technical support for anything related thereafter. Before taking delivery of the CF-5s, the BDF leadership complained that Bristol Airspace was taking advantage of their contract and dragging their feet.610

This is why the CF – 5s were not delivered until 1996 and even after that, Bristol Airspace failed to fully complete its contract, particularly the radio modifications which made it difficult for the

BDF Air Arm to operate the aircraft. In essence, it took the Air Arm about 4 years to begin fully operating the CF-5s which were then designated as BF-5 in its Z28 Fighter Squadron. It is important to note that the Air Wing was operating without a fighter aircraft between 1993 and

1996 when the BF-5s were delivered because soon after the Strikemaster accidents in 1989, the

BDF decommissioned them and by 1996 had sold some of the remaining ones to Kenya and

609 Interview with Brigadier D’omcaza K. Mokgwathi, BDF Air Arm, Director of Capital Logistics, Capability and Planning, Gaborone, 14 January 2019. 610 BNARS OP 58/5 – Botswana Defence Force – General “Correspondence between Lt. Gen S K Ian Khama and James K Bartleman, Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa” 27 August 1998.

208 salvaged communication equipment from the rest of them to export to various international companies.611

Built in 1968 both as a single and dual seater, the CF-5 was part of the American Northrop freedom fighter family designed during for the Cold War. It was smaller and less powerful than other fighter aircraft operated by NATO nations at the time but for the BDF, it was the best deal not only because it outclassed the Strikemaster but also because it was readily available and the most affordable for the BDF at the time. Armed with twin MN-39 20mm cannons from General

Motors, some sidewinder missiles, up to 7000 lb of varying payloads, and two 5000 lb M-82 bombs, the CF-5 was the most lethal aircraft acquired by the BDF.612 It was also twice as fast as the Strikemaster and more fuel efficient. Though it probably could not match the South African operated Mirage or the Angolan MiG 21 & 23 in terms of speed, adding it to the Air Wing inventory provided a significant lethal capability in the air that the BDF did not get from the

Strikemaster. Further, procuring 13 of these aircraft signified that Botswana did not want to be left defenceless despite de-escalation of tensions in Southern Africa. Among those in the BDF, particularly those in the Air Arm, the CF-5s represented a natural progression. To them, the

Strikemaster was a trainer aircraft while the CF-5 was the real deal, the pure jet fighter that meant business.613 Furthermore, the move to procure ex-Canadian fighter aircraft may have been influenced by the experiences from the BDF – BAe dealings of the past. It is likely that this was a manifestation of Ian Khama’s ideology that the BDF had become overly reliant on the British for supply of equipment, funding and training. The fact that the BAe Hawks were still available when

611 Mokobi, Interview; BNARS OP 58/5 – Botswana Defence Force – General “Correspondence from Tebogo Masire to Minister of Finance and Development Planning requesting to dispose of the remaining Strikemaster aircraft” 2 October 1996. 612 Harold A Skaarup, Canadian Warbird and War Prize Survivors (New York: Writers Club Press, 2000), 187; see also Skaarup Canadian Warplanes (New York: iUniverse Inc, 2009). 613 These are shared sentiments between Major General Tebogo Masire and Brigadier Mokobi, both from the Air Wing

209 the CF-5 deal was signed shows that Botswana wanted to explore other previously unopened avenues. Additionally, Canada did not have any colonial ties to Botswana apart from being a member of the British Commonwealth, another important factor that may have had a bearing on this decision in the same way that its military became involved in training the Tanzanian military during the Cold War.614 It also eliminated a paternalistic attitude that the British government may have had towards Botswana and the BDF.

The procurement drive did not end with the CF-5 because later in 1995, the Air Arm commander, Tebogo Masire travelled to the US to purchase two Lockheed Hercules C-130 B aircraft which increased the BDF capabilities exponentially.615 The Hercules, had been in production since the mid – 1950s and had a long prestigious history of service in the US Air Force including during the Vietnam War. It is also used widely by militaries across the world including

Canada and South Africa. It provided the Air Arm with the same airlift capabilities it had given the US Air Force. The model acquired by the BDF, the C-130 B, had two extra underwing fuel tanks for extended endurance. Though it wasn’t the biggest model in the range, it could accommodate up to 92 combat troops or 64 para troops as well as either two 9-ton Scorpion tanks or four Landrovers with ease as its gross take-off weight was 204 000 lbs.616 The value of tactical airlift for any army cannot be understated. Since the Second World War, air transport of paratroopers provided significant advantages for militaries conducting airborne operations. equally proved critical in the Vietnam and Korean wars where the C-130 performed remarkably well.617

614 Kilford, The Other Cold War, 3. 615 SIPRI – “Arms purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday May 2, 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 616 Martin W. Bowman, C-130 Hercules, A History (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Aviation Press, 2017), 20 – 22. 617 Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airlift, The United States Air Forces in South East Asia (Washington: US Air Force, 1983), 27 – 30.

210 After they were delivered in 1997, these large transport aircraft gave the BDF the ability to deploy quickly around the country and to project power beyond the borders of Botswana.

The 1990s therefore presented a coming of age of the BDF as it rushed to improve its capabilities not only in the spirit of catching up to regional powers but also to mould itself into a formidable and effective armed force that would properly defend the country from external threats.

This of course came at a high price but fortunately, the ever-growing budget had the support of a successful diamond economy which would begin to slow down by the mid – 2000s. Some local and international observers started to pay close attention to these growing spending habits and even purported the idea that Botswana was starting an arms race in the region.618 By 1997, BDF expenditure was so high that IISS ranked it 4th largest per capita in the world after North Korea,

Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia respectively which made it the highest spending military in Africa at the time.619 One could argue that Angola’s military spending was more understandable because it contended with an ongoing civil war that lasted until 2002 while there was no war in Botswana.

Ian Khama, in 1995, had however urged the government to maintain funding for the BDF as it needed to achieve a certain level of infrastructure and equipment development. Despite heavy spending, he reminded people attending the opening ceremony of Thebephatswa that the BDF was the only military in the region to not have inherited any infrastructure or equipment at independence and remained the 3rd smallest armed force in the SADC area apart from the defence forces of Lesotho and Swaziland. Khama called the airbase and its equipment an investment that had been created with future missions in mind.620 Indeed, the importance of Thebephatswa could

618 “Botswana buys arms and the world wonders why” The Weekend Argus, 29 June 1996; “Why does Botswana need so many tanks and fighters?” Diamond Fields Advertiser, 27 June 1996, p. 5; “Botswana builds up arsenal” The Times, 22 June 1996, p.17. 619 BNARS OP 58/5 – Botswana Defence Force – General, “Correspondence from the Botswana – Japan High Commission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Botswana” 13 January 1998. 620 “Khama wants BDF spending to be maintained at current levels” The Botswana Daily News, 8 August 1998, 3.

211 not be understated – having a larger runway than the Sir Seretse Khama International Airport

(SSKIA), the main airport of Botswana, it also served as a diversion landing strip for abnormally large civilian aircraft.621 It would also prove worthy when airlifting troops and equipment for the peacekeeping missions in the future.

New Artillery and Air Defence Capabilities

While the BDF was making significant improvements to the Air Arm and introducing armour capabilities in the 1990s, it also spent some time and effort on bolstering other existing units such as the helicopter squadrons, artillery, air defence and mechanised infantry. These purchases were not as massive as the other units but did also add to the overall spike in BDF spending during this period.

In 1995, the BDF bolstered both its air defence and artillery regiments by procuring 50 handheld Igla-1/SA-16 missiles and 15 L-118 105mm Howitzer towed guns from Russia and the

United Kingdom respectively.622 These procurements were a continuation of the enhancements to capabilities that began in the 1980s and saw the creation of two field artillery regiments (FAR), namely 11 FAR in Gaborone and 14 FAR at Selebi Phikwe. These units expanded rapidly as well in that three years later in 1998, 11 Artillery Brigade was formed and stationed at what became the

Glen Valley Barracks that today house the BDF Staff College and the Air Defence HQ. In the same year, an unknown number of 155mm towed howitzers were procured from the US Army and resulted in the conversion of 11 FAR to a medium artillery regiment or 11 MAR. The procurements of even greater firepower took place while the BDF was undergoing its brigade grouping exercise

621 Mokobi, Interview. 622 SIPRI - “Arms purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday May 2, 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

212 and it is sometimes not clear where some artillery units originated. Regardless, the BDF also procured a significant number of Swedish made 120mm Tampella Mortars and 105mm LFG (Light

Field Guns) for its artillery units in the same period. The 105mm LFGs were then handed to 14

FAR at Phikwe while the 120mm mortars were used to form 120mm Light Artillery Regiment

(LAR) in Gaborone.623 Brigade grouping continued to 2004 and resulted in the amalgamation of several more artillery units. Being one of the main combat arms of the BDF, artillery was divided into several distinct but coordinated units which boasted the massive firepower of field artillery guns and mortars as well as Target Acquisition Radars (TARs). Brigade grouping not only resulted in the growth of these artillery units but also equipped them with the necessary support elements that were critical to their function such as reconnaissance, transportation or towing of the howitzers, and fire control instruments across the BDF camps in the country.624 The armaments procured deepened the scale and lethality as well as rapid manoeuvrability. Apart from the critical role of providing fire support to other units, these new weapons also increased the ability to concentrate indirect fire on enemy installations until they were neutralised. In large-scale operations, artillery serves as one of the key factors determining a successful campaign.

In the same token of brigade grouping, the acquisition of 50 Igla-1/SA-16 handheld missiles for the Air Defence regiments resulted in a massive boost of their capabilities. Previously, the BDF only had two small Air Defence regiments that were formed in 1986 following the SAAF helicopter raid. Initially located at Mogoditshane HQ, the Air Defence relocated to Thebephatswa when it was opened to serve as the first line of defence for the airbase. As more men were recruited, the unit grew to brigade size by 1997 and eventually relocated to the Glen Valley barracks in

Gaborone in order to work in tandem with the artillery brigade. The anti-aircraft SA-16 missile

623 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 35 624 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 35

213 was lighter and more portable than its SA-7 predecessor that the BDF had acquired from the Soviet

Union at the beginning of 1981. Some 41 countries including Botswana procured the handheld

SA-16 missile in large numbers in the post – Cold War period because of its improved tracking accuracy.625

Z23 Helicopter Squadron and the Expansion of Military Anti – Poaching

The creation of this squadron was necessitated by the multiple roles played by the older Z21

Helicopter Squadron that had been operating since the early 1980s. However, helicopter shortages continued to haunt the BDF throughout the 1980s particularly after the beginning of anti-poaching activities. The available helicopters at the time were shared between units and performed various tasks with minimal downtime. In addition to its critical role in anti-poaching, Z21 was responsible for providing support to ground units, aiding Civil Authority and VIP transportation. Finally, in

1995 some of these roles were eased by the acquisition of 3 Eurocopter AS-350B Squirrel helicopters from France which resulted in the creation of Z23 Squadron. This new helicopter unit was based in Maun and Francistown, and it relieved Z21 of its tactical airlift, general support to civil authority roles allowing it to focus primarily on support to the anti-poaching unit.

Furthermore, Z23 was also tasked with converting pilots from fixed wing to rotor wing aircraft in conjunction with the FTS.626 This role improved efficiency and versatility because it allowed pilots who had been employed to fly fixed wing aircraft to be ready to take up helicopter duties if needed.

The two distinct helicopter squadrons allowed the BDF to focus closer on providing constant aerial support to its anti-poaching. Since the BDF began anti – poaching activities along

625 Marvin B. Schaffer, “The Missile Threat to Civil Aviation,” in Aviation Terrorism and Security, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Brian M. Jenkins (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 79. 626 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 52, 56; SIPRI – “Arms Purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday May 2, 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

214 the Kwando River in the late 1980s, there had been a slow decline in poaching incidents. One of the reasons for this was the technology and equipment made available to the anti-poaching unit.

However, poaching was still rampant in the national parks and resulted in significant deaths of wildlife despite the BDF presence. One of the main hindrances to BDF anti-poaching operations in the beginning was their inability to access some key areas in the national parks to conduct patrols. In 1993, the BDF purchased 15 Panther airboats from the US government to be used for patrols in the rivers of the north but on some occasions, the BDF would deploy them for rescue missions during floods and other natural disasters.627 They also added 9 second-hand Cessna

Skymaster 337-02a light reconnaissance aircraft equipped with Forward Looking Infrared Radar

(FLIR). Not only could the Skymaster maintain slow speed at low altitudes but the radar system allowed it to be used effectively at night to spot poachers from long distances. This array of equipment, including planes, helicopters, radar systems and boats added a layer of advantage over armed Caprivi poachers. It reflected the high level of commitment that the BDF had to curbing poaching in Botswana. Over the years they kept adding more technology to significantly improve their success – night vision goggles in this case became invaluable additions to their nightly patrols.628

By 1996, the anti – poaching unit had recorded a string of successful operations against poachers which at the same time came at high risk not only to the Commando Squadron, but the civilian trackers employed to help the unit. This gave rise to attempts to convert the trackers into full time soldiers as they had been performing similar duties as the Commando Squadron, yet their remuneration was significantly lower than that of a private or recruit in the BDF. Furthermore,

627 “BDF gets boats from US government” The Botswana Daily News, 9 June 1993, 5. See also Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 64. 628 SIPRI – “Arms Purchases by Botswana,” accessed Saturday May 2, 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php; Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 64

215 their lives were not protected in the same way as the soldiers because they were merely civilian contractors to the BDF. When they were initially recruited, the trackers did not possess the skills nor the education requirements to join the force as regular soldiers but over time they managed to acquire the practical and technical abilities needed to function effectively in the anti-poaching unit.

Most were reported to be physically and mentally fit to join the force so that they could receive the same benefits and protections as their Commando Squadron counterparts. Initially, the BDF felt that their lives were at a higher risk, so they suspended the use of trackers while they worked to formalise their recruitment into the armed force. While this process was ongoing, there was a suggestion that could remedy the trackers’ risks by offering them more pay which was subsequently declined on the basis that the incremental figure suggested would give them a higher pay rate than a private / recruit in the BDF.629 The Office of the President felt that the unarmed trackers could still be deployed next to the soldiers but assigned less risky tasks, but this was unreasonable as they operated in the frontlines against poachers. It is hard to understand what the

Botswana government officials thought would be less risky than being unarmed and leading a group of soldiers towards the enemy. In the event of a firefight, trackers are the first to fall victim.

In 1996, after several months of communication between the Office of the President and the BDF command, a decision was finally made to formally recruit the willing trackers into the armed force most of whom accepted the offer to become regular soldiers.630 This was yet another sign of growing military professionalism amongst the BDF leadership in that they recognised the dangers that the contractors faced and pushed the government of Botswana to pass legislation that turned trackers into full time soldiers.

629 BNARS OP 58/5 – Botswana Defence Force – General, “Employment of “trekkers” 18 May 1995. 630 BNARS OP 58/5 – Botswana Defence Force – General, “Conversion of Trackers into soldiers – correspondence between Office of the President to BDF Command” 1 September 1996.

216 Conclusion

BDF expansion and arms acquisition in the 1990s was less reactive than during the 1980s when they were always responding to emergencies emanating from South Africa. The exponential growth of capabilities in this period was part of a planned process that was largely dictated by three intertwined key factors: the fall of the belligerent apartheid government in South Africa, the availability of second-hand armaments, and the growth of diamond revenues. In this situation,

Botswana suddenly had flexibility to procure weapons, most of which had been manufactured in mass numbers during the Cold War period. Though most stable weapons manufacturing countries usually operated with strict arms export policies geared towards reducing civil unrest in the developing world, the good reputation of the BDF gained it credibility and access to these suppliers. Botswana seized the golden opportunity to get its hands-on weapons that in the region were considered highly sophisticated.

The Khama leadership at this time also worked with a clear mandate of improving discipline amongst the rank and file as well as the efficiency and a working structure that created a clear chain of command. This was the aim of the brigade grouping exercise which resulted in a well organised defence force that perhaps mirrored other militaries in the world. However, even though the Cold War had ended, and apartheid South Africa disappeared, there was still, in the back of the minds of the leadership, an external threat that the BDF needed to prepare for. It can be argued that despite the need to catch up with regional militaries, BDF spending grew exorbitant because of the perceived external threat that never materialised. Some of the observers who were critical of BDF spending had a point that some of the funds could be better used for social projects or saved as the economy was slowing down. Despite this, the BDF leadership kept with its program of expansion in a bid to build a world-class force despite its small size. The rocky relationship

217 Botswana had with its new neighbour, Namibia, at times stood in the way of this expansion. As was the case, the purchase of the Leopard 2 tanks never materialised due to diplomatic and military tensions with Namibia. Eventually, the BDF had to settle for less powerful tanks because of the

Sidudu / Situngu border disputes. In essence, even though the picture one might get depicts a BDF on a shopping spree, there were still some major issues that forced it to remove some items from its shopping list thus limiting its overall capability. It is therefore ironic that the potential for conflict resulted in limitations on defence spending which speaks volumes about the confines of sovereignty for small African countries such as Botswana.

Aside from border tensions with its new neighbour, some BDF capabilities were developed with previous experiences in mind. Such was the case with the expansion of its Air Arm which after 1995 had a full airbase to operate more efficiently from. Purchasing fighter aircraft from a country that previously had not supplied the BDF with any war materiel represented a move away from British paternalism yet still positioned Botswana clearly within the Western arena. It showed that the BDF had indeed come of age and now had home grown funds and a continued stable political environment which gave it the flexibility to look elsewhere for arms. While this was happening, the BDF was not only creating new relationships but also proving its credibility as a professional military which would come to the forefront in the era of its participation in United

Nations peacekeeping missions discussed in the following chapter.

218 Chapter 6: Our Boys Restore Hope: The BDF in Peacekeeping Missions across Africa in the 1990s

Introduction

When the BDF was established, one of its core principles was to act as an instrument of Botswana’s foreign policy to strengthen ties with other countries. In the 1990s, this principle was exercised by way of the BDF’s cooperation with other national armed forces and in particular its participation in international peacekeeping missions across Africa. This was important because while Botswana was experiencing economic prosperity, political stability and shopping for military hardware around the world, other African nations were hit with civil and political turmoil that resulted in the displacement of people and loss of millions of lives. The end of the Cold War period saw outbreaks and continuation of civil wars in Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) amongst others. With these countries spiralling into seemingly endless chaos, the

United Nations (UN) was forced to put together multinational peacekeeping missions some of which the BDF actively participated in to help restore order. The 1990s was therefore not only a period of massive expansion and reorganisation for the BDF but also one where it conducted operations beyond Botswana’s borders for the first time.

Political Unrest in Post – Cold War Africa

While Cold War sponsorships had been extremely helpful in securing the political freedom of some African nations, the collapse of the Soviet Union spelled disaster for the same countries as they could no longer enjoy the financial and military backing that the communist giant had provided for many years. Some African countries during the Cold War era had in fact become so reliant on superpower aid to the point where historians argued that this signified a new form of

219 colonialism.631 During this period, some African leaders tried to pit the superpowers against each other in order to get military and financial aid. This was the case with Muhamad Siad Barre of

Somalia who during the late 1970s, abruptly ended his long relationship with the Soviet Union and turned to the United States for help in fighting his communist neighbour Haile Mengistu Miriam of Ethiopia who then received Soviet backing. In Angola, in the 1970s and 80s, UNITA’s relationship with the CIA and the apartheid government of South Africa mainly happened because

Jonas Savimbi presented himself as an anti – communist who fought the Soviet – sponsored MPLA government. 632 By the time the Soviet Union weakened and collapsed from 1989 to 1991, many of these African leaders were left high and dry, scrambling and fending for themselves against internal rebel groups who saw an opportunity to oust them.633 The end of the Cold War also meant that the US no longer had to contain communism in Africa and ceased its financial and military support to pro – American dictators like Joseph Mobutu of Zaire. This created an extremely volatile political atmosphere as civil wars and power struggles followed. Furthermore, with the end of socialism, Western style free market economy came to dominate Africa with Structural

Adjustment Programs (SAPs) leading to more poverty and armed groups turning to smuggling resources to support themselves. 634 Without superpower backing, authoritarian regimes collapsed while there was a rising expectation of multi – party democracy across Africa in this period.

631 Mark Langan, Neocolonialism and the Poverty of Development in Africa (Newcastle: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 149; Rajen Harshe, Africa in World Affairs, Politics of Imperialism, the Cold War and Globalisation (Oxon: Routledge, 2019), 10-12. 632 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 302 – 4; Vladimir Shubin, The Hot Cold War, The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 105; Peter Polack, The Last Hot Battle of the Cold War, South Africa vs. Cuba in the Angolan Civil War (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2013), 75 – 78; Donna R. Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (Jefferson: McFarland and Co. Publishers), 62; Rodaslav A. Yordanov, The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War, Between Ideology and Pragmatism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 168. 633 Marc Alexandre et.al, The Challenge of Security and Stability in West Africa (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2015), 115. 634 George Klay Kieh Jr., The First Liberian Civil War, The Crisis of Underdevelopment (New York: Peter Lang, 2008) 91; Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 162 – 3.

220 As a result of growing political unrest on the continent, the Organisation of African Unity

(OAU), an intergovernmental organisation formed in 1963 but with very limited resources, struggled to mitigate the outbreaks of civil wars. Consequently, the UN responded by deploying peacekeepers to restore order but in some instances, it was regional intergovernmental organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern

African Development Community (SADC) that spearheaded those attempts.635 In this immediate post-Cold War period, the nature of international peacekeeping was fast evolving to regularly include the use of lethal force to maintain ceasefire agreements between warring factions unlike in previous years where most UN missions were established to observe ceasefire agreements. This was the case in Somalia where the initial United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was not authorised to use force but due to violations of the ceasefire agreement the mission had to quickly adopt a UN resolution authorising the use of lethal force.636

Somalia’s Post – Cold War Woes

The political turmoil in Somalia predated the end of the Cold War era but grew more complex and pronounced after the fall of Muhamad Siad Barre’s dictatorship in 1991 at the hands of the United

Somali Congress (USC). Before this, Somalia had seen a series of civil wars and layers of intertwined problems since the 1970s. When he took over through a successful coup in 1969, Barre

635 There is a good literature on this including Augustine Ohanwe, Post-Cold War Conflicts in Africa, Case studies of Liberia and Somalia (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2009), 22 – 25; Kwame Akonor, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, A Critical Examination and Recommendations for Improvement (South Orange: Springer Publishing, 2017),18, 36 – 38; Kevin A. Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009); Kenneth Rutherford, Humanitarianism under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2008); David Bercuson, Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996); Susan Williams, Who Killed Dag Hammarskjold? The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 636 Eric Berman and Katie Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, (UNIDIR: United Nations, 2000), 13 – 15.

221 declared Somalia a socialist state and grew closer to the Soviet Union. Between 1970 and 1989,

Barre’s regime received over 200 Soviet manufactured tanks and APCs, 60 or more MiG 21 fighter jets, light and heavy artillery pieces amongst a plethora of equipment as well as numerous Soviet military advisors.637 Despite the country’s small population of about 3 million, Somalia’s military quickly grew to become one of the largest and best armed per capita in East Africa and the rest of continent due to increasing Soviet support. This growth emboldened Barre’s vision of creating a

Pan-Somali state that to him included native Somalis who lived in Ethiopia’s Ogaden Desert and some parts of northern Kenya. In July 1977, Barre marched his troops across the border into

Ethiopian territory in a move that would prove disastrous not only for his military but the Soviet support he had received up to that point.638 Barre’s failures in the Ogaden War of 1977 – 1978 would begin the undoing of his regime and continue in a series of cataclysmic events that would lead Somalia to total chaos. At the end of the war, Barre’s disgruntled generals broke away to form various clan – based military groups including the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the

United Somali Congress (USC) which destabilised the country further capturing several important towns.639 By early 1991, pressure from these various fighting factions forced Barre out of the capital to Kenya and later Nigeria where he died in 1995.640 What remained in Somalia was an extremely multifaceted political situation compounded by numerous armed clans and sub-clans that fought one another and were hard to control and bring to the negotiating table for a peace

637 Ian S. Spears, Civil War in African States, The Search for Security (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2010), 135 – 6; MacQueen, United Nations, 202. 638 Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts, Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945 – 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 184 – 87; Michael Brzoska, Frederick Pearson, Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-escalation, and Negotiation (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 180; Tom Cooper, Wings over Ogaden: The Ethiopian – Somali War, 1978 – 79 (West Midlands: Helion & Co, Limited, 2014). 639 Tim Stapleton, A Military History of Africa, Vol. 3, 105. 640 Hussein M Adam, “Somalia, International versus local attempts at peacebuilding,” in Durable Peace, Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa, ed. Taissier M. Ali and Robert O. Mathews (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 256.

222 settlement. Both the OAU and the UN made several attempts to broker a ceasefire between the main factions but largely failed. Within a year of Barre’s overthrow, the war resulted in the deaths of more than 50 000 people.641 With the power vacuum created by Barre’s departure, a plethora of clan – based militia groups in control of different regions around the country, and hundreds of thousands dying due to famine, the United Nations saw a need to quickly respond to Somalia’s plight.

UN Resolution 751: UNOSOM I

The UN started paying close attention to Somalia in the late 1980s but by March 1991, its humanitarian efforts in the country had grown significantly. This was because after Barre’s ousting, there was a sharp rise in lawlessness and banditry across the country as there was no longer a state structure in place to maintain order. Furthermore, Somalia was gripped by a dire drought and famine that created an urgent need for humanitarian aid.642 The UN first sent envoys and representatives to Somalia in order to open communication channels between the main factions led by Muhamad Farah Aidid of the Somali National alliance (SNA) and interim president Ali

Mahdi Muhamad of the USC.643 The two eventually agreed to a ceasefire that allowed humanitarian aid and essential supplies to be sent to Somalia hence the creation of the UNOSOM

I which was initially a group of 50 international unarmed uniformed military personnel whose task was to support UN relief efforts. UNOSOM’s main objectives of ensuring a secure environment for aid distribution rested on the fragile ceasefire between Aidid and Mahdi but considering the

641 UNOSOM I, accessed 19 May 2020 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unosom2backgr2.html#one 642 Laurence Binet, Somalia, 1991 – 1993: Civil War, Famine and UN Military and Humanitarian Intervention (MSN Speaks Out, 2013), 59; Edward R. Ricciuti, Somalia, A Crisis of Famine and War (Brookfield: Millbrook Press 1995), 32 – 33; see also in general Scott Peterson, Me Against my Brother at War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda (New York: Routledge, 2002). 643 “Early United Nations Efforts” accessed May 7, 2020 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html#two

223 fact that there were numerous other armed sub-clans that ran their own militia groups and did not necessarily follow either Aidid or Mahdi, the mission was set for doom from the beginning. By the end of August 1992, the UN was struggling to send aid to areas mainly in southern Somalia that had been most affected by the drought. This was made extremely complex by the large number of armed bandits who overwhelmed the small UNOSOM units. As a result, the UN passed

Resolution 775 which increased the peacekeeping force to 750 troops in order to ensure that convoys carrying supplies reached their destinations intact.644 Even with a ceasefire in place, the smaller armed bands still prevented aid from travelling across the country from ports in

Mogadishu. UNOSOM peacekeepers were fired upon and had some of their vehicles forcefully taken from them which was a clear indication that a use of force needed to be authorised to ensure that aid reached the people who needed it most.645 The UN then passed Resolution 794 which authorised the use of necessary force to ensure the safe delivery of supplies but UNOSOM was still unable to contain the situation or armed banditry. Towards the end of 1992, the United States presented the UN with a solution to this problem which was a multinational peacekeeping force called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) that they would lead. The mission operated under chapter

VII of the UN Charter which authorised the use limited force to ensure that relief was reaching areas it was needed while UNOSOM on the other hand, remained on the ground to focus on the ambitious peace talks amongst the warring factions.646

The BDF Joins UNITAF for Operation Restore Hope

644 “Early United Nations Efforts” accessed 7 May 2020 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html#two 645 Macqueen, United Nations, 205. 646 Ken Rutherford, Humanitarianism under Fire: The US and UN intervention in Somalia (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2008), 102 – 3; MacQueen, United Nations, 205 – 6. See also Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, accessed 30 May 2020, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html

224 UNITAF was an ambitious attempt by the UN to rescue the fast-deteriorating situation in Somalia and at the end of the Cold War, there was no other nation to spearhead it but the United States. In some ways UNITAF was a genuine response to the plight of the suffering Somalis but in other ways, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US felt that they wielded the power to intervene anywhere in the world as they had done in the recent Gulf War. When the US troops landed on the beaches of Mogadishu in 1992, there was a media circus to showcase the operation in the hope that it would strike fear in the hearts of the Somali warlords.647 After the Americans arrived, other military forces including the BDF started landing in Somalia to fulfil their UNITAF commitments.

The joint task force quickly grew to about 37 000 troops including armed forces from Australia,

Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand,

Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United

Kingdom and later Zimbabwe.648 The US alone initially contributed about 15 000 men comprising the bulk of the task force while the other 22 nations brought in a combined 14 000 troops.649 They all concentrated in the capital, Mogadishu but later spread through most of southern Somalia which was most troubled region.650 Eventually UNITAF, under the leadership of Lieutenant General R.

Johnston (US Marine Corps) decided that it would be best to deal with their mandate if Somalia was split into several Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS) or operational zones which would be put under the watchful eye of the various military contingents that had just arrived including the

BDF.651

647 MacQueen, United Nations, 209 648 MacQueen, United Nations 209. 649 “Newspaper hails BDF troops” The Botswana Daily News, 19 March 1993, 2. 650 Michael J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations; The Search for a Legal Framework (London: Kluwer International, 1999), 14 – 15. 651 Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining 15.

