Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview- JFK #1, 8/3/1964 Administrative Information
Creator: Cyrus R. Vance Interviewer: Joseph Califano Date of Interview: August 3, 1964 Place of Interview: Arlington, Virginia Length: 51 pp.
Biographical Note Vance, Cyrus R.; General Counsel, Department of Defense (1961); Secretary of the Army (1961-1963). Vance discusses his role in John F. Kennedy’s [JFK] presidential campaign (1960) and his position as General Counsel. He covers the riots surrounding the enrollment of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi, and discusses JFK’s decisions to use armed forces in order to maintain order throughout this situation, among other issues.
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Transcript of Oral History Interview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.
Suggested Citation Cyrus R. Vance, recorded interview by Joseph Califano, August 3, 1964, (page number), John F. Kennedy Oral History Program.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATI ON JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of Cyrus R. Vance
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United states Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Cyrus R. Vance do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United states of America all my rights , title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted on August 3, 1964 at Washington, D. C. and prepared for deposit in the John F. Kennedy Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: ( 1 ) The transcript shall be made available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the John F. Kennedy Library. (2) The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.
(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcri pt and tape.
(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape r ecording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.
(5) Copies of the transcripi and tape recording may be deposited in or John F. Kennedy Library.
Archivist?&& of the Uni ted States Cyrus R. Vance
Table of Contents
Page Topic 1 Vance’s initial interactions with John F. Kennedy [JFK] 3 Vance’s participation in JFK’s presidential campaign, 1960 3 Vance as General Counsel of the Department of Defense during the Kennedy Administration 5 JFK’s defense policies 7 The “Oxford situation,” 1962: James Meredith and the University of Mississippi 19 JFK’s signing of the Proclamation and Executive Order regarding the “Oxford situation” 41, 50 Reflection on, and reassessment of, the “Oxford situation”
CALIFANO: This is an interview with Cyrus R . Vance, General
Counsel of the Department of Defense from J anuary 29, 196 1 until July 4,
1962. On July 5, 1962, he was sw orn in as Secretary of the Army and remained in that post until January 28 , 1964. On J a nuary 28, 1964 , he was sworn in as Deputy Secretary of Defense, a post h e now holds. Today's date is August 3, 1964, and the interview is being conducted in Secretary
Vance's office. The individua l doing the interviewing is myself, Joseph
Califano.
CALIFANO: Mr. Va n ce, when did you first meet President Kennedy ?
VANCE: I fi rst met Preside n t K ennedy, I b e lieve, i n Februa ry of 1942. At that time I was about to go into the Navy and was awaiting a definite date on which I was to r eport. I went down during the month of
February to Charleston, South Carolina, to the wedding of a good friend and former roommate of mine, Stanl ey R e sor. At the wedding there was a young naval officer w ho was introduced as Ensign Kennedy. H e was a slim, shy and attractive y oung man. We spent, I would guess, about
15 or 20 minutes together talking about the Navy and his tour in Charleston where I believe he was awaiting a ship. I didn't see him again until after he was nominated for the Preside ncy. At that time I met him at a dinner which was held at The River Club i n New York at which he asked a number of lawyers and businessmen in the New York area to meet wi th him to discuss prospects for the coming campaign. CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, when was the first time you met
President Kennedy a fte r he was elected Pre sident?
VANCE: After he was elected President, the first time I met him was a t a swearing-in ceremony at the White House. At t hat time he
swore in about t e n of us. I can recall t hat Byron White was the re, and also from the Defense Departme nt Tom Morris, Charlie Hitch, Paul Nitze and m y self. The swearing-in took place at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon a t a ceremony in the East Room. The President not only invited a ll o f those who were to be sworn i n but also their wives and children. My wife and our two e ldest daughters went with me t o the swearing-in. A fter the swearing-in, the Pres ident and his wife greeted a ll of the gue sts, which was a great thrill not only t o those w ho we r e bein g s w orn in but to their families as well.
CALIFANO: Do you remember anything the President s aid to you a t that time?
VANCE: I b e lieve the only thing he said at that time was,
"Cy, I a m awfully glad to see you and I am delighted that you are going to b e working with us. 11
CALIFANO: I might just go back for a m inute. Did you have any
contact with Pre side nt K e nne dy between the time he spoke to you at The River
Club and the time he swore you in?
VANCE: No, I didn't have.
2 CALIFANO: Did you do any work for the Preside nt during the campaign?
VANCE: Yes, I did some work during the campaign. I participated in furnishing ideas with respect to the Defense program which I transmitted to S enator Symington who at that time was working on a report for the President in the Defense area.
CALIFANO: Was that the limit of your activity?
VANCE: Yes, plus soliciting s o me funds for the campaign.
CALIFANO: How did you come to be a part of the Kennedy Ad- ministration:
VANCE: I recall this rather vividly. I believe it was Friday before Christmas of 1960 that I r eceived a t e lephone call late in the afternoon from Ros Gilpatric, who was a lawyer in New York and a friend with w hom
I had worked on a number of l egal matters. Ros said that he had just come back from out of town and had a matter which he would like to discuss with me the next morning if I could stop by his house. At that time Ros had already been designated as the prospective Deputy Secretary of Defense, so that I thought that it might have something to do with possibly going down to Washington to work for the Defense Department. The next morning I went down to Ros' house and met w ith him in his living room. Ros said that he and Bob McNamara had bee n meeting to select those who were to work with them in the new administration at the Defense Department, and they would like very much for me to join them as General Counsel. Ros
3 then got out an organization chart and went over it with me, pointing out
those w h o m they were going to a sk to f ill the various spots. H e s a id he thought t hat the post of G ener a l Counse l would be a ver y interesting one.
He pointed out tha t it covere d a wide gambit of activities a nd that it would not be confined t o l e ga l work. H e s aid that h e h oped that I woul d accept the invitation to join t he Defense team as G e n e r a l Counsel and to w ork closely with him and Secretary McNa mara. He ask e d that I consider this very
care fully and let him know the next Wednesday if I c o uld possibly do so.
We the n spe nt about an hour discussing Defense problems, afte r which I went home t o mull over the tough decision of whether o r not I should give up the p r actice of l aw a nd c ome down to Washington. Over t h e Christmas holidays I had numerous conversations w i th my wife, Gay, at which we discussed the pros and cons of going down to wo rk for the Gove rnment. I
believe it was on Monday that I r eached a final decis ion, that I would go
down to Washington if appointed, and called Ros t o tell him that I would be most happy to come and work with him a nd Secretary McNamara.
CALIFANO: When, Mr. V a nce, did you first meet S ecretary
McNa m a r a ?
VANCE: I believe it was on January 4th. Mr. McNamara had
been skiing at Aspen and was due to r e turn o n the 4th. A few days before
that, Ros called me and told me that Mr. McNamara would be back on the
4th and asked me to fly down and meet with him and Secretary McNamara
that day. A s I r e c a ll it, I caught an early morning plane fro m New York,
4 flew into National Airport and came over to the Pentagon to Ros Gilpatric's office. After talking to R os for a few minutes, we went into an office which is adjacent to that of the Secretary of Defense and met Mr. McNamara.
We had a conversation of 15 or 20 minutes, a fter which time I went back with Ros to his office. In the course of the conversation Mr. McNamara had asked me if I would come and work as General Counsel of the Defense
Department. I told him that I would be delighted to do so and looked forward very much to working with him and Ros. Shortly thereafter, Ros took me down and introduced me to the then current General Counsel, Mr. Vince
B u rke, who filled m e in on the duties of my ~pective office. Mr. B u rke also set me up in an office adjacent to his, w here I proceeded to dive i nto a host of papers to try and fill m y self in on the duties of the G eneral Counsel and my upcoming activiti es for the next seve ral years.
CALIFANO: One more question about this early period. At that meeting with Secretary McNamara or in any of the pre-January 20 days , did he tell you about President Kennedy's Defense policies or Defense ideas?
VANCE: Yes, we did have, I believe, several discussions of
President Kennedy's Defense policies. These were views which I was ex tremely glad to hear because my views happened to coincide with those of
President Kennedy. I had felt very strongly that our Defense policies in the past were not adequate and that a major reshaping of those Defense policies was n ecessary.
