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1993 (30th) Yesterday's Vision is Tomorrow's The Space Congress® Proceedings Reality

Apr 28th, 2:00 PM - 5:00 PM

Paper Session II-A - Report of the Comstac Task Group on Soviet Entry Into the World Space Market

Robert D. Jones Program Manager-Advanced Technology, Rocketdyne Division-Rockwell International

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Scholarly Commons Citation Jones, Robert D., "Paper Session II-A - Report of the Comstac Task Group on Soviet Entry Into the World Space Market" (1993). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 5. https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1993-30th/april-28-1993/5

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FEBRUARY 1993

REPORT OF THE COMSTAC TASK GROUP ON SOVIET ENTRY INTO THE WORLD SPACE MARKET

ROBERT D. JONES PROGRAM MANAGER-ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ROCKETDYNE DIVISION-ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL

Presented to Canaveral Council of Technical Societies Thirtieth Space Congress Cocoa Beach, Florida 27-30 April 1993

4-10 REPORT OF THE COMSTAC TASK GROUP ON SOVIET ENTRY INTO THE WORLD SPACE MARKET

Robert D. Jones Program Manager-Advanced Technology Rocketdyne Division-Rockwell International

ABSTRACT Bob Jones Rockwell International, Rocketdyne Division paper is based on the evaluations of the special Task This Sam Mihara McDonnell Douglas Aerospace Group of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Gil Rye Orbital Sciences Corporation Committee as reported to the Department of Transportation. :02A)2/93 The Task Group analyzed the impact of entry of former Soviet Republics into world commercial space market and PROCESS provided policy recommendations to the Secretary of Trans­ portation. The use of Soviet launch series by United States The Task Group held biweekly meetings over a period of origin satellites should not be allowed until enforceable, fair several months. Interviews were conducted with individuals rules are agreed to by the United States and the Common­ from National Space Council, Office of US Trade Repre­ wealth of Independent States. sentative, Congressional Research Service, National Aero­ nautics and Space Administration, Department of State, INTRODUCTION Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) marketing representatives, and contractors who have recently visited This paper is based on the evaluations by the special Task the CIS. The group also met with Dr. Roald Saghdeev, the Group of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory former director of the Institute for Space Research in Committee (COMSTAC) as reported to the Department of Moscow. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation Transportation. The Task Group performed appropriate (OCST) authorized an on-site visit within CIS by one of investigations and provided draft recommendations for their support contractors, Berner, Lanphier and Associates, consideration by the Commercial Space Transportation who also provided data to the Task Group. Advisory Committee membership. STATUS OF CIS PROGRAM The charter of the Task Group was to— • Compile the Soviet's space transportation products and The military and civilian space programs of the former services being offered. were completely intertwined. At the peak, • Assess the marketability of these products and services. 1000 industrial and research organizations were involved, breakup of the • Evaluate the impact that market entry would have on the employing over one million people. With the trans­ domestic space transportation industry and include potential union, "ownership" of the various organizations About opportunities as well as threats, ferred to the republics in which they were located. 80% of these are in Russia. With little central funding, each recommendations to as­ • Prepare National Space Policy factory and laboratory is independently seeking foreign commercial space transpor­ sure the future viability of the business. tation industry. Present US policy does not permit the export of our The Task Group had members from and satellites for launch from the Soviet Union. This policy is satellite industries to encourage a fair hearing on policy based primarily on national security concerns. These con­ recommendations from both perspectives. Membership of cerns are greatly reduced now, and CIS leaders are urgently the Task Group was as follows: requesting a change in our policy to allow them to earn hard currency by providing launch services for Western satel­ Rick Hauck International Technology Underwrit­ lites. ers (INTEC) Lee Scherer General Dynamics Commercial SPACE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES Launch Services David Braverman Hughes Aircraft Company The family of CIS vehicles is illustrated in Figure 1. The Bill English Legal Consultant Soviet Union consistently conducted more than four times as Rex Hollis Space Systems/Loral many launches each year as did the United States.