225 Prior to becoming part of the UNITAF in Somalia, the BDF had never operated beyond the borders of Botswana. It had no prior combat experience except for the skirmishes with the

Rhodesian Forces in the 1970s and its anti – poaching unit that dealt with small armed bands of

Caprivi poachers on a regular basis. Even then, it could be argued that despite its counterinsurgency styled response to the poachers which included foot tracking and aerial reconnaissance, the BDF was nowhere near ready for the scale of hostility they would encounter in Somalia. Despite this inexperience, the BDF leadership saw joining UNITAF as an important milestone that would bring a lot of experience and greatly improve the reputation of the small military of Botswana. Still, President Masire and BDF commander Ian Khama’s motivations to send men to Somalia are not clear apart from Botswana being a member of the UN. What is also not clear is why Botswana was the first African nation to take part in the mission yet there were other countries with more capable militaries and even closer proximity to Somalia such as Kenya,

Tanzania and Uganda. Perhaps this was due to the fact that at the time the stable democratic government of Botswana was one of the most pro -Western regimes in all of Africa and its military enjoyed good relations with the US Army which had recently supplied it with APCs, missiles and other military hardware. When the US needed African militaries for UNITAF, the BDF fit the bill.

In light of this, the BDF agreed that it would deploy men some 5000 kms away from home to help protect and deliver international aid to starving Somalis. Back home the message from government run media outlets such as the Botswana Daily News was that of encouragement while privately owned newspapers such as Mmegi and the Botswana Guardian highlighted the possible negative aspects of deploying men to Somalia. To capture the attention of readers, they published titles to make it seem like the BDF contingent was in danger, yet this was not entirely true.652 By portraying

652 Between 1993 and 1995, the Botswana Daily News published more articles that presented Botswana’s role in Somalia as generally a good thing while Mmegi and Botswana Guardian had more articles that did the opposite.

226 the Somalia conflict in a positive light, the government-controlled media was trying to garner support amongst its readership and eliminate any fears that parents of soldiers may have had. As a result, the nation was divided by the sudden and rigorous involvement of its troops outside of the country. What generally worried the people was the fact that Somalia had almost no ties with

Botswana apart from being in the same continent whereas Mozambique, the scene of the BDF’s next major peacekeeping deployment, shared closer SADC connections.

While the BDF was undergoing its brigade grouping exercise, shopping for new military hardware to expand its capabilities, and pondering the Sidudu island border dispute only just at its early stages, its leadership rushed to put together a battalion – strong unit to join other militaries for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The mission would run from December 1992 to May 1993.

Brigadier Thulaganyo Masisi was tasked with selecting men from different organs of the BDF and commanding the composite contingent.653 Most men were said to have been keen to answer the call due to the experience this would bring so Masisi had to make sure that he chose the best ones for the job. Apart from that, UN stipends for peacekeepers added to soldiers’ regular salaries and became a strong incentive for the men. The bulk of the contingent consisted of men from the ground forces, mainly light infantry, some drivers and mechanics, and some came from the engineering platoon while other men came from armour and mechanised infantry. Their equipment included FN rifles that used 7.62 x 51mm NATO ammunition which was compatible to what most western contingents would have brought. They also brought soft skinned Landrovers and M – 325 trucks as well as a small number of V-150 Cadillac Cage APCs which offered some protection to troops during their convoys.654 By 17 December, the first batch of the BDF contingent, 51 soldiers

653 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 128. 654 Francis Bobby Maseko, “The Experiences of Botswana Defence Force Peacekeepers in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, The Case of Somalia, 1992 – 1995,” (MA Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2014), 90.

227 including higher ranking officers, boarded a UN marked Hercules C-130 carrier aircraft and left for Somalia. A few days later they were joined by the remaining 260 men who were transported by the BDF’s CASA-235 aircraft.655 The hasty manner in which the BDF prepared for this mission meant that no pre-deployment training was done so the men left for a foreign country without a clear understanding of the UN mandate or why there was a conflict in Somalia.656 This also meant that psychologically, the troops were not prepared for the environment they would be operating in which was entirely new to them and created problems in the first few weeks.

The Mission

Upon arrival, the BDF contingent was attached to the US Marines who had initially taken control of the Mogadishu operational zone where most of the supplies were entering the country. Though the BDF’s primary assignment was to guard the Mogadishu airport, part of their mission was to help the Marines conduct regular patrols in highly contested areas such as the Bakaraa Market of

Mogadishu and adjacent areas.657 This was likely because the BDF was one of the most inexperienced contingents in peacekeeping missions and needed to be eased into the work unlike the Pakistani or Canadian armed forces that had a lot more understanding of foreign interventions.

Shadowing the Marines proved very useful for the BDF as in a short period they became more autonomous and able to stand alone as a single unit without US support. Batswana troops began independently escorting UN trucks carrying supplies across the harsh, hot and hostile countryside to areas including Beledweyne (or Belet Huen), an 8-hour drive towards the Ethiopian border and

655 “Masole a laetswe go nna boikobo” The Botswana Daily News, 17 December 1992, 1. 656 Maseko, “The Experiences of Botswana Defence Force Peacekeepers,” 83. 657 Peter Baxter, Somalia, The US Intervention 1992 – 1994 (Pinetown: 30 Degrees South Publishers, 2013), 69.

228 Baledogle which lay 340 kms east of Mogadishu.658 BDF convoy escorts were frequent which meant that the men had very little rest between assignments with some men complaining that they hardly had time to change their uniforms. 659

While some BDF troops were protecting UN convoys, others started regular patrols of buffer zones that had been created by UNITAF to separate the warring factions. In most cases, this included small-scale operations of raiding militia – controlled areas for weapons in order to disarm them and ensure that there was a safe route for UN convoys to pass. Most of the BDF raids were carried out with the help of the US Marines allowing the Botswana troops to gain expertise.660 This meant that the BDF not only managed to gain the confidence of UNITAF leadership in a short period but also the Somali people and clan leaders who lived in those areas. For instance, Brigadier

Masisi, the contingent commander and his subordinate Captain Boikanyo Addanes were known to have regular close contact with local Somalis in different areas.661 This is why throughout their deployment they were described by the media, UNITAF and officers from other national forces as the most organised and self-sufficient African contingent in the mission.662

By April 1993, the inexperienced but hard-working BDF contingent had won the full confidence of the US Marines and took control of the operational zone at the city of Bardere that was known to be one of the most hostile in southern Somalia.663 Until the end of the UNITAF mission in May 1993, the BDF was reported to have exchanged fire with rebels less than five times

658 HANSARD 110, 2nd Meeting 5th Session, 6th Parliament, address by Minister of Presidential Affairs, Mompati Merafhe, 18 – 19. 659 Maseko, “The Experiences of Botswana Defence Force Peacekeepers,” 90. 660 “BDF contingent in Somalia pleases commander” The Botswana Daily News, 12 January 1993, 1; HANSARD 110, 2nd Meeting 5th Session, 6th Parliament, address by Minister of Presidential Affairs, Mompati Merafhe, 18 – 19. 661 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 129. 662 “BBC praises Botswana soldiers’ successes in Somalia” The Botswana Daily News, 31 August 1993, 3; “BDF contingent in Somalia pleases commander” The Botswana Daily News, 12 January 1993, 1 663 “BBC praises Botswana soldiers’ successes in Somalia” The Botswana Daily News, 31 August 1993, 3.

229 without suffering casualties on their side.664 Personnel from a human rights organisation called

African Rights and Mines Advisory Group (ARMAG) worked in Bardere at the same time and reported that they did not come across a single instance of abusive behaviour from the BDF. They added that in contrast to other peacekeeping contingents, the BDF displayed courtesy and consideration toward locals. In total, ARMAG estimated that the BDF was able to successfully escort twice as many UN convoys than the Americans because of their respectful approach towards the Somali people.665 In Botswana and international media, the BDF peacekeepers were hailed as heroes who had been able to penetrate the most volatile clan-controlled areas where even the

Americans had failed. When BDF commander Ian Khama travelled to Somalia in March 1993 to assess the situation of his troops, he was applauded by the US Marines for having contributed a highly organised unit for the mission.666 On his return, Khama stated that his troops would “drive through villages to enthusiastic chants of ‘BDF’ and messages of graffiti that say `Botswana you are our brothers we need you in Somalia.’”667 The same message was echoed by former BDF commander Merafhe, who was now Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Service following his visit to Somalia in February 1993. He expressed his pleasure at how the BDF fostered good relations with the locals despite the lack of language and cultural training prior to deployment.

BDF men were generally respected because they were quick to recognise the traditional authorities in their operational zones.668 In the Berdera sector, for instance, the BDF relied on the village headmen and the councils of elders to re-establish local governments.669 This was fundamental in

664 “BBC praises Botswana soldiers’ successes in Somalia” The Botswana Daily News, 31 August 1993, 3. 665 Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, “Document V. Somalia: Human rights abuse by United Nations Force” in Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia, Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17 – 19 January 1994, ed. MA Mohamed Salih and Lennart Wohlgemuth (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstutet, 1994), 147 666 “BDF contingent in Somalia pleases commander” The Botswana Daily News, 12 January 1993, 1. 667 “BDF involvement in Somalia a milestone” The Botswana Daily News, 19 March 1993, 1. 668 HANSARD 110, 2nd Meeting 5th Session, 6th Parliament, address by Minister of Presidential Affairs, Mompati Merafhe, 18 – 19. 669 Rick Orth “African Operational Experiences in Peacekeeping” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 7: 3 (1996): 316.

230 the overall success of the mission and the preservation of the lives of the BDF troops as it resulted in them having to deal with a lot less attacks on their camps and convoys than other peacekeepers.

The traditional principle of Botho (Ubuntu in Zulu) or humility that is taught to every Motswana child and becomes an integral part of their upbringing became relevant to the peacekeeping mission. It relates to one’s humbling him or herself wherever they go and for the BDF men, this played a crucial role in their interactions with Somali locals.

Generally, the BDF was successful in carrying out its UNITAF mandate mainly because of the conduct of the men and how locals responded to them. However, these successes only apply fairly when examining the mission at an individual contingent level. At the end of April 1993 when

UNITAF was set to hand the mission over to the UN, the various mechanisms of finding a peaceful solution to the war in Somalia were disintegrating. The media impact of announcing that the

Americans had landed on Somalia’s shores had only created some initial shock in the eyes of the rebels, but over time, they became used to the fact that UNITAF troops, with all their shiny new weapons were patrolling the towns. In fact, the presence of Americans and other western militaries resulted in an escalation of hostilities where armed rebels with rusty Cold War era AK – 47s staged increased attacks against US, Canadian, Belgian, Italian convoys and camps.670

In the end, UNITAF failed to achieve the goals it had set for itself, that is of ensuring that the Somali rebels observed some peace in order to allow aid workers to travel easily across the country without being attacked.671 One of the mission’s main obstacles lay in its overall command structure and its refusal to properly disarm the rebels who themselves seemed to multiply every month if not every week. First, the Rules of Engagement (RoE) for UNITAF had been established

670 Orth “African Operational Experiences,” 315 – 16; Grant Dawson, Here is Hell, Canada’s Engagement in Somalia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 164. 671 MacQueen, United Nations, 210 – 11

231 at the international level by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) without considering the state of affairs in the country. UNITAF commanders were given the latitude to interpret those

RoEs differently according to their immediate circumstances so there was no uniformity in what the different contingents did.672 There was also a stipulated code of conduct to be followed, but like the ROEs, how well this was carried out depended on how contingents understood them. This was a sign of overall poor planning as far as the UN and CENTCOM were concerned. In essence, the various interpretations of the RoEs led to some UNITAF contingents abusing Somali civilians such as the Canadian Airborne Regiment that tortured and killed a 16-year-old boy, Shidane

Arone, whom they caught in their camp looking for clean drinking water. Not only did some of the Canadian troops see Arone as a threat because they thought he was there to steal ammunition, they were also accused of being racist towards the Somali people.673 In a similar vein, the Belgian and Italian contingents in Somalia were also amongst those that were accused of poor conduct during the mission.674

By the end of April 1993, the BDF men were exhausted and grew weary of this war that they did not understand fully. Many started to wonder whether they would be returning home at the end of their initial mandate. Their commander Ian Khama made yet another trip to Somalia to assess whether the BDF could extend its commitment to UNOSOM II that was set to begin once

UNITAF handed over to the UN in May 1993. His biggest concern lay in the fact that there seemed

672 Piero Ignazi et.al, Italian Military Operations Abroad, Just Don’t Call it War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 164; David D. Laitin, “Somalia: Intervention and Internal Conflict” in Military Intervention, Cases in Context for the Twenty – First Century, ed. William J. Lahneman (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC, 2004), 33. 673 David Bercuson, Significant Incident, Canada’s Army, the Airborne and the Murder in Somalia (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996); Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo – Operational and Legal Issues in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 273; see also Dawson, Here is Hell, 157. 674 “In Italy, Belgium and Italy, Somalia peacekeeping scandals keep growing” Associated Press News, 23 June 1997, accessed June 2020, https://apnews.com/deea729ccf6dfe142799ed245261b675

232 to be no end in sight for the war in Somalia. In his view, there was no need for Botswana to get bogged down in a protracted peacekeeping mission that multiplied the risks to his troops with each passing day. It seemed that he was set on pulling his men out of Somalia altogether but surprisingly, parliament announced that the BDF would send more men to join UNOSOM II. 675

UN Resolution 814: UNOSOM II

BDF involvement in UNOSOM II began in March 1993 and lasted until the end of the mission in

March 1995 with the Botswana government agreeing to send a new contingent every 6 months in that period. Unlike in UNITAF, the initial BDF contingent for UNOSOM II only had 200 men owing to manpower constraints resulting from the BDF’s simultaneous engagement in another UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique.676 The small size of Botswana’s contribution to UNOSOM

II reflected the overall significance of the UN mission in Somalia; it had failed to restore order in the country so there was no need to deploy more peacekeepers. Under the command of General

Cevic Bir of Turkey, UNOSOM II followed four phases between 1993 and 1995 where the first of these was taking over operational control from UNITAF forces. The remaining phases followed a gradual withdrawal of UN troops until the end of the mission. It is not clear who commanded the new BDF contingent nor if the men ever received pre-deployment training. However, it was tasked with the same mission of protecting supply convoys though this time, the men not only operated in Mogadishu, but advanced further south into the Gedo region. This means that the BDF operated in three or four places at the same time including the highly contested Berdera area which was one of Aidid’s strongholds. According to Ian Khama, with only about 1200 Americans remaining in

675 “Continue to support peace call” The Botswana Daily News, 3 April 1993, 1; “BDF Involvement in Somalia a milestone” The Botswana Daily News, 19 March 1993, 1. 676 HANSARD 110, 2nd Meeting 5th Session, 6th Parliament, address by Minister of Presidential Affairs, Mompati Merafhe, 104; “Masire welcomes our heroes” The Botswana Daily News, 18 March 1993, 1.

233 Somalia during UNOSOM II, the BDF contingent had to work with the Indian Army brigade to continue the disarmament process and establish a peaceful environment in their operational zones.677 This coalition with the Indians was likely due to the long-standing relationship between the Indian Army and the BDF – the two shared similar military cultures, spoke English and were thus more familiar with one another. Both worked hand-in-hand to send aid to people while disarming militia groups in Mogadishu, Berdera and Gedo. They established a strong presence through constant patrols but also relied on courteous communication with local clan leaders. Apart from raiding infrastructure known to hold militia fighters in these areas, they also secured major highways by mounting more than 24 road checkpoints to stop and search incoming and outgoing traffic for weapons. Colonel Ronald Oageng, one of the BDF officers who had been put in charge of directing these roadblocks, applauded the success and overall conduct of his men during the checks.678

Soon, some normalcy started to return to the regions in which the BDF operated. The first of many signs of this was the resurrection of the Somali Police which according to a news report saw more than 8000 policemen return to work to re-assert law and order within the towns and villages. Some schools, despite being ransacked, resumed operations though at a very slow pace.

District as well as regional councils also started to show signs of recovery not just in the BDF operational zones but in most parts of Somalia by the end of 1993. Ian Khama, during one of his visits to Somalia, donated several units of long and short-range radio equipment that had been previously used by the BDF as well as some handcuffs and basic khaki uniforms to the Somali police in the Gedo and Berdera regions.679 This was to facilitate communication between the police

677 “Next BDF batch will leave for Somalia mid – April, Khama” The Botswana Daily News, 22 March 1994, 2. 678 “Situation in Somalia very fragile” The Botswana Daily News, 4 March 1994, 5. 679 “Somali Police Force gets back on its feet” The Botswana Daily News, 10 March 1994; see also Ashok Krishna, India’s Armed Forces: 50 Years of War and Peace (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1998), 153.

234 in those areas and the BDF contingent in emergencies. It is not clear if this was an official UN mandate or a pragmatic decision but the relationship with the Somali Police also aided in the success of the BDF in their mission. On a much larger scale, the international community, the UN, as well as the OAU donated more than $64 million to the restoration of the Somali Police because its ability to operate effectively was a crucial sign that some order was indeed returning to the hands of Somali authorities.680

Logistical Difficulties for the BDF

Deploying troops in Somalia was the most ambitious activity the BDF had ever attempted since its inception. This was due the fact that in 1992 the BDF was just beginning to increase its capabilities so the contingent only had access to limited equipment to bring with them. Not only that but airlifting some equipment proved to be very challenging because the troop carriers they had were two CASA 235s which had the ability to fly directly between Gaborone and Mogadishu.

This medium carrier could only transport a limited amount of equipment at a given time which caused major issues for the Air Wing as it had few pilots to make the strenuous return flights to

Somalia. Furthermore, the lack of vehicles for the mission meant that the men had to share those they had which proved a logistical headache as they had to stick to a strict timetable of vehicle usage. It is therefore baffling how the decision to send men to Somalia was taken so quickly yet the leadership knew of their equipment limitations. Despite these problems, the BDF was determined to successfully complete its mandate. Even with a small number of pilots and the deployment of an even larger contingent in Mozambique, the Air Wing made regular flights to

Somalia for troop relief, delivering equipment and food supplies for the soldiers, as well as

680 “Somali Police Force gets back on its feet” The Botswana Daily News, 10 March 1994.

235 transporting VIPs who went to assess the status of the men.681 This set the BDF apart from other

African contingents who had to rely solely on the Americans for almost everything during the

Somalia mission and greatly boosted its reputation. In this regard, the men from the inexperienced

15-year-old armed force of Botswana were more self-sufficient, and more effective in restoring order than those from much older militaries in Africa as well as those from more developed countries.

Another major issue had to do with the fact that the BDF men had not been taught about the cultural differences they would encounter when they reached Somalia, a country that is predominantly Muslim while Batswana in the BDF were mostly Christian. Though this may mean very little in terms of how one approaches people, it was important for the men to know that the

Somalis had different attitudes towards life in general because of the many years of being exposed to war. It was important for the BDF men to conduct themselves at the highest degree of professionalism at all times not only because of the tough situation on the ground but also because the world was watching.682

Communication was yet another barrier for the men as none of the BDF troops spoke

Somali. This made it particularly difficult when the men had to enter different zones where they had to speak with clan leaders. To remedy this, the BDF relied on three Somali interpreters, Farah

Mohamed Miri, Ahmed Mohamed Jama and Mohamed Abdisula Guled to facilitate communication throughout the entire mission. At the end of the mission, and given the continued dangerous situation in Somali, the interpreters were offered asylum and resettled in Botswana in

1996. Masire’s government also offered them scholarships through the University of Botswana where they studied and went on to live productive lives and then integrated into Botswana

681 Masire, Interview; Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 40. 682 Maseko, “The Experiences of Botswana Defence Force Peacekeepers,” 83.

236 society.683 It was important for the government to formally recognise the importance of the interpreters in the mission for without them, the BDF could not have been able to establish close ties with Somalis and communicate with them in the same way. Their importance to the successes of the BDF mission in Somalia could therefore not be understated.

Operational Issues, Failures and Demobilisation

Most aspects of the UN mission in Somalia were failing because Aidid did not trust the peace process. On numerous occasions he had his men attack various UN convoys and aid workers mainly because he believed that they were holding negotiations with his enemy Ali Mahdi. In

1993, Aidid proved to be a major obstacle for UNOSOM II as a whole. In January that year, his men attacked a Belgian convoy and badly wounded six soldiers. He then ordered a series of attacks on civilian aid workers in broad daylight killing several of them. Then in June, both the Pakistani and American contingents came under fire resulting in numerous casualties in both camps.684 At the end of 1993, following the shooting down of two American Black Hawk helicopters during a failed mission that cost the lives of 19 US soldiers and authorised by the US government without

UNOSOM’s approval, Belgium, France and Italy announced their intentions to withdraw their troops.685

Fortunately, the BDF had not been targeted in any of Aidid’s attacks but the news reports about these incidents created great anxiety amongst Batswana. In response, President Masire paid a quick visit to the contingent in April and on his return to Botswana, he seemed to dismiss the

683 BNARS OP 58/5 Botswana Defence Force – General, “Somali Refugees – correspondence regarding asylum status of Somali interpreters in Botswana” 17 August 2996 684 Rutherford, Humanitarianism under Fire, 155. 685 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, A Story of Modern War (New York: Grove Press, 1999); Matt Evermann and Dan Schilling, ed. The Battle of Mogadishu, Firsthand Accounts from the Men of Task Force Ranger (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005); Maj. Roger N. Sangvic, Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure (Auckland: Pickle Partner Publishing, 2015); MacQueen, United Nations, 215.

237 fears by stating that the BDF troops in Somalia were revered by the locals so there was no reason to worry.686 Though this was true, it was somewhat reckless for Masire to portray a picture that made it seem that the men were not in as much danger as the other contingents. The BDF contingent was extremely fortunate to return from the mission without casualties. Soon after

Masire’s address, the BDF leadership renewed their mandate for UNOSOM II and the following year in 1994, increased the size of the contingent from 200 to 400.687 The men who took over continued until the end of the mission in March 1995. Because the greater UN mission had fallen apart, the BDF men also packed up and headed home and watched all their efforts in Somalia become undone. Peace was not possible because Aidid still lurked in the shadows and called the shots. Even though contingents such as the BDF and Indian Army had succeeded in carrying out their mandates within their areas of responsibility, UNOSOM II had cost the UN more than $ 1.6 billion and it resulted in the deaths of many peacekeepers and aid workers alike. For the BDF contingent, the general feeling was that they were abandoning the Somalis while the peace process was incomplete.688 However, the Botswana contingent which landed in Somalia in 1992 left three years later with vast knowledge of Somali culture and invaluable experience in peacekeeping missions.

Another major issue that seemed to cripple UNOSOM II was the overall lack of unity in command amongst the plethora of military contingents that operated in the country. Some of these chose to not follow orders from the Turkish commander and usually waited for authorisation from their national governments before carrying out his instructions. For instance, the Saudi Arabian contingent refused to follow orders without clearing them with their leadership at home, the

686 “President back from Somalia” The Botswana Daily News, 19 April 1993, 1. 687 “Botswana renews mandate for BDF assistance in Somalia, Mozambique” The Botswana Daily News 13 April 1994, 3; “Next BDF batch will leave for Somalia in mid – April” The Botswana Daily News, 22 March 1994, 2. 688 “Situation in Somalia very fragile” The Botswana Daily News, 4 March 1994, 5.

238 Pakistani contingent is said to have refused to work near the Indian Army and the Egyptians were accused of accepting bribes from some Somali armed groups.689 The mission had completely disintegrated and peace in Somalia seemed even more unattainable. For the BDF, mission command was never a problem as they worked closely with the US Army contingent at first before they started to operate on their own. This was perhaps another key factor that contributed to their overall success in some of the toughest areas of Somalia.

Civil War in Mozambique: 1976 – 1992

In Mozambique, after the Salazar dictatorship refused to grant independence to Lisbon’s so-called overseas provinces, the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) or Frente de Libertação de

Moçambique, fought a long war against the Portuguese colonisers during the 1960s and early

1970s. FRELIMO had been established in 1962 from an amalgamation of several exiled African nationalist movements and began to wage its war of independence using Tanzania as a staging area. By 1974, the nationalist movement, with the help of the Soviet Union was winning the war against the Portuguese and had gained control of a large portion of the country but the war ended abruptly following a coup d’etat in Lisbon that installed a new government which in turn relinquished all of Portugal’s overseas colonies.690 From then onwards, Portuguese colonies including Mozambique and Angola became independent countries. Because FRELIMO had been the main liberation movement since the 1960s, it formed a new independent socialist government which in some eyes became tyrannical despite efforts to improve the lives of the people.691

FRELIMO’s socialist policies alienated traditional leaders and land-owners who then found hope

689 “Situation turns nasty in Somalia” The Guardian, 29 January 1993, 3; see also Rutherford, Humanitarianism under Fire, 143; “Situation in Somalia very fragile” The Botswana Daily News, 4 March 1994, 5. 690 Stapleton, A Military History, 274. 691 Stapleton, A Military History, 274.

239 in a new anti-FRELIMO movement called the Mozambique National Resistance or Resistência

Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) which was created covertly by the racist Rhodesian government in 1976.692 This was done so that RENAMO could launch attacks and destabilise the

FRELIMO government which had an established alliance with ZANLA allowing it to use

Mozambique as a staging area for cross-border infiltration of Rhodesia.693 By 1980, when

Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe under a new majority government, RENAMO’s support switched clandestinely to apartheid South Africa which destabilised FRELIMO – led Mozambique to force it to back away from supporting the anti – apartheid ANC.694 RENAMO’s guerrilla force grew quickly mainly due to external support and so did its civil war against the FRELIMO government which spanned more than 15 years.695 The conflict devastated the country’s infrastructure, and disrupted the economy in the context of an ongoing drought and famine. By

1983, the war’s death toll stood at an estimated 100 000.696 The Mozambique Civil War also had major repercussions in neighbouring countries including Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania.

Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF government became involved in Mozambique’s civil war because its earlier independence war against the Rhodesian government had been won largely with help from

FRELIMO and in return, the ZANU-PF government in Harare agreed to help fight RENAMO forces. More importantly, the ongoing civil war was blocking Zimbabwe’s access to oil through

Mozambique’s Beira corridor. Zimbabwe then had to actively participate in the war against

692 Glenn Cross, Dirty War: Rhodesia and Chemical Biological Warfare, 1975 – 1980 (West Midlands: Hellion & Co. LTD, 2017), 66; Sayaka Funada-Classen, The Origins of War in Mozambique; A History of Unity and Division (Somerset West: African Minds, 2013), 7. 693 Shubin, The Hot Cold War,135. 694 Funada – Classen, The Origins of War, 8. 695 Emerson, The Battle for Mozambique, 183. 696 William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), 44.

240 RENAMO to secure its economic interests.697 Botswana, as a member of the Frontline States and

SADCC was highly vocal against the Mozambican civil war and took a firm stance against South

Africa’s backing of RENAMO. In general, the Frontline States came to the aid of the FRELIMO government throughout the war in an effort to counter South African sponsored de-stabilisation of the region.698 Fortunately, at the end of the Cold War, South Africa found itself plagued by an economic crisis worsened by international sanctions, an international arms embargo and growing internal protest against apartheid. By the time F W De Klerk was sworn in as president of South

Africa in 1989, his country’s superiority in the region was already waning which meant that it could no longer afford to fuel wars beyond its borders. His government also unbanned the anti- apartheid movements and entered negotiations to bring about a democratic transition within South

Africa. In this context, Pretoria ended its sponsorship of RENAMO and the destabilization of

Mozambique as well as other countries in the region. In the same post-Cold War context, without

Soviet support, FRELIMO was also forced to abandon socialism and moved toward multi-party democracy which was now expected in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa. Essentially, the end of the Cold War brought stability to Mozambique. By 1992, RENAMO president Afonso

Dhlakama was compelled by these changing circumstances to sign a peace agreement that effectively ended the civil war and began a disarmament process in Mozambique. UN involvement in these negotiations eventually called for a strong peacekeeping mission that was established the following year in 1993.699

697 Stephen Chan and Ranka Primorac, “The Space of many Voices” in Zimbabwe Since the Unity Government ed. Stephen Chan and Ranka Primorac (New York, Routledge, 2013), 12 – 13. 698 Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours; Apartheid Power in South Africa (London, James Currey LTD, 1986) 219; Minter, Apartheid’s Contras,44; Stapleton, A Military History of Africa, 279. 699 “General Peace Agreement” Accessed 11 May 2020, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozFT.htm#General

241

UN Resolution 797: ONUMOZ

The mandate of United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) coincided with the terms of the peace agreement between RENAMO and FRELIMO. It concerned itself with the humanitarian, electoral, and military aspects of implementing and maintaining long lasting peace in

Mozambique. This means that ONUMOZ would have troops on the ground who would be occupied with disarming the formerly warring factions but also escort food convoys to different regions where they were needed most as was the case in Somalia. Furthermore, some ONUMOZ personnel were charged with monitoring the ceasefire and helping pave the way towards peaceful general elections in Mozambique. With more than 6500 international troops and military support personnel as well as about 1087 police observers, ONUMOZ became one of the largest UN peace operations in Southern Africa. Countries that contributed military personnel included Argentina,

Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Pakistan, the former colonial master Portugal and 30 others. Botswana and Zambia were the only SADC countries that contributed troops for the mission.700 This was possibly because the two nations had not been involved in the

Mozambican civil war unlike the Tanzanians or Zimbabweans for instance. In this regard, it was hoped that the peacekeepers from Botswana and Zambia would not have any bias when deployed in Mozambique.