5 CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, what did Secretary McNamara indicate were Pre sident Kennedy's policies?
VANCE: He said that President Kennedy felt very strongly that in the past we had shaped our Defense policies on the basis of arbi trary budgetary decisions rather than on what was required. He said
President Kennedy had made it very clear that we in the Defense Department were to come up with a statement of our requirements, and that the money would then be appropriated to meet those requirements. He further pointed out that President Kennedy felt strongly that our current strategy was n a rrow, that it did not provide for flexible r e sponses to varying situations, and that it would be necessary to do some very hard thinking on how to reshape our strategic concepts.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, did President Kennedy have any specific ideas of the vast reorganization changes brought about by S ecreta ry McNa mara in those early days?
VANCE: To the best of my know l edge, the details and the scope of the proposed reorganization were not discussed in any detail.
Rather, certain fundamental principles were agreed upon, and it was left to Secretary McNamara to develop the full scope and details of the proposed changes.
CALIFANO: Two more questions about the early days. Did
Secretary McNamara tell you of any of President Kennedy's views about eithe r the Service S ecretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
6 VANCE: No, I don't believe he ever told me at that time e ~President Kenne dy 1 s vie ws on tho se two subjects.
CALIFANO: Why don't w e move now to the s i tuation in Oxford,
Mississippi.
VANCE: I'd be delighted to.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, what was the first involvement o f the
Army vis-a -vis the Oxford crisis?
VANCE: The first r ecollection I have of any connection w i th the Ox ford crisis was a meeting which I had w ith Mr. Katzenbach o n
Septe mber 5 th, which I believe was just two days afte r L a b or Day.
CALIFANO: 1962.
VANCE: Yes, in 1962.
CALIFANO: And y ou wer e the n S e cre ta r y of the A rmy ?
VANCE: At that point I was Se cretary of the Army, and Nick
Katzenbach called me and asked if he could come ove r and see me about a p otentia l problem. I told him I would be delight ed to see him and he came over that morning as I r ecall it. H e told me that we were about to face what might be a very di fficult problem arising out of the enrollment of J ames
M e redith in the University of Mississippi a t Oxford. He outlined in general terms what the problem was we faced. H e indicated that he believed that
Governor B arnett and the Sta t e officials would try to prevent Meredith from enr olling in the University, and that it might be necessary to use Government
7 forces t o enforce the court orders if the Governor failed to carry them out.
As I r ecall it, we di scussed the problem in general terms and agr eed that it
would be necessar y to embark upon joint planning to make s ure that we woul d
b e fully prepared if the situa tion should develop as he feared it might.
CALIFANO: Did you talk at that point whether o r not you would use
R e gular Army troops or the Mississippi National Guard?
VANCE: No, we didn 1t. It was j ust a general disc ussion at
that time with no discussion of the types of troops that might have to be used.
CALIFANO: Was that a bout what was cov e r ed w i th Mr. Katzenbach
at that meeting?
VANCE: Yes, as I recall it, i t was. I think we a lso discussed who woul d work on the devel opment of the n ecessary plan, and I indicate d to
him t h at I would l et him know as soon as I had a ch ance to do a little fur the r work on it and discuss it with the Chief of Staff. As I r e call it, I called him
either the next day or the day the r eafter and told him that you, Joe Califano, and Creighton Abrams would be the two people charged with working directly with the Department of J ustice in developing our plans to meet the Oxford
situation.
CALIFANO : Who was Chief of St a ff of the Army at that t ime ?
VANCE: At that time G eorge Decker was Chief of Staff of the
Army. G eneral Wheele r ha d a lready b een announced a s the prospective new
Chief of Staff but he was n ot actually Chief of Staff.
8 CALIFANO: What was your next contact with the Oxford situation?
VANCE: I believe I had a number of telephone calls off and on over the next week or so with Nick Katzenbach and with Burke Marshall, who was another Assi stant Attorney G ene r al. And then I have a recollection of a m e eting with B urke Marshall in my office on September 14th. As I recall it, you were present, along with General Abrams and, I believe, either General Wheeler or General Decker or both of them. At that time
I believe we got into a discussion of more detailed plans for the Oxford situation.
CALIFANO: Did you then discus s t he use of R e gular Army force s and National Guard troops?
VANCE: Y es. I think we discussed at that time the possibility of usi ng either one or two types of forces: (1) Regular Army forces and
(2) National Guard forces. We discussed the pros and cons of using either type of troops and did not arrive at any conclusion.
CALIFANO: At that meeting did Burke Marshall in any way indi cate what he thought the President1 s views were, or w hat the President had told him or the Justice Department?
VANCE: With respect to what?
CALIFANO: With respect to the use of F ederal troops.
VANCE: As I r ecall it, there was a discussion on that subject, and Mr. Marshall indicated that the President hoped that it would not be necessary to use any Federal troops, but that h e was dete rmined to see that the court orders were carri ed out, a nd that if required troops would be used.
9 CALIFANO: What resulted from tha t meeting, Mr. Vance?
VANCE: As a r esult of that meeting, further detailed planning was undertaken. in close cooperation with the Department of Justice. This planning went on for a period of approximately two weeks, during which increasingly detailed plans were drawn up to meet the various contingencies which might arise. During the latter part of this two- week period, the
situation increased in pace in the Mississippi area, with various maneuverings between the Governor and his staff in attempting to block Mr. M e redith's efforts to seek and obtain ad.mission to the University.
CALIFANO: During this period which, say, takes us up to about the 26th of September, or close to the week end of the 29th, did you have any contact with the President on this subject?
VANCE: No, I did not have any direct con tact with the President on it; however, I had very close contact with the Attorney G eneral, Robert
Kennedy.
CALIFANO: What were his views during this period?
VANCE: His views were very clear, that he hoped we would
not have to use either Federal troops or National Guard units to bring about
the enrollment of James Meredith, but that we would take whatever steps
were required to make sure that the court orders were carried out.
CALIFANO: I s it fair to say that as early as September 14t h, or
even September 5th, it was clear to you that the policy of the Administration
and the President was that Federal troops would be used if necessary?
10 VANCE: Yes, it was clear to me from the start that Federal troops would be used if required.
CALIFANO: Getting into the time immediately preceding the week end, do you have specific r ecolle ctions of m eetings with the Attorney
General, or plans that were drawn for Mr. Meredith to enter the University of Mississippi?'
VANCE: Yes. I recall a meeting held at the Department of
Justice on September 28th at about 1:30 p . m. At that meeting we r eviewed the detailed plan and discussed in some considerable detail whether o r not we should use Regular Army troops or National Guard troops in the event it should b e come n ecessary.
CALIFANO: What was the importance of the distinction between these troops?
VANCE: The importance of the distinction b etween the troops was the r eaction that it might bring about in the State of Mississippi. On the one hand, there were those who felt that it would be much easier to use
Regular Army troops because they were trained for riot control action, because their discipline was excellent, and because the chain of command would be clear and precise. On the other h and, it was argued that intro- ducing Regular Army troops into the State of Mississippi would bring a very strong adverse reaction from the l ocal citizens who might claim that this was an invasion of the State of Mississippi by Federal authorities. In this connection we discussed at great length the lessons l earned during the
11 Little Rock incide nt. In this connection G eneral Wheeler was of great h e lp,
having s e rved as G e neral Taylor's special r epresentative at Little Rock.
CALIFANO: Were any decisions m a de about the use o f e ither
National Guard or Regular Army troops on F r i day, the 28th of S e ptembe r?
VANCE: No. No final decision was reac h e d at that time.
CALIFANO: Were any troops alerted for action at that time?
VANCE: Yes. By that time I b e liev e we had placed on a lert
two task forces. I believe they were task forces Alfa and Bravo. One of
the se task forces was built around an MP c ompany - - I believe it was the
503d from F ort Bragg. And the oth e r was built around a battle group from
the S econd Infantry Divis ion. I believe it was the 503d Battalion r ather
than company from F ort Bra gg that I mentioned.
