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TEIREE ARMIES IN KOREA:

THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES EIGHTH ARMY

IN KOREA, JULY 1950-JUNE 1952

A Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the

Graduate School of the Ohio State University

by

Kelly C. Jordan, M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1999

Dissertation Committee:

Allan R Millett Approved by

John F. Guilmartin Jr.

Warren Van Tine

Adviser Department of History UMI Number: 9931623

Copyright 1999 by Jordan, Kelly C.

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9931623 Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Kelly C. Jordan L999 ABSTRACT

For the first two years of the Korean War, the United. Nations relied largely

upon the American Army component of the United States Eighth Army to achieve its

political goals. As the entity referred to as the Eighth United States Army in Korea

(EUSAK) formed, expanded, and matured, it also changed significantly during the

period July 1950 to June 1952. These changes produced three distinct organizations

in terms of composition, senior leadership, mission, and method of combat operations.

The “first” Eighth Army was the army that fought between 13 July-25 December

1950, whüe the “second” Eighth Army existed during the period 26 December 1950-

12 November 1951, and the “third” Eighth Army came into being during the period 13

November 1951-30 June 1952. While this observation is perhaps not surprising from

an organizational point o f view, it challenges a basic and prevailing American view

regarding the evolution o f its armies in conflict. This dissertation examines the US

Army component of the Eighth United States Army in Korea between July 1950-June

1952 and evaluates it in terms of its combat effectiveness by assessing the six fimdamental elements of combat power, leadership, administration, firepower, maneuver, integration, and protection, using a unique battlefield effectiveness

n paradigm to produce an assessment of the Eighth Army’s leadership, battlefield activities, and overall combat eflfectiveness. This assessment also supports the argument that the “second” Eighth Army that fought in Korea was substantially different from the “first” Eighth Army that preceded it and the “third” Eighth Army that succeeded it, and that the second Eighth Army was the most combat effective of the three armies at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. A combination of deliberate reform measures, battlefield opportunities, an influx of excellent soldiers and leaders, and a synergistic effect among all of these occurrences explains the remarkable battlefield performance of this organization, which was perhaps the best

American field army between World War II and the Gulf War.

m To my father.

Dr. John Patrick Jordan, Major, USAR, Retired, for being my role model as a man, soldier, scholar, and father. It was you who inspired me to achieve the things I have, and instilled in me the desire for excellence and to coirçlete my Ph D.

and

To my wife,

Roberta A. Jordan, for being my friend, confidant, helper, wife, and mother of our two wonderful children. Over the last five years, I have spent far too much time in my oflhce and not enough with you and the children. Thanks for picking up my slack, understanding, and helping me complete this project.

I owe you both more than I can ever possibly repay, and I am thankful that you have both stuck by me from the beginning of this project to its completion. Your combmed influence helped me to persevere, and this work is a much better product because of your involvement.

IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my adviser, Allan R. Millett, for his intellectual support, encouragement, and guidance that made this dissertation possible, and for his patience in correcting both my stylistic and substantive errors.

I also need to thank Mark Jacobson, Alexander Lassner, Lieutenant Colonel

David T. Fautua, and Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane for the innumerable stimulating discussions that I had with them which led me to recognize^ conceptualize, and define many fimdamental aspects of my argument. I could not have completed this project without the direct assistance of my fiiend William R. Roberts on several significant occasions, and I am in his debt as well for his consistent support.

I am deeply grateful to my superiors in the Department of History at the

United States Military Academy, especially Colonel Robert A. Doughty, Colonel

Charles F. Brower IV, Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, and Colonel James M. Johnson.

Without their conthuiing interest in my progress and the decisions that they made that provided me with the time, opportunity, and resources to work on this dissertation over the past three years, I am certain that I would not have completed it while at

West Point. I am particularly grateful to the support I received J&om the United States Military Academy’s Faculty Development Research Fund, which allowed me to conduct numerous essential research trips to various archival locations.

My debt to the two men who inspired me to begin my study of the Korean War and the Eighth Army, as expressed in the dedication of my MA Thesis, remains unchanged. My uncles. First Lieutenant Herbert L. Jordan, USA, Infantry, who, as a member of Conçany L, 8th Cavalry Regiment, First Cavalry Division, gave his life for his country on 18 September 1950 on Hill 403, Tabu-Dong, Korea, and Colonel

William S. Jordan, USA, Infantry, whose gallant actions on Heartbreak Ridge between

5 September-6 October 1951 as the commander of Company B, 23d Infantry

Regiment, Second hifantry Division, inspired me to study the Korean War, will always be two of my greatest heroes. This work is a personal tribute to them as well

Finally, I believe that the writing of history should be both an academic and an artistic undertaking, and the music ofWol%ang Amadeus Mozart, Johaim Pachelbel,

Shania Twain, Jewel, Queen, Styx, Mindy McCready, Patty Loveless, and Trisha

Yearwood was an integral part of the creative process that produced this work. These particular artists, along with many others, provided me the intellectual stimulation that

I needed to persevere during the long and seemingly endless nights of writing, and their contributions were as important to the artistic portion of this work as the primary and secondary sources were to the academic part of this endeavor. Their melodies and voices soothed me, and their lyrics inspired me to continue on my quest to gain a better understanding of the Eighth Army in Korea as an organization and as an eclectic and ever-changmg group of fascinating, conçlex, and heroic individuals.

v i VTTA

February 12, 1964 ...... Bom - Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

May 17, 1986 ...... B.A., Virginia Military Insthute, Lexington, Virginia

1986-Present ...... U.S. Army OfiBcer

June 7, 1996 ...... M.A., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

July 6, 1996 ...... histructor. Department of EEstory, United States Mihtary Academy, West Point, New York

July 1, 1998 ...... Assistant Professor, Department of EQstory, United States Mihtary Academy, West Point, New York

PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERENCES

“The Persistent Prophet: The Role of Percy Hobart in British Armored Warfare Doctrine Development from 1927-1934,” conference paper presented at Theatrum Mhitarum HI Graduate Student Conference in Military History, The Ohio State University, April 21-22, 1995.

The Napoleonic Titan: Napoleonic Warfare, Organizations, Operations, Weapons, and Tactics. West Point, NY: United States Military Academy Department of History, 1996.

‘Tilling The Void: Planning And Conducting Small Unit Search-And-Attack Operations,: forthcorning in

Editor, West Point Atlas for Warfare Since 1945, in The West Point Military History Series. Wayne, NJ: Avery Pubhshing Group, 1998.

v i i ‘Tilling the Ençty Battlefield: S.L.A. Marshal and the Ratio of Fire in Korea,” conference paper presented at the U.S. Army EBstorians’ Conference, Bethesda, Maryland, 11 June 1998. This paper has received conditional approval to appear in The Journal o f Military History.

‘Troducing Strategists for the Twenty-first Century,” co-authored with Major Thomas Goss, Army, June 1999, 45-49.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

vni TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... ii

DEDICATION...... iv

ACKNOLEDGMENTS...... v

VTTA...... vü

LIST OF TABLES...... xi

LIST OF FIGURES...... xüi

INTRODUCTION...... I

CHAPTER 1 - INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW...... 11

CHAPTER 2 - THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS PARADIGM...... 32

CHAPTER 3 - THE ORGANIZATIONS AND DOCTRINE...... 51

CHAPTER 4 - THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT...... 101

CHAPTER 5 - THE FIRST EIGHTH ARMY...... 151

CHAPTER 6 - THE SECOND EIGHTH ARMY ...... 233

CHAPTER 7 - THE THIRD EIGHTH ARMY ...... 308

CHAPTER 8 - SYNERGY AND COMBAT POWER...... 349

CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION...... 402

IX APPENDIX A - IMPORTANT EIGHTH ARMY LEADERS IN KOREA...... 411

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 414 LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE Table I. Korean War Significant Events, June 1950-November 1951 25 Table 2. Korean War Significant Events, December 1951-July 1953 27 Table 3. Comparison of Communist and Eighth Army Personnel 62 Strengths, July 1950-June 1952 Table 4. Recapitulation of Numbers and Types of Tanks Available to the 108 Eighth Army, January-July 1951 Table 5. Comparison of Certain Characteristics of Tank Effectiveness 110 for American and Communist Tanks in Korea Table 6. Conçarison of Tank Main Gun Effectiveness Using a Muzzle 112 Energy Calculation Table 7. Penetration Performance for the AP Projectile Fired fi’om 113 Tanks Used in Korea Table 8. Comparison of Tank Effectiveness Criteria for Eighth Army 116 and C ommunist Tanks in Korea Table 9. Comparison of Tank Effectiveness for Tanks Actually in 117 Combat during the July 1950-June 1952 Period Table 10. Characteristics of the Eighth Army's American Artillery 121 Weapons Table 11. Characteristics of the Communist Forces’ Artillery Weapons 127 Table 12. Comparison of the Eighth Army’s and Communist Forces’ 131 Artillery Weapons Table 13. Aircrafi: Available for Close Air Support to UNC Forces 133 Table 14. Capabilities of Navy and Marine Corps Close Air Support 140 Aircraft Available to the Eighth Army Table 15. Aircraft Available to the Communist Forces 143 Table 16. Comparison of Close Air Support Aircraft Available to the 148 Eighth Army and the Communist Forces in Korea

XI TABLE PAGE Table 17. Récapitulation of the Results of the Analyses of the Elements 149 of Firepower for the Eighth Army and the Communist Forces Table 18. First Eighth Army Persormel Figures 187

Table 19. Comparison of Communist and Eighth Army Personnel 193 Strengths, July-December 1950 Table 20. Arrival and Status of American Units in Korea, 1950 223 Table 21. Arrival and Status of AUied Units in Korea, August-October 225 1950 Table 22. Arrival and Status of AUied Units in Korea, November- 226 December 1950 Table 23. First EUSAK Combat Effectiveness Summary 230 Table 24. Second Eighth Army Persormel Figures 256 Table 25. Comparison of Communist and Eighth Army Personnel 271 Strengths, January-November 1951 Table 26. Comparison of Committed Communist Elements’ Personnel 273 Strength and the Eighth Army’s Total Personnel Strength, January-November 1951 Table 27. Revised Recapitulation of the Eighth Army’s Firepower 283 Effectiveness, January-November 1951 Table 28. Second EUSAK Combat Effectiveness Summary 305 Table 29. Comparison of Communist and Eighth Army Persormel 325 Strengths, December 1951-June 1952 Table 30. Comparison of Committed Communist Elements’ Personnel 327 Strength and the Eighth Army’s Total Persormel Strength, December 1951-June 1952 Table 31. Third Eighth Army Persormel Figures 329 Table 32. Third EUSAK Combat Effectiveness Summary 347 Table 33. Elements of Combat Power and Levels of Military Activity 353 Integration Matrix Table 34. Integration Matrix for the Relevant Elements of Combat 375 Power at the Operational Level of Military Activity and the Three Eighth Armies

xn TABLE PAGE Table 35. Overall Combat Power at the Four Levels of Military Activity 377 for the Three Eighth Armies Table 36. Exançles of Possible Two-dimensional Synergistic 397 Interactions Between Leadership and Other Elements of Combat Power

xm LIST OF HGURES

FIGURE PAGE

Figure 1. Korean War Events 1950-1953 20

Figure 2. Eighth. Army Organization hi the Korean War 60

Figure 3. Infantry Division Organization In the Korean War 69

Figure 4. Division Artillery Organization In the Korean War 70

Figure 5. Infantry Regiment Organization In the Korean War 72

Figure 6. Infantry Rifle Company Organization In the Korean War 73

Figure 7. Infantry Rifle Platoon Organization In the Korean War 74

Figure 8. WWII & Korean War hifantry Rifle Squad Organization 77 Comparison

Figure 9. WW II & Korean War Infantry Rifle Platoon Organization 78 Comparison

Figure 10. Tank Battalion Organization In the Korean War 83

Figure 11. Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion Organization In the 87 Korean War

Figure 12. Important Aviation Areas in Korea 142

Figure 13. MiG Alley and U.S. Navy’s Aviation Area in Korea 277

XIV INTRODUCTION

Speaking in May 1953, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins

remarked that the exceptional achievement of the United States Eighth Army in Korea

was its ability to succeed despite the ffct that the Army’s fluid rotation patterns caused

the unit’s personnel to turn over three times during the w ar/ Collins was saying that

America had, in effect, mobilized three different armies to fight the Korean War.

Indeed, most military organizations experience some level o f personnel umest over

the course of a conflict, like the American Continental Army during the Revolutionary

War, the Union Army of the Potomac during the Civil War, the American

Expeditionary Forces during World War I, or Patton’s Third Army during World War

n, but the leaders and soldiers of these units were committed to serve with these

organizations for the duration of the conflict in which they were involved. The same

cannot be said, however, for the United States Eighth Army during the Korean War.

This organization was the first American field army to experience the turbulence accompanying a personnel replacement system tied more to the desires of the

^ Remarks by General J. Lawton Collins, Armed forces Day, Houston, Texas, 15 May 1953, Oral Histories, J. Lawton Collins, HRC 350.001, CMH, cited in David T. Fautua, ‘The ‘Long PuIF Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army,” The Journal o f Military /firro/y, 61:1, January 1997, pp. 111-112.

1 individual soldiers than to the requirements o f the event in which they participated.

While some have argued that the individual rotation system had little impact on unit cohesion, it is clear that a mass rotation system of personnel replacement will likely have a profound impact on the composition, character, and proficiency of an organization."

While referring mostly to changes in personnel, Collins’ observation is worth considering in the broader sense as well. Over the course of the Korean War, the organization referred to as the United States Eighth Army supported several truly distinct political goals, pursued two fundamentally different strategic approaches, conducted a wide variety of operational maneuvers, and employed m any different tactics as the principal ground component of the United Nations Command (UNC) m

Korea. In addition, the senior leadership of the Eighth Army changed at least annually if not more rapidly, and the composition of the units that made up the Eighth Army remained in a constant state of flux. These constant changes made it very difBctdt for the Eighth Army to develop any kind of cohesion or distinctive organizational personality, hi much the same way as each soldier experienced a different Vietnam

War, the Eighth Army becamemany different organizations depending on the period when one served. Although the soldiers from Task Force Smith and those who seized the peak of Heartbreak Ridge or fought for possession of “Old Baldy” were all

" Roger Kaplan, “Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam: A Bum Rap,” Parameters, September 1987, pp. 58-67. members of the Eighth Army, in many respects, their experiences during their period of assignment had little in common with one another.

As the Eighth Army formed, expanded, and matured, its character as a military organization took on at least three distinct dispositions, and each of these entities fought differently, had different leaders, and experienced different levels of success.

More specifically, the “second” Eighth Army that fought in Korea between 26

December 1950-12 November 1951 was substantially different fi'omthe “first” Eighth

Army that preceded it and the “third” Eighth Army that succeeded it, and the second

Eighth Army was the most combat effective of the three armies at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.^ A combination of deliberate reform measures, battlefield opportunities, an influx of excellent soldiers and leaders, and a synergistic effect among all of these occurrences explains the remarkable battlefield performance of this organization, which was perhaps the best American field army between World War H and the Guff War.

This dissertation wül use J. Lawton Collins’ observation that America mobilized three different armies to fight the Korean War in the broadest sense to guide the study and as a way of examining the changing nature of the Eighth Army in Korea.

Although addressing the Eighth Army’s impact at the political, strategic, and tactical levels of war, this study will remain focused on examining the Eighth Army’s

^ I make this claim despite the contentions by Walter G. Hermes and J. Lawton Collins that James A_ Van Fleet’s Eighth Army (April 1951-February 1953) was as good an army as America has ever put in the field. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, in the U.S. Army in the Korean War series (Washington, DC: OfBce o f the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1988), p. 390 (hereinafter cited as Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front). operational reforms and selected institutional changes to show both their effect on the

Eighth Army’s combat effectiveness and their interrelationships with the conduct of the Korean War at the other levels of war. Organized chronologically, this work will begin with an examination of the “first” Eighth Army, the army that fought between 13

July -25 December 1950, then transition into an in-depth examination o f the “second”

Eighth Army, the army that fought between 26 December 1950-12 November 1951, and conclude with a look at the “third” Eighth Army, the army that fought during the period 13 November 1951-30 June 1952. Once completed, this study will compare the three armies and attempt to account for their diSering levels o f success at the different levels of war. Finally, 1 will provide what I beheve to be a plausible explanation for the tremendous combat effectiveness demonstrated by the “second”

Eighth Army and offer some more general conclusions about the combat effectiveness of units in battle. Given the consistent nature of his association with the army throughout much of the period of my study, I will also highlight the influence of

Matthew B. Ridgway on the Eighth Army as member of the US Army staff as its commander, and as the United Nations Command (UNC) / Far East Command (EEC) leader as a recurring motif to help describe and explain the complexities of the organization and the difficulties associated with fighting a limited war in the early part of the burgeoning Cold War.

Like the Eighth Army, the Korean War itself remains something of a curiosity in American history. Although the conflict began just five years after World War 11 ended and was an integral part of a struggle for global power between the acknowledged superpowers, it remains the “bridesmaid” of American military efforts.

The lack of a clear-cut military victory ou the battlefield furthered this characterization, and evaluations of America’s conduct in Korea only began to improve in the wake of the Vietnam War debacle. Nevertheless, the general public has paid little attention to the Korean War in the ensuiug forty-six years since the guns along the 38th Parallel fell silent, leading many to label it the “forgotten war.”^

From a bibliographical standpoint, however, it does not appear as though authors ever forgot the Korean War. Currently, about sixty-five general histories exist, and according to Keith D. McFarland, a long-time chronicler of Korean War works, new works continue to appear at a substantial rate.^ Several notable sources also exist that recount the exploits of the Eighth Army, the UNC’s primary fighting organization in the Korean War, although they concentrate primarily on the first six

■' For example, see Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York; Times Books, 1987) (hereinafter cited as Blair, The Forgotten War).

* Most authors agree that David Rees' Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964) and T. R. Fehrenbach's This Kind o f War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963) are the most useful references. Other works, including, Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History o f the Korean War (New York: Putnam , 1962), Joseph C. Goulden'sKorea: The Untold Story o f the War (New York: McGraw, 1982), Burton I. Kaufinan’s The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis. Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), Galium A. MacDonald’s Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986), Max Basting’s The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), Bevin Alexander's Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987), and John Toland'sIn .Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1991), and Blair, The Forgotten War, are also excellent sources. Articles by Glenn S. Cook, “Korea: No Longer the Forgotten War,”The Journal o f Military History 56:3, July 1992, pp. 489-494, and Allan R. Millett, “A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War,” JomrForces Quarterly 7, Spring 1995, pp. 119-126, provide good reviews of many published materials. For a comprehensive listing of available Korean War sources, see, Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An .Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986); and Paul M. Edwards, General Matthew B. Ridgway: An Annotated Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). months of the w ar/ Despite this large number of works, no one has yet produced an assessment of the Eighth Army’s combat effectiveness during the Korean. War. This is remarkable because the unit’s actions included dramatic battles, featured illustrious figures, and had global significance. Nevertheless, the reality of the Eighth Army’s participation in a limited war resulted in its being ignored due to the absence o f an appropriate “yardstick” by which to measure its combat effectiveness and to the lack of a comprehensive official history against which to compare it. Both of these recently became available, and I wül make use of them in this study. ^

® S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat o f the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces. .November 1950, in the Battle o f the Chongchon River. Korea (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1953); and. Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea (London: Greenhill Books, 1988), reprinted from original published as Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea. Winter o f 1950-51 (Washington, DC: Operations Research OfBce, Department o f tire Army, 1952) (hereinafter cited as Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea). For works emphasizing the Eighth Army’s activities during the January-July 1951 period, see Blair, The Forgotten War, and Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990).

Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray developed this recent evaluation method. They present it in volume I of tlieir three-volume study.Military Effectiveness, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988) (hereinafter cited as Millet and Murray, Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, vol. II, or vol. HI). Regarding the ofBcial history, the U.S. Army did not publish the fifth and final volume of theUnited States .Army in the Korean War series covering a significant part of the period addressed in this study until 1990; see Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow. November 1950-July 1951, in The United States .Army in the Korean War series (Washington, DC: Office of the Ctiief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1990). The other three narrative volumes, all published by The Army’s Office of the Chief of Military History in Wasltington, DC, appeared in 1961 (Roy E. Appleman’s South to the Naktong. North to the Yalu), 1966 (Walter G. Hermes’ Truce Tent and Fighting Front), and 1973 (James F. Schnable’s Policy and direction: The First Year). The series’ other volume, Albert E. Cowdrey’s The M edics’ War, came out in 1987, and a volume by Frank A. Reister’, Battle Casualties and Medical Statistics: U.S. Army Experience in the Korean War, although not part of the Army official history, appeared in 1973. The Army’s Office of the Chief of Military History (CMH) has also published six Korean War monographs, including Korea, 1950 in 1952, Russell A. Gugler’s Combat .Actions in Korea in 1954, John G. Westover’sCombat Support in Korea in 1955, Korea. 1951-1953, by John Miler, Owen J. Carroll, and Margaret E. Tackley. 1956, Robert K. Sawyer’s Militcny Advisors in Korea: KNIAG in Peace and War in 1963, and Terrence J. Gough’s U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach in 1987. CMH’s most recent effort. Black Soldier. White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, written by the team of William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle and published in 1996, 6 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the US Army component of the

Eighth United States Army in Korea between July 1950-June 1952 and evaluate it in

terms of its combat effectiveness. I wfll identify and assess the six fundamental

elements o f combat power using a battlefield effectiveness paradigm, based upon a

military effectiveness model developed by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray and

refined by myself to produce an assessment of the Eighth Army’s overall combat

effectiveness. The objective o f this assessment is to support the argument that the

Eighth Army’s competent leadership and superb battlefield performance between

January-November 1951 combined in such a way to produce a synergistic effect powerfiil enough to allow the unit to transcend its discernible capabilities and become

one of the most combat effective military forces ever fielded by the United States.*

This study wUl focus on the US Army component of the Eighth Army in Korea between July 1950-June 1952 for three reasons. The first is that the US Army component provides a relatively homogenous group for examination, as compared to a study of the entire organization that would entail examinations of elements from four different branches of America’s armed forces as well as the groimd combat forces contributed by fifteen other nations. The second is that the Eighth Army exercised direct control over the majority of the ground forces assigned to the UNC, and US

represents the Army's final contribution to the historiography of the Korean War to date. William Glenn Robertson'sCounterattack on the Naktong, 1950 (Leavenworth Papers 13, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1985) is another short monograph produced by the Army, although it is not properly part of the Army’s ofiScial history.

* A synergistic effect is one in which simultaneous actions combine to enhance each other’s performance. It explains ^^y a unit’s total combat effectiveness is not simply the sum of its parts. Army personnel dominated the command structure of the Eighth Army.^ Finally,

although the US Army component of the Eighth Army accounted for less than half of the organization’s total personnel strength, US Army units produced the

overwhelming majority of the casualties inflicted upon the Communist forces/® For these reasons, an analysis of the Eighth Army that focuses on its US Army component

is both an acceptable limitation and a legitimate undertaking.

As an evaluative process, this study has two distinct parts. The leadership

assessment will evaluate three of the four Eighth Army commanders dining the Korean

War, recognizing that their positions required them to function as leaders and

manager.»;, to respond to the desires of their immediate superior, and that the changing battlefield situations imposed different criteria for success upon each leader. Only

Maxwell D. Taylor is excluded from the study, since his period in command

(February-July 1953) was fairly unremarkable and outside the chronological scope of

’ In addition to furnishing the overall commander and staff for the Eighth Army, U.S. Army persotmel provided commanders and staffs for three of the army’s five corps and six of the army’s fourteen divisions. American Army ofBcers also dominated the Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG), which supplied the ROK Army with expert training and operational advice. With the exception of the 1st U.S. Marine Division and the First Commonwealth Division, U.S. Army officers controlled virtually every important organization within the Eighth Army.

‘“ U.S. Army units (augmented by Allied battalions and brigades) inflicted ninety percent of the total casualties inflicted on Communist forces by the Eighth Army in the month of February 1951. Of the remaining ten percent, ROK Army units inflicted nine percent of the casualties and the U.S. Marine Corps inflicted the other one percent (as it spent much of the month chasing NKPA guerrillas operating in the Eighth Army’s rear areas). Complete statistics of this nature were available only to determine the major UN units responsible for inflicting the casualties on the Communist forces for the month of February 1951. 1 used this month’s result as a representative sample for the January- July 1951 period, recognizing that the Marine Corps’ contribution would be significantly higher (perhaps as much as ten percent of the Eighth Army’s total) during the months that it was engaged in active combat operations. National Archives College Park Reference Branch, Records Group 338, Records o f U.S. Army Commands, 1942-, Box P609, Eighth Army Periodic Intelligence Reports number 210, 217, 224, and 232 covering the period 312400 JAN 51-282400 FEB 51.

8 this study. The battlefield evaluation will focus on the other five elements of combat power, paying particular attention to the organization’s ability to successfully maneuver and protect itself while maximizing its firepower advantage, and its ability to integrate its efforts with the UN and United States’ strategic and political goals while also obtaining the maximum effectiveness from its organic and attached combat assets.

This approach will ensure that the resulting assessment will address the army’s people and its performance.

I have divided this dissertation into five sections to support my argument. The first section includes this introduction and Chapter One, which outlines the international context of the 1945-1950 period, provides a brief overview of the Korean

War, and identifies and explains the three different Eighth Armies to which I referred in the title. The second section, addressing certain aspects of the Eighth Army’s experience during the first two years of the war that remained constant and contains

Chapter Two, which describes and explains the combat effectiveness paradigm used throughout the study. Chapter Three, which outlines the army’s common organization and doctrine, and Chapter Four, which enumerates the weapons and equipment used by both sides during the war. The third section analyzes the three Eighth Armies in great detail in Chapter Five, which assesses the combat effectiveness of the first Eighth

Army, Chapter Six, which assesses the combat effectiveness of the second Eighth

Army, and Chapter Seven, which assesses the combat effectiveness of the third Eighth

Army. The fourth section uses one chapter, Chapter Eight, to evaluate the effectiveness of the three Eighth Armies at the different levels of war and describe and explain the synergy of combat power and military activity to help explain the relative

success and failure of the various Eighth Army’s at the different levels of war.

Chapter Nine is the final chapter of this dissertation, and it summarizes the study’s

findings, highlights the significance of the work, and identifies areas for further

research regarding the Eighth Army’s battlefield performance in the Korean War in

Chapter Nine. The final product should provide the reader with an excellent overview

of the Korean War’s first two years and with an organizational study that not only helps to explain the Eighth Army’s battlefield performance but also brings to light certain aspects of military organizations in combat that have perhaps broader application to armed forces of the twentieth century and beyond.

10 CHAPTER 1

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND

KOREAN WAR OVERVIEW

What started as a peripheral conflict far fironithe Americans’ and Soviets’ main

areas of interest became what some have described as “the most bitterly contested of

all Cold War battlegrounds. As the first conventional war of the nuclear age, Korea

demonstrated that America could employ the doctrine of containing communism

without the use of nuclear weapons and that the members of the UN could cooperate

in pursuit of a common objective. Nevertheless, despite the UN forces' successes in

preserving South Korea as an independent nation, America’s unfamiliarity with limited

warfare caused many to view it as either a battlefield draw or defeat and to dismiss it

altogether. Its importance to the Cold War, however, has never been questioned, and

with the opening of increasing amounts of foreign archives and documents, the shroud

of uncertainty that has hung over the conflict is finally being lifted. Indeed, according to journalist David Rees, “...the lessons of Korea and the actions of the two blocs in that Far Eastern war are relevant to every phase of the cold war....”^

' John Lewis Gaddis, IFe Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 70.

■ David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. xvi. 11 International Context

After World War H, America abandoned its traditional isolationist policy and became active, indeed dominant, in international affairs. In the wake of the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam conferences among the victorious Allies, it became evident that the defeat of the Axis Powers also destroyed the common bonds that held the Allied coalition together. Traditional animosities reemerged in Europe and all over the world, pitting former partners against one another and turning traditional colonial relationships upside-down. Beginning with Soviet participation in the Allied Pacific campaign against Japan, the threat of worldwide Communist domination immediately replaced the fears of Nazi and Japanese hegemony.^ Elsewhere, Communist challenges appeared in Greece, Turkey, and French Indochina, each of which required a strong American-led response in order to prevent Communist expansion fi*om occurring.

Recognizing that the post-World War II era required a fimdamental reassessment of American foreign policy, President Harry S. Truman set the US State

Department to work on the task. As a result, an American policy of “containment” emerged, oriented initially not on destroying the Soviet-sponsored threat of communism, but rather preventing its expansion anywhere. America’s new

“globalism” and the ability of technology to “shrink” the world as it existed meant that the US faced a substantial and sustained foreign threat for the first time in its history.

Only now are the Russo-Japanese territorial issues among Japan's northern islands now being settled.

1 2 Most knowledgeable observers believed that this ideological threat could be contained primarily though the threat of nuclear weapons alone because the potential for catastrophic destruction would prevent any further significant aggressive acts in the future. Additionally, many experts (although not military ofiBcers) felt that the usefiilness of conventional ground forces was fundamentally altered. As civilian strategist Bernard Brodie stated in 1946, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them It can have no other useful purpose.”^ As the period 1945-1950 demonstrated, this idealistic prediction failed to account for the inevitable outburst of small-scale armed conflicts across the globe as a new world order emerged fi-om the wreckage of century’s most destructive conflict.

In 1946, conflicts broke out in Greece, Turkey, and China, demonstrating that

Brodie’s pronouncement was not entirely correct. Describing Soviet actions in central and eastern Europe in the year following the end of World War H, British

Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated on 5 March 1946 that ‘Trom Settin in the

Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain had descended across the continent.”^

Conflict was also brewing in Southeast Asia in 1946 as well. By 1947, the term “Cold

War” had entered the American lexicon, and Truman had espoused a doctrine of his own to deal with it, stating on 12 March 1947 th at‘T believe that it must be the pohcy

Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” inTim Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, Bernard Brodie, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, I946),p. 76.

^ Jeremy Issacs and Taylor Downing, Cold War: An Illustrated History, 1945-1991 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1998), p. 31.

13 of the United States to support free peoples wdio are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” thereby committing America to what

John Lewis Gaddis terms a “symmetrical” policy of response to any Communist threat/ hi 1948, the Malayan Civil War began, pitting Communist-led Chinese-

Malayan forces against British-sponsored Malayan forces, the Soviets blockaded

Berlin, producing the Allied Berlin airlift in response, and the Israehs fought their first war for independence. In addition, Czechoslovakia, attempting to become a democracy in the aftermath of World War EL, succumbed to a Soviet-sponsored coup.

Clearly, armed forces in the post-World War II era would have some usefulness in combating these “brushfire” conflicts that resulted from the larger ideological conflict of the US-Soviet Cold War.

America was holding its own during this period, succeeding in preventing

Communist expansion in Greece and Turkey. Still, the US was essentially powerless to prevent the fall of Czechoslovakia in 1948, and other developments in 1949 were far more ominous, hi rapid succession, the Soviets exploded their own atomic weapon, the Chinese Communists defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in the

Chinese Civil War, and charges of Soviet-sponsored espionage against the west surfaced in the US, Canada, and Great Britain, manifested most visibly in the Alger

Hiss case and the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for passing nuclear information to the Soviets. The emergence of Mao Zedong’s Communist regime as China’s

® John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American National Security Policy (flew York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 68-69, 101.

14 dominant political body in 1949 led to the perception that the Truman administration had ‘lost” China to the Communist sphere of influence and fueled fears of the establishment of a monolithic “Communist Bloc” determined to establish a despotic hegemony over as much o f the world as possible. It appeared as though a fundamental shift in the balance of power had taken place, with the Communists doubling their holdings virtually overnight, and that the march of communism was approaching the

United States from the west and east in much the same manner as the Axis threat of

World War II from Germany and Japan.

In response to the increased threat of communism during this period, America formed the Organization of American States in 1948 to reinforce its traditional commitment to defend the Western Hemisphere, and America signed the North

Atlantic Treaty in 1949, committing itself to its first foreign alliance in over 150 years.

In early 1950, Cold War events in America came to a head with Secretary of State

Dean Acheson’s 12 January 1950 speech to the National Press Club that seemingly excluded the Republic of Korea from the American defense perimeter and Senator

Joseph McCarthy’s sensational charge in February 1950 that the American government was infested with Communists, igniting the century’s second “Red Scare.”

Perhaps the capstone of America’s efforts to respond coherently to the newly identified ideological and national security threat posed by the Soviets, and indeed all

Communists, was the development of National Security Council memorandum 68

(NSC 68). Delivered to Truman on 14 April 1950, NSC 68 characterized the Soviet threat as world-wide in nature and portrayed it in grave terms, far more menacing than

15 previous policy assessments. It advocated a tripling o f the US defense budget to meet the threat and seemed to advocate a “symmetrical” response to Communist threats.^

Thus, on the eve of the Korean War, Americans and Truman administration officials could well-justify their feelings of being besieged by Communist threats all over the world and the menace of communism never seemed greater than in 1950.*

The Cold War had thus evolved into an ideological struggle between the forces of democracy and communism, the loss of which many feared would lead to a domino­ like falling of many other free-world countries as one nation after another was absorbed into the monolithic bloc of communism Faced with such high stakes,

America and the UN felt that a victory in the next significant conflict was crucial to their very survival. Subsequent events would serve to invahdate many of the ‘TDomino

Theory’s” worst predictions, but fear of Communist expansion was at its height between 1949 and early 1951. In this context, the North Korean actions early on the morning of 25 June 1950 seemed to confirm many of America’s worst fears, and the

Tnunan administration resolved to take a strong stand against communism in northeast

Asia to prevent its expansion elsewhere in the world.

Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, pp. 89-109. See also David T. Fautua, ‘The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army,” The Jommal o f Military History, 61:1, January 1997, pp. 96-99.

* Robert GrifBth, The Politics o f Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), p. 47.

16 The Korean War

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when the Communist-sponsored

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea North Korean People’s Army (NKPA)

crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded the Repubhc of Korea (South Korea). The

invading forces drove the overmatched Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) south at

an alarming rateand threatened to gain control o f the entire Korean peninsula, barring

outside intervention. The United States viewed the invasion as a direct Communist threat to the Cold War balance of power and led the UN assistance effort by immediately committing American forces to the conflict to pursue the American and

UN goal of preserving South Korean independence.

American ground forces in the United States Far East Command (EEC) were consohdated under the control of the Japan-based Eighth United States Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker.^ Upon his arrival in Korea, Walker assumed control of all American ground forces in the theater and became the commander of all UN ground forces as well. Walker remained the Eighth Army’s commander in Korea until he died in a jeep accident on 23 December 1950. His

’ Walker gained fame during his World War II command of an armored corps assigned to General George S. Patton’s Tliird U.S. Army. He had been in command of the Eighth Army since 1949.

In all, nineteen nations contributed some type of unit to the UNC’s effort in the Korea War, and, even though the ROK and American forces dominated the UNC’s force composition and leadership positions, it was truly an international undertaking. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, pp. 407, 494, and passim. William Stueck presents an effective argument for the international nature of the Korean war as well. See William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 3.

17 replacement, Matthew B. Ridgway, commanded the army until he succeeded General

Douglas MacArthur as the UNC and FEC commander/^ James A. Van Fleet took

over for Ridgway, and both he and Ridgway remained in their commands until

replaced by Maxwell D. Taylor ( 1953) and Mark W. Clark ( 1952), respectively. Clark

and Taylor retained their commands until the war’s end in July 1953. These last four

commanders represented, with few exceptions, the brightest stars of the army; each

possessed a reputation of high operational competence based on their World War U performances.*" These men fought a war that changed dramatically, especially during the first eighteen months.

Historians generally divide the first six months of the war into three periods: 25

June-14 September 1950; 15 September-24 November 1950; and 25 November-23

December 1950. During the period 25 June-14 September 1950, the North Koreans

drove the UN forces south firom the 38th ParaUel down into an area surrounding the port city of Pusan. Desperate fighting occurred around this pocket, called the “Pusan

Perimeter,” and Walker stabilized the UN forces’ withdrawal, preventing the North

Koreans fi’om achieving their objective of driving the UN forces off the Korean peninsula. On 15 September 1950, UN forces made an amphibious landing at the port of Inchon, midway up the peninsula’s western coast. This brilliant maneuver coincided

" President Harry S. Truman relieved MacArthur on 11 April 1951 because Truman felt that MacArthur could no longer support the American and United Nations’ political position in Korea.

^ Ridgway and Taylor distinguished themselves as airborne commanders. Van Fleet was a famous infantry regiment, division, and corps commander, and Clark gained acclaim for his command of the Fifth Army in Italy. A short biographical sketch precedes each of these commander’s leadership assessments in the following section.

18 with the Eighth Army’s breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, disrapting the NKPA and allowing UN forces to drive as far north as the North Korean border with China along the Yalu River. This advance tempted the UN with the possibility o f uniting the entire

Korean peninsula under a single, pro-western government and gave rise to the optimistic “Home before Christmas” prediction. China responded to the threat posed by MacArthur’s Thanksgiving offensive with the massive influx of 260,000 soldiers of the Chinese

19 ■:<*: num m $eryr»t< i J F^iUfilo:

% Pf«iiRyaii4

iSeouPvi Naila

«ÛWW

Tfwoitfi:

Figure I. Korean War Events 1950-1953'^

" Map taken from Blair, The Forgotten War, front inside cover. Graphics added by author.

2 0 Peoples’ Volunteer Army (CPVA), an expeditionary force drawn involuntarily from the People’s Liberation Army of China across the Yalu River into North Korea. These reinforcements attacked the UN forces beginning on 25 November 1950 and drove them back out of North Korea, setting many of the conditions under which the remainder of the war occurred.

The oscillation finally stabilized within the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, the

Communists halting to resupply and the UN pausing to consider the impact of prosecuting a new war that now involved a major Communist power. This pause persuaded the UN to return to its limited war aims of securing the independence of

South Korea. Some interpreted this move as a “substitute for victory,” or as an example of a “die for a tie” deal in troop jargon, but it was in fact a return to the war’s origiual aims.

The commitment of CPVA units to the Korean War was a dramatic international event, and it elicited the incisive comment from MacArthur that the UNC faced “an entirely new war.” Once Walker stabilized the situation around the Pusan

Perimeter, both American and UN commanders beheved that they could defeat the

NKPA and reclaim South Korea and perhaps even more teritory farther north. The

Eighth Army’s operations in the second half of September and October 1950 appeared to confirm these evaluations, and the unit’s race into North Korean territory was largely an attempt to complete the destruction of the shattered NKPA. The CPVA’s entry into the Korean War ensured that the UNC would face an enemy with virtually

2 1 unlimited supplies of personnel and equipment, and an ideological motivation for opposing a united Korean peninsula that was allied with America.

The CPVA’s unanticipated entry into the war combined with MacArthur’s increasingly pessimistic assessments to create a genuine fear that the CPVA might actually drive the UNC forces off the Korean peninsula during the period December

1950-January 1951. In hght of the new battlefield situation in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued revised guidance to MacArthur in December 1950 directing him to protect his forces by defending from successive positions and to insure that his fimdamental mission of providing security for the Japanese remained his primary focus.

The JCS further directed MacArthur to consider plans for the evacuation of UN forces as the situation dictated. MacArthur questioned this directive and responded that the

JCS’ course of action amounted to httle more than a pohcy o f “evacuation or annihilation.” Frustrated by a lack of clear purpose and rehable inteUigence, the JCS sent General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff and the JCS’ executive agent for the Korean War, to Korea on two separate occasions to assess the situation and advise the State Department and the President on a suitable pohcy.

During Collins’ 4-7 December 1950 visit MacArthur advised the Chief of Staff that without reinforcements, the UN forces should puh out o f Korea.C ohins’

D. Clayton James, The Years o f MacArthur, vol. 3,Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton MifQin Company, 1985), p. 549.

James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, The United States Army in the Korean War Series (Washington, DC: OfiBce of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), pp. 282-284 (hereinafter cited as Schnabel, Policy and Direction).

2 2 personal evaluation of the battlefield situation supported this assessment, and many in

Korea and Washington believed that the UN forces were unable to remain on the

Korean peninsula and avert World War lH while also providing adequate security for the Japanese Islands. Accordingly, the Eighth Army began drafting plans for the units’ evacuation off the Korean peninsula to the Japanese Islands.

This was the situation that Ridgway encountered when he assumed command of the Eighth Army in December 1950. During the first two weeks of January 1951 it appeared that the CPVA forces could indeed push the Eighth Army and all UN forces completely out of Korea. Ridgway resolved to prevent this, however, and by the time of his second visit on 15 January 1951, Collins was convinced that the Eighth Army was in “good shape” and that it would “stay and fight."D espite these encouraging signs, it was clear that for approximately six weeks ( 1 December 1950- 15 January

1951) the American government and many military officials believed that the UN forces might be defeated in Korea and that the evacuation of those forces was a distinct (and anticipated) course of action.*’ These fears were further exacerbated by the death of Walker on 23 December 1950. There can be little doubt that upon

Ridgway’s arrival in Korea, he faced a military situation that appeared as desperate as anything either he or the United States had encountered since the Second World War.

Ibid., p. 326.

The Papers of General Matthew B. Ridgway, Box 17, Korean War-Eighth Army-Correspondence December 1950-April 1951, January 1951 Correspondence file, memorandums from Ridgway to MacArthur dated 6 and 7 January 1951 and memorandum firom MacArthur to Ridgway dated 7 January 1951, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carhsle Barracks, FA (hereinafter cited as Ridgway Papers).

23 During the first half of 1951, the Eighth Army launched series o f limited objective attacks designed to inflict the maximum possible damage on the opposing

CPVA and NKPA forces while also advancing steadily to defensible positions in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. Beginning in late-January 1951, Ridgway launched

Operations WOLFHOUND, THUNDERBOLT, ROUNDUP, KILLER, RIPPER,

COURAGEOUS, RUGGED, and DAUNTLESS, which succeeded in advancing back to the 38th Parallel, recapturing Seoul, and blunting the Communists' Fourth and Fifth

Phase Offensives in February and April-May 1951, respectively. Van Fleet’s

Operation PELEDRJVER allowed the UNC to occupy advantageous positions north of the 38th Parallel and persuaded the Communists to agree to begin armistice negotiations by July 1951. Limited objective attacks in the Punchbowl area of Korea during the late summer and early fall of 1951 further punished the Communist forces at battles like Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge, and demonstrated the UNC’s ability and determination to achieve a political solution to the problem As a result of the hard fighting of this period, the Eighth. Army assumed the active defense on 12

November 1951, and the Communists agreed to the estabhshment of a Military

Demarcation Line on 27 November 1951. These events brought about a battlefield stalemate that responded to and served as a backdrop for the extended negotiations of the war’s final twenty months.

The table below provides a brief outline of the Eighth Army’s major activities during the maneuver phase of the Korean War.

24 DATEEVENT

iVlaneover JEliase 25 June 1950 -12 November 1951

25 June 1950 NKPA invades ROK 27-30 June 1950 Truman commits US air, naval, and ground assets to help ROK 5 July 1950 TF Smith fights first US action in ROK 8-13 July 1950 MacArthur becomes CBSTC UNC & Walker establishes EUSAK 14 July 1950 Syngman Rhee places all ROK forces under CINC UNC command 19-27 July 1950 Truman mobilizes US Reserves and extaids currait ailistments 4 Aug-16 Sep 1950 EUSAK establishes and fights in Pusan Perimeter 15 Sep 1950 X Corps lands at Inchon on western Korean shore 16-26 Sep 1950 EUSAK breaks out of Pusan Perimeter & links up with X Corps 27 Sep 1950 Seoul liberated and US authorizes actions north of 38th Parallel 7 Oct 1950 UN authorizes actions north of 38th Parallel 25 Oct 1950 CPVA launches Ist-phase offensive 26 Oct-17 Nov 1950 X Corps lands on eastern Korean shore near Wonsan 24 Nov 1950 EUSAK begins “Home Before Christmas” offensive 25 Nov 1950 CPVA launch 2d-phase offensive 29 Nov 1950 EUSAK b^ins withdrawal south 23 Dec 1950 Walker killed in jeep accident 26 Dec 1950 Ridgway takes command of EUSAK 31 Dec ‘50-5 Jan‘51 CPVA launch 3d-phase offensive 25 Jan- 5 Feb 1951 EUSAK launch OPNs THUNDERBOLT & ROUNDUP 11-17 Feb 1951 CPVA launch 4th-phase offensive 13-15 Feb 1951 Battle of Chipyong-ni — EUSAK Turning Point 21 Feb-5 Apr 1951 EUSAK launches OPNs KILLER, RIPPER, & RUGGED 11 Apr 1951 Truman relieves MacArthur; Ridgway becomes CINC UNC 14 Apr 1951 Van Fleet assumes command of EUSAK 22 Apr-20 May 1951 CPVA launch 5th-phase offensive 21-30 May 1951 EUSAK launch counterattack to drive CPVA out of ROK 10 July 1951 Armistice talks b%in 31 Aug-19 Oct 1951 EUSAK seizes Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, & Old Baldy 12 Nov 1951 EUSAK ceases offensive operations & b^ins Active Defense 27 Nov 1951 Military Demarcation Line established near the 38th Parallel

Table I; Korean War Significant Events, June 1950-November 1951

25 The remainder of the war involved local combat operations designed to secure advantageous terrain and diplomatic negotiations centered primarily on the belligerents’ pohcies for prisoner of war reparations. The frequency of major combat operations fell off sharply during 1952, and the major emphasis o f the UNC was to maintain its position north of the 38th Parallel and to support the ROK Army’s counterguerrilla Operation RATKTLLER in the south. Just as Mark W. Clark was replacing Ridgway as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) UNC, Communist prisoners rioted at Koje-do prison, capturing the US commandant and gaining an important propaganda victory. Frustrated with the Communists’ intractable negotiating position regarding the ability of prisoners to repatriate themselves voluntarily and the limitations placed on combat operations. Van Fleet retired for age in February 1953, and Maxwell D. Taylor arrived to command the Eighth Army. The seemingly increased possibility for the use of nuclear weapons in Korea in early 1953, as communicated by the newly elected US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin in March 1953 combined to give the Communists greater incentive to negotiate for an armistice. In April 1953, both sides exchanged sick and wounded prisoners during Operation LITTLE SWITCH, and, in preparation for final negotiations, the Communists launched one last ferocious offensive in July

1953. After achieving what they considered a final victory, the Communists agreed to sign an armistice that would bring the Korean War to a close a little over three years after it began. Hostilities ended at 10:00 p.m. on 27 July 1953 with the border

2 6 between the two countries reestablished at virtually the same place as when the war began.

The table below provides a brief outline of the Eighth Army’s major activities during the active defense phase of the Korean War.

Active Defense Phase 13 November 1951 - 27 July 1953

2 Dec 51-15 Mar 52 TF Paik conducts OPN RATKILLER against guerrillas Dec 51-Jan 52 45th & 40th CD (USANG) replace 1 CAV & 24 ID 7-11 May 1952 Communists riot at Koje-Do prison & capture BG Dodd 12 May 1952 Clark becomes CINC UNC; Ridgway to SHAPE for Eisenhower 8 Oct 1952 Armistice talks stalled indefinitely due to repatriation issue 20 Jan 1953 Eisenhower becomes President of the United States 10 Feb 1953 Taylor assumes command of EUSAK; Van Fleet retires 5 Mar 1953 Stalin dies 16 Apr-10 July 1953 Battles along the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) 20-26 Apr 1953 OPN LITTLE SWITCH exchanges sick & wounded POW’s 26 Apr 1953 Armistice talks resume 4 June 1953 Communist accept UN cease-fire proposal in all major aspects 13-20 July 1953 Communists launch final ofifensive 27 July 1953 Armistice signed and cease-fire goes into effect at 1000 p.m.

Table 2: Korean War Significant Events, December 1951-July 1953

Justifications for the Three Eighth Armies

With this overview in mind, it is appropriate to define the three specific Eighth

Armies that this dissertation will address. Before identifying the periods o f existence for these organizations, I must first identify the criteria I used to distinguish one army firom the others. These criteria included the composition of the units that made up the

27 Eighth Army, the senior leadership of the Eighth Army (defined as division commanders and above), the mission o f the UNC, and the method of combat operations o f the Eighth Army. To qualify as a distinct entity, I determined that the

Eighth Army had to experience significant changes in all four areas. This method allowed me to address periods of sufficient length and distinctiveness while also accounting for changes at all levels of activity. It is also important to note that the changes in these areas that delineated the various organizations did not occur simultaneously, meaning that each specific organization was constantly changing during the period of study as weU. However, the periods of the different Eighth

Armies’ existence generally reflect the Korean War’s most significant events, but only because in most cases they brought about the final change necessary to distinguish one organization firom another.

Based on my interpretation of these four criteria, the “first” Eighth Army was the army that fought between 13 July-25 December 1950. This period began with the activation of the Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK) on 13 July 1950 by Walker and includes the fighting in and around the famous Pusan Perimeter, the arrival of other

UN units, the Eighth Army’s breakout firom the Pusan Perimeter, crossing of the 38th

Parallel, advance to the Yalu River, and the retreat firom North Korea back to a position just north of the 38th Parallel and Seoul. This period encompasses the conduct of the CPVA’s First and Second Phase Offensives, and concludes with the death of Walton H. Walker.

2 8 The “second” Eighth Army existed during the period 26 December 1950-12

November 1951. This period begins with Matthew B. Ridgway's assumption of command of the Eighth Army and included the absorption of the US X Corps into

EUSAK and the many limited objective offensive operations conducted by EUSAK, and it ends when Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to assume the “active defense” on 12

November 1951, which effectively ended all large-scale UNC offensive operations in the war. This period includes the execution of the notorious “meat grinder” operations, the rehef of Douglas MacArthur, the elevation of Ridgway to CINC UNC, the arrival of James A Van Fleet to assume command of EUSAK, and the beginning of armistice negotiations. During this period, the Communists launched their Third,

Fourth, and Fifth Phase Offensives as weft, the last of which was their largest and most determined eflftjrt to obtain a battlefield victory during the Korean War.

The “third” Eighth Army existed during the period 13 November 1951-30 June

1952, and was, by its own admission, “an entirely different organization fi*om the one which had faced the overwhelming Chinese hordes on 1 January 1951.”** This organization was distinct firom its predecessor because, among other reasons, virtually all veterans of the 1950-1951 winter, which included many mobilized reservists with

World War II experience, had rotated out o f Korea, and the army had emerged firom the experiences of 1951 as “ a stronger, wiser, more confident fighting force.”*^ This

Records Group 407, Records o f the Office of the Adjutant General, 1917-, Box 1291, Eighth Army Command reports, January 1952, Section I: Narrative, p. 25, National Archives College Park Branch.

According to tlie Eighth Army’s Command Report for January 1952, “EUSAK reported to CENCFE that only 151 ofBcers and 92 enlisted men, who were serving in Korea on 1 January 1951, were still in combat units on 23 January 1952. Of this number, 51 ofBcers and 23 enlisted men had voluntarily 29 period began with the Eighth Army assuming the active defense and the subsequent

establishment of a Military Demarcation Line,and included the ROK Army’s conduct

of Operation RATKILLER. It ended with the promotion of ROK Army General Paik

Sun Yup to the position of ROK Army Chief of StafÇ which set in motion of series of

events that, by 1953, saw the ROK Army dominating the conduct of the UNC’s

ground actions. The period of the third EUSAK also included the rotation of two

veteran U.S. regular divisions for two American National Guard divisions, the

continuation and culmination of Van Fleet’s efforts to rebuild the ROK Army and

improve its combat prowess, and the replacement of Ridgway with Mark W. Clark as

the CINC UNC. Communist activity during this period was relatively light, and

military action was largely ancillary to the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom

One may legitimately question why this analysis halts at the end of June 1952

and does not continue on through the remainder of the war. The answer is that my

research indicates the possibility that a "fourth” Eighth Army existed during the last

year of the Korean War as a result of the improved effectiveness of the ROK Army,

the promotion of Paik Sun Yup to the position of ROK Army Chief of Staf^ and the

American desire to increase the capabihties of its forces assigned to support NATO.

Increasingly after this period, the ROK Army came to dominate combat operations in

Korea, and the Eighth Army assumed a somewhat secondary role. In terms of

remained in their assignments.” Out of almost 250,000 soldiers, one can legitimately claim that virtually all soldiers from the previous winter had left Korea by January 1952. On 1 April 1952, EUSAK rotated out its 200,000th soldiers, further supporting the assertion that the third EUSAK was an entirely different organization from its two predecessors. EUSAK Cmd Rpt, JAN 52, Section 1: Narrative, pp. II, 25; EUSAK Cmd Rpt, April 1952, Section I: Narrative, Part 3, Personnel, p. 36. 30 distinctiveuess, my preliminary research, indicates that the Eighth Army experienced significant changes in at least two o f the four areas of consideration, including the composition of the units that made up the Eighth Army and the senior leadership of the Eighth Army; however, I have not yet determined if the UNC experienced a significant change in the mission or if the Eighth Army employed a method of combat operations substantially different firom that utilized by the third Eighth Army. I suspect that neither one of the final two criteria were sufficiently different firom the period of the third Eighth Army, meaning that I will likely extend my treatment of the third

Eighth Army to incorporate the war’s final year instead of considering it as yet another distinct period of the Eighth Army. My intent is to continue researching this period to determine the answers to these questions before completing my analysis of the Eighth

Army’s performance during the Korean War. Despite this ommission, I beheve that the substance of the dissertation as written addresses the most important period of the

Eighth Army’s participation in the Korean War and is thus sufficiently original and meaningful to merit consideration on its own. CHAPTER 2

THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS PARADIGM

One of military history’s most perplexing problems involves developing an objective and meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of fighting organizations.

Straight numerical comparisons fail to account for the many intangibles of military units, including leadership, chance, motivation, and innovation. Assigning subjective, consistent values to these inherently inconsistent evanescent aspects becomes even more problematic, leaving the author open to a wide range of criticism regarding the

“weighting” of certain variables and their “nonlinear” behavior. Despite these

(hfdculties, many scholars and authors have attempted to assess the organizational effectiveness of fighting units in recent times. They have employed a variety of techniques to accomplish their objectives, including comparison and “threat analysis,” quantification, and military effectiveness assessments. A brief overview of the other available techniques is in order to acknowledge their existence and highlight their strengths and weaknesses before describing the combat effectiveness paradigm utilized in this study.

One of the most prevalent methods for evaluating the effectiveness of a military unit assesses relative combat power by comparing two or more forces. The

32 most common technique in this category is the process of conducting net assessments.

Net assessment compares the relative effectiveness of one force to another

subjectively, making it an explicit method of comparison.^ Although this is an

acceptable technique for evaluating some elements of combat power (e.g., firepower

assets), it cannot evaluate all aspects of a unit’s combat effectiveness. Another

technique is the process of conducting a “threat analysis.” This practice, widely used

in military organizations, seeks to appraise the combat effectiveness of a specific force

by examining the quantity of its personnel and equipment, and the capabilities and

intentions of its forces and leaders. This method makes an implicit comparison to

determine the extent to which a given military organization can threaten one’s own

forces.^

A second method of assessing military effectiveness involves attempts to

quantify various aspects of combat using subjective values to give them a standardized

rating and make them more suitable for comparison. Operations research analysis is

‘ See Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Calculations: Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Paul F. Braim also uses a comparative method to assess the effectiveness of U.S. Army divisions in World War II. According to Braim, a direct comparison of the number of days the division spent on line in France, the distance each division advanced against fire, the total number of awards for valor won by members of the division, the total number of casualties suffered by the division, and the number of prisoners o f war captured by the division yields a legitimate relative combat effectiveness rating. He contends that factoring and weighting each category would not change the ratings significantly, and that his results are very much in line with “the subjective judgments of those observers o f the AEF in combat and those historians who have made qualitative comment [on the relative combat effectiveness o f the US Army divisions in World War I], including me.” Paul F. Braim, The Test o f Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the NIevse-Argonne Campaign (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1987), pp. 146-150, 178-183.

■ See Ernest R. May, ed.. Knowing One s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Joshua M. Epstein,Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe (Pxmcoton,'^y. Princeton University Press, 1984).

33 the oldest form of this method. It seeks to determine how to best employ existing

forces using economic methods of analysis to evaluate military effectiveness. Some

authors have also endeavored to develop approaches using quantitative analysis to

assess combat effectiveness, but these systems proved to be too subjective and

cumbersome for widespread use.^ Neither net assessment, operations research

analysis, nor quantitative analysis proved adequate to assess a military force on its own

because they all relied upon external values as standards for comparison. Other

scholars have addressed the related topic of innovation, but their analyses tend to

identify indicators of success or failure in military organizations without assessing their

mihtary effectiveness. These methods are also unable to adequately assess several

vitally important, yet difhcult to quantify, aspects of military effectiveness.'’

Authors like John A. Lynn have sought to examine “relative combat

effectiveness” as a function of interest, motivation, and the organization’s mihtary

system.^ This method is also unsuitable for my purposes because it emphasizes the

sociological aspects of combat effectiveness but fails to account for organizational

■’ Cf. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War Using History to Evaluate Combat Factor and Predict the Outcome o f Battles (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1979), which uses Dupuy’s own “Quantified Judgment Model and Method,” and Martin van Creveld,Fighting Power: German and U.S. .4rmy Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), which employs a comparative method based on Dupuy’s quantitative analysis method. See also Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven, CT : Yale University Press, 1997), which argues that leaders assess their strategic performance using quantitative “dominant” indicators.

Cf., Andrew W. Marshall, J. J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen, eds.. On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); and Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military (l^hzcz: Cornell University Press, 1991).

^ John A. Lynn, Tlie Bayonets o f the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the .Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-94 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 21-40.

34 dynamics within a unit. Despite these many attempts, none of the resulting methods could assess an organization’s military effectiveness and organizational dynamics without relying on subjective values or other organizations for comparison.

Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray effectively solved this problem in their three-volume study. Military Effectiveness, where they endeavored to evaluate a nation’s military effectiveness on its own terms. Millett and Murray define military effectiveness as “the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power.”® This concise definition is intended to apply to all elements that comprise a given nation’s military capability, including political, economic, social, and ideological resources. Thus military effectiveness considers a nation’s ability to develop and apply military force.

The Millett and Murray concept is uniquely suited to the task of assessing a nation’s overall military effectiveness because it evaluates this characteristic in terms of what was possible compared to what was actually achieved. Millett and Murray’s method focuses on a military unit as a unique organization and avoids external comparisons. The overriding assumption in this type of assessment is that any comparison among rival forces’ military establishments is inherently flawed because of the political, social, cultural, and economic differences that exist among all countries.

This means that although two countries may have identical resources and military establishments, one cannot assume that their military effectiveness wiU be necessarily equal.

® Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, pp. 1-30; p. 2, quotation.

35 la terms of the military organizational component o f a nation’s military effectiveness, the concept of combat effectiveness can be extrapolated from this process to analyze the battlefield performance of a nation’s armed forces. The concepts of combat effectiveness and military effectiveness are closely related but remain distinct from one another by virtue of their scope. Within a nation’s armed forces, the ability to generate and sustain combat power is the best measure of its overall effectiveness. In effect, the combat effectiveness of a given military organization is a subset of the nation’s overall military effectiveness. Combat effectiveness represents a military organization’s ability to maximize its available resources in support of a nation’s overall military effectiveness. Thus, measuring combat effectiveness may be described as the process of evaluating the armed forces’ component of a nation’s military effectiveness. This connection ensures that the two processes remain closely related and, in some instances, include common aspects of evaluation.

One example of this relationship is each process’ consideration of military activities within the various levels at which it occurs. Regardless of the level of concern, aU military activity occurs in the same four levels. Before defining the elements of combat power, one must first understand these levels of military activity and how they relate to an organization like the Eighth Army.

The military activity within which a commander can demonstrate his unit’s combat power takes place at four levels: political, strategic, operational, and tactical.

The effectiveness of combat power is dependent upon distinct aspects that pertain to

36 each level Military activity at the political level mvolves “the efifort[s] to obtain

resources for military [activities] and the proficiency in acquiring those resources.”^

The political-level concerns apply only to the Eighth Army in this analysis/ “The

strategic level of military activity refers to the employment of national armed forces to

secure by force [or threat of force] national goals defined by political leadership.”®

Strategic activity consists of developing and executing plans for military forces to

attain those objectives. These plans occur as campaigns or as a series of military

operations designed to defeat enemy forces in a specified space and time with

simultaneous and sequential battles. A key aspect of this level is its interrelationship with the pohtical level in the formation and pursuance of national goals. The strategic-

level concerns apply only to the Eighth Army in this analysis. “The operational level

of military activity refers to the analysis, selection, and development o f institutional

concepts or doctrines for employing major forces to achieve strategic objectives within

a theater of war.”^° It is the operational level that plans and conducts the campaigns necessary to obtain strategic objectives. The operational level of activity involves the army and corps echelons. “The tactical level of military activity refers to the specific techniques used by combat units to fight engagements in order to secure operational

' Ibid., p. 4.

* The levels of military organization referred to are as follows (from lowest to highest): squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, division, corps, and army. As a general rule, a higher organization consists of three units from the immediately lower level (i.e., three squads = one platoon, etc.), but the composition of these organizations may vary, especially above regimental level.

® Millett and Mirrray, Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, pp. 6-7.

Ibid., p. 12.

37 objectives.”" The tactical level involves an organization’s performance on the battlefield regarding how it engages an opponent. Tactical issues pertain to units firom

corps to squad level; however, this assessment will only address them at the corps, division, regimental, and battalion levels. These levels of military activity overlap and interact with one another, but their actions, procedures, and goals make them distinct entities.

The four levels of military activity are interrelated; they exist within a continuum from which they cannot be isolated. A complete military eflectiveness assessment must consider all four levels; however, a combat effectiveness assessment win mainly consider only the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of mihtary activity. While a nation’s military estabhshment (presidential mihtary advisors, national mihtary stafrs, etc.) may have some influence over its mihtary activities, the specific mihtary organization assigned to conduct those activities generaUy has no more than a limited influence on the pohtical aspects of its activities. In recognition of the fact that certain mihtary organizations are able to influence their activities at the pohtical level, I wül assess each aspect of combat power within each level of mihtary activity as appropriate. Nevertheless, the primary focus of this assessment wih remain at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of mihtary activity.

This study wih evaluate the combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army component of the Eighth Army; therefore, I wih conduct my analysis in terms of assessing the

" Ibid., p. 19.

38 Eighth Anny’s combat power. Sinçly put, '’’'Combat power is the ability to fight.

It involves the process of transforming the potential of available resources and battlefield opportunities into actual capabilities manifested in the form, o f coordinated and decisive actions on the battlefield designed to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy at bearable costs. “Resources” are assets available to military forces, including personnel, equipment, technical prowess, intelligence, doctrine, national wfll, host- nation support, logistical capabilities, the political-military relationship between the military organization and its governing body, the intellectual qualities o f military leaders, and morale.

This is an inherently ambiguous process for which precise measurements do not exist. Nevertheless, it is possible to evaluate a military force’s transformation of potential to actualities by assessing its use of the possibiUties open to it in a given situation. Millett and Murray define a fiiUy effective force as one that derives the maximum combat power from the available physical and political resources, and I will use this standard as well. The better a military force is able to execute this process, the more effective it becomes. This indicates that the concept of military effectiveness incorporates some notion of efficiency as well. Similarly, although battlefield victory is a vital aspect of military effectiveness, it is important to note that it is ’’’not a characteristic o f an organization but rather a result o f organizational activity.'’'’

Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986), p. 11, emphasis added (hereinafter cited as FM 100-5, 1986).

Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, vol. I, p. 2.

39 Therefore, ‘judgments of military effectiveness must retain some sense of proportional cost and organizational process” as well as battlefield results/^

Combat power consists o f six elements: leadership, administration, firepower, maneuver, integration, and protection/^ A commander generates combat power through the skiUfiil combination o f these elements in a manner that most effectively counters an enemy force in a given situation. Quantitative measures o f these elements are important, but their quality and utilization on the battlefield and the military organization’s ability to avoid enemy efforts to diminish these capabilities may be equally or more important. Combat power is thus the result of the combination of objective and subjective forces within an organization, some of which are not readily discernible. It is for this reason that a net assessment fails to account for an organization’s entire military capability. This relationship also explains why a force with the quantitative advantage does not always prevail on the battlefield. The leadership within an organization usually accounts for this additional aspect of combat power. To assess a unit’s entire combat power accurately, the final stage of the evaluation must be an assessment of the combined effects of these elements. Only then can one truly gain an appreciation of an organization’s assets and its battlefield utilization of them that can explain a particular unit’s combat performance. In the

Ibid., p. 3; emphasis added.