The BDF in ONUMOZ

On 5 April 1993, a BDF battalion of 740 men left Gaborone by train and made their way towards

Harare, Zimbabwe from where they drove some 300 kms east crossing the border into

700 “General Peace Agreement” Accessed 11 May 2020, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozFT.htm#General

242 Mozambique. The battalion was placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bernard

Ntelamo who prior to this mission had served as Botswana’s military attaché to Zimbabwe so there was no higher-ranking officer in the BDF who had better knowledge of the civil war in

Mozambique. The process of selecting personnel for this composite infantry battalion was similar to that of Somalia in that it drew men from various ground forces units within the BDF though a majority of them were from the light and mechanised infantry. Because the mission took longer to launch, the BDF leadership enjoyed more latitude in selecting men but once mission ready, and their equipment loaded onto the trains, the battalion left with the hope to return home after 6 months in Mozambique.701

The Mission

ONUMOZ was tasked with carrying out the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (or

DDR) of about 62 000 FRELIMO and close to 30 000 RENAMO forces. In order to achieve this, the UN created operational zones similar to those established in Somalia with specific national contingents assigned to each. The BDF was assigned the Tete Corridor, an area known as one of

RENAMO’s strongholds. The Beira Corridor, a highly contested area during the war, was assigned the Italian contingent of about 1000 men because ONUMOZ command believed them to be the most prepared for the mission. Other contingents including those from Zambia and Uruguay monitored different sections of the southern part of the country where FRELIMO remained strong.702 Within these various operational zones, ONUMOZ created more than 40 meeting areas or assembly points where former combatants would converge at different times for a number of

701 “Battalion leaves for Mozambique” The Botswana Daily News, 6 April 1993, 1. 702 “Battalion leaves for Mozambique” The Botswana Daily News, 6 April 1993, 1; “President bids soldiers bon voyage – Continue to support peace” The Botswana Daily News, 2 April 1993, 1; see also Stapleton, A Military History of Africa, Vol. 3, 280.

243 weeks to be gradually exposed to various activities that would hopefully re-introduce them to a normal life. The DDR programs included various sporting and educational activities, jobs, and farming where they had to turn in their weapons in order to get hoes, and other agricultural implements. 703 This was important in sensitising the ex-combatants about the importance of the peace process. ONUMOZ’s DDR program was very extensive and it would succeed for that reason. It included a team of dedicated people who were tasked with making sure that ex – combatants, women and children had access to everything they would need to transition to a better life after war. This team worked closely with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) which made sure that those who had fled the country were repatriated and could restart their lives.

Apart from that, ONUMOZ implemented a financial subsidy program which gave ex-combatants a stipend based on their military ranks for about 18 months as a way to ensure that those seeking employment could do so while having some money in their pockets.704 Disbursed by the United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the stipends ranged between $15.00 and $130.00 per month which at that time not only helped the individuals but also helped kickstart Mozambique’s economy.705

Despite its lack of experience in UN peacekeeping missions, the BDF received several key tasks in Mozambique to ensure that the DDR process was carried out smoothly. This may have been because by the time the mission started, the BDF contingent serving in UNITAF had been on the ground for about 5 months and the UN had received numerous reports of its overall good conduct. ONUMOZ command had therefore hoped that the BDF battalion would replicate this

703 Gabatlhokwe and Mokbi, Interview. Stephanie Schwartz, Youth in Post – Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 45. 704 Schwartz, Youth In Post – Conflict, 46; see also 705 Chris Alden, “Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique, Security Dialogue, 33, 3 (2002): 344 Accessed 20 June 2020, https://doi- org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1177/0967010602033003008

244 performance and contribute to the overall success of the mission. Under Ntelamo’s command, the

BDF contingent included Lt. Colonel Jefferson Tlhokwane as Chief Liaison Officer and he later became the Air Arm commander and subsequently Deputy Commander of the BDF. Colonel

Otisitswe Tiroyamodimo served as deputy to the Italian regional commander and he later became the Deputy Commander of the BDF between 2009 and 2011. Colonel Ngonde Lukashe became

Chief of Military Personnel while Colonel Duke Masilo was made Chief of Operations. Other important tasks in ONUMOZ included Deputy Chief of Logistics and Chief of Information which were handed to Majors Enoch Emang and Basimane Mmualefhe, respectively.706 While these appointments reflected the good reputation of these BDF officers, serving at a high level in a UN peacekeeping mission was prestigious and provided them with a wealth of knowledge and experience for future operations. There is no doubt that serving in this mission provided a gateway for these men to gain promotion to higher ranks in the BDF in the years following the Mozambican mission.

A large portion of the BDF men spoke the Shona language of Zimbabwe and Mozambique and went into Tete Province with high hopes that this language skill would facilitate communication between them and the locals. However, this almost backfired because in the Tete region, the Shona-speaking Zimbabwean soldiers were despised. They had helped FRELIMO kill many RENAMO operatives, so the locals grew suspicious that the BDF contingent was in fact composed of Zimbabweans wearing different uniforms who had come to finish them off. This initial mistrust caused the BDF contingent commanders to immediately cancel the use of Shona during the mission.707 Though possessing different language skills is usually beneficial especially for peacekeepers deployed in foreign countries, this was an example of how it can easily become

706 Key assignments for the BDF in Mozambique” The Botswana Daily News, 18 February 1993, 1. 707 Mokobi and Gabatlhokwe, Interviews.

245 counterproductive as language can be associated with one side of a conflict. Once the suspicions had eased, the BDF established better relations with local people making it easy for the former to carry out the disarmament process in the assigned region. However, even after it was established that the BDF were indeed not Zimbabweans, it was still difficult for the people to trust them entirely. This was the unfortunate repercussion of the civil war – most of the people who had to turn over their weapons did so with great difficulty because they did not trust the disarmament process. Through better relations with locals, the BDF men managed to carry out their various daily tasks until the people of Tete accepted them as peacekeepers. Apart from escorting supplies, the BDF contingent started some small community outreach development projects such as connecting clean water pipes, constructing foundations for school classrooms, and organising social gatherings in order to turn the region around to foster reconciliation and cooperation. These were not UN sanctioned tasks but ideas that the BDF contingent commanders came up with to help the local people. In Botswana, the BDF was known to carry out similar projects around the country.

These included using its manpower to build housing facilities for people living with disabilities in

Mogoditshane, as well as financing the construction of some orphanages around the capital,

Gaborone.708 Even before ONUMOZ command authorised the de – mining operations, that is tracing and disarming un – detonated landmines, some of the Batswana troops had already started the process and when the Tete locals saw them do this, they started to feel more at ease about the

BDF presence.709

Operational Difficulties and Demobilisation

708 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 118. 709 Mokobi, Interview.

246 While most other ONUMOZ contingents changed personnel every 3 months, the BDF chose to conduct 6-month long tours. This was an advantage because continuity of personnel meant there was a lesser need to learn the job afresh and promoted good relationships with locals and their chiefs. Some amongst the BDF even started learning Portuguese to communicate better with the people. However, choosing to stay longer in mosquito infested areas such as the Tete region came at a heavy price because some of the men went back home suffering from malaria and though not a large number, there were fatalities as a result. In fact, malaria became one of the main causes of early termination of tour and the BDF leadership was later criticised by some Batswana for sending their children into such areas.710 Because none of the men in the BDF had ever been to

Mozambique before, they did not foresee an outbreak of malaria as a potential problem for the mission. The leadership perhaps assumed that because there were people dwelling in areas where their troops would be deployed everything would go smoothly. The BDF took regular precautions of vaccinating the men for various diseases prior to deployment though it is not clear if they were provided with anti-malarial drugs prior to and during deployment. Though malaria exists in parts of Botswana, it is not on the same scale as in Mozambique and many Batswana have not developed much resistance to the disease.

Besides malaria, one of the biggest issues expressed by those who went to Mozambique was an overall lack of communication from the BDF leadership to the rank-and-file. Those who were selected for the mission did not get a chance to inform their loved ones about their imminent departure and only sent letters back home after several weeks on the mission. The men stated that they expected the trip to Mozambique to be similar to the routine ones they made from Gaborone to Kasane or Maun which did not need a lot of preparation as the soldiers were used to them and

710 “Tete veteran dies of Malaria” The Botswana Guardian, 22 October 1993, 1 – 2.

247 remained within the borders of the country.711 However, the 6-month tour in war-torn and mosquito infested Mozambique was an entirely different affair that required psychological and medical preparations which many of them did not get. Furthermore, the BDF contingent commander was not informed that he would have to feed his men in the first 60 days of the mission before the UN could take over that role. This means that the Botswana contingent arrived in

Mozambique without enough rations to go around which was however quickly rectified by re- supply flights from home that brought the men’s rations and other medical equipment soon after their arrival which made the BDF contingent one of the most self-sufficient contingents in

ONUMOZ. 712

Despite the BDF contingent establishing good relations with local Mozambicans, some

RENAMO operatives remained active in the more remote areas of the Tete region though they were no longer as formidable as they were during the civil war. In some instances, RENAMO fighters would set up roadblocks targeting the UN trucks. Instead of engaging in a firefight with them to try and reclaim those supplies, the BDF contingent came up with an idea they called an anti-roadblock roadblock which worked remarkably well. It consisted of them setting up their own checkpoint some 10 or more kilometres away from where RENAMO had set up theirs and if possible, they would quickly carve out an alternative dirt road which would redirect the UN trucks.

In the end, the purpose of such BDF roadblocks was to send the UN supplies on a minor detour around the RENAMO roadblock but then re – join the main roads once they were out of sight of the rebels. Though this proved successful in most cases, it was not easy for the BDF to leave the main roads and carve out a new ones in the dirt because some of the areas remained with active

711 Interview with Sergeant Mmutlane Gosalamang, retired Paratrooper of the BDF Commando Unit, December 30, 2018. 712 Gabatlhokwe, Interview.

248 landmines.713 This eventually led to a significant reduction in RENAMO’s roadblocks thus allowing aid to reach the different areas.

ONUMOZ also monitored the Mozambique general elections which took place in October

1994 and resulted in a sweeping victory for FRELIMO. Prior to this, in most parts of the country where FRELIMO enjoyed strong support, the path to elections went relatively smoothly. In other parts, including the Tete region where the BDF operated, there was an entirely contrasting picture because RENAMO leaders struggled to maintain control over their men who on several occasions violated the ceasefire.714 There were numerous instances where they concealed arms caches and some of their soldiers refused to be registered for DDR even towards the end of the ONUMOZ mandate. This stretched the mission beyond its intended timeframe and cost the UN more money because peacekeepers and Civil Police (CIVPOL) had to backtrack in order to finish the DDR process. BDF men attribute that to the idea that the ex-combatants did not want the peacekeepers to leave so they hid weapons deliberately in order to keep receiving their UN stipends.715 There were also some instances where ex-combatants refused to hand their weapons over to the abusive

Italian contingent simply because they did not trust them. This made the mission very difficult and, on these occasions, ONUMOZ leadership had to authorise some of the BDF men to drive to

Beira to aid the Italians. According to Major Gabatlhokwe, a BDF officer on the mission, as soon as the ex-combatants recognised the BDF men arriving in their UN marked Landrovers, they immediately started to reveal their weapons.716 Though this did not happen on many occasions, it was costly for the UN and time consuming.

713 Mokobi, Interview. 714 John S. Saul, “Inside from the Outside? The Roots and Resolution of Mozambique’s Un/Civil War” in Civil Wars in Africa, Roots and Resolutions ed. Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 1999), 164; See also MacQueen, United Nations, 158 715 Mokobi, Interview; Saul, “Inside from the outside” 152. 716 Gabatlhokwe, Interview.

249 Alleged discrimination by the Italian peacekeepers against their African colleagues made the mission even more difficult. On several occasions, the now retired Major Gerald O.

Gabatlhokwe who served in Mozambique as part of the BDF Combat Engineers responsible for diffusing and removing landmines, found it very difficult to work with his Italian subordinates because they refused to recognise his seniority within the mission. Gabathlokwe was expected to compile mission reports every morning and send them to various offices, both locally and abroad using information provided to him by Italian engineers on the ground. However, because they were racist towards him and refused to hand in the information, that then stood in the way of the entire mission. He had to constantly contact the Italian superiors to get them to order their men to release the critical data so he could complete his reports.717 For Gabatlhokwe, strictly maintaining deadlines was paramount as he was only part of a chain of people responsible for informing the

UN about how many landmines had been removed, in which region and how many remained. The

Italians came to be known for being difficult to deal with and their contingent in Mozambique was dissolved after allegations of child prostitution against them surfaced.718 It is surprising why they took part in so many peacekeeping missions despite such allegations. In Somalia, they were also accused of being racist and abusive towards locals.

Unlike in Somalia where the UN departed without stabilizing the country, Mozambique proved a great success. ONUMOZ’s budget initially stood at about $ 320 million but the mission ended up expending about $500 million including funding for humanitarian assistance to the war- torn country. The mission helped re-settle about 4.6 million Mozambicans including about 1.6 million refugees who returned from neighbouring countries. It also helped turn Mozambique into a relatively well governed country including the demobilisation of RENAMO forces and their

717 Gabatlhokwe, Interview. 718 Stapleton, A Military History, 280, Mokobi, Interview.

250 integration into the new national army.719 Despite the plethora of problems that remained when

ONUMOZ forces pulled out in December 1994, the BDF had played a key role in restoring hope in Mozambique. Like those who had been to Somalia, the men of the ONUMOZ contingent were hailed as heroes in Botswana for successfully helping a fellow SADC country.720

Political Unrest in Lesotho: 1994 – 1998

Lesotho, like Botswana and Swaziland, is a former British High Commission Territory (HCT) but unlike the other two, the constitutional monarchy has had a troubled political climate since independence in 1965. Its internal conflicts were not necessarily related to the end of the Cold War as much as the rest of Africa but most of them were connected to destabilisation caused by apartheid South Africa. The small and mountainous country, which is completely surrounded by

South Africa, suffered the wrath of the apartheid government because like other African nations in the region, it also harboured ANC guerrillas since the 1960s. Following the transition to democracy in South Africa in 1994, tensions between King Letsie III and Ntsu Mokhehle the Prime

Minister and leader of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), began to escalate. In April 1994, a small group of soldiers from the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) assassinated the deputy prime minister and threatened Mokhehle and to try and mitigate this serious issue, he offered to increase the soldiers’ salaries by 66%.721 This promise represented Mokhehle’s desperate attempt to resolve a boiling political issue. King Letsie, seeing that the country was falling into chaos, illegally dissolved the elected parliament and suspended the constitution thereby rendering himself the

719 Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa, Roots and Resolutions (Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 1999), 7 – 8. 720 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 118. 721 Feliciano de Sa Guimaraes, A Theory of Master Role Transition; Small Powers Shaping Regional Hegemons (London: Routledge, 2020), 77.

251 supreme ruler over the country. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, commonly referred to in this instance as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Troika, quickly condemned the king’s actions and urged the Basotho to settle their internal political issues.722 After some tough negotiations and South Africa’s decision to station paratroopers on Lesotho’s borders,

King Letsie agreed to reinstate the constitution and stepped down from the throne. SADC had succeeded in helping resolve the issue without much bloodshed and this was one of the events that gave the organisation some credibility as a regional intergovernmental body. It is important to note that at this time this organisation had changed its name from Southern African Development

Coordinating Conference (SADCC) to SADC and had a slightly different mandate. Whereas the older SADCC had been created in 1980 mainly to focus on reducing the economic dependence of the region on apartheid South Africa, the new SADC which came into being in 1992, had bigger and more expansive goals than its predecessor. These included regional economic development, socio – economic cooperation amongst its members states, as well as collective security. With

South Africa now a key member, SADC evolved into a regional organisation that possessed the power to intervene militarily in any of its member states should the need arise. The new SADC was similar in some ways to ECOWAS in West Africa which staged a series of armed interventions in that region and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).723

In 1998, Lesotho was once again the scene of another political crisis involving a total dissolution of government due to contested election results that installed the new Prime Minister

Pakalitha Mosisili of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). Violence erupted throughout

722 Laurie Nathan, Community of Insecurity, SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa (London: Routledge, 2012), 81 – 82; Khabele Matlosa, “Lesotho” in Security and Democracy in Southern Africa, ed. Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), 80 – 83. 723 Adeyeke Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War, Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 41; David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Burlington: Ashgate Publishers, 2006), 174 – 77.

252 the capital Maseru, as people took to the streets to contest the LCD’s victory. Innocent women and children were killed, and shops looted and burned down. While this turmoil was unfolding, the new prime minister lost control of the military as the majority of junior officers in the LDF mutinied by capturing and imprisoning their commander and other senior officers who had been sympathetic to Mosisili.724 Many of the remaining senior officers fled into South Africa and later pleaded with the SADC countries to intervene in assessing the contentious election results. By

August 1998, pandemonium had befallen the country - a mutiny and looming coup d’etat, the king and the opposition’s disregard of the LCD’s election victory, and violent protests in the streets all culminated into total lawlessness in Lesotho. SADC quickly initiated the Langa Commission (LC) to assess the situation around the election results but failed to confirm whether or not the elections had been rigged. The only thing it agreed on was the fact that there were major irregularities in the electoral process and recommended for new elections to be held as soon as the turmoil had settled.725

SADC Peace Enforcement: Operation BOLEAS, 1998

Botswana and Lesotho have a common history dating back to the colonial era when both territories, then called Bechuanaland and Basutoland, (including Swaziland or eSwatini today) were administered by the British High Commissioner’s office at the Cape. Both countries speak

Setswana and Sesotho respectively, languages that are mutually intelligible and when the political turmoil began in Lesotho, both were members of SADC. Apart from being long – standing trade

724 Theo Neething, “Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation BOLEAS and Beyond” The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 22 (May 1999) Accessed 7 June 2020, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6107~v~Military_Intervention_in_Lesotho__Perspectives_on_ Operation_Boleas_and_Beyond.pdf see also Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 82. 725 “Commission fails to avert anarchy” Mmegi, 25 September 1998, 2; Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 82.

253 partners, Botswana also had a long history of hosting tens of thousands of Basotho students and vice versa. In fact, when what is now the University of Botswana (UB) was opened in 1964, it was called the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland (UBBS) which became

University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS) after 1968. This was because it had been built collectively by the governments and people of these three countries. It was therefore not surprising to see the Botswana government quickly rise to help resolve Lesotho’s political turmoil.

At the beginning of September 1998, with no end in sight to the turmoil, Mosisili wrote to the SADC leadership seeking a quick military intervention to quell the unrest. Article 11 of the

SADC collective security mechanism clearly states that the organisation has the power to authorise a military intervention in a member state to prevent a coup d’etat that threatens a legitimate government.726 In Lesotho, SADC had failed to denounce the rigged elections thereby standing by

PM Mosisili as a legitimate leader. By 20 September, the SADC mission had been authorised and a 600-strong unit from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the new name for

South Africa’s military after 1994, under the command of Colonel Robbie Hartslief drove across the border into Lesotho’s capital Maseru in what looked like an invasion disguised as an intervention.727 Because of the distance between Botswana and Lesotho, the BDF contingent of about 200 under the command of Colonel Thulaganyo Masisi who had previously led one of the peacekeeping contingents in Somalia, arrived the following day in Lesotho which was too late to support the South Africans and therefore disastrous to the start of the mission. The composite contingent from Botswana brought several V-150 APCs for troop protection which meant that it was predominantly made up of men from the mechanised infantry though it had others from

726 SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 62 Accessed 7 June 2020,http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/3854~v~Plan_strategique_indicatif_pour_l_organe_traita nt_de_la_politique_la_defense_et_la_cooperation_en_matiere_de_securite.pdf 727 “BDF joins SA troops on Lesotho peace mission” The Botswana Daily News, 23 September 1998, 1.

254 different units. The SADC mission, Operation BOLEAS, had a mandate to intervene in Lesotho as quickly as possible to prevent further anarchy and restore the country to normalcy. It was also tasked with locating and identifying those who had been destabilising the government, disarm and contain them and to do this it was authorised to use necessary force. The overall aim was to create a stable environment and restore law and order in the country which would pave the way for the new elections that the Langa Commission had recommended.728

Operational Errors and the Fragile Peace in Lesotho

Operation BOLEAS was poorly planned from the beginning which resulted in significant casualties on the SANDF side. First, the SANDF forces seriously underestimated the strength of the (LDF) mutineers who were armed to the teeth and caused major problems for BOLEAS. When the SANDF contingent arrived in Maseru, they were met with stiff armed resistance and were fired upon from all directions because the LDF mutineers had spotted their convoys from across the border and quickly organised themselves. A news report noted that “amid the fire, an armoured medical unit was treating a half dozen wounded [SANDF] soldiers while three others were dead”729 Secondly, the mutineers had the advantage of the mountainous terrain that they mastered and used for cover after the initial attacks on the BOLEAS forces. By the end of the first day, as many as 35 people were dead including about 10 SANDF soldiers. The BDF leadership was highly criticised for the late arrival of its contingent because its presence would have made a huge difference. Merafhe justified the late arrival by pointing out that the BDF had to cover more ground

728“BDF in Lesotho till Chaos Ends” The Botswana Daily News, 24 September 1998, 1; Neething, “Military Intervention” 2 729 de Sa Guimaraes, A Theory of Master Role Transition, 78. “Tiny Neighbour gives South Africa Rude Surprise” The New York Times, 23 September 1998, 3, accessed 7 June 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/23/world/tiny-neighbor-gives-south-african-army-rude-surprise.html

255 than the SANDF but the damage had been done.730 It was an embarrassing tactical error that exposed a lack of coordination among the BOLEAS forces and stained the reputation of the newly formed SANDF.

Despite this terrible start to the mission, the BDF contingent arrived a day later to find that their SANDF compatriots had suffered casualties and together the two contingents managed to push the Basotho rebel forces back and claimed four strategic locations including the king’s palace, the Katse Dam which supplied water to the capital and the Makhonyane barracks where the mutineers were stationed.731 In all, the fighting lasted for about a week and after the BOLEAS forces managed to gain control of the strategic areas in Maseru, the rebels started losing hope and eventually surrendered and order was restored. For the men from Botswana, it may have been strange to work side – by – side with the SANDF which was essentially its former enemy though it had been re-structured. The collapse of apartheid four years earlier meant that Botswana gained a new ally. In November 1998, the political parties of Lesotho agreed to observe the processes put in place so that fresh elections could be held. South Africa and Botswana played an important part in these negotiations. Both the SANDF and BDF, however, remained in the country and were joined by the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) which effectively replaced BOLEAS with

Operation Maluti which lasted until early 1999. Its mandate was to re-train, de-politicise and instil the models of military professionalism among the LDF rank-and-file and officers alike.732

Operation BOLEAS and the SADC Controversy

730 Merafhe, The General, 127. 731 “Lesotho crisis – Battle for Maseru” Mmegi / The Reporter, 25 September 1998, 3. 732 Nathan, Community of Insecurity, 85

256 When the military intervention took place some Batswana, Basotho and South Africans were surprised about SADC’s hasty decision. Media reports in these countries described the peace enforcement mission as an outright invasion and claimed that SADC as a regional body did not have the authority to sanction such an operation without the UN Security Council’s approval.733

Indeed Article 39 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter states that it is the Security Council’s task to maintain international peace and security.734 Though the language about this is clear, it also does not specifically state that regional bodies such as SADC are unable to authorise military action to maintain peace and order. Perhaps SADC decision makers thought that escalating the matter to the

UN Security Council would have taken too long. Still, observers and government critics argued that even though there had been loss of life in Lesotho, SADC went overboard by calling in a military assault on another member state. The Lesotho peace enforcement mission was not a new phenomenon for regional bodies like SADC. In West Africa, ECOWAS had carried out several similar military interventions in member states such as Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.

Also, starting in July-August 1998, SADC conducted a much larger and more robust and even more controversial military intervention in DRC to aid President Laurent Kabila of that country.735

In the Botswana parliament, opposition political parties at the time were also very vocal against the decision to march troops into Lesotho. In fact, they complained that they had not been properly consulted about the mission until it was too late.736 Though the Defence Council had been in existence since the BDF was created in 1977, it is not clear if it was ever involved in the decision

733 “Fearful milestone for South Africa” The Star, 25 September 1998, 14; “The incursion that went wrong” Pretoria News, 26 September 1998, 5. See also Neething, “Military intervention” 4 – 5. 734 United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html 735 Adeyeke Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: 162 – 3; David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Co, 2006), 204 - 5. 736 BNARS Hansard 128, First Meeting, Fifth Session, Seventh Parliament, 9 – 13 November 1998, “Paul Rantao questioning General Merafhe on the decision to send the BDF to Lesotho” 26 – 27.

257 to send men to Lesotho. Its role in this was critical in assessing and weighing the risks involved in sending Batswana troops on external peace operations such as this one. Critics also claimed that the news reports of disorder in Lesotho had been highly embellished which eventually caused

SADC to rush in without properly assessing the situation. A fact-finding mission sanctioned by

SADC would have helped the organisation weigh its options and possibly even invite the UN

Security Council to negotiate on their behalf. In parliament, Merafhe justified Botswana’s role in the intervention by saying that the mission met its military objectives in a few days which averted further loss of life. He added that the mission ought to signify SADC’s readiness to maintain law and order and prevent future mutinies and military coups.737 In the end and despite the criticism, the BDF had learned valuable lessons from the Lesotho intervention including operating in international peacekeeping missions alongside other nations’ militaries. It also signified the BDF’s first experience operating in conjunction with the post-apartheid South African military.

Conclusion

In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, most of Africa was burning with civil strife. For the BDF, this period presented an opportunity to learn about the inner workings of external peace operations and work side by side with other national armed forces. It was important also for Botswana as one of Africa’s longest running democracies to improve relations with other countries and help rebuild African conflict zones.

It was impressive for the relatively new and small BDF to perform so well in its first major external operation that proved disastrous for other militaries involved. Considering that controversies around the mission in Somalia resulted in the restructuring of the Canadian Forces

737 Merafhe, The General, 129.

258 and an American hesitance to stage foreign interventions called the “Somalia Syndrome, the small successes by the BDF represented a significant feat. With no previous experience in external operations, less equipment than the US Army and other Western forces and very little knowledge of the dynamics of the Somalia conflict, the men from Botswana highlighted the BDF on the international arena affirming what the country had been building the past two decades – a highly professional and efficient military. In Botswana, the people grew proud that their military could be called for such important missions and perform as well as they did despite the distance away from home and other operational difficulties. In some ways, the conduct of the BDF in Somalia reflected the principles of Botho, the Tswana traditional principle of ethical behaviour. Indeed, after the mission, Somali immigrants arrived in Botswana searching for a better life. In

Mozambique, which shared closer SADC and Frontline States connections with Botswana, the

BDF replicated the same humble and respectful conduct unlike the other national contingents that were also deployed. This was why the BDF did not experience any scandals that led to the termination of their mandate like the Italians. or Canadian contingents for example. There is no other reason to explain why BDF peacekeepers were able to disarm combatants easier than the

Western military contingents. In both Somalia and Mozambique, the BDF created bonds and engaged much closer with the people which was fundamental in the success of their missions.

Another reason for their success is that the Batswana were not racist toward their fellow Africans while white European and North American troops were very hostile to black people. The Batswana troops also came from a country where soldiers did not routinely abuse civilians and obeyed the rule of law unlike many other African militaries.

Though the role of the BDF in the peace enforcement mission in Lesotho was recorded as a military success, it only put a band – aid over a gaping wound. Lesotho’s political troubles were

259 far from over and needed a bigger SADC commitment in order to be resolved because in the following years the small constitutional monarchy would experience more political turmoil.

Between 1993 and 1999, the BDF had deployed more than 2000 men in different peacekeeping missions outside the country which represented a significant portion of its military manpower. The different peace operations were critical to exercising Botswana’s foreign policy of rending aid to fellow African nations in need but also opened the eyes of the troops that had no previous peacekeeping experience. It is therefore surprising that Operation BOLEAS became the last large – scale external mission that the BDF engaged in up to today and the reasons for this are not clear and leave room for speculation. Perhaps, as Botswana’s diamond-based economy began to slump after 1998, so did the BDF’s ability to support men operating beyond the country’s borders. Another reason could have been more personal in that sending men on these missions was steered by the BDF commander, Ian Khama who was a unique military leader being the son of the country’s first president and who possessed political ambitions. In 1998, he retired from the force to join politics and became the Vice President of Botswana and later served as the country’s 4th president. This, however, does not mean that the BDF no longer had the ambition to operate externally but rather suggests that the government of Botswana opted for a policy that focused more attention inwards than projecting power outside the country. Ian Khama’s successors as BDF commander including Lieutenant Generals Matshwenyego L. Fisher and Tebogo C. Masire saw that the BDF needed an overhaul of infrastructure and improvements in the welfare of troops in order to increase effectiveness. Another reason for the end of external operations may have been that Botswana’s rigorous deployment of men as peacekeepers in the period represented the ambitions of the country to become a major player in the politics of Southern Africa particularly now that apartheid in South Africa had been defeated. After 1994, Botswana’s ambitions as a

260 regional power could grow freely as its military now had the ability to project power beyond its borders and what better way to achieve that than to actively participate in UN and SADC peacekeeping? However, at some point, the Botswana government realised that these ambitions could never be reached given the regional influence of South Africa and gave up on foreign peace interventions altogether. The last hypothesis recognizes that though some SADC and UN peace operations ran beyond 1999, those that involved Botswana’s neighbours had largely ended apart from the one in DRC. The Southern African region and the rest of the continent, to some extent, was slowly transitioning towards peaceful solutions and multiparty democracy hence a lesser need to deploy men beyond Botswana’s borders.

261 Chapter 7: A Transformation Complete? BDF Expansions in the 2000s

Introduction

The founders of the BDF intended for the military to grow in all aspects even though they knew that it could never be stronger or bigger than other armed forces in the region. They aimed to build a formidable, well-equipped, professional military that would effectively defend the country against external threats and unequivocally serve as an arm of the government of Botswana both locally and internationally. Arguably, by the 2000s, this planned evolution of the BDF began to take shape with the completion of the brigade grouping objectives, and modernising equipment and training methods. The 2000s were also a time when the BDF took big strides towards professionalising its officer corps by slowing down its overseas training and opening a command and staff college in Gaborone. Another important but late development was the recruitment of women to the force in 2007 which had been recommended by the BDF high command in 1987 but was shelved right away for various reasons including the inferior legal status of women in

Botswana as a whole.