CALIFANO: What were the pla ns, if ther e w ere specific plans a t
this time, for placing M e r edith at the University of Mississippi?
VANCE: The plans were as follow s : A large number of Federal
marshals were to go to Mississippi. They wer e to be s tationed a t a place
called Holly Springs, which was, I believe, some 15 or 20 miles from the town of Oxford. This would be their home camp. They would be available there to be used if required to a ssist Meredith in e nrolling at the campus.
The plan was that the Justice D e partment officials, toge the r w ith the marshals, would s eek to register Meredith, using t he smallest number possible. If they w ere turned back by the Governor o r the Lieutenant Governor, they would then increase the number of marshals and try again. As I r e call it,
12 we eventually planned for about 200 marshals to be p r e s ent who would be
on call to assist.
CALIFANO: Were any dates set for regi stering Meredith a t the
University at this time?
VANCE: Yes. Seve r a l dates h ad been s et; however, with
respect to each of these dates the Army was not to play a ny part. During
this period of time, registration was to be accomplished by Mr. Meredith
going with a r e presentative of the Department of Justice plus one or more
m a rshals who would see k to a chieve his enrollment.
CALIFANO: Do you know what date was s e t? You said several.
Wa s there a ny agre ement by Friday, the 28th of S e ptember, o n w hen
Meredith would be brought to the Unive rsity?
VANCE: As I recall it, M e r e dith had b een brought to the
University once or twice by that time, and I believe on the 28th we agreed that Meredith would b e brought back again on Monday, w hich would be,
I b elieve, the first of Octobe r, a nd was to be enr olled at a bout 12:00 o'clock
noon.
CALIFANO: We re you under the impression on the 28th of
S e ptember that the President was in close touch with the situa tion in
m aking the decision?
VANCE: Yes, the President was in very close touch with the
situation. He was discussing the matter v e ry frequently with his brothe r,
13 the Attorney G e neral, and with Nick Katzenba ch a nd Burke Marshall.
CALIFANO: Had he discussed the situation with y o u at all a t that time?
VANCE: No. I did n ot meet with the Pre sident until
S e pte mber 29th.
CALIFANO: Whic h was the next day.
VANCE: That was the next day.
CALIFANO: Who was present at the m eeting with the Pre sident and what took place there?
VANCE: As I recall it, i mmediat e ly prior to the meeting ---
CALIFANO: A nd why was the meeting called? Excu s e me.
VANCE: A s I r ecall it, immediately p rior t o the mee ting at about 11: 15, I met with G eneral Whee l e r and w ith G enera l Abrams to discuss the proposed plans for Monday. One of the issues w hic h we discussed at tha t time was the possible use of Nationa l Gua rd t r oops as opposed to R e gular Army troops. One of the main purposes of the meeting w ith the President was to dis c uss t his issue, as well a s to r e view our over- all plans for the next M o nday.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, w hat took place a t your meet ing with the President, or the meeting preceding it in preparation for tha t meeting?
14 VANCE: At the meeting with the President we first reviewed
the proposed plan of action for next Monday. I believe the Attorney General
outlined the proposed plan, and then both General Wheeler and I commented
on the pla n.
CALIFANO: Did the Attorney G eneral outline the plan essentially as you just outlined it here?
VANCE: He outlined it essentially as follows: That we would preposition our Regular Army units at the Memphis Air Station and would hold them in reserve. In the meantime, we would move down to Holly
Springs the marsha ls who w ould be on hand. The marshals would go with Meredith to t h e camp us and s eek to accomplish the enrollment. If any thing went w rong we would then use whatever troops were require d. In the meantime, we had also decided to alert, if nece ssary, elements of the
Mississippi National Guard. We would the n be a ble to make a decision as to w hether or not we would use only Regular Army troops, or whether we would use National Guard troops, or whether we would use both.
CALIFANO: What were your comments, or General Wheeler's
comments, on the plan as outlined by the Attorney General?
VANCE: We both said that we agreed with the proposed plan.
I mentioned the fact that Senator Stennis had spoken to me and had said that
he was greatly concerned about the way the situation was developing, and
had urged very strongly that if it were necessary to use troops, we should
not use National Guard troops because of the reaction that this would have
in Mississippi.
15 CALIFANO: I thought that you said earlier you thought the use of Mississippi National Guard troops might be easier on the State of
Missi ssippi than the introduct ion of R e gular Army troops.
VANCE: The re were those who b elievedthat this would be the case. On the other hand, Senator Stennis felt very strongly that the converse would be true.
CALIFANO: Before we go into further details of the meeting, do you remember who else was there? You indicated that you were present, the President, the Attorney General, and General Wheeler.
VANCE: Mr. McNamara and B urke Marshall were also present.
CALIFANO: What happened after you commented on the Attorney
General 1 s outline of the plan?
VANCE: We discussed at some le ngth the pros and cons of using National Guard units, and no fina l decision was reached as to whether or not we would use National Guard t roops in the event that troops were r equired.
CALIFANO: Do you remember what the President said at that meeting:
VANCE: No, othe r than to ask our various views with r espect to this issue and the adequacy of the plans.
CALIFANO: But was it clear at this meeting that he had r eached no decision with respect to what troops to u se?
VANCE: It was clear that he had not reached a decision as to what troops to use.
16 CALIFANO: Did he seem to be on top of the entire situation?
VANCE: Yes, he certainly did.
CALIFANO: Was anything e lse discussed a t the meeting?
VANCE: No. As I recall it, having approved the proposed plan we decided to keep in close touch the rest of the afternoon to see what developed.
CALIFANO: How long did the meeting last, Mr. Vance?
VANCE: I believe that I got back to the Pentagon about 1:30 and had lunch i n the Army Dining Room with G eneral Wheeler and others.
I do recall that a b out 2: 30 that afternoon I met with G ene r a l Abrams again to review the situation, and made several telephone calls to Nick Katzenbach to find how the situation was devel oping i n Mississippi. I also r ecall that during the afternoon I met with you and I believe Ted Decker to go over a proposed Proclamation and Executive Order. At that time Ted Decker was the Judge Advocate General of the Army and you were General Counsel of the Army.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, you met to go over a proposed Executive
Order. Was this Executive Order in the hands of the President at this time?
VANCE: I do not b e lieve it was in the hands of the President.
This Executive Order and Proclamation had been wo rked on several days, however, by the Army and the Departm e nt of Justice, and we were at this point virtually agreed on its final form.
17 CALIFANO: Did a nything else s ignificantly happe n that Sa turday afternoon?
VANCE: Yes. After meeting with you and T ed D eck e r , we talked again with, I b elieve, Nick Katze nbach and Burke Marshall a t the
Department of Justice and agr eed upo n the final for m of the Proclamation and Executive Order. Later that afternoon, I went over to the Capi tol at the request of Senator Stennis to meet with him. Senator Stennis repe ated to me his c oncern about the situation in Mississippi and again urged that
National Guard troops not b e used. I told him that we wer e fully cognizant of his views in this r e gard a nd h ad, in fact, discussed them at a m eeting with the President.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, did you then go home?
VANCE: No, I c a me back to t h e office and worked o n t h e various plans to m a k e sure that everything was in order for t he next day. As I reca ll it, we had determined at that time to move T ask Force Alfa into
Memphis and set up our h eadquarters there. We had also had discussions w ith the Department of Justice as to what our setup would b e in Oxford.
It h a d b e en determined that we would use the Marshal's office, which was in t he basement of the F ederal Building the re as I r e call it, to be the local h eadquarters. As I recall it, L o u Oberdorfer, another Assistant Attorney
G e neral, was to be pre sent a s the senio r p e rson at that office. We had some discussion as to wha t communications we could introduce into the
Oxford area prior to M o nday, and it had bee n daermined t hat the only
18 communications which we could put in was a SCAN line from the
Marshal's office back to the Naval Air Station at M emphis.
CALIFANO: What w a s the rea s o n for t hat, Mr. V a nce?