The U.S. Army defines combat power as composed of only four elements: leadership, firepower, maneuver, and protection. My study o f the Eighth Army led me to include the additional components of administration and integration to fully assess the unit’s combat effectiveness. Despite this difference, my concept of combat power is largely the same as that of the U.S. Airmy as expressed in the 1986 version of FM 100-5,Operations, 1986, pp. 11-14.

40 following paragraphs, I have defined the elements o f combat power and the parameters within which I will analyze these elements.

By leadership I refer specifically to military leadership, which I define as the ability or process of influencing others to accomplish tasks by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. Styles of leadership are as varied as the number of leaders themselves and may range fi"om pure inspiration by personal example to stark intimidation. No standard leadership method is appropriate for every situation; however, successful leaders adapt their leadership style to specific situations while maintaining their own integrity. Essentially, this criterion ascertains whether the

Eighth Army was led by effective leaders during the first two years of the Korean War.

With respect to assessing the unit’s combat power, there are three important factors of leadership to address. The first question is:

i/ow appropriate to the battlefield situation was the leadership provided by each leader?

This criterion recognizes that each Eighth Army commander employed a unique style of leadership and seeks to ascertain the appropriateness of each leader’s style in relation to the specific battlefield requirements.

While this definition may not differ greatly from a civilian version, it is intended to specifically relate to military concerns and is endorsed by the U.S. Army. Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Military Leadership (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990), p. I.

This is the crux of John Keegan’s argument in The Mask o f Command (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987), p. 315.

41 The second question is;

What were the significant factors that distinguished one leader's level o f effectiveness from the others?

Although many differences existed among each leader's styles, this question attempts to highlight those aspects that distinguished the leadership of each Eighth Army commander to determine whether they differed greatly from one another.

The frnal question is:

Did the Eighth Army commanders ’ relationship with their immediate superior have any appreciable impact on the organization’s battlefield performance?

This criterion examines the changes in UNC and Eighth Army leadership during the period July 1950-June 1952 to determine the impact that these relationships had on the individual Eighth Army commanders and on the Eighth Army as a whole.

The intent of this category is to assess the leadership provided by Walker,

Ridgway, and Van Fleet, and, in light of the differing battlefield fortunes that occurred during each period, to account for these changes in terms o f the higher-echelon leadership practices and relationships.

Administration involves acquiring, maintaining, and distributing those items necessary to support combat and sustainment operations and “is the management of all services and resources necessary to sustain military forces. Since administration applies to the management of the functions of logistics, it is inseparable from

42 logistics.”*® This aspect also includes the essential area of personnel availability,

causing any operational evaluation to include it in an assessment. Within the

paradigm, there are three key factors to assess. The first question is:

To what extent did the Eighth Army have access to manpower in the required quantity and quality

The major issues to assess with respect to this question include: units’ manning

strengths, the availability of appropriately trained personnel, the training level of

assigned personnel, and the leadership abilities of noncommissioned and commissioned

ofScers. The intent of this analysis is to ascertain whether the U.S. Army supphed the

Eighth Army with the best available units at an appropriate level with which to fight

the war and whether the Eighth Army’s leadership was eflfective at influencing this

process.

The second question is:

To what extent were supporting activities integrated with the operational concepts o f the military organization? Did the Eighth Army have the capacity to support its operational practices with the existing supply system?^^

This aspect examines the logistical feasibility of the plans developed and executed by

the units.

John I. Alger,Definitions and Doctrine o f the Military Art Past and Present, in The West Point Military History Series, Thomas E. Griess, ed. (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1985), p. 7.

This criterion is based on a measure identified by N'lillett and Murray. Millett and Murray, M ilitary Effectiveness, vol. I, p. 6.

Ibid., p. 16.

43 The third question is:

To what extent were the Eighth Army's operational systems consistent with its support capabilities?^^

Again, this criterion analyzes the logistical feasibility of the missions given to the units

to accomplish.

‘Tirepower provides the destructive force essential to defeating the enemy’s

ability and will to fight.” It facilitates maneuver by suppressing the enemy’s fires and

disrupting the movement of bis forces, and exploits maneuver by neutralizing the

enemy’s tactical forces and destroying his ability to fight. Firepower may also be used

independent of maneuver to destroy, delay, or disrupt uncommitted forces.

Firepower assessments require an evaluation of the relative strengths of opposing

major weapons systems, including such factors as the number of personnel, tanks,

artillery, and air support. Within this category there are two key elements to assess.

The first element is:

What were the Eighth Army's relative strengths and weaknesses in terms o f firepower? Were any o f these strengths or weaknesses significant?

In this respect, firepower evaluations resemble net assessments. This aspect requires a

quantitative and quafitative comparison of the Eighth Army’s major weapons systems vis-à-vis those of the Communist forces. For the purposes of this assessment, those

Ibid., p. 25.

FM 100-5, Operations, 1986, pp. 12-13.

44 systems include U.S. Army personnel, tanks, and artillery weapons and U.S. Air Force

close air support aircraft.^

The second element is:

How did commanders capitalize on their firepower strengths and minimize the impact o f their firepower weaknesses?

This element addresses each commander’s ability to employ his available weapons

systems in the most effective manner in relation to the battlefield, terrain, and situation.

This portion of the assessment is significantly different from a net assessment because

it concerns the use of available assets on the battlefield, avoiding quantitative and

qualitative comparisons.

The main objective of the firepower effectiveness assessment is to determine whether the Eighth Army possessed a significant technological advantage over the

Communist forces and if it did, whether its commanders were able to capitalize on this

advantage.

“Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage.A commander may gain this advantage by either moving his own forces or by allowing the enemy to move into a disadvantageous position. Regardless of how it is achieved, maneuver is critical because its successful execution provides an advantage by keeping an enemy force off balance, forcing an enemy to react to one’s movements (and thus depriving him o f the initiative), or

^ The qualitative assessment of these assets appears in Chapter 4, and the quantitative assessments for each Eighth Army appear in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

FM 100-5, Operations, 1986., p. 12.

45 placing one’s strengths against an enemy’s weaknesses. As a qualitative measure, the

critical element to address within the maneuver category is:

To what degree did the operational and tactical activities o f the Eighth Army place its strengths against its adversary’s weaknesses?^

This criterion addresses the fundamental aspect o f the maneuver element of combat

effectiveness. This assessment must not only answer the stated question, it must also

consider the organization’s alternatives, hi some instances, units may not have been

able to avoid an enemy’s strengths and so the assessment must examine the unit’s

performance within this context.

Integration involves the efiBcient and reasonable combination of forces and

capabilities for a given unit. Integration involves two distinct aspects. The first

addresses the integration of the tasks assigned to a unit at some level with the next higher level’s goals and objectives. Within this aspect there are three essential

questions which must be addressed. The first question is:

To what degree would achievement o f the Eighth Army’s strategic objectives result in securing the political goals o f the United States and o f the United Natioris?^^

This question attempts to ascertain whether the restoration of the Korean border at the

38th Parallel was an acceptable and politically viable strategic military objective.

The second question is:

To what extent were the Eighth Army’s operational concepts consistent with the strategic objectives assigned to it? 27

^ This criterion is based on a measure identified by Millett and Murray. Millett and Murray, Military EjJectiveness, vol. 1, pp. II, 19.

Ibid., p. 7.

46 This is an. essential aspect of integration effectiveness because the successful accomplishment of a unit’s operational activities constitutes the fundamental measure of battlefield success. As a result operational concepts that do not support appropriate strategic goals prevent the military organization from securing an acceptable military outcome and from qualifying as an effective unit.

The third question is:

To what extent were tactical concepts within the Eighth Army consistent with operational capabilities?^^

This criterion questions the suitability of the units’ training, equipment, manpower, and levels o f supply to accomplish their assigned missions.

The second aspect of integration involves the effective combination and utilization of all available combat resources. It addresses both inter-service and intra­ service cooperation.^^ The essential question is:

To what degree were the Eighth Army’s operational methods integrated? To what degree did the Eighth Army attempt to combine combat arms to take fid l advantage o f its strengths while covering its weaknesses?^°

This question examines how well commanders made use of their available assets and combined them to produce the optimum level of performance possible for the unit. It

Ibid., p. 18.

-* Ibid., p. 20.

^ Inter-service efforts involve the integration of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine capabilities while intra-service efforts refer to each services integration and use of its own organic capabilities.

This criterion is based on a measure identified by Millett and Murray. Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, vol. I, p. 13.

47 also addresses the organizational dynamics of the Eighth Army, as it was an ever- changing organization throughout the period of this study.

Protection is the preservation of fighting potential for further use on the battlefield. Protection also has two components. The first is the unit’s ability to influence its assigned objectives so that they are logical, reasonable, and attainable goals. The other involves the acquisition of an appropriate mix of units so that the organization’s force composition is suitable to its assigned mission. In this category there are two critical areas to assess. The first question is:

To what degree were the military leaders able to communicate with and influence the political leadership to seek logical military goals?^^

This aspect of the analysis assesses the differing levels of influence that the various

UNC/FEC and Eighth Army commanders had on their political superiors during the period of the study and how they attempted to direct the war’s activities.

The second question is:

To what degree were strategic goals and courses o f action consistent with the Eighth Army’s force size andstructure?^^

This criterion examines the Eighth Army as an organization to determine if it was capable of securing its assigned strategic goals. The army’s composition, manpower level, equipment, and operational latitude comprise the major aspects of this issue.

Taken together, these criteria allow one to examine an organization fi'om a wide variety of perspectives and study it in great detail. While each is interesting and

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid.. p. 9.

48 relevant on its own, the overall objective is to consider them in aggregate to see what one can leam from an examination that is both comprehensive and extremely detailed.

What is not apparent yet is the optimum mixture of proficiency among these elements for an effective organization. There is perhaps no magical threshold beyond which an organization can said to be universally effective in combat; rather, the unique conditions and specific circumstances of a given period of time during a particular conflict will largely determine where and what constitutes that elusive and variable blend of leadership, capabilities, performance, and opportunities.

The crux of combat efrectiveness is how well an organization utilizes its available assets on the battlefield within a given situation. Skdlfifl combination can accentuate a unit’s strengths and produce a synergistic effect that compliments and enhances its combat performance. Through examinations of the elements o f combat power at various levels of military activity, one can evaluate the organization’s overall combat effectiveness. Afrer estabhshing a common base among the three organizations to serve as a point of departure, I will conduct an analysis o f its combat power by addressing the elements of combat power in the order fisted (leadership, administration, firepower, maneuver, integration, and protection) and then analyze the impact of the Eighth Army’s overall combat effectiveness during the period July 1950-

June 1952 to assess whether a synergistic effect occurred. This examination will reveal the substantial differences among the three armies and serve as the basis for the study’s concluding chapters.

49 While the paradigm described above is helpfiil in this process, it is the actions

of die soldiers and units of the Eighth Army during the war’s first two years that are the most important part of this study. Before addressing these activities directly, the next two chapters will describe the Eighth Army’s organization, doctrine, weapons,

and equipment to set the stage for the extensive combat effectiveness assessments that

follow.

50 CHAPTER 3

THE ORGANIZATIONS AND DOCTRINE

The U.S. Army component of the Eighth Army was in many ways a typical

army organization of its day, but it and the organization as a whole were significantly

different at almost every echelon from its World War II predecessors. Prior to the beginning of hostilities in Korea, the Eighth Army was charged with responsibility for conducting the occupation of Japan. This was a result of the Eighth Army’s World

War U service in the Pacific assigned to Douglas MacAithur’s Southwest Pacific Area and under the co m m and of General Robert L. Eichelberger. From VI Day in 1945 until spring 1949, occupation duty remained the primary focus of the Eighth Army.

Occupation duty had little to do with preparing for combat and everything to do with routine and administrative duties, including guarding vital installations, keeping supply routes open, maintaining disaster rehef measures, and monitoring the developing political condition.

Still, occupation duty of the islands of Japan required a significant number of soldiers, and the Eighth Army had four of the Army’s ten combat divisions under its

51 control ‘ These units included the 7th lofkntry Division (7 ID), wiiich controlled the

northernmost island of Hokkaido and the upper third of the central and main island of

Honshu; the 1st Cavalry Division (1 CAV) (a cavahy division in name, it was actually

an infantry division), which was responsible for the populous area in the center of

Honshu; the 25th Infantry Division (25 ED), which controlled the lower third of

Honshu except the area around Hiroshima (controlled by British Commonwealth

occupation forces); and the 24th Infantry Division (24 ED), which controlled Japan’s

southernmost island of Kyushu.^ Including other organizations under its control, the

Eighth Army had a total strength of approximately 83,000 soldiers.

While this is certainly a large number of troops, the Eighth Army had far fewer

soldiers assigned to it than its combat organization required. The Eighth Army’s two

corps headquarters, I and DC, had recently been deactivated. Additionally, although the standard infantry division was authorized about 18,900 soldiers, the average

Eighth Army infantry division, organized according to a modified Table of

Organization and Equipment (T O&E), had about 12,500 soldiers assigned to it.^ The

' The Army actually had fourteen divisions at this time; however, four of those divisions existed solely to train soldiers and were thus not operational outfits.

■ In addition to these four divisions, the Eighth Army also had the 40th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment under its control. Records Group 407,Records o f the Office o f the Adjutant General. 1917- , Box 1081, EUSAK IVar Diary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Box 1081, Section I: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, pp. i-ii. National Archives, College Park Reference Branch, (hereinafter cited as Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAK IFar Diary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950).

^ The 1st Cavalry Division, 7th Infentry Division, and 24th Infantry Division had an average strength of 12,504 soldiers as of 30 June 1950, while the 25th Infantry Division had 15,018 soldiers assigned to it, since one of its regiments had all three of authorized infantry battalions. Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAK iVar Diary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section I: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, p. vi.

52 modified T O&E meant that each division lacked nearly 7,000 troops, three of its twelve authorized field artillery batteries, three of its twelve authorized antiaircraft batteries, and most of its armor assets, and that eleven of the Eighth Army’s twelve in&ntry regiments contained only two instead of three infantry battalions.^ On paper, the Eighth Army maintained its “modified” strength at or above ninety-five percent of its authorization; however, to be an effective fighting force, the Eighth Army lacked over thirty percent of its strength.^

Lacking the appropriate number of soldiers, one would expect that perhaps the quality of the troops assigned to the Eighth Army units would be high to compensate for the shortages in numbers. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Many of the soldiers drafted in 1948 and 1949 and assigned to the Eighth Army were of below- average intelligence and motivation. Over forty percent of these draftees ranked in the lowest two categories of the Army’s general aptitude and classification tests. ^ In addition, units were denied the best possible leadership by some administrative

■' A division was supposed to have one heavy tank battalion, consisting of four heavy tank companies, assigned to it, and each regiment was supposed to have one heavy tank company and one reconnaissance company, equipped with M-24 light tanks, assigned to it. At the outbreak of the Korean War, each division was short six of its seven authorized heavy tank companies. The 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infentry division had all three of its authorized infantry battalions, as it was the only all-black unit in the Eighth Army, and all African-American infentrymen were assigned to it.

^ Of its authorized wartime strength of approximately 75,600 soldiers, the Eighth Army had 52,529 troops assigned to its four infantry divisions as of 30 June 1950, equating to 69.5 percent of its authorized combat strength. Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAKWar Diary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section 1: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, p. vi.

® J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons o f Korea, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 67, (hereinafter cited as Collins, War in Peacetime).

53 assignment policies that prevented the assignment of battle experienced officers and noncommissioned officers to combat units at the company and battalion levels/

Combined with, an annual turnover rate of approximately forth-three percent, these

circumstances created a condition in which it was very difficult to achieve and maintain

an appropriate level of training proficiency, let alone a sense of cohesion, esprit, or unit pride at levels above the battalion/

The equipment provided to the soldiers of the Eighth Army was also far below

an acceptable standard. Units reported particular problems with radios, small arms,

and vehicles, and cleaning and presendng supplies were scarce as welL® MacArthur

repeatedly informed the JCS of the poor condition of his equipment, but, after

enduring a prolonged period of inactivity, he began obtaining his own equipment through the efforts of Operation Roll-Up. Operation Roll-Up was a program that

refurbished discarded military equipment recovered from Pacific island battlefields by

salvage teams. Although this program helped alleviate some of the Eighth Army’s

equipment shortages, it was certainly not a complete or satisfactory solution.^*

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 56 & fii 43.

8 Blair. The Forgotten ITar, pp. 49-50.

9 Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, in the U.S. Army in the Korean IVar series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1986), pp. 113-114, (hereinafter cited as Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu).

Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAKWar Diary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section I: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, pp. ii; Blair,The Forgotten War, p. 50.

” According to one historian, ‘The Far East Command had received no new vehicles, tanks, or other equipment since World War II. Almost 90 percent of the armament equipment and 75 percent of the automotive ecjuipment in the hands of the four combat divisions on [25 June 1950] was derived from [Operation Roll-Up]. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 59. 54 Coupled with these difficulties, ammimition for some o f the units’ critical weapons was extremely scarce or unserviceable as well. Thus, as historian James F. Schnabel concludes, "[n]o serious effort was made [during the period 1945 to 1949] to maintain combat efficiency at battalion or higher leveL”*^

This situation changed significantly in terms of training when Lieutenant

General Walton H. Walker assumed command of the army on 15 September 1948.

After conducting an initial assessment of the Eighth Army as a fighting organization.

Walker changed the primary focus of the unit from one of occupation to one of training beginning in April 1949.^^ By June 1949, the Eighth Army was

engaged in an intensive training program designed to bring each individual and unit up to a state of combat readiness... The units had run the schedule steadily and progressively, starting with squad tactics and developing the training through a controlled Military Training Program until, at the time the divisions of the Army were sent to Korea, the units were conducting problems of battalion and regimental size.

Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, pp. 54-55. Author Clay Blair puts it more bluntly: “From 1945 to 1949 Eighth Army was strictly an occupation force; it was not equipped and did not train for battle.” Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 34.

This change came as a result of MacArthur’s softening of the Japanese occupation, after four years of rather strict policies, in anticipation of the signing of a peace treaty with Japan. In addition, since the newly adopted Japanese constitution specifically prohibited the development of a Japanese army, the US was facing a situation in wliich it would have to provide its own military force in Japan to maintain its strategic position and interests in the Far East. Under these circumstances. Walker’s shift in focus was entirely appropriate. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 55. The Eighth Army War Diary contends that this shift came earlier in January 1949, but the timing of the training program suggests that Schnabel’s source (the FEC Annual Historical Report) is more accurate. Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAK War Diary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section I: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Report of Activities G-1 Section OlOOOlK July to 122400 July 1950, p. 1; Blair,The Forgotten War, p. 46.

Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAKWar Diary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section I: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, pp. i. Interviews conducted by Roy K. Flint corroborate much of this information as well. See Roy K. Flint, ‘Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay 55 Finding resources and training areas to conduct individual, squad, platoon, and company training was possible; however, obtaining resources and securing areas large enough to conduct training for units of battalion size or larger proved to be more difBcult.

Because occupation duty required regiments to be dispersed across a fairly large area, the Eighth Army in Japan resembled the American Army on the western frontier in the latter half of the 19th century. The Eighth Army’s area of responsibility, if superimposed on the United States’ eastern seaboard, would have stretched from

Canada to Florida. In addition, large, open areas were far more vital for the economic and national recovery of Japan than for American military training. Thus, regimental exercises were fairly limited in scope and precluded combined arms training with field artillery assets, and the available maneuver areas were not large enough to allow for the conduct of training on a division scale. Japan’s rebuilding infrastructure fiuther precluded assembling divisions into maneuver areas, meaning that divisions could only train as units at the command and staff level by using Command Post Exercises

(CPXs).'^

and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950,” Chapter 9 in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofift, eds., America's First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 273-275.

Roy K. Flint, ‘Task Force Smith and the 24th Division; Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950,” Chapter 9 in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofift, eds., America’s First Battles. 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 273.

‘®Ibid.

56 Nevertheless, Walker continued to insist that his army train to the highest level of proficiency allowed by the situation. He developed teams of inspectors to travel to the units and monitor their progress. Army Chief of Staf^ General J. Lawton Collins, visited Walker in October 1949, and he was suitably impressed with the Eighth Army’s training efforts, predicting that the units he had inspected would be in “excellent shape” by April 1950.'^ Commanders were not able to adhere to Walker’s rather ambitious timetable of completing division exercises by early summer 1950, but by the beginning of the Korean War, “most units had progressed through battahon training, although some battalions had failed their tests.”^* Despite this progress, the training program did not live up to Collins’ expectation, causing him to remark that “[w]hen the Korean War broke, few units of the Eighth Army had reached a satisfactory level of battahon training, and combined training with air and naval support had just got under way.”'^ Since regimental and division levels of training and maneuvers had not yet occurred, not one of the four divisions had operated in the field as a tactical entity since World War II."° In the absence of higher unit maneuver training. Walker had nonetheless instituted an effective program of CPXs that improved the performance of

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 56-57.

** Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 113.

Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 66.

Ibid.

57 stafife and greatly assisted the Eighth Army in creating a new set of logistics values for the area.^^

Still, based upon the level and type of training conducted by the Eighth Army on the eve of war, one would expect better performances at the squad, platoon, company, and battalion levels than at the regiment, division, corps, and army levels.

Unfortunately, this was not the case for units involved in the desperate fighting of the war’s first thirty days.

Another fimdamental aspect of assessing the Eighth Army commanders’ performances is to understand the size and composition of the organization and the scope of their responsibilities. The Eighth Army was based in Japan afl;er the end of

World War II and became the base around which the UNC command was formed in

1950. These forces initially consisted of the ROK Army but eventually grew to include forces fi'om nineteen separate nations. Sixteen countries provided ground forces (ranging in size firom a division to a sixty-personnel detachment) including

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the RepubUc of Korea, Thailand,

Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. India, Norway, Sweden, and Italy also provided medical detachments to support the Eighth Army’s forces, completing the total contributions firom the UN’s twenty nations. Neither the air contingent provided by the Union of South Afiica nor the Danish

Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAK IFarDiary, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section I; Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, p. ii.

58 hospital ship were under the control of the Eighth Army, but they did

support the unit’s combat operations. 22

~ Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan all failed to provide the units that they had promised the UNC in fall 1950. Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), pp. 407, 494, and passim (hereinafter cited as Appleman, Ridgway Duels fo r Korea)', Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951 in the U.S. Army in the Korean War series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990), pp. 23-24, 29, (hereinafter cited as Mossman, Ebb and Flow)-, William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation during Combat Operations (Tokyo, Japan: Military History Section, Headquarters, Far East Command, 1952), pp. 27, 56, 231- 240; The War History Compilation Committee of the Republic of Korea,The History o f the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, vol. H (Seoul, ROK: The Ministry of National Defense, 1973), pp. 751-752.

59 Eighth United States Army in Korea

IX u s C o r n sI US CorpsIX us CornsI X US Corps I ROK Corps m ROK Corps

I Cav Div 1 Mar Div 2 IN Div Cap D iv 2 ROK Div Thai Bn ROL M ar Dutch Bn Greek Bn Bde French Bn

7 ROK Div 11 ROK Div (*) 25 IN Div 24 IN Div 7 IN Div Turkish Columbian Ethiopian Bde Bn Bn

9 ROK Div 3 IN Div 28 U.K. Bde (-) Phil. Bn U X. Bn Belgium Bn Alls. Bn 5 ROK Div Lux. Detach Canada Bn S’.Z. .-Irty Bn Legend Underline - Major controlling Headquarters Italics - Command subordinate to higher unit 12 Sec Bn 1 ROK Div 6 ROK Div Bde - Brigade (ROK) Drv - Division Bn - Battalion IN - Infantry Mar - Marine Cap - Capital (ROK elite) Abn - Airborne Sec - Security 187 RCT 29 Ü.K. Bde Phil - Philippine Lux - Luxembourg Aus - Austrailian N.Z. - N ew Zealand Arty - Artillerv Detach - Detachment U.K. - United Kingdom Cav - Cavalry (organized as an IN Div) RCT - Regimental Combat Team Indian Norwegian Swedish (-) - Understrength unit Ambulance Hospital Hospital Group

Figure 2. Example of Eighth Army Organization In the Korean War

60 The Eighth Army was a very large organization. The unit fluctuated in size throughout the war because of the varying levels of commitment by the Allied countries. For the sake of comparison, an average World War H army consisted of approximately 200,000 soldiers. By contrast, the Eighth Army reached its first plateau of roughly 390,000 soldiers at the end of October 1950, 170,000 of which were

American troops. By February 1951, the Eighth Army had over 500,000 soldiers assigned to it, including almost 220,000 US troops. At its peak (July 1953) the Eighth

Army numbered around 933,000 soldiers (split roughly in half between ROK troops and forces firom other countries, the largest contingent coming firom the United States) and was over four times the size of Patton’s famous World War II army, making it the largest field army ever commanded by an American general.^

In terms of actual personnel strength relative to the total available Communist forces during the July 1950-June 1952 period, both the entire Eighth Army and the

U.S. Army component of the Eighth Army were at clear disadvantages. The table below summarizes the average personnel strengths for the North Korean People’s

Army (NKPA), Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army (CPVA), and Eighth Army forces during this two-year period to illustrate this point.

^ Personnel figures firomLogistics in the Korean Operations. Volume I o f IV Volumes (Japan: Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, 1 December 1955), figure 2a (hereinafter cited as Logistics in the Korean Operations. Volume I o f IV Volumes).

61 DATE

Î3JU L 50 100,000 92,955 1.08 : 1 43,307 2.31: 1 AUG 50 69,100 150,120 .46 : 1 48,268 1.43 : 1 SEP 50 30,000 229,772 .13 : 1 132,108 .23 : 1 OCT 50 50,000 266,381 .19: 1 140,930 .35 : 1 NOV 50 300,000 291,558 1.03 : 1 153,536 1.95 ; 1 DEC 50 333,000 310,603 1.07 : 1 163,507 2.04: 1 JAN 51 599,184 325,843 1.84: 1 175,342 3.42: 1 FEB 51 483,000 334,754 1.44: 1 194,093 2.04: 1 MAR 51 345,306 345,600 1 : 1 202,590 1.70: 1 APR 51 465,800 357,393 1.30: 1 216,287 2.15: 1 MAY 51 640,250 359.946 1.78 : 1 230,536 2.78 : 1 JU N 5i 392,250 359,849 1.09 : 1 229,291 1.71 : 1 JULY 51 484,500 355,189 1.36 : 1 217,596 2.23 : 1 AUG 51 437,400 355,527 1.23 : 1 222,906 1.96 : 1 SEP 51 623,100 360,569 1.73 : 1 232,977 2.67 : 1 OCT 51 582,400 362,509 1.61 : 1 240,171 2.42: 1 NOV 51 632,900 353,241 1.79 : 1 232,375 2.72: 1 DEC 51 682,800 350,989 1.95 ; 1 227,869 3.00: 1 JAN 52 672,100 361,225 1.86 : 1 241,971 2.78 : 1 FEB 52 655,100 362,533 1.81 : 1 236,179 2.77 : 1 MAR 52 668,600 370,751 1.80 : 1 234,640 2.85 : 1 APR 52 683,800 377,584 1.81 : 1 234,145 2.92: 1 MAY 52 689,200 382,337 1.80 ; 1 239,551 2.88 ; 1 JÜN52 681,800 392,120 1.74: 1 238,615 2.86 : 1 AVERAGE 470,900 325,390 1.37 : 1 197,033 2.28 : 1

Table 3. Comparison of Communist and Eighth Army Personnel Strengths, July 1950- June 1952 24

These figures include all known and suspected enemy combat forces operating in Korea, including enemy guerrilla forces as well. NKPA and CPVA figures taken from National Archives College Park 62 As the preceding table and chart illustrate, the Communists’ combat troops

were greater than the entire Eighth Army’s combat troops by an average factor of

1.37 for the 24-month period between July 1950 to June 1952, and the Communists’

combat troops were greater than the U.S. Army component o f the Eighth Army’s

combat troops by an average factor o f 2.14 for the same period.

The most meaningfid portion of the preceding analysis for the purposes of this

study portrays the entire array of Communist forces against only the U.S. Army units

of the Eighth Army, neglecting other services and Allied countries’ ground combat

forces. The comparison is valid during the war’s first two years because the U.S.

Army components of the Eighth Army made up forty percent or more of the entire

UNC, meaning that it conducted a large portion of the UN’s combat operations and

occupied the majority of the Eighth Army’s MLR during this period.

A large organization such as this had to do a great many things. Although never formalized, a possible job description for the Eighth Army commanders in Korea might have included the following duties:

Branch, Records Group 338,Records o f U.S. Army Commands. 1942-, Boxes P605, P609, and P610; Records Croup 401, Records o f the Office o f the Adjutant General, 79/7-, Boxes 1081, 1089, 1101, 1111, 1122, 1123, 1134, 1135, 1139, 1149, 1161, 1173, 1186, 1199, 1213, 1226, 1232, 1238, 1243, 1254, 1255, 1266, 1267, 1273, 1280, 1286, 1291, 1292, 1297, 1305, 1311, 1317, 1723, 1330, 1331, 1336, 1343, 1347, 1354, 1358,1364, 1365, and 1370, Eighth Army War Diaries (July-November 1950) and Command Reports (December 1950-July 1952), Command Narratives, G-1 Sections, G-2 Sections, and Chief of Staff Summaries, also Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 263, 500, 545, 604, & 768-769; Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, pp. 353,450, & 452; and Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 53-54. The overall source for the Eighth Army personnel strength figures was Logistics in the Korean Operations. Volume I o f IV Volumes, Chapter HI, figures 2b, 6, and 10. These figures reflect the Eighth Army’s persormel strength at the end o f each montli.

63 Responsible for the health, welfare, morale, training, and combat performance of the soldiers assigned to the Eighth United States Army and the ground forces assigned to the United Nations Command in Korea.^ Plan, supervise, execute, and evaluate the collective training and combat operations o f all organizations assigned to the unit. Train and evaluate all division and corps commanders and ensure that all subordinate leaders conduct similar framing and evaluations for their subordinates. Supervise the maintenance of the unit’s equipment. Maintain accountability of all personnel and equipment assigned to the unit as well as captured enemy personnel and equipment. Ensure, as far as possible, the safety and security of aU enemy prisoners of war. Advise and report to the commander of the United States Far East Command and the United Nations Command on the combat, social, and poHtical situation within the Repubhc of Korea and, when appropriate, other areas of operation. Plan, supervise, and execute security operations for aU friendly areas within the Republic of Korea and the entire Japanese nation.

As this job description illustrates, the commanding general of the Eighth Army was responsible for many tasks, and it took a talented individual to succeed in this position during periods of peace. The wartime demands placed upon the Eighth Army’s commander were truly daunting, and one must keep the tremendous scope of the commander’s responsibilities in mind when assessing his leadership of the organization.

The Eighth Army activated its headquarters in Korea on 13 July 1950, taking over responsibihty for combat operations from the United States Army Forces in

^ The number of personnel assigned to the Eighth Army rose from 147,857 to 678,051 during the period July 1950-June 1952.Logistics in the Korecm Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, figure 2a.

The U.S. Army only had one field army (the Eighth Army) in its organization until late in 1950 when it activated a second field army in Europe (the Seventh U.S. Army). The organizations designated as “armies” that were stationed in the continental United States were merely regional organizations that facilitated the grouping of the Reserve and National Guard units assigned to them. In actuality these organizations were “paper” armies and their commanders were primarily managers.

64 Korea (USAFIK). The common designation of EUSAK (Eighth, U.S. Army in Korea) arose from the initial distinction Walker made between his Eighth Army forces remaining in Japan and those forces actively engaged in the Korean War. This distinction quickly lost its applicability by fall 1950 but remained in use until 19

Febmary 1953, and I wül use it as an abbreviation for the Eighth Army throughout the entire period of this study.

According to the Army doctrine of the time, an army was an organization

“composed of a headquarters, certain organic army troops, a variable number of corps, and a variable number of divisions. Some or all of the divisions may be assigned or attached from time to time to corps. The army is an administrative as well as a tactical unit.”^* When the Korean War began, EUSAK had four divisions assigned to it with no corps headquarters active to assist in commanding and controlling these units.^

Corps headquarters became available within the first sixty days of the war. Army doctrine described a corps as consisting “of a corps headquarters, certain organic and attached corps troops, and such combat divisions as may be attached to it. The corps is primarily a tactical unit. In some situations, it also may be an administrative unit as

' Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAKfVar Diary, Eighth United States Army, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section I: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, pp. ix, xiv-xv, (hereinafter cited as EUSAK War Diary)' Mossman, Ebb and Flow, p. 24 n.

Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1949), p. 3, (hereinafter cited as FM 100-5, 1949).

^ Records Group 407, Box 1081, EUSAKWar Diary, Eighth United States Army, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Section I: Prologue, 25 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, pp. ix, xiv-xv, (hereinafter cited as EUSAK War Diary)', Mossman, Ebb and Flow, p. 24 n; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 189, 544.

65 welL”^° Corps organization difiFered significantiy from World War II in that these

organizations no longer had any organic combat assets assigned to them, but they

continued to serve as organizational groupings and the highest tactical element in the

US Army/^ This echelon included a headquarters and two or more divisions. Most

important to the corps operation were its communication and artillery assets, and,

although authorized, the Eighth Army corps did not have adequate amounts of either

until mid-1951.^^

Throughout the Korean War, the Eighth Army had a total of six corps assigned

to it. The ROK 1 and n Corps were the first organizations assigned to EUSAK,

becoming part of the army on 14 July 1950. Next came the US 1 Corps, which was

activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 2 August 1950 and became operational on

13 September 1950. The US IX Corps became EUSAK’s fourth corps, activated on

10 August 1950 at Fort Sheridan, Illinois and becoming operational on 23 September

1950. The ROK Army formed a third corps headquarters, the ROK HI Corps, on 16

October 1950, giving EUSAK its fifth corps, and the newly arrived Ridgway assumed

control of the US X Corps, which had been operational since 26 August 1950, in

F M I00-5, 1949, p. 3.

Peter G. Tsouras, Changing Orders: The Evolution o f the World’s Armies. 1945 to the Present (London: Arms and Armour, 1994), p. 15.

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 544-545.

66 late-December 1950/^ These six corps formed the nucleus of the Eighth Army for the remainder of the war/"*

Army doctrine held that “the division [was] the basic large unit of the combined armies. It [was] comprise[d of] a headquarters; infantry^ armored, or airborne units; artillery units; and certain other troops of the arms and services. It is an administrative as well as tactical unit.”^^ Furthermore, “the infantry division [was] the basis of organization of the [Army’s] ground field forces,” and “k [was] the smallest unit that [was] composed of aU the essential ground arms and services and which

[could] conduct, by its own means, ground operations of general importance.”^® All eight of the US Army divisions that served in Korea (six active and two National

Guard) conformed to this description and were organized according to the Table of

Organization and Equipment (TO&E) developed in 1948 as a result of lessons learned during World War H. Only three of the four American divisions initially assigned to

Eighth Army (24 ID, 25 ID, and I CAV) moved to Korea at first, with the fourth division remaining in Japan to serve as the base unit for an additional separate US corps (the X Corps). EUSAK obtained its fourth American division (2 ID) from the

33 Appleman, South to the \'aktong. North to the Yalu, pp. 112, 618.

^ The ROK Army II Corps was virtually destroyed by the CPVA's Second phase Offensive, and Walker deactivated it in December 1950. Under Van Fleet's guidance, the ROK Army reactivated its II Corps in April 1952.

In 1949, ‘The terms ‘arms' and ‘services' [were] used to designate the branches of the Army. The term ‘arms’ [was] used to designate those branches of the Army whose primary mission [was] combat and combat support. The term ‘services’ refers to those branches of the Army primarily concerned with combat support and/or administration.” FNI100-5, 1949, pp. 3, 5.

FNf 100-5, 1949, p. 256.

61 United States, and it arrived in Korea on 19 August 1950. The final three US

divisions (3 ID, 7 ED, and the 1st Marine Division) joined the army when it gained the

US X Corps on 26 December 1950. Two National Guard divisions (45 ID and 40 ID)

replaced two of the veteran divisions (1 CAV and 24 ID) in December 1951 and

January 1952, marking the final large American units to join EUSAK. In addition to

these assets, the Eighth Army also controlled fourteen ROK Army divisions and one

division made up of units firom the British Commonwealth.^’ At its height, EUSAK

had 22 divisions assigned to it during the Korean War.

A U.S. Army American infantry division in the Korean War was “triangular” in

composition and contained combat elements including three infantry regiments, an

artillery regiment, a heavy tank battalion, an engineer battalion, and a reconnaissance troop (company).^* To support these combat assets, an infantry division also

contained an engineer battalion, a medical battalion, a signal company, an ordnance

company, a quartermaster company, and a nulitary poHce company. This flexible

organization derived its combat value fi'om its ability to combine the action o f the

The 1st Marine Division was far larger than an American Army division, totaling approximately 25,000 Marines, while the ROK Army division were much smaller than American Army divisions, with roughly 10,000 ROK Army soldiers assigned to them. The British Commonwealth Division numbered about 20,000 British, Canadian, Australian, and N ew Zealand soldiers.

The Eighth Army did not have any American units organized as brigades, which was an echelon of conunand that existed between the division and the regiment. According to Army doctrine, “A brigade [was] primarily a tactical unit composed of two or more regiments or groups of the same arm, together with a headquarters and headquarters company, or similar unit. A brigade [could have] include[d] units of other arms and services and [could have had] administrative functions.” Units from the British Commonwealth and Turkey were called brigades, but they did not conform to the above definition and more closely resembled the organization o f an American regiment. The U.S. Army did not adopt the brigade as an integral echelon of command until its 1962 Reorganization of the Army Division (ROAD) initiative. Fkf 100-5, 1949, pp. 3, 256.

68 many types of units assigned to it, conduct combat operations over a considerable period of time, fight sustained close combat actions, and gain and hold ground/^

Compared to its World War II predecessor, it was a far more powerful entity, as it had gained a tank battalion, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, and its military police unit had increased to a company-sized element. By 1955, a Pentagon official reported that these additional alterations increased the firepower of a contemporary infantry division by 80 percent over its World War H predecessor.

Infantry Division (18,804)

Infantry Tank Engineer Division Regiment Battalion Battalion Artillery

Recon MP Ordnance QM Signal Company Company Com pany Company Company

Figure 3. Infantry Division Organization In the Korean War

' FM 100-5, 1949, p. 256.

' Military Review, 35:2, May 1955, p. 67.

69 The division artillery group, or Divarty, consisted of three eighteen-gun 105 mm artillery battahons FABs), one eighteen-gun 155 ram artillery battalion, and an antiaircraft (AAA) battalion. The tank battalion contained three tank companies of 22 medium or heavy tanks, and the reconnaissance troop contained 20 light tanks.

Division Artillery (3,668)

105mm FA 155mm FA Antiaircraft HQ&HQ Medical Battalion Battalion Battalion Battery Detach

HQ&HQ FA Service Medical Battery Battery Battery Detach

HQ&HQ FA Service Medical Battery Battery Battery Detach

Figure 4. Division Artillery Organization In the Korean War

70 An in&ntxy regiment was a fixed organization that included both tactical and administrative units, and it contained three infantry battalions, a heavy (4.2 inch) mortar company of twelve heavy mortars, and a regimental tank company, which contained two light tanks and twenty medium tanks. An infantry battalion was the basic tactical unit of the Eighth Army, and it consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company.^^ The heavy weapons company had a light (.30 caliber) machiue gun platoon, a 75 mm recoiUess rifle platoon, and a medium (81 mm) mortar platoon.'*^

^^m W O -5, 1949, p. 3.

In September 1952 the organization of the heavy weapons company was modified to include four of the new 105 mm recoilless rifles, which significantly increased the company's available firepower. John L. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry. Part I: Regular Army, in the Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Aomy, 1972), p. 80 (hereinafter cited as Mahon and Danysh, Infantry).

71 Infantry Regiment (3,774))

Infantry Heavy Mortar Tank HQ&HQ Service Battalion Company Company Company Company (12 4.2 in. mortars) (22 tanks) Medical Company

HQ&HQ Rifle Heavy Legend Company Company Weapons Company HQ - Headquarters

Lt. MG - Light Machine Medium Lt. MG RR gun Mortar Platoon Platoon Platoon (.30 cal.) (75mm) RR - Recoilless Rifle (81mm)

Figure 5. Infantry Regiment Organization In the Korean War

72 An infantry rifle company was the Army’s basic administrative unit, and it had a headquarters section, three rifle platoons, and one weapons platoon.'*^ The company's weapons platoon had a headquarters, a hght (60 mm) mortar section with a headquarters and three mortar teams, and a 57 mm recoilless rifle section with a headquarters and three rifle teams.

Infantry Rifle Company (211)

Headquarters Rifle W eapons Section Platoon Platoon

HQ Rifle Weapons Section Squad Squad

L egen d Lt. Mortar RR HQ - Headquarters HQ Section Section Section RR - Recoilless Rifle (60mm) (57mm)

Figure 6. Infantry Rifle Company Organization In the Korean War

' F%1100-5, 1949, pp. 3-4.

73 The rifle platoons had a headquarters, three 9-man rifle squads, and one 9-man weapons squad. The rifle squads had six riflemen armed with M-1 Garands, two

automatic riflemen armed with Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), and one sniper

armed with an M-1 sniper rifle.‘‘‘‘ The weapons squad had one 4-man rocket launcher team and one 4-man light machine gun (.30 caliber) team. By May 1952, the number

of hght machine guns in the weapons squads doubled, and the rifle platoon headquarters acquired two more rocket launchers.**^

Infantry Rifle Platoon (42)

H eadquarters Rifle W eapons S ectio n Squad S quad

BAR M -I Squad Man R ifletn an Sniper

Legend HQ - Headquarters Lt. M G RL HQ Lt. MG - Light Machine gun S ectio n S ectio n S ectio n RL - Rocket Launcher (3.5 in)

Figure 7. Infantry Rifle Platoon Organization In the Korean War

According to the Army's ofBcial history of the infantry, "the [second] BAR [in each rifle squad] did not become organic to the rifle company until 13 April 1953, but many infantry units fighting in Korea had used two automatic rifles per squad long before the official toe change." Anecdotal evidence firom a variety of sources confirms this assessment. Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, p. 81; and Colonel Robert B. Rigg, “Whither the Squad?," /Irmy, February 1960, pp. 38-39.

Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, p. 81.

74 The changes at all levels marked a significant departure firom the structure of their

World War II counterparts and are worth exploring in greater detail to determine their influence on the Eighth Army’s fighting ability.

Infantry Unit Organization

The Army dramatically reorganized the infantry rifle squad and platoon during the period 1945-1950 as a result oÇ among other things, the suggestions of the oflScers and NCO's who commanded those units in World War H. Most agreed that the twelve-soldier squad was too unwieldy for effective control by the squad leader.

Most further contended that the platoon needed to increase its organic firepower by assigning some of the company’s 2.36 inch bazookas and .30 caliber light machine guns to the platoon to recognize what was common practice in most units in combat."*^

As a result of these changes, the infantry rifle squad and platoon on the eve of the

Korean War were substantially different from their World War II predecessors.

Like its counterpart in World War II, the Korean War infantry platoon had an effective strength of thirty-six soldiers. The Korean War infantry squad, however, consisted of nine soldiers: a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, two two-soldier

BAR teams consisting of a BAR man and a BAR assistant gunner, two riflemen

(armed with M -1 Garand rifles), and. one sniper (armed with an M -1 Garand sniper

Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, p. 73.

75 rifle). Adding one more BAR to the infantry squad was perhaps the most significant of these changes because, according to Marshall:

In infantry operations in Korea, it is conspicuous that rifle fire builds up strongly around the BAR It is therefore reasonable to beheve that an increase in ratio of BARs to rifles would stimulate stronger [riflemen] fire within the squad unit. In every engagement there are pivotal influences — fire builds up because one man is doing a particular thing with his weapon and others move to support him BAR action is most frequently the moving force because of the high mobility of the weapon and its solid fire effects.

Marshall suspected that by increasing the ratio of BAR's to riflemen in a squad, one could possibly double the useful fire from the squad as a whole.'** As a result of this alteration, the two scouts and one ammunition bearer of the World War II squad had been eliminated.'*^ Despite reducing the overall size of the organization, these changes almost tripled the squad's ratio of crew-served weapons to squad members, increasing it from 1:12 to 2:9.

■*' Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, pp. 54-55.

■** Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, pp. 53, 63.

Marshall would not have expected any of these soldiers to fire their weapons in combat, since their assignments would have placed them in positions in which they would be somewhat isolated from the unit even before entering combat, so one may assume that number of potential firing soldiers in a squad remained constant during World War It and the Korean War. S.L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem o f Battle Command in Future War (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1947; reprint ed., Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978), pp. 47-49, (hereinafter cited as Marshall, Men Against Fire).

76 WW n Rifle Squad Organization Korean War Rifle Squad Organization

(Scout)] f

(ASL)

M l903 Springfield Knipc^ M-1 Sniper Rifle

12 Soldiers & 1 BAR 9 Soldiers & 2 BAR’S

Figure 8. World War EE & Korean War Infantry Rifle Squad Organization Conçarison

The Korean War infantry platoon consisted of three of these nine-soldier

squads and contained an additional weapons squad of nine soldiers, as well as a platoon headquarters identical to the World War U platoon. The weapons squad

consisted of a squad leader, one four-soldier rocket launcher team armed with a bazooka, and one four-soldier machine gun team armed with the light .30 caliber

77 machine gim/° As with the squad reorganization, this change almost tripled the platoon's ratio of crew-served weapons to platoon members, increasing it from 3:42 to 8:42.

WW n Rifle Platoon Organization Korean War Rifle Platoon Organization

SL) (SL (Scot^ (S oxî) (Sco^ '^BARN /B A R \ .AG y I AG , & (ASI V^AGJ 0 0 " S (RM) 0 0 0 ElM (RM,

0 0 0 RM (RM 0 0 0 (B/ 0 0 0 /BAk\ /BÂ5\ V AG y V AG J

3 Squads of 12 Soldiers & 4 Squads of 9 Soldiers & 3 Crew-served Weapons 8 Crew-served Weapons

Figure 9. World War H & Korean War Infantry Rifle Platoon Organization Comparison

' Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, p. 73.

78 The reorganization of the squad and platoon resulted from the suggestions of

World War II leaders and men like Marshall, but they were not really tested until the outbreak of the Korean War. Marshall's observations from World War H held that men operating crew-served weapons usually fired their weapons in combat, so the addition of five crew-served weapons at the platoon level would lead one to expect a corresponding level of iucrease in the ratio of fire from such a unit. According to his own research, this is in fret what occurred, and the ratio of fire observed by Marshall at the squad and platoon level increased from 25 percent in World War II to 55 percent in Korea.

The Army continued to make changes to the higher echelons in its infantry divisions. These changes increased the infantry company’s ratio of fire in the Korean

War, and similar changes occurred at the battalion, regimental, and division levels as well.^'

Tank Unit Organization

The Eighth Army's tanks were fairly well dispersed within the six combat divisions. Each division had an organic reconnaissance company that was authorized seven M-24 light tanks (Chaffees) and five M-44 armored utility vehicles.^”

For discussion of these changes, see Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, pp. 73-76; and Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution o f US Army Tactical Doctrine. 1946-76, Leavenworth Paper No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), pp. 2-7.

” Table of Organization and Equipment Number 17-57N, Reconnaissance Company (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 23 January 1948), p. 13. The Department of the Army issued one change to this document prior to the outbreak of the Korean War (Change 1, dated 17 March 1948) and another change to this document during the Korean War (Change 2 dated 15 November 1950), 79 Equipment shortages, battle damage, and mechanical difficulties reduced these numbers to about six M-24's and four armored utility vehicles for each reconnaissance company and caused the Eighth Army to substitute M-39 armored utility vehicles for the authorized M-44's, giving these units a total of 38 M-24's and 24 M-39's/^

Besides the reconnaissance companies, eleven of the Eighth Army’s initial nineteen

U.S. Army regiments had an active regimental tank company, and all EUSAK infantry regiments had their authorized regimental tank company by January 1952.^^ These companies were organized similarly to a tank company of a tank battahon.^^ Each

neither of which altered these authorizations. The convention for identifying tanks by an alphanumeric designation was not standardized in the Army during this period. For the purposes of continuity, I have adopted the current method of placing a dash between the letter and the number of a tank’s designation (e.g., M-24) except for when referring to the M4AI and M4A3E8 tanks, which never included a dash. Many of the quotations from this period do not include dashes in the tanks' designations, and I decided to present them as they originally appeared for accuracy and because it was not overly distracting to me.

’■’ These figures reflect an operational readiness rate of 86 percent for the M-24 tanks and 80 percent for the M-39 armored utility vehicles. I derived these operational readiness rates from the available data in Records Group 407, Boxes 1149, 1161, 1173, 1186, 1199, 1213, and 1226, Eighth Army Command Reports for January-July 1951, Book VII - Armor Section reports, January-July 1951.

^ Because of the post-World War II equipment shortages in the Army, none of the four divisions that came to Korea from Japan (the 1st CAV, 7th, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions) were allotted tanks to outfit their regimental tank companies. Under General Almond's direction, the 7th Infantry Division corrected this deficiency by obtaining enough tanks salvaged from Pacific islands and refurbished by the Japanese to equip its three regimental tank companies. The 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions, and the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) arrived in Korea with their organic regimental tank companies (a total of seven) fully equipped. In addition, the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry division acquired enough tanks to outfit its one regimental tank company, bring the Eighth Army's total to eleven regimental tank companies. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, p. 7; Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 638; Records Group 407, Boxes 1149, 1161, 1173, 1186, 1199, 1213, and 1226, Eighth Army Command Reports for January-July 1951, Book VII - Armor Section reports, January-July 1951.

Table of Organization and Equipment Number 17-37N, Tank Company, (Heavy) or (Ivfedium) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 26 January 1948), p. 5. The Department of the Army issued two changes to this document prior to the outbreak o f the Korean War (Change 1, dated 20 December 1949 and Change 2, dated 22 May 1950) and another change to this document during the Korean War (Change 3 dated 15 November 1950). Change 1 to this document adjusted the types of 80 company was authorized 22 medium or heavy tanks (either M4A3E8's, M-26's, or M-

46's), but equipment shortages, battle damage, and mechanical difiBculties reduced this number to approximately 20 M4A3E8 tanks per company/^

The six independent tank battalions assigned to the Eighth Army did not enjoy the homogeneity of organization that the reconnaissance companies and regimental tank companies did/^ A new Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) was

developed for tank battalions after World War II based upon the Army’s current inventory of tanks (M-4, M-24, M-26, and M-46) and on the Army's new "family of

armored vehicles" that were being developed at the time (the M-41 light tank, the T-

42 medium tank, and the T-43 heavy tank)/^ This presumptive planning produced a bewildering array of TO&E's for tank battalions that defied standardization. None of the tanks included in the new "family of armored vehicles" made it into the Eighth

tanks assigned to a tank company from twenty heavy tanks and two M-45 medium tanks (p. 9) to 22 medium or heavy tanks. This organization remained constant throughout the entire Korean War.

Records Group 407, Boxes 1149,1161, 1173, 1186, 1199. 1213, and 1226, Eighth Army Command Reports for January-July 1951, Book VU - Armor Section reports, January-July 1951. The most useful documents appeared in Box 1199 and contained operational readiness statistics for eight of the eleven regimental tank companies for the month of May 1951. I used this data to establish the average operational readiness rate for regimental tank companies (which differed from the operational readiness rates of the tank battalions) and supported it with information contained in the other Armor Section Command Reports.

As independent units, the tank battalions could be assigned anywhere within the Eighth Army. These units were associated with the six American infantry divisions in Korea to build cohesive relationships and ease their administrative requirements. The traditional assignments paired up the following organizations during the January-July 1951 period: 1 CAV & 6th Tank Bn; 2 ED & 72d Tank Bn; 3 ID & 64tli Tank Bn; 7 ED & 73d Tank Bn; 24 ED & 70th Tank Bn; and 25 ED & 89th Tank Bn.

An "M" designation for American tanks meant that the vehicle was in active service with the Army. A "T" designation meant that the tank was still in the developmental stages and not yet in active service.

8 1 Army's inventory during the Korean War, but the battalions that arrived to fight the war reflected Army planners' expectations that they would. As a result, the Eighth

Army's Armor Section had to settle the matter by developing a standard TO&E for tank battalions serving in Korea. Anticipating that M-46 tanks might become available to the Eighth Army, the Armor Section selected an existing tank battalion TO&E that could accommodate units equipped with either M4A3E8, M-26, or M-46 tanks and modified it. According to this TO&E, each battalion was authorized two M-24 light tanks for reconnaissance and 69 medium or heavy tanks organized into three companies of 22 tanks each, with each company having four platoons of five tanks each and two tanks in the company headquarters.^^ Equipment shortages, battle damage, and mechanical difficulties reduced these numbers to an average of two

M-24's and sixty medium or heavy tanks per battafion organized according to the modified TO&E but with some platoons operating with only four tanks instead of five.^° After universally condemning the M-26 as a "lousy tank" and requesting replacements for all of them, the Eighth Army operated with three tank battahons equipped with M4A3E8 tanks and three tank battahons equipped with M-46 tanks.

Table of Organization and Equipment Number 17-35N, Tank Battalion. (Heavy) or (Medium) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 23 April 1948). The Department of the Army issued many changes to this document prior to and during the Korean War. The change that proved to be most useful to the Eighth Army's Armor Section turned out to be Change 4, dated 15 November 1950, which allowed for many adjustments according to the type of tanks that the unit was equipped with. For information on the TO&E dispute, see Records Group 407, Box 1139, Eighth Army Command Report for December 1950, Book VTI - Armor Section report. Tank Notes dated 1 December 1950, pp. 1-3.

“ Records Group 407, Boxes 1149,1161, 1173, 1186, 1199, 1213, and 1226, Eighth Army Command Reports for January-July 1951, Book VII - Armor Section reports, January-July 1951.

61 Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 637-638. 82 Tank Battalion (667)

HQ&HQ Tank Medical & Service Company Detachment Company

HQ Tank Section Platoon

Legend Platoon Tank HQ - Headquarters HQ Tank

Figure 10. Tank Battalion Organization In the Korean War

83 By June 1952, after a concerted effort to improve the Eighth Army’s tank

assets, EUSAK had seven independent tank battalions assigned to support its

divisions, six American and one British (equipped with M4A3E8, M-46, and in the

case of the British unit. Centurion tanks), and 26 regimental tank companies, eighteen

American, seven ROÎC, and one Canadian (with sixteen out of nineteen of the

American and Canadian units equipped with M4A3E8 tanks and the remaining three

American companies having M-46 tanks, while all ROK Army tank companies were

equipped with World War H surplus M-36 Tank Destroyers)/^

Communist doctrine dictated that tanks be organized into tank divisions (e.g. the NKPA 105th Tank Division and the CPVA 1st Armored Division) under the

control of the army group commander; however, by April 1952, Eighth Army inteUigence officers concluded that the CPVA was not massing its tanks in a division­

sized unit, opting instead for three unidentified independent tank regim ents.This is understandable, as Communist doctrine permitted a tank regiment firom the tank

division to separate from the main body and operate under the control of an army commander during certain instances, and these independent tank regiments developed

“ Records Group 407, Box 1336, April 1952 EUSAK Cmd Rpt, Section II: Supporting Documents, Book 7: Armor, p. 2. The Eighth Army was in the process of activating ten tank companies for the ROK Army, and by June 1952, seven of these units were either in training or had completed training ad were conducting combat operations.

Records Group 407, Box 1330, April 1952 EUSAK Cmd Rpt, Section I: Narrative, Part 2- Intelligence Estimate, p. 13.

84 a habitual relationship with one or two specific CPVA armies.^ Chinese Communist

doctrine also discouraged tank units firom engaging in tank-versus-tank battles of

attrition with opposing forces. These directives ensured that the Communist tanks

would remain massed, but they also limited the tanks' availability to subordinate

commanders (division and regimental commanders) and flexibility when engaged in

battle. This command arrangement was in sharp contrast to the Eighth Army’s

organization, which allocated its entire inventory of tank assets to division and

regimental commanders.

Artillery Unit Organization

Artillery assets in the Army experienced a dramatic reorganization between the

end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War. In 1950, the Field

Artillery and Antiaircraft Artillery branches merged to form the Artillery branch, which

lasted until 1968 when the Army broke it up into the newly created Air Defense

Artillery branch and revived the traditional Field Artillery branch. This means that

during the Korean War, artillery referred to both field and antiaircraft artillery, and its

armament consisted of guns, howitzers, mortars, rockets, guided missiles, automatic

weapons, and controlled submarine mines. In theory, all artillery belonged to the same

branch, adhered to similar doctrinal employment criteria, and was controlled by

^ The corresponding American levels of command for Communist army groups and armies are armies and corps, respectively. Records Group 407, Box 1213, Eighth Army Command Report for June 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, translation o f a captured CPVA document entitled, "The Tactics of a Tank Unit," p. 1; Records Group 407, Box 1330, April 1952 EUSAJC Cmd Rpt, Section I; Narrative, Part 2-Intelligence Estimate, p. 13.

85 common higher headquarters. This was a somewhat confusing organization, and the traditional field artillery oflBcers and soldiers were not particularly enamored with their new antiaircraft artillery kinsmen.®^

The principal mission of all division field artillery assets was to provide fire

support on those targets that could interfere with the execution of the mission of the

supported units. The basic Army field artillery unit was the battery consisting of six howitzers or guns, which was an increase of two weapons from the World War II

organization.®® Crews of between five and twelve soldiers serviced each weapons, and three crews and weapons combined to form a section. Normally, one 105 mm FAB provided direct support for each of a division’s three infantry regiments and the

remaining 155 mm FAB provided general support to the division.

Corps artillery controlled most of the FABs not assigned to a DIVARTY.

Consisting of an organic headquarters and an observation battalion, corps artillery

controlled aU field and antiaircraft artillery units retained under the direct control of the

corps commander. Artillery units not assigned to division or corps artilleries became part of the General Reserve Artillery, and field artillery group usually functioned as a headquarters for these units.

Author’s telephonic interview of David Ross, curator, US Army Air Defense Artillery Museum, Fort Bliss, Texas, on 29 December 1998; and F M 100-5, 1949, pp. 8-9.

The U.S. Army changed its basic artillery organization from the four-gun battery to the six-gun battery in 1947. This increased the available firepower in each artillery battery and battalion by one- third. The Chinese Communist Forces also switched to a six-gun battery organization, but the NKPA retained the older World War II organizational model and continued to employ the four-gun artillery battery during the Korean War. Department of the Army Pamplilet 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1952), p. 38; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 11.

86 Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) units also based their organization around a battery, but the AAA battery was somewhat different from a field artillery battery.

AAA squads consisted o f between eight and ten soldiers manning one of five types of motorized weapons platforms: the M -15, which had a 37 mm cannon and two .50 caliber machine guns; the M -16, which had four .50 caliber machine guns and was known as the “Quad .50”; the M-19, which has two 40 mm cannons and was known as the “Duster”; the M-42, which was simply an improved version o f the M-19 and was also referred to as the “Duster”; and the M-2, which was a 90 mm antiaircraft gun. Although grouped together a battahons for administrative purposes, AAA assets were almost always employed as batteries, and they normally carried a designation as

“AAA automatic weapons” units when providing direct fire for ground operations.®^

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

HQ & HQ AAA Service M edical B attery B attery B attery D etachm ent

o r r ro o ro

M 1 5/1 6/19/42 M 1 5/1 6/19/42

Figure 11. Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion Organization In the Korean War

67 Ibid.

87 Doctrine

The Army’s doctrine for the Korean War was an expression of the lessons learned from World War II, and it emphasized combined arms operations above all else. According to the Army’s capstone field manual of the period, FM 100-5,

Operations, published in August 1949, “No one arm wins battles. The combined coordinated action or team work of aU [branches of the Army] is essential to success.”^* Combined arms operations require organization and structure to be successful, but in the past, battlefields and combat areas had been characterized by their noticeable lack of those very elements. To coordinate the actions of the various branches and enhance the conduct of combined arms operations. Army leaders developed a relatively simple framework to organize the combat areas and structure the activities of Army units fighting the conflict.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, Army officials designated Korea as a theater of operations controlled by the U.S. Army’s Far East Command (FEC) and supported by the Eighth Army and the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). According to the doctrine of the period, the Army organized this theater into three areas: the Combat

Zone, the Communications Zone, and the Zone of Interior. The Combat Zone comprised “that part of the theater of operations required for the conduct of war by the field forces.” Its size depended upon a number o f issues, and commanders down to division level could be assigned areas of responsibility within it. The Korean War

Combat Zone existed entirely on the Korean peninsula. The Communications Zone

100-5, 1949, p. 6.

88 (ComZ) included all territory of the theater of operations between the rear boundary of

the combat zone and the rear boundary of the theater. It provided an area for the

operation and defense of the supply, evacuation, transportation, service, and other

administrative agencies required for rendering support to the combat zone. The

Communications Zone was activated for Korea in August 1952 around Pusan and

Japan and linked the Combat Zone with the Zone of Interior. The Zone of hiterior

(21) consisted of national territory exclusive of other theaters of operations and could

include foreign territory as the situation required.^® During the Korean War, Japan and

the United States served as the Eighth Army’s ZI.

Army leaders based all combat operations around the interaction of the

infantry, armored cavalry, and artillery. Infantry forces were the arm of close combat,

designed to close with and destroy or capture the enemy in the attack and to hold its

position and repel a hostile assault in the defense. Armed with rifles, bayonets,

automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, carbines, pistols, grenades, light antitank weapons, recoilless rifles, flame throwers, and tanks, the infantry fought by combining

fire, which inflicted losses on the enemy and neutralized his combat power, movement, to close with the enemy and enhance the value of the fire, and shock action, to

complete the destruction of the enemy in close combat. Armored cavalry was the arm

of mobility, armor-protected fire power, and shock action, and the tank was its principal weapon. Primarily offensive in nature and designed to conduct reconnaissance, exploitation, and pursuit operations, commanders were to use these

F M I00-5, 1949, pp. 1-2.

89 assets to lead, accompany, or support infantry in the penetration of the enemy’s

defenses in the attack, and to destroy enemy penetrations and conduct counterattacks in the defense. Field artillery was the Army’s principal arm of hre support, and it performed a variety of missions including close support of the other arms, counterbattery fire, and long-rang fires to destroy enemy reserves, and command, communication, and supply installations. The role of antiaircraft artillery was to provide maximum protection against hostile aircraft for fiiendly units and installations, and it was also very efifective at providing direct fire against ground targets. In the absence of a visible air threat to fiiendly forces, doctrine encouraged their employment in the ground-support role whenever practicable

Army doctrine of the period recognized the necessity of conducting operations designed to either destroy an enemy force or capture an important terrain objective and was crafted broadly enough to accommodate either approach.^^ Regardless of its orientation, the basis of all Army operations was "‘fire and maneuver,” meaning that in the offense or defense, American Army units sought to use one element as a base of fire to pin down the enemy unit (fire) while another element moved to the side or rear of the enemy and attacked or created an assailable flank (maneuver) to destroy the opposing force or capture the terrain that it occupied. George C. Marshall developed

■°F^nOO-5, 1949, pp. 6-11.

71 Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949), pp. 5-8, 80-155; FM 7-20, Infantry Battalion (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949), pp. 146-363; FM 7-10, Rife Company, Infantry (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949), pp. 184-336. 421, 426-432.

90 this “holding attack” technique at the Infantry School during the interwar period, and it became the Army’s standard tactic from squad through corps level in World War

Achieving validation against some of the best armies ever fielded, advancing by fire and maneuver to conduct a holding attack became the ultimate objective of any

Army offensive or defensive operation/^ The 1949 version of FM 100-5 bears this out, and it provided iustmctions for leaders at all levels to execute this scheme of maneuver.

Army doctrine directed commanders to use combat aviation assets as early as possible during offensive operations to disrupt enemy command and control and obtain information about the opposing force. Recognizing the strengths of its available weapons. Army artillery doctrine of the period emphasized the use of mortars and 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers against enemy personnel targets, while the 8-inch howitzers units, because of their accuracy and large projectiles, focused on destroying the enemy’s artillery assets through “counterbattery” fire. Accordingly, commanders used field artillery assets to target enemy troop concentrations and gain fire superiority for the attacking ground forces. This method placed a premium on using field artillery assets to provide indirect fire, although they were also quite capable of delivering accurate and effective direct fire. Ground forces would move forward under the cover

■■ Geoffrey Perret, There 5-.4 War To Be Won: The United States Army in World War II (New York: Elandom House, 1991), pp. 14-16.

James C. Fry, Assault Battle Drill (Harrisburg, PA: Military Services Publishing Co., 1955), pp. vii-ix, 64-66. Fry commanded 2 ID in Korea fi'om May 1952 to May 1953, and he says that his soldiers used the holding attack in Korea with great success. He also includes testimonials from several other oflBcers as well. Thus it appears that at least a few leaders were staunch advocates of this technique, and one suspects that there many other supporters as well.