An Overview of the BDF’s Evolving Policies up to the 2000s

The evolution of the BDF throughout the years can best be seen or explained by closely examining the policies and objectives implemented by its commanders at different times. Though these policies may not have been written or accessible to researchers, when we look back at the shape of the BDF over the years we can tell what each commander focused on at a given time. For instance, during its formative years in the late 1970s and 1980s, Merafhe’s biggest priority was to establish a professional military with a solid foundation that was both apolitical and highly

262 accountable.738 Even though he was not a soldier by training, the ex-policeman managed the limited resources fairly well while at the same time grappling with external aggression from both

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa. Because the BDF had just been abruptly established under dire circumstances, issues such as sending a men abroad for a wide range of courses were not necessarily important to Merafhe. He needed competent soldiers who could perform the task of defending Botswana’s borders. When Ian Khama took command at the end of the Cold War era in 1989, he pursued a policy that deviated from his predecessor in some ways.

His tenure was characterised by an aggressive policy of arms build-up supported by a strong diamond economy, the projection of power within Southern Africa following the collapse of apartheid, and cooperation with other nations through various peacekeeping missions in other parts of Africa. Though he still maintained discipline and made sure that his men recognised the importance of the rule of law, he commanded the military with a perceived external threat from

South Africa in mind. It was during his era as commander that the BDF slowly started sending men for specialised courses abroad as there was no local training institution to fulfil that role.

When Lieutenant General Matshwenyego Fisher took over from Ian Khama in 1998, he recognised that he needed to make improvements in areas other than increasing the lethal capabilities of the

BDF. In particular, Fisher was concerned by the lack of professional education for both commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well poor infrastructure.739 Under his command, more soldiers studied abroad in American, Canadian and British institutions than in any other period. This served as a major leap forward for the BDF’s military professionalism. Fisher was replaced by Lieutenant General Tebogo Masire, one of the BDF’s first four airmen, who charted a path that also differed from what his predecessor had implemented. This does not mean that Masire

738 Merafhe, The General, 61 – 65. 739 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 22.

263 undid what Fisher, Ian Khama and Merafhe put in place but rather laboured to implement his own vision that was marked by a momentous leap forward of introducing women to the armed forces that had been planned since 1987. Apart from that, Masire’s policy had been to focus on the improvements of the welfare of troops as well as to move away from the perceived external threat that the BDF had been operating under for a long time.740 Essentially, all three commanders up to the early 2000s faced unique circumstances but all succeeded in implementing their differing visions which culminated into the BDF we know today. They completed their terms without unrest within the military which was highly uncommon in a continent rife with mutinies, coups and counter coups. They were never accused of corrupt practices or anything that tarnished their reputations or that of the BDF and Botswana’s democracy. Indeed, these men served their country remarkably well and set exceptionally high standards for those who took over after them. While all this was taking place, some high-ranking officers such as Major General Otsisitwe

Tiroyamodimo and Brigadier Peter Magosi faced strong disciplinary action which shows the professionalism and accountability of the BDF. Both were dismissed from the military by

President Ian Khama in 2011 under controversial circumstances connected to the anti – poaching unit that Tiroyamodimo had helped set up in the late 1980s.741

Changes in Recruitment and Training

As the BDF evolved over time, there was a gradual and visible change in the recruitment and training policies which also represented the BDF’s progress towards global military standards. For instance, most of the men who joined between 1977 and 1985 possessed lower educational

740 Masire, Interview; “Masire appointed BDF Commander” Mmegi, 27 October 2006, 3. 741 “Spooks Haunt BDF” The Patriot Online, 20 July 2016. https://patriot1706.rssing.com/chan- 58260906/all_p15.html

264 qualifications compared to those who came in after this period. This was largely due to the overall low literacy rates in the country at the time but also because the needs of the military were different.

After 1985, the BDF started raising its educational standards and sending some of its officers and men for various courses abroad, mainly to the USA, Canada and the UK so they could return and serve in more challenging capacities.742 Most of the courses that the men attended focused on military or technical aspects while very few were academic in nature which again reflected the needs of the BDF at the time. Technical skills seemed to hold a higher value amongst the officer corps in the 1980s than academic degrees in the Social Sciences or Law for instance. In some cases, the few officers who already held university degrees before enlisting benefitted from BDF sponsorship to study abroad and acquire technical qualifications. The now retired Major General

Pius Mokgware who served as the Ground Forces Commander between 2004 and 2010, joined the

BDF in 1980 as an officer cadet with a degree in mathematics and accounting. Throughout his military career, the BDF sent him to schools in the UK and the USA for various courses including the Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT) which led him to serve as an internal auditor for the military.743 In a similar vein, Brigadier Domcaza Kengaletswe Mokgwathi who at the time of writing serves as the Director of Capital Capability and Logistics Planning, an office in the BDF that controls the purchasing of military assets, joined the BDF Air Wing because he loved flying but his wit and incredible attention to detail led him towards becoming an aircraft engineer through

BDF sponsorship.744 In some rare cases, the BDF recruited athletic people such as Colonel

Christopher Mbaakanyi for the BDF XI Football Club. Mbaakanyi had not particularly excelled in

742 The author’s interviews with a number of the retired officers reveal this shift. Major General Bakwena Oitsile, Ground Forces Commander, 1999 – 2006; Interview with Pius Mokgware, former Ground Forces Commander, 2004 – 2010, 743 Interview with Major General Pius Mokgware (Rtd), Former Ground Forces Commander of the BDF, 7 January 2019, Gabane. 744 Interview with Brigadier Domcaza Kengaletswe Mokgwathi, Director of Capital Capability and Logistics Planning, 14 January 2019, Gaborone.

265 school before enlisting in 1990 but after realising the wide range of opportunities availed by the

BDF, he seized them and went on to study in various places including a degree in telecommunications engineering at the University of Rochester in New York.745 Because the

Batswana recruited into the BDF prior to the 1990s did not necessarily have basic foundations in science, accounting and engineering for example, it was fundamental for them to study overseas and develop the wide variety of skills that also supported their promotions. It is not clear whether some of the officers enrolled at the University of Botswana which, at the time had some of these courses.

By the late 1990s, this military education policy changed largely due to the rising educational standards of the country connected to a growth in the economy. The BDF then started encouraging locally educated university degree holders to apply for the military with the incentive of rising rapidly through the ranks. When the 2000s began, the BDF became an attractive employer to many young Batswana holding law, science and engineering degrees which gave them a career advantage over those who joined in the 1980s and 1990s. Their strong educational backgrounds supported rapid promotions thereby creating a strong and professional officer corps.

The Matshwenyego Fisher Years: 1998 – 2006

Unlike his two predecessors, General Fisher was the first commander to go through all the ranks of the BDF officer crops since joining in 1978. He was also unique because he did not have the same political connections as Merafhe, who was a personal friend of Seretse Khama, or Ian Khama who was the son of the first president. Throughout his rise in the force, Fisher benefited from policies that supported the training of officers in various countries. By the time he was appointed

745 Interview with Colonel Christopher Mbaakanyi, Air Arm Command, 18 January 2019, Gaborone.

266 BDF commander, he had completed numerous key positions including Force Adjutant, Chief of

Military Intelligence, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander. Fisher was different because he was the first Motswana ever to graduate from both the United States Command and General Staff

College (USCGSC) and the United States Army War College (USAWC). His exceptional performance at these institutions led to his induction into the USCGSC and USAWC International

Fellow Hall of Fame, a feat that no one else in the BDF has ever accomplished to date. According to an academic study by US Air Force Officer Dan Henk, throughout his military career, Fisher

“acquired as much US military education as most US generals.”746 These achievements made him the first truly professional officer to command the BDF. This uniqueness and dedication to serving his country made him the best candidate to take command of the military. In some ways, his appointment demonstrated how much the BDF had grown and what direction it would take from then onwards. Fisher’s US military education would play a big role in the policies he implemented throughout his tenure.

As a BDF commander highly conversant with military strategy and intelligence, Fisher placed emphasis on issues relating to national security. He worked on the development of

Botswana’s National Security Strategy (NSS) which prior to his tenure seemed vague and ambiguous. From that point onwards, the BDF aligned its military strategy with the country’s

NSS.747 This model of lining up the country’s defence interests with the national security strategy was in place in the US and it became a new phenomenon in the BDF under Fisher’s leadership. It also helped the overall image of the BDF as it now became clearer that the military was carrying out the wishes of the government. Though Fisher’s predecessors had also enacted policies that

746 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 43; “Fisher inducted into the International Fellow Hall of Fame of USAWC” The Botswana Daily News, 3 September 1998, 3; Martin Rupiya, Evolutions and Revolutions, A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa (Pretoria: Institution of Security Studies, 2005), vii. 747 Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 87.

267 reflected the interests and wishes of the country, it was not always entirely clear where they acquired their ideas. Because Batswana could now look at the NSS to tell where the country’s defence priorities lay, it greatly improved the transparency of the BDF which in previous years had largely been missing.

Increased Military Spending and Eroding Public Trust

Despite the weakening of Botswana’s diamond revenues after 1998, Fisher’s tenure began with a sharp increase in military spending when compared to the early 1990s. It is fair to note that for some time prior to his tenure, the constant rise in military spending had resulted in the souring of the relationship between the BDF, the government and the people. What was not surprising about the increases was the fact that the BDF which now numbered well over 9000 combat ready troops or comprising almost a division, needed to be maintained at all levels. The equipment procured up to that point needed to be serviced with new parts in order to keep them battle ready. In the same vein, the men’s salaries, pensions and other financial programs in the BDF had to be retained. Not only that but since the beginning of the 1990s, the BDF had run into a dire need to improve its infrastructure, that is, housing for the troops, facilities, and offices amongst others, to support a growing military so to that end, these budgetary increases were justifiable. On the other hand, to economic observers and privately owned newspaper outlets, increased BDF spending represented the doom of the country. It was the massive leaps by hundreds of millions of Pula throughout the late 1990s that mainly concerned economic observers. In fact, many of them including members of opposition political parties had been highly vocal against increasing military budgets since the early 1990s when the BDF started modernising its equipment.748 The slump in Botswana’s

748 “Is Defence and security a priority in Botswana?” Mmegi, 8 April 2011, accessed 20 June 2020, https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=10&aid=27&dir=2011/April/Friday8

268 diamond revenues that began towards the end of the 1998 when Botswana’s GDP fell from $5.2 to $4.79 billion represented a major point of friction and a good argument for these observers.749

This was the country’s first significant decline since 1990 and a sign of an economy that was slowly grinding to a halt. Another reason that fuelled arguments against BDF increased spending had to do with the stability of the region since the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid in

South Africa in 1994. Botswana no longer faced external threats after this time prompting calls to reduce military spending and direct funds elsewhere. Botswana’s healthcare system for instance, was being overwhelmed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1990s which had far reaching and devastating economic effects and therefore needed serious financial investments.750 Other government sectors such as the ministries of education, transport and communication had also fallen behind and required attention from the government that they did not receive. Instead, in the in the late 1990s, SIPRI estimated that BDF spending stood at P 764 million which was four times higher than the budget in 1993/94. This was about 9.8% of the country’s total spending which had risen from the previous year’s 8.6%. By the end of Fisher’s term in 2006, BDF spending stood at a whopping P 1.5 billion and showed no signs of slowing down.751 In comparison, regional

Nan Tian et. al, Military Expenditure Transparency in Sub-Saharan Africa (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2018), 28 – 9; “Botswana losing its sparkle: Africa’s exemplar of good governance facies rockier days” The Economist, 16 January 2016; “Botswana to prioritise defence and security spending in 2018/19 budget” Defence Web, 3 October 2017, accessed 30 June 2020, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/governance/governance-governance/botswana-to-prioritise- defence-and-security-spending-in-20182019-budget/; “Why does Botswana need so many tanks and fighters” The Diamond Fields Advertiser, 27 June 1996, 3. 749 Gladys Mokhawa, “All that Glitters is not Diamond: The Politics of Diamond Dependence and Abundance in Botswana” in Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs,2005), 105; World Bank, GDP (current US$) – Botswana, 1990 – 1999, Accessed 30 June 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1999&locations=BW&start=1990 750 Elizabeth Lule and Markus Haacker, The Fiscal Dimensions of HIV/AIDS in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland (Washington: The World Bank, 2012); Iyabo Masha, “An Economic Assessment of Botswana’s Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS” in The Macroeconomics of HIV/AIDS, ed. Markus Haacker (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2004), 287- 89. 751 BDF budgets grew by big margins well into the 2000s. SIPRI - “Military Expenditure by Country in local currency, 1998 – 2019” accessed Monday 29 June 2020. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20i n%20local%20currency.pdf See also Kenosi, “The Botswana Defence Force”, 195 – 96.

269 militaries of relative size to the BDF such as the Royal Swaziland Defence Force (now Umbutfo

Eswatini Defence Force or UEDF) and the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) were spending significantly less in the same period. According to SIPRI data, the average government military spending in Lesotho and Swaziland averaged 6.1% and 5.7% respectively between 1998 and 2006 while Botswana’s military expenses stood at an average 8.7% in the same period. SIPRI data also shows a significant decline in military spending for these two countries in the period between 2007 and 2016 while BDF budgets kept rising.752

It is important to note that despite these worries, most of the equipment procured by the

BDF in earlier years was now old and therefore needed extra care and maintenance. For instance, by 1998, the BTR-60 APCs were almost 40 years old and well past their prime. The Canadair CF-

5s were built in 1968 meaning that their parts were hard to come by and most likely had to be sourced from the Canadian manufacturers. In that regard, the BDF still needed to modernise its equipment in order to keep up with evolving internal and external security threats.

Between 2002/3, the BDF spent $179 million to buy 45 refurbished Swiss-made MOWAG

Piranha III APCs to provide tactical support to the Cadillac Cage V-150s and possibly to replace older Soviet BTRs.753 The Piranha was a unique addition in that it was designed to be fully amphibious, meaning it could be driven into the water immediately unlike the BTR which had to undergo some minor modifications prior. Though the BDF’s V-150 APCs were also amphibious, they were smaller and needed some modifications prior to driving in the water. This made the

Piranha the best choice for any of the BDF’s amphibious operations. The Piranha could carry up to 16 men including two crew members. It was fully armoured to resist small arms fire and it

752 SIPRI - “Military expenditure by country as percentage of government spending, 1988 – 2019,” accessed Monday 29 June 2020, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 753 SIPRI - “Arms purchases by Botswana” accessed, Monday 29 June 2020, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

270 boasted a variety of armaments including a 90mm gun turret or an 81mm mortar as well as a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun.754 Procuring the Piranha demonstrated that the BDF was modernising its equipment by phasing out the Cold War era BTR though some still remained in service. In the same year, the mechanised infantry also added 37 fully amphibious French built

Panhard VBL infantry vehicles. This light armoured 4x4 truck could withstand small arms fire and its size and agility made it best suited for urban warfare, and anti – poaching operations. Perhaps the BDF hoped the VBL would either be deployed alongside the V-150 or eventually replace it altogether. Panhard initially made the VBL in 10 variations but the basic version that the BDF procured was armed with either a 7.62mm or a 12.7 mm machine gun. Its small size also made it easily transportable by a Hercules C-130 but this was also its disadvantage as it could only carry up to 4 soldiers at a time.755 Besides this limitation, the VBL represented a great addition to the

BDF in that it was relatively the same size as a Landrover but offered significantly more troop protection and performed more tasks. The Piranha and VBL were the main additions to the BDF inventory that took place under Fisher’s command.

In the midst of rising military budgets, a lack of transparency within the BDF equally seemed to be on the rise leaving no room for Batswana to get answers on government decisions related to military spending. Apart from annual parliamentary budget speeches, which were also not open to the public, the people lacked an opportunity to debate budget allocations which drastically eroded Botswana’s civil and military relations. This is not to suggest that the BDF or the government was required to open their books to the public in order to justify every Pula they

754 Piranha II 8x8 Armoured Personnel Carrier, Fact Sheet, Accessed Monday 29 June, 2020, https://www.armyrecognition.com/wheeled_armoured_vehicles_swiss_switzerland_army_u/piranha_ii_2_wheeled_ armoured_vehicle_personnel_carrier_data_sheet_description_information_uk.html 755 SIPRI - “Arms purchases by Botswana,” accessed, Monday 29 June 2020, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

271 spent on building the country’s defence structure, but rather, that those who asked questions never received direct responses leaving room for damaging and misleading speculation. It was this type of secrecy that led to rumours that the Thebephatswa Airbase had been built by the American government for their own use or that the BDF had become a puppet of the US Army in the region.756 Though this was not true, it created anxiety amongst Batswana who indicated that they did not trust their government nor the military. Additionally, this period also saw escalating tensions between Botswana and Zimbabwe that was experiencing an intense political and economic crisis. State controlled media in Harare accused the BDF for opening its airbase to the

US Army who were spying and planning to destabilise their country.757 According to a study conducted in Botswana by Afrobarometer, a non-partisan pan-African research institution that undertakes surveys on public perceptions of democracy, governance and economic issues, between

1999 and 2006, more than 59.5% of their Batswana respondents said that they did not entirely trust the BDF.758 This showed a visible erosion of overall civil confidence in the army which was problematic for one of Africa’s most transparent nations. Perhaps the problem was that Batswana were used to government transparency, but this did not apply to the military. This general decline of the people’s confidence in their military was something that Fisher tried to repair when he took over as commander. This began in 1999 when Fisher publicly disclosed the findings of a commission that he had set up to study irregularities in the recruitment processes of the BDF.

According to an academic study by Lekoko Kenosi, this move greatly improved the image of the

756 “Airbase money spent on facilities” The Botswana Daily News, 7 August, 1995; “US Army build P 100m facility at Thebephatswa Airbase” Sunday Standard, 13 October 2013, accessed 3 July 2020, https://www.sundaystandard.info/us-army-builds-p100m-facility-at-Thebephatswa-air-base/ ; see also, Henk, The Botswana Defense Force, 78. 757 “Botswana denies foreign collusion” The Zimbabwe Independent, 15 July 2005. 758 Afrobarometer, online data analysis tool, R1 – R3 (1999 – 2006), Survey regarding Botswana public trust on government institutions, accessed 30 June 2020, https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online; Molomo, “The Trajectory,” 171

272 BDF in the eyes of the people.759 By eventually managing to make the BDF slightly more transparent, Fisher had successfully created a friendlier environment between the BDF and the public. Speaking to the Mmegi newspaper in 2011, Fisher stated that “secrecy is the worst ally of the defence force [which] undermines the support for the defence budget and it is not good for the development of healthy and robust civil- military relations … how do you expect people to support your budgetary requests if they do not know what you need?”760 Arguably, this showed the influence of his extensive and high-level US training. At the end of his tenure, Fisher had done a great deal to mould the BDF into a professional military that was accountable and reflective of the democratic principles of Botswana.

Completion of Brigade Grouping and Post 2000 Developments

The Defence Logistics Command

One of the most significant factors in the growth of the BDF was its brigade grouping exercise that began in the late 1980s and became more visible in 2002 with the establishment of the Defence

Logistics Command (DLC) under the leadership of Major General Jefferson Tlhokwane who handed it over to Major General Otsisitswe Tiroyamodimo in 2006. This was a major organ tasked with planning, managing and organising the logistical requirements of the BDF while ensuring that troops were deployed in a timely manner with all the resources they need. Defence Logistics

Command was formed from an amalgamation of independent units such as the Corps of Force

Ordnance which had existed since 1977 responsible for procuring, storing and provisioning all of the BDF’s weaponry as well as uniforms. It also took under its wing both the Corps of Electrical

759 Kenosi, “The Botswana Defence Force” 195 – 96. 760 “Is Defence and security a priority in Botswana?” Mmegi, 8 April 2011, accessed 20 June 2020, https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=10&aid=27&dir=2011/April/Friday8

273 and Mechanical Engineering (CEME) that was previously known as Workshop Engineers, as well as the Corps of Transport Services that was established a year earlier in 2001 with the responsibility of maintaining and coordinating the BDF’s transport assets across the country. The last two units under DLC were the Corps of Food Services, and Military Health Services which had also existed since the formative years of the BDF. The Corps of Food Services was previously called the Corps of Agriculture and Catering until 2002 and had been responsible for procuring and providing rations for the BDF through different farmers and suppliers within the country.761 After 2002, the

BDF command saw it fitting to engage in large – scale food production where they acquired large tracts of land in different areas of Botswana in order to become food self-sufficient.762 It was unusual for a military to produce its own food but this decision was prompted by demand and supply complications and payment discrepancies in the past where local farmers that had been selected to supply food to the BDF were failing to honour their agreements. The semi – arid climate of Botswana has always made it difficult for local farmers to keep up with the food demands of the military. This created numerous issues around the lack of quality and low quantities of the food supplied to the BDF from local Batswana farmers. In November 1997, the BDF was accused of failing to pay a Serowe based chicken supplier, GM Poultry, in a matter that resulted in the souring of that business deal. Though this was not a common occurrence, the hassle and headache caused by similar agreements prompted the decision to establish an in-house food production unit within the BDF.763 Each of these Defence Logistics Command units had their respective commanding officers whose ranks ranged between captain and major and reported to the commander of the

761 BNARS OP 58/5 Botswana Defence Force – General, Payment for Chicken, GM Poultry (Serowe), Correspondence between Commander of the BDF and the Permanent Secretary to the President, 12 November 1997. 762 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, pp. 66 – 72. 763 BNARS OP 58/5 – Botswana Defence Force – General, “Payment of Chickens for GM Poultry (Serowe)” Correspondence between Acting Commander of the BDF, Col. L A. Motlhatlhedi and Permanent Secretary to the President, 17 November 1997.

274 DLC who himself reported directly to the commander of the BDF. Before the brigade grouping exercise, this chain of command was not as clear, and it tended to be confusing when the commanding officers of these various units reported directly to the BDF commander.

The Corps of Engineers

Like DLC, the Corps of Engineers also benefitted greatly from the Brigade Grouping exercise.

This component was established in 1978 at the same time with the various Support Units (SU) in

Francistown, Selebi – Phikwe and Gaborone. Initially called the Engineer Platoon, it operated as part of Force Troops Headquarters, which was under the command of Captain Moatswi, who was then replaced by 2nd Lieutenant Mogamise in 1980. When engineers from the IATT arrived in

Botswana in 1982, they helped create a Field Engineering unit which was responsible for training the BDF’s combat engineers with the help of the Botswana Polytechnic Institution which trained the troops in the necessary technical skills. As the BDF continued to grow, by 2002, the Engineer

Platoon morphed yet again to be called the Corps of Engineers which saw its head office move to the SSKB in Mogoditshane. Added to its normal duties were roles such as the planning, construction and maintenance of BDF facilities as well as providing aid to various civil authorities where necessary. This was the unit responsible for tasks such as constructing roads and clearing of fields. The Corps of Engineers grew to become an extremely complex unit that was integral in the overall operation of the BDF. It was now made up of three units namely, the Directorate of

Construction Development which primarily dealt with all construction related issues, 80 Combat

Engineers Regiment (80 COE) and 94 Construction and Maintenance Regiment each with unique tasks that are vital to continued fluid functioning of the BDF.764 Despite low literacy levels in the

764 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 76.

275 late 1970s, the BDF recruited some men specifically into these units and later sent them to various institutions across the country for technical courses as their roles and expectations evolved. For instance, in 1979, the BDF ran a series of advertisements in the Botswana Daily News that invited enlistment by mechanical engineers with an interest in various fields such as welding, auto – electrical, panel beaters, vehicle mechanics and spray painters.765 The now retired Major

Gabatlhokwe who served as one of the BDF’s Combat Engineers in ONUMOZ that was responsible for de – mining combat zones, was amongst the many men who were initially recruited into this engineering unit around that time. He benefitted greatly from several local and international courses that sharpened his engineering skills so that he could over time assume a more important role within this engineering unit.766

765 “Vacancies in the Botswana Defence Force – Mechanical Engineers, The Botswana Daily News, 3, 6 and 9 June 1979. 766 Gabatlhokwe, Interview.

276 The BDF Command After 2004767 Commander Lieutenant General

Deputy Commander Major General

Air Arm Ground Forces Director General Defence Logistics Commander Commander Support Services Command Major General Major General Major General Brigadier

Major Command Force Sergeant Major Command Sergeant Major Major Major Command Sergeant Major Ground Forces Warrant Officer I Sergeant Major Air Arm Command Command Defence Logistics Command Warrant Officer I Warrant Officer I Warrant Officer I

The Tebogo Masire Years: 2006 and beyond

Lieutenant General Tebogo Masire spent his entire adult life in uniform having joined the BDF

Air Wing upon its formation in 1977. His career in the military progressed very well including attending international courses until he was eventually appointed BDF commander. He described his rise in the military as relatively easy as he was one of very few airmen in the BDF with plenty of opportunities along the way.768 In 1995, he was the officer who led the BDF Air Arm to its new headquarters at Thebephatswa, then three years later, he became Fisher’s second in command until

2006 when he took over the leadership role of the BDF. Masire surely had big shoes to fill as the new commander because his predecessor had worked hard to expand and modernise the military.

767 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 5 768 Masire, Interview.

277 Not only was he keen to continue the tradition of improving the reputation of the military, but he strived to continue moulding it into a professional organisation that reflected the democratic principles of Botswana.

Masire viewed his job as commander as an opportunity to follow a slightly different trajectory from his predecessors. This was because he believed that in the early 1990s when the

BDF began the rapid expansion in view of protecting Botswana against external threats, it had compromised the basic tenets of a well-established organisation. His main agenda was therefore to try and cover the basics that had been missed by previous commanders such as the long-standing infrastructure needs, and the regulation of the BDF promotion system which had been somewhat haphazard up to that point. He also believed that professional military education had grown at a slow pace and that those who had previously gone for various training courses were graduating from military training without being properly groomed for leadership positions. These were some of the most important areas that he tried to address throughout his tenure. Masire took over at a time when BDF budgets were on the rise but like Fisher, he did not see a need to spend funds on highly sophisticated arms when the force did not have basic things like infrastructure. It was clear by that time that there were no direct threats in the region during his tenure so most BDF funds went towards professional development of officers and NCOs, and acquiring newer and standardised uniforms, rifles and basic vehicles such as Landrovers and trucks instead of tanks and

APCs, that would facilitate the day-to-day tasks of the military.769

769 Masire, Interview.

278 Women in the Armed Forces in Africa: A Contextual Background

Though rare, African women combatants have a long history dating as far back as the 14th and 15th centuries in some major kingdoms of West - Central Africa such as the Kongo and Ndongo. Nzinga who became the first woman to rule the Ndongo Kingdom in the early 1600s was one of the few women warriors who were groomed for battle from a young age in this region.770 On other rare occasions in some West African kingdoms, women were tasked with maintaining order. In

Dahomey for instance, high – ranking women played key roles in King Gezo’s royal guard between

1797 and 1818. Apart from the elite royal wives, regular women were central in establishing order in the kingdom. Many women also formed a significant part of the Dahomey military where they held equal or more important ranks than their male counterparts.771

In East Africa in 1896, thousands of Ethiopian women marched alongside men at the Battle of Adwa where they helped secure decisive victory over the invading Italian forces.772 Ethiopian women were also involved in resisting Italian occupation in the late 1930s. They played an active role in the Second World War campaign that evicted Italian forces from the country in 1940. Many women who joined the resistance efforts had learned how to fire rifles prior to Italian occupation so they did not require extensive training to help the anti-fascist resistance efforts.773 From that point onwards, women played key roles in Ethiopian military affairs. In a similar fashion, the

770 Linda M. Heywood, Njinga of Angola, Africa’s Warrior Queen (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), 12 – 13. 771 J. Cameron Monroe, The Precolonial State in West Africa, Building Power in Dahomey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 103, 181. 772 Minale Adugna “Women and Warfare in Ethiopia: A Case Study of their Role during the Campaign of Adwa, 1895/96, and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–41” Gender Issues Report Series, 13:1 (2001). 773 Hailu Habtu and Judith A. Byfield, “Fighting Fascism: Ethiopian Women Patriots 1935–1941” in Africa and World War II, ed. Judith A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 392; see also Alberto Sbacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience (London: Zed Books, 1986); Angelo del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935–41 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

279 Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) had a significant number of women combatants who fought for independence during the 1970s and 1980s.774

During the period of nationalist struggles for liberation across Southern Africa, many women joined war efforts though their numbers were generally smaller compared to men. In

Rhodesia a significant portion of African women joined the Zimbabwe African National

Liberation Army (ZANLA) which was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union

(ZANU) to fight the oppressive white minority government during the 1970s. One of the most prominent insurgents of the liberation struggle was Joyce Mujuru, famously referred to as Teurai

Ropa in the Shona Language which means “spill blood.” Mujuru, who was married to ZANLA leader Solomon Mujuru, was a woman whose reputation as a guerrilla fighter and political activist made her a key target for the Rhodesian forces. Her unrelenting determination to fight for the freedom of her people made her the epitome of an African hero that other combatants looked up to.775 Sheba Tavarwisa was another female figure who later during the struggle became a commander of one of ZANLA’s women’s camps in Mozambique. Though her reputation did not match that of Mujuru, she led her small section of female combatants with integrity and gained the trust of the ZANLA high command.776 During the armed struggle, ZANLA declared its intention to fight not only for racial equality but for gender rights as well, which resulted in a few female guerrillas gaining prominence. Even though ZANLA had established such a mandate, it relegated women to traditional female tasks such as carrying supplies and cooking. There were also numerous cases where its female combatants were discriminated against and sexually abused by

774 Amrit Wilson, Women in the Eritrean Revolution, The Challenge Road (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 1991), 10 – 17. 775 Tanya Lyons, Guns and Guerilla Girls, Women in the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle (Trenton: Africa World Press Inc., 2004), 111 – 12; 776 Fay Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga, Memories From Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle (Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2006), 131 – 32; see also Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For Better or Worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle (Harare: Weaver Press, 2000), 40 – 41.