VANCE: It w a s felt that to put in a large mobile communica -
tio ns unit might exac e rba t e the situation in Oxford. In addi tion, t h ere
was a small mobile communications setup at the so-called tent camp
at Holly Springs where the marshals were to b e billeted. I believe the
marshals 1 camp had been set up on about Friday, and I believe that a
M a jor Christopherson was the enginee r in charge of s e tting up the
t ent camp and providing faciliti es for the marshals.
CALIFANO: Doe s this a bout sum up your activi ties o n Saturday
a fte rnoon?
VANCE: No, I a m afra id it does n 1t. I fina lly got away from
the office about 8:30 that night. I wa s supposed to go t o dinn e r a t J e eb
Halaby 1 s. Jeeb was the Admin istrator of the Federa l Aviation Authority, a nd I was supposed to get the r e at 7:30 but didn't arrive until about 8:30.
During the cou rse of the dinner I rece ive d two phone calls. I believe the
first phone call was from Nick Katzenbach and the second was from the
Attorney General. Nick called to say that things were not developing well and that it looked as though the Preside nt might have to sign the Proclamation and Exe cutive Order that evening. He aske d if we were all set to go if this should happen, and I said that we w e re. Shortly thereafter, the
Attorney Genera l called me a nd confirme d that the Pre sident w a s thi nki ng
19 of signing the Proclamation a nd Executive Order that night. H e said he
would call me back as soon a s he g ot further infor mation. At about 10: 30
I got a s econd phone call from the Attorney General, who said the
President would sign the Proclama tio n and Executive Order that night .
I told him that I was going to go back to my office a n d pick up a copy of
the Order to be signed by Mr. M c Namara and w ould go over to his hou se
a nd stand by awaiting the President's signing of the Proclamation and the
Executive Order.
I went back to the P e ntagon from the H a labys by car. My wife drove
me over and left me off there. I w e nt i nto my safe a nd got out a copy of
the Pro clamation and Executive O rder to be signed by the President, plus
the original of the Order to be signe d by Mr. McNamara implementi ng the
Preside nt's Exec utive Order. Jim B a ldwin, my Military Assistant , had
a rrived back at the P entagon, a nd he a nd I gci i n a car together and d r ove
over to Mr. McNamara's hous e . As I reca ll it, we a rrived shortly befor e
12:00 o'clock. Mr. McNamara and I got on a phone t o the White House
a nd were informe d w hen the Preside nt signe d the Proclamation and
Executive Orde r . Imme diate ly the r eafter, Mr. McNama r a signed an
Orde r impleme nting the Exec utive Order w hich the President had signed.
The Executive Orde r signed by the President instr ucted the Secretar y
of De fense to take a ll action necessa ry to enforce the court orders a nd to remove any obstructions to justice. It further provid e d that h e could
use such R egul ar Army forc es and Air forces, in addition to any Nati onal
20 Guard units which were federalized by the Order, to carry out the
mandate of the Executive O rder.
When Mr. McNamara signed this Order, I left and returned to
the Pentagon. At the Pentagon I called the White House to find the
number of the Executive Order, w h ich I then filled in by pen in the Order
already signe d by Mr. McNamara. We then prepared a t e legram to the
Governor of Mississippi and to the Adjutant General of the State of
Mississippi, which r eci ted the Proclamation and Executive Order signed
by the President and the Order signed by Mr. McNamara. This tel egram
thus notified the Governo r and the A djutant G ener al that the Army and Air
National Guards of the State of Mis sissippi had been called to F eder a l
active duty effective as of 0002 on the 30th of S eptember.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, two points w e should pick up. Did
Mr. McNamar a say anything when he signed the memorandum delegating
authority to you?
VANCE: No, he did not s ay anything about the memor a ndum
to me, but he did comment on a provision of the E xecutive Order. I've
forgotten which paragraph it was, but I believe it was either paragraph
numbered 1 or 2. He asked if it were clear under the terms of this
pa ragraph a s to w ho had the r e sponsibility to carry out the purposes of
the Executive Order. H e s a id that h e thought there might be a question
as to whethe r or not the full authority r ested in the Se cretar y of Defense
in light of the language used in the E xecutive O rder. We discussed this
,~ . 21 and determined that it was sufficiently clear to show that the a uthority was vested in th e Secretary of Defense.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, was this a change in the timing of the
Oxford scenario a s you developed i t Saturday afternoon?
VANCE : It was a cha nge i n tha t we had not expected that it would be n ecessary to issue a Proclamation and Exe cutive Order on
Saturday night. It was thought that if it wer e to be issue d it would probably b e issued on Sunday.
CALIFANO : Are you aware of the exact reason w hy the President decided to do this Satur day n ight?
VANCE: I believe it was becaus e of certain acti ons taken by
Governor B a rnett .
CALIFANO: Do you have any recollection of what those actions wer e?
VANCE: At this time I cannot recall the precise nature of those actions.
CALIFANO: Incide ntally, Mr. Vance, up to this time had you had any other communications with G overnor Barnett other than the telegra m you s ent him?
VANCE: No, I had no communications with Governor Barnett.
CALIFANO: What did you do after you sent the t e l egr a m out?
VANCE: I then met w ith General Greenlie f and other members of the Army Sta ff to review the troop listsof the Mississippi Na tiona l Gua r~
22 both Army and Air. As I recall it, we spent over an hour r eviewing the troop lists to ascerta in where a ll of the units were l ocated and the a pproxi mate movement times which would be r e quired to move these units from their home stations to Oxford. We also discussed the q uestion of how m uch time would be required in terms of a l ert for these various units.
CALIFANO: Do you have a recollection of how many men were in the Mississippi National Guard at this time?
VANCE: My recollecti on is that it was somewhere in the neighborhood of 10, 000.
CALIFANO: Wh at did you then do, M r . Vance?
VANCE: At that time I went home a nd left G e neral Greenlie f and some othe r members of the Army Staff in the Army War R oom, who w e r e finishing up on the paper w o rk that was r e qui red in connection w i t h the call-up .
CALIFANO: Were there any Army troops in Oxford at this time ?
VANCE: There were no Army troops in Oxford at this time.
T here was a cavalry troop-I believe Troop E--of the Na tional Guard which had its h e adquarters in Oxford, but the r e were no Regul a r Army troops there . A s I previously indicated, there wer e a few engineer s outside of Oxford at the Holly Springs camp.
CALIFANO: When did you return to your office, or when was the next contact on Sunday, Se ptember 30, w ith the Oxfor d situation?
23 VANCE: As I r ecall it, on Sunday morning General Wheeler and I went over to the Attorney General's office and discussed with him the steps which we could anticipate during the next 48 hours. At that time, we envisaged that Meredith would be returned to Oxford at about noon on Monday to be enrolled at the University. After our meeting at the Attorney General's office, G eneral Wheeler a nd I came on back to the P entagon and I went to my office. As I recall it, General Wheeler and I spent half an hour or so discussing our plans , and the n he went home for lunch and I stayed on at the Pentagon.
CALIFANO: What did you d o at the P e ntago n, Mr. Vance?
VANCE: As I recall it, I got out the troop lists and the outline plan and reviewed them o nce again. I then stood by to hear from the
Atto rney Gene ral on how things wer e developing during the day.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, w hen did you next hea r from the Attorney
General, or what was the next action you took in connection with the Oxford situation?
VANCE: As I recall it, I h eard from the Attorney General at about 1:30. Under t h e plans which were about to go into effect, the Army had ordered the Commanding Officers of three Mississippi Guard units to report to General Billingslea, who was Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Infantry Division, to report to him in Memphis at 1600 on the afternoon of September 30th. My r ecollection is that the Attorney General called me at about 1:30 saying that it had been determined to move the
24 marshals from M emphis into the tent camp that day. I discussed this with him and suggeste d that he get in touch directly with Ge neral Abrams, who was at Memphis a s the Chief of Staff's personal representative. In cidentally, General Abrams is now the Vice Chief of St a ff of the Army, to s ucceed General Hamlett on Septemb er first. After the Attorney
Gene ral hung up, I sent a message to G e neral A b rams telling him that he would rece ive a call from the Atto rne y General setting forth the plans w ith r esp e ct to t he movement of the marshals from M emphis to Oxfo rd that afternoon.