91 of the field artillery units and attack using an envelopment or penetration fi)nn of

maneuver. Having achieved a breakthrough, commanders used armored forces to

exploit the breech, widen the destruction, and attack deep into the enemy’s rear to

disrupt his ability to control his forces or conduct supply and sustainment operations.

Army leaders en çhasized the employment of tank-infantry teams in any possible

situation, since “infantry and tanks are ideally suited to assist each other in the

attack.”^'* Airborne units were usefid for attacking key objectives in the enemy’s rear

areas as weU, but leaders had to employ them in areas where attacking units could

reach them before the paratroopers were surrounded or completely destroyed. When

units encountered obstacles, especially gas or mines, doctrine held that they were to

mark those areas clearly and then bypass them altogether to avoid arresting the

advance for any significant length of time. While initial plans may not occur as

planned, the key was to maintain continuous pressure, both day and night, to deny the

enemy any fireedom of action and avoid giving him any respite, keep the opposing

forces ofFbalance and wear them down, and use all available means to secure the

assigned objective.

The Army’s vision of a defense was far firom the static trench lines of World

War I; rather, it was an operation that used a combination of mobile and static means to retain possession of a given area. Units in the defense were to be aggressive.

Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 7-20, Infantry Battalion (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1950), pp. 149-150.

FM 100-3, 1949, pp. 104-110.

92 conducting non-stop patrols, raids, feints, demonstrations, and were to use harassing

fires to force the enemy to react, thus denying him the initiative. Units would defend

an area in depth and only garrison critical locations with static defenses. The

remainder of the fiiendly forces would fight firom successive positions, moving as necessary to avoid decisive engagement while continuing to inflict casualties on the

attacking forces. Commanders in the defense positioned their forces to give them the

abflity to maximize their available firepower, reduce their own losses, and halt the

enemy’s attack or regain a surrendered position by counterattack. Combat aviation would attack the assaulting forces in depth throughout their entire advance to disrupt their operations and obtain information. Field artillery units occupied positions close enough to the firont to provide rapid and responsive indirect fifes that did not require high-angle fife missions and fimctioned in direct support of the ground combat units using large amounts of ammunition to disrupt attacking formations, destroy the enemy, and eliminate opposing artillery assets through counterbattery fire. Armored forces focused on destroying enemy tanks, halting enemy penetrations, and conducting counterattacks when the attacking forces slowed down or became vulnerable. The overriding objective of any defensive operation was to allow for a rapid shift to offensive operations.^®

While based solidly upon experience gamed during World War n, the U.S.

Army doctrine was fairly sophisticated and required a relatively high level of proficiency to execute correctly. The leaders who developed it had fought for an

100-5, 1949, pp. 147-155.

93 extended period of rime in one or perhaps two wars within the previous three decades against Germans primarily, and the doctrine reflected the abihties exhibited by Second

World War soldiers after several years of almost continuous combat. After demobilizing the Army rapidly and relying largely on draftees of limited experience to man the ranks, this doctrine appears to have been too complex for marginally trained soldiers and leaders to execute, especially considering the state of training in the Army during the period 1945-1950. Nevertheless, this doctrine is eminently sound, and, when executed by experienced leaders and soldiers, had the potential to be extremely effective on the battlefield.’’

Close Air Support Coordination

Since EUSAK did not have any Close Air Support (CAS) air forces organic to it, its CAS effectiveness was largely dependent upon the air-ground operations system that controlled the attack sorties. The Eighth Army and its supporting tactical air component in Korea, the Fifth Air Force, engaged in a protracted debate during the first year of the war over the effectiveness of the close air support provided by the Air

Force to augment the Army’s ground operations. The Marine Corps' 1st Aircraft Wing had supported Army General Edward M. Almond's X Corps during his operations between September-December 1950, and he felt that the Fifth Air Force's close air support did not measure up favorably. Accordingly, he strongly advocated that the

The Army’s 1949 doctrine has many similarities to AirLandBattle Doctrine, the Army’s 1986 method used with such success against the Iraqi's in the Gulf War.

94 Eighth Army adopt an air-ground operating system that closely resembled the Marine

Corps'method. The problem with such a recommendation was twofold: (1) the

Marine Corps' air component was much better integrated with its land component; and

(2) the Marine Corps' air component's main mission was to provide close air support

to the ground forces, as opposed to the Air Force's triple responsibility of maintaining

air superiority and conducting interdiction and close air support of ground forces.

Each of these issues presented obstacles that required a solution different from the

Marine Corps’ solution.

The Air Force's autonomy presented the Army with a completely different

command relationship than that which existed within the Marine Corps. The Air Force became a separate service in 1947, and the Korean War presented an ideal opportunity for the service to demonstrate its effectiveness in a combat situation. Unfortunately, the entire thrust of Air Force operations between World War II and Korea had been the development of an improved strategic bombing capability, causing Air Force planners to ignore the close air support mission for the most part. Consequently, when the Air Force attempted to demonstrate its capabilities in a theater in which the major focus was on close air support, it experienced several problems concerning the employment of its aircraft and the establishment of an effective system of control.

The central issue of the debate revolved around the aspect of battlefield control of the assets and the Air Force's consistently held opinion that ground army control of air assets was inherently inefficient and prevented their use elsewhere. Although correct, the inefficiency issue mattered Uttle to ground commanders who felt entitled

95 to continuous, responsive air support to assist their efforts against a numerically superior opponent. Neither side was willing to compromise, but the Air Force had the additional incentive of protecting its fledgling status as an independent service. In the end. Generals Collins and Ridgway voiced their support for the established system, which in effect amounted to a significant victory for the entire Air Force. Despite this

Army show of support for its sister service, the conflict created lasting resentment among both Army and Air Force oflScers and was a matter of constant concern for both services during the rest of the war.

The joint air-ground operations system developed to coordinate Army and Air

Force operations was entirely new (arising from the lessons of World War II) and had never been tested between two separate services (as the Air Force had just come into existence). In World War H, the system was a cooperative relationship that functioned as an internal method of control within the Army between ground forces and the Army

Air Forces. Almond's famiUarity with the system as it existed during World War H might explain why he continued to insist upon controlling his own air assets despite the expficit command arrangements established in the jointly published doctrinal manual that established a separate Air Force commander for this purpose.’* The Air

Force, however, was determined to retain complete control over all of its assets to support its efforts to establish its legitimacy as an independent service. These factors made the Air Force hyper-sensitive to criticism and loathe to change the estabhshed system in any way that would reduce its control over air assets. They also explain the

FM 31-35 Air-Ground Operations, published in 1946.

96 Air Force's determination, expressed in a March 1951 study, to maintain the then-

current system as outlined in FM 31-35/^ The Marine Corps' system, by contrast, had

been functioning since the 1930's/°

During the first half of 1951 both MacArthur and Ridgway expressed

remarkable confidence in the air support provided by the Eighth Army's supporting

tactical air component in Korea, the Fifth Air Force.*^ Despite their superiors'

confidence, numerous ground commanders of the period expressed repeated

dissatisfaction with the existing system and level of support that they received.

Almond conducted and circulated several extensive studies and although he ultimately

praised the Air Force's efforts ofiBcially, he continued to assert that the Air Force's

The major objective o f this study was to express ofBcial support for the existing air-ground operations system. "‘Analysis of the Air-Ground Operations System in Korea” (Korea; Headquarters, Eighth Army, U.S. Joint Air Ground Operations Board (EUSAK and 5AF), 26 March 1951).

It is significant to note that the Marine ground and air commanders had a relationship more akin to Almond’s desires, and Almond was not shy in bringing up the issue of close air support control to anyone who would listen. Nevertheless, one should not dismiss Almond as simply a typically disgruntled ground commander. In fact, he was perhaps the best trained and most experienced commander in Korea with respect to air-ground operations. He attended the U.S. Army War College (1933-34), the U.S. Army Air Corps Tactical School (August 1938-June 1939), and the U.S. Naval War College in 1940 as well as serving as a division commander in the Italian Theater during World War n. Considering these credentials, Almond was evidently speaking fi-om a position of significant air-ground operations experience.

Robert F. Futrell, TJje United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983) p. 341 (hereinafter cited as Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953). These were public comments made by men who were not actually receiving the support and so one must evaluate their content accordingly. A technical study commissioned by the Army in early 1951 and a board of inquiry convened by the Eighth Army in March 1951 presented statistical and testimonial evidence to support the claims made by MacArthur and Ridgway. See William A, Gunn, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-13 (FEC) entitled/! Study o f the Effectiveness of Air Support Operations in Korea (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 26 September 1951); and “Analysis of the Air-Ground Operations System in Korea” (Korea; Headquarters, Eighth Army, Joint Air Ground Operations Board, 26 March, 1951). The Eighth Army's Joint Air Ground Operations Board had an equal number of Army and Air Force officers assigned to it.

97 response time to immediate close air support requests was entirely inadequate.^ Led by Almond, commanders at the battalion, regimental, and corps levels consistently indicated that even though the statistical analyses placed the Air Force's close air support operations in a favorable light, the level of support was simply not acceptable to the ground commanders. An experienced battahon and regimental commander in

Korea offered the following comments regarding tactical air support that adequately summarize many of the ground commanders' feelings;

If you want it, you can't get it; if you can get it, it can't find you; if it can find you, it can't identify the target; if it can identify the target, it can't hit it; but if it does hit the target, it doesn't do a great deal of damage anyway.^

Although not satisfied with the situation, ground commanders generally concurred with the Air Force's priority of missions.^ The prevailing feeling among many officers was that the higher commander's emphasis on interdiction was an

^ Almond conducted several tactical air studies as the X Corps commander. His initial study examined the period 28 June -8 September 1950 and was highly critical of the Air Force's efforts. His studies in 1951 tended to be more laudatory of the Air Force, but he maintained that the Air Force's response time to immediate close air support requests was 28 minutes too slow on the average. The Air Force finally met Almond's standard of a 30-minute response time for immediate close air support requests during the Vietnam War, but given the limited Air Force resources and mutual unfamiliarity with the air-ground operations system, the Air Force's efforts in Korea were remarkably efficient.

^ Interview with General Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army War College Senior Debriefing Program (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 21 December 1982), p. 56 (hereinafter cited as Johnson interview, MHI).

^ Van Fleet was as concerned as anyone about the Air Force's close air support efforts, but in a discussion with Generals Collins and Ridgway, they all agreed "that close air support [sorties] must be reduced to the minimum in order to give the maximum attention to the interdiction program." General James A. Van Fleet Papers (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Library, Virginia Military Institute, Box 82, file 82/1, personal MFR written by Van Fleet dated 30 October 1951 describing his discussions witlt Collins and Ridgway between 28-29 October 1951.

98 appropriate trade-off because the close air support that ground units did receive was never flexible or precise enough to be effective.®^ Army commanders preferred to rely on their own artillery assets to provide them with indirect fire support within 1,000 yards of their position because o f the field artillery's superior accuracy and ability to deliver significantly more ordnance than aircraft could deliver within the same period of time. Ground commanders also realized that the amount of artillery available to them was much greater than the corresponding amount of aircraft and that the supporting aircraft had additional responsibilities beyond their close support activities.

Despite their acknowledgment that the limited air assets required prioritization, their general agreement with those priorities, and their assessment that close air support was inflexible and inaccurate, ground commanders continued to complain about air support effectiveness and lobby for greater control over its employment within their battlefield area.^

Johnson interview, MHI, p. 55.

^ Lt. Col. Thomas M. Crews (USA), Thunderbolt through Ripper: Joint Operations in Korea 25 January-31 March 1951, unpublished U.S. Army War College Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 30.

^ Van Fleet felt that this area extended for a depth of fifty miles and argued that ground army control over all close air support assets included the ability to designate the aircraft type and ordnance load for each mission. Almond advocated an even greater level of ground force control. A though Ridgway expressed some displeasure with the lack of ground control over close air support assets, he largely echoed Collins' (and the Army's) position of supporting the A r Force's control over all theater air assets. These observations came firom the documents previously cited in this section from these ofBcers' personal papers. 99 Conclusion

Soldiers who tried to refight World War II in Korea had a difficult time because many of the units had experienced significant organizational changes, and the

Army’s doctrine was substantially different as well. While changes to both unit organization and doctrine were rooted in the experiences of World War IE, these modified outfits and methods were put to the test in a very different environment against a very different enemy. Just as during World War H, however, efforts to correct mistakes from a previous conflict rarely had a direct successful correlation to battlefields action in the next war without some period of trial and adjustment. The first six months of the Korean War served as the trial period for many of these changes, and by the beginning of 1951 most leaders and soldiers had identified the ineffective organizations and concepts and set about correcting them. Nevertheless, the adjustment was far less than what the American Army had experienced in World

War 1 and World War n, suggesting that the US entered Korea with suitable organizations and sensible doctrine. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the weapons and equipment the soldiers fought with throughout much of the war.

1 0 0 CHAPTER 4

THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

As D Clayton James writes in Refighting the Last War, “With, the outstanding exceptions of helicopters and jet fighters, the weapons and equipment of the American forces in Korea were all of World War II vintage or modified versions of them.”^

Adding to this list only the development and widespread use of individual body armor,

James is essentially correct; the combat units of the Eighth Army in Korea did not benefit from any significant technological changes from the World War II period. This holds true especially for the infantry, as the weapons of the infantry squad and platoon in World War n and the Korean War were virtually identicaL The basic weapon of the infantryman remained the .30 caliber M-1 Garand rifle, and squads and platoons continued to derive the majority of their firepower from the .30 caliber M- lAI and M-

2 carbines, .45 caliber M-1911 A-1 pistol, .30 caliber M-1918 A-2 Browning

Automatic Rifle (BAR), .30 caliber M-1919 A-6 light machine gun, and the 2.36 inch or 3.5 inch rocket launchers, known commonly as “bazookas.” In addition, squads and platoons could request support from the company’s .30 caliber M -1917 A-1

' D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953 (New York The Free Press, 1993), p. 2.

lOI water-cooled heavy machine guns, M-1921 M-2HB .50 caliber Browning machine guns, 57 mm recoilless rifles, 75 mm recoilless rifles, and 60 mm mortars.^ The Army developed all of these weapons before or during World War H, and soldiers had made good use of them throughout World War II and the 1945-1950 time period.

John L. Mahon writes in the Army’s ofBcial history of the infantry that, “The bayonet became more important in Korea than it had been during World War n. It was valued as a morale builder and as a last resort weapon, although most infantry units never fought with it.” Most soldiers carried the Ml bayonet, but those armed with M-1 carbines and other weapons carried the M4 knife bayonet, and most soldiers preferred the latter to the former.^

Mahon goes on to write;:

Infantry units in Korea had more firepower than World War II units, and their communications and transportation equipment was also much better. Between 1 June 1945 and 13 April 1953 the number of radios in the rifle company increased fi'om 8 to 14 and telephone wire firom 2 1/2 to 4 miles, while the various trucks and trailers organic to the infantry regiment grew firom 243 and 159 to 330 and 223, respectively.

■ Russell F. Weigley, History o f the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 502-503; Lyle Rishell, With a Black Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1993), pp. 40-41; S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gavntlet (New York: Time, Inc., 1953), pp. 350-356 (hereinafter cited as Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet).

^ John L. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry. Part I: Regular Army, in the Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1972), pp. 82-83.

■’ John L. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry. Part I: Regular .Army, in th^.Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1972), p. 83.

102 These radios included the popular SCR-300 at the company level, which had a three- mile range, and the SCR-536 at the platoon level, which looked like a large walkie- talkie and had a range of about one mile/ What is perhaps most significant about these pieces of equipment is that they had no Communist counterparts at the battahon level and below, thus giving EUSAK small units a significant advantage in terms of communication ability. Infantry regiments continued to experience organizational changes, so that by May 1952,

a 6-man Ught aviation section became organic to all infantry regiments and a heUcopter, as well as a fixed-wing airplane, was authorized. In Korea, however, the infantry regiments’ aircraft were usually combined with aircraft organic to other elements of the division for centralized operations. Often provisional division aviation companies were organized, although no such units were included in the TO[&]E’s.^

Army units also had a wide variety of other equipment, including trucks, trailers, and other miscellaneous items, aU of which was largely unremarkable and did not provide

EUSAK soldiers with any significant advantage over the Communists.

Weapons

Although they were not necessarily new, three particular types of weapons deserve special treatment because they gave one side or the other a significant

^ Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 359.

® John L. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army, in xhQÂrmy Lineage Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1972), p. 83.

103 advantage at various times throughout the war. The NKPA gained a significant

advantage during the first month and a half of the war fi'om their tanks, while the

Americans gained substantial advantages through the use of their artillery and close air

support. Indeed, Van Fleet believed that the Korean War amounted to little more than a large-scale artillery duel during much of 1952.^

Tanks

At the beginning of the Korean War, the NKPA forces possessed far more tanks than the UN forces, and they maintained and exploited this superiority for almost two months. Beginning in September 1950, the Eighth Army enjoyed a clear superiority to the Communist forces in the area o f armored vehicles. From a quantitative standpoint, the Eighth Army increased its strength from less than twenty light tanks in June 1950 to a high of 943 Ught and medium tanks by February 1952.®

The Eighth Army's tank assets stand in stark contrast to the armored vehicles available to the Communist forces during this period. The NKPA had made great use

' Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front in the United States Army in the Korean War series (Washington. DC: Office of the Chief of Military History. United States Army, 1988), p. 509.

* The Canadian 25th Infantry Brigade arrived in Korea on 5 May 1951 equipped with M-10 Tank Destroyers. They asked for permission fi'om the United States to exchange their tank destroyers for American tanks. The Eighth Army agreed and provided the Canadians with 36 M4A3E8’s. Also, the Eighth Army was able to keep its American armored units supplied with their authorized number of vehicles for the second consecutive month by May 1951. Records Group 407, Box 1199, Eighth Army Conunand Report for May 1951, Book VU - Armor Section report, narrative dated 15 June 1951, p. 1; Herbert F. Wood,Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defense Policy o f Canada (Ottawa, Canada: Roger Duhamel, F.R.S.C., Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1966), p. 94; February 1952 EUSAK Command Report, Box 1311, Section II: Supporting Documents, Book 7: Armor, Armex C entitled “Consolidated Tank Status Report, EUSAK Armor Section,” dated 29 February 1952.

104 of tanks during their initial invasion of South Korea and their subsequent drive to the

South between June-August 1950. This situation changed dramatically with the arrival

of American medium and heavy tanks into Korea in August 1950. According to

Colonel William P. Withers, the Eighth Army's armor officer from June 1950-March

1951, "The timely arrival of the M4A3 and M26 tanks was a major factor enabling

[the Eighth Army] to stop the tank led North Korean attacks and to hold the Pusan

Bridgehead. Our penetrations out of the bridgehead were tank led."^ Once the Eighth

Army wrested the initiative from the NKPA they destroyed an estimated 206 North

Korean tanks between August-December 1950. This represented virtually the NKPA's

entire complement of tanks. Intelligence estimates attributed the inactivity o f

Communist armored forces between January-May 1951 to an attempt to regenerate

the kind of superiority that the NKPA had enjoyed during the war's hrst two months.

The Eighth Army's intelligence reports estimated the initial Communist

armored strength at approximately 156 T-34/85 tanks in June 1950, which, after

almost being completely annihilated by October 1950, grew to a high o f409 by March

1952." Perhaps more enlightening was the limited Communist armored activity between the period October 1950 to May 1951 and that continued to character the

® Records Group 407, Box 1139, Eighth Army Command Report for December 1950, Book VII - Armor Section report, memorandum dated 2 December 1950 entitled, "Report of Observations of Performance o f Ordnance Equipment in Korea, 28 September 1950 to 20 October 1950," p. 2.

Records Group 407, Box 1186, Eiglith Army Command Report for April 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, operational log entry dated 6 April 1951.

" Battlefield sightings of JS-I and JS-III tanks continued to trickle into the Eighth Army’s headquarters during this period, but these reports were never confirmed and there are no reports of UN forces actually encountering JS-I's or JS-IH's on the battlefield. Ibid.; Records Group 407, Box 1323, March 1952 EUSAK Cmd Rpt, Section II: Supporting Documents, Book 7: Armor, pp. 2-3. 105 Communist armored threat through June 1952. This scarcity of armored activity was

further compounded by the Communists’ lack of an appropriate antitank weapon with

which to destroy AUied armored vehicles.Communist antitank guns disappeared

from the battlefield in October 1950 and did not reappear until the very end of May

1951.*“^ Even when they reappeared, the Eighth Army never lost its armored

dominance of the battlefield.

American armored vehicle strength was both impressive and deceptive. Of its

total number of tanks, the vast majority were American (36 of which were assigned to

the Canadian 25th Infantry Brigade) and 45 were British. This analysis wiU. only

concern itself with the American tanks, as the British and Canadian tanks remaiued

^ Records Group 407. Box 1199, Eiglith Army Command Report for May 1951, Book VTI - Armor Section report, narrative dated 15 June 1951.

Records Group 407, Box 1161, Eighth Army Command Report for February 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, translation of an enemy document captured on 6 February 1951 and reprinted in the Eighth Army Tank Notes dated 25 February 1951, p. 1. The specific comment was as follows: "‘We [Communist forces] have no effective weapon to combat the enemy's [UNC forces] heavy tanks.”

Records Group 407, Box 1199, Eighth Army Command Report for May 1951, Book Vn - Armor Section report, narrative dated 15 June 1951. During the last week of May 1951, Communist forces began to use a new 57 mm hypervelocity armor-piercing (HVAP) antitank round in their antitank guns and a Soviet-made antitank grenade (the RPG-43) with a shaped -charge warhead against UNC vehicles. Both proved to be effective against even the heaviest American tanks, and the Eighth Airmy tank units began losing armored vehicles again on the battlefield, although not in significant numbers.

Dr. Owen Cook o f the Canadian National War Museum in Ottawa confirmed the Canadian figure during a telephonic interview on 3 January 1996. The British tanks were a mixture of medium Churchill’s (Mk VU's) and heavy Centurions. American tankers in Korea did not like the Centurion very much because it only mounted one machine gun, it was very slow and heavy, it was not very agile, and its main gun was not very effective against T-34/85’s. Blair, The Forgotten IFor, p. 637; Records Group 407, Box 1149, Eighth Army Command Report for January 1951, Book VH - Armor Section report, narrative dated 14 February 1951, p. 1.

106 attached to their parent units throughout the period and rarely provided support for

American units.

The Eighth Army operated with three tank battalions equipped with M4A3E8 tanks and three tank battalions equipped with M-46 tanks. The table below provides a general recapitulation of the Eighth Army’s tank assets during the August 1951-June

1952 period.

Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 637-638.

107 UNIT

DiviaonRecoii Replaced by 38 0 Co’s (X 6 } April 1951 R^;tmeatal 220 0 Tank.Co’s(x ii) 70& Tank 60 2 Replaced Battafiou 72th Tank 60 2 Replaced in BattaKon. January 1951 89th Tank 60 2 Replaced BattaSoa 6th Tank 2 Replaced 60 Battalion 64th Tank 2 Replaced 60 BattaHon 73rd Tank 2 Replaced in 60 BattaKon April 1951 TOTALS 400 50 0 180

Table 4. Recapitulation of Numbers and Types of Tanks Available to the Eighth Army, January-July 1951^’

' These figures represent averages based upon the operational readiness rates identified in Chapter Three and do not include the 38 M-4 tanks and M-36 tank destroyers assigned to the ROK Army armor school. The ROK Army had M-4’s that were fitted with the 75 mm gun (which proved incapable of penetrating the hull of a T-34/85) and two models of the M-36 tank destroyer (the M-36 and M-36B2), whose armor was too thin (only 12 mm in some areas) to provide the crews with adequate protection firom the T-34/85. The Eighth Army put these vehicles to good use by employing them as training aids for the newly established ROK Army Armor Training Center in spring 1951. Records Group 407, Box 1186, Eighth Army Command Report for April 1951, Book VU - Armor Section report, narrative dated 15 May 1951, p. 1.

108 Besides possessing a quantitative advantage, the Eighth Army also enjoyed a qualitative superiority over the Communist tanks. American tankers of the period rated the combat effectiveness of a tank according to four criteria: the effectiveness of its main gun; the effectiveness of the protection provided by its armor; its battlefield agility (defined as “freedom of maneuver over the adverse terrain of the battlefield” that is not synonymous with speed or necessarily affected by weight); and its mechanical reliability. Using these criteria, the Eighth Army’s Armor sectiou evaluated the battlefield performance of the armored vehicles in Korea. The table below summarizes pertinent characteristics o f the tanks identified in Korea during the

July 1950-June 1952 period.

Records Group 407, Box 1139, Eighth Army Command Report for December 1950, Book VII - Armor Section report, memorandum dated 2 December 1950 entitled, “Report of Observations of Performance of Ordnance Equipment in Korea, 28 September 1950 to 20 October 1950,” pp. 12-13.

109 MODEL

T-34/85 85 mm 2650 f/s 20 mm to 500 HP 35 tons 14.3 90 mm M4A1 75 mm 2030 f/s 25 mm to 400 HP 34 tons 11.8 51 mm M4A3E8 76 mm 3400 f/s 38 mm to 500 HP 36 tons 13.9 64 mm M-24 75 mm 2030 f/s 9 mm to 25 220 HP 20 tons 11.0 mm M-26 90 mm 3350 f/s 51 mm to 500 HP 45 tons 11.1 102 mm M-36TD 90 mm 2650 fi's 12 mm to 500 HP 30 tons 13.9 50 mm M-46 90 mm 3350 f/s 51 mm to 810 HP 48 tons 16.9 102 mm

Table 5. Comparison of Certain Characteristics of Tank Effectiveness for American and Communist Tanks in Korea

Records Group 407. Box 1139, Eiglith Army Command Report for December 1950, Book VU - Armor Section report, memorandum dated 27 December 1950 entitled, “Russian Armored Vehicles,” pp. 1-5; Box 1139, Tank Notes prepared on 3 December 1950, pp. 1-2. See also Jane's Tanks o f World IFnr/ / (Glasgow, UK: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), pp. 136-137, 148-151, 206-209, 212- 213, 228-229, 232-233; Will Eisner, A Pictorial Arsenal of America's Combat Weapons (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 49-53; and R. P. Hunnicutt, Sherman: A History o f the American Medium Tank, (San Rafeal, CA: Taurus Enterprises, 1978), p. 564, Stuart: A History o f the American Light Tank, (Novato, CAc Presidio Press, 1992), p. 500,Pershing: A History o f the Medium Tank T20 Series, (Berkeley, CA: Feist Publications, 1971), p. 230, and Patton: A History of the American Main Battle Tank, vol. 1, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), p. 450.

110 This table presents the basic data with which one can begin to conduct a systematic comparison of the tanks. The data in the right column represents the figure used by Eighth Army tankers during the Korean War to evaluate a tank’s battlefield agility. Armor officers believed that the power-to-weight ratio was the most important measure of this characteristic and empirically determined that a value of foxirteen or higher was desirable for medium and heavy combat tan k s.U sin g this value as a standard, only the T-34, M4A3E8, M-36 TD, and the M-46 tanks in Korea possessed adequate battlefield agility. In addition, although the M-24 tank’s battlefield agility value was substantially lower than the accepted standard for medium and heavy armored vehicles, tankers accepted this vehicle because it was a light tank useful for reconnaissance operations.

The next quantifiable criterion is an evaluation of the tank’s main gun eSectiveness. The simplest objective measure of a tank’s main gun effectiveness is to calculate its muzzle energy with a given projectile and then compare that value to those calculated for other tanks’ main guns. I selected the most common round available to UNC and Communist forces, the armor-piercing (AP) round, and calculated the muzzle energy for each of the tank main guns actually available for use in Korea using the kinetic energy equation of VoMV^. I then divided the result by

Although tankers did consider a tank’s ground overpressure, their major concern centered on the power-to-weight ratio. Records Group 407, Box 1139, Eighth A^rmy Command Report for December 1950, Book Vn - Armor Section report, memorandum dated 2 December 1950 entitled, “Report of Observations of Performance of Ordnance Equipment in Korea, 28 September 1950 to 20 October 1950,” pp. 12-13.

I l l 2000 to produce a figure that expresses the tank’s main gun muzzle energy in fijot-

tons. The table below fists the results of these calculations.

MODEL

T-34/S5 85 mm 2650 f/s 20.4 Ibs 1113 fl:-tons M4A1 75 mm 2030 fis 13.9 Ibs 445 fl-tons M4A3ES 76 mm 3400 fis 9.4 Ibs 844 fl;-tons M-24 75 mm 2030 fis 13.9 Ibs 445 ft-tons Mr26 90 mm 3350 fis 16.8 Ibs 1465 ft-tons M-36 TD 90 mm 2650 fis 24.1 Ibs 1315 ft-tons M-46 90 mm 3350 fis 16.8 Ibs 1465 ft-tons

Table 6. Comparison of Tank Main Gun Effectiveness Using a Muzzle Energy Calculation"’

According to the above calculations, the main guns on the M-26 and M-46 tanks were clearly the most effective weapons on the battlefield. The T-34 tank also

"'To arrive at this figure I divided the projectile’s weight by two (2) and then converted it to slugs (N'). I then squared the velocity (N“) and multiplied N' by N" to produce a figure representing muzzle energy in foot-pounds. To reduce that to a more manageable number, I divided this result by 2000 to produce a muzzle energy value expressed in foot-tons. The conversion factor used to convert fi"om pounds to slugs is .0310810. Mr. Charles Lemons, Curator for the Patton Museum at Fort Knox, Kentucky, provided me witli the projectile weights for the M4A1 and M-24 tanks during a telephonic interview on 22 December, 1995. The difference between the muzzle energy of the M-36 TD’s 90 mm gun and the muzzle energy of the M-26 and M-46 tanks’ 90 mm gun arose from the different round fired by these vehicles. The M-36 TD’s AP round was substantially heavier than the M-26/M- 46 tanks’ AP round, lowering its muzzle velocity and thus its overall muzzle energy.

112 mounted a very efiEective main gun, and the main gun of the M4A3E8 could hold its own in combat as welL Considering these figures, one can assume that the M-26, M-

46, and T-34 tanks mounted the most effective guns that tankers would encounter in combat.

As a method of assessing the validity of the above statement, I have included an evaluation of the penetration performance of AP projectiles for the various guns.

For the sake of comparison, I used standardized values for homogenous armor, an oblique angle of 30 degrees, and a range of 1,000 yards. The table below presents the results of this evaluation expressed with regard to these standards.

TANK

T-34/85 85 mm 1113 ft-tons 178 mm M4AÏ 75 mm 445 ft-tons 63 mm M4A3E8 76 mm 844 ft-tons 135 mm M-24 75 mm 445 ft-tons 63 mm M-26 90 mm 1465 ft-tons 199 mm M-36TD 90 mm 1315 ft-tons 112 mm M-46 90 mm 1465 ft-tons 199 mm

Table 7. Penetration Performance for the AP Projectile Fired from Tanks Used in Korea^^

Hunnicutt, Sherman, p. 564, Stuart, p. 500, Pershing, p. 230, and Patton, p. 450; I am indebted to William H. Roberts for assistance in determining the penetration performance for the Communist tanks. The formulae to calculate this data appeared in an article by Nathun Okun entitled, “Armor and its Application to Warships,” part U, Warship International 14:2, 1977, pp. 98-102.

113 The information in the table simply reinforces the conclusions drawn from the muzzle energy calculations. It also illustrates that the American 90 mm gun was superior to the Communist 85 mm gun, and that the American 76 mm gun was powerful enough to penetrate the hull of a T-34/85 tank on the battlefield, which measured 90 mm at its greatest thickness. In quahtative and quantitative terms this meant that the Eighth Army had superior numbers of guns that performed well enough or better than the Communists’ best available weapon.

The final two tank effectiveness criteria are protection and rehability. Both of these criteria are somewhat subjective because their evaluation depends equally upon internally and externally controlled influences. Protection, as an internal entity, is largely measured by the amount of armor present on a given tank The thickness of a tank’s armor varies throughout the vehicle but is thickest generally on the front of the hull and on the front and sides of the turret, and thinnest on the bottom of the hull and on the top of the turret. The most obvious external influences on a tank’s protection are the type of round that strikes it and the location of the round’s impact.

Recognizing that tank designers around the world viewed the problem of armor thickness in a variety of ways, an average value of a tank’s armor thickness taken from its thinnest and thickest measurements appears to provide a reasonably objective measure of a tank’s armor protection. Similarly, the reliability of a given tank depends as much on its design as it does on the logistic system that supports it and the crew’s abihty to maintain it. Given that complete operational readiness data did not exist on all of the Eighth Army’s tanks, let alone those of the Communist forces, this criterion

114 was addressed using subjective assessments provided by a variety of experts, including

the Eighth Army’s Armor Section, and other internationally recognized authorities’

opinions.^ These opinions appear in the table below to provide the final elements

necessary to assess the efifectiveness of the various tanks in combat in Korea during

the July 1950-June 1952 period.

^ I drew the tank reliability data primarily from Jane s Tanks o f World War II and supplemented it with other published sources that addressed armored vehicle performance in World War II and the Korean War.

115 TANK EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

MODEL

T-34/85 1113 ft-tons 55 mm 14.3 Very Reliable

M4AI 445 ft-tons 38 mm 11.8 Very Reliable

M4A3E8 844 ft-tons 51 mm 13.9 Most Reliable

M-24 445 ft-tons 17 mm 11.0 Very Reliable

M-26 1465 ft-tons 77 mm 11.1 Very Unreliable

M-36TD 13 15 ft-tons 3 1 mm 13.9 Reliable

M-46 1465 ft-tons 77 mm 16.9 Very Reliable

Table 8. Comparison of Tank Effectiveness Criteria for Eighth Army and Communist Tanks in Korea 24

The analysis suggests that the Eighth Army had already deduced what the table above confirms: the M4A1 tank was ineffective because its main gun was virtually ineffective against the Communists' tanks (the M-24 tank could overcome this

Although the T-34/85 was widely regarded as one of the most mechanically reliable tanks in the world, its tendency to catch fire when penetrated by American tank rounds in Korea prevented me firom giving it a "‘most reliable” rating. I discuss this phenomenon in greater detail below.

116 dejficiency because it was a light tank, used for reconnaissance and not tank-versus- tank engagements like medium and heavy tanks) and that the M-36 tank destroyer did not provide adequate armor protection for its crew on the Korean battlefield.

Removing these vehicles fi’om the comparison, the analyst is left with the five tanks that conducted the majority of the armored operations in Korea during the July 1950-

June 1952 period.

TANK EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

MODEL g

T-34/85 1113 ft-tons 55 mm 14.3 Very Reliable

M4A3E8 844 ft-tons 51 mm 13.9 Most Reliable

M-24 445 ft-tons 17 mm 11.0 Very Reliable

M-26 1465 ft-tons 77 mm 11.1 Very Unreliable

M-46 1465 ft-tons 77 mm 16.9 Very Reliable

Table 9. Comparison of Tank Effectiveness for Tanks Actually in Combat during the July 1950-June 1952 Period

117 According to the above comparison, the M-46 was the most effective tank on the Korean War battlefield during the period of this study. Its main gun and armor protection were superior to the T-34/85, M4A3E8, and M-24 tanks, and its battlefield agility and reliability were superior to the M-26 tank. This objective analysis concurs with the Eighth Army tankers’ subjective opinions. According to the Eighth Army’s

Armor Section, “The Medium Tank M46 is the best liked tank in Korea because it has twice the armor protection of the T34, a gun that can loll the T34 at any reasonable battle range, excellent agility (higher ground pressure than desired), and good reliability.”^ Perhaps the tanker’s only complaint was that the M-46 consumed two to three times as much fuel as the M4A3E8 tanks, but that was a problem the logisticians could solve with relative ease."®

Eighth Army tankers also preferred their M4A3E8, M-26, and M-46 tanks over the Communists’ T-34/85 tanks because the T-34/85 tank had a tendency to ignite when penetrated by a projectile fi’om any of the Eighth Army’s medium or heavy

American-made tanks. Tank fires due to penetration were an extremely rare occurrence in the Eighth Army’s tanks."' Tankers attributed the absence of fires in

^ “Treasonable battle range” during this period was approximately 800-1000 yards. Lemons interview, 22 December, 1995; Records Group 407, Box 1139, Eighth Army Command Report for December 1950, Book W - Armor Section report, memorandum dated 2 December 1950 entitled, “Report of Observations of Performance of Ordnance Equipment in Korea, 28 September 1950 to 20 October 1950,” p. 11.

EUSAK Cmd Report, October 1951, Box 1261. Supporting Documents, Section II, Books 6-11, Book 7: Armor, ‘Report on EUSAK Armor form (sic) 11 June 51 to 6 Oct 51 (QGC) OT (123),” dated 21 October 1951, p. 3.

-■ Ibid.

118 their own tanks to their practice of storing ammunition very low inside their vehicles and the fact that the T-34/85 tank’s projectile lost most of its energy during its penetration of the American tanks armor, rarely having enough remaining to do any serious damage once inside. These tankers also believed that the penetrations that did occur to their M4A3E8, M-26, and M-46 tanks occurred at extremely close ranges and thus felt relatively safe when facing T-34/85 tanks at medium and long ranges.

This observation is supported by the Eighth Army’s statistics on tank losses during the

July 1950-June 1952 period, which indicate that the majority of the Eighth Army’s tank casualties due to enemy action were caused by land mines and not tank engagements or antitank guns.^®

AH of these factors led the Eighth Army’s Armor Section to declare in

December 1950 that, ‘T34’s are no longer considered a serious threat to American tank-led columns with 76 mm or 90 mm guns because the American tanks equipped with those guns can kill T34’s at all reasonable battlefield ranges and their armor can deflect most North Korean antitank fires.This statement clearly indicates that the

Eighth Army had acquired the initiative on the battlefield regarding armor operations by January 1951 and that Communist forces were never able to regain the armored initiative during the war because of the superior quality and quantity of the Eighth

Ibid. See also Boxes 1149, 1161, 1173, 1186, 1199, 1213, and 1226, Eighth Army Command Reports for December 1950-June 1952, Book Vll - Armor Section reports, December 1950-June 1952.

^ Records Group 407, Box 1139, Eighth Army Command Report for December 1950, Book VU - Armor Section report, memorandum dated 2 December 1950 entitled, “Report of Observations of Performance of Ordnance Equipment in Korea, 28 September 1950 to 20 October 1950,” p. 12.

119 Army’s tanks. This battlefield superiority also denied the Communist forces the power of their other weapons and allowed the Eighth Army to retain the tactical initiative firom the beginning of 1951 to the end of the war.

Artillery

The quality of the U.S. Army artillery weapons is relatively easy to assess; the same cannot be said for the Communist artillery weapons. The Eighth Army’s

American artillery pieces fell into four general categories: 105 mm howitzers; 155 mm howitzers; 155 mm guns; and 8 inch howitzers. For the purposes of comparison, the

American 4.2 inch mortar will also be included in this assessment, as the Communists made extensive use of a similar weapon (the 120 mm mortar). The table below shows the characteristics of the American artillery pieces used by the Eighth Army in Korea between July 1950-June 1952.

120 ' “■

WEAPON

105 mm 12,205 yards 33 lbs 18.81 Howitzer 155 mm 16,355 yards 95 lbs 35.36 Howitzer 155 mm 25,715 yards 95 lbs 44.72 Gun 8 meb 18,510 yards 200 lbs 58.51 Howitzer 4.2 inch 6000 yards 29 lbs 11.80 Mortar

Table 10. Characteristics of the Eighth Army’s American Artillery Weapons'30

The Modified Relative Firepower (MRFP) figure in the table’s last column is based on a calculation used by the Eighth Army’ Artillery Section in Korea to compare artillery weapons. It makes an exphcit comparison among artillery weapons by combining the maximum range and projectile weight of each gun into a standardized value. These figures are not meaningful on their own; however, when compared to the figures fisr

30 Eisner, pp. 28-29, 54, 60-66; Boyd L. Dastrup, King o f Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery, TRADOC Branch History Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993), p. 263, (originally printed as CMH Pub 70-27, 1992).

121 other weapons, they illustrate the desirability o f having the ability to shoot heavy

projectiles a great distance/^

These weapons gave the Eighth Army a tremendous amount of firepower with

a relative level of homogeneity not enjoyed by the Communist forces. The Eighth

Army had a fairly mature logistical system m place by the beginning of 1951 that was

able to supply all of its artillery units with ample ammunition. Even when Van Fleet

quintupled the daily rate of fire allowed for each artillery weapon, the Eighth Army’s

logistical system was able to meet the units’ demands in every situation and never had

to limit the amount of ammunition fired by an artillery unit in a combat situation.

The Eighth Army’s artillery pieces had an average range of 15,757 yards, an

average projectile weight of 90.4 pounds, and an average MRFP o f33.84. As this

comparison will illustrate, this provided the Eighth Army with, among other things, a

range advantage of more than 5,000 yards over the Communist forces. This capability

allowed the Eighth Army to position its artillery units farther away from the battle

The Eighth Army staff determined the Relative Firepower (RFP) figure using the formula: RFP = D + IF + R, where D was the range, in thousands of yards; IF was the weight of the projectile divided by 5; and R was the normal number of rounds per minute of the weapon fired. I discarded the last criterion because I could not obtain reliable figures for this component of the equation, and I believe that this variable is also far too subjective, since the actual number of rounds fired by a given weapon is as much a reflection of the crew's level of training and overall proficiency as anything else. Having discarded this subjective variable, I believe that the Modified Relative Firepower (MRFP ) values I derived are more legitimate figures for an objective comparison. Records Group 407, EUSAK War Diary, G-4 Section, Annex A to Periodic Logistics Report (PLR) No. 133, Artillery Report No. 15, dated 22 November 1950, as cited in Roy E. Appleman, Disaster In Korea: 'Fhe Chinese Confront MacArthar (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), pp. 470, fii. 9, 43-44 (hereinafter cited as Appleman, Disaster in Korea).

Logistics in the Korean Operations. Volume II o f IV Volumes, Chapter IV, p. 126, figure 2, pp. 121-128.

122 areas (making them more secure) and to rely less on inaccurate high-angle fire missions/^ An analysis of the Eighth Army’s fire missions for the period I January-28

April 1951 determined that less than nine percent of all artillery missions fired by

Eighth Army artillery units were high-angle missions/'^ This figure allows one to draw two conclusions: first, that the Eighth Army was able to position its artillery units

close enough to its ground-combat units to provide adequate support without resorting to high-angle fires; and second, that the vast majority of the Eighth Army’s fire missions used the more accurate low-angle trajectory. Thus, while the Eighth

Army’s artillery units may have been outnumbered in terms of raw numbers of artillery pieces, the above analysis suggests that the Eighth Army’s artillery support of its ground-combat units was more effective than the artillery support provided to the

Communist ground-combat units.

Although high-angle fire has some advantages, such as a better burst pattern for VT or quick-fuzed high explosive shells and an ability to reach steep and/or reverse slope positions, its relative inaccuracy makes it unsuitable for fire missions that require precision (making it the least desirable method for providing close support to ground-combat units). In addition, high-angle fire missions take longer to load, have extended times of flight, and are very difBcult to adjust in liigh winds. For these reasons, the U.S. Army's artillery doctrine has always emphasized low-angle fire missions whenever possible. The best way to insure that an artillery unit can fire low-angle fire missions in support of ground-combat units is to position it close enough to the units that it is intended to support so that it will never have to fire a mission farther away than two-thirds of its maximum effective range. This positioning strikes a balance between an artillery unit’s security concerns and the effectiveness characteristics of the weapons but requires a battlefield situation in which the ground- combat units can provide the artillery units with a relatively secure environment. The closer an artillery unit is positioned to the front lines, the greater security risk it becomes. Records Group 407, Box 1213, Eighth Army Command Report for June 1951, Book VTII - Artillery Section report. Artillery Information Bulletin number 13 dated 19 June 1951, p. 3.

^ Records Group 407, Box 1199, Eiglith Army Command Report for May 1951. Book VUI - Artillery Section report, memorandum entitled, "Percentage of Hi-Angle Fire” dated 7 May 1951.

123 The Eighth Army’s Artillery Section rated the combat effectiveness of the unit’s artillery weapons in January 195 L According to this assessment, the Eighth

Army’s 105 mm and 155 m m towed howitzers' performance was “quite satisfactory,” while the 8-inch howitzer’s performance was rated as “satisfactory.”

The principal reason for this distinction stemmed from the mechanical difficulties associated with the 8-inch howitzers’ equdibrators.^^ Also, U.S. Army artillery doctrine of the period emphasized the use of 8 inch howitzers in a “counterbattery” fire role, while orienting the use of mortars and 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers towards antipersonnel missions. Since the Eighth Army also concentrated on the destruction of Communist personnel, American Army units would rely upon mortars and 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers for the majority of their indirect fires. The Eighth

Army’s artillery composition reflected this emphasis, as 63 percent of its weapons were 105 mm howitzers, 31 percent were 155 mm weapons (the majority of which were howitzers, but some were guns), four percent were 4.2 inch mortars, and only two percent of its total weapons were 8-inch howitzers. With the UNC’s air superiority and its armored dominance, this composition provided the Eighth Army with an ideal method of accomplishing its primary objective — the destruction of

Communist personnel and equipment while protecting UN forces. Toward the end of

1951 and into 1952, as the battlefield situation stagnated and each side began developing heavily fortified static positions. Van Fleet started to convert some of his

Records Group 407, Box 1149, Eighth Army Command Report for January 1951, BookV in • Artillery Section report. Annex 12 - daily log entry dated 8 January 1951.

124 105 mm howitzer units to 8-inch howitzer units because the 8-inch howitzer was more accurate and better able to destroy the enemy’s bunkers/^

The Communist forces’ artillery support came from a much more heterogeneous mixture of weapons. Their artillery weapons ranged in size from 70 mm to 122 mm and were of varied origin, type, and age. The NKPA artillery was almost exclusively of Soviet origin. These weapons included the 76 mm howitzer

(M1927), the 76 mm divisional gun (M1942), the 122 mm howitzer (M1938), and the self-propelled SU-76 equipped with a 76 mm gun (M l942), which many soldiers confused with a tank.^^ The CPVA artillery was a much more eclectic collection, consisting primarily of Soviet, Japanese, and American weapons.^® These weapons included the Soviet 76 mm mountain gun (M1938), 76 mm divisional gun (M1902/3O and M1942), 122 mm howitzer (M1938), and 120 mm mortar (M1938); the Japanese

70 mm howitzer (type 92), 75 mm mountain gun (type 41), 75 mm gun (types 38, 90, and 92), 105 mm howitzer (types 91 and 99), and 120 mm mortar; and the American

Records Group 407, Box 1323, Eighth Army Command Report for March 1952, Section II: Supporting Documents, Book 8: Artillery, Command Report, p. 2. 1 am also indebted to Major David Shugart, a Field Artillery oflBcer with extensive experience with the Army’s 8-inch howitzer, for describing the accuracy and capabilities of this weapon to me.

Records Group 407, Box 1173, Eiglith Army Command Report for March 1951, Book VUI - Artillery Section report. Artillery Information Bulletin number 11 dated 10 March 1951, p. 3.

A study conducted by the Eiglith Army's Intelligence (G-2) section in March 1951 determined that the CPVA’s artillery was composed of weapons from the following countries: China - 1 percent; USSR - 6 percent; Japan - 22 percent; and USA - 19 percent. The origin of the remaining 52 percent of the CPVA’s artillery weapons was unknown but believed to be from some or all of the following countries: China, USSR, Japan, USA, UK, Canada, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. Records Group 338, Box P609, Eighth Army Periodic Intelligence Report (PER) number 242 covering the period 102400-112400 March 1951, Enclosure 8 entitled, “Weapons Employed by the CCF,” dated 11 March 1951, p.4.

125 75 mm. pack howitzer, 105 mm howitzer, and 155 mm how itzer.T he table below

summarizes the characteristics of the artillery weapons used by the Communist forces

in Korea during the July 1950-June 1952 period.

Records Group 407, Box 1161, Eighth Army Command Report for February 1951, Book VUI - Artillery Section report. Artillery Information Bulletin number 10 dated 2 February 1951, pp. 2-3.

126 WEAPON

Soviet 76 mm 14,550 yards 13.7 lbs 17.29 Oivisîoîtâl Gan Soviet SD-76 12,400 yards 13.9 lbs 15.18 SPGott Soviet 122 mm 12,900 yards 48 lbs 22.50 Howitzer Soviet 120 mm 5,500 yards 30 lbs 11.50 Mortar (estimated) Japanese 70 ram 3,000 yards 8.3 lbs 4.66 Howitzer Japanese 75 ram 7,000 yards 13.2 lbs 9.64 Gun Japanese 105 mm 11,500 yards 31.5 lbs 17.80 Howitzer Japanese 105 ram 20,000 yards 34.7 lbs 26.94 Gun Japanese 120 ram 5,500 yards 30 lbs 11.50 Mortar (estimated) H,S, 75 ram Pack 8,000 yards 13.4 lbs 10.68

12,205 yards 33 lbs 18.81

U.S. 155 ram 16,355 yards 95 lbs 35.36 Howitzer

Table 11. Characteristics of the Communist Forces’ Artillery Weapons' ,40

40 DA PAM 30-51, pp. 88-91; Appleman, South to the Naktong, Morth to the Yalu, p. 18n; Records Group 407, Box 1139, Eighth Army Command Report for March 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, memorandum entitled, “Russian Armored Vehicles” dated 27 December 1950, p. 1.

127 These artillery weapons had an average range o f 10,743 yards, which equated to a range of 5,014 yards less than the EUSAK assets, an average projectile weight of

30.39 pounds, which was 60.01 pounds lighter than EUSAK’s projectiles, and an average MRFP of 16.82, which was 17.02 less than EUSAK’s MRFP. These statistics suggest that the Communist forces’ artillery assets in Korea were decidedly inferior to those of the Eighth Army.

This collection of weapons had other significant drawbacks as well. One notable disadvantage that existed until the middle of 1951 involved the difficulty encountered by the Communists’ inefficient logistical system in supplying their units with the appropriate type of ammunition.^' This was a hardship that the American forces did not have to face. For the Communists, it limited the amount of artillery support that units could provide to ground-combat units based upon the availability of the correct type of ammunition. Thus, although the Communists usually had more artillery pieces that the Eighth Army, they could not always fire them at the same rate that the Americans did.

Another more serious deficiency involved the limited range of the majority of the Communists’ artillery weapons. This deficiency forced the Communists either to place their artillery weapons closer to the battle areas (and risk losing more of them), or to fire more high-angle missions (which are significantly less accurate than missions

Records Group 407, Box 1232, Eighth Amty Command Report for August 1951, Section I: Narrative, Part H, Enemy Situation, pp. 5-7.

128 fired at lower trajectories). The Communists experimented with both methods of employment throughout the 1951-1952 period with mixed results. Regardless of their outcome, the inferior range of the Communists’ artillery weapons reduced the combat effectiveness of their superior quantity of artillery weapons.

The Communists also employed their artillery m different roles. According to their doctrine the primary mission of mortars was the destruction of enemy personnel, while the principal mission of artillery was the destruction of enemy fortifications.'*^

The mortar’s role was particularly appropriate because it exploited one of the

Communists’ best artillery weapons. According to one author the Communists’ 120 mm mortar was a superior weapon because, “[i]t had long range and could be sited well back firom the fi'ont and in defilade. Its burst was almost equal to that of US medium artillery, and it got results, causing many US casualties and also damage to tanks. Despite this advantage, the majority of the Communists’ artillery weapons appear to have been variants of the Soviet 76 mm howitzers and guns described above.

Approximately eighty-two percent of the Communist’s 858 artillery pieces were thought to be some type of Soviet 76 mm weapon, with the remaining eighteen percent composed of Japanese 105 mm howitzers and Soviet 122 mm howitzers.*^

Records Group 407. Box 1173, Eighth Army Command Report for March 1951, Book V m - Artillery Section report, memorandum entitled, “Extract of a Special Report of Interrogation of a Selected CCF Prisoner” (undated), p. 3.

Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, p. 492.

Records Group 407, Box 1186, Eighth Army Command Report for April 1951, Book VUI - Artillery Section report. Artillery Report number 24 dated 14 April 1951, p. 1.

129 Using this as a best-case scenario for the Communist forces, the table below compares the Eighth Army and C ommunist main artillery weapons.

130 WEAPON

U,S. 105 ram 12,205 yards 33 lbs 18.81 Howitzer U.S. 155 mm 16,355 yards 95 lbs 35.36 Howitzer U.S. 155 mm 25,715 yards 95 lbs 44.72

U.S. 8 inch 18,510 yards 200 lbs 58.51 Howitzer U.S. 4.2 inch 6000 yards 29 lbs 11.80 Mortar Soviet 76 mm 14,550 yards 13.7 lbs 17.29 Divisional Gun Soviet SU-76 SP 12,400 yards 13.9 lbs 15.18 Gun Soviet 122 mm 12,900 yards 48 Ibs 22.50 Howitzer Japanese 105 mm 11,500 yards 31.5 lbs 17.80 Howitzer Soviet 120 mm 5,500 yards 30 lbs 11.50 Mortar (estimated)

Table 12. Comparison of the Eighth Army's and Communist Forces’ Artillery Weapons

Given that sixty-three percent of the Eighth Army’s artillery support came from 105 mm howitzers and eighty-two percent of the Communists’ artillery support came from 76 mm weapons, it appears that the Americans had a slight advantage in

131 this category. The real advantage came from the American’s 155 mm howitzers and

guns, both because the Eighth Army had a larger percentage of these weapons than the

Communists had of their corresponding 122 mm howitzers and because the American

weapons were simply better than their Soviet counterparts in terms of maximum range,

projectile weight, and MRFP. When Van Fleet began converting some of the Eighth

Army’s 105 mm howitzer units to 8-inch howitzer units, the American advantage

became even more pronounced during the first half of 1952. Thus in terms of artillery

quality and overall superiority of indirect fire support, the Eighth Army appears to

have had an advantage over the Communist forces in Korea during the first two years

of the war.

Close Air Support

The Eighth Army enjoyed a potentially enormous advantage in the number of

aircraft available to provide close air support for its ground operations, totaling up to

1,502 aircraft of various types. While this is an impressive figure, strategic differences among the American service component chiefs drastically reduced the availability and effectiveness of many of these assets in 1951. A fimdamental difference surfrced between the Air Force and the Navy regarding the most effective use of the UNC’s available air assets. The JCS made the final decision, which effectively denied the

Eighth Army a significant portion of the UNC’s available air assets. The table below illustrates the variety o f aircraft and approximate numbers available to the UNC forces during the period of the study.

132 SERVICE/ COXJNTRY ÜSAF Fighter-B omber F-51 187 USAF Fighter-Bomber F-80C 252 USAF Fighter-B omber F-84E 75 USAF Fighter F-86A & D 75 USAF Liglit Bomber B-26 139 USAF Medium Bomber B-29 90 USN Fighter-Bomber F7F 24 USN Fighter-Bomber F9F 66 USN Fighter-Bomber F4U 259 USN Fighter-B omber AD 73 USMC Fighter-Bomber FTP 24 USMC Fighter-Bomber F9F 24 USMC Fighter-Bomber F4U 142 Australia Fighter-Bomber F-51 31 South Aftica Fighter-B omber F-51 31 ROK Fighter-Bomber F-51 10

Table 13. Aircraft Available for Close Air Support to UNC Forces' .45

The priority of the type of air support provided to ground-combat units was the crux of the debate among the Army, Air Force, aud Navy. The Air Force deftned interdiction as “any air action which prevents, or delays, or destroys enemy

The Fifth Air Force did have one squadron of North American F-82 Twin Mustang all-weather fighters based in Japan, but these aircraft were used sparingly over Korea because the Air Force possessed so few of them and the supply support for them was very limited. Allan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950-1953," Chapter 8 in Casa Studies in the Development o f Close Air Support, Benjamin F. Cooling, ed. (Washington, DC; Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1990), p. 355; Mossman, p. 36; Appleman, South to the h'aktong. .Vorth to the Valu, p. 17.

1j j movements of men and supplies to the zone of a ground battle,” while close air support involved “air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to fiiendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of these forces.”^® The disagreement revolved around which mission was a more effective use of air assets in the Korean theater of operations.

The Air Force’s standard priority of missions, developed using the lessons of

World War H, emphasized the maintenance of air superiority and the execution of interdiction missions at the expense of close air support activities — in essence, an indirect type of air support.'*^ Within the Korean theater of operations the Air Force maintained this posture by making the mission of interdiction its primary focus and relegating the mission of providing close air support to the ground-combat units to a position of secondary importance. According to Air Force General Otto P. Weyland, the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) vice chief of staff for operations, “tactical airpower will contribute more to the success of the ground forces and to the over-aH mission of a theater commander through a well-planned interdiction campaign than by any other

Ibid.; U.S. Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine o f the United States Air Force, vol. II (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Office of the Chief of Staff, 1992), p. 276.

■*' The mission of the Air Force's tactical air command, as specified in War Department Field Manual (FM) 31-35 Air-Ground Operations, was to cooperate with the ground forces to destroy the enemy armed forces within, moving into, or withdrawing from a combat zone. Additionally, FM 31-35 established the following priority for tactical air support missions: (1) maintaining air superiority; (2) interdiction; and (3) close air support. MacArthur did not modify these priorities, and the Air Force planned and conducted their tactical air support campaign accordingly. War Department Field Manual (FM) 31-35 Air-Ground Operations, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 14; and Robert F. Futrell, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict I November 1950-30 June 1952, USAF Historical Study Number 72 (Maxwell AFB: Historical Division, Air University, 1953), p. 187.

134 mission short of the attainment of air supremacy.”^* This statement accurately reflects the prevailing behef in the Air Force organizations supporting the Eighth Army in

Korea. Air Force ofiBcers, having concentrated their efforts in the 1945-1950 period on improving their strategic bombing role, analyzed the battlefield situation in Korea and concluded that the terrain would allow for very few opportunities to use airpower in close air support.^^ With the UN’s limitations on the war’s activities preventing them from conducting strategic bombing missions. Air Force ofBcers turned to their next-preferred method o f achieving a strategic victory in Korea: air interdiction.

The Navy held a position diametrically opposed to that of the Air Force. Naval aviation experience in World War U had convinced the Navy that once air superiority was gained, close air support, whether directed against enemy ships or personnel, was the most effective operation. Thus the Navy’s priority of support also emphasized the maintenance of air superiority but differed from the Air Force’s prioritization in that it placed close air support above interdiction. According to Vice Admiral A D. Struble, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet operating off the coast of Korea during this period, “strong close air support... wül do more to hurt the enemy potential than any other type of operation in which [the Navy] can participate at this time.”^° These

Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, revised edition, (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Office of Air Force History, 1983). p. 125.

Gen. William W. Momyer, USAF (Ret.), .d/>povver/mThree Wars (WIVI!. Korea. Vietnam) (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1978), p. 276.

Millet, Korea. 1950-1953. p. 378.

135 beliefs led the Navy to promote an air war plan that allowed them to focus their efforts on providing ground combat units with close air support.

The difference in prioritization may also be attributed to the different capabilities of the services’ aircraft and their internal operational preferences. Since the Air Force preferred missions involving strategic bombing, interdiction, and achieving and maintaining air superiority, it was logical that they developed aircraft suited to perform these missions.

The North American F-51 appeared to be the optimal fighter-bomber for interdiction missions during the early portions of the Korean War. Armed with six .50 caliber machine guns and capable of carrying six 5-inch rockets and two 110 gallon napalm tanks, the “Mustang” had a maximum speed o f487 miles per hour and was as fast and agile as any propeUer-driven aircraft in Korea. Its normal operating radius was 400 mües, but it could be increased to 760 miles by using external fuel tanks

The Lockheed F-80C was the oldest of the Air Force’s operational jet aircraft and could almost match the ordnance capacity of the F-51. This aircraft, however, was designed to be a counterair interceptor, not to be flown at low altitudes in support of ground operations. Armed with six .50 caliber machine guns, the “Shooting Star” could carry two 110-gallon napalm tanks and two 5-inch rockets (over short distances). It had an operating radius of 125 miles that could be increased to 550 miles with external fuel tanks and a maximum speed of 550 miles per hour. Both the

F-51 and the F-80C could carry 2,000 pounds of bombs if the mission required it.^'

Appleman, South to the Naktong. North to the Yalu, p. 96; Mossman, p. 34.

136 The Republic F-84E was more adaptable to the ground support role than the

F-80C. Armed with six .50 caliber machine guns, the “Thimdeq'et” could carry up to

2,000 pounds worth of ordnance. It had an operating radius of 175 miles that could

be increased up to 590 mües with external fuel tanks and had a maximum speed o f 604

mües per hour. With the appearance of the MiG-15 in Korea, the F-84E performed

better in its ground support role than in its fighter role.

The North American F-86 was the best fighter in the FEAF arsenal and the

oîüy aircraft capable of consistently conJfionting the MiG- 15’s with any real chance of

success. The “Sabrejet” was armed with six .50 caliber machine guns and had a

maximum speed of 693 mües per hour. Its chief drawback was its 100-müe operating

radius, but this could be extended to a radius of 245 mües using external fuel tanks.

An F-86A downed a MiG-15 during its first combat mission on 17 December 1950,

and this aircraft presented a formidable chaUenge to the MiG- 15s for the rest of the

war.^^

The Douglas B-26 medium bomber also provided Eighth Army soldiers with

close air support. Armed with fourteen forward-firing .50 caliber machine guns, the

‘Tnvadef” could also carry large quantities of bombs and rockets. Although they flew many close air support missions in the early months of the war, their relative

superiority in night operations and interdiction attacks limited their participation in close air support acthdties after January 1951.^^

Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, pp. 249-251.

” Millett, Korea. 1950-1953, p. 363.

137 In general terms, the F-80C and the F-84E provided better close air support than the F-51. The jets had three significant advantages over the prop-driven Mustang:

“they could provide twice the sorties of the F-51 per day, with only about half the maintenance time; they had a higher operational readiness rate and better parts

availability; and their greater speed reduced their vulnerability to ground fire/^'*

According to an Army operations research study completed in February 1951, “Aside from endurance, it [was] difficult to determine any marked deficiency in [the abilities]

of the F-80 or F-84 to bomb, napalm, rocket, or strafe a target. Overall, despite the

Air Force’s decreased interest in conducting close air support operations, it appears that the aircraft available to provide this support were effective.

The Navy, on the other hand, preferred to conduct operations involving close air support activities and acliieving and maintaining air superiority for understandable reasons. As a result, its aircraft excelled at these missions. All of the Navy’s aircraft mounted four 20 mm cannon (except for the AD-4, which retained its four .50 caliber machine guns) and could carry large bomb-loads. The aircraft’s maximum speed and operating radius is what set them apart from one another. The Douglas AD-4

“Skyraider” had a maximum speed of 349 mües per hour and an operational radius of

674 mües. The Vought F4U “Corsair” had a maximum speed o f446 mües per hour

^ Ibid. In addition to these advantages, the F-51 had a significant mechanical disadvantage related to the vulnerability of its liquid-cooled engine: a single puncture in the coolant system (from small- arms fire, etc.) disabled the aircraft's entire engine system. This is a substantial drawback for a close support aircraft. I am indebted to Dr. John P. Guilmartin Jr. for bringing this fact to my attention.

Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 347.

138 and an operating radius of 503 miles. The Grumman F7F ‘Tigercat” had a m axim um

speed o f423 miles per hour and an operating radius of 798 miles. The Grumman F9F

“Pantheqet,” the Navy and Marine Corps’ only jet aircraft in Korea, had a maximum

speed of 575 miles per hour and an operating radius o f677 miles.

Marines originally preferred their own F4U’s for close air support, and the

Navy initially relied upon the AD-4’s to provide the majority of its close air support requirements. However, as the war continued into the spring of 1951, both the Navy

and Marine Corps began to prefer the more versatile F9F to fulfill this role. The

Pantheqets’ greater speed and excellent operating radius and ordnance capacity made it a natural choice for both services, and it performed very well as a close support aircraft throughout much of the Korean War.^^

The table below summarizes the capabilities of the aircraft available to the

Eighth Army for close air support operations.

Millett, Korea. I950-I953, p. 380.

139 SERVICE

USAF Fighter-Bomber F-51 487 760 USAF Fighter-Bomber F-80C 550 550 USAF Fighter-Bomber F-84E 604 590 USAF Fighter F-86A & D 693 245 USN/USMC Figliter-B omber F7F 423 798 USN/USMC Fighter-B omber F9F 575 677 USN/USMC Fighter-Bomber F4U 446 503 USN Fighter-B omber AD-4 349 674

Table 14. Capabilities of Navy and Marine Corps Close Air Support Aircraft Available to the Eighth Army

In terms of pro\âding close air support, the principle difference between Air

Force and Navy aircraft was that Air Force aircraft were armed with .50 caliber machine guns, while the majority of Navy aircraft were armed with 20 mm cannons.