4-19 80- LEO- GSO - SEO - Semi-Synchronous Elliptical Orbit 60 - SSO * Sun-Synchronous Orbit

Meters 40 -

20 -

Tsyklon Proton Energiya/ (SL-1) (SL-14) (SL-12) (SL-13) Energiya Buran Average annual 15 41 2 1 1 launches (Since (Since 1987) (Since 1988) (1980s) 1985)

Operational 2970 7000 8800 10,00 3900 15,400 30,300 12,100 Moon 44,100 238,000 LEO 66,000 LEO LEO LEO LEO LEO SEO LEO LEO 11,500 Venus LEO 70,500 Moon capacity 4000 25,00 10,000 Mars 61,700 (Ib) SSO SSO 6500 GSO Mars/Venus 41,800 GSO

Figure 1. Former Soviet Union Launch Vehicles Medium and Large Launch Vehicles payload for Zenit is also integrated horizontally and is launched from Baikonur. A string of 14 successful launches The largest commercial launch service market today is between April 1985 and May 1990 was followed by three for medium and large communication satellites. Satellites in successive failures. In November 1992, the Zenit was this group weigh more than 3000 Ib to geosynchronous successfully launched, placing an early warning satellite transfer orbit. The US family of launch vehicles for this into orbit. market consists of , , and . The CIS competitors in this class are the Proton and Zenit launch Small Launch Vehicles systems. Their performance capabilities are shown in The United States has the , , Taurus, and Figure 2. the air-launched Pegasus in this weight class. The most competitive CIS vehicles are the Kosmos and Tsyklon, as Proton has been operational for more than 25 years and well as modified weapons systems such has flown more than 200 missions with a cumulative as SS-18 and the air-launched SS-24. The performance capabilities reliability of about 88%. It has been used to boost of these vehicles are shown in Figure 3. to low Earth orbit, geosynchronous transfer orbit, and for interplanetary missions. The Proton is designed at KB Kosmos was first introduced in 1964. Its launch rate has Salyut and manufactured at the colocated Krunitschev been 7 to 10 per year and nearly all launches are from production plant in Russia. The vehicles are integrated with Plesetsk. the spacecraft horizontally and launched from Baikonur. Tsyklon was first introduced in 1966. Its launch rate has During the July visit to Krunitschev, the Proton reliability been 10 to 16 per year. was reported to be 97.5%, and more than 30 flights have been successful since 1988. SS-18 is an intercontinental ballistic missile for which CIS is seeking commercial uses. Zenit was first introduced in 1985, it is one of the newest SS-24 is a smaller weapon system which can be air- of the CIS launch vehicles. One two-stage version (Zenit 2) launched from an AN-124 aircraft located anywhere in the has flown to date. First flight of the three-stage version world. It is a direct competitor to the US Pegasus. (Zenit 3) is scheduled for 1993. The Zenit 3 is the version competing for the medium and large communication satel­ The first flight of SS-25 is scheduled for 1993. lite market. Zenit is produced at the Yuzhnoye factory in the Plans are in work to try commercialization of submarine- , but its engines are manufactured in Russia. The launched missiles for suborbital microgravity missions.

4-20 301005 8FX Former Soviet Union United States 200 — A 175 - i 150 - 1 A

125 /" Kn A Feet Sfi = 100 " m f A A 75 - _ — )A — /ffl ^ 50 -- -- - "*~" — & - • 25 - = : u~l U » i I n \ 0 y 4 t Proton Zenit Delta Atlas Titan GTO (Ib) 12,100 9500 3200-4000 4900-8000 11,000

Figure 2. Medium and Large Competitive Launch Vehicles

Former Soviet Union United States 200

175 -

150 -

125 — . A

Feet 100 , _ A L. i / — 75 ;__ m E 1 83 t u 1 fIn \ 50 ~~* A M

  • 25 —— N •< rrr^ TTTT _tT n n 0 —— £ V A Kosmos Tsyklon SS-18 SS-24 Scout Taurus Conestoga Pegasus