CALIFANO: Were the marshals moved as planned?
VANCE: Yes, the marshals were moved as planned to Ox ford that aftern oon. I ncidentally, Genera l Abrams had gone down to Memphis a t 10:00 o'clock on Sunday morning and he arrived there about 12:00 n oon, as I r ecall it. The marshals wer e met at the a irport by, I believe, five trucks from the tent camp at H o lly Springs . They we r e then to be trucked from the a irport over to Holly Springs.
CALIFANO: Mr. V a nce, w h at was your next contact o r action that y o u took in connection with the O xford situation?
VANCE: My r ecollection i s that at about 5: 30 in the afte rnoon
I r eceived word that it ha d been d etermined to m ove M e redith onto the campus. I don't r ecall wh ether I received this information from the
Attorney Ge ne r a l, or w h ethe r it came from Nick Katzenbach . I do recall, however , r eceiving such a c ommunicat ion a t a bout 5:30 tha t afternoon.
25 CALIFANO: Where was Mr. Katzenbach?
VANCE: Mr. Katzenbach was in Oxford a t that time. I immediately communicated this informa tion to G eneral Abrams at
Memphis .
CALIFANO: Was Meredith at M emphis at this time?
VANCE: Yes. I subsequently learne d that Meredith had been brought to the Oxford airport by John Doar, an attorney at the Department of Justice, and as I r e call it they arrived somewhere around 5:50 in the afternoon.
CALIFANO: Do you know why it was decided to move Meredith to the Oxford campus?
VANCE: I recall that this was a determination made at the time and, I believe, in the field by Mr. Katzenbach after discussing the matter with the Attorney General. I believe the reason for it was that the situation seemed quiet at Oxford and that they, therefore, thought he could be introduced onto the campus without any trouble.
CALIFANO: To your knowledge, was the President a part of this decision?
VANCE: I do not know whether he was or not.
CALIFANO: Was the A ttorney General at the White House on
Sunday afternoon, or was he in his own office?
VANCE: I believe he was in his office when he called me at
1:30 and again at 5:30.
26 CALIFANO: What next happened as far as you were concerned
after 5 : 30:
VANCE: As I recall it, at about 6:45 I received a telephone
call from Mr. K ennedy, the Attorney G eneral, statin g that Meredith had
been introduced onto the campus and was safely located at the Lyceum
Building. I communicated this information, as I recall it, to General
Abrams in Memphis.
CALIFANO: At this point at 6:45 on Sunday evening, were there any troops in Oxford in addition to those that had been there before,
Mr. Vance?
VANCE: No. The only t roops tha t were t here were the few people from the tent camp at Holly Springs.
CALIFANO: Were you getting reports from Oxford a s to the
situation at the Lyceum Building o r on the campus?
VANCE: No, I was not getting any reports directly from
Oxford. The reports were coming directly from Mr. Katzenbach to the
Department of Justice.
CALIFANO: How did the situa tion progress as far as you were concerned?
VANCE: As I recall it, the President was to make a speech to the nation at somewhere a r ound 6:00 or 6:30. He had delayed making this speech, and it was broadcast on the radio and television that the
speech would b e made late r in the e vening. We t urned on our television
set and stood by awaiting the President's mes sage.
27 CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, did you have anything to do with drafting the President's speech?
VANCE: No, I didn't.
CALIFANO: Did you know what was going to be in it?
VANCE: I knew the general outlines of the spe ech but I did not know the final details. As I r ecall it, it was being drafted in the
White House by the President and Mr. S orenson and the Attorney General.
CALIFANO: Do you know why the President delayed the time of giving his speech?
VANCE: I believe it was b ecause of telephone conversations between either the President and Governor Barnett, or the Attorney
General and Governo r Barnett.
CALIFANO: Do you know anything a bout the substance of those telephone conversations?
VANCE: No, I do not.
CALIFANO: What was your next involvement in the situation in
Oxford?
VANCE: I attempt ed to get h old of Mr. Katzenbach by telephone but his direct line was busy, as wer e the comme rcial lines. I , the r e fore, sent word to M e mphis for them t o get word to Mr. Katzenbach to call me as soon as he could. At about 8:00 o' cl<0ck or 8: 15 as I recall it, Mr.
Katzenbach called me. I told him that I thought it would be a good idea to have an Army officer come over to the L y ceum Building as promptly as we could get him there to act a s liaison between him and G en e ral
28 Billingslea, who was in over-all command of all Federal for ces in the area. Nick said he thought this would be a fine idea, and I said I would get somebody there as promptly as we could. I believe it was at about this time that Nick told me that the crowd was getting larger outside the building, a nd that things did not look as quiet as they previously had; however, the situation was still well in hand.
CALIFANO: Do you know where Mr. Meredith was at this time?
VANCE: I recall that he was moved from the Lyceum Building to a nearby dormitory. I've forgotten what the number of the dormitory was or what its name was.
CALIFANO: Did you do anything as a r esult of Mr. Katzenbach's statement that the situation was worsening on the campus?
VANCE: We decided to follow the situation very closely in light of Mr. Katzenbach's report and, therefore, k ept in close touch w ith both Memphis and the Departme nt of Justice.
CALIFANO: What was your next action during the night, or your next contact with either Justice or the White House?
VANCE: At about 9: 30, I received a telephone call from the
Attorne y G ener al asking whether or not we could quar ter about 200 Federal m a r shals at the local armory. I sent a message to Gener al Billingslea, with a copy to General Abrams, telling him about this query and asking him to get in touch with the people in Oxford and see whether this could be accomplished. At about 10:30, I received a telephone call from Mr.
29 Katzenbach in Oxford. Mr. Katz enbach said the situation h a d gotten
very serious a nd that they had to use t ear gas. He requested that we
get them additional tear gas and gas masks as soon a s possible. I
immediately sent a message to Gene r a l Billingslea telling him that Mr.
Katze nbach needed gas masks and was attempting to contact General
Billingslea. I a ske d him to establish and maintain communications
directly with Mr. Katzenbach so that the r esponse woul d be as prompt
as possible.
CALIFANO: Were any troops moved at this time?
VANCE: No troops wer e moved at this time.
CALIFANO: What next happen ed, Mr. Vance?
VANCE: Shortly afte r 10: 30, G eneral Billingslea r e ported
by phone to the Army War Room that he had checked on the armory and
found i t occupied by cavalry troops. H e said that he had placed his M P battalion and helicopter company on alert for possible call for assistance from marshals o n the campus, and that he had put the guard on one hour a l ert. General Abrams reported that a liaiso n officer to Justice on the
campus was already on his way and was to report at the Lyce um. H e
s a id that h e was going in a marshal's car in civilian clothes.
CALIFANO: Did the situation continue to get wor se on the campus?
VANCE: Yes. It continued to worsen, and I b e lieve it was at
about 10:30 that further action was taken. At about that time we received
30 instructions from the President through the Attorney General to move
between 800 and 1, 000 National Guard troops to Oxford. This order was
communicated to G ene r a l Billingslea in Memphis.
CALIFANO: Was this a decision by the President to handl e the
situation with National Guard troops?
VANCE: Yes.
CALIFANO: Were any Regular t roops in the area at that time?
VANCE: No. The closest Regular troops we re in Memphis.
CALIFANO: What next happened, Mr. Vance?
VANCE: The situation continued to worsen on the campus and violence broke out on a large scale. A t about 11:30, in response to a telephone call from the Attorney General, I directed the initiation of movement of R egul a r Army MP units from Memphis to Oxford in numbers deemed necessary by General Billingslea to support the Federal marshals.
CALIFANO: Do you have any recollection of how many troops
General Billingslea moved in at this time?
VANCE: As I recall it, General Billingslea moved in a company of MPs which he was going to move in by helicopter, and the balance of forces he was going to move by road down to Oxford because there were only sufficient helicopters to move one company.
CALIFANO: Did G e neral Billingslea have discretion to move any number of troops in?
VANCE: Yes, he did.