Both weapons were excellent in air-to-air engagements; however, the 20 mm cannon was more effective at providing ground support (i.e. close air support), and the .50 caliber machine gun was a superior strafing weapon (Le. interdiction). This difference is consistent with the respective services’ ground support orientations.

Regardless of aircraft capabilities and internal preferences, the Navy’s prioritization clearly favored the Eighth Army’s battlefield, efforts. Unfortunately for the Eighth Army, the JCS sided with the Air Force. In January 1951, FEAF (with the support of Ridgway and the JCS) changed the emphasis o f the UNC air efforts and

140 iii:q)lemented its preferred priority of air operations (air superiority, air interdiction,

and close air support, respectively). Emphasizing interdiction missions over close air

support activities, FEAF ordered aU air assets in Korea to begin extensive interdiction

strikes along Korea’s east coast and in the North. Korean interior areas, concentrating

on the Communists’ supply lines and rail and road networks. The net effect of this

decision was to reduce substantially the number of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft providing close air support to U.S. Army units. Because they were either conducting

interdiction missions within their assigned sector (which was three hundred miles north

of the battle area) or providing close air support for the 1st Marine Dhdsion, they were

effectively removed from the Eighth Army’s firepower calculation, (see Figure 1).

This left the Eighth Army with the ability to receive close air support primarily from the U.S. Air Force and Allied aircraft. Not all of these aircraft were available to the

Eighth Army either, as the seventy-two Allied aircraft were not specifically committed to support the Eighth Army and the other ninety were B-29 bombers concentrated solely on the new interdiction mission to the north.^^

The ROK flight was assigned to the FEAF and was under its direct operational control. The South African squadron was not assigned to the FEAF but was attached to it and under its operational control. The Australian squadron was neither assigned nor attached to the FEAF but it maintained a liaison with it in recognition o f MacArthur's and Ridgway's position as the theater’s supreme commander of all Allied Powers' armed forces in the area. For operational purposes, the Australian squadron tacitly recognized the FEAF's control over its combat operations. Futrell,The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 4.

141 Fyonjsyang '

K'eeioiie:

i W = i f ^ YAsga

^ I S ' ^ . | . ‘a ^ ' ^ .^p Tacjoii^Kur:dtoii(,

X T btinju

K w aiigjii

58 Figure 12. Important Aviation Areas in Korea'

58 Map taken from Blair, The Forgotten War. front inside cover. Grapliics added by author. 142 The Communist close air support situatioa was an issue of entirely different proportions during the same period. UNC forces had enjoyed air supremacy between the war’s begnming and the end of October 1950. This condition changed immediately on 1 November 1950 with the appearance of the first MiG-15 over the

Yalu River in North Korea. The MiG-15 rendered most of the FEAF’s fighters obsolete and threatened to end the UNO’s air dominance over the Korean skies. This aircraft, combined with the formidable 11-10, the outdated Yak-3, -7, and -9 and the

La-5, -7, -9, and -11, and the antagonizingly slow Po-2 and MBe-2, provided the

Communist air force with enough aircraft to increase its available firepower dramatically. The table below summarizes the significant aircraft available to the

Communists during the first two years of the war.

COUNTRY

China Fighter MiG-15 445 China Close Support n-10 175 North Korea Fighter Yak-3, -7, -9 & La- 150 5, -7, -9,-11 North Korea Light Liaison Po-2 imavailable North Korea Seaplane MBe-2 tmavailable

Table 15. Aircraft Available to the Communist Forces .59

” Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, the U.S. Army in the Korean War Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), p. 80; Richard P. 143 The North Korean’s Yakolev Yak-3, -7, and -9 fighters were lightweight

airplanes of mixed wood and metal construction. They had maximum speeds varying firom 360-415 miles per hour and were very agile. They resembled the F-51 but were not as technologically advanced or as effective. The Lavochkin La-5, -7, -9, and -11 fighters were radial engine-powered airplanes that were older and slower than any of the UNC’s prop-driven aircraft.^” These airplanes were easy targets for Allied pilots and of marginal value to the Communists’ firepower calculation.

The Mikoyan and Gurevich MiG-15 was an extremely formidable aircraft.

Designed as a high-performance fighter, the MiG-15 could attain a maximum speed of

650 mile per hour at sea level and mounted one 37 mm and two 23 mm cannons.^'

This aircraft was superior to the FEAF’s F-51, F-80C, and F-84E aircraft, as well as the Navy and Marine Corps’ AD-4’s, F4U’s, F7F’s, and F9F’s, even though an F9F did manage to shoot down a MiG-15 on 18 November 1950.*’^ The MiG-15 and the

F-86D were roughly equivalent aircraft, with advantages usually going to the superior

Hallion, The Maval Air War in Korea (Baltimore. MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986). p. 29.

“ Hallion, p. 29.

DA PAM 30-51. p. 125.

“ Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College Station, TX; Texas A&M University Press, 1989), p. 244.

144 püot.®^ Fortunately for the Eighth Army, the MiG- I5’s limited range prevented it from penetrating more than 100 mües into Korean air space from the air base complex at

Antung, China.^ FEAF’s air superiority campaign prevented the Communists from basing its premier aircraft any closer to the fighting front and from employing its 11-10 ground attack aircraft in a close air support role by limiting the Communists’ area of relative air superiority to the area known as “MiG Alley,” in the northwest comer of

North Korea (see Figure 1).

The Communist air war plan envisioned using “MiG Alley” as the starting point o f its efforts during January-May 1951 to enlarge its area of air superiority. The intent was to establisli fimctional air bases close enough to the main line of resistance to allow the II-10’s to provide close air support during the ‘Tiflh. Phase Offensive,” scheduled to begin in May 1951 and end the war with a Communist victory. American

F-86 Sabrejets successfidly challenged the MiG- I5’s in this area during spring 1951, thus restoring UNC air superiority over the entire Korean peninsula. The Air Force prevented the Communist air force from conducting any close air support missions whatsoever along the main line of resistance during the January-May 1951 period and limited the Communist air force to laimching one unsuccessful mission during the

June-July 1951 period.^^ The Communists were unable to initiate any other close air

® Stephen E. Pease, Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953 Harrisburg, PA; Stackpole Books, 1992), pp. 178-180 (excerpt taken from the Eglin Air Force Base Operational Test Center Final Report on Project APG/ADA/49-A-1, F-86D versus MiG-15 prepared by Col. W. B. Putnam, USAF).

^ Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 286.

“ On 20 June 1951 afliglit of F-51's from the Fifth Air Force intercepted a group o f eight IL-lO’s enroute to a close air support mission, destroying two and damaging three of the IL-lOs and forcing 145 support missions during the January-July 1951 period/^ Thus in terms of their ability to provide their ground-combat units with close air support, the Communist air force was completely ineffective during this period.

By November 1951, after a sustained build up of air assets by the Communists, the Air Force no longer exercised complete control over MiG Alley, and the UNC began losing bombers and fighters at an alarming rate. Van Fleet responded to the increased air threat posed by the Communists by moving more of his AAA battalions around key locations, such as Seoul Inchon, and Pusan, during the first half of 1952.®^

The Communists’ inability to operate effectively outside of MiG Alley was unfortunate because some of their aircraft could have provided excellent support to ground-combat units. The design of the prop-driven Ilyushin 11-10 was based on the

Soviets’ highly successful 11-2 “tank buster” of World War U. Armed with two 23 mm cannons, two 7.62 mm machine guns, one 12.7 mm machine gun, and capable of carrying two 132 mm rockets, the 11-10 had an operating radius of 410 miles and could attain a maximum speed of 330 miles per hour.^® Possessing two air regiments equipped with this aircraft, the Communists had tlie potential to dramatically increase

the remaining Communists to abort their mission. Futrell,The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 310.

^ Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 312.

William B. Pickett. MiG Alley,” in James 1. Matray, ed.. Historical Dictionary o f the Korean War (New York: Greenwood Press. 1991),p. 297; Records Group 407, Box 1232, Eighth Aumy Command Report for August 1951, Section I: Narrative, Part II, Enemy Simation, p. 6.

DA PAM 30-51, p. 128.

146 their available firepower if they could position the Il-IO’s close enough to the battlefield to provide their ground-combat units with close air support.

The PoUkarpov Po-2 was a canvas-covered, open-cockpit biplane trainer reported to be among the oldest of Soviet aircraft. With a top speed of only 92 miles per hour, the aircraft was nevertheless highly maneuverable and able to confound the

FEAF’s high-performance aircraft.^® These aircraft flew the majority of the “Bedcheck

Charlie” harassment-type missions. The Blochavidan MBe-2 was a pusher-type seaplane that was also able to fimstrate FEAF pilots with its slow speed and high agility.N either the Po-2 nor the MBe-2 presented a significant challenge to the

FEAF’s air superiority above the battlefield, but they required extreme vigilance firom the Fifth Air Force’s air crews to prevent them firom penetrating Allied air space and causing sporadic damage. The Air Force was able to accomplish this mission, but the presence of these outdated Communist aircraft diverted some FEAF air resources that could have been used in other more profitable roles.

The table below presents a comparison of the significant close air support aircraft available to the Eighth Army and the Communist forces in Korea dining the first two years of the Korean War.

® The practice of using the Po-2 at night at niglit as a harassment bomber dates back to World War II. Its slow speed and poor radar signature made it hard to intercept in the darkness, and it proved to be a very effective aircraft in World War II. This same advantage made it an effective harassment bomber at night in Korea because the higli-performance jets could not maneuver at speeds slow enough to engage the Po-2. 1 am indebted to Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. For bringing this information to my attention.

Futrell, The United Stales Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, pp. 309-311.

147 SUPPORTED ARMY

Eighth Amor Fighter-Bomber F-51 490 760 E ^ th Ariny Fighter-Bomber F-80C 550 550 Eighth Army Fighter-B omber F-84E 600 590 Eighth Army Fighter F-86A & D 660 245 Eighth Army Fighter-B omber F7F 423 798 Eighth Army Fighter-B omber F9F 575 677 EyttfhAimy Fighter-Bomber F4U 446 503 Eighth Army Fighter-Bomber AD-4 349 674 Communist Fighter MiG-15 650 100 Communist Close Support n-io 330 410

Table 16. Comparison of Close Air Support Aircraft Available to the Eighth Army and the Communist Forces in Korea

According to one author, “In tlie final analysis, [Communist] air operations in

Korea were not efifectrve.”^' The Air Force's ability to prevent the Communists firom emplojong their H- lO’s in any appreciable numbers removed a powerfiil weapon firom the Communists’ arsenal. This also allowed the Eighth Army to concentrate its artillery efforts on antipersonnel and counterbattery missions and to convert most of its antiaircraft weapons into direct-fire assets capable of providing seciuity for artillery positions. These measures increased the Eighth Army’s artillery effectiveness and

' ^ Samuel B. GrifiBth, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 167.

148 relieved many ground-combat units from their artillery security responsibilities, thus increasing the Eighth Army’s overall available firepower.

Analysis

The table below provides a summary of the preceding analyses of the quantity and quality of Eighth Army and Communist tanks, artillery, and close air support.

CATEGORY Tank Quantity Significant Advantage Significant Disadvantage Tank Quality Advantage Disadvantage Artillery Quantity Significant Disadvantage Significant Advantage Artillery Quality Advantage Disadvantage CAS Quantity Complete Advantage Complete Disadvantage CAS Quality Complete Advantage Complete Disadvantage

Table 17. Recapitulation of the Results of the Analyses of the Elements of Firepower for the Eighth Army and the Communist Forces

Using this table to assess the Eighth Army’s relative strengths and weaknesses in terms of firepower, the Eighth Army’s strengths were in the quantity and quality of its tanks and close air support, and in the quality of its artillery. The Eighth Army was at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Communists hi terras of artillery quantity. Thus it

149 appears that the Eighth Army did possess a significant technological advantage over the Communist forces.

Conclusioa

The Eighth Army enjoyed substantial advantages over the Communists in terms of firepower during tlie first two years of the Korean War, but it also faced several significant disadvantages. Knowing that they would not receive any additional units during this period, commanders devised an operational system that capitalized on their firepower strengths and minimized the impact of their firepower weaknesses.

They accompUshed this by placing their strengths in the quantity and quality of their tanks and close air support, and in the quality of their artillery against the Communists’ corresponding weaknesses. However, the success enjoyed by each EUSAK was somewhat different, as the detailed analyses of these distinct entities in Chapters Five,

Six, and Seven wül show.

150 CHAPTER 5

THE “FIRST” EIGHTH ARMY - 13 JULY-25 DECEMBER 1950: BUILDING AN ARMY AND GAINING EXPERIENCE THE HARD WAR

Korean War Overview 25 June - 25 December 1950

The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) attack south across the 38th

Parallel began at about 0400 on 25 June 1950 with a force of approximately 90,000 soldiers and 150 Soviet-made T-34 tanks. The intent of the North Korean Premier,

36-year old Kim II Sung, was to conquer the Repubhc of Korea and reunite the entire

Korean peninsula, thereby allowing for the election of a national parhament in early

August. Kim 11 Sung had already scheduled the parliament’s first meeting for 15

August 1950, the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule.' The

NKPA initial attacks were very successful, and American President Harry S. Truman, based upon several United Nations (UN) resolutions, authorized the use of US forces in Korea on 30 June 1950, directing that two divisions (24 ID and 25 ID) be sent from

Japan and the estabhshment of a naval blockade of North Korea. With the routing of

Task Force Smith on 5 July 1950, American and Repubhc of Korea Army (ROK

Army) imits continued their withdrawal south, ultimately occupying a 150-mile

' Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p.p. 19-21.

151 perimeter around the ROK city of Taegu and protecting the southern port of Pusan by

4 August 1950. US forces, further bolstered by the addition of the 1st Cavalry

Division, the 2d hifantry Division, the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional), and ROK

Army troops stubbornly held the Pusan Perimeter for over forty days while MacArthur planned an amphibious turning movement to the north on the western coast of the

Korean peninsula.

On 15 September 1950, Major General Edward M. Almond’s U.S. X Corps, part of the United Nations Command (UNC) but not assigned to the Eighth Army, executed Operation CHROMITE and conducted an amphibious assault on the island of Wolmi-do and the port city of Inchon using the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s

7th hifantry Division. After securing Inchon, the X Corps recaptured the ROK capital of Seoul on 28 September 1950.

Operation CHROMITE used the X Corps to provide an “anvil” against which the “hammer” of the Eighth Army would strike. The Eighth Army launched its own offensive one day after the CHROMITE landings and broke out of the Pusan

Perimeter during the period 16-22 September 1950." Exploiting the break-out. Eighth

Army launched a pursuit of the NKPA units to the north and linked-up with elements of the X Corps just north of Osan on 27 September 1950.^

' EUSAK War Diary, RG 407, Box 1101, Section I: Summary 1 September-30 September 1950, pp. 34-35; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 573.

^ Eightli Army documents record the time of the Link-up between the Eighth Army and X Corps elements as 2345 hours on 26 September 1950, but Appleman’s sources, including a quotation of the actual message informing higher headquarters of the link-up, appear to be more accurate. EUSAK War Diary, “Summary 5 Sept-2 Oct 50,” produced by the TI&E Division, EUSAK Information Section, pp. 1, 5, Box 1111, RG 419; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 597.

152 After receiving both American and UN authorization to proceed north to

complete the destruction of the NKPA (on 27 September and 7 October 1950, respectively). Eighth Army crossed the 38th Parallel on 9 October 1950^ with the mission of not only destroying the retreating North Koreans but also unifying the

Korean peninsula, if practicable. The Eighth Army continued moving north and captured the north Korean capital of P’yongyang on 19 October 1950. Meanwhile, east of the Taebaek mountain range, the X Corps made another amphibious landing on the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula at Wonson and Iwon between 26 October and 9 November 1950, joining with the ROK Army forces advancing up the eastern coast of the peninsula.

Although UNC organizations, especially ROK Army units, had experienced some sharp fighting with Chinese units during the Chinese Communists’ First Phase

Offensive (25 October-7 November 1950), MacArthur continued his advance north to the Yalu River, with Eighth Army ROK Army units reaching the river on 26 October

1950 and US X Corps units reaching the river farther to the northeast on 21

November 1950. Having reached Korea’s border with Manchuria at several locations,

MacArthur launched his infamous “Home Before Christmas” offensive on 24

November 1950, designed to push the entire UNC c o mm and up to Korea’s northern limit and complete both the destruction of the NKPA and the unification of the peninsula.

ROK Army forces crossed the 38th Parallel on 30 September 1950 under ROK President Syngman Rhee’s authority.

153 The Chinese, having completed their infiltration of over 300,000 soldiers of the euphemistically named “Chinese People’s Volunteer Army” (CPVA) across the Yalu

River into North Korea, launched their Second Phase Offensive against the Eighth

Army in the west on the evening of 25 November 1950 and against the X Corps in the east on the evening of 26 November 1950. The Second Phase Offensive pushed the

Eighth Army back below the Ch’ongchon River by 29 November 1950, causing

Walker to lose contact with the CPVA by 1 December 1950. Over the next three weeks. Walker withdrew the Eighth Army farther and farther south, abandoning

P’yongyang, and estabhshing a strong defensive line north of the 38th Parallel and

Seoul

On 23 December 1950, Walker died in a jeep accident while traveling north firom Seoul to visit some units. While waiting for the new army commander to arrive,

I Corps commander. Lieutenant General Frank W. Milbum assumed temporary command of the Eighth Army until Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway arrived.

In the wake of the death of its commander, the Eighth Army braced for another CPVA attack, expected to begin on 25 December 1950.

The Second Phase Offensive caused the X Corps to retreat as weU, forcing the

1st Marine Division to conduct it epic fighting withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir in early December 1950. Continued CPVA pressure convinced MacArthur that his most prudent curse of action would be to continue to withdraw X Corps and evacuate the unit fi"om the port of Himgnam. X Corps evacuated North Korea between 11-24

December 1950, destroying the port facilities and all serviceable equipment and usable

154 supplies ia its wake. Between 24-25 December 1950, X Corps was en route to Pusan where Almond would receive a new mission for his unit.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT OF THE “FHIST” EUSAK

LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS

The senior leaders associated with the first Eighth Army share a common characteristic of having made their military reputations in the Second World War.

While many were successful as lower-level commanders and staff officers, few had demonstrated the ability to succeed in the high-level positions that they held during the

Korean War. In addition, the relationships among the senior leadership of the EEC and the Eighth Army is also a significant consideration when assessing the unit’s combat effectiveness during this period. Using the criteria identified previously I will conduct an assessment of three key leaders associated with the Eighth Army to illustrate this point. In assessing each leader, I wUl confine my study to only those criteria in which the individual was conspicuous (positively or negatively) from a military leadership perspective.

MacArthur

Douglas MacArthur had been a military prodigy until 1942, the son of the famous Civil War general Arthur MacArthur, a Medal of Honor winner at age twenty

155 and a dominant figure in the Army for the next forty years. Graduating first in the

West Point class of 1903, MacArthur performed gallantly during World War I and returned from Europe as a thirty nine-year old permanent brigadier general in 1919.

He occupied successive positions of increasing responsibility during the 1920s, culminating with a five-year tour of duty as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 1930-

1935. hr retirement, MacArthur worked as a field marshal in the Philippine army. The

War Department recalled him to active duty for World War H, and he perfijrmed brilliantly (if unevenly) as the commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, recetving the

Medal of Honor (among other decorations) and promotion to General o f the Army

(five stars). After World War H, MacArthur served as the supreme commander of the

AUied occupation forces in Japan where he supervised the reconstruction and democratization of Japan. At the outbreak of the Korean War, MacArthur assumed control of all UN forces in Korea in addition to his duties in Japan. The Inchon landing in September 1950 was the crowning glory of his Army career and enhanced his already exalted military reputation. After his relief in April 1951, MacArthur retired from military service.

MacArthur was a difficult and complex character who was either loved or hated by those who had or have an opinion of him. His chief biographer, D. Clayton

James, who has studied MacArthur for over thirty years, offered the following description of him that is germane to the period of this study:

For a bright coimnander whose forte was launching unexpected assaults, [MacArthur’s] leadership style from 1941 to 1951 ironically followed a highly

156 predictable pattern, which was characterized by thorough and shrewd planning, boldness of vision, aggressiveness in operational execution, keen sensitivity to his carefully molded hero image, and arrogant challenges of his superiors’ directives that sometimes bordered on insubordination... During his command of the United Nations forces in the Korean War, his leadership traits were consistent with his behavior as occupation chieJÇ such as generally masterfiil handling of four high-level commands simultaneously, imaginative envelopment and cmshing of the [NKPA], supreme self-confidence that led to initial defeat but later recovery of the momentum against the [CPVA], and sharp differences with Washington that finally led him to tragic insubordination.^

MacArthur was particularly skilled at utilizing whatever logistical support he received to achieve maximum offensive effectiveness and at getting the most out of his staff and subordinates. Although not an especially gifted tactician or grand strategist, he was nonetheless superbly competent at the operational level o f military activity, and he was most comfortable functioning in this role and as an administrator, despite his constant efforts to expand his authority beyond its intended limits.^

Besides an almost paranoid concern for his reputation that he displayed throughout his entire life, MacArthur had several other significant weaknesses that he demonstrated during the Korean War. HQs constant pursuit of pubhcity led him to perhaps take more credit than was his due for the accomplishments of his subordinates. His actions in the Southwest Pacific in World War H conformed to this description, and he continued operating this way in Korea while serving as Walker’s

’ D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last {■Var: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 30.

* Ibid., p. 32; D. Clayton James, “MacArthur, Douglas,” biographical entry in Roger J. Spiller, ed., American Military Leaders (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989), pp. 183-184.

157 and Ridgway’s superior. In one telling instance, MacArthur stated that he ordered the resumption of the offensive that began with Operation KILLER in February 1951.

Ridgway stated later that MacArthur had never given such an order, and that

MacArthur ‘s habit of visiting Korea on the eve of the Eighth Army’s offensive operations was beginning to tip the Communists off and spoil the surprise of these operations.^ MacArthur also tended to exaggerate the battlefield situation, for better or worse, thereby making himself look better with a victory. This was in evidence for the better on the eve of the CPVA’s Second Phase Offensive and, for the worse, in

December 1950 and January 1951. In addition, MacArthur, who was seventy years old in 1950, was beginning to show signs of aging afl;er having performed for over two decades in highly demanding positions. He remained mentally sharp, but he was increasingly bothered by problems of aging, especially poor eyesight and Parkinson’s syndrome.® Having been away from Washington since 1935, MacArthur was also woefully out of touch with the contemporary thinking in Washington about such important issues as the Cold War, limited war, and coahtion fighting. He was also prone to do things his own way and criticize his superiors unmercifully, but he would demand unswerving devotion from his subordinates. In the end, MacArthur’s luck and charisma, which stemmed largely from the carefidly regulated lifestyle that allowed him to avoid much of the stress associated with his various commands, ran out, and his

' Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 109-110.

* James, Refighting the Last War, p. 37.

158 isolation and hypersensitivity began to become evident to many as a rampant and uncontrollable egotism that was finally manifested as outright insubordination.^

At the beginning of the Korean War, 25 June-14 September 1950, MacArthur was at his best, displaying an aggressive style of leadership in which

he often intervened in the conduct of operations, and he was eagerly anticipatory, his concern ever on planning a counteroffensive. He was active, vigorous, and confident, and he was blessed with luck on the timing of his reinforcements. This period, when he was overseeing the Naktong River defensive operations and winning over his superiors to his Inchon plan, was his “finest houf' in the Korean War and determined the outcome of the North Korean stage. 10

From the time of the hichon landing to the beginning of the CPVA’s Second Phase

Offensive, MacArthur did not perform nearly as well. His overconfidence and reckless optimism during this period prevented him from recognizing the real and dangerous threat posed by the Chinese and allowed him to convince himself that his divided command was not in danger as it approached the Yalu River. He continued to direct operations, but his involvement was much more cursory and far less effective than during the war’s first three months. Nevertheless, he was the most prominent leader in

Korea during these periods, and most were happy to have him in command of the

UN’s forces.“

® Ibid., pp. 40-41.

Ibid., p. 47.

" The British were never happy with MacArthur’s selection as the Commander-in-Chief for the UNC, since they believed that his policies were not representative o f either the US or the UN, and that he was reckless and out of control in Korea. The UK welcomed his relief in 1951, thinking that it would lead to a substantial change in the war’s conduct. Only later did they realize that many of 159 In the wake of the CPVA’s Second Phase Offensive, MacArthur withdrew almost completely from exercising operational control of his two fighting organizations, and his traditional decisiveness was noticeably absent. When the main

Chinese assault began hi late November, MacArthur reacted, as one might expect, like an exhausted and emotionally drained old man. Apparently, the strain of directing combat operations was too much for the seventy-year old, and he chose instead to focus his efforts on Japan and would strike back savagely at anyone who criticized his handling of the situation. MacArthur took perhaps his greatest pounding by the press during this period, and his inability to accept criticism and blame for any action, regardless of the validity of the claim, was displayed in abundance and showed many a side of MacArthur that was decidedly different and far less attractive than his normal persona. He became depressed, irritable, short-tempered, and he had trouble sleeping at night. Experiencing wild mood swings, he spent many nights pacing back and forth in the Embassy hallway worrying about the situation in Korea and its effect on his own reputation. By this time, MacArthur’s leadership had little impact in Korea, leaving

Walker and Almond to figure out the best way to respond to the Chinese attacks.

While Almond began planning and executing the US X Corps’ withdrawal from

Korea’s eastern coast. Walker determined that his most prudent course of action would be to conduct a rapid and deep withdrawal to the south and reestablish a

MacArthur s actions were fully sanctioned by the US. Cf. Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 84.

James, Refighting the Last War, p. 45.

160 defensive line in the vicinity of the 38th ParalleL Neither of these actions were

particularly desirable to the UN, JCS, or MacArthur, but his lack of guidance left his

commanders with no other choice but to act as they saw fit. MacArthur’s gloomy

predictions were greatly imsettling to the UN and those in Washington as well, and he

largely abdicated his role as the war’s top commander by late December 1950.

During 1951, MacArthur left the running of the war mostly to Ridgway and

focused his attention on his fight with Washington. His actions became more

unpredictable and insubordinate, causing the JCS to lose almost complete faith in any

of his observations or recommendations. By this time in the war, MacArthur was little

more than a figurehead for the UNC, as Ridgway, Collins, and the JCS made almost

aft decisions of any importance. Despite the Eighth Army’s remarkable turnaround

during the first part of 1951, the CPVA’s Second Phase Offensive seems to have broken MacArthur’s ability to fimction as an effective leader and sapped him of his

desire to continue even trying to do so. Allan R_ Miftett contends that MacArthur wanted to be relieved in Korea after the entrance of the Chinese and the beginning of an “entirely new war,” but he was unable or did not know how to quit, so his behavior became increasingly outlandish until he forced Truman to send him home. His incredibly calm reaction to the news and departure from Korea without any fuss suggests that this interpretation has merit.

D. Clayton James, The Years o f MacArthur, vol. Ill,Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964, (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985),p. 559.

" Author’s conversation with Dr. Allan R. Millett, Mershon Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, spring 1996.

161 bi the end, MacArthur performed best at the operational level, although he demonstrated flashes of tactical brilliance and tremendous strategic perception. He was a mass of contradictory traits — egotistical yet modest, flamboyant but shy, austere and gracious, aloof but charming, decisive yet hesitant — preventing one from making blanket statements about his abilities and performance in Korea. His effectiveness as a leader in Korea was at its height when it was needed most, during the war’s first three months, and then steadily declined until his relief in Aprfl. 1951.

MacArthur’s actions and perceptions of the battlefield situation dominated the Korean

War events of 1950, and even after he surrendered this role to Ridgway in 1951, he was still a formidable and important figure in Korea until several months after his departure.

Walker

Walton H. Walker began his military career in 1912 after spending one year at the Virginia Military Institute (1907-1908) and four at the United States Military

Academy at West Point (West Point). After twenty-nine years of successful service as an infantry officer (including combat duty in World War I), Walker established his enduring reputation as a hard-driving commander of armored units during World War n. Commanding General George S. Patton’s lead corps during much of the Third

Army’s race across France in fall 1944, Walker distinguished himself in combat and

D. Clayton James, “MacArthur, Douglas,” biographical entry in Roger J. Spiller, ed., American Military Leaders QNestpoxi, CT: Praeger, 1989), p. 183.

162 was recognized by Eisenhower as one of the three or four American European army’s outstanding corps commanders.

Eisenhower and Walker had been close friends since first serving together in

Texas as young lieutenants in 1915. Eisenhower was impressed with Walker’s World

War n battlefield performance as a corps commander and highly recommended him for promotion to lieutenant general (second only to J. Lawton Collins) on II April 1945.

Eisenhower’s next slate o f recommendations for promotion to lieutenant general

(submitted on 21 May 1945) began with Matthew B. Ridgway, as Eisenhower’s first choice, Troy H. Middleton, had aheady decided to resign his commission at the war’s end. The Army promoted Walker on 15 April 1945, Collins on 16 April 1945, and

Ridgway on 4 June 1945. The Army also promoted Middleton to lieutenant general on 5 June 1945 in recognition of his tremendous combat record during World War n.

Eisenhower considered excellence in battle and length of service in making each of these recommendations. He specifically referred to Collins and Ridgway as outstanding leaders, while praising Walker and Middleton as only excellent fighters.

Given that Walker and Middleton were six years older than Ridgway and seven years older than Collins and all performed very well in World War n, one can conclude that

Eisenhower rated Walker almost as high as Ridgway, Collins, and Middleton in terms of combat performance. Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s recommendations seem to indicate that Walker’s and Middleton’s promotions were more of a reward for excellent service, while Collins’ and Ridgway’s promotions were made in recognition of their excellent World War II performance and of their tremendous potential for

163 future service as high-level army leaders. lu the post-war Army Walker’s age

prevented him from ascending to the highest echelons of leadership, but he headed the

Fifth U.S. Army in Chicago before assuming command of what would become his final

command, the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, Walker assumed command of all Allied

ground forces in Japan and Korea and organized both the defenses of the Japanese

Islands and the Pusan Perimeter on the Korean Peninsula. Upon his arrival in Korea in

July 1950, Walker fought a masterfiil mobile defense around Pusan with poorly trained

troops and in the face of overwhelming odds, conserving his forces and providing

MacArthur with enough time to mount a deliberate counterattack. The Eighth Army

broke out of the perimeter in conjunction with the Inchon landing in September 1950

and pursued the retreating NKPA almost all the way north to the Yalu River before

conducting an orderly fighting-withdrawal back to the 38th Parallel in response to the

CPVA’s attacks in November-December 1950. Walker died in a jeep accident on 23

December 1950 and was promoted posthumously to the rank of general (four stars).

Although Walker did not possess a particularly inspiring personality or powerfiil intellect, he was pugnacious and a true professional soldier. Ridgway, however, was not impressed with Walker, and he recommended that Collins relieve

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed.. The Papers o f Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. IV, The War Years (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 2599-2600; and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and Louis Galambos, eds.. The Papers o f Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. VI,Occupation, 1945 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University' Press, 1978), pp. 78-81 (hereafter cited as The Eisenhower Papers)', Collins and Ridgway also rated Walker as an excellent combat commander, Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons o f Korea (Boston'. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), pp. 89- 90; Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs o f Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 195.

164 Walker in August 1950. Collins did not agree completely with. Ridgway’s assessment of Walker’s leadership and chose to leave Walker in command of the Eighth. Army.^’

Walker possessed what may be termed as an “armor” state of mind that understood mobile warfare and which proved to be a mixed blessing for the Eighth

Army. While it fit nicely with the types of combat operations that occurred during the war’s first six months, it did not correspond to the Eighth Army’s level of training

during the same period. This firame of mind led Walker to develop plans that were too

sophisticated for many of his units to execute, but it did give him a unique insight into the Communists’ battlefield activities. According to author John Toland, “[Walker’s]

‘armor state of mind’ allowed him to assess and respond to the rapidly changing situations more swiftly than the enemy. And his broad experience in mobile operations provided a reservoir of options to draw upon when either surprised by enemy actions or disillusioned by fiiendly performance.”^*

The Eighth Army’s initial adversary in the Korean War, the NKPA, was a

conventionally armed Communist force that relied heavily upon maneuver and firepower in the form of light infantry, tanks, and artillery. Walker’s World War H

experience attuned him to this kind of warfare and prepared him to counter a superior enemy’s thrust. He demonstrated this skill during his execution of an extremely demanding defensive battle — the Pusan Perimeter — where he was able to hold a large attacking enemy force at bay for over six weeks and retain enough combat power to

Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 186, 189, 219-221, 223, 554-556.

** Toland, In Mortal Combat, p. 130.

165 launch an offensive operation in support of the Inchon landing.*® Walker

accomplished this feat through the adroit maneuver of his available forces within the perimeter, and his example provided his subordinate division commanders (all of whom were staff officers in World War II and had no combat experience in command positions) with the technical expertise to continue these kinds of operations for over

forty days (4 August-15 September 1950).^°

Walker was successfiil in teaching several of his regimental commanders his

style of fighting. Those leaders who could grasp its intricacies became the

commanders of his “fire brigades,” whose duties were to respond rapidly to

Communist attacks around the Pusan Perimeter. The successfiil employment of these exceptional units, which included the U.S. Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team and

27th Infantry Regiment and the U.S. Marine Corps’ 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, enabled the UNC to blunt a long series of Communist attacks around the Pusan

Perimeter.^* Partly through Walker’s experience, the Eighth Army acquired three

The E. M. Lynch Papers, contained in the John Toland Collection (Hyde Park, NY: Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library), letter to John Toland dated 5 May 1987, p. 3.; ‘Time, Space and Fighting Wars,” unpublished article, pp. 7-9.

The division commanders at the time were John H. Church (24 ID), William B. Kean (25 ID), Hobart R_ Gay (I CAV), and Laurence B. Keiser (2 ID), all of whom had distinguished themselves as staff oflScers for many of the World War II battlefield luminaries but had not ever commanded soldiers in combat (except Keiser, who had some experience with combat command in World War I). Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 73-74, 144-145, 155-156, 201-202.

A trio of outstanding soldiers commanded these units. These men included Col. John L. Throckmorton (USA), Col. John H. Michaelis (USA), and Brig. Gen. Edward A. Craig (USMC), respectively. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, The U.S. Army in the Korean War Series (Washington, DC: Department o f the Army Center of Military History, 1986), pp. 108, 257-258, (originally printed as CMH Pub 20-2, 1961).

166 exceptional units that were able prevent the NKPA from gaining complete control of the entire Korean Peninsula.

Walker was a commander who was more prone to develop substandard subordinates rather than reheve them ^ He continued to provide instruction to his senior commanders throughout his entire time in Korea, teaching them the methods developed by Patton’s Third Army in World War II. The Eighth Army’s advances north during September-November 1950 and its fighting withdrawal back below the

38th Parallel in November-December 1950 fimctioned much as the operations within the Pusan Perimeter had, with Walker providing the technical and tactical expertise for many of his subordinate commanders that allowed them to successfully execute their required combat operations. Walker’s armor state of mind fimctioned as the “well” from which his subordinates could draw the necessary knowledge and expertise to supplement their own inexperience.

Walker’s untimely death in December 1950, after the defeats of the war’s first three months and the CPVA’s invasion in October-November 1950, ensured that his reputation would predominantly reflect his failures instead of his successes. Although one may question Walker’s generalship at various stages of the Korean War, he was nonetheless successful at preventing a complete Communist victory and the destruction of the Eighth Army even though he faced a ferocious Communist onslaught.^ Walker’s success was largely due to his abihty to enhance the Eighth

■ Patton Papers, p. 479.

^ Blair, TJte Forgotten War, pp. 554-556.

167 Army’s technical expertise in ground warfare and to identify and protect his army’s vulnerable areas of readiness, personnel strength, equipment availability, and leadership.

Walker’s relationship with MacArthur was characterized by a certain amount of coolness between the two men and a great amount of friction between Walker and

MacArthur’s staff (primarily with MacArthur’s chief of staff Edward M. Almond)."'*

MacArthur demonstrated no personal or overt animosity towards Walker, but their relationship lacked the element of trust so vital to the senior-subordinate relationship.^

MacArthur did not know Walker very well, causing him to keep a close watch over

Walker’s actions. As a result, MacArthur exercised a fair amount of control over

Walker’s actions, not properly characterized as restrictive, but something less than the amount of freedom that a soldier o f Walker’s experience and stature would expect.

Almond was a 1915 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and fought in World War I. A rising star between the world wars and a prominent southern ofBcer, Almond commanded one of America’s all-black divisions during World War n. The division’s poor performance in Italy did not damage Almond’s sterling reputation. After World War U, he transferred to the Pacific theater and became MacArthur’s chief of staff in the FEC. MacArthur formed the X Corps for the Inchon landing and assigned Almond as its commander while also maintaining him as the FEC’s chief of stafil Almond’s dual assignment caused many difSculties with Walker and the Eighth Army, and, at Ridgway’s request, Almond relinquished his position as the FEC chief of staff in January 1951. Almond commanded the X Corps until mid-1951, when he returned to the United States to serve out his final tour of duty as the president of the U.S. Army War College and retired as a lieutenant general (three stars). Known throughout his career as a self-serving oflBcer and a demanding superior, his professional reputation. World War H actions, and Korean War activities remained a source of controversy for the rest of his life. Shelby L Stanton,Am erica’s Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA; Presidio Press, 1989), pp. 1-18;The 1989 Register o f Former Cadets o f the Virginia M ilitary Institute (Lexington, VA; The VMI Alumni Association, Inc., 1989), p. 137.

^ MacArthur described Walker as simply “a seasoned and experienced officer” in his memoirs. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (GxeenvAc\i, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1964), p. 380. Author D. Clayton James concurs with this assessment of the MacArthur-Walker relationship as well. James, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 42.

168 Compounding matters was the overt animosity that existed between Ahnond and

Walker. These circumstances combined to produce an environment in which Walker

repeatedly experienced a number of slights — unintentional from MacArthur and

intentional from Almond.

This command relationship was partially responsible for denying Walker the

freedom of replacing substandard commanders or effectively integrating his unit into

the FEC, thus limiting his abihty to develop and sustain either internal or external

constituencies. Further, Walker’s “outsider” status prevented him from having any

appreciable influence over the Eighth Army’s missions and training opportunities.

This circumstance became particularly evident during the Eighth Army’s operations

conducted before and after the Inchon landing. Walker’s plans for an amphibious

operation to assist him in destroying the NKPA (the ‘Kunsan Plan”) and for pursuing

the NKPA up to the 38th Parallel were supported by the Navy and the Marines and

appeared to have had some merit despite being substantially different from

MacArthur’s plans.^® Under the existing command relationship within the UNC/FEC,

however. Walker could never hope to exert much influence or gain approval for his

proposals because he was not a ‘MacArthur man,” and his personal feud with Almond

sabotaged his relationship with the FEC staff. This circumstance may have caused the

“ For the most comprehensive assessment of Walker’s Kunsan Plan, see Toland,In Mortal Combat, pp. 176-178, 207,339. See also Blair, 77m Forgotten War, pp. 226-227, 231-233, 235-36, 263.

169 UNC to miss several opportunities to bring the Korean War to a rapid conclusion but at the very least, prevented Walker from performing at his highest level of efficiency. 2 7

Eighth Army Staff

The Eighth Army staff before the war was undistinguished and dominated by two of Walker’s friends from previous assignments. Little information exists on his personnel officer (G-1), infantryman Col. Raymond R. Tourtülott, or his plans and operations officer (G-3), artilleryman Col. William EL Bartlett. Walker had never even met his intelligence officer (G-2), thirty-four year old West Point drop-out Lt. CoL

James C. Tarkenton, before he was assigned to the Eighth Army. Nevertheless,

“[djespite Tarkenton’s youth and lack of high-level intelligence experience. Walker was impressed by him and reUed upon him to an extraordinary degree.”^*

Walker’s chief of staff infantryman and former Major General (during World

War II) Col. Eugene M. Landrum, was almost sixty years old and had worked for

Walker continuously since 1945. In World War H, Landrum had been a hero while

Walker’s “Kunsan Plan” envisaged an amphibious landing at Kunsan on the west side of the peninsula, well below the port of Inchon. He believed that all of the NKPA was south of the city of Taejon. Accordingly, his intent was to coordinate this assault from the east with a westward attack from the Pusan Perimeter to establish a cordon across the peninsula that would trap the entire NKPA south of it and enable him to destroy the North Korean’s army before it had a chance to escape to the north (as much of the NKPA did in response to the Inchon landing). Similarly, Walker planned to conduct a coordinated drive along the western portion of the peninsula to pursue and destroy the retreating NKPA after the Inchon landing (as opposed to MacArthur’s operation, which pulled the X Corps out of the pursuit and shifted in around to the east side of the peninsula for an amphibious landing at Wonson). Historians continue to debate the merits of these plans but an elementary map study o f them leads one to conclude that Walker’s plans were more strategically and operationally oriented than those of MacArthur.

Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 377-378.

170 commanding a division in Alaska, but Collins, with. Bradley’s consent, relieved him of

his division command in Europe and, even though Army Chief of Staff George C.

Marshall gave Landrum command of another division, Eisenhower refused to accept

Landrum in Europe as a commander.^ Thus, the three most powerful men in the

Army, Collins, Bradley, and Eisenhower, all had rather low opinions of Landrum’s

abilities. Walker, on the other hand, felt that Collins had perhaps been too hasty in

relieving Landrum, and thought very highly of Landrum as an ofiScer and friend. As

a commander who visited units on the front line everyday. Walker reUed on Landrum

to complete the necessary staff work and keep him informed during his absences from

the headquarters.^^ Landrum apparently performed well enough in this capacity to

allow Walker to remain absent from headquarters for extended periods o f time and

continue to practice his preferred method of command.

Walker’s supply oflBcer (G-4) was infantryman Col. Albert K_ Stebbins Jr.

Stebbins had an interesting career, serving as a Marine enlisted man in World War I before graduating from West Point in 1924. Stebbins served in the Pacific during

World War II as the 27th Infantry Division’s chief of staff and as the commander of

^ EUSAK War Diary, Section I: Prologue, 12 June 1950 to 12 July 1950, Biography o f Colonel Eugene Manuel Landrum; Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 185.

According to Walker’s personal bodyguard. Corporal Randle M. Hurst, Walker referred to Landrum as “General Landrum,” and even after being replaced by Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen in September 1950 as the Eighth Army’s chief of staff Landrum’s ofiBce and residence continued to remain adjacent to Walker’s. Hurst also observed that, even though he was reduced to serving as the Eighth Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff Landrum, along with Col. William A. Collier, Walker’s World War n chief of staff in the XX Corps, ran the Eighth Army headquarters. Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 390-391; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 392.

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 335.

171 the 106th Infantry Regiment, which fought, among other places, on Okinawa/^ He

had been the Eighth Army’s G-4 since 1949 and described himself as a close friend of

Walker/^ Stebbins’ competence as a staff officer was sorely tested during the first six

months of the war, and by all accounts, he proved himself to be more than capable of performing his duties in an extremely demanding environment.

According to Appleman, Walker had “many [other] capable staff officers at his

Eighth Army headquarters at this time” besides the principal staff officers.

Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that Walker was discontented with his

staff or that he ever requested any significant replacements other than those necessary to bring his headquarters up to its authorized strength. Thus one may conclude that

Walker was satisfied with his staff as it existed during the latter half of 1950 and confident of its ability to assist him with the command and control of the Eighth Army.

Outside observers, however, did not share Walker’s confidence.

Visitors to Walker’s headquarters in Korea were often concerned by the

“confusion and lack of direction” exhibited by the Eighth Army’s staff Leaving the original G-1, G-2, and G-4 officers in their positions, the Army, desiring perhaps to make some immediate improvements in the Eighth Army’s performance, sent Col.

USh^LA 1987 Register o f Graduates and Former Cadets (West Point: Association of Graduates USMA, 1987), p. 346.

Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 52,496 fii I.

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 392.

Hastings, Tlte Korean War, p. 120.

172 John A. Dabney to replace CoL William H. Bartlett as the Eighth Army’s G-3 in July

1950.

Forty-six year old artilleryman Dabney had been Maj. Gen. Lloyd R.

Fredendall’s chief of staff when he commanded the U.S. U Corps in North Africa in

World War U. After Eisenhower replaced Fredendall, neither of the succeeding U

Corps commanders (Patton, then Bradley) wanted Dabney. He spent the remainder of

World War U as the G-3 of the continentally based U.S. Second Army and commanded the 21st Infantry Regiment during the post-World War U years.

According to Appleman,

Dabney was quiet and unassuming, possessed of a good mind, sound professional knowledge, persistent in his search of facts, and blessed with a fine judgment in evaluating combat information. [Demonstrating] common sense throughout the critical Naktong battles of the Perimeter, [he] was a trusted and valued advisor to General Walker and his chief of staff.

Dabney’s performance began to wane, however, after he was injured seriously in a jeep accident with Walker in August 1950.^^

During a visit to Korea in August 1951 as the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, Ridgway described the Eighth Army’s staff as

“mediocre” and expressed concerns about its competence.^* One of his

Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 220, 745; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 392.

Appleman, Disaster in Korea, p. 459; Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 220-221.

Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 185.

173 recommendations to the Army Chief of Staff was to strengthen the Eighth Army’s staff by immediately replacing the chief of stafÇ and in September 1950 Maj. Gen. Leven C.

Aden replaced CoL Eugene M. Landrum as the Eighth Army’s Chief of Staff

Fifty-six year old infantryman Aden was a highly respected soldier and was known as one of the most intelligent and affable staff generals in the Army. Given

Walker’s particular weaknesses, these traits were exceptionady welcome in the headquarters. Aden knew the Eighth Army’s commander wed, having served with

Walker in World War I and in the Army’s War Plans Division. After succeeding

Bradley in the prestigious position of Commandant of the Infantry School and impressing Marshad, Aden spent the remainder of World War H as the chief of staff for Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group in Europe. According to Blair, Aden had “an

Army-wide reputation for fairness and coolness under pressure,” and Collins felt that

Aden’s presence “would greatly strengthen the senior staff and provide Walker [with] urgently needed administrative backup.

Aden’s assignment as the Eighth Army’s chief of staff also suggests the level of dissatisfaction felt by many Army leaders regarding the Eighth Army’s battlefield performance in summer 1950. Ridgway was very critical of Walker’s leadership in

Korea, and he contemplated going directly to MacArthur to recommend Walker’s

Ridgway felt that Landrum was too old to coordinate the Eighth Army’s staff activities and was not impressed by Bartlett’s performance. EUSAiK IFnr Diary, Section I; Summary, 4 September 1950 entry, p. 6; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 382, 392; Omar N. Bradley, A General’s Life, with Clay Blair (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 102, 212; Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 185.

Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 220, 223; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 382.

174 relief. Dissuaded from this approach by his traveling companion. Secretary of the

Army Frank Pace, Ridgway decided instead to inform Collins and the other members

of the JCS of his assessment of Walker’s leadership. Collins listened to Ridgway’s

argument but decided not to relieve Walker for several reasons. Nevertheless,

Ridgway remained concerned about the Eighth Army’s performance in Korea, and he

had alerted the other members of the JCS to his concerns as welL**^

Since Walker was staying in command and they were unable to penetrate

MacArthur’s inner circle of advisors, and since most of the Army’s senior leadership

had significant reservations about Landrum’s competence, perhaps the best way they

could try to help Walker and retain some level of influence in the conduct of

operations in Korea would be to assign someone who was thoroughly cognizant of all

pertinent issues and trusted by the JCS as the Eighth Army’s chief of staff. Allen fit

these criteria perfectly, as he was currently serving in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) as Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson’s executive secretary. In this capacity, Allen managed the secretary’s immediate office, and AUen was among a handful of individuals who Johnson authorized to issue directives on approved policy

matters within OSD’s jurisdiction.'*^ Thus, Allen was an extremely capable staff officer trusted by the JCS who was also well versed in the most intimate matters of concern to OSD. Short of relieving Walker, Ridgway and the JCS, by sending Allen to become

Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 186-187, 189-190.

Doris M. Condi t.The Test o f War, 1950-1953, History o f the Office o f the Secretary o f Defense, Volume II: (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), p. 27.

175 the Eighth Army’s chief of stafl^ had intervened considerably to improve the performance of the Eighth Army’s staff and ensure that the JCS and OSD concerns were well represented in Korea.

Although Walker was apparently satisfied with his staff at the beginning of the war, other leaders took steps to provide Walker with some better principal staff officers. Paramount among these additions were Dabney and Allen, who had reputations as smart and competent officers. The arrival of these two officers greatly improved the Eighth Army staff’s ability to plan and coordinate the unit’s actions in

1950. Nevertheless, the Eighth Army staff took most of 1950 to mature as a coherent entity, and it did not begin producing monthly command reports until December 1950.

Corps and Division Commanders

The first Eighth Army had two combat-experienced corps commanders in John

B. Coulter and Frank W. Milbum from September to December 1950. Although both had commanded at least at the division level in Europe during World War U and had periods of excellence as corps commanders in Korea, the strains of battle in Korea revealed that their time as successful combat commanders had past.

Fifly-nine year old John B. Coulter was a cavalryman who had much in common with MacArthur during the early years of his career. He obtained his commission from MacArthur’s old secondary school alma mater. West Texas Military

Academy, in 1911. After participating in Pershing’s punitive expedition into Mexico,

Coulter, along with MacArthur, joined the 42nd “Rainbow” Division during World

176 War I, serving as an. aide-de-camp to the commanding general and as a battalion

commander in combat. During the interwar period, Coulter served on the Army staff

and graduated from the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College,

and the Naval War College. The 85th Infantry Division was Coulter’s home for most

of World War H, where he served as an assistant division commander and as its

commander during fighting in Italy 1944-1945.

After World War n. Coulter again served with MacArthur. Coulter

commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Japan and served as the deputy commander

for the United States Armed forces in Korea (USAFIK), where he developed an

excellent rapport with the newly elected president of the Republic of Korea, Syngman

Rhee. He commanded the US I Corps in Japan until it was deactivated in early 1950.

Returning to America, Coulter became deputy commander of the Fifth Army, headquartered at Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

On 19 July 1950, MacArthur asked for his two deactivated corps to be reactivated and sent to Korea immediately. The Army’s only readily available corps was the V Corps, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Complying with

MacArthur’s request that his two corps should be designated 1 and DC Corps, Army

officials quickly redesignated V Corps as I Corps and named Coulter as its

commander. Resuming his old command. Coulter and his staff flew to Korea, arriving

177 on 13 August 1950. Coulter’s corps would follow him, and the corps arrived in Korea in early September 1950 partially manned, equipped, and trained.**^

Upon his arrival in Korea, Coulter immediately began planning for the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, but Walker urgently needed an American to command the crumbling ROK portion of the perimeter along the east coast of South Korea. Taking command of the makeshift Task Force Jackson, consisting of the ROK I Corps and various American forces. Coulter succeeded in holding his portion of the perimeter.

Nevertheless, Walker was not overly impressed with Coulter’s overall generalship and did not did not beUeve that Coulter was aggressive enough to command the Eighth

Army’s main effort. Compoundiug Coulter’s troubles. Walker viewed him as a

“MacArthur-Almond” man, owing to Coulter’s previous associations with MacArthur, which was a significant hability for any of Walker’s subordinates.^ As a result.

Walker decided that he would not rely on Coulter to lead I corps, which was to be

Walker’s main effort, during the upcoming breakout from the Pusan Perimeter.

Accordingly, Walker relived Coulter of command of I Corps and placed him in command of DC Corps.

DC Corps lacked a substantial amount of its authorized personnel and equipment and was almost completely untrained upon its activation as an operational unit in Korea on 23 September 1950, having been formed haphazardly from elements

James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, U.S. Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of tlie Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1972), pp. 134-136.

Blair, 77;e Forgotten War, pp. 279-280.

178 of the Fifth Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. DC Corps lost even more personnel and

equipment to I Corps on the eve of the breakout in order to bring Walker’s main eftbrt

as close as possible to its authorized strength. Consequently, Coulter’s corps played a

secondary role in the Eighth Army’s breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and

subsequent operations north of the 38th Parallel while it obtained its authorized levels

of personnel and equipment and matured as an organization. By the end of November

1950, Walker had brought DC Corps into North Korea and placed it along the

Ch’ongchon River. Absorbing the brunt of the CPVA’s Second Phase Offensive, DC

Corps, and especially 2 ID at Kunu-ri, suffered crippling losses. According to one of his regimental commanders. Coulter had actually “fled the battlefield” in the face of the

Communist attack.**^ As one might expect. Walker again questioned Coulter’s generalship in this action and by the end of 1950, Coulter was decidedly out of favor with the Eighth Army and UNC leadership."*®

Fifty-eight year old Frank W. “Shrimp” Milbum had a reputation as an

outstanding athlete before graduating from West Point in 1914 and obtaining a

commission in the infantry. Missing out on overseas service in World War I, Milbum nonetheless graduated from and served as an instructor at the Command and General

Staff College. During World War U, he commanded the 83rd Infantry Division and

Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 341-342.

This biographical sketch comes largely from information contained in John Keimedy Ohl, “Coulter, John B. (1891-1983),” entry inThe Korean War: An Encyclopedia, Stanley Sandler, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995), pp. 93-94; see also James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: Tlie First Year, U.S. Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: OfBce o f the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1972), pp. 134-136.

179 the XXI Corps in Europe. After the war, Milbum commanded the 1st Infantry

Division and V Corps, and he was the deputy commander of American forces in

Germany at the outbreak of the Korean War.

After assuming command of the recently formed DC Corps and bringing over the advance elements, Walker transferred Milbum to be the commander I Corps so that Milbum could lead Walker’s most important drive during the Eighth Army’s breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. Although he was a quiet man who rarely spoke during meetings, Milbum arrived with ColUns’ endorsement. That was good enough for Walker, who received him as a welcome altemative to Coulter and began relying heavily on Milbum’s tactical acumen from the moment I Corps became operational on

13 September 1950.

Milbum performed well during the Eighth Army’s breakout from the Pusan

Perimeter and the pursuit of the NKPA north of the 38th Parallel. During this period.

Walker and Milbum developed an excellent command relationship home out of mutual respect for one another. Milbum continued to perform very well during the dangerous and confusing withdrawal from North Korea in December 1950, but his quiet and unassuming nature that Walker came to admire would not sit well with Walker’s successor.'*’

John Kennedy Ohl, “Milbum, Frank W. (I892-I962),” entry inThe Korean War: An Encyclopedia, Stanley Sandler, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995), pp. 224-225; see also James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, U.S. Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1972), pp. 134-136; and Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 279-280..

180 With an average age of 58.5 years. Coulter and Milbum were 5.5 years older than their average World War H counterparts.*** Despite delivering good performances during parts of 1950, Coulter and Milbum were older officers who were in command during the longest retreat in American military history. One can excuse them in part because their corps never really had a chance to form before being thrown in to the cauldron of battle, but neither one distinguished themselves as particularly effective combat leaders. Recognizing their share of responsibility for the Eighth

Army’s battlefield defeats in 1950, one must also examine the performance of the division commanders who had been fighting almost from the beginning as well.

The division commanders of the Eighth Army included fifty year old William F.

Dean and then fifty-eight year old John H. Church (24 ID), fifty-three year old William

B. Kean (25 BD), fifty-six year old Hobart R. Gay ( 1 CAV), and fifty-five year old

Laurence B. Keiser and fifty-four year old Robert B. McClure (2 ED). As a group, the

Eighth Army’s division commanders lacked significant command experience during

World War II. Only Dean and McClure had commanded divisions in combat during the Second World War; the remaining three officers had all served as staff officers to luminaries of World War 11.**^

Robert H. Berlin, ii.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), p. 16.

Dean commanded the 44th Infantry Division in Europe, and McClure commanded a regiment under Collins in the 25th Infantry Division before commanding the 23rd “Aunerical” Division in combat in the Pacific. Church, although heroic, had been chief of staff for the crack 45th ‘Thunderbird” Division and then Assistant Division Commander for the 84th Infantry Division. Kean served as Bradley’s chief of staK Gay was Patton’s chief of staff in World War H, and Keiser was chief of staff for Lucas’ VI Corps at Aoizio before becoming the 4th Airmy’s chief of staff in World War II. Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 73-74, 89-90, 144-145, 155-156, 201-202.

181 An experienced lot, their average age was 54.3 years, while the average age of their regimental commanders was 47 years. While the division commanders’ average age was close to the average age of 1940 Regular Army division commanders who did not take their commands into combat (52 years), it was 7.3 years older than the average World War H division commander in combat.^° Similarly, the Eighth Army’s regimental commanders were, on average, two years older than the forty-five year ideal established for regimental commanders by George C. Marshall during World War n. MacArthur had turned seventy in January 1950, so he probably did not believe age to be an inhibiting factor for a senior commander. One may question MacArthur’s view on this issue, as combat regimental and division commanders led extremely physical fives and stfil did much of their work in the field with their troops.

Nevertheless, it appears “that by and large. Army officers sent to Korea [as senior commanders] were older and, in some cases, less robust than their World War H counterparts.”^^

One may thus surmise that the initial slate of senior Eighth Army commanders was comprised mainly of older, competent officers being rewarded for their World

War n service. In addition, it appears that the Army, in assigning these officers to these positions, did not believe that a threat serious enough to bring about war existed in the Far East. Nevertheless, these officers had to fight, and the physical and mental

LTC Gary Wade, World War II Division Commanders, CSI Report Number 7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, undated), p. 3.

Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 74.

182 demands of the Korean War combat environment quickly identified those men who were still fit for battlefield command These men were not well- suited for the task they ultimately had to perform, considering their age and World War II experience, and they appear to have performed poorly, as one would have perhaps expected. The best that can be said on their behalf is that these men prevented America and the UN from experiencing a military defeat that would have had catastrophic imphcations for the burgeoning Cold War and allowed for the possibility of success, however shght, by the end of 1950.

ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

The Eighth Army faced many of its greatest challenges in the areas of administration and logistics during the second half of 1950. The army had to fight a war that was not supported by a corresponding increase in domestic wartime support and had to rely upon a supply line that spanned the Pacific Ocean. On the Korean peninsula, the Eighth Army had to utilize a primitive transportation network that traversed some of the most rugged terrain in the world. In addition to these conditions, the Eighth Army had to compete for many of its essential resources with other American military organizations charged with combating communism elsewhere on the globe. These were formidable obstacles to overcome during the last half of

1950, and one must keep them in mind when assessing the Eighth Army’s administrative effectiveness.

183 According to the Eighth Army’s G-4 Section, for the war’s first thirty days, logistical panning was, of necessity, ‘hand to mouth. Logistical (as well as combat) decisions were ad hoc. By mid-August 1950, however, a fairly detailed picture of the force requirements had emerged. With the situation more defined, the Eighth Army staff completed an estimate of its anticipated personnel needs on 27 August 1950, and this document served as the unit’s basis for logistical planning for the entire period of the first Eighth Army.

Personnel

The heart of the administrative effectiveness assessment of the Eighth Army revolves around the issue of personnel, which is primarily a command issue. While it is the commander’s responsibihty to acquire personnel for the unit, the G -1 assists greatly in the acquisition process and is responsible for strength accounting and reporting. This makes the issue of personnel a shared area of responsibility, and I chose to address in the administration analysis because it fits most appropriately in this area and the records to support the analysis are with the Eighth Army’s logistical documents.^^

’^EUSAK Logistics Summary, Vol. 1, Chapter HI, p. 3.

The Eighth Army command reports and other statistical sources of the period lump logistics and personnel together in almost every instance. While I am well aware that personnel is a commander’s responsibility and that the personnel section of any headquarters is not technically a logistical asset, the G-1 is also primarily responsible for strength accounting, reporting and executing routine personnel actions. In addition, the G-1 works closely with the G-4 when determining a unit’s administrative and logistical requirements and in the unit’s battlefield sustainment efforts. Accordingly, 1 have included those aspects of personnel that relate primarily to strength accounting and reporting in with the logistical information since the Eighth Army staff presented the information in this manner and because this data is most directly relevant to logistical matters. Since senior 184 According to the Eighth Army’s personnel summary, one o f the most significant administrative problems in Korea concerned troops strengths/'* Although the Eighth Army had 99.4 per cent of its peacetime personnel authorization, it only had 48.8 percent of its aggregate wartime personnel authorization. By December

1950, Walker had managed to acquire enough troops to increase this number to seventy percent of his wartime authorization.^^ Thus the Eighth Army improved its personnel status by 22.8 percent during 1950.

Another challenge for the Eighth Army staff was the distinct composition of combat forces required to support the war effort in Korea. Army experience in World

War n indicated that the relative proportion of armor, artillery, and infantry troops in a given theater should be about 21:66:100. This figure was never realistic for Korea, and the Eighth Army’s average ratio for the entire war was actually 8:46:100. Owing to the rugged terrain of the peninsula and other factors, the ratio of armor, artillery, and infantry troops in Korea during 1950 began at about .8:47:100 and by the end of

1950 conformed more closely to a ratio of approximately 9:41:100. While commanders were able to dramatically increase the proportion of armor soldiers in the

Eighth Army to the highest percentage during the entire war, they allowed the proportion of artillery soldiers to decrease substantially, when compared to the initial

leadership issues are more germane to the leadership assessment, I addressed them in that section. While perhaps a bit cumbersome, I believe that the presentation of the information in this manner is the most appropriate, and I will adhere to this methodology throughout the remainder of this dissertation.

^EUSAK Logistics Summary, Vol. 1, Chapter HI, p. 1.

” Ibid., p. 2.

185 ratio. Both Ridgway and Van Fleet would take notice of the low ratio of artillery troops, and each would ask for substantial reinforcements to correct this deficiency.

These figures also indicate that the Eighth Army was a predominantly infantry force, meaning that the Eighth Army leaders had to retain a constant focus on the units’ infantry strength.

En aggregate, commanders were able to maintain a relatively equal balance between combat arms and service troops within the Eighth Army, with the combat arms constituting roughly 52 percent of the Eighth Army’s strength throughout all of

1950. This figure was 12 percent below the ideal planning figure for a combat zone of

63 percent, but, despite JCS guidance to the contrary, the Eighth Army had to provide the vast majority of logistical support for almost aU of the Allied units in Korea throughout 1950.^’ This data indicates that Eighth Army commanders were not effective in obtaining the requisite number of artillery soldiers and that the Eighth

Army had perhaps too many support personnel.

In terms of units, the G-3 and G-4 estimates indicated that the Eighth Army would need a maximum of 6 2/3 U.S. Army divisions consisting of approximately

233,000 U.S. Army personnel to successfully prosecute the war effort. The table below indicates that the Department of the Army (DA) was able to supply the Eighth

Army with the appropriate number of divisions but had some difiSculty in meeting the specific personnel requirements.

^®EUSAK Logistics Summary, Vol. 1, Chapter in, p. 8.

^'EUSAK Logistics Summary, Vol. 1, Chapter HI, pp. 5, 8.

186 Date

JUL50 3/3 0 38,800 48,268 + 9,468 + 24-40 AUG 50 3 2/3/4 1/3 + 2/3 76,000 90,092 + 14,092 +18.54 SEP 50 6 1/3 /4 1/3 -2 115,500 132,108 + 16,608 +14.38 OCT 50 6 2 /3 /4 -2 2/3 142,000 140,930 - 1,070 -0.75 NOV 50 6 2/3/4 -2 2/3 162,000 153,536 - 8,464 - 5.22 DEC 50 6 2/3/4 -2 2/3 184,000 163,507 - 20,493 - 11.14

Table 18. Eighth Army Personnel Figures' 58

The Eighth Army’s inabihty to obtain its anticipated number of personnel is understandable when viewed within the wider context of the UNC and the Army’s entire spectrum of responsibilities at the time.

The Eighth Army’s buildup occurred simultaneously with the Army’s activation of its NATO contingent for European defense and a continentally based contingency corps, both of which appeared in response to the heightened fears of a

During July 1950, EUSAK had 24 ID, 25 ID, and 1 CAV. During August 1950, EUSAK controlled 24 ID, 25 ID, 1 CAV, 2 ID, 5th RCT, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. During September 1950, EUSAK had 24 ID, 25 ID, 1 CAV, 2 ID, and the 65th RCT under its control. During October, November, and December 1950, EUSAK only controlled 24 ID, 25 ID, 1 CAV, and 2 ID, until the US X Corps joined EUSAK on 26 December 1950, bringing with it two Army divisions, one USMC division, and one RCT. The overall source for these figures wasLogistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, Chapter HI, figures 2b, 6, and 10

187 Soviet attack in Europe/® These developments stretched the Army’s personnel

resources to the limit and produced a situation in which the commander of an active

combat theater had to compete with peacetime organizations for personnel resources.