280 their male counterparts within the organisation. The experiences of fighting for liberation resulted in the formal recruitment of women into the ZNA that was established at independence in 1980 even though many of them were still faced discrimination.777

Botswana Laws, BDF Attitudes and Emang Basadi!

Unlike Zimbabwe or most other neighbouring countries that experienced struggles against white minority governments, Botswana did not have women war veterans who could be integrated into the BDF at its formation in 1977. Though there were several reasons for this, the overarching one was the fact that Botswana laws were inherently biased against women which reflected and maintained a heavily patriarchal society. Since the precolonial era, customary law played a key part in favouring men over women. The well-known notion of mosadi ke ngwana wa monna meaning that “a woman is a man’s child” speaks volumes about how traditional Setswana society operated for a long time.778 This old saying had a major influence on the constitution of Botswana which itself relegated Batswana women to second-class citizenship rendering them legally inferior to men. By that same token, women were not allowed to join the BDF because they were believed to be unfit for the type of tasks performed in the military. Furthermore, literacy levels in the country were also low which meant that a very small portion of the population, even by the early 1980s, had been exposed to ideas of equal rights for all so the society was not vocal about including women in the BDF specifically.

777 Norma Krieger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post – War Zimbabwe, Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980 – 1987 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 123 – 24; Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For Better or Worse? 12 – 13. 778 Lily Mafela, “Batswana Women and the Law, Society, Education and Migration, c. 1840 – c. 1980” Cahiers d’études Africaines 187 – 188 (2007): 1 accessed 8 June 2020, file:///Users/main/Downloads/etudesafricaines- 7962.pdf

281 It would be unwise to assume that Botswana was alone in having such negative attitudes towards the notion of women in the armed forces. Most, if not all western societies have long grappled with this idea mainly because warfare has largely been a gendered affair. While early modern European armies comprised men as soldiers, they were accompanied by large numbers of women who were soldiers’ wives and camp followers providing logistical services. By the nineteenth century, the development of formal logistical elements within European armies led to the elimination of female camp followers resulting in armies that were almost entirely male dominated.779

During the First and Second World wars, in the British and American armies, women were employed to perform roles that were still considered auxiliary in nature. According to Lucy

Noakes, the feeling amongst the British Army officials in the 1900s was that women were not capable of reaching the same levels of fitness as men and therefore unable to perform similar combat related tasks.780 In essence, western – style African militaries that adopted a British model such as the BDF followed this patriarchal attitude towards women in military service. The decision makers in the Botswana government failed to consider women for military service not only because of Tswana social norms but also because of the way the British Army was set up at the time. By 1985, this situation started to change due to increasing numbers of university graduates, academic publications and newspaper outlets that were vocal about how the so-called African miracle of Botswana did not afford equal rights to women. In 1986, Emang Basadi Association for

Women, a non-profit organisation that defended women’s rights, was established and started

779 Jennine Hurl-Eamon, Marriage and the British Army in the Long Eighteenth Century: “The Girl I Left Behind Me,” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 121. Myna Trustram, Women of the Regiment: Marriage and the Victorian Army, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 68 – 70. 780 Lucy Noakes, Women in the British Army, War and the gentle sex, 1907 – 1948 (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 1 – 4. See also Shelford Bidwell, The Women’s Royal Army Corps (London: Leo Cooper, 1977), 3 – 5.

282 putting pressure on the government to change its discriminatory laws towards women. Emang

Basadi, which means “stand up women,” is derived from the national anthem of Botswana and calls for the women of the country to rise up and work for the betterment of the country. Emang

Basadi grew rapidly and even though it immediately focused on issues relating to the social and economic status of women, its very existence reverberated across the country and inspired the creation of more organisations of a similar nature.781 By the late 1980s, Emang Basadi had made tremendous progress in several of its endeavours. One of these was a landmark court case against the government that resulted in a thorough overhaul of Botswana’s laws that were unfavourable to women.782 The movement’s rapid growth and advocacy for women put the government under considerable scrutiny which was also felt by BDF decision makers. With pressure on the government to change its discriminatory laws against Batswana women mounting, some attention was directed to the lack of women in the BDF. By 1987, this pressure had become so great that the BDF formulated a proposal to introduce a Women Corps for the first time in Botswana though it was never implemented.783 At that time, the BDF was nowhere near ready to recruit women based on the accommodation shortages it was experiencing. Officials within the BDF suggested that its garrisons around the country had male only hostels for the rank-and-file and in order to accommodate women, all infrastructure had to be re-designed to include female specific facilities.

It is also true that the BDF had to make considerations for the training of women, their uniforms, how they would integrate with their male counterparts in terms of intimate relations amongst seniors and juniors in the entire military as well as many other variables. This was not a simple

781 Kathleen Sheldon, African Women: Early History to the 21st Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), 281. 782 Judith van Allen, “Radical Citizenship: Powerful Mothers and Equal Rights” in Power, Gender and Social Change in Africa, ed. Muna Ndulo and Magret Grieco (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 68. 783 BNARS OP 58/1 Staff – BDF, BDF Women Corps (Regular Army Regulations), 4 May 1987.

283 task that could happen overnight but rather one that required deep thought and financial investments to make it happen.

However, it is rather too coincidental that the BDF created this proposal when Emang

Basadi was escalating its efforts to secure women’s rights across the country. The proposal appears to have been a well – thought out document but it lacked important details about how to incorporate women and which capacities they would serve in. For instance, it lacked information about the number of women to be recruited, the preferred educational backgrounds, as well as how and when their training would commence. In all fairness, this may reflect the preliminary nature of the document, but the lack of details particularly pertaining to those key aspects indicates that there was never really a plan to introduce women to the force at that time.

The proposal also stated that the BDF Women Corps would not be deployed in combat roles except as members of units set up in rear bases and not in the frontlines like their male counterparts which was largely in line with what other western style militaries were doing at the time. This discriminatory line of thinking continued in other units of the BDF such as the Air Wing where the proposal stated that women recruits could only serve in less physically demanding positions such as air traffic controllers but not as pilots.784 In essence, the 1987 proposal appears to have been nothing more than a document that was be used to buy the BDF time or stave off opposition from pressure groups.

The First BDF Women Officer Cadets

According to General Masire, the decision to recruit women occurred in the early 2000s even though BDF officials felt that they were still not equipped to fully train women to the required

784 BNARS OP 58/1 Staff – BDF, BDF Women Corps (Regular Army Regulations), 4 May 1987.

284 capacity. It was then decided to send the prospective female recruits elsewhere for training.785 The

BDF command requested recommendations for training programs from militaries of neighbouring countries including South Africa, Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania. This was because these defence forces had more experience with training women to serve in the military in different roles. Masire then settled on sending the women to Tanzania for training because the BDF believed that the

TPDF had a more suitable training program compared to other countries. Masire added that it had the right type of training, the best syllabus and it was the perfect length to properly induct the women into the military.786

Following a different military model than the BDF, the TPDF emerged in the wake of the

1964 East African mutinies and became an overtly politicized force serving President Julius

Nyerere’s socialist one-party state. During its formative years, the new TPDF received military aid from various sources including Cuba, the Soviet Union, Canada and China.787 In line with the country’s socialist policies, the TPDF started recruiting women between 1964 and 65 but owing to a lack of infrastructure, they were released from service in 1966. As its expansion continued, the TPDF reinstated women in 1972 and from that point onwards it became one of the few African militaries to have a significant number of them serving within its ranks. After the independence era, the TPDF through its military academy in Arusha trained women of various militaries from

Southern and East Africa. 788 The TPDF and Julius Nyerere had also played a key role in the liberation struggle of Southern Africa by opening training camps to armed groups from various countries in the region. It was in this context that Botswana’s first president, Seretse Khama

785 Masire, Interview 786 Masire, Interview; “BDF to recruit women next week” Mmegi, 30 March 2007, 2. 787 Thomas, “The Tanzanian People’s Defence Force,” 32; see also Stapleton, A Military History, 88; Kilford, The Other Cold War, 3. 788 Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State, 288

285 became close friends with Nyerere who shared similar interests and was driven to see the region liberated from white racist minority governments. Despite Tanzania’s socialist – leaning policies, it was not strange for Botswana, a pro-western and capitalist country, to send women cadets there for training as these two countries had a history of military cooperation that dates back to the late

1970s. For instance, in 1978, a BDF shipment of arms and ammunition from Belgium was delayed for several weeks and Nyerere stepped in to supply Botswana with the weapons it desperately needed.789 Nyerere’s weapons were readily available and became some of the earliest that the BDF used to train and defend Botswana’s borders against Rhodesian incursions. It is highly likely that

Tanzania became an essential entry point for Soviet BTRs, and SA-7 missiles headed for Botswana which were essential in the BDF’s development of mechanized warfare and air defence capabilities. We therefore cannot overlook the East African nation’s role in helping Botswana defend its territorial integrity and continued support throughout the years.

Recruitment and Training

By the early 2000s, organisations such as Emang Basadi had managed to secure the rights of

Batswana women many of whom were now able to gain employment of their choosing though discrimination still remained in some sectors. For the BDF, the days of hiding behind lack of infrastructure and women – specific facilities were over, and the only choice was to recruit women for the first time. Once the agreement between Botswana and Tanzania was signed in early 2007, the BDF started its female recruitment drive. It was looking for physically and mentally fit women with good character aged between 18 and 24 years old which was the same requirement for the men. It also emphasised that those who held university degrees would stand a far better chance of

789 BNARS OP 28 / 1, Staff - BDF, Letter from Seretse Khama to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere thanking him for the arms and ammunition supplied to the BDF” 30 September 1978.

286 acceptance as this first intake of women was for those who would become commissioned officers.790 The news about the recruitment of women was received with a lot of enthusiasm around the country as many, including members of Emang Basadi who had been pushing for women’s rights interpreted this as a great victory. This was not just a momentous point in the history of women in Botswana but also a milestone in that of the BDF.

Despite the large number of applicants, the BDF only took 30 women into the initial stream of officer cadets because officials thought that keeping the number small was more feasible and manageable.791 Though within official BDF circles this may have been true in terms of the financial aspects of sending the women abroad for training, it is important to see this reasoning in a different light. Firstly, by 2007 Botswana had a sizeable number of able – bodied female university graduates who qualified for officer training which eliminated the doubts of creating a largely uneducated Women Corps. Second, it had been 20 years since the BDF drafted its 1987 proposal to recruit women which meant enough time to fix the infrastructure woes in order to fully accommodate a significant number of women. It is hard to imagine that by 2007 the BDF had managed to build gender specific facilities for just 30 women. According to General Masire, the major issue that stood in the way of establishing a Women Corps before his tenure was the well – known macho attitude that existed amongst members of the BDF high command who believed that being a soldier was not a job fit for women.792 This brashness seems to have been ingrained within the BDF high command but was also connected to the inferior legal status and negative attitude towards women in the society of Botswana. So, when the time came, recruiting a small number of

790 “BDF to recruit women next week” Mmegi, 30 March 2007, 2. 791 Masire, Interview. 792 Masire, Interview.

287 women to specifically join the officer corps should be seen as part of gradually undoing the long

– standing macho attitudes within the army.

Most, if not all of the women who joined the BDF in 2007 held various degrees from the

University of Botswana and South African universities amongst others. For instance, Captain

Ednah Ruins Mfazo held a Bachelor of Business Administration from the University of Botswana prior to enlisting in the military. Captains Oratile Mothupi (formerly Ratlhaga) and Gabotepele

Molefhi joined the BDF having just completed their Bachelor of Commerce Law and

Physiotherapy Science respectively at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. 793 This clearly reflects the competitive nature of the recruitment process of new BDF recruits in general who were far more educated than those who had joined in the early years. It also shows that the

BDF focused initial recruitment on elite women who entered the officer corps.

Prior to departing for Tanzania, the 30 women who had been accepted into the BDF were attested as officer cadets and began initial training in Botswana which lasted for about 3 weeks.

This was to introduce them to basic military duties and also prepare them for their courses at the

Tanzania Military Academy (TMA) in Monduli which were to run for about 14 months. According to Captain Mothupi, the training in Tanzania was surprisingly not different to how the BDF was training men. The women attended similar courses and drills and were expected to complete their training in the same timeframe as their male counterparts. Their weapons training included the extensive use of FN and AK 47 rifles as well as 82 mm mortars all of which were similar to the ones used by the BDF.794 Along with the women, the BDF sent some of its male instructors to assess the TMA training program in order to create one in Botswana. They were also surprised to

793 Interview with Captain Ednah Ruins Mfazo, one of the first women in the BDF who trained in Tanzania, Gaborone, 21 September 2019. 794 Interview with Captain Oratile Charity Mothupi (formerly Ratlhaga), one of the first women in the BDF who trained at Tanzania, Gaborone, 21 September 2019; Masire, Interview.

288 see how similar it was to how male recruits in Botswana were trained, so they recommended that the subsequent intakes of women be trained at home, which the BDF did.795

The BDF women were not the only ones undergoing training at the academy in northern

Tanzania. They were amongst other female cadets from Uganda, Kenya, Lesotho, and Seychelles which speaks volumes about the pivotal role played by the TPDF in the development of the capacities of African militaries. Because almost all instruction in the academy was done in

Kiswahili, the BDF cadets had to learn the language in order to keep up with the rest of the cadets from East Africa where it is widely spoken. Though this was a major factor in the successful completion of their training, learning the language of instruction was not part of the curriculum and they did that through interaction and relationships they created with locals. The women stated that during their stay in the training camp, they carried themselves well which generated a positive image in the eyes of the Tanzanian people. This made it easy for them to make friends with locals who taught them the language, customs and traditions of the country. At the end of the training, the BDF’s pioneer women spoke Kiswahili so frequently and fluently that it became their language of choice when communicating amongst themselves which sets them apart from those who joined after.796 Apart from holding higher ranks than the women who enlisted after them, speaking

Kiswahili re-emphasises their unique experience as the first BDF women officers.

While training in Tanzania generally progressed smoothly for most of the women, a few amongst them did not fare well. Due to varying factors, 7 of the 30 BDF women had to return to

Botswana after sustaining serious injuries which needed urgent care that could only be provided back home. These women, after making full recoveries, would later complete their training at the

Paje base camp in the Central District of Botswana, alongside that year’s intake of male officer

795 Masire, Interview. 796 Mfazo, Interview.

289 cadets. Though they had to wait a bit longer to recover, the seven women took their rightful places as second lieutenants a few months after their colleagues.797 It is worth stating that the seven who completed their training locally were also pioneers in that they were the first to do so alongside men. This means that the long – standing excuses by the BDF leadership of a lack of facilities to train women was exaggerated and suggests a negative attitude amongst previous commanders towards women in the force.

Completion of Training and Partial Integration

After their training was complete, the women were commissioned as second lieutenants in October

2008 and advanced through BDF ranks in a way that was similar to most male commissioned officers. They were promoted to captain within an 8-year span which was a normal progression in the BDF where promotions usually took place every 4 or 5 years. At the time of writing, the senior women in the BDF who trained in Tanzania hold the rank of captain. The emphasis on recruiting highly educated women into the BDF was a reasonable decision because upon completion of training they went on to serve in various key capacities within the military where they applied their expertise. Captain Mothupi with her Bachelor of Commerce Law went on to complete her Bachelor of Law (LLB) after her training. She then enrolled for several other law related courses to further sharpen her skills. Her academic record led to her appointment as the Legal Advisor to the BDF

Commander while simultaneously working in the BDF’s Procurement Office which is responsible for all of military contracts.798

Captain Gabotepele Molefi’s Bachelor of Science in Physiotherapy landed her in the

Military Health Services where she served as one of the few physiotherapists not only in the clinics

797 “Seven more women join BDF ranks” The Botswana Daily News, January 2008. 798 Mothupi (Ratlhaga), Interview

290 but as part of the many sports teams that exist in the BDF. Molefhi, who also holds a Diploma in

Human Resource Management and an MSc in Project Management, was also appointed as the official physiotherapist for the Botswana National Olympic Committee (BNOC), a role that was unique amongst women serving in the BDF.799 In general, the importance of recruiting highly educated women into the BDF breathed new life into the military and set the standard for future recruits. The decision to recruit female officers into the military in 2007 changed the shape of the

BDF for the better. It meant that the military now practiced non – discriminatory recruitment practices. For a country that had only recently secured the full legal rights of women, this was a major feat, but one cannot help but think about what it took to reach the intended levels of integration. It was not until 2015 that the BDF recruited women into the rank – and – file and though it is unclear why it took this long it would not be wrong to suggest that the high command dragged its feet to complete this process.

The Defence Command and Staff College (DCSC)

The Paje base camp which was built in the mid – 1980s was responsible for the initial preparation of officer cadets who at the end of that training were commissioned as second lieutenants.

Although not a military academy that offers university degrees, it introduced officer cadets to basic military training as well as various courses that prepared them for leadership positions.800 Before

2008, the second lieutenants and higher-ranking officers would then be sent abroad for further studies in countries such as the UK, US and Canada. Though this was important in developing a diverse range of skills amongst the officer corps, it had more disadvantages than advantages which

799 “First batch of female office cadets returns from training” Sunday Standard, October 26, 2008, Accessed May 12, 2019, https://www.sundaystandard.info/first-batch-of-botswana-female-officer-cadets-returns-from-training/ 800 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 82 – 83.

291 stemmed from the costs incurred and the limited spaces at institutions like the Naval Postgraduate

School in California and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.801 During its formative years, the BDF relied heavily on loans from the British Military Assistance Office (MAO) to support the training of some of its officers who later assumed key positions within the BDF. However, this assistance was always limited by the amount of funding available which meant that the BDF could not fully develop the competencies it wished its officers to possess. This lack of an in – house training institution also speaks to the overall slow pace of professionalization within the BDF. As an evolving military, it became fundamental for the BDF to establish its own staff college and train higher ranking officers locally to eliminate the long – standing dependence on other countries.

Furthermore, the BDF found that sending men to various institutions across the world was creating an officer corps that was not entirely cohesive because of different training doctrines.802 This was the case with other African militaries such as the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of

Congo (or FARDC) which received training from a wide range of foreign military instructors since it was established in 2003 following a bloody civil war that resulted in a new government.803

The decision to establish the DCSC was in line with what other regional militaries such as the Zambia Defence Force, South African National Defence Force and the Kenya Defence Force had done to localise professional training of officers. Kenya’s National Defence College was established in 1992 while Zambia’s Defence Services Command and Staff College started operating in 1996 both with similar objectives of creating a curriculum for its officer corps that

801 BDF Staff Training College Starts Operation”, Mmegi, 4 February 2008. 802 “BDF Staff Training College Starts Operation”, Mmegi, 4 February 2008; Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 91 – 92. 803 Julianne Kippenberg et. al, Soldiers who rape, Commanders who Condone; Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 20; James Dobbins et. al, Europe’s Role in Nation Building: From the Balkans to the Congo (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 210.

292 was tailored for local and regional affairs.804 Seeing that other regional militaries had developed their own staff colleges, the BDF moved swiftly to do the same. The DCSC opened its doors in

2008 and operated from a temporary location in Block 8, Gaborone while construction of the main college was ongoing inside the Glen Valley Barracks. Its main objective was to provide the officer corps with training that was relevant to Botswana’s operational environment in concert with a doctrine unique to the BDF. Establishing the DCSC was not only crucial for the improvement of the BDF command structure but also fulfilled its overall aspirations of being a self – reliant professional military within Southern Africa. When it opened, it was placed under the watchful eye of Commandant Gotsileene Morake, who at the time of writing serves as the Deputy

Commander of the BDF. Morake and General Masire saw a necessity in securing accreditation for the DCSC through the University of Botswana in 2009 which resulted in a strong partnership between the two institutions. This enabled BDF personnel to enrol for academic courses through the university and graduate with either a Diploma in Military and Strategic Studies or a Masters in

Defence and Strategic Studies.805 The DCSC’s first intake in 2008 comprised 32 officers at the rank of major and lieutenant colonel whose studies were reported to have progressed well. Initially, the BDF only catered for its own personnel but over time, the DCSC opened doors to foreign officers mainly from the SADC countries in order to reinforce mutual trust and promote the exchange of ideas amongst regional military powers.806 The opening of the DCSC was a momentous occasion in the history of the BDF as it symbolised the level of growth it had achieved.

804 Brigadier General D M Mwendaofyo (Rtd), The DSCSC – Historical Background accessed 10 July 2020, https://www.dscsc.edu.zm/dscsc-s-history.html; The National Defence College, Historical Perspective, accessed 10 July 2020, https://ndc.go.ke/history/

805 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 91 806 “BDF Staff Training College Starts Operation”, Mmegi, 4 February 2008.

293 Conclusion

By the new millennium, the BDF had achieved tremendous milestones considering the numerous problems it faced since inception. What was once three ill equipped and under-trained companies drawn from the PMU in 1977 had become one of the region’s most potent professional militaries despite being one of its smallest. Now at the division level, the BDF boasted some of the most lethal air and ground capability and with commanders who served the interests of the government which was rare in a continent rife with political instability.

Another key signifier of the level of growth in the BDF during the early 21st century was the completion of the brigade grouping exercise which, as described previously, resulted in a singular and cohesive operational structure. This was marked by the establishment of new organs such as the Defence Logistics Command, Corps of Engineers and DCSC. The BDF had come a long way from not being able to fully provide its troops with the required expertise during its formative years to spending large sums of money to train them abroad in the 1980s and 1990s.

After these developments, the BDF became substantially self – reliant. An officer could now begin and successfully complete his or her training locally without the need to go overseas which was not only cost effective but proved the capability of local instructors. Not only that but the ability of the DCSC to accept and train officers from neighbouring countries put the BDF amongst the key players in the development of a cohesive defence and security atmosphere in the region while also earning revenue for the BDF.

The transformations that had taken place up to the 2000s overall reflected a highly accountable and reliable professional military. This was reinforced by Generals Fisher and Masire who despite skyrocketing budgets placed emphasis on the professional development of troops instead of the procurement of highly sophisticated military hardware like new fighter aircraft. It

294 was through them that the BDF in the new millennium had a wide range of highly educated officers with diverse military training and academic backgrounds. This was also supported by the increase of educational levels within Botswana’s wider population from which the military recruited. When the Women Corps was introduced, it also drew from the streams of university graduates in order to maintain the same standards of military professionalism that were now being pursued rigorously by the BDF command.

Even though the plan to introduce a Women Corps had been produced in 1987, it was not exactly clear if they would be joining the commissioned or non-commissioned officer ranks. This reflected both the lack of preparedness within the BDF command to implement that plan and the low educational standards at the time, particularly amongst women who had long endured discriminatory laws. Once pressure groups such as Emang Basadi succeeded in securing equal rights for women, the BDF could no longer exclude them from serving their country. By the time they were recruited, most women had the same educational levels if not better than men. Further, the recruitment of women, first exclusively into the Officer Corps, was a step in the right direction but it has to be seen as an expression of the BDF’s somewhat negative attitude towards women.

The insistence on officers and in such a small number is indicative of something similar to a test

– run that was done to make sure that they would become role models for the other females who would be recruited later. This entire process of integration was too slow even though there was a significant number of well-educated women in the country who could be trained to fill the required positions within the officer corps as well as the rank – and – file. Nonetheless, it was a welcome development that represented important changes that the military of Botswana was willing to make.

295 Chapter 8: The BDF and the Society of Botswana

Introduction

Since its establishment in 1977, the BDF developed a relatively positive image in the eyes of the society of Botswana and the world. In a continent rife with highly politicised militaries prone to committing human rights violations, it was rare for the BDF not only to have a cordial relationship with the civilian society but to undertake numerous projects that improved this relationship. Aside from the reputation of Batswana as non – violent people, other factors have been important in the good relations between the BDF and civilians. The stable political environment fostered by free and fair democratic elections held every 5 years since independence, the authority that the parliament, cabinet and judicial system wield, as well as the solid performing diamond economy throughout the 1990s also cultivated an atmosphere that promotes peaceful coexistence between the military and the people. Though some of its social undertakings such as its involvement in the development of sports in Botswana were not necessarily unique, this chapter argues that the BDF successfully mounted such programs to improve its image while simultaneously drawing potential recruits.

Postcolonial African Militaries and their Interactions with Society

The interactions between postcolonial African militaries and the societies they serve varies greatly due to the different experiences and unique colonial and postcolonial circumstances. However, in some cases, highly politicised militaries throughout postcolonial Africa, particularly those that lacked civil oversight mechanisms tended to abuse power. Though this does not apply uniformly across the continent, postcolonial African militaries tended to focus on maintaining internal security affording them the latitude to abuse people. For instance, the Ugandan Army under

296 military dictator Idi Amin between 1971 and 1979 was used as an instrument of terror to maintain his control over the country and eliminated anyone whom he labeled as political opponent.807 The political violence and terrors caused by the military in Uganda began prior to Amin’s tenure but became amplified during his time as president where an estimated 80 000 to 300 000 people including women and children were killed by the army.808 When he took over through a 1971 coup d’etat that deposed president Milton Obote who was also a northerner, Amin swiftly moved towards dissolving parliament and amended the constitution to give himself absolute power. This saw him terrorize army officers purging the Ugandan military of Acholi who were seen as loyal to

Obote and then replacing them with his own people from the Kakwa as well as some Sudanese mercenaries.809 People across the country lived in constant anxiety that the army could show up at any time to take them away. This was the state of affairs in Amin’s Uganda where social and economic life had deteriorated significantly.810 This became a common feature of life across

Uganda until Amin’s overzealousness eventually led to him being ousted in 1979 given the

Tanzanian invasion.811 However, despite the brutal dictator having fled, the Ugandan people underwent continued troubles at the hands of several leaders until 1986 when Yoweri Museveni who commanded the National Resistance Army (NRA) took over as president. At that point,

Uganda had undergone more than 15 years of internal violence that claimed more than 500 000 lives and displaced another estimated 1.2 million more. Even under Museveni, Uganda’s troubles

807 Alicia Decker, “Idi Amin’s Dirty War: Subversion, Sabotage and the battle to keep Uganda clean, 1971 – 1979” International Journal of African Historical Studies 43, 3 (2010): 489; see also, Decker, Idi Amin’s Shadow, Women, Gender and Militarism in Uganda (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014), 61 – 62; Henry Kyemba, A State of Blood, The Inside Story of Idi Amin (New York: Groset & Dunlap, 1977). 808 David M. Anderson and Oystein H. Rolandsen, “Violence as Politics in eastern Africa, 1940 – 1990” in Politics and Violence in Eastern Africa, The Struggles of Emerging States. ed. David M Manderson and Oysten H. Rolandsen (New York: Routledge Publishers, 2015), 5. 809 Phares Mukasa Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1992), 106 – 7. 810 Kyemba, A State of Blood, 45. 811 Onwumechili, African Democratization, 54

297 continued with the rise of rebel movements such as the Lord’s Resistance Army under Joseph

Kony in the north of the country. 812

In Zaire or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) today, CIA backed President Joseph

Mobutu established one of the most brutal and corrupt dictatorships in the continent between the time he seized power through a coup d’etat in 1965 and 1997 when he fled the country. The Congo had experienced an extremely violent colonial period under Belgian King Leopold II’s Congo Free

State and then the Belgian Congo in which the Force Publique terrorized civilians and developed a reputation for poor discipline.813 While in power, Mobutu did nothing to develop trust between his military and the Congolese people. Instead, he promoted an environment of dissent, violence, and kleptocracy, and used the Zairean Armed Forces (FAZ) and several other security forces including the youth movement called the Committee of Activists for the Defence Revolution

(CADER) to maintain control in the country.814 Mobutu came to power during a period when there was a lot of turmoil in the Congo which gave him some legitimacy as the alleged saviour of the country. In turn, he used this legitimacy to oppress the people and turn the country into a one-party state and personalistic dictatorship.815 Rene Lemarchand described the FAZ as a “political machine lubricated by strong doses of corruption, clientelism and ethnic favouritism.”816 At about 150 000 men in the 1990s, Mobutu’s FAZ was highly stratified along ethnic lines which was similar to

812 Anderson and Rolandsen, “Violence as Politics” 5. See also Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 29 – 30 and Opiyo Oloya, Child Soldier, Stories from Joseph Kony’s Lord’ Resistance Army (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 813 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost, A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: Mariner Books, 1998), 56. 814 Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo, From Decolonisation to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 56 815 Hubert Kabasu babu Katulondi, Democratization in the DR Congo from Joseph Mobutu to Joseph Kabila, A Modelled Exploration (Bloomington: Author House, 2019). 816 Rene Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo, From Failure to Potential Reconstruction” in ed. Robert I Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 40.

298 other dictatorships including that of Amin. Acting on the wishes of Mobutu and unchecked in a one party – state, FAZ which was commanded by his brother – in law, General Etienne Nbgale

Kongo Nzimbi, committed numerous human rights violations such as a series of indiscriminate killing of innocent people in Lubumbashi in 1991, Mbanza-Ngungu and Mbandaka in 1992, and

Kisangani in 1993.817 These killings were related to the weakening of his dictatorship at the end of the Cold War and growing dissent amongst people. Until he was deposed in 1997, Mobutu used his army to instill fear and kill those who opposed him. These examples represent the interactions of a large portion of postcolonial African militaries and the societies they were meant to protect.

Instead of acting as agents of political change particularly after the departure of colonialists, some forces became extremely predatory where they killed, abducted, raped and looted indiscriminately.

Perhaps the absence of properly functioning judicial systems and rule of law can be connected to the lack of legal action against those forces.