31 .. . .
CALIFANO: After he had moved these two companies of troops
in, were more troops ordered in by the President?
VANCE: At about 11 :45, the President directed that before
G eneral Billingslea commit h i s forces he proceed to Oxfo rd and make
an eval uation of the situation, reporting the results of his evaluation
directly to the President. He further specified that G eneral Billingslea
could initiate movement of all forces under his command, including all
of the National Guard, to Oxford or other locations in a position to be
employed.
CALI FANO: Was this a direct conversati on between you and the
President?
VANCE: As I recall it, it was a direct conversation between
me and t h e President.
CALIFANO: Did h e say anything else to you at that time to your
r ecollection?
VANCE: Nothing except that the situation was getting very
serious.
CALIFANO: Did General Billingslea then report to the President?
VANCE: I do not know what General Billingslea did immediately
thereafter. It is my recollection that he made preparations for moving
as promptly as possible to Oxford so that he could survey the situation and
communicate back to the President.
CALIFANO: What was your next p e rsonal contact w ith the situation?
32 ...... , ••, ..... ' ...... ,; • • .. - • • _.,_...... _ • • • - ·-· ...... · -·· · ~ ·· ...... <.1 ...... - .... . -· · -~ • -- ••••••• ,; • ·- · ...... •• • ~ · ......
VANCE: At about 12:00 o 1 clock, I gave directions to initia t e
movement of the 720th MP Ba ttalion from Fort Hood to Memphis. At about
15 minutes a fter midnight I dispatched a message to G e neral Billingslea
i nforming him that he is authorized to take all neces sary action with a ll
of the forces at his disposal to relie ve the pres sure on the Federal marshals on the campus and restore order in Oxford. I further directed that he report the progress of his action on the movement of troops and the situation as frequently as he could.
CALIFANO: W e re you told to give the s e orde rs to Gene ral B i llingslea
by the Pre sident?
VANCE: Yes, I was.
CALIFANO: This was in a call subsequent to the first call you
received from him.
VANCE: That is correct.
CALIFANO: Do you recall anythi ng e lse he said to you at that time?
VANCE: No, I don't.
CALIFANO: Did you have other conversations with the President
during the evening as troops were moved in?
VANCE: Yes, I talked to the President I believe at l east 15 times
during the night.
CALIFANO: Could you, to the best of your recollection, tell me
what the P r esident said during those conve rsati o ns, o r directed?
33 -~ VANCE: At about 0045, I r eceived a call from the President
asking me whether the troops had actually left the field at Memphis for
Oxford. As I recall, I told the President, after checking, tha t the first group
had left the field. Subsequently I found out that this was not correct, and I
called the President back and told him that the information I had given him
regarding take-off was not correct. We then attempted to get in touch
directly with G eneral Abrams at Memphis to find out the exact status of the
movement of the troops from Memphis. We could not get through because
the line to G eneral Abrams had b een preempt ed by the Attorney General
who was talking directly to Gen eral Abrams in Mem phis. Subsequently we
got through to M e mphis and received word that the h elicopters had not yet
left but wer e on the field awaiting tower clearance. I then c a lled the
President at about 1 : 35 and told him that the helicopters were still on the
field but were waiting for tower clearance.
CALIFANO: Do you r emember what the Pre sident said at that time?
VANCE: Yes. The President asked me why it was taking so
long for them to get off the ground. He commented that the situation was in
very serious shape and unless they got there fast the marshals might be
overrun and would have to fire their weapons, and then the whole situation
might get completely out of hand.
CALIFANO: Did you say anything to these remarks of the President?
VANCE: I told the President we were doing everything we could
to get the troops there as fast as possible, and I would call him as soon as
the planes were in the air. I kept in close touch with the air station at Memphis
34 .· .
and made a progress r eport to the President a bout ten m inutes l ate r ,
saying that the planes had still not l eft the field. T he P r e side nt agai n asked
me why the planes h ad not yet gotten off the field. I told him that we still did
not know but that I would inform him as soon as we had some information.
About eight minutes later I calle d the President again and t old him the h e li-
copters V\Ould take off momentarily. Shortly thereafter the helicopters did
take off and I so reported to the President.
CALIFANO: Was that your las t conve rsation w ith t h e President
that evening?
VANCE: No. I had a number of other conve rsa tions with the
Pre sident during the eveni ng. I neglected t o mention a previous c onversa-
tion that I h ad w i th the Pre sid ent. The President c a lle d directly about
22 minutes after twelve and gave instructions to me t o commit the National
Guard unit l ocat ed in Oxford, na mely Troop E. I gave these instructions
and the troop was commi tted. Some time the reafter the President called
me and asked me w hether, in fact, Troop E had l eft the a rmory. I attempted
to ascertain this information from Memphis, bu t again the line s were pre-
empted and I was unable to get through. I aske d my Military Assist ant,
Jack Cushman, to place a call directly to the armory and see if he could
r each anybody there. Jack did place such a call and got a cook on the other
end of the line. He was the only person who was left in the armory. Jack
aske d him w h e the r or not the troops had left for the campus , and h e said
that h e wasn't permitte d to talk to anybody, that the l ast instr uctions the
35 ...... ~ ,...... ' . - ......
troop comma nder had give n t o him wer e not to t a lk to anyb od y a s n ews pap e r r eporte rs would proba bly be c a lling. Jack Cushma n t o ld h im that he was c allin g o n beha lf o f t he S e cretary of t he Army and h e nee d e d the i nformati o n . T he cook declined t o give a ny furthe r i nformation; t h e r e upon, I took the phone and spok e to the cook and asked him for this information. H e asked me who I was, and I told him that I was the
Secre tary of the Army and I nee d e d this information for the President.
H e t old me tha t thi s w as a likely sto ry, that h e didn't belie v e it. A fter a coupl e of min ute s I was a ble t o convi nce him at l east temp orar ily t hat I was the Se cre tary of t he Army, a nd h e informe d m e t hat the troop had l e ft a b o ut ha lf an h our a go for the campus. I r e po rted this informa tion b a ck t o the White H ous e. L a ter during t h e evening I s p oke w ith the
Pre sident many tim e s. We dis c u sse d the s i tuation from time to time a s i t developed.
CA LIFANO: How did the t r o ops build up during t he evening ? Do you have a ny estima te of tha t , or recollection of that?
VANCE: As I r e call it, the membe rs of Troop E arrived on the campus sometime around 1:00 o'clock Washingto n time and stood with the marsha ls in resisting the attempts of the mob to reach the Lyceum.
This unit was commanded by Captain F a ulkner and did a very good job under extremely difficult conditions. Subsequently other e l ements of the
108th Armore d Cava lry Regime nt, of which Troop E was a component, b e gan to a rrive o n t h e c a m pus. M y r ecolle cti on is tha t the troop bui ldup
36 went something as follows: by about 3:00 o'clock in the morning there were 600 soldiers on the campus; by 4:00 o'clock, approximately 1, 100; by 5:00 o'clock in the morning, 2, 100; and by 8:00 o'clock the next morning, 4, 000.
I m ight add h e re that the b attle group from the 2d Infantry Division was on its road march from Fort Benning to Memphis during the afternoon and evening of the 30th. And as I previously stated, the operation was to have taken place at 12:00 o'clock on Monday, and their instructions had b een to conduct a road march w hich would get them to Memphis on Monday.
It was necessary, as the situa tion worsened during the night, to tur n the battle group from its Memphis destination and to commit it to Oxford. We did this by getting word to the battle group on the road. As I recall it, we did this by reaching them at a place called Selman. They then turned and moved south and arrived in Oxford and went into deplo yment directly from the r o ad march.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, were more troops committed beyond the
4, 000 you m entioned?
VANCE: Subsequently we achieved a buildup in support of the operations there w ith a t otal of about 22, 000 troops. As the evening pro gressed, after discussions with the President, we decided it was necessary to get a much larger force than we had anticipated. We were receiving reports from FBI and Army intelligence sources that many cars and other means of transportation were moving towards the Oxford area with
37 . . -. , ...... - ...... • . • ...... - ...... ~ ...... , ...... ··- · . _., __ ...... _.,...... ,,...... , ..,...... \ _ ..... , .. -....
troublemakers. We were fearful at that time that the entire situa tion in
that part of Mississippi might get completely out of hand and, therefore,
believed it desirable to move in such a large force that we could imme
diately contain any situation that might develop.