The perceived Soviet threat further exacerbated the situation by persuading

the American government to retain control of the available trained National Guard and

Reserve units for use as contingency forces (initially in Europe and eventually

worldwide), which prevented their assignment to the Eighth Army as cohesive units.

The ironic result was that many Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers who had not

trained at all since the end of World War II suddenly found themselves engaged in

combat operations hi Korea as individual replacements while actively training

Reservists remained with their units in the United States awaiting some unforeseen

contingency. This policy had an adverse effect upon the unit cohesion in Korea, as

they absorbed large numbers of new soldiers during a relatively short period of time,

and caused great resentment among the IRR soldiers, because they felt that they had

already done their part in World War II. Although many leaders repeatedly attempted to persuade the JCS to release additional soldiers for use in Korea, the pressing

international concerns of the time prevented the President and other military leaders

from acquiescing to the demands from the Far East.

The Department of the Army (DA) activated the U.S. Seventh Army in November 1950 to serve as the United States ground component of the NATO defense force in Europe. This army initially consisted o f two divisions and ultimately grew to include six divisions (four infantry, two of which were National Guard divisions, and two armored divisions) organized into two active corps. DA also formed the XVTII Airborne Corps to function as a contingency force for the United States. DA assigned all of the Army’s six active corps to either the Eighth Army, Seventh Army, or the XVTII Airborne Corps between November 1950 and May 1951.

188 Although the Army coatinued rushing personnel and units to Korea throughout

the second half of 1950, MacArthur diverted a significant portion of these forces away

firom the Eighth Army to form the separate US X Corps on 26 August 1950. hi fact,

at MacArthur's direction, the X Corps’ 7 ED received all infantry replacements sent to

Korea between 23 August and 3 September 1950 and all artillery replacements sent to

Korea between 23 August and 8 September 1950. This came to over 400 officers and

5,400 enlisted troops, which represented over 22 percent of all combat officer and

almost 60 percent of aU combat enhsted replacements received by EEC during August

and September 1950.^ Given that the Eighth Army’s personnel strength was

substantially above its projected figures at that point, MacArthur’s decision is understandable. However, according to the 7 ID’s commander, Maj. Gen. David G,

Barr, these replacements were high quahty troops who had received excellent training firom experienced NCOs, and his division was at a much higher state of readiness that it had been just one month prior to their influx.®* Given the dire situation facing

Walker and the Eighth Army in the Pusan Perimeter, one may question if this decision allowed MacArthur to make the best use of his resources. MacArthur obtained service troops for 7 ED in a similar manner, diverting arriving replacements firom the

Eighth Army to X Corps units. Realizing the Eighth Army’s urgent need for

“ Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 492; and Harry S. Truman Library, papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Woodyard for General Lowe, dated 2 April 1951, titled “Strength and Replacements,” Tab D, chart labeled “Strength of ROK Persormel Attached to US Army Infantry Divisions, As of First Day of Each Month.”

^'^Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 492.

189 replacements, MacArtlinr justified his actions by stating that the X Corps’ needs were

“imperative.”®^

In addition, MacArthur prevented arriving units fi'om joining the Eighth Army.

He never allowed 7 ID to join EUSAK, preferring instead to keep it separate and increase its strength of 9,117 soldiers on 27 July 1950 to 24,845 troops (including the attached South Koreans) on the eve of the hichon landing.®^ With a total of 17,080

US soldiers assigned to it, 7 ID had more Americans in it than any other division in

Korea except 2 ID, which had 17,498 US troops assigned to it. Combined with the 8,

652 KATUSAs assigned to it, the 7 ID was by far the strongest American division in

Korea in September 1950.®^ MacArthur also withdrew, in accordance with the

Marine’s repeated demands, the 1^ Marine Brigade firom the Pusan Perimeter so that it could participate in the upcoming Inchon landing. The 1^ Marine Brigade joined the

1st Marine Division, which formed in late August and early September 1950, and the entire division was assigned to the X Corps for the remainder of 1950.®® MacArthur

^Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 492.

®^Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 491-492.

^ 2 ID had 17,498 Americans and 232 KATUSAs for a total of 17,730 soldiers. 24 ID had 15,349 Americans and 1,470 KATUSAs for a total of 16,819 soldiers. 1 CAV had 15,141 Americans and 736 KATUSAs for a total of 15,877 soldiers. 25 ED had 15,058 Americans and 735 KATUSAs for a total of 15,793 soldiers. Harry S. Tmman Library, papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary’s Files, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Woodyard for General Lowe, dated 2 April 1951, titled “Strength and Replacements,” Tab A , chart labeled, “US Army Infantry Divisions In Korea, Comparison of Actual Strength Against Authorized Strength, As of First Day Each Month July 1950 - March 1951,” and Tab D, chart labeled “Strength of ROK Persormel Attached to US Army Infentry Divisions, As of First Day of Each Month.”

^®The final regiment of the 1" Marine Division, the 7'** Marines, did not arrive in Korea until after the Inchon landing.

190 did allow one Regimental Combat Team (RCT), the bS**" from Puerto Rico, to join the

Eighth Army in the Pusan Perimeter, but he withdrew this unit just before the breakout

and it joined the X Corps as the third infantry regiment of the 3 ED, which arrived in

Korea in November 1950. MacArthur also never relinquished control of the 187'*'

Airborne RCT, instead keeping it as a theater reserve force. Finally, MacArthur

removed one of the Eighth Army’s three newly arrived heavy tank battalions (the 73 d

Heavy Tank Battahon, equipped with M-26 Pershing tanks) from the Pusan Perimeter

and assigned it to the 7 ED for the Inchon landing. Thus MacArthur’s decisions

deprived the Eighth Army of two Army divisions, one Marine division, one airborne

RCT, and one heavy tank battahon during 1950.

Nevertheless, Walker did receive substantial reinforcements during August

1950 in the form of 2 ED, the 5*** RCT, the 1^ Provisional Marine Brigade (for a short time), as well as five tank battahons, totaling approximately 30,000 additional

soldiers.In addition, all infantry regiments in Eighth Army had acquired a third battalion and ah artillery battahons had obtained a third battery by the end of August

1950. These replacements and additions ahowed Eighth Army to increase its strength to something close to that of the NKPA (60,000 to 70,000) by mid-September 1950.

Including the ROK Army units, this superiority was greater than 2:1.^^ Thus, the

Eighth Army, by mid-September 1950, had a clear numerical superiority over the

“ Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 267.

UNC forces consisted of approximately 60,000 Americans, 9,000 KATUSAs, 60,000 ROK Army troops, two corps headquarters adding about 6,600 soldiers, and the EUSAK and ROK Army headquarters, adding another 10,000 soldiers for a total of about 150,000 UN soldiers against approximately 70,000 NKPA troops. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 547.

191 North Koreans. This was the situation even though American casualties up to 15

September 1950 totaled 19,165 men.®* During the same period. Eighth Army received a total of 36,497 replacements, 4,643 oflScers and 31,854 enhsted soldiers, for a net gain of 17,332 soldiers.®^

As a result of the Army’s overaU personnel situation and MacArthur’s decisions, the first Eighth Army was consistently at a significant disadvantage with respect to total numbers of Communist forces. The chart below provides data for

EUSAK and the Communists during the entire period of the first Eighth Army.

Of this number, 4,280 men were killed in action, 12,377 were wounded, o f whom 319 died of wounds, 401 were reported captured, and 2,107 were reported missing in action.” Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 547.

®^arry S. Truman Library, papers of Hany S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Woodyard for General Lowe, dated 2 April 1951, titled “Strength and Replacements,” Tab B , chart labeled “Bulk Replacements Received in PEC from Zone of Interior 1 July 1950 - 27 March 1951.”

192 DATE

13 JUL 50 Unknown Unknown 100,000 43,307 2.31 : 1

5 AUG 50 Unknown Unknown 69,100 48,268 1.43 : I

I SEP 50 Unknown Unknown 97,850 74,162 1.32: 1

15 SEP 50 Unknown Unknown 109,417 90,092 I.2I : 1

30 SEP 50 Unknown Unknown 30,000 132,108 .28 : 1

OCT 50 Unknown Unknown 50,000 140,930 .35 : I

NOV 50 Unknown Unknown 300,000 153,536 1.95 : I

DEC 50 Unknown Unknown 333,000 163,507 2.04: 1

Table 19. Comparisoa of Communist and Eighth Army Personnel Strengths, July- December 1950^°

Althougli no reliable figures exist for the chart’s first two columns, I decided to place 'Unknown” in each of them to maintain the same chart format for all three versions of the Eighth Army, thus making it easier to compare the figures for each organization. The figures in the fourth column include all known and suspected enemy forces operating in Korea, including enemy guerrilla forces as well. NKPA and CPVA figures derived or taken fi-om the following sources for the following months: July 1950, author’s estimate based upon information contained in National Archives College Park Branch, Records Group 407, Records o f the Office o f the Adjutant General. 1917-, Box 1081, Eighth Army War Diary July 1950, Section II: Summary for the period 13 July 1950 to 31 July 1950, pp. 1-8, and Appleman, South to Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 263; August 1950, Appleman, South to Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 263; September 1950, Appleman, South to Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 500, 545, 604, & 768-769; October 1950, author’s estimate based upon information contained in National Archives College Park Branch, Records Group 407, Records o f the Office of the Adjutant General, 1917-, Box 1 III, Eighth Army War Diary October 1950, Section I: Summary for the period 1-31 October 1950, pp. 1-50, and Appleman,South to Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 717-720; November 1950, author’s estimate based upon information contained in National Archives College Park Branch, Records Group 407, Records of the Office o f the Adjutant General, 1917-, Box 1122, Eighth Army War Diary November 1950, Section I: Summary for the period 1-30 November 1950, pp. I-II4, Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 46, 81, and Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 65-83; and December 1950, Box 1134, Eighth Army Command Report December 1950, Section H, 193 As the table illustrates, the U.S. Army component of the Eighth Army was consistently

outmanned in terms of total forces by an average factor of 1.4 throughout the entire period.

In the end, it appears that the first Eighth Army received adequate numbers of personnel, even increasing its strength, until October 1950, and that the Eighth Army, because MacArthur refused to incorporate X Corps into Eighth Army, never obtained its desired number of divisions. The hiability to acquire the appropriate number of divisions resulted firom circumstances beyond Walker’s control, and it appears that

Walker and the Eighth Army did their best to obtain what personnel assets were available. After October 1950, the Eighth Army was unable to obtain enough replacements to maintain its assigned strength at the levels anticipated by the 27

August 1950 planning document. Thus, over the period July-December 1950, the first

Eighth Army was not a particularly efifective organization in terms of personnel, since many of its infantry units were undermanned and contained too many KATUSA’s.

The quality of replacements sent to Korea was low at first, with the notable exception o f those assigned to 7 ED in late August and early September 1950, and

Narrative, p. 19. The Eighth Army figures came primarily fi'om Logistics in the Korean Operations. Volume I o f IV Volumes, (Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, 1 December 1955), Chapter HI, figure 2b, and reflect the Eighth Army’s personnel strength at the end of each month; however, the figures for 13 July 1950 came fi-om National Archives College Park Branch, Records Group 407, Records o f the Ojfice o f the Adjutant General, 1917-, Box 1081, Eighth Army War Diary July 1950, Section I: Summary for the period 13 July 1950 to 31 July 1950, p. 1 (with Eighth Army forces in both Japan and Korea, as the units were in the midst of deploying to Korea), and the figures for 15 September 1950 came fi'om Appleman,South to the Naktong. North to the Yalu, pp. 500, 504.

194 remained low throughout the rem ainder of 1950. When the Korean War erupted, the units stationed in Europe had the highest priority for personnel, while units assigned to the Far East had a much lower priority and received replacements at a substantially reduced rate. As a result, most of the Eighth Army’s individual replacements were

World War II veterans who had not served as combat arms soldiers and were thus either reassigned from their specialty into a combat arm (infantry, armor, or artillery) or recalled to active duty from the IRR who received little or no refresher training.^ ^

Regardless of the replacements’ competency, the Eighth Army personnel replacement system was responsible for further training of replacements received from the United

States. As a method of determining which soldiers were qualified for immediate assignment, the Eighth Army determined that “individuals who had completed basic training (or equivalent) and had been performing in their assigned specialties for a minimum of three months were considered qualified without further tactical or speciaKst training,” At a minimum, all replacements completed a brief indoctrination and orientation course upon arrival in th eater.T h is situation existed from July through September 1950, after which the Army began giving the Far East Command top priority for its available troops and equipm ent.Still, the Eighth Army did not

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 381-382.

EUSAK War Diary, 13 July 1950 to 31 July 1950, Section II: Summary, p. 6.

James A. Huston, Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean IVar (Selinsgtove, PA; Susquehanna University Press, 1989), pp. 98-99 (hereinafter cited as Huston, Guns and Butter).

195 begin receiving well-trained soldiers as replacements from the United States until early

1951.

A significant innovation of this period was the direct assignment o f indigenous personnel to American units in an attempt to raise the overall strength of US combat divisions. Known as the Korean Augmentation to the US Army program^ it was referred to as KATUSA and its participants became known as KATUSAs. As the example of 7 ID illustrated, this program did significantly increase the strength of US divisions in Korea; however, there were serious drawbacks to the method that were ultimately more trouble than they were worth. Many KATUSAs were ROK citizens impressed into military service, some taken literally from the street. Beginning in

August 1950, many commanders welcomed the ROK citizen-soldiers into their units, only to discover later that they had received virtually no military training whosoever.

Compounding the problem was the significant language barrier and the tremendous cultural differences among American and ROK individuals. Reaching a peak of 39,300 in October 1950, the program had mixed reviews throughout 1950. Although

KATUSAs performed well as laborers, scouts, ammunition carriers, and wire men, they performed poorly as riflemen and security guards. Thus, the main advantage of the KATUSA program (it provided personnel for badly depleted US units at a time when they were urgently needed) failed to compensate for its substantial disadvantages

(lack of military training, language barrier, cultural differences, and poor

196 administration), and commanders had lost faith in it by January 1951/** Although a less than optimal expedient, it remained in use throughout the rest of the Korean War.

Logistics

The first sixty days of the war were spent trying to equip Eighth Army units adequately. Because most units had unserviceable items in their units, and since the

Army had just activated an army in Europe and a corps in the continental United

States (CONUS), EEC had to rely primarily on World War H surplus items in 1950.

Despite receiving top priority for supplies in September 1950 and the conduct of an extensive build-up throughout the last six months of the year, the Eighth Army still reported substantial shortages in rocket launchers, trucks, mortars, tanks, and pistols.^^

The Eighth Army also faced significant difficulties in supporting combat operations and distributing necessary supphes throughout aU of 1950. According the

G-4's assessment, “At the outset of hostilities in Korea, the U.S. Army did not have an organic means of supporting firont line troops in the mountainous terrain of Korea.

Supply by human carries was the only means available, and the use of indigenous laborers instead of U.S. personnel became mandatory” to keep the units’ fighting strength as high as possible while also keeping them resupplied.T he situation did not improve during the breakout firom Pusan or once the combat units crossed the 38^

’■'EUSAK, Logistics in the Korean Operations, Vol. I, pp. 25-28.

’^EUSAK Command Report, DEC 50, Section II, Narrative, Part 4, Logistics, pp. 104-105.

'®EUSAK, Logistics in the Korean Operations, Vol. I, p. 25.

197 Parallel Indeed, according to the December command report, “the problem of logistics became prodigious” with the start of the CPVA’s Second Phase Offensive/^

In another logistics assessment, the Eighth Army G-4 Section asserted that, “It was improbable that the logistical capabilities existent in November 1950 could have provided sustained support to the Eighth Army and X Corps in a movement to positions along the Yalu River, considering the logistical difBculties which were encountered in the resumption of the Eighth Army attack northward.”^®

The Eighth Army’s logistical ineffectiveness became apparent during this period with the postponement of the planned attack to the Yalu River from 15

November 1950 to 24 November 1950 because of logistical inadequacies. In

November 1950, “Eighth Army units were operating with only one day of fire on hand, one and one-half days of petroleum, oü, and lubricants (POL), and three to four days of [food].” Indeed, the Eighth Army had outdistanced its logistic system, and

“the delay in mounting the offensive [was] entirely due to logistical difBculties.”’^

Thus the Eighth Army’s administrative effectiveness during 1950 is a story with some successes but more inadequacies. The staff was able to keep units supphed in most cases during a period of intense fighting and dramatic geographical shifts.

Nevertheless, in many instances, the Eighth Army commanders could not obtain the necessary numbers of replacements, and the logisticians could not supply the necessary

'^EUSAK Command Report, DEC 50, Section II, Narrative, Part 4, Logistics, p. 96.

78 EUSAK,, Logistics in the Korean Operations, Vol. I, p. 11.

’’EUSAK, Logistics in the Korean Operations, Vol. I, pp. 2-3.

198 amounts of combat equipment items or ammunition to the combat units. Most seriously, logistical difficulties necessitated the postponement of a major offensive operation in at least one significant instance, perhaps allowing the CPVA’s Second

Phase Offensive to be more effective than it should have been. By most measures, although the Eighth Army made great improvements during the period, the first Eighth

Army was at best marginally effective in terms of administrative support.

FIREPOWER EFFECTIVENESS

For the first several weeks of the war, USAFIK and then EUSAK were at complete disadvantages with respect to the number of personnel and amount of equipment available to oppose the NKPA attack. Beginning with the arrival of Task

Force Smith in Korea on 1 July 1950, which numbered around 540 men and consisted of two infantry companies, an artillery battery, a 4.2 inch chemical mortar section, and a recoilless rifle platoon, America began to build up its forces on the peninsula. Task

Force Smith was able to delay the attacking NKPA infantry on 5 July 1950, and, with the activation of EUSAK on 13 July 1950 and the arrival of the 24th and 25th Infantry

Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division in the latter half of July 1950, EUSAK began to redress the quantitative imbalance in Korea. In August 1950, the 2d Infantry Division arrived, increasing the number of EUSAK’s combat divisions to four, and the Eighth

Army received additional reinforcements as well.

199 This determined effort to bufld up American forces in Korea meant that by 1

September 1950, there were 90,092 US forces and over 500 tanks organized into four infantry divisions and two separate regiments in and around the Pusan Perimeter opposed by approximately 98,000 NKPA troops and at least 80 T-34 tanks organized into thirteen infantry divisions, one armored division, two armor brigades, and several miscellaneous security forces/" The American build-up continued in anticipation of X

Corps’ Operation CHROMITE and the Eighth Army’s subsequent breakout from the

Pusan Perimeter. Historian Roy Appleman assessed the situation by mid-September

1950 as follows:

A fair estimate of enemy strength facing Eighth Army at the Perimeter in mid- September would be about 70,000 men. Enemy equipment, far below the [recent] Eighth Army 75 per cent estimate, particularly in heavy weapons and tanks, was probably not more than 50 per cent of the original equipment... [For example,] the reported strength of one NKPA battalion on 14 September 1950 was 6 officers, 34 NCOs, and 111 troops, for a total of 151 men. There were 82 individual weapons in the unit: 3 pistols, 9 carbines, 57 rifles, and 13 automatic rifles. There was an average of somewhat more than 1 grenade for every 2 men — a total of 92 grenades. The unit still had 6 light machine guns but less than 300 rounds of ammunition for each... ph addition,] morale in the North Korean Army was at a low point. No more than 30 percent of the original troops of the division remained... Food was scarce, and undernourishment was the most frequently mentioned cause of low morale by prisoners.^^

SO EUSAK, Logistics in the Korean Operations, Vol. I, figure 2b; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 394-395.

** Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 546.

200 By contrast, Appleman assesses the Eighth Army in mid-September as follows:

The Eighth Army had a clear numerical superiority over the North Koreans. Including the ROKA units, this superiority amounted to something more than 2:1 in personnel [approximately 150,000 UNC troops to roughly 70,000 NKPA soldiers] and at least 5:1 in tanks at the beginning of September 1950 [500+ US tanks compared to less than 100 NKPA tanks]. This was the situation even though American casualties up to 15 September 1950 totaled 19,165 men... [and the fact that] the first fifteen days of September [1950] brought higher casualties than any other 15-day period in the war, before or afterward.^

Nevertheless, although the Eighth Army fared better than the NKPA by mid-

September 1950, and although many of the subordinate units’ assigned strengths appeared high on morning reports, in reality there were far fewer troops who did the actual fighting. According to Appleman, “Some of the rifle companies at this time were down to fifty or fewer effectives — little more than 25 percent strength. The

Korean augmentation recruits, virtually untrained and not yet satisfactorily integrated were of Httle combat value at this time.”^ Additionally, the ROK Army units aU had

^ The composition of the UN forces by mid-September 1950 included approximately 60,000 Americans, 9,000 KATUSAs, 60,000 ROK Army troops, two corps headquarters adding about 6,600 soldiers, and the EUSAK & ROK Army headquarters, adding another 10,000 soldiers for a total of about 150,000 UN soldiers. O f the Eighth Army’s losses up to 15 September 1950, 4,280 men were killed in action, 12,377 were wounded, of whom 319 died of wounds, 401 were reported captured, and 2,107 were reported missing in action. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 380- 381, 547.

^ Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 547.

201 low levels of combat eflfectiveness because of the tremendous losses they suffered

among trained leaders and soldiers. Appleman concludes his assessment as follows:

any reahstic analysis of the strength of the two opposing forces must give considerable numerical superiority to the United Nations Command. In the matter of supporting armor, artillery, and heavy weapons and the availability of ammunition for these weapons, the United Nations Command had an even greater superiority than in troops, despite the rationing of ammunition for most artillery and heavy weapons. Weapon fire power superiority was probably six to one over the North Koreans. In the air the Far East Air Forces had no rival over the battleground, and on the flanks at sea the United Nations naval forces held unchallenged control.^

After a rather difiBcult seven-day struggle to breakout o f the Pusan Perimeter between 16-22 September 1950, one may characterize the Eighth Army, at least its US

I Corps and two ROK Army corps, as a virtually unstoppable rolling juggemaut that used firepower to destroy the NKPA as an effective fighting force. Intelligence summaries of the period estimated that no more than 30,000 NKPA soldiers, lacking almost all artillery and armor support, escaped capture or destruction from the combined UNC attack of 15-29 September 1950.^^

The Eighth Army retained and exploited its firepower advantage throughout

October 1950 as it crossed the 38th Parallel, captured P’yongyang, and drove north to the Ch’ongchon River. The sharp action during the Communists’ First Phase

^ Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 547-548.

85 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 604.

202 Offensive in late-October and early November 1950 did little to decrease the Eighth

Army’ firepower advantage, and Walker prepared to exploit this strength once again

while executing MacArthur’s “Home by Christmas” offensive in late-November 1950.

In November, the Eighth Army Artillery officer calculated that Eighth Army

had considerable superiority over the Chinese and North Korean forces in terms of

overall artillery firepower. He estimated that the enemy’s artillery firepower was at

about thirty percent of the Eighth Army’s, meaning that the Eighth Army had a

quantitative and qualitative advantage over the CPVA and NKPA in terms of artillery

troops and equipment. The Eighth Army had 789 artillery pieces on the eve of the 24

November 1950 attack. 257 were in I Corps, 478 were in DC Corps, and 54 were in

the ROK n Corps. According to Appleman, the Relative Firepower (RFP)*® of the

Eighth Army and its attached troops was 18,735, as compared to an REP of 5,500 for

the NKPA. This indicates that EUSAK enjoyed a relative advantage of nearly 3 Vz to

1. Furthermore, Eighth Army logisticians estimated that they had sufficient artillery

ammunition on hand to support fifteen days of sustained offensive operations.^

Despite this disadvantage. Eighth Army intelligence estimates rated CPVA and NKPA

morale in November and December 1950 as “excellent,” similar to the morale and

combat efficiency of US forces, while the morale and combat effectiveness of the ROK

Army units, because they had disintegrated on several occasions and most recently

*^he Relative Fire Power (RFP) figure is determined by the formula: RFP = D + W + R, where D is the range, in thousands of yards; W is the weight of the projectile divided by 5; and R is the normal number of rounds per minute of the weapon fired. Appleman,Disaster in Korea, P. 470, fn 9.

^ Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 43-44.

203 with the breaking of the ROK Army II Corps in the face of the CPVA Second Phase

Offensive, were rated as only ‘Tair.”^®

The surprise and overwhehning nature o f the Communists’ Second Phase

Offensive of late November early December 1950 largely negated the Eighth Army’s firepower advantage for the remainder of 1950. This was not because of the large amount of equipment destroyed by the attacking CPVA and NKPA; rather, it was because the Communists were successful in disrupting the Eighth Army’s ability to conduct offensive operations. While evidence exists that suggests that EUSAK’s “bug out” was actually a sldllfiilly conducted withdrawal, except in a few highly pubhcized episodes,one cannot deny that American soldiers discarded much equipment during their retreat, which further reduced the Eighth Army’s overall firepower advantage vis-à-vis the Communist, forces.

MANEUVER EFFECTIVENESS

Initially surprised and greatly outnumbered. Walker’s greatest advantage was in the potential of UNC forces to assemble in the Repubhc of Korea and destroy the

NKPA, making the port of Pusan the UNC’s most important location in all of South

EUSAK Command Report, December 1950, Section II: Narrative, pp. 19, 34.

I will discuss tliis issue in greater depth in the first EUSAK’s maneuver section.

204 Korea. Thus, using all available forces to secure the port of Pusan and maintain a foothold on the peninsula was the best possible course of action open to Walker

during the war’s initial stage, and that is exactly what he did.

After building up forces in the Pusan Perimeter, Walker outnumbered the

NKPA in terms of both manpower and firepower. Thus, to best maximize his

advantages and exploit the NKPA’s weaknesses. Walker’s best maneuver would have been to attack in strength that emphasized EUSAK’s tank and personnel superiority.

In mid-September, Walker did launch an attack in conjunction with the Inchon landing, but he failed to fully exploit his advantages in tanks and personnel. As a result, it took the US I Corps seven days to breakout of the Pusan Perimeter. Only the ROK Army units along the east coast made substantial gains during this period.

Walker identified the Eighth Army’s weaknesses in terms of the units’ poor

state of readiness, personnel strength, equipment availability, and leadership.^” Unable to affect many changes to these areas while engaged in combat operations. Walker decided to protect these deficiencies and capitalize on those advantages available to him. Accordingly, his decision to consolidate aU of his ground units within the fifly- by-one-hundred-mile Pusan Perimeter was both a necessary response to the tactical situation and a pragmatic solution to the Eighth Army’s deficiencies. This consolidation reduced the deficiencies of individual units, by enabling Walker to reinforce any of them using forces from other units, and secured for the Eighth Army the vitally advantageous element of interior lines within the perimeter. Facing a

Hastings, The Korean War, p. 85.

205 position protected on two sides by water and sporting a defensive perimeter of approximately 150 miles, including the Naktong River, the NKPA was forced to concede that Walker had established his forces in a superior defensive position.

Coupled with the mobile defense method that Walker chose to employ, units were capable of responding to the numerous NKPA assaults with the maximum combat power available to the Eighth Army. This method prevented the NKPA from destroying the Eighth Army in a piecemeal fashion and allowed Walker to capitalize on his existing stores of manpower, equipment, and leadership to thwart the NKPA’s efforts at pushing the AUied forces off the peninsula or destroying them outright.

During the Eighth Army’s breakout and pursuit o f the NKPA, Walker’s best choice would have been to lead with armor to exploit his advantages in mobility and firepower. This is what he did, leading with the 1 CAV’s TF Lynch to the north and sending out armored spearheads to the northwest, west, and southwest. While TF

Lynch largely outran the majority of Walker’s forces attacking north, the units attacking elsewhere remained within supporting distance of the armored spearheads, allowing them to sustain and exploit that tanks’ rapid movement and shock effect.

After TF Lynch linked up with elements of the US X corps south of Seoul near

Suwon, EUSAK had a difficult time in trapping NKPA units fleeing north, bypassing many NKPA soldiers and units as large as battalions. While the US I Corps advanced north and joined the US X Corps around Seoul, the US EX Corps moved methodically west, northwest, and north, destroying and capturing NKPA soldiers and units along

206 the way imth it closed with, the other UNC units along the 38th Parallel in early

October 1950.

During the pursuit o f the NKPA across the 38th Parallel and into North Korea up to the Yalu River, Walker should have led with armor to exploit his advantages in

mobility and firepower and remained enemy-oriented to complete the destruction of the NKPA. Walker did continue to rely on Gay’s armor mentality and his armor-heavy

1 CAV Division to lead his attack; however, he focused on a terrain objective,

capturing P’yongyang, instead of an enemy objective of destroying the NKPA, and

subsequently allowed much of the pursued NKPA to escape into China.

Throughout the withdrawal firom North Korea, EUSAK faced a force with a

strength primarily in surprise and dismounted infantry, while Walker’s strength was in his firepower and mobility. Nevertheless, Walker failed to exploit his advantages and had little coordination among his corps at times, and the retreat took on the

appearance of a route in some instances, especially after evacuating P’yongyang.

Indeed, EUSAK lost contact with the CPVA during this period of its withdrawal, as

Walker had intended, and it was the CPVA, not EUSAK, that reestablished contact between the two forces. Thus, wlule Walker did evacuate his forces and retain much

of their political, strategic, and operational effectiveness, his method was disastrous firom both a tactical and morale perspective.

Despite the above-stated criticism, it is important to realize that EUSAK’s withdrawal firom North Korea was much less of a “bug out” than is generally thought.

Only portions of 2 ED “bugged out” and that was after being decimated a the “pass.”

207 The rest of EUSAK (1 CAV, 24 ED, & 25 ED) withdrew in good order, taking

approximately six weeks to retreat the 165 miles back to the 38th Parallel along jammed roads, which is an average of a little over four miles per day, as opposed to

the 15 days (9-23 October 1950) it took to go forward the same distance, equating to

an average of a little over thirteen miles per day. Consider, for example, the period 24

November-5 December 1950, during which perhaps the most sensational instances of

“bug outs” occurred. It took EUSAK approximately five days (20-24 October 1950)

to move forward firom P’yongyang to the Ch’ongchon River, while it took about

eleven days (24 November-5 December 1950) to retreat the same distance.^^ Walker’s

units also executed a systematic and methodical program of bridge destruction along their lines of retreat, suggesting that EUSAK’s withdrawal firom North Korea was

I used the Korean War maps contained in the newly printed fFest Point Atlas fo r Warfare Since 1945 (Avery Publishing Group, 1998, maps 115-II8. This atlas, compiled by the author and Steve R. Waddell, is not yet commercially available, although these particular maps have appeared in several other Avery publications over the past decade. The United States Military Academy’s master cartographer, Mr. Edward J. Krasnoborsld, created the maps, and they are meticulously researched and prepared, making them extremely reliable historical sources.) to determine the distances and dates used in this argument. One of my students, CDT Timothy Tehan, also corroborated this information using the unit histories of the 1 CAV, 2 ID, 24 ID, and 25 ED. While these are admittedly biased sources, little evidence exists anywhere to support the widespread claims of “bug outs” for any units other than two regiments of 2 ID caught in “the pass,” the 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments, and one Negro unit, 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, which was also part o f 2 ID. My preliminary research indicates that every sensational account of units “bugging out” during this period came from either the 9th or 38th Infantry Regiments of 2 ID, made public by S.L.A. Marshall’s popular book. The River and the Gauntlet (William Morrow & Company, 1953). Predictably, unit histories of I CAV, 24 ID, and 25 ID portray an orderly and methodical retreat from North Korea, particularly from south of P’yongyang back to the 38th Parallel. This is not surprising in and of itself, but what is startling is the lack of reported “bug outs” from any o f these divisions’ subordinate units in any contemporary or historical source. While further research in this area is needed, I suspect that my analysis will prove to be correct. I am indebted to CDT Timothy Tehan for bringing this issue to my attention and working with me to conduct the necessary research to support our jointly held hypothesis. For a less definitive discussion of EUSAK’s withdrawal, see also Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 416-450

208 anything but a disorganized retreat that resembled a flight.^ In actually, given

Walker’s lack o f control of his corps in October 1950, the withdrawal from

P’yongyang in the face of the attacking CPVA was probably much more orderly than the advance that led to its capture in the first place.

INTEGRATION EFFECTIVENESS

The first Eighth Army had two objectives with respect to integration: eject the

NKPA from South Korea and maintain the Republic of Korea’s sovereignty; and later, to destroy the NKPA and unify the Korean peninsula under a pro-western and non-

Communist government, if possible.

In July, EUSAK operations had little effectiveness, focused mainly on trying to avoid annihilation. StiU, by the end of the month, EUSAK was able to begin establishing the Pusan Perimeter so that by the beginning o f August, Walker’s forces were firmly situated in a very secure defensive position. Even though some felt that

EUSAK might still be forced off the peninsula, Ridgway, after his August 1950 visit, stated that the Eighth Army was not going anywhere and that it could hold.^^

In August, MacArthur completely shifted his focus, and thus that of the entire

FEC, from the Pusan Perimeter to the upcoming amphibious landing at Inchon. He

^ Burton, “Engineers at Kmm-n'’’ Military Review, 75, March 1995, p. 78.

Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 421-423;

209 lost touch to such an extent that he remarked, in early September 1950 during the

period of the war’s most costly fighting to date, that the situation within the perimeter

was “not critical.M eanw hile EUSAK was doing better, with some excellence, in

the Pusan Perimeter. Working to his own strengths. Walker developed a very

sophisticated mobile defense plan for the Pusan Perimeter that was successfixl in the

end but which is far too complex for most of his units to execute based on their level

of training. Thus, EUSAK’s initial operations in Korea and around the Pusan

Perimeter supported the first objective because Walker was able to prevent the NKPA

fi"om achieving a complete victory while also allowing the UNC to build up its strength

in anticipation of taking the offensive.

By September, MacArthur was completely focused on winning an old style

victory by capturing the ROK capital of Seoul. As the senior ground operational

commander (since he alone commanded the Eighth Army and the X Corps),

MacArthur failed to plan effectively for the X Corps - EUSAK link-up, as was his

responsibility. This should have been the most important aspect of the Inchon

landing, deserving a significant planning effort and a detailed plan for its execution, as

it was the decisive point of the entire operation. For some reason, MacArthur

suddenly no longer believed that linking up with the Eighth Army elements moving north fi'om Pusan was essential to the success of the Inchon landing. He stated, “The prompt juncture of our two forces, while it would be dramatically symbohc of the

^ Blair, The Forgotten (Far, p. 263.

210 complete collapse of the enemy, is not a vital part of the operation.”^^ This is an incredible change of heart and is conçletely at odds with the entire reason for launching such a daring maneuver in the first place. Nor does it suggest support for

MacArthur’s own strategy of annihilation, as it emphasizes the capture of Seoul at the expense of the destruction of the NKPA.

These instances provide further evidence of MacArthur’s shortcomings as a tactician and his inability to function well as a ground commander. As historians D.

Clayton James and Ronald H. Spector point out, MacArthur, acting impulsively, made a number of judgmental errors in World War U as weU. Spector goes on to write that,

“despite his undoubted quafities of leadership, MacArthur was unsuited by temperament, character, and judgment for the positions of high command which he occupied throughout [World War II].”®® While this is perhaps too harsh a judgment,

MacArthur, nonetheless, does not measure up as a ground co m m ander or planner in this instance. It appears that MacArthur lost his focus on the proper enemy center of gravity, the NKPA, and instead focused on capturing the capital cities of Seoul and later P’yongyang (much like Mark W. Clark in Italy during the spring and early summer of 1944 in World War II), apparently believing that their capture was more important than completing the destruction the NKPA and that these actions would

Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 263.

Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the San: The American War with Japan (New York The Free Press, 1985), pp. xiv-xv.

211 compel the North Koreans to sue for peace. MacArthur was focusing on terrain objectives when he should have been focusing on the enemy.

During the month of September, EUSAK’s performance was fair in the first part of the breakout firom Pusan (16-22 September 1950), and improved in subsequent operations during the second half of the month. Despite this judgment, its link-up with

X Corps and trapping and destruction of remaining NKPA units not particularly well done, owing as much to MacArthur's lack of planning as to Walker’s and Almond’s own failings. In relative terms, the Eighth Army destroyed or captured 239 T-34 tanks and 74 self-propelled 76 mm guns while losing 60 tanks during the period 26

September-21 October 1950. Of the 239 tanks, 154 were destroyed, 102 by air action and at least 52 by ground action. The figure o f239 T-34 tanks represents almost every tank available to the NKPA, meaning that very few tanks escaped across the 38*

Parallel.In the end, the Eighth Army’s breakout firom the Pusan Perimeter, led by the US I Corps, fiuther supported the first objective, while the subsequent operations of American units, especially the US DC Corps, remained focused on destroying NKPA and thus supported both objectives.

MacArthur, in October, had no simple plan for exploiting the bichon landing’s gains or the successes of EUSAK and X Corps. As a result of the complex nature of withdrawing the US X Corps and conducting another amphibious landing on Korea’s eastern coast near Wonson, he lost sight of his primary objective, the destruction of the NKPA. MacArthur instead focused on capturing P’yongyang and securing the

Appleman, South to the Maktong, North to the Yalu, p. 602.

212 P’yongyang-Wonson line, demonstrating that he retained his focus on terrain instead of enemy objectives, trying again to obtain an old style victory that culminated with the capture of the enemy’s capital, as the US had done to Japan in World War II. He, along with Walker, developed plans that were 6 r too difficult for his forces to execute in the time allowed. His deployment of the US X Corps in an amphibious landing on the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula prevented two US divisions from perhaps completing the destruction of the NKPA, and his guidance to Walker to focus on capturing P’yongyang resulted in Walker developing a plan which the other two US divisions ( 1 CAV and 24'*' ID) were more concerned with reaching the capital than with trapping and destroying the remaining NKPA forces.^* Again, there existed a clear mismatch between MacArthur’s stated strategy of annihilation and his actions, which better supported a terrain-oriented approach. For EUSAK’s part. Walker continued to develop plans far too sophisticated for his units to execute.The US I

Corps’ attacks up to P’yongyang were poorly coordinated, conducted, and executed by Milbiun, equating basically to a race to see which unit could get there first, much like the race to the Rhine in the ETO during World War n. However, the US I Corps performed well during its advance beyond P’yongyang to Yalu in November, and

Milbum did a particularly good job coordinating his units withdrawal to P’yongyang.

Similarly, Coulter’s IX Corps operations were adequate during the advance up to

Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 350-351.

” Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 352.

213 Ch’ongchon River, but Coulter’s performance in. particular was very poor during the entire CPVA Second Phase Offensive.

Thus, EUSAK’s crossing-of the 38th Parallel primarily supported the second objective; however, during the period 9-19 October 1950, Walker, the US I Corps, and the ROK I and H Corps replaced an enemy-orientated approach with a terrain- orientated advance focused on capturing P’yongyang, while the US IX Corps continued to remain focused on destroying the NKPA in South Korea. After capturing P’yongyang, all four of EUSAK’s corps oriented more on completing the drive to Yalu River and xmifying the peninsula and less on destroying the NKPA. This orientation was legitimate but unfortunate, as it inverted the priority of the UN’s intended missions for the Eighth Army.

In the last month of 1950, MacArthur had so fragmented the UNC that the

CPVA was able to obtain local superiority in their Second Phase Offensive against both EUSAK and X Corps. Compounding this error, MacArthur did not give much guidance to Walker during the withdrawal from North Korea. As a result, during

EUSAK’s withdrawal from P’yongyang to just north of Seoul, both of Walker’s corps broke contact with the enemy. Also by this time, MacArthur had stopped directing tactical operations, as he had been doing since late-September 1950, and he never resumed this role again. Thus, by late-December 1950, the Eighth Army had completely surrendered the operational initiative to the enemy, and it was a thoroughly demoralized outfit that did not give any indication that it could even defend itself let alone defeat the CPVA. It appears that in the wake of the Communists’ Second Phase

214 Offensive, the Eighth Army’ withdrawal focused on protecting its soldiers and units

and maintaining ROK sovereignty, disregarding almost congletely its objective of

destroying the NKPA or imifying peninsula.

Overall, EUSAK’s operations tended to support its first objective well during the period 13 July-9 October 1950, continued to support both objectives during the period 9 October-24 November 1950, despite inverting the priority and adopting a

somewhat misguided orientation, and supported the first objective while largely failing to support the second objective at all during the period 25 November-25 December

1950.

The other significant aspect of integration, the effective combination and utilization of all available combat resources, included issues such as the coordination between the US I and IX Corps, combined arms integration among the infantry, armor, and artillery, coordination among the American, ROK, and aUied units, the

EUSAK-FEAF coordination for air operations, the integration of EUSAK and US X

Corps’ ground operations, logistics, and issues of race, but focused primarily on the

Eighth Army’s use of CAS, the integration of American and ROK Army units within the UNC, and the coordination of EUSAK and the US X Corps operations during

1950.

EUSAK made excellent use of CAS during 1950, and most operations were characterized by good combined arms integration, except that EUSAK was far too road-bound. Facing an army whose strength was in infantrymen, EUSAK was too focused on conducting highly mobile operations relying on tanks and trucks instead of

215 making the best use of the available terrain. However, EUSAK’s mobility was one of its great advantages over the NKPA, so Walker was somewhat justified in exploiting this advantage. Nevertheless, it was perhaps emphasized too much at the expense of standard infantry operations that made better use of the terrain. EUSAK also made excellent use of ROK Army units, although commanders tended to accept too much risk when using their ROK Army and Alhed units. EUSAK also suffered firom too much World War H-ETO influence, with its emphasis on fast-paced operations with looser infantry-armor-artillery coordination, and had too httle World War H-PTO influence, with its emphasis on slower paced operations using very tight infantry- armor-artillery coordination.

In July and August 1950, the most important integration aspect was integrating

ROK Army and American forces into a coherent whole. Walker did particularly well in accomplishing this difficult task, and he divided up responsibility for areas along the

Pusan Perimeter and supplemented the ROK Army units with American units, leadership, and equipment as necessary to ensure the best possible integration.

From September to December 1950, the most important integration aspect was coordinating the activities of EUSAK and the US X Corps. Walker was not too successful in this area, mostly because MacArthur tried to do this himself and did not let Walker even try. As an example of the Eighth Army’s ineffectiveness in this area, consider the EUSAK-US X Corps link-up after the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and Operation CHROMITE, during which the UNC forces failed to trap the majority of the NKPA units and soldiers trying to retreat north. Nevertheless, the UNC was

216 successful in preventing almost aU of the NKPA’s tanks from escaping to the north.

Afterwards, neither the UNC’s advance into North Korea aor its retreat back to the

38th Parallel was very well coordinated among American, allied, or ROK Army units.

PROTECTION EFFECTIVENESS

When examining perhaps the most important aspect of protection effectiveness, one is struck by the fact that Walker had virtually no influence on decisions made at the political level during the period of the first Eighth Army.

Bradley did not think that Walker was “the ideal commander for the situation.

Bradley also felt that “MacArthur quickly lost faith in [Walker]; but instead of relieving him, he made the mistake of trying to second-guess him and run the tactical ground war from Tokyo.”^°‘ This was most apparent in the JCS’ rejection of his

Kunsan plan in favor of MacArthur’s Inchon plan. Nevertheless, the success of the actions of the Eighth Army during the September 1950 breakout from the Pusan

Perimeter, along with those of the US X Corps during the Inchon landing, persuaded

US and UN leaders to alter their political aims and adopt a goal of uniting the Korean

Bradley, A General’s Life, p. 543.

Ibid.

217 peninsula under one democratic ruler. The United Nations formally expressed its position in their resolution of 7 October 1950.^°^

Throughout these deliberations and the discussions regarding the wisdom of

crossing the 38th Parallel to extend and complete the NKPA’s destruction. Walker had virtually no voice. The decision to cross the 38th Parallel and adopt a more ambitious political goal for the Korean War was made almost exclusively from information provided by and discussions with MacArthur. Roy Appleman offers the best evidence in support of this assertion, stating that

Of aU the intelligence levels of the U.N. command and the American government, perhaps the most decisive in evaluating the intention and capability of Chinese intervention in the Korean War was that of the Far East Command in Tokyo. The evaluation by General MacArthur and his intelligence officers of Chinese intervention and Chinese military capability in Korea in October and November 1950 seems to have been the determining factor in shaping the future course of U.N. military action in that country.

Other sources, such as Bradley and Collins, corroborate Appleman’s opinion, as both stated that the JCS received about 90 percent of its Korean War intelligence during this period from MacArthur’s headquarters. Apparently, the Central Intelligence

Agency’s assessment was either inconclusive or it coincided with MacArthur’s.

James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs o f Staff and National Policy, Volume HI, The Korean War, Part I, in The History o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff series (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979), pp. 244-245, hereinafter cited as Schnabel and Watson, History o f the JCS, Volume III.

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 757.

Bradley, /I Soldier's Life, pp. 561; and Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 173.

218 Summing up MacArthur’s virtual dominance in this area, Appleman states that “[t]he conclusion, then, is that in the developing situation of November [1950] the views of the Far East Command were decisive on the military course to be taken in Korea at that time,” further supporting claims of MacArthur’s almost complete involvement with and participation in making the determination to pursue the retreating NKPA and invade North Korea.

The decision to retreat from North Korea in the wake of the Communists’

Second Phase Offensive was made in a very similar manner, as Walker’s opinions were again not solicited by anyone of importance.‘°® Indeed, Bradley believed that the JCS should have relived Walker in early December 1950, indicating that by this time the

Army’s senior leadership had almost no confidence at all in Walker as a battlefield commander. Only Walker’s untimely death prevented the JCS from taking such a drastic step. Thus during the period when the actions of EUSAK had perhaps the greatest influence at the political level, it was MacArthur, because he was directly controlling the actions of EUSAK and X Corps, and not Walker who had the greatest influence during the period of the first EUSAK.

It is also valuable to examine the impact that the first Eighth Army had on the

Communists’, especially the Chinese, political objectives. This kind of analysis has

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 757; Schnabel and Watson, History o f the JCS, Volume IE, The Korean War, Part I, pp. 240-249; Bradley, >1 Soldier's Life, p. 561; and Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 173.

Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, pp. 274-278.

Bradley, A Soldier's Life, p. 604.

219 only become possible recently wrth the opening of many Soviet archives. When working with some newly released materials, the Chinese scholar Shen Zhihua discovered a 2 October 1950 telegram by Chinese Premier Mao Zedong to Soviet

Premier Josef Stalin that contained some startling information. In this telegram, Mao writes the following:

If [Communist Chinese] troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the revolutionary front and China, even though the second question ([the possibility] that the United States would declare war on China) would still remain as a serious issue. In other words, the Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of [the] American troops (although the war might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of [North] Korea for a long period.) If this occurs, even though the United States had declared war on China, the ongoing confrontation would not be on a large-scale, nor would it last very long. We consider that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental to China’s economic reconstruction already under way, and would cause dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people {who are absolutely afraid ofwar.)^°*

This document clearly indicates that, after having decided to intervene in Korea, the worst possible battlefield outcome from the Chinese perspective was a situation in

Shen Zhihua, translated by Chen Jian, ‘The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions o f Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean Wan A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,” Cold War International History Project, Electronic Bulletin, Bulletin 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, cited at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a22.htm, pp. 2-3, emphasis added.

220 which the fighting in Korea bogged down into a relatively static contest between two largely immobile forces. The specific battlefield objective of the CPVA was to destroy all or part of the US Army in Korea, beginning by conçletely and thoroughly destroying an entire US corps. The Communists’ Second Phase Offensive did succeed in virtually wiping out the ROK Army EE Corps, destroying large number of

American troops, and the battlefield situation in Korea remained fairly fluid from the time of the CPVA’s entry in late 1950 until spring 1951, meaning that the first

EUSAK was not able to have much impact on the Communists’ decisions at the political level.

As an emerging entity, the First Eighth Army, during the period 13 July-25

December 1950, can best be characterized as a developing organization, beginning the period by assuming a unique Korean War character, followed by periods of constant growth and intense fighting. After deploying three of its four habitually assigned infantry divisions to Korea, the Eighth Army absorbed one new infantry division (2 ID) during its first thirty days, integrated what amounted to two new corps headquarters (I and IX Corps) during its first sixty days, and received twelve units of various size from

UN allies during its first ninety days. Thus, the first EUSAK was not a mature organization by any measure during its period of existence, yet it had to fight some of the Korean War’s most desperate actions.

Ibid. The actual text of the memorandum refers to the complete and thorough destruction of one [American] army, but one must keep in mind that the echelons referred to by the Chinese Communists’ were generally one level above their American counterparts.

221 The chronology of arriving units during the first six months of the war illustrates the developing nature of the Eighth Army as an organization. This development occurred in two stages. The chart below shows the first stage of this development, the arrival of American units, which lasted firom the beginning of July to late-September 1950:

222 Ï M y l9 5 ô US 24 ID Partially Partially Partially Trained Manned Eqiripped iO-tSJiiîyî^SO US 25 ED Partially E’artially Partially . : ...... ' Trained Marmed Equipped Eighth US Army in Trained Fully Manned Partially Korea (EUSAK) Equipped established 18-22 M y 1950 US I CAV Partially Partially Partially Trained Marmed Equipped 24J«ly J950 29th RCT (-) Partially Partially Partially (no HQ, only 2 bns) Trained Marmed Equipped 5Ü1RCT Partially Partially Partially Trained Manned Equipped 2 Augast 1950 1st Provisional Fully Trained Partially Fully Marine Brigade Marmed Equipped (departs EUSAK 13 (Bns had 2 SEP 50) rather than 3 authzd rifle COs) 2 August 1950 US I Corps Activated Partially Partially Partially at Fort Bragg. NC Trained Marmed Equipped 10 Aagust 1950 US IX Corps Untrained Partially Partially Activated at Fort Marmed Equipped Sheridan, IL 19 August 1950 US 2 ID Partially Partially Partially Trained Marmed Equipped 13 September US I Corps Partially Partially Partially 1950 operational in Korea Trained Marmed Equipped 22 Sej«ember 65th RCT Partially Partially Partially 1950 Trained Marmed Equipped 23 September US EX Corps Untrained Partially Partially 1950 operational in Korea Marmed Equipped

Table 20. Arrival and Status of American Units in Korea, 1950 110

110 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, passim.

223 As the table above shows, during the withdrawal south and the fighting in and around the Pusan. Perimeter, the Eighth Army received four infantry divisions, none of which was fully trained, manned, or equipped, and one well-trained and well-equipped but understrength Marine brigade. In addition, many smaller units arrived in Korea during this period, including several infantry, armor, and artillery battahons as well as numerous combat support and combat service support units. Furthermore, I Corps did not even become operational until just three days before the breakout. Finally

EUSAK’s other US corps, DC Corps, did not become operational until one week after the breakout began and after the operation’s most difficult fighting, which lasted firom

16-22 September 1950, was over. Even when operational, this corps was almost completely untrained and lacked significant personnel and equipment.

Although the size of Walker’s forces greatly increased during July and August

1950, most of the units he received were not well trained, well equipped or at their authorized personnel strength when they arrived in Korea. In addition. Walker had to control all of the units by himself imlil his two corps headquarters became operational.

One can best characterize the Eighth Army during this first stage of development as an organization that was fighting while growing.

Phase n of the Eighth Army’s development began at the end of August when

United Nations’ forces of various sizes and functions started to arrive in Korea. The charts below show the second stage of this development, the arrival of Allied units, which lasted from the late-August to mid-December 1950:

224 1>AT^

29 August 27th British Fully Trained Fully Manned Fully Equipped Î9S0 Infantry Brigade (-1,500 (becomes 27th soldiers) Commonwealth infantry brigade Brigade on 2 w/ 3 infantry OCT 50) battalions & headquarters 19 S o m b e r. 10th Battalion Untrained Fully Maimed Partially Equipped 1951} Combat Team (-1,243 (BCT), Philippine soldiers) Expeditionary infantry Force to Korea battalion 23 S^tembef Swedish Red Fully Trained Fully Manned Fully Equipped Ï950 Cross Hospital (-168 personnel) detachment l Ü É liÉ H lÉ ^ 3rd Battalion, Fully Trained Fully Manned Fully Equipped 1950 Royal Australian (-1,038 Regiment soldiers) infantry battalion 1st Turkish Partially Fully Manned Partially Equipped 1950 Armed Forces Trained (-4,604 Command soldiers) infantry brigade & headquarters

Table 21. Arrivai and Status of Allied Units in Korea, August-October 1950 111

Maj. William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Co-Operation Owing Combat Operations, History of the Korean War, Military History Section, Headquarters, Far East Command (Washington, DC: OflBce of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952), pp. 231-236; The War History Compilation Committee of the Republic of Korea,The History o f the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, vol. II (Seoul, ROK: The Ministry of National Defense, 1973), pp. 751-752.

225 3 November UK 29th Infentry FuUy Trained Fully Maimed Fully Equipped Brigade Group (-8,000 soldiers) reinforced infantry brigade w/ 5 infantry battalions & headquarters 7 November Thai 21st Infantry Untrained Fully Marmed Partially Equipped Î950 Regiment (-1,217 soldiers) infantry battalion & headquarters # 0 W # W 0 # # Indian 60th Field Fully Trained Fully Marmed Fully Equipped 1950 Ambulance and (—326 soldiers) Surgical Unit 24 November Netherlands Partially Fully Marmed Fully Equipped 1950 Detachment, Trained (needed (—740 soldiers) United Nations only orientation infantry training) battalion 29 November French Infantry Partially Fully Marmed Fully Equipped 1950 Battalion T rained (needed (-1,050 only orientation soldiers) training) infantry battalion & headquarters Oî>ecem6ef Greek Partially Fully Marmed Fully Equipped 1950 Expeditionary Trained (needed (—849 soldiers) Force only orientation infantry training) battalion ÎS- Daçember 2nd Battalion, Partially Fully Marmed Partially Equipped 1950 Princess Patricia’s Trained (-1,150 Canadian Light soldiers) Infantry infantry battalion

Table 22. Arrival and Status o f Allied Units in Korea, November-December 1950 112

112 Ibid.

226 As the charts above show, the Eighth Army received over 20,000 soldiers from eleven different countries during this period, most of which were combat troops.

However, with the exception of units supplied by Great Britain, all of the combat units required additional training and/or equipment before they were ready for battle.

The difiBculties involved in getting the Philippine battalion organized, equipped, and trained for battle after its arrival in September 1950 prompted the Eighth Army to establish a United Nations Reception Center as a location for Allied units to assemble and to ensure that a basic continuity existed among Eighth Army units with respect to many military concerns. Among a myriad of issues. Eighth Army had to solve problems involving different languages, differing staff tactical, artillery, air, and armor concepts, and attempt to integrate many disparate systems of replacements, rotation, liaison, communications, medical evacuation, and supply into a coherent whole. Since

X Corps did not receive any Allied units during its period as an independent unit except a Royal Marine commando unit for the United Kingdom, the Eighth Army had to solve almost all of the problems involved with creating an international force and integrating Allied units on its own. Additionally, since the Allied units arrived at different times, they had to be phased into the fighting as they became available. As a result of the changing battlefield situation during this period, some of the units that arrived earliest could not be given the same careful consideration as the later arrivals."" Fortunately for the Eighth Army, many of these units came from Great

Maj. William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Co-Operation During Combat Operations, History of the Korean War, Military History Section, Headquarters, Far East Command (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952), pp. 51-54.

227 Britain and were ready for immediate participation in combat operations. As the

Eighth. Army’s experience with the Philippine battalion demonstrated, the Eighth Army was not so lucky with units arriving from other Allied nations. To make better use of these outfits, the Eighth Army began in December to assign Allied units more or less

“permanently” to a particular American division with the expectation that the

Americans would help train and maintain these units while also developing a habitual relationship with each other, which would in turn increase cohesion among Eighth

Army units. Although this program was formalized in December 1950, it did not really begin to have any effect until 1951.““^

Coupled with the relatively poor state of training of the American units, one can thus conclude that the Eighth Army was not a mature organization during 1950.

This organization spent much of the period conducting some of the most difficult military operations, fighting a mobile defense, conducting pursuits, and executing a withdrawal under pressure, with relatively untrained units. This suggests that, rather than damning the Eighth Army for its less than stellar performance during 1950, perhaps one should be impressed that the army could accomplish what it did using partially trained and recently arrived units, fighting while growing.

Maj. William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Co-Operation During Combat Operations, History of the Korean War, Military History Section, Headquarters, Far East Command (Washington, DC: OfBce of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952), pp. 51-57. 228 OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

The Eighth. Army does not emerge as a particularly effective military organization during the last half of 1950. The table below summarizes the criteria used to conduct this evaluation and the Eighth Army’s rating in each.

229 AREA

Leadership Effective leadership Marginally

Effective

Access to manpower in required quantity and quality Marginally Effective

Admin Logistical supportability of operational activities Marginally Effective

Logistical supportability of tactical activities Marginally Effective

Firepower Maximize firepower strengths and minimize weaknesses Marginally Effective

Maneuver Placing army’s strengths against enemy’s weaknesses Marginally Effective

Strategic objectives’ ability to secure political goals Marginally Effective

Integration Consistency of operational concepts with strategic goals Marginally Effective

Integration of operational methods Marginally Effective

Protection Ability to influence the adoption of logical military goals Not

Effective

Consistency of force’s composition with actions and goals Marginally Effective

Table 23. Combat Effectiveness Summary

230 As the table shows, the Eighth Army was not always able to transform resources into combat power in every area, entitling it to an overall rating as a marginally effective military unit.

Of particular note was Walker’s inability to influence the decisions of his superiors during 1950. Since EUSAK was an organization that was fighting while growing. Walker was perhaps the only individual able to provide a truly accurate assessment of its capabilities. However, Walker himself misread the organization and tried to conduct operations that were perhaps too complex, given the overall level of training for many units. Integration also proved to be a difficult challenge for Walker, especially matching EUSAK’s operational methods to the strategy and strategic objectives. When conducting operations, although EUSAK possessed communications equipment far superior to that of the Communists, Walker and his subordinates were not always able to exploit this advantage because of supply, maintenance, and integration problems. For the most part, the Eighth Army’s replacements did not arrive to their units very well trained, and, given the nature of the war’s first six months, there was little thatcommanders could do to rectify this situation. In addition, the Eighth Army’s logistical status did not allow it to conduct the kind of war that soldiers and commanders wanted. Perhaps most importantly, the

Eighth Army’s leadership was not the best that the Army could provide and in many cases key individuals were not up to the tasks demanded of them

Thus 1950 was not a good year for EUSAK, and the first Eighth Army was at best a marginally effective organization that managed not to lose during the war’s first

231 six months. Its fortunes would change dramatically in 1951, beginning with the arrival of a new commander and the addition of another seasoned corps, so that by November

1951, EUSAK had become one o f the most potent, lethal, and combat effective forces of the entire Cold War.

232 CHAPTER 6

THE SECOND EUSAK 26 DECEMBER 1 9 5 0 - 1 2 NOVEMBER 1951: THE ARMY THAT WINS THE KOREAN WAR

Korean War Overview 26 December 1950 - 12 November 1951

The second Eighth Army came into being on 26 December 1950. This date is significant for two reasons: Matthew B. Ridgway took over as the EUSAK commander, and the US X Corps ended its independent existence and ofiBcially became part of the Eighth Army. This day provided the Eighth Army with one of the most outstanding American field army commanders of the century, and it significantly increased the assets available to EUSAK to conduct its combat operations, as the US

X Corps had the US 3 ID and 7 ID assigned to h, as well as the hard-fighting 1st US

Marine Division. Nevertheless, before Ridgway could begin making use of these additional assets, he first had to prepare to absorb the Chinese Third Phase Offensive, lasting from 3 1 December 1950-6 January 1951, which compelled the UNC to evacuate Seoul and retreat farther south down the Korean peninsula. More than any other event, this withdrawal demonstrated the depths to which the Eighth Army’s combat effectiveness had sunk during winter 1950-1951.

233 Realizing that the Communist forces were not pursuing EUSAK, Ridgway halted the withdrawal on 7 January 1951 and began planning regimental-sized reconnaissances in force to reestablish contact with the enemy. This effort commenced on 15-16 January 1951 with the US I Corps’ Operation WOLFHOUND and continued with the DC Corps’ Task Force Johnson on 22 January 1951, both of which showed that few enemy forces were anywhere near the Eighth Army’s current position. Based on the success of these two missions and as a way of gathering more intelligence and improving the confidence of his dispirited command, Ridgway ordered the execution of Operation THUNDERBOLT to begin on 25 January 1951. This operation largely expanded the scope of WOLFHOUND and Task Force Johnson by having the US I and DC Corps launch simultaneous division-sized reconnaissances in force, thus marking the beginning of Ridgway’s almost continuous multi-corps operations. Operation THUNDERBOLT lasted from 25 January 1951 to 11 Febmary

1951, and it evolved into a fiiU-fledged attack by 30 January 1951. Having moved his two western-most corps a significant distance north, Ridgway launched Operation

ROUNDUP on 5 February 1951 to bring the US X Corps, which had been covering the right flank of Operation THUNDERBOLT, on line with the rest of his army by 11

February 1951. The Communists responded to these advances by launching their

Fourth Phase Offensive in mid-February 1951, which the Eighth Army easily rebuffed.

Having done much to restore the fighting confidence of the Eighth Army and believing that the time was right to mount an even larger attack, Ridgway launched the

Army-wide Operation KILLER between 20 Febmary 1951 and 6 March 1951 to

234 continue the UNC advance toward the 38th Parallel Building on the success of

Operation KELLER, Ridgway followed it up immediately with Operation RIPPER, a tightly controlled Army-wide attack lasting from 7 March 1951 to 25 March 1951 that allowed the UNC to cross the Han River and recapture Seoul This operation brought

Allied forces north to the 38th Parallel and demonstrated the renewed combat power of the Eighth Army. Ridgway also launched Operation COURAGEOUS between 22-

31 March 1951 as a supplement to RIPPER and as an attempt to trap a large number of NKPA soldiers. By the end of March 1951, Ridgway had the entire Eighth Army in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, while the majority of Communist forces were out of

South Korea, north of the 38th Parallel, and thus beyond the reach of the Eighth

Army’s ground units.

The success of this series of operations, however, forced the United Nations to again face the dilemma of crossing the 38th Parallel Having decided to re-cross the

38th Parallel the UN authorized Ridgway to conduct operations in North Korea, believing that a military stalemate would develop shortly and wanting to be in a strong negotiating position when this occurred. * Focusing on the terrain immediately north of the 38th Parallel, Ridgway identified an area bounded by the towns of P’yonggang in the north, Ch’orwon in the west, and Kumhwa in the east as an area of critical

^ The UN remained committed to unifying the Korean peninsula under a single, pro-western government, but in 1951 the UN began to pursue tliis goal through primarily diplomatic and political means, thus removing it from EUSAK’s ability to achieve. NSC 48/5 stated these desires explicitly in April 1951, meaning that the UNC and EUSAK spent the remainder of the war trying to achieve a strategic objective through military force that differed from the conflict’s political goal. Schnabel and Watson, History o f the JCS, Volume EH, The Korean War, Part I, pp. 466-468, 477-482.

235 importance to the Communists. This “Iron Triangle,” as the media called it, was important because of its central location and the fact that it was a road and rail complex twenty to thirty miles above the 38th Parallel in the diagonal corridor dividing the Taebaek Mountains into northern and southern ranges. Furthermore, since it functioned as a unique center of communications for the Communists, it was vital that the enemy retain control of it to facilitate resupply and coordination efforts.^

Accordingly, Ridgway latmched Operations DAUNTLESS and RUGGED between 1-22 April 1951 to capture the ‘Tron Triangle and bring the entire UNC across the 38th Parallel and into advantageous defensive positions in North Korea designed as Line KANSAS. During the conduct of these two operations. President

Harry S. Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur of his commands on 11 April

1951 and appointed Ridgway as his successor. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army on 14 April 1951 with DAUNTLESS and

RUGGED continuing all the while.

In the aftermath of MacArthur's relief and the UNC’s renewed attacks into

North Korea, the Communists responded with their largest and most determined attacks of the entire war, known as the Communist Fifth Phase Offensive and which occurred in two impulses. The First Impulse, which began on 22 April 1951 and lasted until 30 April 1951, was oriented on recapturing Seoul by converging roughly

270,000 Communist soldiers in a coordinated and deliberate attack to the south.

Although Eighth Army units surrendered control of the Iron Triangle and withdrew

Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 348-349.

236 between 20 and 35 miles to the south, the UN retained control of Seoul, thus

preventing the Communists from achieving the main objective of their attack.

Determined to retake Seoul at almost any cost, since several Chinese leaders had

promised its capture as a May Day gift to Mao Tse-tung, the Communists launched

the Second Impulse of their Fifth Phase Offensive on 16 May 1951 and continued

fighting until they were past the point of exhaustion on 20 May 1951.