A Brief Overview of Civil – Military Relations in Botswana

Samuel Huntington, who is regarded as one of the key and early thinkers of civil – military relations, observed that the professionalization of the officer corps is the key to ensuring effective civilian control of the military and making sure that the defence needs of a country are met accordingly. Huntington effectively argues that professionalising the officer corps eliminates the tendency for military personnel to abuse power or engage in a coup d’etat.818 Huntington was concerned by the growth of internal disharmony amongst the various mechanisms that controlled the US Army during the Cold War era and set out to study the ways in which the strongest armed

817 Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic” 41 818 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil – Military Relations (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 7 – 8.

299 force in the world could maintain political stability. His work became influential not only for the

US but other military and security institutions around the world such as the BDF which during the

1990s was striving to professionalise its officer corps.819

Contrary to the trajectory followed by the post-colonial African militaries discussed above,

BDF interactions with the society of Botswana have been more cordial. The BDF is regulated by two arms of government, the legislature and the executive (president and defence council) but however, as noted by Lekoko Kenosi “this control is more subtle and indirect [as] most of the time the army functions with a high degree of autonomy to enable it to carry out its security functions.”820 Though this presents potential problems where abuse of power could go unchecked for some time before the civilian authorities decide to intervene, the BDF, as an arm of government has never displayed instances of abuse of power nor acted in a heinous way towards civilians.

Incidents where they opened fire on civilians such as the killing of Raymond Archibald at a BDF manned roadblock in 1987 were extremely rare though they tainted the force’s record. When it took place, Merafhe, who was commander at the time, was quick to issue an official apology towards Archibald’s family who later successfully sued the BDF for the wrongful death. Botswana, unlike countries like Zaire under Mobutu and Uganda under Amin, had the mechanisms to control the military and judicially punish members of the BDF whose actions resulted in the death of civilians.

The Corporate and Social Responsibility Program (CSR)

The BDF has a long history of giving back to the society and though the people largely interpreted this as a noble gesture, it was also geared at improving the force’s public relations. Since its

819 Molomo, “The Trajectory” 132. 820 Kenosi, “The Botswana Defence Force” 192

300 formation, the BDF has gone to great lengths to engage closely with the community by undertaking social projects such as the building of orphanages, residential facilities and youth centres. BDF officials suggest that this “spirit of giving is instilled into members of the BDF during their basic military training. Every Class or Intake of trainees undertakes an outreach project that is then handed over at the culmination of their course.”821 It is not clear what exactly these projects are and how long the BDF has been doing this, but they appear to be very limited in scale. The older and retired soldiers, whom the author interviewed, did not mention anything of this sort which suggests that it was a recent development, or it was previously not a formal policy of the BDF.

The fact that these projects fall within the CSR reflects a coordinated attempt to improve the military’s relations with the public.

The BDF’s CSR program was likely formalised in the early 1990s which coincides with the massive increases in military budgets. It was during this time that the BDF became more flexible with its spending as it started to receive the largest portion of the national budget.

According to a BDF publication, previously, the CSR program was administered at unit level, which means that each organ of the BDF such as the Corps of Signals or the Corps of Food Services could organise a fundraiser or collectively agree to build a house for a person in need within the community. This was, however, seen as unsustainable hence to decision to move the program to garrison or installation level.822 This saw the BDF’s charitable projects administered from either the Sir Seretse Khama or Glen Valley Barracks in Gaborone or Francistown and Selebi Phikwe garrisons which would donate to their respective communities. Throughout the 1990s and early

2000s, these installations undertook various projects that ranged from the construction of a fully equipped youth centre at Mababe village in the Northwest District of Botswana to refurbishing the

821 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 114. 822 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 114.

301 Lephoi Centre for the Visually Impaired in Francistown. Other BDF gestures could be as simple as donating textbooks and notebooks to secondary schools in Gaborone as well as spending more than P 80 000 to supply computers to Kavimba Primary School in the north of Botswana.823 Also important was the Halfway Home Project which was built entirely using BDF funds and manpower through the Corps of Engineers. This was one of the biggest social projects that the BDF has undertaken to date and it serves as a temporary shelter for homeless and vulnerable people in

Mogoditshane and surrounding areas.824

Disaster Relief Efforts

Professional militaries around the world usually have dedicated teams called in during times of natural disasters and the BDF is no different.825 This is because, in most cases, militaries not only have that mandate but also because they have the necessary equipment, and training to respond to disasters of all sorts. One of the BDF’s responsibilities according to Section 175 of the BDF Act is to provide aid to the civil authority during times of need.826 This provision resulted in cooperation between the Botswana Police Service and the BDF to perform various tasks including search and rescue missions.

In Botswana, the rainy season usually runs between November and March, but rainfall is usually sporadic throughout. Between November 1994 and March 1995, however, the country received abnormal amounts of rainfall that resulted in serious floods in the Central Distric, mainly

Mahalapye, Palapye and Serowe. This natural disaster claimed 20 lives within the first month of

823 “BDF recruits donate computers” The Botswana Daily News, 11 April 2014. 824 “Home for the homeless of Mogadishu” Mmegi Online, 20 March, 2015, accessed 28 July 2020, https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=50044&dir=2015/march/20 825 John Y. Schrader, The Army’s Role in Domestic Disaster Support: An Assessment of Policy Choices (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 1993); James F. Miskel, Disaster Relief and Homeland Security: What Works, What Doesn’t (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2008), 59 – 60. 826 BDF Act of 1977, Chapter 21:05, Part XII, Section 175

302 the rainy season.827 The continued heavy rains throughout the country also resulted in the loss of homes, livestock and businesses in those areas. Because it was the only organisation in the country equipped with airboats acquired from the US government in 1993, and the mandate to aid the civil authority in times of need, the BDF began search and rescue missions that lasted for several weeks and saved countless lives.828 This was the first time the BDF used those airboats for disaster relief as they were mainly purchased for use in anti – poaching operations in the Chobe area. The following year in 1996, the BDF responded to another natural disaster in Sua, a village in the north east of Botswana, when heavy rains resulted in more floods that were flowing towards the salt – producing pans. Economically, the Sua pans are important as the salt they produce is sold to SADC countries and for that reason, the BDF was called in. It deployed troops in a mission they named

Operation Save Sua whose task was to quickly and strategically place over 90 000 sandbags and

12 000 tyres to build an artificial wall that helped redirect the flow of the flood water.829

In some instances, under the umbrella of CSR, the BDF performed tasks that could be otherwise deemed as unconventional for a military. For instance, between 1996 and 1997,

Botswana’s livestock economy was threatened by an outbreak of cattle lung disease in the

Ngamiland District. In this region of the country, wildlife roams freely on the same area where cattle would normally graze. This presented problems for the unarmed agricultural officers from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) because the area was also a hunting ground for lions and hyenas. The ministry then requested that the BDF deploy soldiers to help control the movement of livestock and contain the spread of the disease. At the end of 1996, armed BDF patrols were seen in the area directing the movement of livestock and by the beginning of 1997, MoA was winning

827 “Mogae visits flood victims” The Botswana Daily News, 23 February 1995, 1. 828 “Pula e sentse ko Motseng wa Mahalapye” The Botswana Daily News, 24 February 1995, 3 – 4. 829 “To satisfy our customers” Africa Defence Forum 10 June 2020, accessed 28 July 2020, https://adf- magazine.com/2020/03/to-satisfy-our-customers/

303 the war against the cattle disease. The successes in this small operation resulted in the BDF deploying several times between 2000 and 2002 to help MoA curb the spread of Foot and Mouth cattle disease in Matsiloje and Francistown.830

Sports in African Colonial Militaries

The involvement of militaries in sports around the world has a long history such as in mid 19th century Britain when military academies such as Sandhurst and Woolwich used physical activity to encourage discipline. According to a scholarly study by Tony Mason and Eliza Riedi, “a kind of football was certainly played at the East India Company’s college at Addiscombe in the 1850s

… as an opportunity for older boys to rough up the younger ones.”831 By the 1870s, other sporting activities such as cricket, boating and swimming became widely encouraged in military schools.

In other instances, sports served as an important tool in promoting unit spirit and physical fitness.

During the Spanish - American War of 1898 for instance, a group of young soldiers of the US

Army played games to combat alcoholism and high cases of desertion among the rank and file.832

In Africa, the development of sports in military service began as a form of leisure for some

European colonial officers. According to James Campbell’s 2003 doctoral thesis, sporting activities such as polo and big game hunting in Kenya occupied British officers who mostly came from the upper classes in England and therefore were familiar with such activities. Campbell further added that the title Inspector of Gymnasia had been formalised in the British Army before the South African War of 1899-1902. The inspector was in charge of the gymnastic staff that

830 “Will Botswana ever stop foot and mouth disease in its tracks?” Sunday Standard, 22 September 2016, 5; Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 120 831 Tony Mason and Eliza Riedi, Sport and the Military: The British Armed Forces 1880 – 1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5. 832 Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Playing to Win, Sports and American Military, 1898 – 1945 (New York: State of New York Press, 1997), 16.

304 conducted the physical training of the recruits who were coming in during the war. At the end of the war, various physical fitness activities were strongly encouraged across the British Army. 833

This gradual introduction of sports in the military has also been connected to the masculinity of war which reinforced the idea that being a soldier was a job which only men could perform.

Historians such as Colm Hickey and Patrick McDevitt, amongst others, examined this connection and both recognise the importance of strength and endurance of men in the British Army and attribute them to the idea of the manliness of war.834 Aside from that reason, army work is physically demanding and requires one to be in peak condition.

Essentially, by the time the colonial period began in Africa, Europeans had developed sporting activities within their armies which also played a crucial role in boosting cooperation and morale. It was also seen as a way of modelling acceptable behaviour among the soldiers and colonial subjects alike. In this way, a strong sports foundation within colonial armies was used as an instrument of controlling both the rank – and – file and colonised peoples.835 According to Peter

Alegi, police forces and armies such as the KAR and RWAFF played a fundamental role in the development of sports in colonial Africa, though colonial officers initially discouraged the rank – and – file from playing football. From early on, African soldiers played football informally as part of their physical training or during their off – duty periods.836 Football in most of Africa was

833 James Bowden Campbell, “The Army isn’t all Work: Physical culture in the evolution of the British Army, 1860 – 1920” PhD dissertation, (University of Maine, 2003), 16 – 17 834 Patrick McDevitt, May the Best Man Win, Sport, Masculinity and Nationalism in Great Britain and the Empire, 1880 – 1935 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 10 – 11; Colm Hickey, “A Nelsonian Broadside to Six Pounder Salvo: Athleticism and the Great War” in Manufacturing Masculinity, The Mangan Oeuvre, Global Reflections on JA Mangan’s Studies of Masculinity, Imperialism and Militarism, ed. Peter Horton (Berlin: Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH, 2017), 103. 835 Humphrey Asamoah Agyekum, “The Best of the Best: The Politicisation of Sports under Ghana’s Supreme Military Council” in Sports in African History, Politics and Identity Formation, ed. Michael Gennaro and Saheed Aderinto (Oxon: Routledge Publishers, 2019). 836 Peter Alegi, African Soccerscapes, How a Continent Changed the World’s Game (Athens, Ohio University Press, 2010), 21.

305 therefore made popular by colonial and post-colonial servicemen. In Southern Rhodesia,

(Zimbabwe today), organised sports such as football and boxing became popular through the activities of African police and soldiers. By the early 1920s, these sports, particularly football had become very popular amongst black Rhodesians and eventually led to African policemen and soldiers spearheading the development of various football teams in the country.837 Though sporting culture in African militaries first emerged among colonial Europeans, these activities gained popularity among African troops and eventually the African public.

Sports for Morale, Recreation and Recruitment

Though football is the most popular spectator sport in Botswana, it is unfortunate that the literature around its introduction and development in the country is very thin. It is commonly believed that football was first brought to Bechuanaland by missionaries and colonial officials probably in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century though the exact period is not known. The sport was popularised by the colonial police force who organised a football team and a small league possibly to keep the men physically fit and build morale. Towards the end of the colonial period, football teams such as Police XI Football Club, Mogoditshane Fighters and Gaborone United were already competing for notoriety in the domestic league operated by the Botswana National Football

Association (BNFA).838 Throughout the 1970s, football in Botswana grew not only as a spectator sport but also as a conduit for improving diplomatic relations with other countries. In February

1977 for instance, a football team from China landed in Botswana to spend a week playing a series

837 Stapleton, African Police and Soldiers, 109 – 110. 838 It is not clear when the BNFA was established but it was the football governing body that later came to be known as the Botswana Football Association (BFA) that exists today. “Clubs – BNFA Dispute, Meeting of Three Planned” The Botswana Daily News, 22 February 1977, 3; “Gaborone United” Mmegi Online, 26 October 2015, accessed 19 July 2020, https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=55163&dir=2015/october/26

306 of matches against local teams in Francistown, Mahalapye and Gaborone.839 This visit had been organised by Botswana’s Ministry of Home Affairs which was also simultaneously hosting a

Chinese delegation that arrived with the team to discuss international trade and cooperation between the two countries.840

BDF XI Football Club

The BDF Football Club, known as BDF XI, was formed in 1978 using a nucleus of men who had played football for Police XI FC. During its formative days, BDF XI was made up of mostly former

PMU personnel but a significant number of new BDF recruits joined the team which boosted its numbers greatly.841 The development of football within the military was done to keep the troops fit and occupied in camps during downtime which was important as it allowed them to build teamwork and morale. Equally important was the fact that football was a popular spectator sport that drew massive crowds and created recruitment opportunities. Though in the 1980s and 1990s the urge of able-bodied Batswana men to join the military was generally high, it was still important for the BDF to use sporting activities such as football matches to showcase the lighter side of army life. Consequently, BDF XI rapidly became a success within the domestic league winning its championship 8 times which was largely because it had physically superior men who trained every day in contrast to teams that were made up of civilians who worked regular jobs. BDF XI also won a plethora of domestic competitions including the Lion Cup, Coca Cola Cup and the coveted

Mascom Top 8 which not only improved the prestige of the team but brought in much needed

839 “Chinese players fly in” The Botswana Daily News, 22 February 1977, 3; “Chinese trounce Mahalapye 4-nil” The Botswana Daily News, 24 February 1977, 4 840 “National XI meets Chinese XI this Sunday” The Botswana Daily News, 24 February 1977 841 Keatlholetswe, Interview.

307 revenue for the players.842 The players of BDF XI received regular army pay as well as their remuneration through the team which provided yet another great incentive for potential recruits.

Apart from that, the team also enjoyed access to BDF training facilities that were not open to other local teams. It was a combination of the various factors discussed above that turned BDF XI into an important recruitment mechanism for the military.843 Throughout the years, a large portion of

BDF XI players became nationally recognised icons who also played for the Botswana national football team, the Zebras. Amongst Botswana’s footballing greats were BDF men such as Sergeant

Zara Ramanoko, Warrant Officer II Master Katse, Major Masego Nchingane (who was the author’s favourite local football player during his younger days), Lance Corporal Modiri Marumo who went on to have an illustrious football career in the South African Premier Soccer League

(PSL) and Corporal Mompati Thuma who captained the Zebras team that represented Botswana at the 2012 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON).844

While playing in the domestic Botswana Premier League is seen as prestigious, many individual footballers who join teams such as BDF XI aspire to play abroad, mainly in South

Africa’s PSL because it is highly lucrative and a lot more competitive. In this case, BDF XI and other teams tend to feed the PSL with talented footballers, though this happened on a small scale.

Over the years, this has been one of the main contributions of BDF XI to Botswana football with the military attracting talented footballers who then used it as a stepping-stone to the prestige of the PSL.845

842 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 143. 843 Keatlholetswe and Mbaakanyi, Interviews. 844 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 143. 845 “Players from Botswana lack hunger to play in South Africa” BBC Sport, 1 September 2019, Accessed October 16, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/49510041

308 BDF involvement in sports has also contributed to national pride. In 2012, the Zebras team, which was then under the stewardship of the BDF’s Lt. Col. Stanley Tshosane, made history by qualifying for its first ever Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) competition hosted collectively by

Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Batswana across the country displayed the national flag on their vehicles and houses throughout the competition and gathered at local bars and pubs to watch the

Zebras play. Though the team was knocked out early in the competition, Tshosane had accomplished a major feat that would be remembered by many Batswana for years to come. Apart from Tshosane, BDF XI also produced a number of men who coached the Zebras, amongst them

Captain Six Keatlholetswe and Major David Bright both of whom were awarded presidential medals in 2018 for their excellent service in the development of football in the country.846

Other Sports

Apart from football, the BDF added to the development of various sports in the country such as softball, karate, volleyball, netball and boxing. Its softball team known as BDF IX formed in the mid-1980s and followed a similar developmental process as the football team. It dominated the domestic softball league, which despite being a lot less popular than football, also drew throngs of people. Netball was another spectator sport where BDF personnel excelled. According to Eilidh

Macrae, it was a quintessential female sport popular amongst English women in the early 1900s.

The objective of the game was to prepare young girls for their roles as mothers and wives where they “had to restrain their bodies by not travelling when they held the ball and by avoiding physical contact with other players.”847 By using their bodies to protect the ball against opposing players,

846 Keatlholetswe, Interview. 847 Eilidh H. R. Macrae, “Exercise and Education: Facilities for the young female body in Scotland, 1930 – 1960” in Sports, Health and the Body in the History of Education ed. Mark Freeman (New York: Routledge, 2015). 44 – 45

309 Macrae suggests that the game taught the young girls that they had to do the same with their infants in their daily lives as mothers. Though this may have been the case in the early 1900s, Macrae’s explanation seems dated in that over the years, netball has seen a steady influx of men which eliminated the gendered nature of the sport.848 In South Africa, netball was tied closely to Afrikaner nationalism and was therefore popular among white women. After the fall of apartheid, however, it became more appealing to black South Africans who formed local leagues that would compete within the region.849 In Botswana, netball arrived well after the colonial period in the late 1980s.

It quickly became a permanent feature in the extra-curricular activities of Botswana’s schools where it was played by boys and girls. It was through the school system that the BDF Cats was established, first as a team made up of a combination of female students and women from the community. Its first name was Black Peril but then it received sponsorship from a locally owned boutique called Cats. Its name then changed to Black Cats but after 1994 when the sponsorship ran out, the BDF took it over and it changed its name once again to BDF Cats. At that time, the

BDF did not have women within its ranks but after 2015, the Cats included some female BDF personnel. Domestically, the Cats have performed well and contributed a large number of players to the national team that competed internationally in the SADC region and beyond.850

Its contribution to the development of various organized sports around the country allowed the BDF to become a member of the International Military Sports Council (CISM) which was established in February 1949.851 CISM is one of the largest multi – national organisations that hosts annual sports meetings between militaries. One of its main objectives was (and is) to improve

848 Angela Pippos, Breaking the Mould, Taking a Hammer to Sexism in Sport (Melbourne: Affirm Press, 2017), 11. 849 John Nauright, Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa (London: Leicester University Press, 1997), 19 – 20. 850 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 149. 851 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 154.

310 international cooperation between various militaries as well as promote peace and positive relationships between member nations.852 By sending its athletically inclined troops to perform on the global stage alongside other soldiers, the BDF became a pillar of Botswana society that opened doors to international exposure and experience. It is at such international meetings that BDF personnel engage closely with other soldiers and learn about how different militaries run their social programs.

Military Service and Music: A Brief Historical Background

The history of music in the British Army is perhaps as old as the army itself with its evidence dating back to the mid seventeenth century where musicians were assembled to occasionally play during the English Civil War of 1642 – 51.853 Even before that period, drummers and trumpeters had formed an essential part of the British military as they were used to convey commands that organised troops in the battlefield, a tradition that carried on for generations. It was not until the late 1700s that army bands became a regular feature in the army when officers of elite regiments including the Royal Artillery popularised them.854 Evidence suggests that by the early 1800s, the

British Army possessed a highly sophisticated network of bandsmen.855 Army bands were important as they performed key tasks during certain rituals and ceremonies such as funerals of important people or during the arrival of dignitaries. This rich history and its importance in the development of colonial militaries cannot be understated. The colonial period in Africa also saw

852 Donald J. Mrozek “The Military, Sport and Warrior Culture” in The Columbia History of Post – World War II America, ed. Mark C. Carnes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 139 – 40. 853 Lewis Winstock, Songs & Music of the Redcoats: A History of the War Music of the British Army, 1642 – 1902 (London: Leo Cooper Limited, 1970) 9 – 10. 854 Trevor Herbert and Helen Barlow, Music and the British Military in the Long Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 18 – 20. 855 “Music in the British Military” New York Times, 24 December 1877, 5. Accessed 30 June 2020, http://ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/docview/93619522?accountid=9838

311 the growth of regimental bands who played a fundamental role in boosting the morale of colonial armed forces as well as aiding the recruitment of Africans into military service. The KAR Band appears to have been established in 1901 around the same time East African battalions were amalgamated into what became the KAR.856 In the Gold Coast (Ghana today) in 1941, the regimental band there played music while aircraft dropped recruitment leaflets in order to attract men into joining the military which re – emphasised the importance of music in British colonial armies.857

The BDF Band and its Significance

The BDF Band has a history that dates back to the formation of the PMU in the late 1960s. One of the main functions of the PMU band, according to Maj. General Oitisile, was to perform during parades and official ceremonies as well as during rituals such as funerals. The PMU Band performed similar functions to what British regimental bands had done many years prior and were still doing. The structure of the PMU Band was not clear except that it was very small. In the early

1970s, it consisted of only five musicians: Sgt, Fire Katse, Sgt. Jackson Mabreaden, Cpl. Edwin

Masike, Lance Cpl. Bajaki Mosweu and Cpl. Molefhe Phiri. These buglers and drummers served in the PMU Band under the direction of Assistant Superintendent Peter Osile. In 1973, Osile travelled to Nigeria to study the organization of the well-established Nigerian Army and Police bands with the hopes of improving the overall structure of the PMU Band.858 When he returned, he slowly started to restructure the PMU band and by the time the BDF was formed, he became its

856 Moyse Bartlett, “The King’s African Rifles, 695; see also Malcolm Page, A History of the King’s African Rifles and East African Forces (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books LTD, 1998), 149; Mike Buckle, Heart’s Greatest Ever Season, The 50th Anniversary Celebration (London: Black & White Publishing, 2007). 857 Killingray and Plaut, Fighting For Britain: 46 – 47. 858 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 95.

312 first Director of Music until he retired in 1979. When he left, the BDF made significant attempts to increase its number of musicians so that it could properly cater for the Francistown and Selebi

Phikwe companies. Initially, band recruitment remained within the military, that is, the BDF invited men from within its ranks who had an interest in music to join the Band Wing.859 After the existing troops who expressed their interest had all joined, the BDF then invited civilians to join the band. Those recruited for the band underwent the same military training as other soldiers. They also had to be within the required age bracket, 18 – 24 years, and possess the same educational and physical standards as their counterparts.860 This means that the band was not treated differently than other organs of the army. In the years following its formation, the band grew steadily until it was divided into several units that served the various BDF garrisons. Within this framework, No.

1 Band remained in Gaborone where it served the SSKB, Village garrison and the Glen Valley

Barracks. No. 2 Band moved to the Francistown garrison and No. 3 Band was based at the

Thebephatswa Airbase.861

Over the years, the BDF Band became a key feature of Botswana’s popular culture through an array of musical performances and the release of their jazz albums. Though they did not necessarily sell many copies, the band’s music was generally appreciated by the older generation.862 Like the social programs that the BDF undertook over the years, its band also served as a necessary link that helped improve the military’s relationship with the society of Botswana.

With music being a highly transferrable skill, the BDF Band also created local musicians such as the Kwasa Kwasa star Frank “Franco” Lesokwane who is loved throughout the country. Franco, who retired from the military band in 2001 to pursue his music career, now has 17 studio albums

859 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 93. 860 “Vacancies in the Botswana Defence Force Band” The Botswana Daily News, 18 June 1979, 5. 861 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 95. 862 “BDF releases its third album” The Botswana Daily News, 10 July 1985, 4.

313 under his belt and is the only Motswana to share the stage with Congolese rumba legend, Koffi

Olomide. Franco has also used his skills to teach other upcoming rumba musicians in the country who themselves have several albums, not just in the Kwasa Kwasa genre but Afro Pop as well.863

Other locally produced musical geniuses who retired from the BDF Band and went on to illustrious music careers include Jeffery “Jeff” Matheatau and jazz legend Socca Moruakgomo who was close friends with the late Hugh Masekela, one of South Africa’s most iconic jazz artists.864 These men are amongst Botswana’s most celebrated musicians who mostly learned their music skills while in service with the BDF Band. In essence, police and military bands, whether during colonial or postcolonial times, played a critical role in introducing popular culture to African societies. These new musical instruments – tambourines, xylophones and many others, as well as the skills required to masterfully play them were transferred to other people by the bandsmen thus creating a bustling music culture and popular genres across most of Africa. In Botswana this was certainly the case with Socca, Franco and Jeff whose music remains popular in Botswana today.

BDF Social Support Systems

Like most modern professional militaries, the BDF created services aimed at helping soldiers cope with the distresses of army life. These services included the chaplaincy office, which provides religious guidance to soldiers and their families in times of need as well as the Social Welfare

Office that offers services including trauma and family counselling, and mental health therapy.865

This shows that the BDF was striving to keep up with other militaries. Though Social Welfare and

863 “Fantastic Franco and his music” The Voice Online, Accessed 1 August 2020, https://news.thevoicebw.com/the- king-of-kwasa/ 864 James R. Denbow and Phenyo C. Thebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), 215. “Socca Moruakgomo remembers Hugh Masekela” Botswana Unplugged Online, accessed 2 August 2020, https://botswanaunplugged.com/9815/socca-moruakgomo-remembers-hugh-masekela/ 865 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 104.

314 Chaplaincy offices did not exist in 1977 when the BDF was established, their significance in a modern professional military cannot be understated particularly in the context of Post-Traumatic

Stress Disorder (PTSD), desertion and high suicide rates within armies around the world.

Generally, psychiatry in the military became a major phenomenon towards the end of the First

World War when physicians in the British Army grappled with different cases of battle fatigue, combat stress reaction and shell shock, which may have been the same phenomenon if not closely related. From early on, these physicians believed that the damage done to the soldiers’ nerves by bombardment ultimately resulted in their deteriorating mental health.866 Over time, with more research and advances in medicine, psychological problems resulting from military work were linked to PTSD though today this is an umbrella term that encompasses a wide range of mental health issues.867 It was because of the growing awareness of mental health issues that most modern militaries rigorously pursued policies to maintain the mental health of troops.868 In the BDF, this was no different though the provision of mental health counselling to troops developed much later in the 1980s. When it was established, the BDF had a dedicated medical services unit that hired civilian doctors and nurses, but it is not clear whether it had personnel dedicated to counselling. It is highly likely that this was not the case. Evidence, however, suggests that the role of counselling was loosely given to local Christian pastors who were appointed through the Botswana Council of

866 Peter Leese, Shell Shock, Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 10; see also Robert Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army of the Second World War (New York: Routledge, 2018). 867 Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War (Hove: Psychology Press, 2005), 3 – 5. 868 The literature of the importance of medicine in modern militaries over the years is plenty and continues to grow in modern times. See for Example, Norman M. Camp, US Army Psychiatry in the Vietnam War, New Challenges in Extended Counterinsurgency Warfare (Houston: Borden Institute, 2014), 300; Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001); Eric Jaffe, A Curious Madness: An American Combat Psychiatrist, A Japanese War Crimes Suspect and an Unsolved Mystery from World War II (Toronto: Simon and Schuster, 2014) and in general John Weaver and David Wright, Histories of Suicide, International Perspectives on Self Destruction in the Modern World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

315 Churches to visit the BDF camps to pray and provide religious guidance for the troops on occasion.869 This means that the BDF leadership was more aware of the religious needs of the troops than their mental health. However, in the 1970s, it would not be wrong to suggest that mental health in the military had yet to become a major concern, particularly in Africa. According to retired Major General Pius Mokgware, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the BDF was marred with high suicide rates and desertion. This was a major worry to the command which conducted a study to determine the causes of the phenomena which resulted in the introduction of the Social

Welfare Department and a permanent Chaplaincy Office. Mokgware further added that these two services greatly helped the BDF resolve the problems of suicide and desertion but also allowed the high command to understand the problems faced by troops on a regular basis and provide means to rectify them.870

Other BDF programs that may have been unique in the region included the provision of transportation for the children of soldiers to and from schools around areas where camps and garrisons are located. The green BDF buses, famously known as ndoro-ndoro became a regular feature of the Botswana education system. According to Mokgware, it was important for the BDF to offer school transportation for the children of the soldiers so that their parents concentrated on doing their work.871 It is not clear why the BDF runs a plethora of social programs but does not have its own primary schools for the children of the troops which is common in other African militaries. One can perhaps guess that this is meant to increase the BDF’s integration with the greater society through the interaction of the troops’ children with others in regular public schools.

869 BNARS OP 28 / 1 Staff – Botswana Defence Force, Official Correspondence between PJM Ndebele, the General secretary of the Botswana Council of Churches, and Deputy Commander, Brigadier Ian Khama regarding their services in the newly formed BDF, 5 September 1977. 870 Mokgware, Interview. 871 Mokgware, Interview.

316 Most of these services including access to medical care and transportation were not restricted to uniformed personnel but also catered for other people who worked for the BDF such as nurses, doctors and their immediate families.872 As with the various CSR undertakings as well as sports development, these free welfare programs served as incentives for recruitment over the years but also improved the image of the BDF in the eyes of the public.

The BDF and the HIV/AIDS Scourge in Botswana

The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa began in the 1980s and had particularly devastating effects on

Southern Africa. Though isolated cases of the virus in Africa began much earlier, the disease spread rapidly through the continent making its way to the south where it multiplied exponentially mainly due to the existence of sex work in areas with high concentrations of migrant workers.