CALIFANO: Was this a personal position of the President?
VANCE: This was a personal position of the President in which
I participated. I believe it was at about 1:30 or so that I called General
Wheeler who was still at home. I had not called him earlier in the evening
as things had been developing so rapidly that the r e was no time to do anything
other than to stay completely on top of the situation. At about 1:30, I called
G eneral Wheeler at home and told him it appeared that we might have to
move in an additional division, and that I thought it desirable that he join
us as soon as he possibly could. He said tha t he would be down immediately.
After G eneral Wheeler arrived, we had further discussions with the President
and d e cide d to deploy an additional division. We selected the 82d Division
and the 101st Division and gave the necessary orders to the Army Continental
Command to deploy five battle groups from each of these divisions to the
Mississippi area.
CALIFANO: Do you have some recollection of the time at about
which this decision was made?
VANCE: My recollection is that this decision was made some-
where b etween 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
CALIFANO: Did G ene r a l Wheel er talk to the President as well as
you?
38 VANCE: No, I was the only one who talked to the Pre sident.
CALIFANO: Throughout the evening, w hat is y our evaluation of
the President's attitude and action? Was he cool, was he in charge of
the situatio n?
VANCE: Yes, the President was cool and was in charge of the
situation. He was deeply concerned about the possible loss of life and was terribly distressed when he h eard of the three deaths on the campus.
He was de termined to take all steps within his power to make sure that the situation did not get fu rther out of hand and that there be no further loss of life. It was for this reason that he felt so strongly that we should move in a ll troops that could conceiva bly be use d so as to demonstrate by a n ove r w helming force that the o rders o f the courts could not be flouted by dissi dent e l ements.
CALIFANO: Do you remember any other personal statements by the Pre side nt during the evening?
VANCE: Yes, I do. The President was deeply concerned at the length of time which it took for our troops to get down to Oxford. This was the first operation of this type that any of us in this Administration
h ad been in contact with. As a result, we were not aware of the difficulties
of movement at night and the difficulties of deploying large numbers of
people as we now are. A ccordingly, I believe we a ll underestimated the
amount of time which would be required to accomplish such troop moveme nt.
CALIFANO: Do you know who was w ith the Pre sident at the White
House during the evening?
39 VANCE: As I recall it, the Attorney General was with the
President and I believe Burke M a rshall.
CALIFANO: Do you have an opinion as to who had the greatest influence on the President duri ng the Oxford crisis ?
VANCE: Yes, I would feel strongly that the Attorney General probably had the principal advisory role during this crisis.
CALIFANO: When did the situation begin to cool off?
VANCE: The situation began to cool off when General Billingslea arrived on the campus with his detachment from the 503d MP Ba ttalion.
Immediately when he arrived on the campus he took complete charge and broke up the rioters who were surging towards the Lyceum Building. I might add that Mr. Katzenbach h ad done a magnificent job earlier in the evening holding the rioters away from the building who wer e seeking to get a t Meredith. They acted under the most extreme conditions and d eserve the highest credit and commendati on for their conduct i n this very, very difficult situation.
CALIFANO: About what time was this when the situation b egan to cool off?
VANCE: Between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock.
CALIFANO: Did you continue to stay in close contact with the
President through 8:00 o'clock in the morning, say?
VANCE: Yes, as I recall it, I did. I might add to what I h ave already said a bout my telephone conversations with the President. When
40 . .. . ··-·-···...... ' .....,...... , ...... ···· · ··~ ~ - ~ .... \, _.. ,, ...... ·- .. ···-· -· · ·· · · .. ·· ---- ......
General Billingslea 1 s troops arrived at the Oxford airport, the President
called to ask that they b e committed a s soon as they arrived. I told the
President that this would be done but that it would be preferable to permit
the entire group to a ssemble and move a s a unit rather t h an to comm it at
piecemeal. I said that I was concerned that if we committed ji piecemeal
they would be much less effective, as they would be chewed up rather than
coming in as a total force. I also had a discussion with the President
about the possibility of the helicopters landing on the c a mpus. We attempted
to do this s o a s to shorte n t h e l ead time as it was about two miles from the
a irport to the campus. It w as not possible to accomp lish this, howev e r,
b ecause there were no landing lights at the football field where they w ould
have to l a nd, and the refore they had to land at the Ox ford Un iversity airport
and then m a rch from the r e to the c a mpus.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, would you say the situation was unde r
control by 4:00 o'clock i n the morni n g, or w as it afte r that?
VANCE: No, it w as under control by 4:00 o'clock in the morning.
CALIFANO: Did you have contact with the President on the Oxford
subject after this evening?
VANCE: Yes, I did. B e fore I went to breakfast that morning,
the President c a lled me and told me that he was concerne d about two things:
first, the length of time that it had taken for the troops to come from
M e mphis to Oxford; and second, the communications which we had during
41 the night between Washington and Oxford. H e asked me to inve stigate the situation and r eport back to him as to these two matters. I t old him that I woul d do so and met with the Chief of Staff the next mor ning and asked that a n immediate i nvestigation b e conducted on these matters.
CALIFANO: What wer e the results of that investigation, and did you repo rt them b a ck to the Pre sident?
VANCE: Yes, I did. The r e s ults of the investigation were re- ported to G eneral Wheeler and to me by the Inspector G eneral of the Army, who made a report on the 3rd of October 1962. General Wheeler p r e pared a memorandum for me based upon the inve stigation of the I nspe ctor G eneral, a nd General Wheeler and I took this to the President and briefly discuss ed it with him.
CALIFANO: What w as the substance of the report t hat y ou gave the President?
VANCE: We told him tha t the re were sever a l l essons which we ha d l earne d from Oxford. First, during the p r e -planning pha s e of our meetings with the r epres entatives of the Department of Justice, w e had agr eed upon a n over-all outline of our plan of oper ations but had not worked out in s ufficient detail the movement plans and times i nvolved. We sug gested in the future precise plans be developed and agreed to by both the
Department of Justice and ourse lve s. I suggested that these plans be initialled by both the Depar tment of Justice and the Department of D ef e nse
42 so that it would be clear that we fully understood the mutual actions which each of us would have to take, and there would be no vacuum which might arise.
Second, we pointed out tha t in any future o p e r a tion it would b e neces sary to have on-the-ground r econnaissance ahead o f time. In this case we had n o t been permitted to conduct sufficient advance reconnaissance and, as a result of this, were hampered in our operations.
Third, we pointed out that originally the guidelines had precluded the c a rrying of rifles by any of the t roops . The original instructions were that they were to carry only night sticks and pistols. When at the last moment it became necessary to change the w eapons which they c arried to rifles , this c a used a delay which would not have been necessary if we ha d agreed in advance that they should carry their normal equipment, namely rifles. In addition, we pointed out that rifles a r e much more e ffective in that they can be used to d efend the A rmy troops with out firing them, and that w h e n bayonets were placed on the rifle s this would be an additional stabilizing factor in the situation.
Finally, we recommended that in any future operations we make sure that we have adequate communications in place in advance of the ope r a tion. This would be done by placing adequate mobile communications in the area so that we could be sure to maintain contact from Washington directly to the area involved. The fact that we had not had advance tactical communications i n the area seriously hampered our ability to communicate with Genera l Billingslea at the Oxford area.
43 CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, what was the reaction of the President t o your recommendations?
VANCE: The President agreed with all of our recommendations.
He said that we had learned some valuable lessons from what had taken place, and he was sure that none of us would make the same mistakes again.
CALIFANO: Did you ever have occasion to discuss Oxford with the President after that?
VANCE: Yes, I did, but i n the context of other operations .
Subsequent t o the Oxford situation, we had civil disorders in connection with integration problems in the State of Alabama, and in our discussions with the President concerning our plans for those operations we drew heavily upon the experience of Oxford.