Van Fleet responded to the termination of the Second Impulse of the

Communists’ Fifth Phase Offensive with a ferocious counterattack between 20 May-

27 May 1951, intended to capture and destroy large numbers of enemy soldiers, and to prevent the Communists from reorganizing for the defense in the wake of their

consecutive substantial defeats.^ This counterattack was fairly effective; however, it failed to achieve all of its stated objectives. As a result, Van Fleet launched Operation

PILEDRIVER during the period 1-13 June 1951 to advance north methodically and reach the JCS-imposed limit of general advance (identified as Lines KANSAS and

WYOMING) in support of efforts to open cease-fire negotiations. Operation

PILEDRIVER achieved this objective, capturing the southern-most leg of the Iron

Triangle (between Ch’orwon and Kumhwa) and positions south of the desirable

‘Thmchbowl” area in the process.'* hi the aftermath of the Communists’ failed Fifth

Phase Offensive and Van Fleet’s vicious counterattack, the Soviet delegate to the UN,

Jacob Malik, provided the impetus to begin working toward a negotiated settlement.

^ Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 470, 485-487.

^ Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 485, 491-494.

237 Ridgway, with JCS backing, broadcast an invitation to begin negotiations to the

Communist forces leader on 30 June 1951, and talks began on 10 July 1951.

Combat operations in July 1951 consisted mainly of developing defenses along

the KANSAS and WYOMING Lines, with the KANSAS Line serving as the UNC’s

Main Line of Resistance (MLR), extensive patrolling, and a few limited objective

attacks oriented on the Iron Triangle and Punchbowl areas. In addition, Ridgway

directed General Otto P. Weyland, the new Far East Air Forces commander, to

continue his on-going air interdiction campaign. Operation STRANGLE, and to use

his assets to punish the enemy as much as possible during the negotiation luU. By 10

July 1951, the JCS removed the temporary restrictions imposed on Ridgway in June

1951 to limit how far EUSAK could advance and to gain prior approval before

conducting any major oSensive operation, and “Ridgway was free to continue ground

operations as he saw fit.”^

August 1951, with its heavy monsoon rains, saw EUSAK slow down, assume the defensive, and dig in so that by the end of the month. Line KANSAS was

considered impregnable by Van Fleet. The major tactical action of September 1951 was Operation CREEPER, executed by the ROKI-US X Corps during the latter half of August 1951, which allowed EUSAK’s eastern units to “elbow forward” to significantly better terrain from which to defend. This operation centered around the savage fights for “J” Ridge and Bloody Ridge, both of which were in UN hands by early September 1951. The battles with the enemy in August and September 1951

' Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 502-506.

238 showed that the Communist forces had affected a substantial change to their defensive

doctrine: instead of continuing to conduct their characteristic fluid defense in depth, the Communist now employed and American-style static defense constructed along an

MLR that maximized the impact of their available firepower.® Apparently, the

combination of punishing operations and constant pressure advocated by Ridgway and

Van Fleet were beginning to have a significant impact on the Communists’ defensive

doctrine.

In October 1951, the Eighth Army executed Operation COMMANDO,

designed to advance several miles beyond the KANSAS Line to provide better security for EUSAK’s supply lines. The most dramatic aspect of this general advance was the

success of the US X Corps’ 2 ID in the west-central sector, after an exhaustive month­

long effort, in seizing Heartbreak Ridge on 13 October 1951. hi the wake of these

costly operations designed to maintain constant pressure on the Communist forces,

substantive armistice negotiations began again on 25 October 1951. Based on a JCS

directive, Ridgway ordered the Eighth Army to assume the “active defense” on 12

November 1951, thus bringing to a close the period of the second Eighth Army.

® EUSAK Cmd Report, September 1951, Box 1243. Narrative, Section I, Supporting Documents, Section II, Book 2, Staff Sections, Chief of Staff and G-1, Command Report No. 10 dated 19 November 1951, pp. 1-8.

239 LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS

The superior leadership in the Eighth Army’s upper echelons explains much of the unit’s tremendous military effectiveness during this period. I will use the study’s criteria to conduct an assessment of three key leaders associated with the Eighth Army to illustrate this point. In assessing each leader, I will confine my study to only those criteria in which the individual was conspicuous (positively or negatively) from a military leadership perspective.

Ridgway

Matthew B. Ridgway is perhaps the most obvious example of a successful

Eighth Army leader. The son o f a U.S. Army colonel, Ridgway graduated from West

Point in 1917. Although he did not serve in a combat unit in World War I, Ridgway steadily progressed through the ranks in the peacetime army so that he was eligible to c o m m and a division when America entered World War II. As a pioneer of airborne warfare, Ridgway co mmanded the U.S. Army’s premier airborne division, the 82d

Airborne Division, and the XVTH Airborne Corps during World War II and established a reputation as a tough and intelligent leader who developed highly disciplined and capable units. Ridgway’s continued success after World War H ultimately led to his assignment as the U.S. Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and

Administration during the first six months of the Korean War. After his service in the

240 Far East, Ridgway went on to command the Western Allies’ North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) forces in Europe and concluded his military career in the

Army’s top position as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. He retired from the Army as a frdl general in 1955.

Of Ridgway’s arrival in Korea, author S.L.A_ Marshall wrote that:

[Ridgway’s] coming electrified the tired Eighth Army.... It was beaten when he took command; hopes had diminished throughout the nation; his superiors had lost confidence. His spirit and action shamed the doubters and restored faith—a prime example of the power of one man to change a situation decisively.’

Similarly, author Thomas Fleming asserts that Ridgway’s efforts during this period were so heroic that they qualify him for the title of the twentieth century’s most outstanding American general.^

Seniors and subordinates alike lavished praise upon Ridgway’s performance in revitalizing the battered Eighth Army, and he deserves much of the credit for the unit’s performance throughout this period. He had a unique “airborne” state of mind, which emphasized the conduct of dismounted infantry operations focused on small-unit infantry actions executed in the face of a superior enemy force, that allowed him to successfully assess the Eighth Army’s requirements from the outset of the new

' Frederick A. Hetzel and Harold L. Hitchens, “An Interview with General Matthew B. Ridgway,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 65:4, October 1982, p. 280, (quoted from an S.L.A. Marshall New York Times article).

* Fleming is something of a Ridgway worshiper, so one must assess his comments accordingly. Thomas Fleming, ‘The Man Who Saved Korea,”Military History Quarterly 5:2, Winter 1993, p. 54.

241 situation that he faced in early 1951. This situation “played to his strengths” as a

former airborne unit commander, which included planning and conducting infantry

reconnaissance patrols, raids, and attacks making the best use of terrain and

emphasizing the use of all available firepower, and he successfiiUy transitioned the

Eighth Army’s operations fi'om those of a mobile defense to operations more suited to

an outnumbered infantry-heavy force. Just as in Walker’s case, Ridgway was the

“right man at the right place at the right time” to execute the operational change.^ His

ability to immediately replace MacArthur as the UNC commander was also vitally

important to the war effort because it prevented the CPVA firom exploiting a tremendously significant change in leadership. Ridgway’s ability to create internal

constituencies was particularly germane to this discussion of leadership because

Ridgway was able to accomphsh what Walker was unable to do: replace old and ineffective leaders in both command and staff positions with younger and more capable leaders. Ridgway’s personal efforts to rebuild the Eighth Army’s staff also had a positive impact on the unit’s performance during the January-November 1951 period.

Finally, Ridgway had an intense desire to “make a difference” that amplified the excellent relationship between his leadership abilities and the required organizational tasks, and his arrival coincided with favorable historical conditions that allowed his achievements to become truly significant Thus the Eighth Army was fortunate to

’ Lynch Papers, letter to John Toland dated 5 May 1987, p. 3.; ‘Tim e, Space and Fighting Wars," unpublished article, pp. 7-9.

242 obtain an extremely effective leader at a critical time who was able to make a substantial contribution to the unit’s battlefield performance.

Despite Ridgway’s tremendous leadership capabilities, he could not bring about the transformation of the Eighth Army on his own nor was he solely responsible for its fulfillment. His successor, James A. Van Fleet, completed the army’s transformation.

Van Fleet

As an Army football star and member of the West Point class o f 1915 (dubbed

“the class the stars fell on” because of the disproportionate number of its members who achieved general officer rank), James A. Van Fleet seemed destined for greatness from the beghming of his professional life. After exceptional service as a World War I battahon commander, the twenty-six year old Van Fleet returned to the United States having earned a Silver Star for gallantry in action and expecting to further his already successfiil career. By a stroke of misfortune. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall developed an undeservedly low opinion of Van Fleet during the interwar period, confusing the teetotaling Van Fleet with an alcoholic officer who had a remarkably similar name (Van VKet), which effectively ended Van Fleet’s chances for promotion within the mobilized Army because the austere Marshall had little tolerance for officers with personal vices of any kind. Thereafter, Van Fleet’s career stood stiU throughout the 1940s as Marshall repeatedly thwarted any attempt to promote him. Only Van

Fleet’s magnificent D-day performance as a regimental commander on Utah Beach and

243 the determined efiforts of Generals Omar N. Bradley and J. Lawton Collins managed to clear up Marshall’s confiision and salvage Van Fleet’s career.

Van Fleet eventually overcame this handicap and commanded a division and corps in Europe during World War II, ending the war as one of the Army’s most respected combat leaders. After World War H, Van Fleet earned a reputation as an ardent opponent of communism while successfully directing Greek nationals to victory over Communist insurgents during the Greek Civil War. IBs assignment as the Eighth

Army’s commander seemed to be an ideal pairing and began well enough, but his mounting fiustrations with the Korean War’s limited aims caused him to retire as a full general in 1953, bitter and disappointed with America’s conduct of the war.

Van Fleet took control of the Eighth Army in mid-April 1951 and immediately impressed superiors and subordinates alike with his fighting spirit. Although he did not enjoy the same autonomy as the Eighth Army commander that Ridgway had. Van

Fleet was able to replace Ridgway to Ridgway’s standards and prevent a decline in the

Eighth Army’s morale and confidence. His ability to perform while under Ridgway’s close supervision eased the change of responsibilities for both and assuaged Ridgway’s apprehension as he relinquished control of his beloved fighting unit.

Collins, IVar in Peacetime, pp. 294-295; Forrest C. Pogue,George C. Marshall, vol. 4,Statesman 1945-1939 (New York; Viking Press, 1987), p. 98; and Bradley, A General's Life, p. 263.

“ After World War II ended, Eisenhower supported the view, held by many other officers, that Van Fleet was “the greatest fighting soldier this war has produced.” The Eisenhower Papers, vol. VI, p. 79.

244 The disagreement between Ridgway and Van Fleet over the political and psychological value of the city of Seoul and Van Fleet’s decision to do whatever was necessary to prevent its recapture by the Communists was the final and crucial factor in completing the Eighth Army’s rebirth. Ridgway’s previous experiences in the

Korean War prevented him fi-om realizing that his success had changed certain attitudes, which in turn had altered the intrinsic value that the Eighth Army soldiers attached to retaining Seoul in spring 1951. Most of the Allies realized that the majority of the territory in Korea was meaningless, and Ridgway operated under this premise during the entire period of his command of the Eighth Army. From the

Koreans’ perspective, however, a Communist recapture of Seoul would have represented a military defeat of the first order and would have ruined Ridgway’s four previous months of work in revitalizing the army. Van Fleet recognized the soldiers’ feelings and responded to them by vowing to protect the city fi-om a Communist recapture. The Eighth Army’s subsequent successful defense of Seoul in April 1951 became one of the unit’s most significant victories of the war. It became increasingly evident that, while Ridgway merely tolerated the Koreans, Van fleet actually Hked them, and one suspects that the Korean themselves were perhaps among the first to identify this subtle but crucial difference between the two commanders. Van Fleet’s

James A. Van Fleet, ‘The Truth About Korea; From a Man Now Free to Speak (part I),”Life, May 11 1953, p. 131.

" Ridgway freely admitted that he preferred to serve in Europe, and he readily accepted the opportunity to give up command of the FEC and UNC to replace Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. One suspects that this attitude was apparent to those around Ridgway throughout his time of service in the Far East. By contrast. Van Fleet enjoyed his time in Korea, and the ROK’s decision to honor him and not Ridgway with a statue at the Korean Military Academy 245 ability to establish a positive rapport with the Eighth Army while operating under

Ridgway's intense scrutiny and to recognize the increased political and psychological value of Seoul’s retention was absolutely essential in completing the Eighth Army’s rebirth and contributed greatly to its outstanding combat effectiveness.

At its core, the Eighth Army’s rebirth and ability to perform at such an incredibly high level of combat effectiveness during the first part of 1951 was a demonstration of the power that positive leadership can exert over an organization.

Van Fleet summed up the results of the Eighth Army’s tremendous leadership effectiveness during this period when he offered the following impressions of his unit in spring 1951:

[The] Eighth Army had reached a peak which it never quite achieved either before or since. It was a truly magnificent outfit....If you have ever lived with troops, as I had in World War I, World War n , and in Greece, you can very quickly get the feel of an army. You can actually just take a fairly fast jeep ride through its installations, stop for a word or two here and there, and at the end of the day have a pretty accurate idea of how well it will do in combat. Everywhere I went to inspect the Eighth Army my spirits rose. I would shout ‘TB. soldier!” and back would come a grin, a salute and a “EG. General!” The whole atmosphere was alert, well disciplined, fiiendly, confident. Once a corporal asked me in all seriousness, “What’s holding us suggests that they reciprocated Van Fleet’s feelings as well. I am indebted to Dr. Allan R. Millett for bringing this to my attention.

It is interesting to note that although Eisenhower and Bradley expressed extremely high praise for Van Fleet’s leadership abilities, Marshall disapproved a recommendation to promote Van Fleet to the rank of permanent brigadier general before the end of World War H. Several authors have also implied that Ridgway disliked Van Fleet and did not consider him to be a particularly able commander. Although Ridgway explicitly denies this insinuation, it is possible that Ridgway may have viewed Marshall’s action as proof of his own misgivings regarding Van Fleet’s leadership abilities. This might explain Ridgway’s decision to adopt his unique approach to Van Fleet as a subordinate. The Eisenhower Papers, vol. VI, p. 427; William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 242-243.

246 back General? Why don’t we get it over with?” In place after place I talked to young second lieutenants with grim, set ftghting jaws—and I knew our army was ready.

Had any one o f the two individuals examined been unequal to the task, the outcome of the entire Korean War might have been decidedly different. The combination of the leadership provided by Ridgway and Van Fleet, in conjunction with other elements of combat power, prevented a Communist victory in Korea.

As the preceding evaluations suggest, both of the individuals examined qualify as effective leaders. Their abihty to identify and protect their organization’s areas of vulnerability was an important common trait among the commanders. Additionally, one must acknowledge their abilities to develop and maintain internal constituencies and to employ their units according to the organization’s abilities, their technical and tactical expertise, and their exceptional abilities as motivators and traiaers.

Eighth Army Staff

Authors Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft observed that American military units demonstrate an endemic weakness in their ability to provide adequate command and control for the country’s initial combat operations at the beginning of every American war.^^ This observation applies to the capabilities of the Eighth

"Ibid.

" Charles E. Heller and William A. Stoffi, America’s First Battles 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press o f Kansas, 1986), pp. 329-332.

247 Army’s stafiF during the first six months of the Korean. War. Ridgway addressed this weakness by rebuilding the Eighth Army’s staff during late 1950 and early 1951.

As the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration,

Ridgway visited the Eighth Army in Korea in August 1950 to familiarize himself with the area of operations, evaluate the units’ performances, and provide what assistance he could. One of his recommendations to the Army chief of staff was to strengthen the Eighth Army’s staff by immediately replacing several of its key officers. The original personnel (G-1), intelligence (G-2), and logistics (G-4) officers remained hi their positions, but in August 1950 Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen replaced CoL Eugene M.

Landrum as the Eighth Army’s Chief of Staff and Col. John A. Dabney replaced Col.

WiUiam H. Bartlett as the Eighth Army’s operations officer (G-3). The arrival of these two officers greatly improved the Eighth Army staff’s ability to plan and coordinate the unit’s actions in 1950. By the early part of January 1951, Ridgway made further changes to the staff by replacing Dabney as his G-3 with Col. Gilman C.

Mudgett and augmenting the Eighth Army’s ability to develop combat plans with the assignment of Lt. CoL A. Day Surles as the G-3’s chief war planner.

Ridgway felt that Landrum was too old to coordinate the Eighth Army’s staff activities and was not impressed by Bartlett’s performance. Allen and Dabney both had reputations as smart and competent ofiBcers. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 382, 392; Omar N. Bradley, A General’s Life, with Clay Blair (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 102, 212.

** Dabney’s career is outlined in chapter 5. Mudgett was a protégé of Allen and a World War H acquaintance of Ridgway. Surles served as Ridgway’s G-3 in the XVTH Airborne Corps in World War H, and Ridgway often confided in him as well. Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 220, 715-716, 745; USMA 1987 Register o f Graduates and Former Cadets (West Point: Association of Graduates USMA, 1987), p. 407.

248 These adjustments resulted in the occurrence of two profound changes in the way that the Eighth Army’s staff planned combat operations. Prior to Mudgett’s

arrival, artfllerymen (and their way of thinking) dominated the Eighth Army’s

operations section. This type of thinking manifests itself with an inordinate

dependence on firepower and a resulting disregard for maneuver and ground combat

operations. While there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach, it did not

emphasize those aspects of combat operations that Ridgway felt were the most important. Ridgway wanted his commanders to exploit the infantryman’s unique combat capabilities (making proper use of the terrain, conducting constant patrols, maintaining control of the high ground, etc.) to make more effective use of the Eighth

Army’s assets. As a seasoned cavalryman, Mudgett’s combat emphasis reflected these desires and was much more in line with Ridgway’s way of thinking. This continuity drew the staff and commanders of the Eighth Army closer together as they received orders more in tune with their own expectations.

Ridgway also took a more active part in planning the Eighth Army’s operations through his personal planning group, headed by A. Day Surles. This group included the Eighth Army’s G-2, James C. Tarkenton, among others, and provided Ridgway with the ability to involve himself much more intimately with the planning process.

These changes dramatically improved the Eighth Army’s ability to plan and control combat operations and further supported Ridgway’s other efforts to transform

Blair, The Forgotten IVar, pp. 715, 745.

249 the unit into a potent and competent combat force by strengthening and improving his

internal constituencies.

Ridgway jSnaUy believed that he had assembled a staff in which he could place

his trust. The oflensive nature o f Operations KILLER and RIPPER (reminiscent of

Ridgway’s World War II operations) attest to this renewed confidence. The staff

continued to fimction at a very high level of efficiency for Van Fleet, even with Allen’s

departure in August 1951.^°

Allen’s replacement, the hard fighting Maj. Gen. Henry I. “Hammering Hank”

Hodes, continued to run the staff with expert precision. The fifly-one year old Ho des

had ably commanded an infantry regiment in Europe from June to September 1944. In

the Korean War, he had served as the Assistant Division Commander for 7 ID from the frichon landing until January 1951, where he directed the division’s crossing of the

Han River, was invaluable during the 7 ID’s retreat from the Chosin Reservoir, and virtually commanding the division for the hapless David G. Barr. After leaving 7 ID,

Hodes received his second star, served as EUSAK’s Deputy Chief of Staff under

Allen, and was a member of the UN’s initial negotiation delegation from summer 1951

to 17 December 1951, making him perhaps the best possible choice to replace Allen.

Hodes was a hard-fighting old cavalryman, described by the UN’s Armistice

Delegation’s head. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, as a “tower of strength,” and he and

Van Fleet apparently got along quite well, as Van Fleet gave him temporary command

EUSAK Command Report, August 1951, RG 407, Box 1232, Section II: Supporting Documents, Book I: OfBce of the Chief of StafF,p. 7.

250 of 24 ID for two months during the winter of 1951-1952.^^ That Van Fleet made no

significant changes to the staff and continued relying on them to plan his operations for

the remainder of 1951 provides fiuther evidence of superb capabilities of these

ofiBcers.

Corps and Division Commanders

After visiting each of his corps and divisions between December 1950-January

1951, Ridgway concluded that many of the regimental, division, and corps

commanders lacked aggressiveness and were generally inferior leaders because they

demonstrated an “occupation mentality” that rendered them “professionally,

physically, and spiritually unqualified for combat.”^ Ridgway persuaded his

immediate superiors. Generals MacArthur and Collins, to replace most of them by

adopting a “senior ofiBcer rotation program.” This allowed Ridgway to bring in

commanders who were “young, vigorous, [and] mentally flexible” and who had the

Van Fleet included Hodes on a list of potential cords commanders in October 1951 with the caveat that Hodes serve a short period, as a division commander prior to taking over a corps. Thus it appears that Van Fleet did indeed think highly of Hodes as an ofBcer and commander. Van Fleet papers. Box 82, Folder I, Memorandum for Record describing discussions Van Fleet had with Collins and Ridgway in Korea, 28-29 October 1951, p. 3; C/5M4 1987 Register o f Graduates and Former Cadets, p. 335; Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 276, 585, Herates, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 17; William V. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The Story o f the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 30, 241; James, Refighting the Last War, p. 93.

~ Ridgway Papers, Box 17, January 1951 Correspondence file, letter to J. Lawton Collins dated 8 January 1951; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co, 1967), p. 90; and the Clay and Joan Blair Collection (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute), Combat Leadership in Korea - Volume 7: Quinn, William W.; Ridgway, Matthew B.; Rowney, Edward L.; and Throckmorton, John', Ridgway Interview, pp. 46, 141.

251 highest possible combat service potential, while at the same time protecting the reputations of the departing leaders.^

Disguised as a positive measure, Ridgway replaced one o f the three corps commanders, five of the six division commanders, and numerous regimental and battalion commanders between January and March 1951.^"* Ridgway did not personally determine which battalion and regimental commanders to replace; however, he told his subordinate commanders that they need only identify those officers who could not perform at an appropriate level and that his personnel section would take care of the rest. Ridgway then successfully lobbied Collins and Mark W. Clark (the commander of the Army Field Forces, which included all Army units based in the continental United States) to make the most promising officers o f corresponding rank available for assignment to Korea. Out of the twenty-eight corps, division, and regimental command positions in the Eighth Army in 1951, fourteen commanders were replaced between January-March 1951 (amounting to a change o f fiffy percent).

These new leaders brought with them a wealth of combat experience and the youthfiil vigor that Ridgway required, lowering the average age of division commanders firom

54.5 years to 49.5 years and of regimental commanders firom 47 years to 41.7 years.

^ Ridgway Papers, Box 17, January Correspondence file, Ridgway MFR dated 24 January 1951 recounting his meeting with MacArthur on 20 January 1951; letter to J. Lawton Collins dated 8 January 1951; and the Blair Collection, Combat Leadership in Korea, pp. 44-46, 141.

These officers included corps commander John B. Coulter (IX Corps); division commanders John H. Church (24 ID), William B. Kean (25 ID), Hobart R. Gay (1 CAV), Laurence B. Keiser (2 ID), and David G. Barr (7 ID); and fourteen of nineteen regimental commanders along with many other staff officers at these levels as well. Ridgway Papers, Box 17, MFR summarizing the 8 January 1951 corps commander’s conference dated 8 January 1951. Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation during Combat Operations, pp. 223-230.

252 His method for accomplishmg this was both ruthless and compassionate, but its inçact was enormous and fairly immediate

As a result of this program, the Eighth Army acquired leadership that was better suited to the rigors of combat in Korea and able to transform a dispirited and defeated army into a competent and aggressive combat force. Continuing to rotate his senior personnel in an effert to acquire even better commanders while also trying to avoid “riding a good horse to death,” Ridgway replaced Mübum and Almond as corps commanders in July 1951, bringing in the highly respected John W. “Iron Mike”

O’Daniel to take over the US I Corps and the highly touted Clovis E. Byers, a former commander of the 82d Airborne Division, to lead the US X Corps. Although only

O’Daniel would live up to his promise as a combat commander, Ridgway, nonetheless, demonstrated his commitment to continually improve the quality of leaders at all levels of EUSAK while also acknowledging the stress that active combat command placed on even the best commanders. Ridgway continued rotating division commanders throughout the rest of 1951 as well, bringing in replacements for four of the six US

Army divisions between July-November 195 1.“ Unlikethe “Senior Officer Rotation

Program” of January-Febmary 1951, these changes were much more routine and reflected a desire on the part of Ridgway and the Army to avoid the overreliance on a handfiil of officers, implement a standardized rotation program, and allow as many

^ Thomas Harrold assumed command of 1 CAV in July 1951, and Ira P. Swift became the 25 ID’s leader in the some month as well. Robert N. Young took over 2 ID in September 1951. Thomas J. Cross replaced Soule as commander of 3 ID in October 1951. In December I95I, 7 ID’s Ferenbaugh relinquished command to Lyman Lemnitzer and 24 ID’s Bryan rotated back to the United States and was ultimately replaced by George W. Smythe in March 1952.

253 senior officers to obtain, valuable combat experience in Korea to prepare for a possible

Communist main effort in Europe.

The legacy of previous individuals and the confluence of talented leaders within the Eighth Army between January-November 1951 was one reason that the Eighth

Army was able to right itself and become such an effective military organization during this period. The other major factor in the Eighth Army’s rebirth was the unit’s superb battlefield effectiveness. These two elements are so closely connected that it is difficult to separate them completely firom one another. As a result, the next section of the study will explore the aspect of military effectiveness in greater detail while continuing to include examples of leadership effectiveness (where appropriate) to enhance the overall evaluation of the Eighth Army’s capabilities.

ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

As with the first six months of the war, the second Eighth Army again faced many of its greatest challenges in the area of administration. As during 1950, the unit had to fight a war that was not supported by a corresponding increase in domestic wartime support and had to rely upon a supply line that spanned the Pacific Ocean.

On the Korean peninsula, the Eighth Army had to utilize a primitive transportation network that traversed some of the most rugged terrain in the world, fix addition to these conditions, the Eighth Army had to compete for many of its essential resources

254 with other American military organizations charged with combating communism elsewhere on the globe. These were formidable obstacles to overcome during 1951 and one must keep them in mind when assessing the Eighth Army’s adrninistrative efifectiveness.

Personnel

The quantity of personnel requested and assigned to the Eighth Army, perhaps the most important administrative aspect of the period, is relatively easy to examine through the unit’s monthly personnel reports. In comparing the Eighth Army’s anticipated personnel requirements to its actual strength it appears that the unit was fairly effective in obtaining and maintaining its desired levels of U.S. Army personnel

Initial projections, based upon the Eighth Army’s G-3 and G-4 estimates, indicated that the Eighth Army would need a maximum of 6 2/3 U.S. Army divisions consisting of approximately 233,000 U.S. Army personnel to successfully prosecute the war effort. The table below indicates that the Department of the Army (DA) was able to supply the Eighth Army with the appropriate number of divisions for part of the period but had some difi&culty in providing the required number of divisions and in meeting the specific personnel requirements until September 1951.

255 Date

JAN 51 6 2/3/6 2/3 0 170,000 175,342 + 5,342 4- 3.14 FEB 51 6 2/3/6 2/3 0 200,000 194,093 - 5,907 -2.95 MAR 51 6 2/3 /6 2/3 0 233,000 202,590 - 30,410 - 13.05 APR 51 6 2/3/6 2/3 0 233,000 216,287 - 16,713 -7.17 MAY 51 6 2/3 /6 2/3 0 233,000 230,536 - 2,464 - 1.06 JUN51 6 2/3 /6 2/3 0 233,000 229,291 - 3,709 - 1.59 JU L51 6 2/3/6 1/3 - 1/3 233,000 217,596 - 15,404 -6.61 AUG 51 6 2/3/6 1/3 - 1/3 233,000 222,906 - 10,094 -4.33 SEP 51 6 2 /3 /6 1/3 - 1/3 233,000 232,977 -23 0 OCT 51 6 2/3/6 1/3 - 1/3 233,000 240,171 4- 7,171 4- 3.08 NOV 51 6 2/3/6 1/3 - 1/3 233,000 232,375 - 625 -0.27

Table 24. Eighth Army Personnel Figures 26

The Eighth Army’s ability to obtain its anticipated number of personnel is

remarkable when viewed within the wider context of the Army’s entire spectrum of

Ridgway decided to withdraw the 187th RCT from Korea in June 1951 and retain it as a theater reserve for the FEC, removing it from EUSAK’s control. This decision explains the Eighth Army’s loss of one regiment between June 1951 and July 1951, decreasing the total number of US Army divisions assigned to EUSAK from 6 2/3 in June 1951 to 6 1/3 in July 1951. The overall source for these figures was Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, Chapter III, figures 2b, 6, and 10.

256 responsibilities at the time. At the war’s beginning, the combat units of the Eighth

Army were over fifty percent short of their normal personnel authorization.^^

According to the Eighth Army command reports, “The buildup of U.S. ground forces

reached approximately 70 percent of its ultimate strength by 31 December 1950 and

was substantially complete[d] by April 1951.”^® This buildup occurred simultaneously with the Army’s activation of its NATO contingent for European defense and a

continentaEy based contingency corps, both of which appeared in response to the heightened fears of a Soviet attack in Europe.^ These developments stretched the

Army’s personnel resources to the limit and produced a situation in which the

commander of an active combat theater had to compete with peacetime organizations

for personnel resources.

As important as obtaining the necessary quantity of personnel was the process

of maintaining these amounts at the required levels, hi early 1951, the civilian leadership agreed to maintain the personnel manning level of the Eighth Army’s six

and two-thirds U.S. Army divisions at the highest possible level as an integral part of

its UN contribution to the war effort. As a result, the Eighth Army’s personnel status

The actual combat strength of the Eighth Army combat units was 48.8 percent of its normal authorization as of 30 June 1950. Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, Chapter HI, pp. 1-2.

28 Ibid., p. 2.

^ As cited previously, DA activated the U.S. Seventh Army in November 1950 to serve as the United States ground component of the NATO defense force in Europe and formed the XVin Airborne Corps to function as a contingency force for the United States. These developments required that DA assign all six of the Army’s active cotps to either the Eigltth Army, Seventh Army, or the XVHI Airborne Corps between November 1950 and May 1951.

257 remained a matter of great concern to civilian and military leaders alike. Because of its increased emphasis and inçoitance, the Eighth Army’s replacement system was more than able to condensate for losses during this period and kept fiesh replacements flowing into the organization at a rate of approximately 25,000 soldiers per month.^°

By any measure, the Eighth Army appears to have succeeded in securing and maintaining the quantity of U.S. Army personnel that it required to complete its assigned missions by September 1951.

Besides receiving an adequate number of soldiers, the Eighth Army received soldiers of acceptable quality as well. The quality of the oflflcers that the Eighth Army obtained during this period was generally superior to that in the rest of the army, as the leadership effectiveness section demonstrated. One of Ridgway’s most effective measures was to use his contacts, statue, and leverage to secure the best possible leadership for his army at every level.^^

Similarly, the quality of enlisted personnel in Eighth Army improved in 1951.

Although forced to accept untrained reservists as individual replacements during 1950, a study of the distribution of draftees within the Army in 1951 contends that the highest quality replacements received assignments to Korea, even at the expense of the

Between January-July 1951, the Eighth Army lost 139,420 soldiers (because of battle and non­ battle injuries and rotation requirements) and received 166,649 replacements for a surplus of 27,229 soldiers over the period. This assessment only addresses the quantity issue as a whole and does not consider the impact on unit cohesion.Logistics in the Korean Operations. Volume / o f IV Volumes, Chapter III, figure 39.

This is an almost universally accepted assessment of Ridgway’s impact on the Eighth Army. See especially Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 176-191, 236; James, Refighting the Last War, p. 50; and Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, p. 148 for elaborations of this point.

258 readiness of the Seventh Army and the X Vm Airborne Corps. By March 1951, the

Army personnel system in the Unites States finally had enough soldiers available to provide trained replacements for the Eighth Army’s battle losses and still leave some experienced soldiers assigned to units in the United States. The Army remained committed to providing the Eighth Army with approximately 25,000 soldiers per month beginning in May 1951 to allow the rotation policy to begin while also supporting the unit’s average monthly losses. These new replacement soldiers were better-trained than many of the inactive reservists that the Eighth Army had received in

1950. Although they lacked the combat experience that many of the inactive reservists possessed, the Eighth Army was able to quickly assimilate the soldiers into their units and draw upon the experience of the units’ veterans to make up for the replacements’

“greenness.”

One reason for this was the dramatic improvement of the Eighth Army’s noncommissioned ofiBcers (NCO’s) that provided the American personnel with more effective small-unit leadership. Author Ernest F. Fisher attributes this NCO improvement to a combination of the battlefield attrition of ineffective leaders (which allowed new and better soldiers to assume positions of leadership) and the uncharacteristically “comradely and mutually supporting” relationship that existed

Carter, Firepower and Mobility, pp. 123-124, 130-131. I interviewed Mr. Carter by telephone on 4 April 1995 and questioned him about the sources upon which he had based tliis assertion. He stated that his observation was an inference that he had made after examining several personnel summaries of the Seventh Army’s incoming replacements and the fact that Korea was an active theater while the European Theater was only threatened. I could not find any document which made this specific point either, but it seems to be consistent with my research regarding the quality and performance of the Eighth Army’s replacements in the first half of 1951.

259 between, junior ofiBcers and NCOs in Korea, the extent of which the U. S. Army had not experienced since World War I. In making the latter assessment, Fisher drew heavily on the works of Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, a U.S. Army military historian who studied the conduct of in&ntrymen in combat during World War H, the

Korean War, and the Vietnam War. According to Marshall, the positive junior ofificer-

NCO relationship in Korea significantly advanced the ‘leadership dynamic of both groups, particularly during ground combat,” producing a correspondingly dramatic increase in the combat effectiveness of American combat units.

The combination of the influx of higher quality soldiers and the improvement of the NCO leadership greatly increased the efficiency of the U.S. Army units by permitting the Eighth Army to replace many of the Korean Augmentation to the U.S.

Army (KATUSA) troops with well-led American soldiers, which in turn allowed the

ROK Army to concentrate on training its units using the KATUSA troops as a combat-experienced cadre of leaders.^"* The Eighth Army also obtained a significant quantity of high-quality soldiers through the practice of establishing continuing relationships between U.S. Army divisions and other UN forces’ units. Begun as an

Ernest F. Fisher, Guardians o f the Republic: A History o f the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), p. 276. See also Marshall’s Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, p. 51.

^ BCA.TUSA combat participation reached an all-time high in October 1950 and then steadily decreased until Van Fleet reorganized the system in June 1952. Prior to Van Fleet’s reorganization, American commanders held KATUSAs’ combat performance in contempt and preferred to use them for menial tasks, a policy that disrupted Korean-American political relations. The general feeling about the KATUSA program was that it was a necessary evil during the war’s first six months but the cultural differences between Koreans and Americans made it an inherently inefiBcient program. Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, Chapter HI, pp. 25-30; Johnson interview, MHI, p. 54.

260 expedient measure in summer 1950, the Eighth Army formalized and institutionalized it as a method of personnel utilization by December 1950/^ These attached AUied units enabled the U.S. Army divisions to operate at strengths above their authorized limit of approximately 18,900 soldiers and contributed to the decreasing reliance upon

KATUSAs.

The program’s impact on the U.S. Second Infantry Division (2 ID), which had taken an inordinately heavy amount of casualties by the middle of April 1951, illustrates this point. During the period August-December 1950 the 2 ID’s assigned strength averaged 3,184 soldiers below its authorized strength. Throughout the same period the division used 1,378 KATUSA personnel. With the formalized augmentation of AUied units to U.S. Army divisions at the end of 1950 and the increased availability of American replacement personnel after March 1951, the number of American personnel assigned to the division increased while the number of

KATUSAs decreased. The division contained 17,388 out of its authorized strength of

18,950 American personnel as of 16 April 1951 (a shortage of 1562 soldiers). An additional 781 French and 544 Dutch soldiers augmented the division’s personnel, causing the requirement for KATUSAs to drop to 1,119 and bringing total divisional strength up to 19,832 soldiers, or 105 percent of its authorization. The other five U.S.

Army divisions experienced similar augmentations.^^

Eighth Army Order o f Battle 13 July 50-27 July 53, “ROK and UN Ground Force Strength in Korea,” Program Review and Analysis Division, OCA, 7 October 1954, figure 3, appendix 1; Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation during Combat Operations, pp. 54-55.

Eighth U.S. Army Order o f Battle, 13 July 50-27 July 53. “ROK and UN Ground Force Strength in Korea,” “Strength of ROK Personnel Attached to US Army Infantry Divisions,” “Eighth Army 261 All of these measures contributed to the Eighth Army’s successful efforts to acquire and inçrove the quality of its American enlisted soldiers six months after the war began. Using these methods, the unit was able to acquire and maintain the quantity and quality of manpower required to acconçlish its objectives during 1951.

Logistics

The ability to support the Eighth Army’s operational concepts was another logistical area of contention during much of 1951. hi a concept that emphasized expending material instead of personnel (and driving up consumption rates accordingly), artillery operations were conspicuous for their exceedingly high supply requirements. The importance placed upon artillery support by the Eighth Army’s operations in 1951 ensured that the commanders would pay particular attention to their supphes of artillery ammunition. The Eighth Army’s reliance upon this asset makes it an appropriate issue to select for assessing the Eighth Army’s operational supportability and inter-service integration efforts.

Pubhcly, the Eighth Army indicated in February 1951 that abundant ammunition was available to the soldiers at every level However, the command reports showed a different situation altogether. Ridgway’s comments in the February

1951 command report noted a “particularly painful shortage” of artillery-delivered battlefield illuminating devices and requested MacArthur’s assistance in rectifying the

Casualty Report,” as of 16 April 1951, Program Review and Analysis Division, OCA, 7 October 1954.

262 situation. By March. 1951, Ridgway’s concern over the status of artillery ammunition in Korea was such that he began the narrative summary of his army’s actions in March

1951 by stating: “Artillery ammunition was the critical supply shortage, and extraordinary efforts were necessary to overcome it.” BSs artillery officer also stated that the tactical units were consistently able to shoot more ammunition than the logistical system could provide. Upon Van Fleet’s assumption of command, the artillery ammunition supply situation grew steadily worse as the Eighth Army’s artillery usage increased dramatically. By June 1951, Van Fleet characterized the artillery ammunition situation as extremely serious and adopted a rationing program aimed at conserving this precious commodity. Despite constant attention and efforts to rectify it, this situation remained the same for the rest of the year.^^ The tone of these excerpts implies that individual gun crews were being denied ammunition and that this shortage was having an adverse effect on the Eighth Army’s combat operations. This was not the case.

The logistical data collected by the Eighth Army’s supply section (G-4) presents a more favorable picture of the units’ supply status. The Eighth Army began the year with a twenty-seven day supply of 105 mm howitzer ammunition in theater and increased this to a forty-three day supply by the middle of June 1951.^^ The G-4

Eighth Army Command Reports, (RCS CSHIS-5 Rl); Command Report number 4, Eighth Army Operations 1-28 February 1951 (dated 27 March 1951), Narrative Summary of Army Commander’s Activities 1-28 February 1951, p. 1.; Command Report number 5, Narrative Summary of Army Commander’s Activities 1-31 March 1951, p. 1, 92-93; Command Report number 8, Section I, Part4, Tactical Narrative Summary of Eighth Army Activities 1-30 June 1951, p. 100.

A “day of supply” for a specific weapon system is calculated by multiplying the number of rounds autliorized for each day’s operations by the total number of weapons authorized for the unit. This method almost always provided a skewed result because it failed to account for equipment damage 263 was able to support 91 percent of all supply requests and 88 percent of all ammunition requests received during 1951, and the theater supply point made no mention at all of any ammunition shortages in Korea between December 1950 and May 1951. The G-

4’s April 1951 logistical assessment stated that the Eighth Army possessed an adequate level of supply in virtually aU types o f ammunition. This situation changed in

April 1951 with the arrival of Van Fleet. Van Fleet’s combat directives encouraged his commanders to fire quantities of artillery ammunition that exceeded the authorized levels by a factor of five in an attempt to inflict even greater punishment of the CPVA while providing better protection for his own soldiers. These increased expenditures produced several instances in which theater supply levels receded to dangerously low levels, but the ammunition supply was never low enough to curtail expenditures by the units in contact with the enemy or inhibit tactical operations in any way.^^ Facing a depleted supply of ammunition, Van Fleet adopted a more economical rate of supply for each artillery piece in Korea, but according to the Eighth Army command report,

“This limitation of expenditures had no apparent detrimental effects on the [Army’s] tactical operations.”^®

and/or losses. In the case of 105 mm howitzers, the authorized expenditure rate was twenty-five rounds per gun per day. Thus a twenty-seven day supply of ammunition meant that the supply system contained enough ammunition for each of the Eightli Army’s 523 105 mm howitzers to fire twenty- five rounds of ammunition per day for twenty-seven days (or 353,242 rounds) before their operations would completely exhaust the theater’s supply of 105 mm ammunition.

Carter B. Magruder, Recurring Logistic Problems As I Have Observed Them (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1991), p. 16.

Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume II o f IV Volumes (Japan: Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, 1 December 1955), Chapter IV, p. 126, figure 2, pp. 121-128, p. 127 (quotation).

264 The Department of the Army had consistently afGrmed its capability to support

the Eighth Army’s anticipated requirements for all major types of artillery ammunition

during 1951, but this afiBrmation did not account for the dramatic increase of

ammunition expenditures that Van Fleet initiated. Nevertheless, the theater logistical

system was able to successfully supply field artillery battalions with 125 percent of

their 105 mm howitzer ammunition requirements throughout the entire period and still

maintain enough ammunition in theater to establish a seven-day reserve. Although

this seven-day reserve fell well short of the Army’s standard of maintaining a forty-five

day reserve, it illustrates the point that the ammunition shortage never existed on the

battlefield itself it was always confined to the rear-area stockpiles and incoming supplies. This situation was more a product of the United States’ extremely low production capabilities than a result of a disconnect between operational planning and logistical supportability.^^ Thus, although it was a close run thing at times, since the

Eighth Army’s operations requiring the highest level of supplies were logisticaUy

supportable by the existing theater assets throughout all of 1951, it is logical to

Ibid., p. 126, figure 16a. 105 mm howitzer and 81 mm mortar ammunition were the two types of ammunition most fi’equently reported in short supply by Eighth Army units, making the logistical support capabilities even more remarkable, p. 128. The most critical period for artillery ammunition supply levels occurred between 15-26 July 1951, p. 127.

The United States had virtually no ammunition production capability between 1945-1950 because it possessed a tremendous surplus from World War U and saw no apparent threat on the horizon. President Truman did not declare a national state of emergency until December 1950, delaying the initiation o f the wartime production measures until the begiiming of 1951. The process o f converting commercial factories to ammunition production facilities produced a lag time of approximately eighteen months, which meant that ammunition ordered at the beginning of 1951 would not arrive in Korea until the latter half of 1952. James A. Huston, Gtms and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, PA; Susqueharma University Press, 1989), pp. 156, 165. For a less scholarly but more detailed description of this phenomenon, see William R. Reeder’s unpublished manuscript entitled ‘The Korean Ammunition Shortage” written for the U.S. Army Comptroller Program conducted at Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY. 265 conclude that all other aspects of the Eighth Army’s logistical demands were supportable as well/^

The other half of logistical operations involves distributing the supplies from the resupply sites to the front-line units. While units were able to travel back to a central supply point for items such as clothing and spare parts, they could not always do so when engaged in combat operations. This was particularly true for the ammunition supplies on which the fighting units depended.

The specific problems encountered in transporting the ammunition up to the units involved the availability of trucks to haul the rounds and the terrain over which the trucks had to travel to deliver the supplies to the units. Tactical units were theoretically supposed to have an organic capabflity to conduct their own resupply operations, but truck losses, extremely rugged terrain, and unusually long distances between the units and ammunition resupply points significantly hampered these operations. Nevertheless, units devised field-expedient methods to correct then- specific resupply problems that prevented any unit from having to curtail its tactical operations because of ammunition shortages.^ Using the requirement to curtail combat operations because of a lack of ammunition as a measure of ineffectiveness.

The G-4’s ability to support 9 1 percent of all supply requests received during this period corroborates this conclusion as well.Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume II o f IV Volumes, Chapter IV, fig. 2.

44 Some o f these “field-expedient methods” were illegal and included either diverting or commandeering ammunition supplies directly from the ports for their respective organizations. Obviously, these practices can not be classified as efficient ones at the operational level, but they were extremely efficient at the tactical level for the units involved. Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume II o f IV Volumes, pp. 118, 124.

266 the Eighth Army’s tactical systems appear to have been consistent with their support

capabilities even though the logistical sustainment procedures required extraordinary measures (at times) to retain their effectiveness.

The truest measure of the Eighth Army’s administrative and logistical effectiveness occurred during the support activities associated with Operation

KILLER between 21 Febraary-6 March 1951. According to author Clay Blair,

Operation KILLER was the toughest administrative and logistical challenge of the entire Korean War for EUSAK!*^ In involved the commitment of over 100,000

American personnel (approximately 75,000 U.S. Army soldiers and 25,000 U.S.

Marines), 400 howitzers, and 385 tanks in a deliberate attack against roughly 350,000

CPVA and NKPA troops (nearly 240,000 CPVA and 110,000 NKPA soldiers).

Outnumbered, the Eighth Army’s success would rest upon its ability to maxhnize its superiority in firepower and technology. This situation translated into a logistical requirement of keeping the combat units’ stocks of ammunition and other essential items at a very high level for the duration of the operation. The unusually warm temperatures during the operation severely degraded the area’s aheady primitive road network and hampered the combat units’ movements and resupply operations. lEstorian Billy C. Mossman concluded that, while the US IX and X Corps commanders experienced some difficulty in supplying their units during Operation

KILLER, neither advocated any change to the operation’s time table or scheme of maneuver. The Eighth Army made use of firequent airdrops of supplies to support the

Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 716.

267 units and allow them to continue their advances to the north. While supply problems exacerbated the units’ difficult advances. Operation KILLER continued nonetheless, albeit more slowly than anticipated, due, in part, to the heroic efforts o f the Korean

Service Corps in bringing forward much-needed supplies over roads that appeared to be all by impassable.'*^ Within the critical area of 105 mm artillery ammunition, the unit’s supply system was able to provide the required amounts of ammunition despite the fact that the Eighth Army’s total expenditure for the operation exceeded the established rate of supply by an average of five rounds per-howitzer-per-day.**^

The administrative and logistical effort required to support such a massive operation challenged the organization’s capabilities but proved that the Eighth Army’s administrative and logistical systems could indeed support its operational concept.

The Eighth Army’s ability to initiate and sustain a combat operation o f this magnitude and difficulty in the face of such unprecedented adversity attests to the administrative effectiveness of the organization during the majority of 1951.

Mossman, Ebb and Flow, p. 308.

The Eighth Army fired a total of 471,864 rounds of 105 mm artillery ammunition from approximately 678 howitzers between 21 February-10 March 1951. That averages out to 34.8 rounds-per-howitzer-per-day. The established rate o f supply per-howitzer-per-day for 105 mm howitzers during tliis period was 30 rounds per-howitzer-per-day.Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume II o f IV Volumes, 16a.

268 FIREPOWER EFFECTIVENESS

By the begmning o f 1951 several important changes had occurred at the policy level regarding the conduct of the Korean War that had dramatic implications for the

Eighth Army’s combat power. The first change was the UNC’s reversion to its original war aim of restoring the Republic of Korea’s pre-war border and the subsequent determination, expressed in National Security Council (NSC)

Memorandum 48/5, to seek a decision based on political and diplomatic, as opposed to military, means. This transformed the war fi*om the “total war” so familiar to most

Americans to one of more limited scope, with restrictions placed on locations and types of operations conducted by the UNC forces. The second change arose fi’om

America’s increasing worldwide defense commitments in the initial stages of the Cold

War. Military commitments in Europe, Korea, and the American mainland required carefiil apportionment in order to meet the demands of each theater.As a result, the

ICS informed MacArthur in December 1950 that he would not receive any more

American divisions. This ICS decision denied the Eighth Army the use of a familiar

American solution to battlefi^eld problems; adding more personnel and equipment to overwhelm its opponent. According to one author, this meant that increases in the

UNC’s combat power would have to come firom more air attacks, better combat

I am again referring to the activation of the U.S. Seventh Army in November 1950 to serve as the United States ground component of the NATO defense force in Europe and the XYHI Airborne Corps to serve as a continental contingency force for American.

269 efifectiveness from the US infantry divisions, the addition o f more UN troops, improvements to and expansion o f the ROK Army, and greater use of heavy artillery at the corps level"*®

The Eighth Army’s jSrepower effectiveness was a function of several

quantifiable frctors. These factors included the quantity and quality of its personnel tanks, and artillery pieces assigned to it. In addition to these aspects, the close air

support provided to Eighth Army also significantly enhanced its overall combat power.

Taken in the aggregate, these factors identify the principal areas of the Eighth Army’s

firepower effectiveness. Before coming to any conclusions in this area, one must first

examine the available data and compare the Eighth Army’s statistics with those of the

enemy forces in order to determine the Eighth Army’s relative strengths and

weaknesses in these areas.

In terms of actual persoimel strength relative to the total available Communist

forces during the January-November 1951 period, the Eighth Army was at a clear

disadvantage. The table below illustrates this point.

Allan R_ Millett, “Korea L950-L953,” chapter 8 inCase Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed, Benjamin F. Cooling (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Office of Air Force History, 1990), pp. 373-374.

270 DATE

JAN 51 262,800 336,384 599,184 175,342 3.42 : 1

FEB 51 223,500 259,500 483,000 194,093 2.49 ; 1

MAR 51 151,450 193,856 345,306 202,590 1.70 ; 1

APR 51 271,500 194,300 465,800 216,287 2.15 : 1

MAY 51 308,100 332,150 640,250 230,536 2.78 ; 1

JÜN51 155,200 237,050 392,250 229,291 1.71 : 1

JUL5i 134,000 350,500 484,500 217,596 2.23 : 1

AUG 51 131,900 305,500 437,400 222,906 1.96 : 1

SEP 51 237,500 387,600 623,100 232,977 2.67 : 1

OCT 51 208,200 374,200 582,400 240,171 2.42 : 1

NOV 51 249,100 383,800 632,900 232,375 2.72 : 1

Table 25. Comparison of Communist and Eighth Army Personnel Strengths, January-November 1951^°

50 These figures include all known and suspected enemy forces operating in Korea, including enemy guerrilla forces as well. NKPA and CPVA figures taken fi-om National Archives College Park Reference Branch, Records Group 338,Records o f U.S. Army Commands, 1942-, Box P609, Eighth Army Periodic Intelligence Reports, numbers 176-340, Box P605, Eighth Army Intelligence Estimates 10 February-27 July 1951; Records Group 407, Records o f the Office o f the Adjutant General, 1917-, Box 1135, Eighth Army Command Report December 1950, G-2 Section, Book HI, 271 As the table illustrates, the Eighth Army was consistently outmanned in terms o f total

forces by an average factor of 2.4 throughout the entire period. However, although

the Eighth Army had to commit, most of its forces to battle during this period, the

Communists did not maximize their total potential combat strengths. Consequently, a

more meaningful comparison may be derived from comparing the committed portions

of the NKPA and the CPVA with the Eighth Army’s total personnel strength to better

measure the actual balance of forces on the battlefield. The table below provides a

force comparison that more accurately assesses the actual forces engaged by the

Eighth Army between January-November 1951.

Part I - Command Narrative, p.l; Box 1143, Eighth Army Command Report January 1951, G-2 Section, Section U, Part 3 - Enemy Situation, p.l; also Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, pp. 353,450, & 452. For most months multiple figures appeared in the Eighth Army command estimates (due to different collection periods and considerations). In these instances, I simply averaged the estimates to arrive at the above figures. This method was used to derive the January-March and May- June 1951 figures. The overall source for the Eighth Army personnel strength figures wasLogistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, (Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, 1 December 1955), Chapter UT, figures 2b, 6, and 10. These figures reflect the Eighth Army’s persoimel strength at the end of each month.

272 DATE

JAN 51 88,800 174,000 262,800 175,342 1.5 : 1

FEB 51 67,050 156,450 223,500 194,093 1.15 : 1

MAR51 41,900 109,550 151,450 202,590 .75 : I

APR 51 42,000 229,500 271,500 216,287 1.26 : 1

MAY 51 56,900 251,200 308,100 230,536 1.34 : 1

JUN5t 56,350 98,850 155,200 229,291 .68 : 1

134,000 llllllllllll 62,000 72,000 217,596 .62 ; 1 61,200 131,900 AUG 51 70,700 222,906 .59 : 1

85,700 237,500 SEP 51 151,800 232,977 1.02 : 1

70,300 137,900 208,200 OCT 51 240,171 .87 : 1

65,900 183,200 249,100 232,375 1.07 : 1

212,114 AVE 63,464 148,650 217,651 .97 : I (30%) (70%)

Table 26. Comparisou of Committed Communist Elements’ Personnel Strength and the Eighth Army’s Total Personnel Strength, January-November 1951^^

Committed strength includes all Communist forces positioned along the MLR. It does not include Communist forces in reserve or not positioned along the MLR.Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume II o f IV Volumes (Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, 1 December 1955), Chapter EH, figures 2b, 6, and 10.

273 The table illustrates that, although the Eighth Army consistently had more personnel available than the NKPA and was usually superior to the CPVA, the total

Communist forces were often times greater than those o f the Eighth Army.

Specifically, the Communist forces had an average of 212,114 combat soldiers along the MLR as compared to the Eighth Army average of 217,651. Thus the combat forces of the Communists and the Eighth Army appear to have been roughly equal to one another throughout the entire period; however, the Communists had to combine their forces (30 percent NKPA and 70 percent CPVA) in order to achieve this parity on the battlefield. It is also significant that, during the months of the most significant

UN offensives (March and lime 1951), the Eighth Army was able to substantially reduce the Communist forces and obtain relative superiority in terms of personnel strength. Thus by August 1951, the combination of two highly successfiil UN offensives and unrelenting pressure on the enemy had reversed the battlefield superiority of the Communist forces, allowing the UN to enjoy its most significant relative personnel strength superiority of the entire war.^^

Also during this period, ROK armed forces strength averaged 261,101, increasing steadily from around 254,00 in January 1951 to a little over 279,000 by

One must keep in mind that this quantitative personnel superiority was only relative. The Communist forces had thepotential to draw upon the huge CPVA reserves positioned to the north of the Yalu River in Manchuria throughout this period. In terms of absolute numbers, the available Communist forces always outnumbered the Allied forces by a substantial margin, but political considerations kept China from committing its huge reserves to the Korean War. Rees,Korea: The Limited War, p. 142.

274 November 1951. In addition, KATUSA strength in US Army divisions averaged

12,774 for the entire Eighth Army, steadily decreasing over the course of this eleven month period from over 14,700 to around 11,400, and the percentage of KATUSAs assigned to service units, vice combat units, changed dramatically in March 1951 and

steadily increased from the remainder of 1951, from a low of 9 percent in February

1951 to a high of 38 percent in November 1951. By May 1952, that percentage rose to its highest point, 49 percent, before beginning a steady decline for the remainder of

the war so that by May 1953 over 75 percent of the available KATUSAs were

assigned to combat units.

As stated in the administrative effectiveness analysis, the Eighth Army received

soldiers of high quality. Although the majority of CPVA soldiers were largely

untrained individuals, the quality of the Communist forces in Korea was adequate for the Communists’ purposes as weU.^^ Thus the overall quality of American and

Communist forces in Korea during the January-November 1951 period appears to have been sufficient for each force to accomplish their objectives.

With respect to major weapons, the Communists usually possessed quantitative

advantages, whde the UNC and Eighth Army enjoyed qualitative superiority in almost

every area. Indeed, it seems clear that although the quality of EUSAK’s artillery weapons was superior, the Communists had a significant advantage over the Eighth

“ Records Group 407, Box 1199, Eighth Army Command Report for May 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, narrative dated 15 June 1951, p. 5; Mossman, pp. 53-56; Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 5-9.

275 Army and UNC forces in terms of its quantity of artillery weapons/^ The same

observation holds true for the opposing aircraft resources, with the Eighth Army

enjoying a potentially enormous advantage over the Communists in the number of

aircraft available to provide close air support for its ground operations, totaling up to

1,502 aircraft of various types/^ These aircraft were particularly important in the

northwest area of the Korean peninsula, as both sides struggled to achieve and

maintain superiority in and around “MiG Alley.”

^ The U.S. Army changed its basic artillery organization from the four-gun battery to the six-gun battery in 1947. This increased the available firepower in each artillery battery and battalion by one- third. The Chinese Communist Forces also switched to a six-gun battery organization, but the NKPA retained the older World War H organizational model and continued to employ the four-gun artillery battery during the Korean War. Department of the Army Pamphlet 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1952), p. 38; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 11.

” Millett, Korea 1950-1953, p. 355; Mossman, p. 36; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 17.

276 m

Ma*4S

Figure 13. MiG Alley and the U.S. Navy’s Aviation Area in Korea 56

56 Map taken firom Blair, The Forgotten War, front inside cover. Graphics added by author.

277 The Eighth Army also enjoyed both a quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Communist tanks as welL Taking direction firom other Communist armies, most of which emphasized the use of armor, this circumstance is somewhat surprising.

Nevertheless, one of the few areas in which the Eighth Army enjoyed a clear superiority to the Communist forces during the January-November 1951 period was in the area of armored vehicles. The Eighth Army had approximately 749 tanks by the end of May 1951, of which 630 were suitable and available for use, and this number increased to 943 by February 1952.^^ These tanks consisted primarily of M4A3E8, M-

24, M-26, and M-46 tanks. The Communist armored vehicles were not nearly so abundant. Most of the NKPA’s tanks had been destroyed during the fall of 1950, but the Soviets provided the CPVA and NKPA with additional tanks throughout 1951 and the first half of 1952, causing the intelligence estimates to place the number of

Communist tanks at approximately 409 by June 1952.^* All of the Communist’s assets were T-34/85 tanks. Perhaps more enlightening was the almost complete absence of

Communist armored activity between January and May 1951.^^ This scarcity of armored activity was further compounded by the Communists’ lack of an appropriate

See Chapter Three for a detailed accounting of the UNC’s tank assets.

Records Group 407, Box 1186, Eighth Army Command Report for April 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, daily log entry dated 6 April 1951; June 1952 EUSAK Command Report, Box 1354, Section I; Narrative, Part H, Intelligence Estimate, pp. 17-20.

Records Group 407, Box 1199, Eighth Army Command Report for May 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, narrative dated 15 June 1951.

278 antitank weapon with, which to destroy Allied armored vehicles.Communist antitank

guns disappeared from the battlefield in October 1950 and did not reappear until the very end of May 1951.^^ These circumstances ensured that the Eighth Army never lost

its armored dominance of the battlefield during this period.

The Eighth Army was at a disadvantage with respect to the Communists in

terms of personnel, artillery, and close air support aircraft quantity. Ridgway’s

operational method directly addressed the Eighth Army’s weaknesses in personnel (as the maneuver efiectrveness analysis will demonstrate), but it was left to others to

devise solutions to counter the Eighth Army’s deficiencies in quantity of artillery and

close air support aircraft. Addressing the artfllery deficiency first, it was surmounted through a combination of doctrine and increased rates of fire.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, Army artillery doctrine of the period emphasized the use of 8 inch howitzers in a “counterbattery” fire role, while orienting the use of mortars and 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers towards antipersonnel missions. Since the Eighth Army also concentrated on the destruction of C o m m unist personnel, American Army units would rely upon mortars and 105 mm and 155 mm

Records Group 407, Box 1161, Eighth Army Command Report for February 1951, Book VII - Armor Section report, translation of an enemy document captured on 6 February 1951 and reprinted in the Eighth Army Tank Motes dated 25 February 1951, p. 1. The specific comment was as follows: “We [Communist forces] have no effective weapon to combat the enemy’s [UNC forces] heavy tanks.”

Records Group 407, Box 1199, Eighth Army Command Report for May 1951, Book VO - Armor Section report, narrative dated 15 June 1951. During the last week of May 1951, Communist forces began to use a new 57 mm hypervelocity armor-piercing (HVAP) antitank round in their antitank guns and a Soviet-made antitank grenade (the RPG-43) with a shaped-charge warhead against UNC vehicles. Both proved to be effective against even the heaviest American tanks, and the Eighth Army tank units began losing armored vehicles again on the battlefield.

279 howitzers for the majority of their indirect fires. The Eighth Army’s artillery corrçosition reflected this emphasis as 63 percent of its weapons were 105 mm howitzers, 31 percent were 155 mm weapons (the majority of which were howitzers, but some were guns), four percent were 4.2 inch mortars, and only two percent of its total weapons were 8 inch howhzers.^^ With the UNC’s air superiority and its armored dominance, this composition provided the Eighth Army with an ideal method of accomplishing its primary objective — the destruction of Communist personnel and equipment while protecting UN forces.

After numerous requests for additional artillery weapons for the Eighth Army,

Van Fleet decided to counter the Communists’ superiority in numbers with a drastically increased rate of fire for his existing artillery pieces. He increased the daily supply rate (expressed in terms of rounds/gun/day) to each gun by a factor of five.

Based upon the Army’s existing day of supply for its artillery pieces, the Eighth Army could fire a total of 53,260 rounds per day, or approximately 56 rounds/gun/day. The

Communists could respond with over twice as many rounds per day ( 114,576) at the equivalent supply rate. Using the “Van Fleet Day of Fire,” the Eighth Army could respond to the Communists’ artfllery attacks with 266,300 rounds per day, thus achieving a relative superiority in terms of artillery firepower.

The Eighth Army was able to protect its weaknesses in overall numbers of artillery pieces by ensuring that its weapons’ mix reflected the current doctrine and by

^ Records Group 407, Box 1213, Eighth Army Command Report for June 1951, Book VIII - Artillery Section report, Aimex 17 - memorandum entitled, “Proposed Weapons Status Without Additional 10 Arty Bns,” dated 24 June 1951.

280 increasmg the rate of fire for each weapon. These expedients made more effective use of the available assets and oGset Communist advantages in terms of raw numbers.

The Eighth Army’s solution to its quantitative inferiority of close air support aircraft was largely the product of a two-part solution developed by Fifth Air Force planners. The first part of this solution ensured that the Air Force continued to provide the Eighth Army with substantial close air support and that they maximized the effectiveness of the aircraft dedicated to providing that support. The Air Force provided the Eighth Army with exceptional air support during its most vulnerable period, flying 19,886 close air support sorties during the 22 December-18 June 1951 period.The theater’s air-ground operations system had also matured to such a level during this period that many more close air support missions were pre-planned operations, enabling the squadrons to maximize their aircraft’s ordnance loads for particular missions and increasing their overall effectiveness.^

The second part of the Fiflh Air Force’s solution to this problem was to prevent the Communists from employing their close air support aircraft. The

Communist air war plan envisioned using “MiG Alley” as the starting point of its efforts during January-May 1951 to enlarge its area of air superiority. The intent was to establish functional air bases close enough to the main line of resistance to allow the

Il-lO’s to provide close air support during the ‘Tifth. Phase Offensive,” scheduled to

^ Robert F. Futrell, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict 1 November 1950-30 June 1952, USAF Historical Study Number 72 (Maxwell AFB: Historical Division, Air University, 1953), p. 187.

^ Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 351.

281 begin in May 1951 and end the war with, a Conummist victory. American F-86

Sabrejets successfully challenged the MiG-15’s in this area during spring 1951, restoring UNC air superiority over the entire Korean peninsula. The Air Force prevented the Communist air force from conducting any close air support missions along the main line of resistance during the January-May 1951 period and limited the

Communist air force to launching one unsuccessfid mission during the June-July 1951 period.The Communists were unable to initiate any other close air support missions during the January-July 1951 period. Thus in terms of their ability to provide their ground-combat units with close air support, the Communist air force was completely ineffective. This began to change in late-1951, but its effects were felt by the third

EUSAK and not the second EUSAK

According to one author, “In the final analysis, [Communist] air operations in

Korea were not effective.”^’ The Air Force’s ability to prevent the Communists from employing their H-lO’s in any appreciable numbers removed a powerful weapon from the Communists’ arsenal This also allowed the Eighth Army to concentrate its artfllery efforts on antipersonnel and counterbattery missions and to convert most of its antiaircraft weapons into direct-fire assets capable of providing security for artfllery

On 20 June 1951 a flight o f F-5Ts from the Fifth Air Force intercepted a group of eight IL-IO’s enroute to a close air support mission, destroying two and damaging three of the IL-IO’s and forcing the remaining Communists to abort their mission. Futrell,The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 310.

6 6 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, p. 312.

Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 167.

282 positions. These measures increased the Eighth Army’s artillery effectiveness and

relieved many ground combat units from their artillery security responsibilities, thus

increasing the Eighth Army’s overall available firepower.

Using the methods described above the Eighth Army was able to counter

Communist advantages in quantity of artillery and close air support aircraft. The table

below presents a revised summary of the Eighth Army’s firepower effectiveness during

the January-November 1951 period taking these employment considerations into

account.