However, it would be unwise to point to Southern Africa’s cross – border employment life as the only cause for the spread of the disease. Other factors were an overall lack of information, largely in remote areas as well as the persistent stigma around the disease. This created a highly volatile situation that saw the numbers of infections spike in countries such as Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.873

In 1985, Botswana registered its first cases of HIV/AIDS but by the 1990s, it had some of the highest rates of infections in the world. Between 1992 and 1999, the percentage of the population living with the disease doubled from an estimated 18% to 39%. The disease mostly affected the country’s young population with the government estimating that more than 250 000 people aged between aged 15 – 45 lived with it. These numbers were made worse by the fact that

872 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 105. 873 Gregory Barz and Judah M Cohen, introduction to The Culture of AIDS: Hope and Healing Through the Arts in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2 – 4.

317 Botswana’s population was very small ranging between 1.36 to 1.61 million in the same period.874

With infection rates on the rise throughout the country, the BDF became one of the main areas of concern where the government had to adjust attitudes towards the pandemic. Though the statistics of infections within the military are not accessible, by 1994, the BDF decided to develop a comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy that aimed at curbing the growth of the disease within the military. This all – out war against the disease was not unique to the BDF as other countries in the region were equally affected by this pandemic. In Zimbabwe, an average of 3000 people were dying every week due to HIV/AIDS related illnesses in the late 1980s while infection rates within the ZDF were estimated to be five times higher than amongst civilians.875 In the early 1990s, the

ZDF launched its own program in a bid to control the spread of the disease that was claiming many civilian and military lives. Though Zimbabwe did not have a fully implemented HIV/ AIDS policy before 1994, it was important for the military, an employer of tens of thousands of people, to be seen pioneering different avenues to control the spread of the disease.876

One of the biggest problems with HIV/AIDS in the region was the associated social stigma and as a result, many of those who had symptoms were afraid to seek testing and counselling. This was a major problem that greatly increased infection rates across Botswana thus the major objective of the BDF HIV/AIDS policy was geared towards providing post – testing psychological

874 Serai Daniel Rakgoasi and Clifford Odimegwu, “Women Get Infected but Men Die! Narrative on Men, Masculinities and HIV/AIDS in Botswana” International Journal of Men’s Health, 12, 2 (2013): 166; see also Abimbola Cole, “Contemporary Uses of the Musical Arts in Botswana’s HIV/AIDS Health Education Initiatives: The Case of the Radio Serial Drama Makgabaneng” in The Culture of AIDS in Africa, Hope and Healing through Music and the Arts, ed. Gregor Barz and Judah M. Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 144 – 157. Population, total – Botswana, accessed 2 August 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=1999&locations=BW&start=1992 875 Reginald Matchaba – Hove, “HIV/AIDS in the Zimbabwe Defence Force: A Civil Society Perspective” in The Enemy Within: Southern African Militaries Quarter Century Battle with HIV and AIDS ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), 158 – 60. 876 Matchaba – Hove, “HIV/AIDS in the Zimbabwe” 161.

318 support to troops if needed.877 The expansion of HIV programs in the country was made possible by funding from the US government as well as the World Bank which collectively provided more than $ 50 million between 2008 and 2015.878 The BDF’s HIV/AIDS program was largely successful in that there has been a reduction in new infections within the military and over time, soldiers appeared to be less worried about the social stigma connected to being infected with the disease. The free anti – retroviral treatment and post – test counselling has allowed the soldiers who are diagnosed with the virus to manage it and maintain their effectiveness.879 Infection rates have gone down in Botswana and the region, largely due to the anti-retroviral therapy programs that were established in the 1990s.

877 Botswana Defence Force, A Ruby Jubilee, 108 878 Botswana National HIV/AIDS Prevention Support Project, The World Bank, accessed 2 August 2020, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P102299?lang=en 879 Sharp and Fisher, “Inside the crystal ball” 51

319 Conclusion

The numerous attempts by the BDF to appeal to the society serves two purposes. One is to improve public relations and the other is to entice men and women to join the force. Aside from the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture in Botswana, no other organisation has had a bigger impact on the growth and development of sports and popular culture in the country than the BDF. Since it was established, the military has put its own funds and resources towards promoting a wide range of sports in the country including some less popular ones such as volleyball and rugby. This type of involvement in sports development and music may not necessarily be unique to the BDF as other militaries in the region do the same to foster an overall positive image of the organisation in the eyes of the public. The various BDF teams created an atmosphere in which civilians can approach and interact with soldiers on a regular basis. Through those interactions, the military of Botswana is seen as an approachable entity that regular members of the society can trust to protect their lives.

Sports such as football, boxing, and netball were introduced to Botswana by the colonialists but grew in popularity because of the PMU and BDF. They draw large crowds and have served as a way to entice people to join the military with the hope of receiving the high levels of recognition and perhaps fame. There is no doubt that some who join the BDF through sports do so because they love those activities but there is also an element of genuinely wishing to pursue careers in professional football, particularly playing in bigger and more prestigious leagues such as the PSL in South Africa whose players own Range Rovers and Mercedes Benzes and live glamorous lives.

Modiri Marumo who went on to play for teams in the PSL became a role model not only for his former BDF XI teammates but young Batswana children who grew up aspiring to be like him.

Getting recruited by BDF XI was a good opportunity because the team has access to better training facilities, free housing as well as a consistent guaranteed monthly salary. The competitive nature

320 of BDF XI, that is, its pay structure, its facilities and prestige attached to playing for a winning side, created a situation where other league teams also tried to improve their attractiveness to players. Teams such as Township Rollers and Gaborone United in recent years improved their pay structures and incentives to prevent BDF XI from taking all the good players and turning them into soldiers. This resulted in the overall improvement of Botswana’s footballing standards.

The growth of music such as jazz and kwasa kwasa was made possible by the BDF band which introduced the pioneers of those genres in the country such as Socca and Franco. These men could not have gained their musical expertise and fame had it not been for the BDF band which opened their eyes and allowed them to teach many more people. This, therefore, means that the

BDF should be rightly credited for being one of the main avenues through which the music industry of Botswana has thrived. The importance of the BDF band, however, goes beyond creating future musical superstars in the country. Its live performances in organised events such as the President’s or Independence Days serves a similar purpose to sports, that is to improve the military’s appeal to the public. The same can also be said for the BDF’s CSR program. It is rare in Africa that a military uses its own funds to build houses for the less privileged or furnish schools in remote areas of the country with the latest computers. It is also rare that a military can be deployed to monitor the movement of cattle in a bid to control the spread of animal diseases yet the BDF did that. The

CSR program, though noble in its gesture, should be understood as serving the purpose of improving the image and stock of the BDF. This should not detract from the fact that before the

BDF existed, there was no organisation capable of emergency response in times of natural disasters, most of which resulted from heavy rains. Here was a home – grown military that had developed to the point where it now had the equipment, personnel and training necessary to provide relief and support to civil authorities in those difficult circumstances. Though this was one of the

321 fundamental functions of the military from the time it was established in 1977, the CSR program greatly multiplied how much the BDF can do in providing civil support. What was once a small core of policemen had evolved over the years into a fully functioning professional military that could afford to undertake non-traditional military operations and rescue lives or construct orphanages around the country.

Responding to the scourge of HIV/AIDS in the country represented yet another important undertaking by the BDF. Though this was not unique in the region, as an organisation that had thousands of personnel, many of whom were usually deployed away from their families, it acted responsibly to launch an internal campaign geared towards eliminating the social stigma around the virus.

322 Conclusion: From Policemen to Soldiers

It was rare that in a region and time when Africans in neighbouring countries such as Rhodesia and South Africa were waging wars against white minority governments in order to secure their freedom, the small democratic nation of Botswana resisted the idea of establishing its own military.

It was also rare that in a continent where coups and mutinies were common, the BDF followed a trajectory that promoted peaceful interactions with the society of Botswana instead of corruption and unprofessional behaviour. This study has demonstrated the ways in which the BDF differed from most other post-independence African militaries. While most African countries had maintained colonial armies that converted into national armed forces upon independence, the closest colonial Botswana had to a military were two different units that were established at different times. First Batswana men served in the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (AAPC), a temporary British unit established for the Second World War and demobilised as soon as the war ended and secondly, the PMU, which was created late in the late colonial period to maintain internal security. This lack of a colonial military was deeply rooted in the lack of funds in the territory as well as British perceptions that the people of Bechuanaland were not prone to violence, yet they launched some bloody riots in the 1950s. These financial difficulties continued for many years after Botswana gained independence from Britain in 1966 and were the basis of the decision by Seretse Khama to decline to establish a military. On numerous occasions, he downplayed the security needs of the country by deflecting questions in parliament regarding establishing a military. As president, his decision was to militarise the small PMU because he did not wish to be seen as aggressive towards Botswana’s neighbours. When the BDF was eventually established in

1977, president Khama asked for loans from the British government in order to help remedy the

323 financial challenges of creating the force. One may wonder why he did not seek those loans in

1966.

While we may criticise Seretse Khama’s lack of action at independence, we should also try to understand his perspective regarding the decision to not establish a military at the time. It could be argued that he played the cards he was dealt fairly well in that he considered how much economically reliant his country was on both South Africa and Rhodesia. From around the time

Botswana gained independence, both these neighbouring white minority states were responding to armed resistance from internal nationalist movements such as ZANU, ZAPU and the ANC.

Rhodesia and South Africa adopted a very aggressive stance towards African freedom fighters, some of whom during that early period of armed resistance had started fleeing into Botswana.

Seretse therefore knew that establishing a military might be interpreted as a threat by both

Rhodesia and South Africa and he did not wish to jeopardise the important relations with the two countries which would have resulted in his nation being economically stranded.

Following Rhodesia’s UDI in 1965, the African nationalist movements from that country armed themselves and began a war for independence that lasted for about 13 years and resulted in the influx of many refugees into Botswana. The spill over of refugees fleeing the war in Rhodesia created extremely difficult circumstances that left President Khama with no other option but to support what opposition Member of Parliament, Philip Matante had been agitating for. By early

1977, the security situation in the north and north – east of the country had become so dire that the

Parliament of Botswana quickly passed legislation to create the BDF. This process involved converting the men serving in the PMU into soldiers of the BDF though a few men chose not to enlist in the new military.

324 The BDF was modelled on the British Army thus strengthening ties with the former colonial power in the following years. The BDF’s formative structure was created by two British

Army officers, Brigadier John Gray and Major Jonathan Swann, who did so at the request of the force commander, Mompati Merafhe. The initial development of the BDF Air Wing, would have been impossible had it not been for Botswana’s ties with the British. It was set up by two former

RAF squadron leaders, Tony Durrant and Harry Haines who also trained the first pilots of the BDF and led it until the mid 1980s. Considering that its early establishment relied on British loans, equipment, rank structure, military instructors, as well as the strategic partnership with the Indian

Army, which was itself modelled on the former colonial power, there should be no doubt about

British Army influence on the early days of the BDF. However, British ties did not stop Botswana from opening relations with, and acquiring military hardware from Eastern Bloc countries, the

Soviet Union and China, particularly in the 1980s. Botswana’s Cold War neutrality made room for the opening of the Soviet Embassy in Gaborone and their subsequent delivery of military hardware to the BDF. Other African nations such as Tanzania also tried to balance foreign influences during the Cold War era.

The BDF continued where the PMU had left off by conducting regular border patrols in an effort to deter Rhodesian incursions, but its presence made a small difference. It arguably resulted in an escalation of these cross-border raids which culminated in the 1978 Lesoma ambush in which

15 BDF soldiers were killed at the hands of Rhodesian forces. This was a clear message for

Merafhe to reassess the strategy of his military as well as procure serious military hardware such as the BTR-60s for better troop protection and SA-7s to defend Botswana from aerial attacks.

These were acquired from the Soviet Union despite Botswana’s close ties to the British and other western powers which was indicative of Gaborone’s Cold War neutrality. The new APCs and

325 SAMs gave the BDF new lethal capabilities that helped them defend the country against a more significant external threat from apartheid South Africa after 1980.These acquisitions also signalled

Botswana’s newly discovered diamond wealth that allowed the BDF to expand its firepower.

Although the BDF followed a steady pattern of growth in terms of its rank – and – file, equipment and training, this study has demonstrated that the transformations that took place in the

1980s were largely in reaction to South African acts of aggression and coercion. The decision by the Seretse Khama and later Masire governments to secretly allow ANC/MK cadres to operate in

Botswana was both brave and risky. Though this policy helped fellow black Africans secure their freedom, it put the country’s security in jeopardy. The SADF was the strongest military in the region and perhaps the continent and supported by a very strong economy and an openly racist ideology. It went to great lengths to eliminate all ANC/MK members who had fled South Africa and operated in neighbouring countries including Botswana. Though most of their bases were in

Zambia, which itself had closer ties to the Eastern Bloc during this period, the best and most efficient way that the ANC/MK freedom fighters could cross into South Africa and stage their attacks, spread propaganda or smuggle weapons was through Botswana. This further complicated the already fragile security situation of which the BDF could do very little to contain as it was no match for the SADF. After the signing of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and

Mozambique in 1984 which ended the use of the latter as a staging area for ANC/MK attacks, the only passage that remained for South African freedom fighters was through Botswana. This saw an increase in guerrilla activity particularly the MK grenade platoon that conducted several cross- border attacks in South Africa mainly to garner support from the broader black South African population. In retaliation, the SADF conducted a major cross-border raid in Gaborone to eliminate known ANC operatives in 1985 that killed many people including some innocent Batswana. This

326 raid undercut the sovereignty of Botswana and proved the BDF incapable of dealing with the South

African threat. Between 1985 and 1989, the South Africans continued their aggression towards

Botswana by bombing houses, cars and public infrastructure believed to host more ANC/MK cadres. The BDF struggled to deter South African attacks throughout the 1980s and tried to further develop its lethal capabilities in response. Its acquisition of the Cadillac Cage V-150 APCs from the USA and the air radar system in 1986 and 1987, respectively was exemplary of a reactive rather than proactive policy of equipment procurement. The US V-150s were smaller APCs compared to the Soviet BTRs, so they were more suited for the streets of the capital, Gaborone, where all SADF bombings were taking place. They provided the BDF with the troop protection and rapid response it needed should there be other cross-border raids such as the one in 1985. The BDF was completely overwhelmed by these acts of aggression throughout this period and were responding after attacks had occurred in most cases. Perhaps this was due to a lack of clear intelligence or a fear of more retaliations by the SADF. In any case, these attacks ceased because of the end of the

Cold War and the concomitant transition of South Africa from apartheid to democracy which ended the regional struggle.

Another aspect in the growth of the BDF was the regional economic influence held by

South Africa that also stood in the way of further military expansion by Botswana. The evidence strongly suggests that the British government blocked the BAe’s attempts to sell the state-of-the- art Hawk fighter aircraft to the BDF in order to appease apartheid South Africa. The official reason for blocking this deal was that the British did not want to escalate tensions between the neighbouring countries, but it should be understood that the British were not prepared to sever ties with South Africa, one of their its biggest purchasers of military hardware. Instead, British officials offered the BDF older Strikemaster jets, a much weaker compromise and clearly concealed the

327 truth about their life expectancy leading to their decommissioning in the early 1990s because three crashed rendering them unsafe to fly. The deal to purchase the Strikemaster aircraft was one of the worst that the BDF ever undertook and perhaps reflects a lack of foresight by the high command who could have looked to purchase newer fighter jets from other suppliers.

Despite great antagonism from South Africa, the BDF in the 1980s continued to grow and established an anti-poaching unit that aimed to protect Botswana’s big game from armed poachers from the neighbouring Caprivi Strip of Namibia. Apart from being a diamond – based economy,

Botswana also relied on wildlife tourism to bring in foreign revenue. The country’s national parks in the Chobe and Ngamiland districts possessed different species of wildlife including elephants and rhinos which were being decimated for their tusks and horns. In a desperate attempt to preserve the natural environment and retain the attractiveness of those national parks and game reserves to foreign tourists, the government of Botswana in 1987 tasked the BDF with patrolling the areas for armed poachers. Neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya had long militarized their anti-poaching efforts so the BDF was not unique in that regard. The immediate successes of this anti-poaching unit reflected the growth of the BDF that some 10 years prior had just been established from a small core of former policemen.

When apartheid finally ended with the 1994 election of a new black majority government led by Nelson Mandela, Botswana suddenly no longer had to worry about the external threat posed by South Africa which became an ally. This study has maintained that the end of apartheid opened many new avenues for the BDF as the government of Botswana no longer had to contend with an aggressive neighbour. In the post – Cold War years, the BDF underwent a rapid expansion in terms of its personnel, operational capabilities and infrastructure. Though this exponential growth coincided with the end of the Cold War, there was another equally important factor, Botswana’s

328 healthy diamond economy which was strongest in the early 1990s. Under the command of Ian

Khama who took over from Merafhe in 1989, the BDF visibly adopted an aggressive stance of arms acquisition as was demonstrated by the astronomical increase in its annual budgets after 1990.

Though some who served within the BDF high command say that the post – Cold War developments were part of its natural progression, the evidence suggests otherwise. For instance, the rise in BDF spending during this period was mainly to increase its lethal capabilities, in particular, to build its Air Arm which included the construction of a massive air base at

Thebephatswa, and the acquisition of CF-5 Freedom Fighter jets and Hercules C-130 tactical transport aircraft which represented a huge leap forward compared to the Strikemaster and Britten

Norman Defender aircraft they operated before. The BDF also spent significant amounts of funds on the purchase of its first tanks - the Scorpion CVR (T) from Britain and later the Austrian-made

SK 105 Kuraissier light tanks. There is no doubt that these purchases were meant to place the BDF amongst the best – equipped militaries in the region.

Another important development that the BDF underwent in the post – Cold War period was participating in international peacekeeping missions alongside other militaries of the world.

Because this was the first time the BDF conducted external operations, these peacekeeping missions represented a major leap forward for a military that was established from a small police paramilitary unit. As one of the longest running democracies in Africa, Botswana saw a fundamental need to send its men to help restore peace and order in Somalia, Mozambique and

Lesotho. In Somalia, the BDF sent a contingent to serve first as part of the US led UNITAF and later as part of the UNOSOM to help secure transport routes for international aid. During their deployment, the men from Botswana received credit for being one of the few contingents able to successfully complete their mission without skirmishes with local clans in highly volatile and

329 hostile areas such as Mogadishu and Belet Huen. Though the entire mission failed, BDF successes were largely due to close relationships they established with local clan leaders which differed from what other contingents were doing. Their participation in ONUMOZ, the 1993 – 1994 peacekeeping mission in Mozambique that helped demobilise and integrate RENAMO and

FRELIMO forces that had been at war with each other since the late 1970s, was also a major success in the history of the BDF. Botswana sent a much larger contingent than the one in Somalia perhaps because of the closer SADC ties with Mozambique but also because it was less of a logistical challenge to transport men within Southern Africa. Furthermore, several commanding officers from the BDF were assigned key responsibilities in this mission which allowed them to learn the ropes of an international peacekeeping operation of such a magnitude.

Though the mission in Lesotho, Operation BOLEAS of 1998, has been criticised and labelled as an invasion of the country, it also taught the BDF many useful lessons that contributed to the force’s overall growth. The SADC mission itself was marred with operational errors that emanated from poor planning as well as the late arrival of the BDF contingent which resulted in casualties on the SANDF side at the hands of the LDF mutineers. However, the mission was successful in quickly quelling the unrest that had gripped the country for some time. Collectively, these peacekeeping missions were not only important for teaching some new skills to BDF personnel, but they also allowed Botswana to extend its foreign policy by aiding fellow African nations in their time of need. This was symbolic of a country that had become a major regional player since the collapse of apartheid in South Africa.

In the new millennium, the BDF experienced more significant growth in that its brigade grouping exercise was now almost complete. Beginning in the late 1980s, its main objective was to create a cohesive and efficient command structure that differed from the one the BDF had at its

330 formation. Brigade grouping also involved the creation of new lethal capabilities and the formation of new components that were not there at the beginning. The acquisition of fighter and transport aircraft, tanks, new APCs, and helicopters, as well as the training of new personnel that took place between 1987 and the early 2000s were all aimed at improving the structure and effectiveness of the military. Apart from this exercise, throughout the 1990s, the BDF took strides towards professionalism by sending men from its officer corps to various institutions in the region and around the world to acquire university degrees. By the 2000s, this had paid off greatly as a large majority of the junior and senior officers held one or more university degrees. The push towards professionalising the military had always been present, but it became more pronounced once the educational standards within the country grew. In the 1990s, the University of Botswana was producing more graduates when compared to previous years and a lot of them became open to serving in the military. University degree holders who were being recruited in the 1990s all went into the officer stream which meant that they could be promoted much faster than the officers who had joined in the 1980s without university qualifications. To remedy this, the BDF pushed the longer serving officers to also get their university qualifications so they would not be left behind in terms of promotions. This created a wide range of professional skills within the BDF’s officer corps. While this happened, the non – commissioned officers were also encouraged to improve their technical skills to create a well - balanced military. To top it all off, the BDF quickly moved to open its staff college in order to teach its own, region – specific curriculum to the officers.

Opened in 2008, it taught officers who otherwise would have had to travel abroad for this type of professional military education. It also entered into partnerships with the University of Botswana to enrol some of the officers for specialised courses where a large number of them graduated with either a diploma or master’s degree in defence and security studies.

331 While the efforts to professionalise were underway, the BDF took another major leap forward that changed the face of the military altogether. In 2007, under the command of Tebogo

Masire, women enrolled in the BDF for the first time. The BDF had formulated a plan to do this as early as 1987 though it may have served the purpose of buying time for the BDF and not genuinely intended for implementation, at least at that time. This study has demonstrated that there were several obstacles that stood in the way of women joining the military in the late 1980s and

1990s. First, the laws of Botswana were discriminative towards women and it took a lot of effort from pressure groups such as Emang Basadi to eventually change them. Secondly, the BDF at the time was indeed undergoing severe infrastructure shortages so accommodating women was not an important topic for the high command. Lastly, the macho attitude and belief that military work was only for men was strong within the BDF at the time. The commanders in particular were resistant to the idea of introducing women to the force. Furthermore, the fact that only a small number of women were enlisted, first into the officer corps, speaks volumes about the way in which this process took place. This clearly points to the country not being ready to have women soldiers in

1987 and so when their time came in 2007, it was important to gradually ease them into the BDF, hence the small batch of highly educated women who all became officers.

The developments that took place in the BDF in the post 2000 years should be viewed as a coming of age of Botswana’s home – grown military. Everything that had taken place between its establishment in 1977 and the time when women were introduced to the armed force was indicative of a professional institution that held the rule of law in high regard. The BDF differed greatly from most other militaries in the continent not only because of the circumstances around its late establishment but also the direction it took after it came into existence. This does not mean that the BDF did not suffer from mishaps or lack of direction in some instances, but rather that the

332 entire process of its establishment and transformation over the years was aimed at developing professionalism and discipline. In a country known as Africa’s longest running democracy, having good civil – military relations is fundamental in ensuring that peace and stability is maintained.

The control over the armed force is maintained by several mechanisms that were underwritten in the BDF Act of 1977. The BDF has always served the democratically elected presidents since

Botswana’s independence. There is also a defence council as well as the country’s judicial system that have always provided direction and control of the military. Importantly, these have, and continue to serve as safety measures that govern the direction of the BDF.

The endeavour to professionalise the military during the 1990s also coincided with numerous efforts to improve its image in the eyes of the public mainly through social projects most of which started in the 1990s when the BDF had surplus funds to put towards building of orphanages and houses for less privileged members of the society. Though in most cases these gestures aimed at improving the image of the military, they also represented genuine attempts to help some struggling Batswana, which is rare amongst other African militaries. By conducting these social projects, the BDF presented itself as a caring and compassionate organisation that remains connected to the society it serves. In a similar vein, the key role played by the BDF in sports development in the country was also meant to enhance its stock within the public eye. While it is important for the BDF to appear as a friendly organisation, it also uses these different sporting activities as a way to attract young men and women into the force considering that some people are recruited for that sole purpose. The success in sporting activities, particularly football, which is loved across the country, is one of the most important avenues the BDF uses to bring recruits into the force.

333 This study has traced the development and evolution of the BDF from the time it was established in the late 1970s to the new millennium. Relying on previously unused historical evidence including oral sources, it has provided a fresh examination of the local, regional and global circumstances around how the BDF came into being and how it made every effort to become a professional western – style military that differed from others in post-independence Africa.

There is no denying the BDF’s uniqueness in Africa related to the stability of Botswana.

The lack of a military in colonial Botswana meant that when the BDF was established it did not have the similar ethnic cleavages seen in the armies of former British territories such as Nigeria,

Ghana and Uganda. In those countries, British notions of martial based recruiting created ethnically polarised colonial militaries that later engaged in coups and numerous human rights violations in the era following independence. Furthermore, the strong national identity, and the institution of democracy in Botswana as well as the diamond – backed economy, were factors that supported the growth of the BDF and allowed it to provide good conditions of military service which eliminated the need for the men to engage in coups, mutinies and corruption.

334 Bibliography

Archival Collections Botswana National Archives and Records Services (BNARS)

C/HQ/4/3/b – Botswana Defence Force Headquarter Structure ____. Correspondence from Brigadier S. K. I. Ian Khama to Office of the President, 11 May 1978

BNARS S 568/13/12 – Establishment of Northern Game Reserves Correspondence from Philip Korwe regarding Botswana’s game reserves, 1960.

BNARS OP 28 / 1 Staff – Botswana Defence Force Files ____. Official Correspondence between PJM Ndebele, the General secretary of the Botswana Council of Churches, and Deputy Commander.

____. BDF Correspondence from M S Merafhe to Office of the President, 7 June 1978.

____. Letter from Seretse Khama to James Callaghan, ND.

____. Letter from Seretse Khama to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere thanking him for the arms and ammunition supplied to the BDF” 30 September 1978.

____. Ambush of Veterinary Staff by BDF” 22 June 1978.

____. Incidents involving veterinary staff in the Vakaranga/Tuli Circle Area” Correspondence from Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Permanent Secretary to the President 18, July 1978.

____. Border Security Incidents – 1974 – 82.

____. “BDF Act, Statutory Instrument and Amendment of Regulation 42 of SI 72 of 1977

____. Land Allocation, Mogoditshane – Correspondence from Director of Water Affairs to Secretary of the [Kweneng] Land Board, 31 May 1978.

____. Letter from President Khama to Dr. Kenneth Kaunda thanking him for all the assistance his country had given to Botswana, 30 June 1978.

____. Purchase of arms and ammunition - Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President, 19 December 1977.

____. Botswana Defence Force – Expenditure, 28 February 1978.

____. Training in India for Botswana Defence Force Personnel - Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President of Botswana, 19 April 1978.

335 BNARS OP 28/2 – Arms and Ammunition – BDF

___. Order of Arms from the United States, ND.

BNARS OP/28/10: District Intel Reports – Francistown.

____. Meeting reports of the Francistown District Intelligence Committee held on 27 April 1971.

BNARS OP 28/12 – Border Incidents – Botswana

____. Correspondence from Minister of Foreign Affairs South Africa and Office of the President, 1983.

____. Correspondence between Major General Merafhe and Permanent Secretary to the President, 22 July 1983.

BNARS OP 28/13 – Staff – Botswana Defence Force Files

____. Pilot Training, Botswana Defence Force. 27 October 1977.

____. Correspondence regarding the possible sale of Britten Norman Defender to Botswana between Mr Rowlands, CSAD, Mr Graham, Defence Department, and Mr Mansfield, 2 May 1977.

____. Purchase of arms and ammunition - Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President. 19 December 1977.

____. Ground Instructor – BDF Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President” 8 February 1978.

____. Contract signed by Anthony Maurice Durrant and Maj. General Merafhe 30 December 1977. ____. BDF Air Strips, 20 September 1977.

____. Report by Brigadier S.K.I Khama on Swedish/British Trip from 3rd to 21st September 1977.

____. Letter from JMS Edminston to Philip Steenkamp regarding the dysfunctional rifles. 8 November 1977.

____. Ref L2/7/242 – Defence Council Duties, From Principal Legal Draftsman to Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, 28 November 1977.

____. Correspondence from Maj. Gen Merafhe to Immigration pertaining to exemption of these individuals from getting work permits as they were contracted by the BDF, 24 October 1978.

336 ____. Training in India for Botswana Defence Force Personnel - Correspondence between Maj. Gen. Merafhe and Office of the President of Botswana, 19 April 1978.

____. Post-mortem reports: De Beer and Arden” 13 June 1978.

____. Salaries Review – Botswana Defence Force. Correspondence from J R Hobbs to Permanent Secretary to the President, 12 June 1978.

____. Correspondence from J R Hobbs to Permanent Secretary to Office of the President, 12 June 1978. 7 ____. Two New Observation Posts at Kazungula Ferry, Correspondence between District Commissioner, Kasane and Office of the President, Gaborone. 8 November 1977.

BNARS OP 36/1, ‘Application for Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union’ March 3, 1967.

BNARS OP 24/38 – Presentation of Credentials by the Russian ambassador Mr. Belokolos, 23 November 1970.

____. Correspondence from Brigadier Ian Khama regarding the services in the newly formed BDF, 5 September 1977.

BNARS OP 41/11 Colonial Office Files

____. Reports on poaching activities in Ngamiland – Correspondence from Dep Commissioner Osborne to K Osborne. 8 June 1966.

BNARS OP 58/1 Staff BDF Files

____. BDF Women Corps (Regular Army Regulations). 4 May 1987.

BNARS OP 58/2 – Defence Police Mobile Unit

____. Report prepared by the Central Intelligence Committee (CIC). 5 August 1966.

____. Report from Central Intelligence Committee. 5 August 1966.

____. Files regarding the history of the PMU from Deputy Commissioner. 11 August 1966.

____. Secret Telex from HMC Bechuanaland to Commonwealth Office. 11 August 1966.

____. Correspondence between H. A. Arthington-Davy of the British High Commission and J. A. Allison, Senior Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, Gaborone. 21 November 1966.