    LEO(lb) 2970 8800 9000 1200 600 3200 900 1000

    Figure 3. Small Competitive Launch Vehicles

    4-21 Launch Sites With the current political and economic situation, receipt of hard currency has become of fundamental importance to Within CIS, there are three launch sites as shown in the CIS. There have been several reports of offerings of CIS Figure 4: launch vehicles at prices well below those of Western • Kapusin Yar is primarily used for suborbital and sounding launchers. The launch price for a Proton, including space­ rockets. craft integration, was quoted at $56 million in mid-1992. • Baikonur is equivalent to Cape Canaveral. It is a site for The latest reports suggest that launch service prices will be all manned, geosynchronous, lunar, and interplanetary placed just enough below the perceived prices of Western launches. There are four Proton and two Zenit pads, but one launchers to make the sale. Zenit pad is reported to be damaged by a recent failure. • Plesetsk is the CIS equivalent of Vandenberg Air Force The maintenance of a reliable launch schedule in the face Base. Until recent years, this was a secret site used mainly of economic and political instability is a most volatile factor for military missions. influencing marketability. There is concern about the instability and uncertainty in regulations and laws, the lack MARKETABILITY of legal information and a reliable banking system, and the Several factors determine the marketability of CIS launch general unpredictability in the commercial environment. vehicles from the satellite owner's perspective. The princi­ The stability of US policy must also be given prime pal ones and an assessment of western customers' views of consideration. these factors are as follows: • Political and economic stability—Uncertain. The Market • Performance—Wide spectrum of choices. • Compatibility—Probably feasible. The worldwide commercial launch vehicle supply al­ • Reliability—Generally equivalent to Western launchers. ready exceeds commercial satellite demand, even without • Licensing—US policy change required. the entrance of the CIS into the commercial market. Note • Prices—Historically less than Western launchers. that in Figure 5 forecasted demand for medium and large launch vehicles remains relatively constant throughout the • Schedule—Good with multiple pads and short interval remainder of the decade while supply increases with the between launches. introduction of the H-2 and 5 vehicles in the • Facilities—Excellent, but require horizontal spacecraft mid-1990s. Obviously, entry of CIS vehicles into the integration. international market will exacerbate the fierce competition • Personnel accommodations—Acceptable. already existing among the Western launchers: Ariane, • Contract authority and enforceability—Uncertain. Delta, and Atlas.

    Kazakhstan

    Baikonur Cosmodr/Fhe (45.6 deg N)

    Figure 4. Launch Sites of Former Soviet Union

    4-22 Market Forecast

    1994 1997 2022 Exdudes LEO Communications Satellites Figure 5. Medium to Heavy Commercial Satellite Market Forecast

    Small vehicle launchers face a similar situation. Demand of submarine-launched missiles will become surplus, this is forecasted to increase sharply in the next several years, market could be completely disrupted if these ex-weapons but then remain at a constant level through the end of the systems are permitted to be used in this manner. decade. Domestic supply alone is almost two times that of There are numerous opportunities for conducting busi^ the projected market. ness ventures in the space arena of the former Soviet Union. Given their desperate economic situation, it is concluded CONCLUSIONS that the number of good opportunities may be decreasing There exists in the former Soviet Union a highly capable with time. and robust space transportation capability. If allowed to RECOMMENDATIONS offer launch services for the satellites for the world without The CIS must, with respect to its international customers, constraints, the CIS could completely dominate the market. agree to abide by certain special conditions designed to Today the CIS is a nonmarket economy. Prices for launch avoid unfair conditions. services can be adjusted as necessary to ensure a sale, The use of CIS launch services by United States origin Western launch providers would not be to compete if a satellites should not be allowed until such time as enforce­ level playing field is not enforced. able fair rules are agreed to by the United States and CIS. From a customer perspective, political stability within The US government should take an immediate, active CIS may be the overriding concern for some period of time. role to encourage and assist industry and government Other major concerns relate to business matters: who has the agencies in the purchase of space-related CIS research and authority to sign a contract, insurance, legal aspects, and technology (ideas, studies, personnel, and use of facilities). general unpredictability in the commercial environment. The US launch industry should not be subjected to unfair competition, particularly of the magnitude represented by The number of satellites requiring commercial launch the CIS launcher capability. Pricing of CIS launch services services is estimated to be between 12 and 15 per year. He offered on the world market must be similar to those prices launch services suppliers of today— the US companies and prevailing in the international market for comparable com­ Arianespace—have a capability of about 26 launches per mercial launch services. The advice of the launch and year, The supply will be increased with the entry of the satellite industries representatives should be solicited in Japanese H-2 and the larger , both of which are arriving at a pricing standard less subject to broad interpre­ planned to enter the market about 1996. The launch services tation and more easily applied and enforced. A workable supply by the end of the decade will be roughly twice the regime is essential to ensure that the transition process demand without the entry of the CIS capabilities into the occurs in a measured manner. market. Direct and indirect government support must be in accord The commercial market for small satellites has not really with practices (by governments and market economies) developed as yet. Since hundreds of ICBMs and thousands prevailing in the international market.

    4-23 No access to technology will be permitted except that precedent difficult to contain as others make similar re­ specifically authorized by the US government. quests. Approval of such requests should await the negoti­ ations of the transition trade agreement. Effective means of enforcing all special conditions must not only be established but rigorously applied. The US policy should direct that our surplus strategic assets not destroyed but retained by the US government not International Maritime Satellite organization (INMAR­ be used for any commercial purposes. The US should assure SAT) has submitted a request to be allowed to use Proton for that the CIS place the same restrictions on reuse of their the launch of one of their INMARSAT III satellites. excess strategic missiles. If they refuse, appropriate trade Acceptance of this current proposal would establish a sanctions should be imposed.

    4-24