CATEGORY Personnel Quantity Disadvantage Advantage Personnel Quality Neutral Neutral Tank Quantity Significant Advantage Significant Disadvantage Tank Quality Advantage Disadvantage Artillery Quantity Significant Disadvantage Significant Advantage ArtiHery Quality Advantage Disadvantage CAS Quantity Significant Advantage Significant Disadvantage CAS Quality Significant Advantage Significant Disadvantage

Table 27. Revised Recapitulation of the Eighth Army’s Firepower Effectiveness, January-November 1951

In terms of overall firepower effectiveness, the Eighth Army capitalized on its quantitative advantages where appropriate and utilized its qualitative advantages to offset Communist quantitative advantages by exploiting its technological superiority.

283 The methods adopted by the Eighth Army during the January-November 1951 period effectively negated any Communist advantages and provided the Americans with a significant firepower advantage on the Korean battlefields during the first half of 1951.

MANEUVER EFFECTIVENESS

The entrance of the CP VA into the Korean War ensured that, without a drastic increase in the number of personnel available, the Eighth Army would consistently fece an enemy force that possessed a substantial numerical advantage. Plentiful though they were, the CPVA soldiers lagged behind the Eighth Army soldiers in the amount of firepower available for their use (as the administrative and firepower effectiveness assessments illustrated). In essence, the two opposing forces held a different advantage over the other, making each commander’s fundamental task that of devising a method of exploiting his own advantage while preventing the other co mm ander from doing the same. The Eighth Army’s operational method during the majority of 1951 satisfied this requirement by exploiting its advantages in firepower and avoiding the

CPVA’s numerical superiority.

During this period, the Eighth Army’s operational method manifested itself by remaining focused on its battlefield objective of inflicting the m aximum amount of punishment on the enemy while protecting its own resources. Three overriding practices distinguished this technique: (1) maiataining constant contact with the

284 opposing enemy forces; (2) exploiting the UN’s firepower and material superiority; and (3) executing coordinated, methodical operations. These methods cleverly accentuated the Eighth Army’s existing capabilities and supported an operational concept that was well suited to the American soldier’s style of fighting.®®

The dramatic increase in the number of combat and reconnaissance patrols sent out by the Eighth Army during the first half of 1951 provides evidence of the manifestation of the first of these imperatives. Prior to this period, American commanders rarely knew the location, size, or disposition of the enemy units opposing them.®® Ridgway began the effort to develop useful intelligence information on 7

January 1951 through the execution of intensive local patrolling and reconnaissance- in-force operations. Operations Wolfhound, Thunderbolt and Task Force Johnson, that lasted throughout the remainder of January 1951. These operations reestablished contact with the enemy and confirmed Ridgway’s suspicions that the enemy forces had withdrawn north of the Han River and that enemy opposition between the Eighth

Army and the Han River was extremely light. This information allowed Ridgway to initiate offensive operations at the end of January 1951.

Russell F. Weigley contends that the “American way of war” has always been characterized by an adherence to the strategy of annihilation, which calls for the military defeat of the opposing forces. American’s have usually relied heavily upon an abundance of firepower, industrial might, and technological superiority to accomplish their strategic goals. The Eighth Army’s operational method during the first half of 1951 was merely an extension of this American tradition that aimed to take advantage of these existing advantages. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way o f War: A History o f United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York; Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), pp. xxii, 386-393.

As an example of the Eighth Army’s lack of useful enemy intelligence information, Ridgway noted that his first intelligence briefing in Korea consisted of an intelligence ofiBcer pointing to a large red “goose egg” on a map with the number “174,000” written inside it. Ridgway,Soldier, p. 205.

285 Ridgway instituted the Eighth Army’s operational concept for offensive

operations on 25 January 1951, and it remained in practice through the end of October

1951. Dubbed the “meat grinder” by the troops, this method involved the execution

of tightly controlled advances between specific locations (designated by “phase lines”)

and the destruction of all enemy forces within the zone during the advance. The intent

of these attacks was to entice the C ommunist forces to attack the UN forces so that

Ridgway could use his superior firepower assets to destroy them Given that Ridgway

attached no particular value to terrain, this concept was a very logical and acceptable method by which to prosecute the war. Although this type of operation severely

curtailed initiative and exploitation opportunities, it was extremely effective in placing the Eighth Army’s primary strength (firepower) against the enemy’s primary weakness

(lack of supporting arms). According to one regimental commander, this operational concept was also a very effective method of helping the fighting units to regain their confidence because it showed them that they could defeat the enemy and was of extremely high psychological value because it allowed the units to resume some northbound m ovem ents.These operations also provided the UN forces with an excellent method of infhcting tremendous punishment on the Communist forces using its substantial technological advantages while protecting its more limited personnel resources. According to one author:

... Ridgway’s solution to his strategic problem was admirable firomthe political as well as the military point of view. He would not worry about holding or capturing ground once he had straightened out his main line of resistance. What he intended to do was punish the enemy and cause so many

Johnson interview, MHI, p. 46.

286 casualties by the controlled use of firepower and by coordination of air and ground attacks that the Chinese would tire of the war/^

This method effectively expended material instead of personnel, permitted the Eighth

Army to fight the Chinese to a standstill, and allowed it to secure the UN’s strategic and political objectives by November 1951.

The tactics required to execute Ridgway’s concept were substantially different from the standard U.S. Army tactics used during World War H. The method’s emphasis on producing enemy casualties (attrition) instead of capturing territory and the significant difference between European and Korean terrain required a fimdamental re-thin king by Eighth Army leaders and soldiers concerning the tactical employment of their forces. These changes combined with increases in firepower at the company and platoon levels to bring about a “subtle but important change in Army thinking.” As ground combat units became more accustomed to and adept at utilizing the massive amounts of firepower available to them, the Army’s tactical focus turned towards the attrition aspect of warfare at the expense of maneuver.

A comparison of the orientation of tactical operations between World War H and the Korean War can illustrate this difference. World War II tactical operations were principally terrain-oriented in that their objective was usually to gain control of a key location regardless of the enemy’s presence. Korean War tactical operations, on

Edwin P. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea 1930 (New York: Paragon House, 1993), p. 184.

Maj. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution o f US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, study number 1 of the Leavenworth Papers (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1976), pp. 6-12, p. 12 (quotation).

287 the other hand, were largely enemy-oriented; their objective was to destroy as much of the enemy’s combat power as possible regardless of its location. The Army’s doctrinal manuals of the period recognized the necessity of conducting operations with each of these orientations (although most soldiers preferred the former) and contained guidance broad enough to accommodate them both.^^ Ridgway’s j&ustration with the

Eighth Army’s established practices is apparent in a statement that he made to his subordinate leaders at his first consolidated corps commander’s conference during the first week of January 1951. With respect to tactical skill, Ridgway stated that:

We are not adapting our tactics to the enemy and to the type of terrain encountered. We have almost every advantage except that of numbers and it is difficult to believe that with aU we have, we can’t defeat the enemy....We must control the roads not only because the enemy has to use them but because we have to use them’**

This statement had the desired effect at the tactical level as soldiers and leaders began adapting existing practices to conform to their specific situation in Korea. The improved quantity and quality of soldiers and leaders arriving to the units further enhanced this development and provided an even greater emphasis on exploiting the advantages offered by the terrain. An assistant division commander for one of the infantry divisions fighting in Korea in 1951 provided tactical guidelines for his subordinates that summarized these adaptations as follows:

Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Wasliington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949), pp. 5-8, 80-155; FM 7-20, Infantry Battalion (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949), pp. 146-363; FM 7-10, Rijle Company, Infantry Tîeg/menf (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949), pp. 184-336, 421, 426-432.

Ridgway Papers, Box 17, MFR summarizing his first corps commander’s conference o f 8 January 1951 (memo dated same).

288 One: [We would] Use the overpowering fire of our infantry and artillery weapons, supplemented by air support [to defeat the enemy]. Two: [We] Never advance[d] up a valley ahead of troops moving along the ridges on each side. Three: When conditions permitted, we would seize or occupy a position a mile or so to our firont, usually a piece of high ground. This could usually be done during the day as the enemy’s fear of artillery fire and air attacks kept them immobile. Four: We would place artillery, tanks, and infantry in these positions. From these locations, we would send out patrols who could be supported by the fire o f artillery and tanks. Five: The terrain prevented the use of tanks as practiced in World War II in Europe. We used the firepower of individual or platoons of tanks to supplement our other weapons and to move against the small arms fire of the enemy. We found that such use was a great help to our infantry. We also used tanks to carry supplies forward when there were no roads. Stream beds became the tanks’ roads. Wounded were strapped to the top of tanks and carried to the rear. On occasion, the firont end of a tank was elevated by running it up the small terraces in the rice paddies. With the assistance and instructions of artillery personnel, the tank’s fire could be directed at distant targets. Six: When occupying a defensive position, we tried to use the high points along a ridge. In these locations, a wide trench would be dug and covered by logs for overhead cover with the firont open for observation and firing. Barbed wire would be strung on firont and persoimel mines would be placed in the wire; and flares that could be ignited by pulling a cord led into the strong point. These strong points were occupied by two to four men armed with a machine gun, rifles and handgrenades.’^

These guidelines represent a general outline of the tactics employed by aU U.S. Army infantry units in Korea to execute the “meat grinder” operations conducted during the majority of 1951 and illustrate the emphasis on exploiting the terrain’s advantages and the importance of utilizing firepower to inflict the maximum amount of punishment on the enemy present at the tactical level of the Eighth Army’s organizations. These

George C. Stewart, M y Service with the Second Division During the Korean War, unpublished manuscript contained in the Blair Collection, Box 54, Alphabetical Files S-Y. Stewart served as the Second Iiifantry Division’s assistant division commander from 16 December 1950-16 August 1951.

289 practices appear to be remarkably consistent with the unit’s operational capabflities and intentions, and they successfully placed the Eighth Army’s strengths against the

Communists’ weaknesses.

The best measure of the Eighth Army’s maneuver effectiveness between

January-November 1951 appears in its combat performance during the period. The

Eighth Army defeated the Communist’s two most significant offensives of the entire war (occurring in January and April, respectively) and was able to launch successful counterattacks in both instances immediately afterwards to exploit its successes. This ability was largely the result of the army’s modified operational methods (and improvements in the quality of personnel assigned to the units) and prompted Van

Fleet to remark that the Eighth Army was capable of doing anything it was asked to do and that its soldiers fought better than any other force in the world by the summer of

1951.’ ®

Overall, the Eighth Army appears to have been tactically effective because its tactical concepts were consistent with its operational and support capabilities. The evidence suggests that the Army’s doctrine for the period was sufBciently flexible to allow for the prosecution of either an enemy- or terrain-oriented campaign^ making it an effective method of warfare as well. Above all, this method was a very effective

® General James A. Van Fleet Papers (Lexington, VA; George C. Marshall Research Library, Virginia Military Institute), Box 95, EUSAK Speeches, Writings, Statements & Interviews by Van Fleet: General statements 4/14/51 to 12/26/52; file 95/9, from a Memorial Day address to the Eighth Army on 30 May 1951; also file 95/5, Stars and Stripes (Pacific edition), 31 July 1951, p. 1; and 11 September 1951, p. 1.

290 use of firepower because it succeeded in placing the Eighth Army’s strengths against the Communist’s weaknesses.

INTEGRATION EFFECTIVENESS

The Eighth Army had both external and internal integration concerns during

1951. This is not surprising, given that the UNC was a multi-service (joint) and a multi-national (combined) organization. The impUcations of the UNC’s joint and combiued nature meant that, in order to be an effective organization, the Eighth Army had to maintain a positive relationship with the other American armed services providing it with support and with the its allies. Important external integration issues during this period involved the Eighth Army’s influence with the UN and the JCS.

Maximizing the close air support assets available firom the U.S. Air Force proved to be the most important area of internal integration for the Eighth Army between January-

November 1951.

The Eighth Army’s ability to integrate its efforts with external organizations was perhaps its most striking success during the first half of 1951. The Eighth Army commanders were able to influence their assigned strategic goals in such a manner that they were attainable objectives in terms of the unit’s operational capabilities. Between

January-November 1951, the Eighth Army was not required to execute any major

291 mflitaiy operation which did not directly support the UNC’s strategic and political goals for Korea.

MacArthur was partially responsible for this occurrence as he did a credible job of insulating Ridgway as much as possible from the raging strategic debates and issued fairly specific guidance for the Eighth Army’s conduct of operations during the early portions of 1951. The most that MacArthur ejq>ected of Ridgway was to inflict a

“broadening defeat” on the Communist forces that would bring about a situation in which the UNC could retain and secure the sovereignty of the Republic o f Korea.

MacArthur added that any substantial military success achieved by Ridgway would undoubtedly strengthen the UN’s diplomatic position.’’ His specific guidance to

Ridgway was as follows:

Hold as far as possible in [the] most advance[d] positions on which you can maintain yourself (On 7 DEC 50, MacArthur had informed the Department of the Army that current planning provides for a withdrawal in successive positions to the Pusan area—.” This was the directive under which the Eighth Army (now including X Corps) was operating when [Ridgway] took command of Eighth Army). Retain Seoul if it is possible to do so for the tactical, psychological and political factors in connection with the maintenance of South Korea. If the tactical situation develops to such an extent as to threaten envelopment of your East flank and bottle up your forces in the Seoul area, you may drop back. In other words, hold Seoul if possible, but not if it becomes dangerous to Eighth Army’s integrity or, in other words, a citadel position.’®

Ridgway E’apers, Box 20, MFR written by Ridgway on 26 December 1950 summarizing his initial meeting with MacArthur.

Ridgway Papers, Box 43, unpublished draft of the working manuscript for The Korean War, pp. 80- 82.

292 MacArthur ameliorated these mstructions by telling Ridgway that the best that anyone

could expect from these operations was a tactical success, that Ridgway was free to

attack, and that MacArthur would completely support all of Ridgway’s judgments/^

The major risk of grounding the Eighth Army's strategic goals upon limited war aims that fell short of unconditional surrender was the possibility of a perceived

loss of prestige by the UN forces conducting the operations. By February 1951,

Ridgway determined that: “The issue (now) is the power and prestige of the U.S.— whether we [the Eighth Army] handle this with honor here, or our Government is

forced to bail us out in shame by appeasement.”^® Indeed, many political and military leaders of the time expressed similar feehngs and perpetuated the belief that a return to thestatus quo antebellum on the Korean peninsula was an unacceptable solution.

Subsequent scholarship has suggested that, had the UNC stopped at the 38th Parallel in September 1950, it would have perhaps registered a significant victory because the

successful defense of South Korea would have secured the interests of the United

States by maintaining American international credibility and prestige while avoiding a major Communist intervention.*^

Regardless of the reality of the situation, the pervasive feeling was that if the

UNC could not achieve a complete victory over the CPVA in Korea, the minimum

® Ridgway Papers, Box 20, MFR written by Ridgway on 26 December 1950 summarizing his initial meeting with MacArthur.

Ridgway Papers, Box 20, personal MFR written by Ridgway on 9 February 1951 regarding his concepts for future Eighth Army operations.

James I. Matray, ‘Truman and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," Journal o f American History, 66:2 (September 1979), p. 333.

293 acceptable result was a complete restoration of the 38th Parallel and a decisive defeat of the CPVA forces on the battlefield. Although the United States Departments of

State and Defense were prepared to allow for a withdrawal of UN forces firom the

Korean Peninsula in January 1951, the renewed success of the Eighth Army’s battlefield performance in the spring of 1951 made the execution o f such an option tantamount to a major Communist victory over democracy, rendering evacuation a politically unacceptable option. The two remaining options were either acceptance of the limited war aim s or an escalation of the conflict in order to liberate the entire peninsula, neither of which provided a solution that was wholly satisfactory to all parties involved. This circumstance provides further evidence of the Eighth Army commander’s ability to effectively influence the course of the war through its external integration efforts.

The Eighth Army commanders’ pragmatic approaches and relative success stand in sharp contrast to MacArthur’s performance in 1951 and illustrate

MacArthur’s weaknesses in his attempts at external integration. MacArthur precipitated two political crises in 1951 that severely undermined his authority and were not representative of the Eighth Army’s actual mihtary capabilities. During the search for an appropriate Korean policy in the wake of the CPVA’s entry into the war in late November 1950, MacArthur received his revised poUtical directive on 30

December 1950. He caused a furor through his attempt to reduce the guidance to an

“annihilation or evacuation” pohcy by interpreting his instructions too literally and by inaccurately portraying the battlefield situation as a desperate struggle to even remain

294 on the peninsula. Fearing the worst and desperate for an objective assessment, the

JCS sent Generals Collins and Hoyt Vandenberg (the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff) to

evaluate the military situation and advise the government on an appropriate policy.

Their report discredited MacArthur's portrayal and instead presented a feirly hopeful

situation in which Collins felt that Ridgway was capable of both maintaining his

current position and continuing to fight. The implications of this report were far- reaching for both MacArthur and the UN effort in Korea. According to D. Clayton

James, “The prospects for combat success made possible by Ridgway and the findings of Collins and Vandenberg revealed as fallacious the threats of annihilation or evacuation MacArthur had posed if his strategy [of carrying the war to China] were not accepted."^ MacArthur's recommendations lost much of their validity after this, and Truman and the JCS increasingly bypassed MacArthur in their dealings with

Ridgway.^ Thereafter, Ridgway’s assessments became the basis for developing

Korean War policy throughout the rest of his tenure as an active participant within the theater.

MacArthur and Ridgway also continued to fundamentally disagree on the

UNC's mission in Korea. In March 1951 Ridgway articulated his understanding of the

UN's mission in Korea in the following manner:

^ D. Clayton James, The Years o f MacArthur, vol. m .Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), p. 559.

^Ibid.; and Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 183.

295 We didn’t set out to conquer China. We set out to stop Conununism. We have demonstrated the superiority on the battlefield of our men. If China fails to throw us into the sea, that is a defeat for her of incalculable proportions. If China fails to drive us firom Korea, she will have failed monumentally.... ^

MacArthur did not share this view. He still believed in pursuing a “total” victory that would unite the Korea peninsula under a single pro-western government, hi response to Ridgway’s above statement explaining his conception of the UN’s mission in Korea,

MacArthur countered by saying that the force required to establish an impenetrable barrier across the peninsula along the 38th Parallel would be better used to “proceed to the accomplishment of [the UN’s] mission in the unification of Korea. Clearly,

Ridgway viewed his task as the protection of the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea, while MacArthur remained committed to the destruction of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea and the unification of the entire peninsula under a single democratically elected ruler. Ridgway maintained his belief in his own view, which represented the United States’ feelings as well, and began to integrate the Eighth

Army’s combat operations more closely with the American government’s desires than

MacArthur had previously allowed.

Ridgway’s understanding of the overall Korean situation (he had just come from the Army staff) combined with his instructions from MacArthur to produce a strategic situation oriented towards obtaining the following results: inflicting the

84 Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 746.

“ Ibid.

296 maximum amount of punishment on the CPVA while preserving the UN forces as much as possible; preserving the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea; and achieving substantial battlefield victories over the CPVA to strengthen the UN’s diplomatic standing. Ridgway regarded terrain as unimportant (except as it facilitated the destruction of enemy forces and the conservation of Eighth Army soldiers) and never maintained the control of the city of Seoul and all ROK territory south of the 38th

Parallel as a strategic objective. These objectives remained true for Van Fleet through

July 1951 as well.^^

MacArthur continued to promote his strategy of carrying the war to China despite the explicit UN and United States directives prohibiting such measures. His disagreement with the Truman administration culminated with Truman firing him on

11 April 1951. Ridgway replaced MacArthur and Van Fleet took over the Eighth

Army. Although Van Fleet became a vociferous opponent of the existing policies later in the war, he enthusiastically supported them during his first three months in command of the Eighth Army.

One can hardly overstate the implications of these changes. Truman’s practice of bypassing the theater commander was unheard of and had eerie portents for the fixture in Vietnam The Truman administration’s extraordinary measures reflected the

The notable exception was that by the time of Van Fleet’s arrival, preventing the recapture of Seoul had become an important goal for the Eighth Army soldiers. Van Fleet recognized this change, but Ridgway did not. Accordingly, Van Fleet adopted the prevention of the recapture o f Seoul as one of his strategic objectives during the third week of April 1951. Although differing over Seoul’s value. Van Fleet agreed with Ridgway that terrain was largely unimportant in Korea during the spring of 1951. Van Fleet Papers, Box 95, file 95/18, “Summary of Eighth Army Military Activities During the Months June Through September 1951,” dated 30 September 1951.

297 6ct that they had lost confidence in MacArthur’s assessments and valued Ridgway’s instead. Although unfortunate, this development is a clear indication of the Eighth

Army’s external integration effectiveness because of the favorable influence its commander was able to exert upon political policy between January-November 1951.

When looking at the second Eighth Army’s impact on the Communists’ political objectives, it is apparent that Ridgway and Van Fleet were able to withstand the CPVA’s repeated attempts to destroy a large American unit (during the Third,

Fourth, and Fifth Phase Offensives) and bring about a stalemate on that battlefield and force Mao to face what he termed to be “the most unfavorable” battlefield situation possible. The second EUSAK was able to foü the CPVA’s most determined efforts to achieve their strategic objectives and instead impose the UN’s will on the Communists, which resulted in a largely static battle line north of an Parallel to the 38th Parallel.

While the United States did not openly declare war on China, which was the other component of Mao’s “worst-case scenario,” the Eighth Army had virtually no ability to influence that kind of decision. Thus, at the political level, the second EUSAK was able to exercise the greatest possible influence on the Communists.

PROTECTION EFFECTIVENESS

The entrance of the CPVA into the Korean War on 25 November 1950 dramatically altered the political situation and had correspondingly disconcerting

298 effects on the Eighth Army’s strategic objectives as welL Between the 27 September-

25 November 1950 period, the UN pursued a pohcy aimed at bringing about the destmction of the NKPA and unifyiug the Korean Peninsula under democratic rule.

As a result of the CPVA intervention, the UN reverted to its original objective of protecting the sovereignty of the Repubhc of Korea at the end of 1950. The Eighth

Army and the US X Corps’ activities had much to do with both of these pohcy changes.

Policy Influence

As mentioned previously, a maze of confusion existed at the strategic level throughout the first six months of 1951, especiahy between MacArthur and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff Despite the prevailing commotion, the Eighth Army commanders felt that they could not suspend combat operations in Korea while waiting for the reconcihation of these pohcy disputes because it would expose their forces to unwarranted dangers. Their military activities during this period elevated them to the status of respected members in the Korean War decision-making process and aUowed them to substantiaUy influence the UNC’s mihtary goals.

Each commander operated under the same basic directive: to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy while protecting his own forces. The major difference that existed between the directives issued prior to 27 September 1950 and those issued after 30 December 1950 was that the latter directives exphcitly aUowed Eighth Army ground actions to occur north of the 38th ParaheL This modification arose as a result

299 of the conmiaiiders’ desires to prevent an artificial land botmdary to inhibit their ability to destroy the NKPA and from the UNC’s realization that the 38th Parallel was a much more significant boundary to the UNC than it was to the CPVA Because the

38th Parallel is so far south of China, the UNC incorrectly beheved that the Eighth

Army did not constitute a direct threat to the Chinese until it advanced north of the

P’yongyang-Wonsan line (see Figure 1), as the Eighth Army learned in October-

November 1950. The significance of this revision was that it allowed Ridgway and

Van Fleet a considerable measure of operational latitude within which to conduct their operations and prevented the establishment of a “sanctuary” for Communist forces in

North Korea.^ This combination of circumstances produced a situation in which

Ridgway’s combat actions had a tremendous impact over the formation of policy during this period of the war. According to J. Lawton Collins:

...Ridgway could not stand still while Washington debated. IDs actions in the field, by default of political decisions in Washington, became the determining factor in the gradual evolution of a pohcy of sorts. The advances gained by Operations Killer and Ripper convinced the National Security Council and the State and Defense Department planners that the United Nations forces were getting the upper hand over the Communists m Korea.**

87 A “sanctuaiy” remained in existence for the Communist forces north of the Yalu River in Manchuria, but its distance from the 38th Parallel prevented it from having a direct impact upon the Eighth Army’s operations.

** Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 266.

300 The confiision over the appropriate political goals for the United States to pursue

during the first year of the Korean War significantly hampered the UN’s war effort and

was in desperate need of some resolution. The Eighth Army’s achievement of its

strategic objectives cleared up the confusion and resulted in both securing and

clarifying the political goals of the United States and the United Nations during the

January-November 1951 period, while also ensuring that the goals that the Eighth

Army commanders deemed to be logical and attainable would be adopted.

Force Structure

Clearly there were risks involved with the Eighth Army’s strategic objectives, but Ridgway and Van Fleet’s ability to influence the poUtical leadership to adopt these goals arose from their confidence in the unit’s size, structure, and fighting abUity. As the logistics evaluation demonstrated, the Eighth Army’s size almost completely

coincided with its staffs revised 1951 projections, and the JCS informed MacArthur in

December 1950 that they did not plan to send any more American divisions to fight in

Korea in the near future.^ Both Ridgway and Van Fleet recommended adjustments to the Eighth Army’s force structure in the first half of 1951. They each asked for an additional ten field artillery battaUons (in January and May, respectively) in order to provide more adequate support to the soldiers and to create a better-balanced combat team. Ridgway also requested an additional five AAA battaUons in April 1951 to

Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, p. 310.

301 augment EUSAK’s direct fire and AAA capabilities/" Ten additional field artillery battalions and four additional AAA battalions arrived between January-April 1951, per

Ridgway’s requests, and these units represented the only significant U.S. Army reinforcements or augmentations that the Eighth Army received during 1951."^

Efforts to achieve and maintain the optimum ratio of armor-artiUery-infkntry troops assigned to the second EUSAK were very successfiil, with the average during the January-November 1951 period corresponding exactly to EUSAK’s average for the entire war of 8:46:100. Reflecting the changing nature of the war throughout

1951, this ratio was 9:41:100 in January 1951 and changed slightly over the ensuing

six months so that by June 1951 it was 8:46:100. This is an appropriate shift, as the

January 1951 figure better supports the more mobile operations of the first six months of 1951, while the June 1951 mix is better suited to support the more static objectives associated with occupying and fbrtifying the BCANSAS and WYOMING Lines.

Continuing the trend of decreasing the number of armor soldiers and increasing the number of artillery soldiers with respect to the total number of infantry soldiers, by the end of 1951 EUSAK’s armor-arthlery-infantry troops’ ration was 7:52:100. Given the nature of the war during the waning months of 1951, this mixture again seems to be ideally suited to support EUSAK’s operations."^

90 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 201.

Blair Collection, Box 40, Unit Command Reports November 1950-June 1951, Command Report Number 4 (May 1951), p. 32; and The Edward M. Almond Papers (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The United States Military History Institute), Korean War Army Tactical Air Support X Corps Box, Headquarters EUSAK, Office O f The Artillery Officer Command Report dated 18 February 1951 covering the period 1-31 January 1951, p. 1; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 201.

^ Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f TV Volumes, Chapter HI, figures 14a & b. 302 In. general terms, the Eighth Army commanders tended to express confidence in the size and structure of their force. In early 1951, Ridgway stated that he could probably defeat aU of the Communist military forces in Korea provided that he received adequate reinforcements but later expressed a confident opinion that his forces, as they were presently conçrised, would not be forced off of the peninsula or defeated on the battlefield by the opposing CPVA units.Van Fleet expressed similar sentiments in May and July 1951 despite not receiving his requested artillery reinforcements.^**

This satisfaction with the Eighth Army’s existing size and structure allowed the military leaders to influence the political leadership to accept three logical and attainable military goals: ( 1) to keep the Eighth Army in Korea in January 1951; (2) to allow the Eighth Army to conduct ground operations above the 38th Parallel; and (3) to occupy advantageous positions north of the 38th Parallel (designated as the

KANSAS Line) prior to the initial cease-fire. Pohticians approved these measures based upon the military capabilities of the Eighth Army as presented by its respective commanders and each significantly contributed to the war’s ultimate outcome.

” Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 121. Ridgway did not specify whether he desired UN or American reinforcements.

^ Van Fleet Papers, Box 95, Stars and Stripes Newspaper (Pacific edition) articles in files 95/5 and 95/9.

303 OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

The second Eighth Army appears to have been an extremely efifective mihtary organization during 1951. The table below summarizes the criteria used to conduct this evaluation and the Eighth Army’s rating in each.

304 AREA

Leadership Effective leadership Effective

Access to manpower in required quantity and quality Effective

Admin Logistical supportability of operational activities Effective

Logistical supportability of tactical activities Effective

Firepower Maximize firepower strengths and minimize weaknesses Effective

Maneuver Placing army’s strengths against enemy’s weaknesses Effective

Strategic objectives’ ability to secure political goals Effective

Integration Consistency of operational concepts with strategic goals Effective

Integration of operational methods Effective

Protection Ability to influence the adoption of logical military goals Effective

Consistency of force’s composition with actions and goals Effective

Table 28. Combat Effectiveness Summary

305 As the table shows, the Eighth Army was able to traasfonn. resources into combat power in every area, entitling it to an overall rating as an extremely effective military unit.

The Eighth Army’s advantages were further accentuated by its superior communications, training, administration, medical care systems, and nourishment. Its communications system allowed leaders to coordinate the activities of infantry, armor, artillery, and air assets and gave them the flexibility to revise their plans and alter their operations as the situation required. The Communist forces did not have this capability (as their communications systems were extremely primitive and unreliable), forcing them to adhere to static plans with little opportunity to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. The Eighth Army’s replacements also arrived to their units significantly better trained than their Communist counterparts. Training facilities established in Korea by the Eighth Army offered further opportunities to improve the soldiers’ tactical and technical proficiency.

The Eighth Army’s efficient administrative system was perhaps its greatest

“combat multiplier” in Korea. While American soldiers (accustomed to lavish support) could complain of potential material shortages. Communist soldiers often arrived to their units without any equipment and were expected to arm themselves with captured weapons.Soldiers from both armies suffered from the harsh weather

Gerhard H. Corr, The Chinese Red Army: Campaigns and Politics since 1949 (Berkshire, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1974), p. 76.

306 of the Korean winter but Communist soldiers suffered even more grievously than did

Americans, with some prisoners of war requiring treatment for diseases ranging from tuberculosis to leprosy/^ American soldiers also received much better medical care and a diet far healthier than their Communist counterparts. This meant that they had a better chance of surviving battle wounds and injuries and that they remained in better overall health, both of which are essential components of maintaining an effective army. 97

Thus the Eighth Army’scommunications, training, administration, medical care systems, and nourishment provided it with many additional advantages over the

Communist forces in Korea during the January-November 1951 period. Although none of these systems directly destroyed any Communist forces, their quality and existence enhanced the Eighth Army’s existing advantages and allowed its leaders to maximize their available assets.

Viewed in this light, the Eighth Army appears to have been extremely effective operationally based upon the consistency of its operational concepts with its strategic objectives, its ability to place its strengths against its adversary’s weaknesses, the integration of its operational methods to take advantage of its strengths while covering its weaknesses, and its logistic capability to support its operational concepts.

Records Group 407, Box 1134, Eighth Army Command Report for December 1950, G-I Command Report dated 14 January 1951, p. 5.

I am indebted to Dr. Allan R. Millett for bringing these issues to my attention. 307 CHAPTER 7

THE THIRD EUSAK 12 NOVEMBER 1951-30 JUNE 1 95 2: MAKING THE BEST OF WHAT IT HAD AND IMPROVING THE ROK ARMY

Korean War Overview 12 November 1951 - 30 June 1952

Ridgway’s 12 November 1951 order to Van Fleet to assume the “active

defense” essentially brought an end to Eighth Army’s large-scale offensive operations

and inaugurated the period of the third Eighth Army in Korea. According to

Ridgway’s ICS-supported directive. Eighth Army had the “authority to seize suitable

terrain along the general trace of [its] present lines,” but Van Fleet was to limit

“offensive operations to the taking of outpost positions requiring [the] commitment of

no more than one division”^ to accomplish the mission, while also retaining the

capability “to exploit opportunities to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy.This

change supported EUSAK’s employment of a strategy of attrition, begun by Ridgway

in early 1951, and EUSAK would continue to pursue a strategy o f attrition throughout

the entire period of the third Eighth Army. This period saw no army-wide or major

‘ Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 190-191.

^ Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 311.

308 ofiFensive operations, causing corps-level operations to assume a heretofore unknown primacy on the battlefield. As a result, limited objective attacks planned at the battahon, regiment, division, and corps to regain ground lost to the enemy and to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy became the order of the day for most Eighth

Army units during the first half of 1952.^

Shortly after this cessation of ofiFensive actions, the UN and Communist forces, on 27 November 1951, agreed upon a military demarcation line that ran roughly along the 38th Parallel. Based upon this development. Van Fleet instructed his corps commanders as follows:

Eighth Army should clearly demonstrate a willingness to reach an agreement while preparing for ofiFensive action if negotiations are unduly prolonged to this end. A willingness to reach an agreement will be demonstrated by: Reducing operations to the minimiiTn essential to maintain present positions regardless of the agreed-upon military demarcation line. Counterattacks to regain key terrain lost to enemy assault wül be the only ofiFensive action taken unless otherwise directed by this headquarters. Every efiFort will be made to prevent unnecessary casualties.*^

Although not a particularly popular order, it reflected reality, as a lull settled over the battlefield from December 1951 to the end of June 1952. Continuing the trend begun in summer 1951, neither side attempted anything like army-wide operations; in 6ct, most actions during the period occurred at the battahon level and below. Although

^ January 1952 EUSAK Cmd Rpt, Box 1291, Section I; Narrative, p. 5.

Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 177.

309 adopting a posture that was primarily defensive in nature. Van Fleet was determined to

“keep Piis] army sharp though the smeh of gunpowder and the enemy.” This meant that Van Fleet aimed to retain the tactical initiative obtained by the UNC in summer

1951 through constant patrolling and smah-unit actions that kept his units in contact with the enemy wlule also keeping the Communist forces off balance and in a reactive mode.

The focus of December 1951 and January 1952 was on rotating two veteran divisions (1 CAV and 24 ID) out of Korea to Japan and bringing to Korea from Japan two National Guard divisions (45 ID and 40 ED). Frustrated with the Communists' complacency along the front line. Van Fleet conceived Operation CLAM UP, a plan distinguished by its desire to deceive the enemy by avoiding action entirely, indicating perhaps that the majority of UN units were withdrawing, and thus enticing the

Communists to come out of their defensive positions and expose themselves to Eighth

Army units. Executed during Febmary 1952, this operation had little success except that it broke the routine for EUSAK persoimel, but it allowed the Communists to improve their positions and conduct resupply operations virtually unhampered.

There were only two notable offensive actions during the period. The first.

Operation RATKDLLER, was a counterguerrilla campaign designed to neutralize an estimated 30,000 active North Korean guerrillas operating south of the 38th Parallel, most of whom had been bypassed by the Eighth Army during its breakout from the

Pusan Perimeter in September 1950. Led by ROK Army Maj. Gen. Park Sun Yup and conducted by the specially organized TF PAIK (comprised exclusively of ROK Army

310 soldiers and units) in four phases between 2 December 1951 and 14 March 1952, this operation was very successfiil, neutralizing over 20,000 of the guerrillas. After the completion of Operation RATKILLER and ushig TF Paik as the basis for reactivating the ROK K Corps, the ROK Army began launching limited objective attacks designed to capture key terrain in their areas of responsibility. The ROK Army units’ ability to conduct these operations and retain control of the captured areas in the face o f determiued Communist counterattacks demonstrated the significant increase in the

ROK Army combat efiectiveness that had occurred during the previous six months and indicated that the ROK Army would be able to play a much more significant tactical role during the war’s last year.

In the period’s other significant action, aggressive attacks by the US 45th ID succeeded in capturing the strategic hill mass known as “Old Baldy,” and the Eighth

Army closed the period by fighting to retain possession of this area.

LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS

Ridgway

Ridgway continued to exercise a strong influence over Eighth Army operations during this period. Retaining his authority to grant approval for any operation proposed by Van Fleet, Ridgway continued his practice of querying the Eighth Army’s corps commanders directly for their opinions on proposed operations. According to

311 Ridgway, one o f the main reasons he withheld approval for many offensive plans during this period was because Van Fleet’s subordinates did not support them.^

Ridgway continued to express displeasure with some of Van Fleet’s actions, indicating that the strained relationship of the second EUSAK period continued, and perhaps deteriorated even further, during the third EUSAK period. Given the continual close supervision Ridgway gave to Van Fleet, his operations, and his command of Eighth

Army, one suspects that Van Fleet breathed a sigh of rehef upon Ridgway’s departure and was hopeful that the Ridgway’s replacement, Mark W. Clark, would allow him a greater freedom of action with respect to the conduct of Eighth Army combat operations.

Ridgway also completed the racial integration of the Eighth Army during this period, a program which continued to have a significant impact on Eighth Army’s operations. Thus Ridgway remained the most externally influential leader in the Far

East during the period of the third Eighth Army.

Clark

When Mark W. Clark arrived in Japan to replace Ridgway, he brought with him a wealth of experience gained as an army and army group commander in Italy during World War U. Coming directly from command of the Army Ground Forces, which was responsible for the training and organization of aU Army training and combat units in the United States, Clark was extremely knowledgeable about the

^ Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 191.

312 Korean situation and the Eighth Army’s capabilities. Clark assumed command of the

UNC and FEC on 12 May 1952, allowing Ridgway to replace Eisenhower as the

Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). Facing immediately the complex issue of the prisoner of war uprising on the island of Koje-do, Clark demonstrated a no-nonsense approach to his running of the war. By early June 1952, Clark had infused the entire UNC with a more bellicose attitude, which manifested itself in

Eighth Army as an increase in the number and tempo of operations conducted.

Although he served for only one and one half months during the third EUSAK’s period, Clark’s actions indicated that he would be a more hawldsh commander than

Ridgway and that the relationship between the UNC and EUSAK commanders had the potential to improve greatly.

Van Fleet

Van Fleet continued to command the Eighth Army during this period in the same tough and beUigerent manor that had characterized him from the beginning.

Frustrated by the restrictions placed upon him through political and diplomatic channels. Van Fleet nevertheless continued to devise innovative and aggressive solutions to the myriad complex problems associated with conducting a limited war during a period of negotiations. According to Bradley:

Van Fleet’s mission, carefully monitored from Tokyo by Ridgway, was frustrating in the extreme. It was to keep sufficient pressure on the Communists to make them negotiate in a meaningfiil way. Few army commanders have ever been called upon for such a delicate and exacting task while paying such a high cost in causalities at the same time. Van Fleet was like a caged lion. He was certain he could punch through to the Yalu and destroy the opposing armies. I felt great sympathy for him — and

313 those men who were killed, wounded or missing — but an armistice, roughly along his battlefield, was the administration’s goal We had to suffer patiently until the Communists were ready to end the w ar/

Although not necessarily the best man for the job because o f his overly contentious tençerament. Van Fleet continued to carry out the administration’s policies during this period to the best of his ability, and, until Ridgway departed, under constant scrutiny fi’omhis immediate superior.

The leadership he provided to the second Eighth Army came close to matching the effectiveness of Ridgway’s, and it matched up very well with the army’s capabilities and attitude as welL Van Fleet exhibited signs o f overconfidence in May and June 1951, however, when he expressed a strong desire to attack north and attempt to destroy the opposing NKPA and CPVA forces. This warlike and positive leadership served the second EUSAK well, but it began to work at odds with the political goals of the third EUSAK His plans for offensive operations were far too antagonistic and perhaps too optimistic as weU, but they continued to feed the soldiers’ and publics’ growing dissatisfaction with the indecisiveness of the battlefield operations that characterized the first half of 1952. The following exchange illustrates the negative attitude that Van Fleet began to demonstrate in pubUc by mid-1952:

Reporter: General, what is our goal [in Korea]? Van Fleet: I don’t know. The answer must come firom higher authority. Reporter: How may we know. General, if and when we achieve victory? Van Fleet: I don’t know, except that somebody higher up wiU have to tell us.^

' Bradley, A General’s Life, p. 649.

314 Van Fleet’s increasing frustration with the situation in Korea is apparent in the

exchange cited above, and it was beginning to have an impact on EUSAK as well by

summer 1952. Nevertheless, solders continued to respond positively to Van Fleet’s

style of leadership* because oÇ among other things, his insistence to protect them as

much as possible and to expend materiel instead of lives m pursuit of the US and UN

‘s goals in the relatively static atmosphere of the third EUSAK’s combat operations.

Thus, whileremaining consistently effective at the tactical level. Van Fleet’s leadership

began to lose its effectiveness at the strategic and political levels as 1952 wore on.

Clark’s relationship with Van Fleet had little time to develop during the period

of this study, but one can surmise that Van Fleet hoped it would be better that his

association with Ridgway. In perhaps the most significant interaction between the two

during spring 1952, Clark expressed displeasure with Van Fleet’s actions during the

Koje-do prisoner mutiny. According to Clark:

I was on the sidelines [during the event] but was filled in on every move because in only a few hours the Dodd incident would be my baby. My feeling was that we should have gone in with force to release Dodd. Ridgway had given [Van Fleet] full authority to use force and had underlined the need for quick action....You don’t negotiate with prisoners of war, particularly

' Melvin B. Voorhees,Korean Tales (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), cited in Time, 3 August 1953, p. 9.

* While it represents the prevailing attitude toward Van Fleet, this observation does not hold true for all cases. E. M. Lynch, who served as the personal pilot for both Walker and Ridgway, felt that Van Fleet was somewhat lacking in his interpersonal skills and requested a new assignment after only serving two weeks as Van Fleet’s personal pilot. This is the opinion of a junior ofBcer, but it indicates that perhaps Van Fleet was not as personable as was Ridgway. Lynch Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY, transcript of interview with John Toland, 28 March 1988, tape 3, side 2, pp. 17-18.

315 ânatical Communist PWs who consider themselves combatants despite capture. At best, negotiation with prisoners is a losing game.^

After arranging for Dodd’s release, Clark was not satisfied with Van Fleet’s recommendations concerning the disposition o f Generals Dodd and Colson in the wake of that event. While disagreeing with the board of officers’ findings that Dodd

should not be blamed for being captured and that Colson “displayed coolness and

excellent judgment in handling the negotiations,” Van Fleet recommended that both

officers receive only adrninistrative action and reprimands. Clark, however, viewed

the situation much differently, and, after appointing his own board of officers to

investigate the matter, he recommended a permanent reduction m rank from brigadier

general to colonel for both Dodd and Colson. Collins accepted Clark’s

recommendation and acted accordingly. Despite Clark’s criticism of Van Fleet’s

handling of the Koje-do prisoner mutiny and his unwillingness to support Van Fleet’s

recommendations regarding Dodd and Colson, it appears that Van Fleet remained

hopeful that his relationship with Clark would develop positively and mature into one

of mutual trust and respect.

* Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper, 1954, reprinted in 1988), p. 41.

Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 47-48, and Collins, IVar in Peacetime, p. 346.

316 EUSAK Staff

Since army-wide operations did not occur during this period, the EUSAK stafiPs influence on the conduct o f operations during this period was somewhat reduced. The most significant occurrence for the staff during this period was the preparations made to establish a Korean Communications Zone (ComZ) to handle the theater logistics. Although not operational until 1 August 1952, these preparations forced the staff to consolidate its logistical actions and prepare to transfer responsibility for their execution to another organization. According to a logistics study prepared by the Eighth Army staff in 1955, “The absence of a communications zone and a theater army headquarters until over two years after the outbreak of combat burdened the [Eighth] Army with complex responsibilities not directly related to the conduct of combat operations,” since the Eighth Army staff retained it responsibility for logistics operations in Japan as well.’*

Corps and Division Commanders

The Eighth Army subordinates who had perhaps the mostsignificant impact on the unit’s operations during this period were the three American corps commanders.

Two of the three commanders changed in December 1951, one as a routine rotation

(IX Corps’ William M. Hoge) and one because of poor performance (X Corps’ Clovis

E. Byers). This meant that only the I Corps commander remained to give continuity to

” Logistics in the Korean War, Volume I of IV Volumes, p. 12.

317 the Eighth Army’s operations of the period. Nevertheless, the nature of the UNC’s operations during these eight months meant that commanders at the corps level and below had the greatest influence on EUSAK’s battlefield operations. What is significant about the corps commanders is that they all appeared to be capable of operating effectively in such an environment, and the corps commanders demonstrated superior ability to manage the many trainings combat, and rotation challenges they faced during this period.

The only relative veteran corps commander of the lot, John W. O’Daniel had been in command of I Corps since 19 July 1951. Known as “Iron Mike,” the fifly- seven year old O’Daniel made his name in World War U as a superb commander of the outstanding 3rd hffantry Division. In contrast to the majority of American commanders, O’Daniel’s field orders contained inspirational exhortations, and he infused his spirit throughout his units wherever possible. Ridgway thought very highly of him as weU, submitting his name to Collins in early 1951 as one of four possible replacement corps commanders for EUSAK He commanded I Corps throughout the entire period of the third EUSAK, finally relinquishing command on 28

June 1952. By all accounts, O’Daniel improved upon the combat effectiveness of the I

Corps, making it unquestionably the best of EUSAK’s corps during this period.

12 Blair, The Forgotten War, pp. 573-574, 948-949.

13 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign o f France and Germany, 1944-1945 (Bloomington, IN; Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 223, 633.

318 As one of the ofiBcers Van Fleet asked for by name in October 1951 and

endorsed by both Collins and Ridgway, Willard G. Wyman took command of the US

IX Corps on 24 December 1951 and led the unit until 30 July 1952/'^ Graduating in

the middle of his West Point class in 1919, Wyman started his career in the Coast

Artillery before switching to the Cavalry by the beginning of World War H. After

serving as a staff ofBcer in both the China-Burma-India theater and in Europe, he took

command of the 71st Infantry Division in 1944, a reserve unit, and commanded it

throughout the remainder of the war. Wyman was an outstanding officer who

completed his Army career by serving as the Commanding General of the Continental

Army Command from 1956 until his retirement in 1958.*^ Building on the successes

of the previous commander, William M. Hoge, Wyman further improved the IX

Corps’ combat effectiveness and cemented its reputation as a fully capable unit that

could contribute significantly to the Eighth Army’s operations. Van Fleet was

obviously impressed with the DC Corps’ commander and staff as he assigned the newly reactivated ROK II Corps commander and staff to DC Corps for training prior to

allowing the additional corps to begin independent operations.

After a disappointing performance by Clovis E. Byers,*® WHliston B. Palmer received command of the US X Corps on 5 December 1951 and remained in command

Van Fleet papers. Box 82, Folder 1, Memorandum for Record describing discussions Van Fleet had with Collins and Ridgway in Korea, 28-29 October 1951, p. 3.

Register of Graduates and Former Cadets o f the United States Military Academy (West Point, NY: Association of Graduates USMA, 1987), p. 329 (hereinafter cited as USMA Register o f Graduates).

Van Fleet’s comments regarding Byers’ performance as a corps commander were as follows: “All three of us [Collins, Ridgway, and Van Fleet] were in agreement that General Byers does not measure up as a corps commander and that he should not be promoted to Lieutenant General. All three of us 319 untü 19 August 1952. Finishing ninth, m the USMA class of 1919, he was a classmate of Wyman. As a Field Artillery officer. Palmer spent all of World War II in Europe, ending the war as J. Lawton Collins’ artillery commander for VH Corps. A gifted leader. Palmer commanded two of America’s best units, the 82d Airborne Division and the 2d Armored Division, before arriving in Korea to head a corps. After Korea,

Palmer served as the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and he served as the

Army’s Vice Chief of Staff from 1955-1957 during Maxwell Taylor’s tenure as Army

Chief of Staff Palmer did much to revive X Corps’ sagging combat effectiveness in the wake of Byers’ departure, and he presented his successor, I. D. White, with a competent and aggressive unit in August 1952.^’

The Eighth Army’s corps commanders during this period were a distinguished group, proving themselves on the battlefield o f Korea and going on to make significant contributions to the Army after their combat commands in the first half of 1952. With an average age of 54.6 years, these three men were only 1.6 years older than their

World War H counterparts. This was the youngest group of corps commanders

had been somewhat misinformed concerning his record as we all believed that he had a very substantial and successful period of division command during World War II. General Ridgway and I were in agreement as to the unorthodox methods by which Byers came out to the Far East, stating that he had Department of the Army approval for corps command provided we would accept him. Both of us were somewhat misled, and of course took him more on faith than personal knowledge. General Collins believes that Ridgway should take Byers off of Eighth Army since 1 would be the one to bounce him and, therefore, it would be difficult to have him under me hereafter. General Ridgway will consider the matter and advise [me of a suitable course of action] within [the] next couple of weeks.” While the Marines who served under him in Korea thought highly of him as a commander, it is obvious that Byers’ superiors did not share this opinion. Van Fleet papers. Box 82, Folder 1, Memorandum for Record describing discussions Van Fleet had with Collins and Ridgway in Korea, 28-29 October 1951, p. 2; Allan R. Millett, In Many A Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps 1917-1956 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 304-305.

USMA Register o f Graduates, p. 327.

320 assigned to the Eighth Army during the entire Korean War, and their vitality

manifested itself in amount of responsibility they were able to handle. In contrast to

earlier periods, when EUSAK routinely conducted multi-corps operations, these men

exercised an inordinate influence over the conduct of operations. The average age of their subordinate divisions commanders increased by 2 1/2 years from that of the

second EUSAK, and the men who led divisions during the period of the third EUSAK were not a particularly distinguished lot, with the exception o f the 7 ID’s Lyman L.

Lemnitzer, who went on the serve as the Army Chief of Stafl^ Chairman o f the Joint

Chiefs of StajBf and SACEUR.** Fortunately, EUSAK received superb corps commanders during this period, and their zeal was more than able to compensate for the shortcomings of the older division commanders. Overall, these men, led by the corps commanders, performed well during an extremely difficult and demanding period.

ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

Administrative effectiveness during the period was adequate to meet the battlefield demands. The most significant problems involved obtaining an adequate

** Information for the division commanders of this period who were graduates of West Point (eight out of the eleven) came fromUSK'LA Register o f Graduates, passim. Biographical information on 2 ID’s Robert N Young came from Amed L. Hinshaw’s Heartbreak Ridge, Korea 1951 (New York, Praeger, 1989), pp. 81-82. I used this information to calculate the division commanders’ average age, however, I am continuing to search for information on the remaining two ofiBcers to complete my assessment. Given what I alreacfy know about these men, I do not believe that the specific information regarding their age will dramatically alter the average age I have already calculated.

321 number of trained artillerymen, the receipt of poorly trained junior officers, maintaining an adequate supply of 155 mm howitzer ammunition, and keeping the M-

46 tanks operational Of these four deficiencies, EUSAK was able to overcome its problems with M-46 tank maintenance and struggled to improve its status in the other three areas.

Personnel

Troop strengths for Eighth Army units continued to be an issue of significant concern in 1952. Because of competing demands around the globe, in January 1952

DA directed EUSAK to reduce its assigned strength to its authorized strength of

219,202 no later than 31 march 1952. Operating under this directive for the remainder of the period, the aggregate strength of the Eighth Army decreased steadily.F rom a high o f236,509 soldiers assigned to the Eighth Army at the end of October 1951, the staff managed to maintain the Army component of the Eighth Army at an average strength of 231,387, ranging firom a low of 224,523 in December 1951 to a high of

235,792 in May 1952.^° This was the highest average strength for the Eighth Army of any time throughout the entire war, and it equated to an average of 6.54 Army divisions in theater. Using the staffs 5 January 1951 estimate as a basis for comparison, the third EUSAK was able to maintain its strength at 99 percent of the anticipated level (233,000 Army soldiers),and they were able to maintain 98 percent of

EUSAK Cmd Rept, January 1952, G-I Section.

Logistics in the Korean War, Volume I of IV Volumes, Figure 4b.

322 the estimated 6 2/3 average Army divisions assigned to the unit, hi addition, the staff estimated that the Eighth Army would lose 158,900 soldiers due to battle, non-battle, and rotation losses during the period, and they were able to obtain 153,092 replacements during the period, or a little over 96 percent of the anticipated losses.

This data suggests that the third Eighth Army was very effective in acquiring and maintaining the required personnel assets.

The rotation of Eighth Army personnel continued throughout the period, resulting in a coirçlete turnover from wmter 1951 by January 1952.^* Throughout this period, the artillery remained unhappy with the number and quality of trained enlisted soldiers it received. Thus, while EUSAK continued to receive replacements and was able to continue its rotation policy, it does not appear that EUSAK was able to acquire the best possible quahty or even an adequate quantity of personnel in aU instances, suggesting that its effectiveness in this area decreased and that its overall combat effectiveness decreased as weU.

Despite its relative success in obtaining and maintaining the desired number of personnel, in terms of aggregate numbers, the Communists enjoyed a 2:1 personnel advantage over the UNC and EUSAK throughout the entire period. Reaching their highest point in June 1952, the Communist forces in Korea totaled approximately

According to the Eighth Army’s Command Report for January 1952, “EUSAK reported to CINCFE that only 151 ofBcers and 92 enlisted men, who were serving in Korea on 1 January 1951, were still in combat units on 23 January 1952. Of this number, 51 oflScers and 23 enlisted men had voluntarily remained in their assignments.” Out of almost 250,000 soldiers, one can legitimately claim that virtually all soldiers from the previous winter had left Korea by January 1952. On 1 April 1952, EUSAK rotated out its 200,000th soldiers, further supporting the assertion that the third EUSAK was an entirely different organization from its two predecessors. EUSAK Cmd Rpt, JAN 52, Section I: Narrative, p. 11, 25; EUSAK Cmd Rpt, April 1952, Section I: Narrative, Part 3, Persoimel, p. 36.

323 913,000 soldiers. This total was composed of a mixture of roughly 634,000 CPVA troops, 269,000 NKPA soldiers, and approximately 10,000 Soviet and satellite troops.

Of this total, approximately 747,000 soldiers were combat troops."^ This compared to the UNC’s highest total during the period of approximately 701,600 total soldiers in

July 1952, of which roughly 396,165 were considered combat troops.^ The Eighth

Army had its highest total of soldiers, 235,792, in May 1952, of which roughly

153,029 were combat troops. When compared to just the Eighth Army combat troops, the Communists enjoyed almost a 5:1 advantage in terms of personnel The data in the table below illustrates this observation.

^ EUSAK Cmd Rept, June 1952, Intelligence summary.

^ Logistics in the Korean War, Volume I of IV Volumes, Figure 2a.

324 DATE

DEC 51 306,200 376,600 682,800 227,869 2.97 ; 1

JAN 52 277,300 394,800 672,100 241,971 2.78 : 1

FEB 52 275,000 380,100 655,100 236,179 2.77 ; 1

MAR 52 289,600 379,000 668,600 234,640 2.85 : 1

APR 52 290,800 393,000 683,800 234,145 2.92 : 1

MAY 52 292,000 397,200 689,200 239,551 2.88 : 1

JUN52 290,400 391,400 681,800 238,615 2.86 : 1

Table 29. Comparison of Communist and Eighth Army Personnel Strengths, December 1951-June 1952^“*

■'* These figures include all known and suspected enemy forces operating in Korea, including enemy guerrilla forces as well. NKPA and CPVA figures taken firom National Archives College Park Reference Branch, Records Group 338,Records o f U.S. Army Commands, 1942-, Box P609, Eighth Army Periodic Intelligence Reports, numbers 176-340, Box P605, Eighth Army Intelligence Estimates 10 February-27 July 1951; Records Group 407, Records o f the Offtce o f the Adjutant General, 1917-, Box 1135, Eighth Army Command Report December 1950, G-2 Section, Book HI, Part I - Command Narrative, p. 1; Box 1143, Eighth Army Command Report January 1951, G-2 Section, Section n. Part 3 - Enemy Situation, p. I; also Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, pp. 353,450, & 452. For most months multiple figures appeared in the Eighth Army command estimates (due to different collection periods and considerations). In these instances, I simply averaged the estimates to arrive at the above figures. This method was used to derive the January-March and May- June 1951 figures. The overall source for the Eighth Army personnel strength figures wasLogistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, (Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, 1 December 1955), Chapter HI, figures 2b, 6, and 10. These figures reflect the Eighth Army’s personnel strength at the end of each month.

325 As the table illustrates, the Eighth Army was consistently outmanned in terms of total forces by an. average factor of 2.4 throughout the entire period.

Although the Eighth Army had to commit most of its forces to battle during this period, the Communists did not maximize their total potential combat strengths.

Consequently, a more meaningful comparison may be derived from comparing the committed portions of the NKPA and the CPVA with the Eighth Army’s total personnel strength to better measure the actual balance offerees on the battlefield.

The table below provides a force comparison that more accurately assesses the actual forces engaged by the Eighth Army between December 1951-June 1952.

326 DATE

DEC 51 83,500 222,700 306,200 227,869 1.34: 1

JAM 52 84,700 192,600 277,300 241,971 1.15: 1

FEB 52 83,600 191,400 275,000 236,179 1.16: 1

MAR 52 82,800 206,800 289,600 234,640 1.23 : 1

APR 52 83,000 207,800 290,800 234,145 1.24: 1

MAY 52 83,200 208,800 292,000 239,551 1.22 : 1

84,100 JUN52 206,300 290,400 238,615 1.22 : 1

AVB 83,557 (29%) 205,200 288,757 236,139 1.22 : 1 (71%)

Table 30. Conçarison of Committed Communist Elements’ Personnel Strength and the Eighth Army’s Total Personnel Strength, December 1951-June 1952^

^ Committed strength includes all Communist forces positioned along the MLR. It does not include Communist forces in reserve or not positioned along the MLR.Logistics in the Korean Operations, Volume II oflVVoltimes (Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army, I December 1955), Chapter m , figures 2b, 6, and 10.

327 The table illustrates that, although the Eighth Army consistently had more personnel available than the NKPA and was usually superior to the CPVA, the total

Communist forces were often times greater than those of the Eighth Army. The

Communists obtained their overall superiority in personnel strength through the combination of their armed forces (NKPA and CPVA) on the battlefield.^®

Commanders were also able to maintain the relatively equal balance between combat arms and service troops within the Eighth Army that had existing since 1950, with the combat arms continuing to account for roughly 52 per cent of the Eighth

Army’s strength throughout the first half of 1952.^^ As during the previous periods examined, this figure continued to be 11 percent below the ideal planning figure for a combat zone of 63 percent.Additionally, FEC began making plans to active the

Korean Communications Zone (KComZ) by August 1952 to remove some of the unnecessary burden from the Eighth Army staff’s responsibility. This data indicates that Eighth Army commanders were as effective as their predecessors in most areas, with their inability to acquire sufficient numbers of artillery troops being their most conspicuous shortcoming.

One must keep in mind that this quantitative personnel superiority was only relative. The Communist forces had thepotential to draw upon the huge CCF reserves positioned to the north of the Yalu River in Manchuria throughout this period. In terms of absolute numbers, the available Communist forces always outnumbered the Allied forces by a substantial margin, but political considerations kept China from committing its huge reserves to the Korean War. Rees,Korea: The Limited War, p. 142.

Logistics in the Korean War, Volume I of IV Volumes, figures 14b and 14c.

■*EUSAK Logistics Summary, Vol. 1, Chapter m , pp. 5, 8.

328 la terms of units, the G-3 and G-4 estimates indicated that the Eighth Army would need a maximum o f 6 2/3 U.S. Army divisions consisting of approximately

233,000 U.S. Army personnel to successfiiUy prosecute the war effort, hi contrast to other periods, the table below indicates that the Department of the Army (DA) was able to supply the Eighth Army with the appropriate number of divisions and was also able to meet the specific personnel requirements as welL

Date 1 - 4,671 - 2.00% NOV 51 6 2/3/6 1/3 - 1/3 233,000 228,329 - 3.64% DEC 51 6 2/3/6 1/3 - 1/3 233,000 224,523 - 8,477 + 0.82% JAN 52 6 2 /3 /7 1/3 + 2/3 233,000 234,910 + 1,910 - 0.21% FEB 52 6 2 /3/6 2/3 0 233,000 232,508 -492 - 1.05% MAR 52 6 2 /3/6 2/3 0 233,000 230,560 - 2,440 - 1.28% APR 52 6 2/3/6 2/3 0 233,000 230,016 - 2,984 + 1.20% MAY 52 6 2/3 /6 2/3 0 233,000 235,792 + 2,792 + 0.62% JUN52 6 2 /3/6 2/3 0 233,000 234,456 + 1,456

Table 31. Eighth Army Personnel Figures' 29

^ The overall source for these figures wasLogistics in the Korean Operations, Volume I o f IV Volumes, Chapter m , figures 4b, 6, and 10.

329 The additional divisions assigned to the Eighth army during January 1952 is a reflection o f the transition among four divisions in Korea: 45 ID completing its rehef of 1 CAV and 40 ID conducting its rehef of the 24 ED. The Eighth Army also gained an additional Regimental Combat Team (RCT), since the 5th RCT, which had been assigned to the 24th ID remained in Korea while the 24th ID returned to Japan and regained control of the 34th Infantry Regiment, which was traditionally assigned to the

24th ID but which had departed Korea in December 1950 as a result of its tremendous combat losses in the wake of the CPVA s Second Phase offensive. As a result Van

Fleet received what amounted to reinforcing units in the form of the 5th RCT, which remained in Korea and thus provided him with an additional brigade-sized unit, and an additional 66 M-46 tanks as a result of the in the 1 CAV - 45 ED switch because the regimental tank companies of 1 CAV were never filled, whereas 45 ID arrived with all three of its regimental tank companies, which equated to an additional tank battalion.^"

Additionally, Van Fleet activated five new ROK Army 105 mm FABs, further adding to his offensive power, and planned to active an additional nine ROK Army 105 mm

FABs and six ROK Army 155 mm FABs as soon as the equipment became available

On balance, then, it appears that the third EUSAK did a remarkably good job of increasing its available firepower through its unit rotation program and good planning.

The Eighth Army had a particularly difficult time obtaining an adequate quality of personnel during this period, especially with acquiring adequately trained junior

December 1951 EUSAK Cmd Rept, Box 1286, Section II; Supporting Documents, Book 7: Armor, pp. 4-5.

330 ofiBcers. Field artillery unit commanders repeatedly conçlained about a lack of

technical ability in the artillery ofiBcers arriving in Korea, and the Eighth Army’s G-1

assessed the quality of its new ofiBcers arriving in December 1951 as follows: “It was

apparent that many of the ofiBcer replacements were older, had not had sufiBcient

training or e^gerience commensurate with their grade and branch, and many were in

doubtful physical condition. The G-1 went on to add.

Many company grade ofiBcers received, particularly Infantry, are too old or physically unqualified to meet the rigors of combat... [And] the training of ofiBcers recalled to duty has not been adequate to acquaint them with new weapons and techniques, or even to refresh some of the skills the previously learned. Many of these ofiBcers have not had sufiBcient troop duty to insure their ability to handle line troops in the field and in some instance ofiBcers have been assigned Infantry MOSs without any previous Infantry training.

As before, the Eighth Army continued to congete with the US 7th Army in Europe for

resources, especially personnel, and, given the importance of artillery and infantry in

both American and Soviet doctrine, it appears the US did not possess enough trained junior ofiBcers from either branch to supply both theaters at the desired levels

simultaneously. While is does not appear that the quality of infantry ofiBcers improved

at all during this period, the Eighth Army G-1 continued to bring these deficiencies to

the Department o f the Army’s attention, and there was a noticeable improvement in

31 EUSAK Command Report, December 1950, G-1 section.

“ Ibid.

331 the training of field artillery ofiBcers arriving in Korea beginning in May 1952.^^

Although the quality of replacements sent to Korea was noticeably low with respect to junior artillery and infantry ofiBcers, it was at least adequate for the period.

By this time, unit commanders had also began making better use of KATUSAs,

dividing them fairly equally between combat and service duties. With an average

strength o f9,866, this period marked the point of the lowest contribution of

KATUSAs to the UNC war efifort, especially in terms of combat duties. Given the

dramatic increase in the size of the ROK Army during this period, expanding by

approximately twenty-five percent, the prevailing opinion of American commanders

that KATUSAs were not particularly effective soldiers, and the relatively high strength

of American combat units during this period, it was perhaps the best possible use of

the available assets to have them form ROK Army units instead of augmenting

American Army units.

For the eighth months of its existence, it appears that the third Eighth Army

received adequate numbers of persoimel and acquired its desired number of divisions.

EUSAK experienced difiBculties in obtaining adequate numbers of trained artfllery and

infantry junior ofiBcers, but the staff was able to irrçrove the quality of arriving artillery

ofiBcers by the end o f the period in question. Additionally, Ridgway and Van Fleet

appear to have been fairly innovative in obtaining reinforcing units for the Eighth

Army at a time when supposedly none were available. It also appears, having acquired

EUSAK Command Reports, December 1950-May 1952, G-1 and Artillery sections.