BNARS OP 58/5 – Botswana Defence Force – General

337 ____. “Correspondence between Lt. Gen S K Ian Khama and James K Bartleman, Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa” 27 August 1998.

____. “Correspondence from Tebogo Masire to Minister of Finance and Development Planning requesting to dispose of the remaining Strikemaster Aircraft” 2 October 1996.

____. “Correspondence from the Botswana – Japan High Commission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Botswana” 13 January 1998.

____. Employment of “trekkers” 18 May 1995.

____. “Conversion of Trackers into soldiers – correspondence between Office of the President to BDF Command” 1 September 1996.

____. “Somali Refugees – correspondence regarding asylum status of Somali interpreters in Botswana” 17 August 1996.

____. Payment for Chicken, GM Poultry (Serowe), Correspondence between Commander of the BDF and the Permanent Secretary to the President, 12 November 1997.

____. Payment of Chickens for GM Poultry (Serowe)” Correspondence between Acting Commander of the BDF, Col. L A. Motlhatlhedi and Permanent Secretary to the President, 17 November 1997.

BNARS OP 58/6 Import of Arms and Ammunition

____. Correspondence from PS Sekwababe to Major General Merafhe, 21 April 1988.

BNARS – HANSARD Parliamentary Files

Hansard 11, National Assembly, Sittings from, 8 – 17 January 1968 – Address from Mr. Nwako, Minister of State on readiness of the PMU. January 1968.

Hansard 57, National Assembly, Second Meeting, Third Session, Third Parliament, Sittings from 29 November to 17 December 1976 – Address by Dr. Q. K. J. Masire, 247.

Hansard 61, Second Meeting, Fourth Session, Third Parliament, sittings from 20 February to 23 March 1978. Statement by Mr. Nkhwa – Member of the Botswana People’s Party.

Hansard 103, Part 1, Second Meeting, Second Session, Sittings from February 11 to March 7, 1991.

Hansard 106, Part 1, Second Meeting, Fourth Session, Sittings from February 10 to March 9, 1992.

Hansard 110, Part 1, Fifth Meeting, Fifth Session, Sittings from February 8 to April 1st, p.154

338 Hansard 110, 2nd Meeting 5th Session, 6th Parliament, address by Minister of Presidential Affairs, Mompati Merafhe, 18 – 19.

The National Archives of the United Kingdom (KEW)

Foreign Commonwealth Files (FCO)

TNA FCO 45/2024 Police Force of Botswana/ Botswana Defence Force

____. “Brief for Secretary of State’s visit to Southern Africa, 4 April 1977.

____. Foreign Commonwealth Office Correspondence from M.J. Maconn, Overseas Police Advisor to D.K. Sprague, 1 May 1977.

____. Correspondence between D. K. Sprague of Central and Southern African Department and P. A. Rafter, British High Commission, Gaborone, 27 April 1977.

____. Correspondence between Alec Ibbott and R B R Hervey, 5 January 1977.

____. Correspondence between EJ Emery and Alec Ibbott Esq relating to formation of the BDF” 27 April 1977.

____. Correspondence between Mr. Graham, Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Leahy of the FCO” 20 April 1977.

____. Chinese weapons to Botswana. 29 April 1977.

____. Correspondence between D. K. Sprague of Central and Southern African Department and P. A. Rafter, British High Commission, Gaborone. 27 April 1977.

____. Botswana Defence Force Training. 27 April 1977.

TNA FCO 45/2025 – Foreign Commonwealth Files

____. Arms for Botswana Defence Force, 20 April 1977.

____. Further Help for Botswana – Correspondence between HMS Reid and M. Mansfield. 7 April 1977.

____. Correspondence from M.J. Maconn, Overseas Police Advisor to D.K. Sprague. 11 May 1977.

____. Proposed assistance to Botswana Defence Force. 16 May 1977.

____. Correspondence between Mr. Graham and Mr. Mansfiled. 3 May 1977.

339 ____. Correspondence between Mr. Mansfield and HMS Reid. 10 June 1977.

____. Correspondence between Palman Sales and Raftery. 15 July 1977.

____. Correspondence between Defence Sales Department and FCO” A series of letter dated between 11 November 1977. 3 January 1978.

____. Ministry of Defence – UK correspondence files, 15 July 1977.

____. Correspondence from HMS Reid to BH Cousins Esq. Explains that they had offered their services to Merafhe during his visit to the UK. 21 July 1977.

____. Sandhurst Course for Botswana NCO, 14 February 1977.

TNA FCO 45/2026 – Botswana Defence Force, Formerly PMU

____. Correspondence between Ministry of Defence and Maj. Gen Merafhe, 17 July 1977.

____. Correspondence between David Sprague and Turner, 4 July 1977.

____. Correspondence regarding British military aid for Botswana Defence Force,” 24 June 1977.

____. Ministry of Defence – UK, Military Charges for Overseas students – correspondence between D. Willcocks, Defence Department and Mr. J F R Martin, 27 June 1977.

____. Ministry of Defence – UK, Correspondence between JC Swann and Miss A. Francis, 6 July 1977.

____. Correspondence from HMS Reid to B H Cousins, Esq regarding trip to be made by Gray and Swann, 21 July 1977.

TNA FCO 45/2027 – Botswana Defence Force.

____. Letter from Major General Merafhe to Brigadier Gray, 27 October 1977.

____. Report on the BDF prepared by Brigadier J W Gray, 6 October 1977.

____. General Merafhe to JW Gray, 27 October 1977.

____. Arms sales to Botswana and Potential Arms sales, ND.

____. Application for release of information or Sale of Defence Equipment Overseas. 1978.

____. Correspondence From HMS Reid to Mr Rowlands regarding funds for BDF students at Sandhurst, 27 September 1977.

340

TNA FCO 105/797 – Visit of Major General Merafhe to UK

____. Correspondence from DJ Gordon to Sir. L. Allison, July 1982.

____. Correspondence from L. Allison to Wilfred Jones Esq, 18 March 1982.

____. Report prepared before Merafhe’s arrival to the UK by Miss D J Gordon, Southern African Department, 25 June 1982.

TNA FCO 105/2583 UK Arms Sales to Botswana

____. Application for the release of information and marketing of BAe Hawk series 60, 100 and 200 – Multiple, to Botswana, submitted on 9 January 1986, acknowledged on 15 December 1986.

____. Correspondence between A Pocock and Mr. Humfrey, Defence Sales Department, 5 February 1987.

____. C T W Humfrey to Mr. Ferguson, 27 February 1987.

____. From British High Commission, Botswana to MOD-UK and FCO, 11 March 1987.

____. Correspondence between CTW Humfrey and Mr Ferguson, Defence Sales Department, 6 February 1987.

____. Internal MOD-UK communique, 26 February 1987.

____. Arms Sales to Botswana – enclosed Hawk 100 and Hawk 200 brochures prepared by BAe. ND

TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe

____. Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort, 14 March 1990.

____. Merafhe – General Walker meeting report prepared by Lt. Col. A M Mason. 30 January 1990.

____. Sales of Arms to Botswana, A J M Dunlop, Southern African Department to Mr. Humfrey, 6 February 1987.

____. Report on visit by William Rutler, Tour escort, 14 March 1990.

TNA FCO 105/3651 – Visit to the UK by General Merafhe – Lt. General Merafhe’s Meeting with Mr. Weldgrave, 20 January 1990.

341 ____. Internal D-MAO, FCO and MOD-UK communique January 1990.

____. Merafhe’s Office call to Mr. Weldgrave, 20 January 1990.

____. Botswana Military Assistance – British High Commissioner to MOD-UK, January 1990.

____. Priority communique from British High Commission in Botswana to MOD-UK Secretary and FCO, January 1990.

TNA: FCO 141/1176, Police Departmental, Efficiency of BP Police – Reports

____. Letter from J.H. Le Rougetel to Lord Ismay – Commonwealth Relations Officer, dated 4 December 1951.

____. Report by W. C. Johnson, Inspector General of Colonial Police to the High Commissioner, Sir Evelyn Baring dated 30 October 1950.

____. Letter from Walter Harragin to Philip Mohl-Baker* dated 24 November 1948.

____. Letter from Acting Commissioner of Police to Government Secretary titled “Internal Security” dated 4 September 1948.

____. Letter from Anthony Sillery to H.E. Priestman regarding British fears of Africans learning about Malayan and Cold Coast uprisings. 13 September 1948.

____. Reports, Letter from Anthony Sillery to H.E. Priestman dated 13 September 1948.

Other Archival Sources

Botswana Defence Force Act 1977, Chapter 21:05, Government Printer, Gaborone NIA 11/70-85 issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “Soviet Policies in Southern Africa.

Oral Interviews

Tebogo C. Masire

Bakwena Oitsile Pius Mokgware Lesego Alfred Motlhatlhedi Molefhe Mooketsi Losika Six Keatlholetswe Mmutlane Gosalamang

342 Mukani Mokobi, Domcaza Mokwathi Cristopher Mbaakanyi Gerald O. Gabatlhokwe Oratile Charity Mothupi (Ratlhaga) Ednah R. Mfazo

Newspapers

The Botswana Daily News (Gaborone) March 1967 January 1976 January – December 1977 January – December 1978 June, August 1979 May 1984 January, February, May, June, July 1985 March, December 1992 January, February, March, April, June, August 1993 March 1994 February, August 1995 January, February, August, September 1998 April 2014

Mmegi (Gaborone) March 2017 June, August 1985 September 1989 April, October 1995 September 1998 October 2006 March 2007 February 2008 April 2011 (online) March, October 2015 (online)

Sunday Standard – Online (Gaborone)

343 April 2018 October 2013 May 2019 September 2016

Botswana Guardian and Gazette (Gaborone) January, October 1993

Sunday Times (Johannesburg) March 1978 October 1982 March 1984 January, June, August 1985

Rhodesia Herald June 1952

The Times (Johannesburg) November 1983 June 1996

New York Times (Online) December 1877 May 1983 September 1998

The Times of Zambia (Lusaka) December 1976

The Weekend Argus (Cape Town) June 1996

Diamond Fields Advertiser (Kimberley) June 1996

The Star (London) May, September 1988

The Observer (Johannesburg) May 1988,

344 Weekly Mail (Pretoria) July, September 1985 (online)

Jane’s Defence Weekly December 1995

Media Monitor July 1996

The Namibian (Windhoek) June 1996

Associated Press / AP News (Online) June 1988 June 1997

The Economist (Online) January 2016

Defence Web (online) October 2017

Africa Defence Forum June 2020

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Book Chapters

Adam, Hussein M. “Somalia, International versus local attempts at peacebuilding,” in Durable Peace, Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa, edited by Taissier M. Ali and Robert O. Mathews, 253 – 281. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006.

Agyekum, Humphrey Asamoah. “The Best of the Best: The Politicisation of Sports under Ghana’s Supreme Military Council” in Sports in African History, Politics and Identity Formation, edited by Michael Gennaro and Saheed Aderinto. 59 – 83. Oxon: Routledge Publishers, 2019.

Anderson, David M. and Rolandsen, Oystein H. “Violence as Poitics in eastern Africa, 1940 – 1990” in Politics and Violence in Eastern Africa, The Struggles of Emerging States, edited by Manderson, David M. and Rolandsen, Oysten H. 539 – 557. New York: Routledge Publishers, 2015.

Barz, Gregory. and Cohen, Judah M. introduction to The Culture of AIDS: Hope and Healing Through the Arts in Africa. 2 – 4. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Bullion, Alan James. “India” in The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood, 196 – 212. London: Frank Cass, 2005.

Cole, Abimbola. “Contemporary Uses of the Musical Arts in Botswana’s HIV/AIDS Health Education Initiatives: The Case of the Radio Serial Drama Makgabaneng” in The Culture of AIDS in Africa, Hope and Healing through Music and the Arts, edited by Gregor Barz and Judah M. Cohen. 144 – 157. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Campbell, Horace “Julius Nyerere: Between state-centred and people-centred Pan Africanism” in Africa’s Liberation, The legacy of Nyerere, edited by Chambi Cachage and Annar Cassam, 44 – 60. Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2010.

Chan, Stephen and Primorac, Ranka. “The Space of many Voices” in Zimbabwe Since the Unity Government, edited by Stephen Chan and Ranka Primorac. 1 – 5. New York, Routledge, 2013.

364 Eldredge, Elizabeth. “Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa c. 1800 – 1830, The Mfecane Reconsidered” in The Mfecane Aftermath, Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History, edited by Carolyn Hamilton, 123 – 161. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995.

Gross, Caroline A. “War Stopping and Peace Making in Mozambique” in Stopping Wars and Making Peace, Studies in International Law, edited by Kristen Eichensehr and W. Michael Reisman, 185 – 211. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.

Gurr, Ted Robert. “Theories of Political Violence and Revolution,” in Conflict Resolution in Africa, edited by Francis M. Deng and William Zartman. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1991.

Habtu, Hailu. and Byfield, Judith A. “Fighting Fascism: Ethiopian Women Patriots 1935–1941” in Africa and World War II, edited by Judith A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. 383 – 400. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Hanak, Harry. “Foreign Policy” in Khrushchev and Khrushchevism, edited by Martin McCauley. 180 – 193. London: Macmillan Press, 1985.

Henk, Dan “The Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) Transfrontier Conservation Area Project,” in African Environmental and Human Security in the 21st Century, edited by Helen E. Purkitt, 213 – 236. New York: Cambria Press, 2009.

Hickey, Colm. “A Nelsonian Broadside to Six Pounder Salvo: Athleticism and the Great War” in Manufacturing Masculinity, The Mangan Oeuvre, Global Reflections on JA Mangan’s Studies of Masculinity, Imperialism and Militarism, edited by Peter Horton. 87 – 114. Berlin: Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH, 2017.

Houston, Gregory. and Magubane, Bernard. “The ANC Political Underground in the 1970s” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970 – 1980], edited by Bridget Theron, 271 – 451. Pretoria: SADET, 2006.

Jackson, Paul. “Military Integration: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe” in New Armies From Old, Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, edited by Roy Licklider, 49 – 68. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014. ka Plaatjie, Thami. “The PAC in exile” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970 – 1980], edited by Bridget Theron, 703 – 748. Pretoria: SADET, 2006.

Kenosi, Lekoko. “The Botswana Defence Force and Public Trust: The Military Dilemma in a Democracy” in Ourselves to Know, edited by R. Williams, G. Cawthra and D. Abrahams. 189 – 203. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003.

Killingray, David. and Anderson, David M. “An orderly retreat? Policing the end of empire” in Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917 – 65, edited by David Killingray and David M. Anderson. 1 – 21. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.

365

Laitin, David D. “Somalia: Intervention and Internal Conflict” in Military Intervention, Cases in Context for the Twenty – First Century, edited by William J. Lahneman. 29 – 46. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC, 2004.

Lemarchand, Rene. “The Democratic Republic of the Congo, From Failure to Potential Reconstruction” in State Failure and State Weakness in a time of Terror edited by Robert I Rotberg. 1 – 49. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.

Macrae, Eilidh H. R. “Exercise and Education: Facilities for the young female body in Scotland, 1930 – 1960” in Sports, Health and the Body in the History of Education edited by Mark Freeman. 749 – 769. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Masha, Iyabo. “An Economic Assessment of Botswana’s Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS” in The Macroeconomics of HIV/AIDS, edited by Markus Haacker. 287 – 310. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2004.

Matlosa, Khabele. “Lesotho” in Security and Democracy in Southern Africa, edited by Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari. 80 – 97. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007.

Mbaiwa, Joseph E. “Tourism Development, Rural Livelihoods and Biodiversity Conservation in the Okavango Delta, Botswana” in Tourism Strategies and Local Responses in Southern Africa, edited by Petri Hottola, 90 – 104. Wallingford: CAB International, 2009.

Markakis, John. “Editorial; The Hammer, the Sickle and the Gun,” in Military Marxist Regimes in Africa, ed. John Markakis and Michael Waller. London, Frank Cass and Company LTD, 1986.

Matchaba – Hove, Reginald. “HIV/AIDS in the Zimbabwe Defence Force: A Civil Society Perspective” in The Enemy Within: Southern African Militaries Quarter Century Battle with HIV and AIDS, edited by Martin Rupiya. 157 – 188. Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.

Mazrui. Ali, introduction to The Warrior Tradition and Modern Africa 1-6, edited by Ali Mazrui. Lieden, E J. Brill, 1977.

Mbenga, Bernard. and Manson, Andrew. “Resistance and Repression in the Bantustans” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 2 [1970 – 1980], edited by Bridget Theron, 749 – 804. Pretoria: SADET, 2006.

Molomo, Mpho G. “The Trajectory of Civil-Military Relations in Botswana” in Civil and Military Relationships in Developing Countries, edited by Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi et. al, 137 – 164. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.

Mokhawa, Gladys. “All that Glitters is not Diamond: The Politics of Diamond Dependence and Abundance in Botswana” in Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler. 105 – 120. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2005.

366

Mrozek, Donald J. “The Military, Sport and Warrior Culture” in The Columbia History of Post – World War II America, edited by Mark C. Carnes. 131 – 154. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Sharp, Paul T. and Fisher, Louis M. “Inside the Crystal Ball – Understanding the Evolution of the Military in Botswana and Challenges ahead” in Evolutions and Revolutions, A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa, edited by Martin Rupiya, 43 – 62. Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2005.

Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, “Document V. Somalia: Human rights abuse by United Nations Force” in Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia, Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17 – 19 January 1994, edited by MA Mohamed Salih and Lennart Wohlgemut. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstutet, 1994.

Ralinala, Rendani Moses et al, “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol 1. 1960 – 1970, edited by Bridget Theron, 479 – 540. Johannesburg: UNISA Press, 2005.

Rathbone, Richard. “Political Intelligence and Policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s” in Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917 – 65, edited by David Killingray and David Anderson, 84 – 104. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.

Saul, John S. “Inside from the Outside? The Roots and Resolution of Mozambique’s Un/Civil War” in Civil Wars in Africa, Roots and Resolutions, edited by Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews. 122 – 166. Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 1999.

Schaffer, Marvin B. “The Missile Threat to Civil Aviation,” in Aviation Terrorism and Security, edited by Paul Wilkinson and Brian M. Jenkins, 70 – 82. London: Frank Cass, 1999. van Allen, Judith. “Radical Citizenship: Powerful Mothers and Equal Rights” in Power, Gender and Social Change in Africa, edited by Muna Ndulo and Magret Grieco. 60 – 76. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009.

Vandervort, Bruce. “New Light on the East African Theatre of the Great War; A Review Essay of English Language Sources.” In Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850 – 1918, edited by Stephen Miller. 287 – 306. Boston, Brill, 2009.

367 Journal Articles

Adugna, Minale. “Women and Warfare in Ethiopia: A Case Study of their Role during the Campaign of Adwa, 1895/96, and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–41” Gender Issues Report Series, 13, no. 1 (2001): 1 – 30.

Alden, Chris. “Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique,” Security Dialogue, 33, no. 3 (2002): 341 – 356.

Rakgoasi, Serai Daniel. and Odimegwu, Clifford. “Women Get Infected but Men Die! Narrative on Men, Masculinities and HIV/AIDS in Botswana” International Journal of Men’s Health, 12, no. 2 (2013): 166 – 182.

Bolaane, Maitseo, “Cross-Border Lives, Warfare and Rape in Independence- Era Botswana,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39, no. 3 (2013): 557 – 576.

Chitalkar, Poorvi. & Malone, David M. “Democracy, Politics and India’s Foreign Policy” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 17, no.1 (2011):75 – 91. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2011.563956

Clarke, FAS. “The Story of the West African Frontier Force” Royal United Service Institution 97: 586, (1952): 223 – 229. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071845209428814

Collins, Francis d.A. “The Rand and the Monetary Systems of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland,” Journal of Modern African Studies 16, no. 1 (1978): 97 – 121. https://www.jstor.org/stable/159767

Dale, Richard. “Not Always a Placid Place – Botswana Under Attack” African Affairs 86, no. 342 (1987): 73 – 91. https://www.jstor.org/stable/722867

____. “The Politics of National Security in Botswana: 1900-1990” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 12 no. 1 (2007): 40 – 56. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589009308729547

____. “The Creation and use of the Botswana Defence Force” The Round Table 73, no. 290 (1984): 216 – 235. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358538408453637

Decker, Alicia. “Idi Amin’s Dirty War: Subversion, Sabotage and the battle to keep Uganda clean, 1971 – 1979” International Journal of African Historical Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 489 – 513.

Draper, Mario. “The Force Publique’s Campaigns in the Congo – Arab War, 1892 – 1894” Small Wars and Insurgencies 30: 4 no. 5 (2019): 1020 – 1039. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2019.1638553

Dwyer, Maggie. “Fragmented Forces: The Development of the Gambian Military,” African Security Review 26 no. 4 (2017): 362 – 377. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2017.1353530

368

Ekoko, Edho. “The West African Frontier Force Revisited,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 10 no. 1 (1979): 47 – 63.

Ellis, Stephen. “Of Elephants and Men: Politics and Nature Conversation in South Africa” Journal of Southern African Studies, 20, no. 1 (1994): 53 – 69. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2637119

Ford, Matthew. “Building Stability Overseas: Three Case Studies in British Defence Diplomacy, Uganda, Rhodesia – Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 3 (2014): 584 – 606. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.913618

Grimmet, Richard F. “Conventional Arms Trade in the Post-Cold War Era” Congressional Research Service, (23 September 1993): 1 – 6 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/transfers-pcw.pdf Accessed 12 May 2020.

Henk, Dan. “The Botswana Defence Force and the War against poachers in Southern Africa” Small Wars and Insurgencies 16 (2005): 170 – 191. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079924

Jackman, Robert W. “The Predictability of Coups d’Etat: A Model With African Data, American Political Science Review 72 (1979): 1262 – 75.

Jackson, Ashley. “Motivation and Mobilisation for War: Recruitment for the British Army in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1941 – 42,” African Affairs 96, no. 384 (1997): 399 – 417. http://www.jstor.org/stable/723186.

____. “Bechuanaland, the Caprivi Strip and the First World War” War and Society, 19, no. 2 (2001): 109 – 142. https://doi.org/10.1179/war.2001.19.2.109

Kwakwa, Edward. “South Africa’s May 1986 Military Incursions into Neighbouring African States” Yale Journal of International Law, 12: 2, (1987): 421 – 443. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol12/iss2/10

Kwante MC Kwante, and Manatsha, Boga Thura. “Origins and Dynamics of the Botswana – Soviet Union Relations, 1960 – 1990” Botswana Notes and Records, 48 (2016): 85 – 96.

Landell – Mills, P M. “The 1969 Southern African Customs Union Agreement” The Journal of Modern African Studies 9, 2, (1971): 263 – 281. https://www.jstor.org/stable/159444 le Roux, C J B. “The Botswana Namibia Boundary Dispute, Towards a Diplomatic Solution of Military Confrontation?” New Contree, 44 (1998): 80 – 93.

Mafela, Lily. “Batswana Women and the Law, Society, Education and Migration, c. 1840 – c. 1980” Cahiers d’études Africaines (2007): 523 – 566.

369 Makgala, Christian. & Seabo, Batlang. “‘Very Brave or Very Foolish’? ‘Gallant Little’ Botswana’s Defiance of ‘Apartheid’s Golden Age’, 1966–1980 The Round Table, Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 106 (2017): 303 – 311. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2017.1327203

Makgala, Christian and Fisher, Louis M. “The Impact of Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle on Botswana: The Case of Lesoma Ambush, 1978” New Contree 57 (2009): 1 – 21.

Maringira, Godfrey. “Politicization and Resistance in the Zimbabwean National Army” African Affairs, 116, 462 (2016): 18 – 38.

Mburu, Nene. “Firearms and Political Power: The Military Decline of the Turkana of Kenya, 1900 – 2000” The Nordic Journal of African Studies 10, no. 2 (2001): 148 – 162.

McCracken, John. “Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police Force” The Journal of African History 27, no. 1 (1986): 39-40

Mgadla, Part. “A good measure of sacrifice”: Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa, 1965–1985’, Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies, 34, no. 1 (2008): 5 – 16.

Morapedi, Wazha. “The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of Zimbabwean Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960–1979” Journal of Southern African Studies, 38, no. 1 (2012): 73 – 90. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2012.649944

Morton, Fred. “Mephato: The Rise of the Tswana Militia in the Pre-colonial Period” Journal of Southern African Studies 38 no. 2 (2012): 385 - 397. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266578

Mole, Stuart. “Negotiating with Apartheid: The Mission of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group 1986” The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 101 (2012). 253 – 260. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2012.690968

Mogomotsi, Goemeone EJ. and Madigele, Patricia. “Live by the gun, die by the gun – Botswana’s shoot to kill policy as an anti-poaching strategy” SA Crime Quarterly 60 (June 2017): 51 – 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413-3108/2017/v0n60a1787

Murphy, Philip. “A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, 4, (2010): 765 – 780. https://www.jstor.org/stable/29778066

Neething, Theo. “Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation BOLEAS and Beyond” The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 22 (May 1999). http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_2neethling.htm

Niemann, Michael. “Diamonds are a State’s Best friend, Botswana’s Foreign Policy in Southern Africa” Africa Today, 40 no. 1, (1993): 27 – 47. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4186886

370 Nelson, Keith. “The Black Horror on the Rhine, Race as a Factor in Post-World War I Diplomacy” Journal of Modern History 42 (1970): 606 – 627.

O-Akurang – Parry, Kwabena. “African agency and Cultural initiatives in the British Imperial military and labour recruitment drives in the Gold Coast (colonial Ghana) during the First World War” African Identities 4, 2 (2006): 213 – 234.

Orth, Rick. “African Operational Experiences in Peacekeeping” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 7: 3 (1996): 308 – 323. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319608423150

Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi. “India’s Foreign Policy” Foreign Affairs, 34, no. 3 (April 1956): 432 – 440. DOI: 10.2307/20031175

Parsons, Timothy, “Wakamba Warriors are Soldiers of the Queen; The Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial Race, 1890 – 1970, Ethnohistory 46, No. 4 (1999): 671 – 701.

Parsons, Neil. “The Serowe Kgotla riot of 1952, popular opposition to Tshekedi Khama and colonial rule in Botswana” Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth Studies 40 (1990): 24 – 36. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/8766814.pdf

Ranger, Terence. “Connexions between ‘Primary Resistance Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa,” Journal of African History 9 (1968): 631 – 641. http://www.jstor.org/stable/180149

Richards, W. A. “The Import of Firearms into West Africa in the Eighteenth Century” Journal of African History 21, no. 1 (1980). https://www.jstor.org/stable/181483

Simelane, Hamilton Sipho. “Labour Mobilisation for the War Effort in Swaziland, 1940 – 1942,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 26 No. 3 (1993): 541 – 574. http://www.jstor.org/stable/220478.

Stapleton, Timothy. “The Composition of the Rhodesia Native Regiment During the First World War: A Look at the Evidence,” History in Africa no. 30 (2003): 283 – 295. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3172093

____. “Gamekeepers and Counter-insurgency in Kenya and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1952 – 1980, International Journal of African Historical Studies 49,2 (2016): 213 – 234. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44715475

____. “The Composition of the Rhodesia Native Regiment During the First World War: A Look at the Evidence,” History in Africa 30 (2003): 283 – 295. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3172093

____. “Martial Identities in Colonial Nigeria c. 1900 – 1930” Journal of African Military History 3 (2019): 1 – 32. https://doi.org/10.1163/24680966-00301003

371 Ukpabi, S.C. “The Origins of the West African Frontier Force,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 3 No. 3 (1966): 485 – 501.

Uzoigwe G. N. “Pre-Colonial Military Studies in Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 13, No. 3 (1975): 469 - 481.

Weiss, Herbert. “The Congo Independence Struggle Viewed 50 Years Later,” African Studies Review 55 No. 1 (2012): 109-115. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41804131

Williams, Paul D. ‘It’s a Crime to be a Tirraileur in the Army:’ The Impact of Senegalese Civilian Status in the French Colonial Army During the Second World War,” Journal of Military History 77 No. 1 (2013): 108 – 145.

Unpublished Theses or Papers

Campbell, James Bowden. “The Army isn’t all Work: Physical culture in the evolution of the British Army, 1860 – 1920.” PhD diss., University of Maine, 2003.

Gumbo, Bongani. “Economic and Social Change in the Communities of the Wetlands of Chobe and Ngamiland, with Special Reference to the Period since 1960.” PhD diss., University of Cape Town, 2010.

Maseko, Francis Bobby. “The Experiences of Botswana Defence Force Peacekeepers in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, The Case of Somalia, 1992 – 1995.” MA Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2014.

Mophuting, Mpho. “Expanding the Shield and Facing the Challenges: Integration of Women in the Botswana Defence Force.” MA Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, 2003.

Oitsile, Boipelo Winnie. “Botswana and the Liberation in South Africa and Zimbabwe: The Government and the People against White Racist Rule. M.A. thesis, Trent University, 2010.

Sello, Gorata B. “The Role of Scandanavian aid in the development of Postcolonial Botswana, 1966 – 2000.” MA Thesis, University of Calgary, 2019.

Thomas, Charles. “The Tanzanian People’s Defence Force, An Exercise in Nation Building.” PhD diss., University of Texas, 2012.

Whittaker, Blake H. “The ‘New Model’ Armies of Africa? The British Military Advisory and Training Team and the Creation of the Zimbabwe National Army.” PhD diss., Texas A & M University, 2014.

Woodfork, Jacqueline Cassandra. “Senegalese Soldiers in the Second World War: Loyalty and Identity Politics in the French Colonial Army”. PhD diss., University of Texas, 2001.

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