CALIFANO: Was the President any p art of the decision to leave troops at Oxford for the entire school year?
VANCE: Yes, this was discussed with the Preside nt. We paid a great deal of attention to the question of how rapidly we could move troops out of Oxford as soon as the situation stabilized. I believe it was about four or five days thereafter that we were able to start to move out the first of the troops. We developed a d etailed plan for the removal of troops from the area which we submitte d to and discussed with the President.
When he had approved this plan we put it into effect. We subsequently determined, after we had removed all of the National Guard troops from
44 Federal active duty and had returned almost all of the active duty forces to their home stations, to l eave a small contingent of troops a t Oxford to ensure Meredith's safety and to make certain that the orders of the court were carried out.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, there were some specific problems that r eceived attention during the Oxford crisis. One was the question of whether o r not the troops that were sent to the campus were segregated.
Were they segregated?
VANCE: No, the troops that were sent to the campus were not s egregated.
CALIFANO: Didn't Mr. Meredith state that they were and ques - tioned your judgment on that?
VANCE: Yes, Mr. Mere dith did issue a statement to that effect several days after the incident. What happened in that situation was simply this: Immediately after the situation was brought under control, we determined that it would be desirable to remove from the controlling units Negro personnel because we were fearful that they might be attacked by some of the local citizens. G eneral Wheeler and I dis cussed this at l e ngth and decided that we should not expose these personnel to undue risk and, therefore, made the decision to remove Negro troops from active patrol. This decision was the subject of much comment and
discussion, and after the situation had stabilized itself and had cooled down we introduced the Negr o e l ements back into their normal duties.
45 CALIFANO: Was the President any part of this decision to remove
N e groes from patrolling in the early stage s?
VANCE: As I recall it, he was not. This was a decision which was made by General Wheele r and by me.
CALIF ANO: Did you discuss t he question of whether or not troops should have been segregated with the President either before or during the week end when you were first sending them on the campus?
VANCE: No, we did not. I might add, Mr. Califano, that the
Negro troops handled themselves with great distinction. I recall one incident which occurred on the campus at nigh t when a Negro jeep driver took an injured marshal out through the mob to a hospital and thus saved his life. This was an act of great bravery under the circumstances. In short, I would say that all the Negro troops w ho w e re present in Oxford handled themselves in a magnificent fashion.
CALIFANO: Did you have any conversations with Governor Barnett either during this week end or subsequently?
VANCE: I subsequently met Governor Barnett at a meeting in
Wa shington where we were discussing the r e organization of the National
Guard, but we did not discuss at that time w hat took place in Oxford.
CALIFANO: The re also on the week end following S eptember 29 was a football game scheduled for Oxford that was cancelled. Was that directed by the President, or was that a decision of yours?
VANCE: That was my decision, concurred in by the Secretary of Defense. As I recall it, we r eceived a recomme ndation from G eneral
46 Howze, who was placed in over-all charge of our forces in Oxford, and from Nick Katzenbach that we permit the football game to go forward on the week end following the rioting. I considered this very carefully and discussed it with Mr. McNamara. We concluded that this would be a very dangerous thing to do because of the large crowds which would be coming into Oxford for the homecoming game and, therefore, directed the University to either cancel the game or to move it to another location.
After discussions with the University officials, they agreed to move the game to Jackson.
CALIFANO: Did you feel that the F ederal Government or the
Secretary of the Army had authority to order a football game not play?
VANCE: I certainly did. I discussed this with my legal advisers, and we concluded that I did have this power under the Executive Orde r issued by the President and implementing orders issued pursuant thereto.
CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, with respect to General Walker, were you aware of General Walker's presence on the campus on the night of
30 September?
VANCE: Yes. I receive d reports during the night that G eneral
Walker was on the campus. I received further r e ports to the e ffect that he was making speeches to the mob which were inflammatory.
CALIFANO: Did you order that anything be done about that?
VANCE: I ordered that a n inve stigation be made t o ascertain w h ether, in fact, this was the case, and furthered ordered all elements
47 of the Army to cooperate with the Department of Justice in following up on this situation.
CALIFANO: Did you have any discussions with either the President or the Attorney General about G eneral Walker's presence?
VANCE: I did not have any discussions with the President about it. I did with the Attorney General.
CALIFANO: What were those discussions?
VANCE: The Attorney General asked if we would make available to the Department of Justice the Army's files with respect to General Walker, and I agreed to his request and instructed that the files be made available.
CALIFANO: Did you have authority to take this action?
VANCE: Yes, I did.
CALIFANO: Did you think that the n umber of troops ordered into
Oxford were excessive?
VANCE: In hindsight, perhaps they were excessive. On the other hand, I feel that the large number of troops had a stabilizing influence , and if I had it to do over again I would err on the side of too many troops rather than too few.
CALIFANO: You mentioned Senator Stennis. Do you remember any of your other contacts with him during this week end, or Senator
Eastland, or their contacts with the President, if any?
VANCE: I had a number of conversations with S enator Stennis during the days following the riot. Senator Stennis was deeply concerned about
48 the use of Negro troops in patrols and urged me on many occasions to s ee that the y wer e not included in patrols. I had no discussions with
Senator E a stland.
CALIFANO: Do you r emember any discussions w ith S e cretary
McNamara about Oxford aside from those you mentioned this afternoon?
VANCE: Yes. I kept Secretary McNamara informed at all times of how the situation was proceeding and w hat actions we were taking.
I would meet with him daily and probably several times a day to keep him up to date.
CALIFANO: Aside from the decision with respect to the football game, did Secretary McNamara take part in the other decisions that were made that eve ning or preceding?
VANCE: My r ecollection is that he took no p a rt in the decisions of that evening. I did report to him the next morning fully what had taken place and kept him informed, as I said, on a ll further aspects of our operations in Oxford. Things were happening so rapidly that evening that there was not time to keep him informed.
CALIFANO: You mentioned that you did not call Gene ral Wheeler on that evening until you were on the verge of committing a d ivision.
Would you say that G eneral Wheeler's advice was sought on the whole throughout this week end and used as Chief of Staff of the Army by you and the President?
49 -~ VANCE: Yes, it was. Certainly General Wheele r participated
fully in the planning which l ed up to the commitment of our forces in Oxford.
He did not participate in the early hours of that evening, and that was only
b ecause I did not call him until, as I have said, approxima tely 2:00 o'clock
in the morning.
CALIFANO: How would you assess President K e nnedy's reactions
and judgments during the week e nd and during the period l e ading up to the
crisis?
VANCE: President Kennedy's r eactions and judgments were
in my view excellent. I think that he made the only decision that could
have been made in ordering the use of Federal troops. I think he was
wholly correct in deciding that there could be no flouting of the laws of
the United States, and I think that the firmness with which he handled the
situation prevented it from e scalating to a much higher degree. His
judgment was sound; he was cool at all times and acted as one would h o pe
a President would act.
CALIFANO: Do you think that the Attorney General had more
influence or took a more active role than was warranted during the Oxford
week end?
VANCE: That's a difficult q uestion, Mr. Califano. At that
time, as I previously indicated, we had never engaged in a j oint operation
of this type. As a result, we had not worked out a modus operandi which
would permit the best utilization of the resources of the Government.
50 I think that we all l earned some hard lessons from the actions that took
place in Oxford which we put to good use in future civil disturbance
situations throughout the countr y.
CALIFANO: Do you have anything else that you would like to say about the Oxford, Mississippi crisis?
VANCE: Yes, I would like to say a word about the fashion in which I believe the troops carried out their mission. I have the highest
regard for the way in which b o th Regular Army and the National Guard units responded. This was an extremely difficult situation to say the l east in which it required the utmost of judgment, of courage, and of understanding. The units, both active and National Guard, lived up to the finest traditions which we expect from the military and gave all of us civilians comfort in the knowledge that our military forces were so well trained and could exercise such excellent judgment under try ing con di tion s.
CALIFANO: I have one final question. Have you ever met Mr.
Meredith?
VANCE: No, I have never met Mr. Meredith.
51