^EUSAK, Logistics in the Korean Operations, Vol. I, pp. 25-28.

332 all possible resources from America, that EUSAK would have to turn increasingly to the ROK Army for additional support. Thus, over the period November 1951-June

1952, the third Eighth Army was as effective as possible in obtaining its required personnel assets.

Logistics

The quahty of Eighth Army’s equipment did not change, and it continued to be superior to Communists during this period. The units did not receive much new equipment, but the Eighth Army did finally receive the 4.5 inch rocket launchers for the 2d Rocket FAB it had been requesting for quite some time, and various units began experimenting with armored vests and tank searchlights. In addition. Eighth

Army artillery commanders requested an increase in the number of 8-inch artillery pieces at their disposal,^^ presumably because of its greater accuracy in destroying bunkers and conducting artillery raids. The Communists did not receive any new equipment during this period that would challenge the UNC’s supremacy, as they continued to employ their same infantry, armor, and artillery weapons, and same aircraft.

The Eighth Army was able to obtain an adequate amount of equipment during this period. Ih fact. Van Fleet was able to supply all equipment necessary to outfit five of the ten planned new ROK Army tank companies and at least six of the ten planned

EUSAK Cmd Rpt, March 1952, Section H: Support Documents, Book 8: Artillery, Command Report, p. 2.

333 new ROK Army 105 mm FAB s. EUSAK also made plans during this period to equip six new ROK Army 155 mm FABs, indicating that even more equipment was on its way to Korea. In addition to these measures, aE US FABs were able to replace the worn out barrels on their howitzers with new ones, and maintenance personnel came up with innovative ways to repair persistent problems in the M-46 tanks, resulting in much higher operational readiness rates for American artillery and armor units.^®

Recognizing the tremendously difficult job required of the Eighth Army administrative and logistical elements, the EEC completed plans during this period to establish a Korean Communications Zone (ComZ) to remove much of the theater logistical burdens from the Eighth Army staff’s responsibility. This suggests that the

Eighth Army was accomplishing more than one could expect from it. It may also reflect Clark’s experience with running an army group and his desire to establish a

ComZ for more efficient logistical operations. In America, Truman’s attempt to seize control of the steel mills in the wake of the strike in spring 1952 was not successful, indicating that America was giving all it was going to give to Korea.

Another indicator of the Eighth Army’s logistical effectiveness during this period was the continual planning for offensive operations. Van Fleet had his commanders plan a variety of attacks, including and army-wide advance named

Operation CHOP STICKS, based upon the tactical situation and the availability of supplies. Political and strategic considerations forced the cancellation of these

EUSAK Cmd Rpt, February 1952 & April 1952 Logistics sections.

334 proposed operations, but Van Fleet was confident enough, of his logistical situation to

realistically consider launching them.

Overall, it appears that EUSAK did the best it could in most areas and was

able to obtain an adequate amount of supplies during the period. The Eighth Army

reported no significant shortages during the period, nor did it face any significant

difficulties in supporting combat operations and distributing necessary supplies in early

1952. The staff was able to keep units suppHed and complete the rotation o f all personnel who had been in Korea in winter 1950-1951, and they were able to supply the necessary number of replacements, combat equipment hems, and ammunition to the combat units. EUSAK was unable to obtain adequately trained junior artillery and infantry officers, but the unit was able to get excellent quality senior leadership.

Perhaps most importantly, the logistical situation was such that Van Fleet could realistically contemplate offensive action during this period. Thus Eighth Army made the best of what it had and was fairly effective in terms of logistical support and operations.

FIREPOWER EFFECTIVENESS

During the third EUSAK’s period there was even a greater emphasis on firepower, since maneuver was largely restricted because of the military demarcation line. Recognizing this limitation. Van Fleet was determined to punish all Communist

335 nuisance attacks “promptly and forcefully” “to the point where their continuation becomes prohibitive in cost.” Although little happened to change the existing situation. Eighth Army commanders continued to take advantage of their firepower advantage and worked to perfect their combined arms operations.

Although DA declined all Van Fleet’s pleas for additional units, EUSAK did increase its available firepower by acquiring an additional RCT, three regimental tank companies (each containing twenty-two M-46 tanks for a total addition of sixty-six

M46 tanks), another AAA battalion, and five additional 105 mm FABs in the ROK

Army. Taken together, EUSAK possessed a significant advantage in terms of tanks and artillery pieces vis-à-vis the Communists. Specifically, by July 1952 EUSAK had

524 M4, 363 M46, and fifty-six M24 tanks, for a total of 943 tanks at its disposal, with an additional seventy-four M3 6 tank destroyers available in the ROK Army.^^

Compared to the Communists’ 390 armored vehicles (T-34/85 tanks and SU-76 self- propelled howitzers), the Eighth Army enjoyed almost a 2.4:1 advantage in total numbers.^*

Furthering the US advantage in armored vehicles, Americans preferred to assign the majority of their tanks to independent tank battalions, attached to infantry divisions, and regimental tank companies, organic to infantry regiments, meaning that almost every available tank was in support of ground troops along the fi-ont Hne. By contrast, the Communists preferred to group their tanks in large independent

EUSAK Cmd Rept, July 1952, Armor section.

EUSAK Cmd Rept, April 1952, Armor section.

336 formations that did not directly support front-line units. Furthermore, at least one hundred of the Communists’ tanks were assigned to tank training centers, in effect preventing them from participating in combat operations.^^ Thus, the Eighth Army possessed an overwhelming superiority in armored vehicles during the third. EUSAK’s period.

The same caimot be said with respect to available artillery support, fri terms of artillery, EUSAK had 828 artillery pieces, as conçaredto the 892 guns the CPVA and NKPA had along its front lines by July 1952.“*° The Communists also had an additional 1,457 guns available for their use, for a total o f2,349 available weapons, but these were not deployed close enough to the front to be employed.**^ Given the positioning of the artillery pieces, one may conclude that EUSAK had a rough parity with the Communists but that the Communists could have upset the balance significantly by moving forward more artillery, assuming they were able to supply the guns with ammunition. The evidence indicates that the Communists had sufficient ammunition to supply more guns during spring 1952, as their use of artillery increased steadily beginning in April 1952 and continuing on until June 1952.'*^ Perhaps more

EUSAK Cmd Rept, March 1952, Armor section.

EUSAK Cmd Rept, February 1953, Artillery section; EUSAK Cmd Rept, July 1952, Intelligence Summary.

EUSAK Cmd Rept, April 1952, Intelligence Summary.

■*“ The War History Compilation Committee of the Republic of Korea,The History o f the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, vol. II (Seoul, ROK: The Ministry of National Defense, 1973), pp. 541-542.

337 inçortantiy, this data also suggests that the Communist supply system was improving,

which would allow them to utilize more of their artillery assets.

Despite this apparent disadvantage in terms of numbers o f artillery pieces. Van

Fleet secured a firepower advantage for EUSAK by exploiting the American logistical

system. He boasted in May 1952 that his units had fired forty times the number o f

artillery shells that theCommunist had fired during the previous year, which largely

negated the Communists’ advantage in terms of numbers of weapons. These rounds

were primarily 105 mm howitzer rounds, as there was a shortage of 155 mm howitzer

ammunition during this period. To compensate for this shortfall, Van Fleet made

greater use of close air support in support of his tactical operations. Eighth Army

units also continued using tanks to support Umited objective attacks launched by the

infantry, and armor units began conducting tank raids aimed at using the tanks’

firepower to destroy enemy bunkers and built-up automatic weapons positions.

EUSAK also increased the number of artillery raids it conducted, and artillery units

concentrated more of their efforts on using artillery to destroy enemy bunkers. In these ways. Van Fleet continued to enjoy a substantial firepower advantage over the

Communists during the entire eight months of the third Eighth Army’s existence to

protect and preserve his force and compensate for the Communists’ tremendous

advantage in terms of combat troops.

May 1952 EUSAK Cmd Rpt, Box 1343, Section II; Supporting Documents, Book I: Chief of Staff p.2.

338 MANEUVER EFFECTIVENESS

The establishment of the Military Demarcation Line on 27 NOV 1950 and the

subsequent armistice negotiations limited EUSAK’s opportunity for maneuver during

this period. What little maneuver that did occur was oriented mostly on improving the

UNC’s positions vis-à-vis the Communists positions. In addition. Van Fleet did take

advantage of the relative lull to reposition his existing forces along the battle line to

make better use of the capabilities. For example, the US 1st Marine Division moved

from its position inland to an area along the western coast of the peninsula to allow for

the possibility' of amphibious operations, and the ROK Army infantry divisions moved

into the mountainous areas in the interior of the peninsula to take advantage of their

extreme mobility. Finally, the period witnessed the movement of most US units to the

extreme forward positions to allow ROK Army units and others to train and improve

their combat efrectrveness. Thus, Van Fleet made the best possible use of his units in a

relatively static situation by placing the units in the positions best suited for their

particular capabilities and by using the US units to occupy the Military Demarcation

Line, which allowed the ROK Army units to complete their modernization and training

programs.

One operation during this period deserved specific mention in terms of

maneuver. Frustrated with the Communists lack of initiative along the battle line. Van

Fleet conceived of Operation CLAM UP in an effort to deceive the Communists into

339 thinking that the UNC units were withdrawing. According to the February 1952

Eighth Army Command Report, “CLAM UP was a scheme designed to bring out enemy patrols, to ambush and capture enemy parties to disclose his positions, and to create a hiatus which would be confusing to the enemy.” According to the plan,

EUSAK units would discontinue all patrolling, all firing, except that dictated by emergencies and to assist in the capture of enemy groups, and all daylight vehicular trafiBc and warming fires visible to the enemy, and limit all light aviation flights over enemy territory and noise to the absolute minimum hr addition to these passive measures. Van Fleet also plarmed to conduct a series of deceptive troop movements, all in a gigantic effort to conceal the true situation and lead the enemy to believe

Eighth Army troops had been withdrawn.^ Unfortunately, the Communists did not

“take the bait,” instead using the respite provided by EUSAK to ameliorate their troubled logistical situation and improve their positions even more. For the Eighth

Army, Operation CLAM UP was good for the training, maintenance, and discipline of the units, and it also broke up the monotony for soldiers sitting on the firont lines. In terms of maneuver. Van Fleet’s idea showed great creativity but did little to improve the existing situation.**^

EUSAK Cmd Rept, FEB 1952, Summary, Section I, Part 3, Tactical Narrative, p. 32.

EUSAK Cmd Rept, FEB 1952, Summary, Section I, Part 3, Tactical Narrative, pp. 36-44.

340 INTEGRATION EFFECTIVENESS

External

The single most important integration aspect during this period concerned the incorporation of the newly created ROK Army units into the UNC, and in this endeavor, EUSAK’s efforts were magnificent. Working together, EUSAK and the

ROK Army trained the cadre of the newly formed ROK II Corps so that the ROK

Army was able to put another corps-sized unit on the battle line by April 1952. The additional of another combat corps along the Military Demarcation Line reduced the areas of responsibility for the other corps and allowed for more internal rotation within corps and divisions. EUSAK also assumed responsibility for training three new Field

Army Groups, fourteen new 105 mm FABs, six new 155 mm FABs, and ten ROK

Army tank companies. By July 1952, the ROK Army, with EUSAK’s help, had trained and activated three ROK Army Field Artillery Groups, two of the fourteen 105 mm FABs, and five o f the ten planned ROK Army tank companies, and the cadres for aU of the other planned units. Further cementing the relationship between EUSAK and the ROK Army, Van Fleet directed the six US Army divisions to provide trainers for the six new ROK Army 155 mm FABs, which would help to insure that the ROK

Army units would be easily integrated into the EUSAK command structure.

American units also continued to develop their habitual relationships with their attached UN units, further improving EUSAK’s external integration. Thus EUSAK

341 was clearly supporting armistice negotiations and allowing ROKs to assume a greater

level of responsibility for the conduct o f military operations during this period.

Internal

At the beginning of the period, two of the three American corps commanders

changed, leaving only one for continuity. Also during this period, the composition of the corps changed significantly so that by the end of the period, the US 2 ID was the

only veteran division that had remained with the same corps throughout the entire period. The US 3 ID remained with I Corps until the end of April 1952, when it assumed a training status. The other two remaining veteran US divisions, the 7 ID and

25 ED, switched corps in February 1952, although the majority of the ROK Army divisions remained assigned to the same corps throughout the entire period. With the successful completion of Operation RATKELLER in March 1952, the ROK I Corps also received a new commander, as Paik Sun Yup had previously been serving as the commander of the ROK I Corps and as the leader of Task Force Paik. After receiving on-the-job training firomthe US IX Corps stafiÇ EUSAK activated a new ROK Army corps. The ROK II Corps, commanded by Paik Sun Yup and formed firom the units that comprised TF Paik, began to make positive contributions almost immediately.

During the beginning of this period, two of the six EUSAK Army divisions rotated out and were replaced by National Guard divisions. The 45th ED replaced 1

CAV in December 1951, and 40 ED replaced 24 ED in January 1952. Because the

National Guard divisions had been in training in Japan since mid-1951 and they had

342 some regulars and draftees assigned to them, this transition was far less traumatic than

it could have been. There seemed to be little problem integrating 45 ID into the Army

structure; however, 40 ID did not begin to make significant positive contributions until

several months after its arrival, and even these contributions were perhaps less than

expected.

Besides the continual switching of divisions among the corps, the majority of the significant changes occurred during the first two months of the period. Given the battlefield lull that existed, it seems that EUSAK chose perhaps the most opportune period to make substantial changes to its composition. Nevertheless, because these

changes had significant impact at the corps level and the corps had assumed an

enhanced importance in the fighting, one can conclude that the period’s organizational

changes brought about a certain amount of degradation in EUSAK’s combat efiëctiveness, albeit one that was never exploited by the Communists or even capable ofbeing measured.

Inside the Eighth Army, units virtually perfected the coordination between armor and infantry units, especially when conducting raids. Continuing the progress made during the previous period, the coordination among artillery, armor, and infantry units also continued to be superb. Finally, the corps established and maintained an excellent program for rotating divisions, regiments, and battalions from front-line positions to rear areas for rest, resupply, and retraining. The cohesive unit that

EUSAK Cmd Repts, FEB-MAY 1952, Summary, Section I, Part 3, Tactical Narrative, passim.

343 emerged during the period o f the second EUSAK continued to manifest itself in the first half of 1952 as well.

The Eighth Army staff was also successful in maintaining an excellent average composition o f combat forces in Korea, as compared to the war’s average ratio of armor, artillery, and infantry troops of 8:46:100. The ratio of armor troops remained remarkably constant during this period, while the proportion of artillery troops fluctuated firom a figure of 52 in January 1952 to a wartime-low of 38 in June 1952, indicating a drop of 28 percent over the course o f six months. Taken together, these changes produced an average ratio for the period of 7: 45:100, which was very close to the war’s overall average but which indicated that the commanders experienced

significant difficulties in obtaining and retainmg adequate numbers of artillery troops.

Responding to this continuing problem, Ridgway and Van Fleet made plans to activate twenty new ROK Army field artillery battahons in 1952, fourteen 105 mm FABs and six 155 mm FABs, and they were able to outfit five of the new 105 mm FABs by the end of June 1952. The Eighth Army, however, remained a predominantly infantry force throughout this period as well

PROTECTION EFFECTIVENESS

Like Walker, Van Fleet also had very little influence at the pohtical level during the period of the third EUSAK Throughout the end of 1951 and the first half of

344 1952, Van Fleet conducted operations according to Ridgway's “active defense” order of mid-November 1951, vMch was in turn an expression of the wfll of leaders at the political level as outlined in NSC 118/2/^ Although Van Fleet continued to appeal to

Ridgway and Clark for permission to launch a large-scale offensive throughout most of the first half of 1952, he was never successfiiL Political leaders continued to turn to

Ridgway for advice and trusted his assessments above all else. Mark Clark also enjoyed this kind of confidence towards the end of the third Eighth Army’s period.

Interestingly, the third Eighth Army had virtually no impact on the Communists’ political objectives during this period, as the second Eighth Army had succeeded in bringing about Mao’s least desired course of action and the third EUSAK spent most of this period maintaining the status quo. Thus, in terms of leaders and impact on the

Communists, it appears that the third EUSAK had virtually no influence whatsoever on policy during the period December 1951-June 1952 and was not an especially effective organization.

In terms of battlefield protection, the Eighth Army commanders and personnel continued to take care of soldiers and reduce aU unnecessary risk during this period.

In line with Van Fleet’s explicit directives, commanders continued to use firepower instead of troops to achieve tactical gains, and the Eighth Army continued its ambitious rotation program, for both units and individuals, in theater for rest and recuperation, and back to the United States at the completion of their combat tours of duty. Commanders also made efforts to increase individual protection available to

Schnabel and Watson, History o f the JCS, Volume HI, The Korean War, Part H, pp. 634-649.

345 their soldiers by acquiring armored vests and tank searchlights. Along the battleline, the soldiers constantly improved their fighting positions, completing primary, alternate, and supplementary positions in a variety of locations, hi the wake of the beginning of

significant armistice negotiations and the establishment of the Military Demarcation

Line, EUSAK’s protection measures appear to have been both prudent and appropriate for the situation.

OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

Viewed from the standpoint of this study, the Eighth Army appears to have been a very competent and effective military organization during the first half of 1952.

The table below summarizes the criteria used to conduct this evaluation and the Eighth

Army’s rating in each.

346 AREA

Leadership Effective leadership Marginally Effective

Access to manpower in required quantity and quality Marginally Effective

Admin Logistical supportability of operational activities Effective

Logistical supportability of tactical activities Effective

Firepower Maximize firepower strengths and minimize weaknesses Effective

Maneuver Placing army’s strengths against enemy’s weaknesses Marginally Effective

Strategic objectives’ ability to secure political goals Effective

Integration Consistency of operational concepts with strategic goals Effective

Integration of operational methods Effective

Protection Ability to influence the adoption of logical military goals Not Effective

Consistency of force’s composition with actions and goals Effective

Table 32. Combat Effectiveness Summary

As the table shows, the Eighth Army was generally able to transform resources into combat power in every area, entitling it to an overall rating as an effective military unit.

347 O f particular note was the Eighth Army’s inability to obtain and maintain

successfiil junior leaders and artillery soldiers in sufficient quantities. In addition, the political situation gave Van Fleet little choice but to place EUSAK’s strengths against the Communists’ strengths in the first half of 1952, there being little opportunity to conduct any sort of maneuver along a relatively static line while negotiations were occurring. Finally, Van Fleet and Clark had little or no influence over pohcy decisions made during this period. In most other areas, EUSAK made the best of what it had available to it and capitalized on the strengths of the ROK Army and other UN units.

The end of 1951 and the first half of 1952 were good periods for the Eighth

Army but provided the organization with little opportunity to make the same kind of impact on the existing situation that the second EUSAK had. Nevertheless, the third

EUSAK was an eflfective organization that did an excellent job of supporting the UN’s political goals of the period. The increased rehance on ROK Army units witnessed during the period provided a glimpse of how the Eighth Army would function during the war’s last twelve months, as the ROK Army became the dominant military organization within the UNC command in the summer of 1952 until the armistice of summer 1953.

348 CHAPTER 8

THE SYNERGY OF COMBAT POWER AND MILITARY ACTIVITY

Trying to account for the differences in performance almost fifiy years after an

event took place and with little or no ability to interview the participants is a difficult undertaking, but the effort can produce some very valuable results. The results of this

assessment arose in response to the leadership and battlefield performances of the

soldiers assigned to the Eighth Army between July 1950 and June 1952. In some instances, their efforts demonstrated a remarkable level of competence in an extremely demanding situation. In other circumstances, however, neither the organization nor its members seemed to perform up to their potential In a similar manner, other

organizations (like General Mark Clark’s Fifth US Army in Italy during World War II) have demonstrated sim ilar characteristics without experiencing a corresponding level

of success, so, while t aking the differences in the opponents into account, how can one

account for the second Eighth Army’s tremendously successful performance?

349 I believe that the concepts of synergy and antergy* can help one arrive at an

explanation that is plausible, satisfying, and is able to account for the many variables

among the various organizations. By synergy, I mean a condition in which separate

elements or components work together in a complimentary manner so that they produce a whole that is greater than the sum of their individual parts. By contrast, I

coined the term antergy to refer to a condition in which distinct elements or

components work against one another in such a negative manner that the product or result is less than the sum of the individual parts. Antergy is somewhat akin to the

Clauswitzean concept of “friction,” in that both tend to degrade the combat performances of military organizations, but there is a subtle but important difference between the two: where frictional forces fail to work together, antergistic forces actually work against one another. Like friction, however, experience and practice can help commanders overcome the effects of both forces to an extent. ^ Both terms refer to forces that are asymmetrical and produce nonlinear results.^ In each case, besides the external stimuh provided by some kind of catalyst, the most important element for the appearance of these forces is the opportunity for them to arise. While this

Antergy is a word I developed to represent the opposite of synergy. Whereas synergy mans working together to produce a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, antergy refers to a condition in which certain elements work against one another and actually generate a product or result that is less than the sum o f its part. I will develop this concept more completely throughout the rest of this chapter.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, reprint edition, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and translators (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 119-121.

^ By asymmetrical I mean unequal, and by nonlinear, I mean unexpected but not necessarily chaotic or unpredictable. See Alan Beyerchen’s “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, No. 3, Winter 1992/93.

350 statement may seem a bit trite, it is nonetheless worth mentioning, since the notion of

opportunity itself points to some potential disequilibrium within a system or among the

relationship of a number of interacting fectors.

Applying these concepts to the Eighth Army during the first two years of the

Korean War helps explain the differences in the relative success of the three diSerent

armies. In particular, I believe that the first Eighth Army experienced the unfortunate

effects of antergy, which negated many of Walker’s efforts to achieve success during

1950. Furthermore, I believe that the concurrent presence of the extremely high levels

of leadership, battlefield effectiveness within the Eighth Army, and opportunity

complemented one another and combined to produce a synergistic effect within the

second Eighth Army that was far greater than the sum of its parts and enhanced its

overall combat power. I believe that this synergistic effect allowed the second Eighth

Army to transcend its discernible capabilities and was the primary cause of the second

Eighth Army’s ability to perform so magnificently on the battlefield during this period.

Finally, I feel that Van Fleet’s third Eighth Army experienced neither antergistic nor

synergistic effects other than the general influences that affected each organization

equally. To help convince the reader of the validity of these assertions, I will review the three Eighth Armies’ combat effectiveness at the different levels o fmilitary activity

and then identify specific examples of antergy and synergy in action during the period

July 1950-June 1952 and show the impact of these forces on the different Eighth

Armies that fought in Korea in the war’s first two years.

351 Levels Of War - Elements Of Combat Power Integration

The analysis in the preceding three chapters has examined the Eighth Army using the six elements of combat power as a framework. While useful for analytical

studies, the levels of military activity provide perhaps the best vantage point from which to compare the actions of several different armies. Accordingly, before conçaring the three Eighth Armies, one must first identify the levels of war to which the combat power elemental analyses belong. After determining the appropriate divisions, one can use the individual analyses from the preceding chapters at the various levels of war to compare the effectiveness of the three Eighth Armies across the entire spectrum of military activity. The table below illustrates the significant areas o f consideration with the appropriate levels of war:

352 X

X X

X

X

XX

X

Table 33. Elements of Combat Power and Levels of Military Activity Integration Matrix

The questions addressed in the preceding three chapters presented the data necessary to compare the three Eighth Armies in these areas at these levels, and this section will highlight the important aspects at each level of military activity.

Political Level

Administration

In terms of total number of divisions needed, EUSAK was successful in having enough (or even more) units assigned to it for twelve of the twenty-four months of the

353 study. The second and third Eighth Armies were the most successful, with the third

Eighth Army having only one month during which h failed to have at least as many

Army units as the staff predictions estimated it would need. The second EUSAK was short one-third o f a division from July through November 1951 because Ridgway decided to recall the 187th RCT and retain it in Japan as a theater reserve force.

MacArthm’s decision to maintain a separate US X Corps prevented the first EUSAK from obtaining the appropriate number of divisions in 1950. For the most part, however, EUSAK had nearly all the Army units it needed beginning in January 1951 and was able to maintain its unit strength frirly consistently throughout the next eighteen months.

During its first two years of existence, the Eighth Army had a difficult time acquiring and maintaining the number of personnel anticipated by the staff’s estimates.

The quality of Army soldiers and leaders assigned to Korea, however, appeared to be the best for the second Eighth Army. After Ridgway’s overhaul of the corps, division, and regimental commanders and the arrival of better soldiers throughout most of 1951, the quality of soldiers increased dramatically from the first Eighth Army. The battle experience gained by these soldiers and leaders during the spring and summer 1951 campaigns helped to further improve the quahty of these veterans so that by November

1951, EUSAK could withstand anything theCommunists could throw at it and, as in the case of Bloody and Heartbreak ridges, could seize virtually any piece of terrain it wanted in Korea despite having the lowest relative number of troops as corrçared to the staff estimates. The untrained soldiers and marginally qualified leaders of the first

354 Eighth Army were significantly inferior, regardless of the fact that their numbers conformed most closely to the staff’s estimate, and the quality of personnel assigned to the third Eighth Army, while much closer in numbers to the staff’s estimates than the second Eighth Army and substantially better than that of the first EUSAK, was inferior to the second EUSAK’s quality as well This was particularly true for division commanders and artillery ofi&cers. Also, with Ridgway’s departure in May 1952, it is apparent that the Army was no longer sending all of its very best leaders to Korea.

Taken together, it appears that the second EUSAK was the most successful at gaining access to manpower in the required quantity and quality.

The quality of the senior ofiBcers who filled EUSAK’s critical leadership positions for the first six months of the war illustrates this point for the first Eighth

Army. Part of the explanation for this disparity has to do with the experience o f the men, selected in peacetime, for service in the Eighth Army. In a trenchant study of combat leadership done at the United States Military Academy, Kenneth E.

Hamburger made two significant conclusions:

1. A variety of assignments in areas unrelated to troop leadership had little effect on the abilities of a combat leader. Successful performance on high level staffs and in ‘high visibility” assignments* were not effective gauges of successful leaders. Officers can be extremely successful at a variety of demanding assignments unrelated to leading soldiers in combat and be abject failures as combat leaders.

* “High visibility” assignments are those that place junior officers in important positions in close proximity with influential senior officers, and excellent performance in such assignments can often lead to future success. Examples of such assignments include aides-de-camp, chiefs of staff and operations (G-3) officers.

355 2. The most salient predictor of a successfiil combat leader was successfiil leadership in peacetime, particularly of a tactical unit. Longer service before combat with the unit he would lead in combat appeared to hrçrove his performance, probably increasing unit cohesion and improvising mutual trust between the leader and the unh.^

The overwhelming majority o f the first EUSAK’s senior leaders served as highly visible and successfiil staff officers in World War II but turned out to be only mediocre combat leaders. This tends to corroborate Hamburger’s first assertion. With regards to Hamburger’s second observation, it appears that the first EUSAK’s senior leaders, especially its division commanders, were not particularly successful peacetime leaders, and that they could have perhaps improved their performances in combat if they had spent more time with their units before going into battle. Peter K Mansoor’s study of the development of combat effective divisions in the US Army during World War H offers further support in this area, concluding that personnel stability and training time prior to combat were perhaps the key elements that distinguished America’s best combat divisions of the Second World War."* EUSAK’s subsequent senior leadership

^ LTC K. E. Hamburger, Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal, A Study for the Officer Personnel Management System Stucfy group. Department of the Army, Conducted by the Department of History, United States Military Academy, unpublished manuscript, 1984, p. 10. In this rigorous historical stucfy, conducted by seven Military History instructors at USMA, the participants screened over two hundred examples of successful and unsuccessful combat leadership (as opposed to management, e.g., staff work or conducting resupply operations not involving enemy contact) firom all wars in which the United States has engaged firom the American Revolution through the Vietnam War. Once assembled, at least five members of the committee analyzed each incident extensively, examining the impact of the leader’s actions and the leader himself. This stucfy was never presented as a “scientific” effort, in that it used neither rigorous behavioral science methodology nor statistical analysis. Nevertheless, its conclusions identified some strikingly similar characteristics of successful and unsuccessful leaders, and its results are fully supported by historical evidence, suggesting a high degree of validity for my purposes.

Peter R. Mansoor, The Development o f Combat Effective Divisions in the United States Army During World IFar/ / (Columbus, OH: Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1992), p. 301.

356 conformed more closely to the parameters of success outlined above, and the fact they these officers tended to enjoy correspondingly increased levels of success appears to corroborate Hamburger’s observations and validate them as legitimate measures of performance in Korea.

Despite the relatively poor performance of many of the first EUSAK’s officers, it appears as though EUSAK received more that its foir share of talented senior officers and future leaders during much of this period. To paraphrase one source, of the Army’s fixture chiefs of stafÇ only four officers — among the thirteen who were old enough to have served in the Korean War — saw no service in that conflict.^ Three of these officers, George Decker, Earle Wheeler, and Bruce Palmer, were old enough to hold significant command positions in Korea, while the fourth, John Wickham, was a

1950 West Point graduate and could have only served as a company grade officer. Of the nine who did serve in Korea, eight were commanders at some level of infantry (or predominantly infantry) units. Ridgway and Taylor commanded Eighth Army,

Lemnitzer commanded 7 ID, Johnson commanded two different infantry regiments in

1 CAV, Westmoreland commanded the prestigious 187th Airborne RCT, while three

* Edward C. Meyer’s assertion was that only two of the thirteen ofBcers who later served as the Army’s Chief of Staff failed to serve in Korea. This is not entirely correct. While he correctly accounted for George Decker and Earle Wheeler, he failed to identify two other ofiBcers who served as the Army’s Chief of Staff and who did not serve in Korea. Bruce C. Palmer, who served as the Army’s acting Chief of Staff between Westmoreland and Abrams, did not serve in the Korean War, and John A. Wickham, the Army’s Chief of Staff after Edwin C. Meyer, did not serve in the Korean War either. As a 1950 graduate of West Point, Wickham was the last Army Chief of Staff who could have possibly served in the Korean War. Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell, & Jane Mahaffey, Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership In the United States Army (Westport, CT; Praeger, 1995), p. 67. My information came from the entries for these ofiBcers from the1987 USI^IA Register o f Graduates and William Gardner Bell, Commanding Generals and Chiefs ofStaJf1775-1991 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1992), pp. 128-154.

357 were infantry battalion commanders (Johnson in 1 CAV, Weyand in 7 ID, and Rogers in 2 ID), and one was an infantry platoon leader and company commander (Meyer in

40 ID). Four also served as staff officers, including Johnson as a corps G-3, Abrams as a corps chief of stafi^ Weyand as a division G-3, and Meyer as a battalion staff officer (see Appendix IV, Important Eighth. Army Leaders in the Korean War, for a conçlete list of the US Army’s division commanders in the Korean War).

Few of the Army’s future leaders served at the corps and division command levels. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that between the post-WW II drawdown and November 1949, the Army did not have any active corps. Between November

1949 and April 1951, as a result of the activation of the 7th Army in Europe for

NATO and the outbreak of the Korean War, the Army activated a total of seven corps.^ For a variety of reasons, none of the Army’s future Chiefs of Staff served as commanders of any of these units, but this does not mean that EUSAK did not receive the very best possible corps commanders. Five of the nine men who did serve as corps commanders during the period of this study went on to serve in positions of significantly increased responsibility (e.g.. Commandant of the US Army War College,

Chief of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group-Indochina, Commander of the

7th Army in Europe, Continental Army Commander, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,

Commander in Chief of US Army forces in Europe, etc.), and three were promoted to the rank of full (four star) general (see Appendix IV, Important Eighth Army Leaders

* These units included the V and VII Corps in Europe as a part of 7th Army, the X Vm Airborne Corps in the United States as a part of the country’s Strategic Reserve, the I, DC, and X Corps in Korea as part of the Eighth Army, and the XVI corps in Japan as part of the FEC.

358 in the Korean War, for a complete list of the US Army’s corps commanders in the

Korean W ar)/ Despite the Army’s seemingly higher ençhasis on supplying and

equipping NATO, it appears that a vast majority of the Army’s future leadership spent

time in Korea during the war.

At the political level, the most important issue was the ability to obtain quality

leaders, and one can conclude that the second Eighth Army was the most successful in

this area. While each of the other two armies had advantages in certain aspect of this

analysis, the second EUSAK had the best overall performance in this area because of

differences in opportunity and in the situation as a whole.

During the period of this study, Frank W. Milbum and John W. O’Daniel served as I Corps commanders, John B. Coulter, Bryant E. Moore, William M. Hoge, and Willard G. Wyman served as IX Corps commanders, and Edward M. Almond, Clovis E. Beyers, and WilUston B. Palmer served as X Corps commanders. I Corps’ O’Daniel became the Chief of the Army’s Military Assistance and Advisory Group-Indochina DC Corps’ Moore left his position of the USMA Superintendent to go to Korea and died less than one month after taking over the corps. Hoge replaced Moore, and Hoge was promoted to general, commanded 7th Army, and served as the Commander in Chief of US Army Forces in Europe. Wyman was DC Corps’ last commander of the period, and he was promoted to general and was the commander of the Continental Army Command. X Corps’ Almond served as the Commandant of the US Army War College. Beyers was a disappointing replacement for Almond, and he only commanded the corps for five months before Van Fleet replaced him with Palmer. Palmer was promoted to general and served as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and as the Deputy Commander in Chief of US Army Forces in Europe. Information for Milbum, Hoge, Moore, Palmer, Wyman, and Beyers came from their entries in the 1987 USA'M Register o f Graduates, pp. 311,314, 320, 327, 329, 334. Information on Coulter and additional information on Milbum came from John Kennedy Ohl’s entries in Stanley Sandler’s, ed.. The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York, Garland Publishing, 1995), pp. 93-94, 224-225. Information on O’Daniel came from Mark Boatner’s Biographical Dictionary o f World War II (Novato, CA; Presidio Press, 1996), pp. 399-400. Information on Almond came fromThe 1989 Register o f Former Cadets o f the Virginia Military Institute (Lexington, V A The VMI Alumni Association, 1989), p. 137, and Shelby Stanton’s America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA Presidio Press, 1989), p. 320.

359 Strategic Level

Integration

The strategic objectives assigned to the Eighth Army during the first two years of the Korean. War were largely supportive of the US/UN goals for the conflict.

Beginning with the first EUSAK, Walker’s mission was to maintain a foothold on the peninsula to prevent the Communists firom achieving a clear cut and rapid victory.

After breaking out firom the Pusan Perimeter, Walker’s mission was to pursue the remains of the NKPA into North Korea to complete the enemy army’s destruction and, along with the US X Corps, to unify the peninsula under one democratic government if possible.* These missions envisioned UNC forces winning the war by military means, hi the wake of the CPVA’s Second Phase Offensive, Ridgway’s mission was to maintain the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea, which meant pushing the Communists north of the 38th Parallel After issuing NSC 48/5,

EUSAK’s mission became one of maintaining its position in Korea and inflicting continuous punishment on the enemy to facilitate and support the negotiations, but it was no longer a mission of winning the war by coercive means.® When substantive negotiations appeared certain in November 1951, EUSAK’s mission was further curtailed to maintaining its position along the 38th Parallel and little else, as members

* Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, pp. 181-184, 193-194; Schnabel and Watson, History o f the JCS, Volume EH, The Korean War, Part I, pp. 230, 244-245.

® Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, pp. 380-387; Schnabel and Watson, H istory o f the JCS, Volume HI, The Korean War, Part I, pp. 466-467, 477-482, 493-495.

360 of the UN wanted to avoid any actions that would potentially upset the on-going negotiations/^

In the context of the Cold War as a whole and viewing Korea as a limited war, it appears, however, that some of EUSAK’s strategic objectives were better suited for the period than others. The first EUSAK’s initial goal was very suitable, if unexpected by the international community. The first EUSAK’s second goal of completing the destruction of the NKPA was technically legitimate; however, since it entailed invading North Korea, it was perhaps ill-advised. As we now know, it was the Inchon landing that upset the strategic balance of power in northeast Asia and which caused

China to begin considering seriously becoming actively involved in the Korean War.

The threat of UN, especially American, forces crossing into North Korea presented such a significant threat to China that, even before the UN authorized MacArthur to send his forces across the 38th Parallel, the Communist Chinese government had aheady decided to intervene militarily on Kim. II Sung’s behalf." Given that America had recently adopted a policy of containment and that the US wanted to avoid widening the war at all costs, the strategic objective assigned to the first EUSAK appears somewhat inappropriate. For years, the prevafling attitude has been that the

UNC only presented a threat to the Chinese after it advanced north of the P’yongyang-

Schnabel and Watson, History o f the JCS, Volume EH, The Korean War, Part EE, pp. 642-649; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 176-178.

" Shen Zhihua, translated by Chen Jian, ‘The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,” Cold War International History Project, Electronic Bulletin, Bulletin 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, cited at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a22.htni, p. 9.

361 Wonsan line in late-October 1950, suggesting that if Walker could have accomplished his mission south of the North Korean capital the Chinese would not have intervened, hi fact, it now appears that any encroachment of the 38th Parallel by American forces would have produced the same affect as Walker faced in late November 1 9 5 0 .Still, given the battlefield situation of the time, one is hard-pressed to come up with a more acceptable objective for EUSAK.

Rather than indicating that the strategic objective given to EUSAK after its breakout from Pusan was incorrect, the information currently available suggests that the Inchon landing was perhaps more responsible for the Chinese entry into the war.

Couple this with the fact that a significant portion of the NKPA escaped across the

38th Parallel because of the difficulty that Walker and Almond had in closing the gap between their forces in the latter half of September 1950, and one could conclude that

Walker’s Kunsan plan was the more desirable option. According to Walker’s information, he could have trapped the overwhelming majority o f the NKPA forces far south of the 38th Parallel, and the gap between the enveloping force and the elements breaking out from the Pusan Perimeter was far smaller than the gap that existed between EUSAK and X Corps, bn addition, it is likely that the Chinese would not have been threatened in the least by an amphibious landing at Kunsan, suggesting that

UNC military operations could have avoided provoking the Chinese while also

Shen Zhihua, translated by Chen Jian, ‘The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,” Cold War International History Project, Electronic Bulletin, Bulletin 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, cited at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a22.htm, pp. 1-2, 9.

362 accomplishing their mission, without widening the war. From a battlefield vantage point, EUSAK’s objective was perhaps the only viable option, but from a geopolitical point of view, the mission, given to Walker and EUSAK to invade North Korea did little to help either the US or the UN achieve its political objectives

Turning to 1951 and 1952, it appears that the mission given to the second

EUSAK was more successful in helping the US and UN achieve their political objectives. Ridgway’s charge was to regain the sovereignty of the Repubhc of Korea by pushing the Communists north of the 38th Parallel and then maintain constant pressure on the enemy to inflict maximum punishment on the Communist forces and bring them to the negotiating table. The United States issued NSC 48/5 during this period as well, indicating a preference for obtaining a negotiated as opposed to an inçosed solution to the problem in Korea. Operating under this guidance, first

Ridgway and then Van Fleet were successfiil in convincing the Communists to begin serious negotiations. By contrast, the mission of the third EUSAK was perhaps as appropriate but did little to help the US/UN achieve its poHtical objectives.

Protection

The strategies adopted by the different Eighth Army commanders varied with the force size and structure available to them and were, with perhaps one glaring error, remarkably consistent with EUSAK’s capabilities. Walker pursued a defensive strategy of attrition while fighting around the Pusan Perimeter, which was an appropriate strategy both in terms of the actual battlefield situation and in view of the

363 upcoming actions by X Corps. With the execution o f Operation CHROMITE and the

Eighth Army’s concomitant breakout from Pusan, MacArthur adopted an offensive strategy of annihilation intent upon destroying the NKPA completely. Walker’s 5:1 superiority in tanks and 2:1 superiority in personnel indicate that initially this strategy was well-suited for the first EUSAK’s force size and structure. Furthermore, given the UNC’s overall superiority in personnel and equipment, this was a suitable strategic approach if confined to the area of South Korea. Once across the 38th Parallel, however, MacArthur’s strategy makes less sense, as it became immediately destabilizing and risked provoking Chinese entry and thus surrendering the UNC’s qualitative advantages. The strategy for the UNC after the Inchon landing reflects an opportunistic approach to strategic thinking during a period (i.e., the beginning of the

Cold War) that required the leaders to pay even greater attention to rational considerations. The lack of rational thought associated with MacArthur’s strategic choice became evident during the Communists’ Second Phase Offensive, when

MacArthur was unexpectedly opposed by an enemy who possessed an overwhelming numerical advantage and was pursuing a strategy o f annihilation as well. As a subordinate commander who lacked the ability to influence his superior’s strategic decision-making. Walker’s strategy for the first EUSAK mirrored MacArthur’s, opening him to the very same criticisms and indicating that the first EUSAK’s strategy was wholly inappropriate for its size and structure during the last quarter of 1950.

Ridgway brought about a significant change in strategy for the second EUSAK that was much more suitable for its size and structure in early 1951. Recognizing the

364 second EUSAK’s qualitative disadvantage, Ridgway adopted au offensive strategy of attrition designed to achieve the US and UN aims with the forces available and that supported the two most significant political directives of the time. Ridgway altered the second EUSAK’s force structure by increasing its proportion of field and antiaircraft artillery, which better suited his strategic approach. As a somewhat unfortunate result of Ridgway’s adoption of an approach that, for American’s of the twentieth century, was fairly unfamiliar, the method of measuring success in this type o f war began to focus more and more on tabulating the enemy destroyed in combat operations, or the infamous “body count” that would become so reviled in Vietnam.

Despite recent claims to the contrary. Eighth Army operations during the period 1951-

1953 were never solely or even mostly concerned with achieving a high body count.

Ridgway and Van Fleet focused their battlefield operations on inflicting the maximum punishment on the enemy and securing advantageous terrain from which to defend

South Korea while remaining focused on the war’s overall objectives of maintaining a free and independent, non-Communist Republic of Korea. To get the Communists to recognize ROK sovereignty might well have required significant battlefield casualties, but these were always a means to an end, at least as reported by all of the principals

These directives were NSC 48/2 and NSC 48/4, both of which supported a strategy of attrition more so than a strategy of annihilation. Schnabel and Watson, History o f the JCS, Volume m. The Korean War, Part I, pp. 466-468, 477-482.

Scott Sigmund Gartner and Marissa Edson Myers, “Body Counts and 'Success' in the Vietnam and Korean Wars,” The Journal o f Interdisciplinary History, 25:3, Winter 1995, pp. 1-16 (cited from The Journal of Interdisciplinary History web cite).

365 involved and the Eighth Army’s own record of events, and never, as they became in

Vietnam, a means unto themselves.

Van Fleet continued to operate in this mode, although, in the wake of the

6ilure of the Communists’ Second Impulse of their Fifth Phase Offensive, he desperately wanted to adopt a strategy of annihilation that would allow him to pursue and virtually destroy the remnants of the CPVA and the NKPA. Debate still exists as to whether this was a feasible option or not; however, when approaching a strategic assessment from a means-versus-ends perspective, it is clear that Van Fleet was mistaken. While the opportunity may have existed at the tactical and operational levels for the UNC to bring about the destruction of the Communist forces in Korea, this course of action was neither in line with the US and UN’s political objectives, nor was it a particularly attractive risk for America. In military parlance, a risk is defined as something from which one can recover if it fads, while a gamble means that one does not have the ability to recover from an action that fails to achieve its objective.

Military commanders are forced to accept risks in every operation; however, gambles are reserved for those special situations that require one to take exceptional chances to avoid annihilation or to exploit a uniquely advantageous situation. Given that the forces available to the US to achieve its global objectives were stretched almost to the breaking point by spring 1951, coupled with the realization that the second EUSAK could achieve its strategic goals in support of the political objectives outlined by the

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is credited with enunciating this distinction. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 2-2.

366 u s in NSC 48/5 and by the UN, leaves one to conclude that Van Fleet’s desires, while perhaps suitable for the existing battlefield situation, would have been unwise fiom a grand strategic perspective. Van Fleet’s proposal was far more illustrative of the

opportunistic strategic thin king that affected the UNC in 1950 than of rational

considerations. Fortunately for the UNC, Ridgway rejected Van Fleet’s recommendation and remained wedded to conducting an offensive strategy of attrition intended to force the Communists into meaningfid negotiations. Ridgway’s approach bore finit in November 1951.

Ridgway’s “active defense” order of 12 November 1951 compelled Van Fleet to adopt a defensive strategy of attrition that supported the negotiations. Given the personnel and equipment imbalances that existed between the UNC and Communist forces, this was perhaps the best possible approach fiom a battlefield point of view. In terms of force size and structure. Van Fleet was able to substantially increase the size

of the UNC and improve its structure to better accomphsh its strategic objectives. By

summer 1952, the third EUSAK’s force structure was far better suited to conduct the type of operations required by the existing strategic and pohtical situation, and it was largely due to Van Fleet’s efforts that the third EUSAK’s force structure was so compatible with its mission.

When considering the impact of the third EUSAK’s combat operations on the negotiations, however, its strategic approach does not appear to have been as effective as that of its predecessor. Whereas the combat operations of the second EUSAK were able to persuade the Communists to agree to armistice negotiations hi June 1951 and

367 to undertake meaningful discussions in November 1951, the actions o f the third

EUSAK had no comparable impact on achieving American and United Nations’ political objectives. One must again acknowledge the dififerences in opportunities available to these two organizations, but the fact remains that, of the three Eighth

Armies in Korea during the 1950-1952 period, the actions of the second EUSAK at the strategic level were the most successful at helping the US and UN achieve their political objectives.

Administration

The Eighth Army consistently made good use of its available resources and was rarely constrained for personnel or logistical reasons. After the desperate first six weeks of the war. Walker amassed enough troops and equipment so that by the time the breakout firom the Pusan Perimeter, he possessed a 2:1 advantage in personnel and a 5:1 advantage in tanks over the NKPA forces. The buildup of equipment throughout the first two years of the war allowed EUSAK to maintain its armored vehicle and aircraft advantages and reduce the disparity between the Communists and allies total number of artillery pieces. As discussed previously, the Communists were able to increase their advantage in terms of personnel over the course of the entire study.

During the period of the first EUSAK, however, several incidents occurred in which the Eighth Army’s supply system could not support its operations. During the period of the second EUSAK, Ridgway and Van Fleet were not forced to alter their operational plans in any significant manner because of supply concerns. In fact,

368 Ridgway was able to execute the most logistically demanding of all of the 1951

operations. Operation KELLER, exactly as he wanted. Van Fleet was so confident of

his supply situation that he felt he could have continued attacking into North Korea

and brought about the complete destruction of the North Korean and Chinese forces,

thus achieving a military solution to the problem in Korea. Throughout the remainder

of the second EUSAK’s period and all during the third EUSAK’s period. Van Fleet

remained confident in his supply situation and did not have to curtail any operations

for logistical reasons. In fact. Van Fleet continued to plan aggressive attacks for his

army throughout the second half of 1951 and the first half of 1952, suggesting that he

believed his logistical situation to be at least adequate to support large-scale offensive

operations. Again it comes down to a question of opportunity when making a

distinction between the effectiveness of the second and third Eighth Armies, and it

appears that the second Eighth Army had the opportunity to better demonstrate its

administrative effectiveness at the strategic level.

At the strategic level, one can conclude that the second Eighth Army was again the most successful because its actions in the combat power terms of integration, protection, and administration best supported the US and UN efforts to achieve their political goals. The strategic objectives and approaches of the second EUSAK were best suited to help obtain the desired political goals. While the supply system and force structure of the third EUSAK were perhaps equally effective to those of the second EUSAK the results of the second EUSAK’s battlefield actions were more effective overall. As with the analysis at the political level, opportunity is again an

369 iiEçortant factor to consider, but it does not alter the results of the strategic

examination.

Operational Level

Leadership

The unique command relationships between the various CINC UNC’s and the

EUSAK commanders were responsible in some measure for the varying amounts of

success enjoyed by the Eighth Army during the first two years of the Korean War. It

appears that the MacArthur-Ridgway relationship was the most profitable for the

army, followed by the Ridgway-Van Fleet and the MacArthur-Walker associations, while the impact of the Clark-Van Fleet relationship was inconclusive during the period of this study. This observation leads one to conclude that in order to be the most effective leader, an Eighth Army commander had to be a competent military professional and enjoy a relationship of mutual trust with his immediate superior.

These circumstances seemed to have existed in the greatest measure during Ridgway’s period of command, followed by Van Fleet’s and then Walker’s tenures as EUSAK leaders. Nevertheless, they appeared to have existed in some form throughout the first two years of the Korean War as evidenced by the success of all three Eighth Army commanders as relatively effective leaders.

370 It also appears that leaders in the Korean War with the ability to conduct

offensive operations (i.e., pursue positive operational goals) had the potential for

greater success than those who did not (Le., commanders vAo had to pursue negative

operational goals) because offensive operations fit much better with the American

soldiers’ psyche and the public’s perception of successfiil combat operations. This has

been generally true throughout aU of American history, but it was particularly relevant

during the first war after World War EE, where offensive operations had been the norm

and had brought about a victory that secured an unconditional surrender from the

enemy.

Mark Clodfelter’s concept of “positive” and “negative” goals can also help in this analysis. One can achieve positive goals by applying force, while accomplishing negative goals requires a commander to exercise the restraint of force in order to achieve them. Given the American culture and fascination with technology and firepower, Clodfelter’s positive goals are far better suited for Americans than negative goals.

Using Clodfelter’s definitions as a guide, the first EUSAK and the second

EUSAK under Ridgway’s command were able to pursue positive operational goals, as they were able to achieve their objectives using offensive operations. For the majority of Van Fleet’s time in the second and third EUSAKs, however, he had to pursue negative operational goals, since he was not allowed to conduct offensive operations

Mark Clodfelter, The Limits ofAir Power: The American Bombing o f North Vietnam (New York The Free Press, 1989), p. xi.

371 during most of these periods. The importance of this circumstance is fairly high, since it placed Van Fleet at an inherent disadvantage in terms o f leadership eflfectiveness vis-

à-vis Walker and Ridgway. Thus, as leaders, one may conclude that Walker and

Ridgway had perhaps better opportunities to succeed in Korea than Van Fleet. The significance of this différence wül become even more apparent in the maneuver analysis as well

In the final analysis then, Ridgway emerges as the most effective leader of the

Eighth Army. He enjoyed the best relationship with his immediate superior, he was able to pursue positive operational goals throughout his entire period of command^ and, perhaps most importantly, he had the opportunity to demonstrate his transformational leadership abilities and bring about a fimdamental change in EUSAK in just four short months. While both Walker and Van Fleet enjoyed varying levels of success in these areas, only Ridgway was able to flourish in aU three areas, indicating that the leadership he provided was the most effective during the war’s first two years.

Firepower

Interestingly, the first EUSAK appears to have fared the best in relative terms with respect to firepower. It experienced the least significant quantitative personnel disadvantage, enjoyed a significant quantitative artillery advantage, and, along with the second EUSAK, possessed a significant close air support quantitative advantage. By contrast, the second EUSAK has the most significant quantitative artillery disadvantage, while the third EUSAK experienced, by far, the greatest quantitative

372 personnel disadvantage and also had to contend with a reduced quantitative close air support advantage, hi relative terms, it appears that the first EUSAK was best o£^ followed by the second and third EUSAKs.

Maneuver

The first EUSAK’s operational activity during the war’s first two months and the second EUSAK’s operational activities produced the highest degrees of maneuver effectiveness during the first two years of the war. Walker’s actions during the Pusan

Perimeter and Ridgway’s performance during February-Aprfl. 1951 were perhaps the most effective periods for the Eighth Army because they did the best job of placing

EUSAK’s strengths against the Communists’ weaknesses and exploiting these differences. Walker’s actions during the last part of 1950 were conspicuously ineffective, while Van Fleet had little opportunity to achieve any level of maneuver effectiveness in 1952 because of the existing political and strategic situation.

Integration

The concept and execution of the second EUSAK’s operational concepts were the most effective in achieving the unit’s strategic objectives, but the operational concepts of both the first and third EUSAK were equally appropriate at times. The concepts of the first and second EUSAKs were perhaps more influential than intended, while the third EUSAK’s operational concept did little more than maintain thestatus

373 quo. It appears that the key for success in this area was the ability to execute the concepts successfully, which the second EUSAK was best able to do.

One can best assess the other aspect of integration at the operational level, the degree to which operational methods were integrated, by comparing the performance of each Eighth Army in the areas of firepower, maneuver, and administration to determine how well the organization combined these elements during its period of existence. The most effective organization was not necessarily the one that performed the best in all individual areas; rather, it was the unit that was best able to apply its strengths to the particular battlefield situation, protect its weaknesses, and achieve the best possible results.

The table below provides a recapitulation of the different Eighth Army’s relative effectiveness at the operational level

374 Effective Most Effective Marginally Effective Effective

Most Effective Most Most Effective Effective Effective

Effective Effective Marginally Effective Effective

Table 34. Integration Matrix for the Relevant Elements of Combat Power at the Operational Level of Military Activity and the Three Eighth Armies

As the chart above illustrates, the second EUSAK was an extremely elective organization at the operational level, while the first EUSAK demonstrated wide fluctuations and the third EUSAK was remarkably consistent. Taken together, the second Eighth Army appears to have been the most effective at the operational level because it performed exceptionally well in most areas, was the most successfiil in exploiting its strengths while protecting its weaknesses, and it achieved the best possible results during its period of existence. Furthermore, the first and third Eighth

Armies, while not as effective as the second Eighth Army, appear to have been more effective fighting organizations than they have been portrayed by authors in the past.

375 Tactical Level

It appears that the third EUSAK’s tactical concepts were the best suited for its operational capabilities, as the first EUSAK’s tactical concepts were too difiBcult and some of the tactical concepts used by the second EUSAK were too simple. In addition. Van Fleet appears to have been the best at calibrating the tactical actions executed by EUSAK with the unit’s operational capabilities. Furthermore, the historical evidence suggests that the second EUSAK’s tactical maneuver and firepower effectiveness were clearly superior to that of the first and third Eighth

Armies. Extending this analysis even fixrther, one can conclude that the second Eighth

Army was also the most effective organization at the tactical level of military activity as well during the first two years of the Korean War.

Overall Combat Effectiveness

Taking the many aspects of this analysis into account, the second EUSAK emerges as a magnificently effective organization that was clearly distinct firom its predecessor and successor. The table below summarizes the results of this chapter’s assessment at the different levels of war.

376 Effective Effective Effective Marginally Effective

Most Most Most Most Effective Effective Effective Effective

Effective Very Marginally Very Effective Effective Effective

Table 35. Overall Combat Power at the Four Levels of Military Activity for the Three Eighth Armies

Although it was not dominant in every single aspect of the combat effectiveness assessment, the second EUSAK was best able to do well the things that were most inçortant in securing the stated objectives at each level of military activity.

This analysis also highlights several other important factors. The first is that

Walker’s first EUSAK was better than usually assumed at each level of military activity during the first two months of the war. The first EUSAK’s combat effectiveness began to decrease as soon as it broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and began advancing north. The farther north his unit went, the lower its level of combat effectiveness became. This suggests that at the outbreak of the Korean War, the Eight

377 Army, despite conducting substantial offensive training in the year preceding the war,

was best suited to conduct defensive operations. In addition. Walker’s fading

conqjetence throughout the last quarter of 1950 indicates that MacArthur’s decision to

split his UNC command and retain personal control of Almond’s US X Corps was

perhaps the most appropriate course of action. MacArthur had been pilloried for this

decision for almost fifty years for mostly doctrinal considerations; however, a close

examination of the actual situation suggests that Walker’s span of control was already

saturated with the units he had under his control by mid-September 1950 and that he

had already surpassed his ability to effectively control any additional units. Viewed in

this light, MacArthur appears to have little choice but to continue directing Almond’s

operations until either Walker was able to demonstrate an improved ability to control

his assigned units or he was replaced by someone who could effectively control an

additional US corps. One of MacArthur’s first actions upon Ridgway’s arrival was to

transfer control of the US X Corps to EUSAK, which seems to corroborate the above

analysis.

The other significant factor that emerges firom this analysis is that the third

EUSAK was a very effective military organization, but it lacked many of the

opportunities to demonstrate this effectiveness that were available to the second

EUSAK Indeed, its most significant difference with the second EUSAK occurred at

the operational level and was largely a result of Van Fleet’s inability to place his unit’s

strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. This occurred because Van Fleet and the third EUSAK had to establish and maintain a relatively static defense intended to “hold

378 the line” and not obtain any additional battlefield advantages. Lacking the opportunity to conduct any sort of large-scale maneuver, the third Eighth Army’s activities were characterized by actions at the battalion and regimental levels directed mostly by the corps and division commanders. While it is difiBcult to speculate just how efifective the third EUSAK could have been in a situation more akin to that of the second EUSAK, especially in light of the transfer of two veteran divisions for two National Guard divisions, it is nevertheless apparent that the third EUSAK never had the opportunity to demonstrate completely its combat prowess. Thus, any comparison of these two entities must always consider the opportunities available to the organization before making a final determination on the overall combat effectiveness of each unit.

Even taking the idea of opportunity into consideration, one is nonetheless struck by the superb performance of the second EUSAK at aU levels of miUtary activity despite the fact that it was experiencing a high level of personnel turbulence and stiff resistance on the battlefield. Many have attributed this phenomenon to the efforts of Matthew Ridgway alone, but the preceding chapters have demonstrated that there was far more to the process of rebuilding the Eighth Army than one man could possibly do one his own. Indeed, the confluence of many factors seems to have coalesced during this period of the Korean War, and the next section wUl present what

I believe to be a satisfactory explanation for this unique occurrence that led to the emergence of one of America’s best field armies of the last fidiy years.

379 The General Synergistic Effect of Ihterwar Organizational Change

Changes in the army's smallest tactical units had some significant inçacts on the fighting abilities of all three Eighth Armies. Besides improving the capabilities of the infantry squad, platoon, and conçany, the organizational changes mentioned in

Chapter 4 also increased the effectiveness of the soldiers assigned to the units. This occurred because the decrease in the size of the squad increased the cohesiveness of these units, which in turn increased the number of soldiers who fired in each unit. This is a textbook example of a synergistic effect, and it was one firom which all three

Eighth Armies benefited in Korea.

In the late nineteenth century, Ardant du Picq noted that, "Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a hon. Four less brave, but knowing each other weU, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, wiU attack resolutely."^’ Studies by author Nora Kinzer Stewart corroborate du Picq's observation. According to Stewart,

Over and over, research in military psychology and sociology in the United States and other AUied nations reaflorms the interrelationship of small-group ties, loyalty, bonding, esprit, and combat performance. Yet the majority of U. S. Army planners continue to emphasize training, tactics, firepower, and

Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies (Paris: Hatchette and Dumaire, 1880), and (London: The MacMillian Company, 1921), appearing in/?oo£yo/.S'trute^.- 5ooÆ 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987),p. 136.

380 weapons systems and, if not ignore, as least downplay the issue of the sociopsychological effect of cohesion on high performance in battle/*

Perhaps uncharacteristically, the Army reforms of the 1945-1950 period conformed

almost exactly to those recommended by Stewart.

As early as the first century B.C., Wu Ch'i, a contençoraiy of Sun Tzu,

identified the optimal size of the squad as five soldiers and advocated grouping two

squads of five together into a section of ten soldiers. Since that time, soldiers and

leaders fiom all over the world have come to agree with Wu Ch'L As historian

Richard Holmes observed, "For centuries an army’s basic unit, like the Roman legion's

ten-man conturbemium or the Prussian army's seven-man Kameradschaft, was

essentially a Irving and messing group rather than a tactical entity, and gained much of

its cohesion from close contact in daily life."^°

The crux of the power of a small group comes from what is now described as

"primary group cohesion." Sociologist Charles H Cooley coined the term in 1920,

and he defined the primary group as a number of individuals whose interaction is

"characterized by intimate fàce-to-fàce association and cooperation."^^ The term

Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War (New York: Brasse/s Inc., 1991), p. 15, hereinafter cited as Stewart, Mates and Muchachos.

Wu Ch'i, "Art of War," Chapter HI, "The Control of Troops," Section HI, Part 2, appearing in Sun Tzu, TIie.Art o f War, translated by Samuel B. GrifiBth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 160.

Richard Holmes, Acts o f War: The Behavior ofMen in Battle (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 128.

Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization, and Military Performance," in Handbook of Military Institutions, Roger Little, ed., (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 297. 381 “primary group coheâon” came into vogue in the years following World War H, with much research conducted to determine the parameters o f the primary group. Modem sociologists discovered that the optimum size of a primary group is five members, something that Wu Ch'i had observed several centuries prior.^ Researchers also studied the impact of varying the size of primary groups. Sociologist Richard T.

LaPiere determined that the degree of control which a primary group can exert upon its members is inversely proportional to the size of the unit, which means that as the primary group increases in size so too does it decrease in cohesion.^

This evidence indicates that the reduction of the squad organization from twelve to nine members had at least two significant sociological impacts on the soldiers assigned to these units: the change brought the squad closer to the primary group's optimal size of five, and it increased the cohesiveness of the Korean War squad vis-à-vis the World War H squad. Army tests fiuther revealed that as the size of the squad decreased, the squad's fire efficiency, which is a measure of the number of hits and the effect of its suppressive fires, increased. Couple this with Nora Kinzer

Stewart's conclusion that the higher the cohesion of a military unit the more soldiers

~ Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation, ORAiE Report No. R 77 (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Department of National Defense Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1980), p. 46. See footnote 18 above for the reference to Wu Ch'i.

^ Richard T. LaPiere, A Theory o f Social Control. This work, though highly technical, is a classic sociological work that provides a widely accepted theoretical explanation for many military activities. Cited in Dr. John H. Johns,Cohesion in the US Military: Defense Management Study Group on Group Cohesion (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), pp. 32, 101.

Paul F. Gorman, The Secret o f Future Victories (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), p. 111-21.

382 will fire their weapons in combat, and one is able to draw several conclusions regarding the impact of organizational changes on the soldiers and the units.^ One can conclude that by reducing the size of the infantry squad firom twelve to nine soldiers, the unit became more cohesive and the soldiers assigned to these squads became more apt to fire a greater proportion of their weapons.

Marshall himself provides the best-know description of this phenomenon.

Marshall wrote.

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade. The warmth which derives firom human companionship is as essential to his employment of the arms with which he fights as is the finger with which he puUs a trigger or the eye with which he aligns his sights... It is that way with any fighting man. He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily. Having to make a choice in the face of the enemy, he would rather be unarmed and with his comrades around him than altogether alone, though possessing the most perfect of quick-firing weapons.

Based upon his own observations, Marshall also felt that there was "a strong implication that the idea [had] become ingrained in the infantry line that fire participation [was] an obligation of honor, and the obligation [was] felt by the average soldier.

23 St&wait, Mates andMuchachos, pp. 21, 28.

26 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem o f Battle Command in Future War (Washington, DC; The Infentry Journal Press, 1947; reprint ed., Gloucester, MA; Peter Smith, 1978), pp. 42-43.

Ibid.; S.L.A. Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter 1950-1951, (Chevy Chase, MD; The Johns Hopkins Operations Research OflBce, 1951; reprint ed., 383 If one assumes that at least one more soldier in a unit wiU. jSre as a result of the

unit's increased cohesiveness, one observes the following changes; the number of

squad members one would expect to fire their weapons in combat increases firom four

of nine to five of nine, thus increasing the squad's ratio of fire to 55.6 percent, which

mirrors almost exactly the figure on which Marshall settled. Similarly, the improved

primary group cohesion of the squads assigned to a platoon improved the platoon's

combat participation to twenty of thirty-six, which also increased the platoon's ratio of

fire to 55.6 percent, and again, mirroring almost exactly the figures offered by

Marshall.

Nevertheless, primary group cohesion alone cannot account for the dramatic

increase in the ratio of fire observed by Marshall. Phillip D'Alton observes that one

must be careful to avoid categorical statements regarding the power of small unit

cohesion. He states that, "While the grouping of men into small physicaUy-close (sic),

segmented task operations offers a better chance for action, it cannot be taken as an

absolute." He cites the flight of German anti-tank gunners (who functioned as members of crews) in 1940 in the face of advancing British tanks as evidence to

support his observation. Stfll, D'Alton concludes by saying that positive action (i.e..

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-6, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1989), p. 61.

384 remaining steadfast in combat) by small units remains the norm rather than the exception/^

It appears that a certain synergy existed between organizational and social

changes that helps explain much of the increase noted by Marshall. I suspect that

Marshall would agree that the psychological changes that accompanied the organizational reforms of the period best explain the increase of the ratio of fire in

Korea. ^ In Men Against Fire, Marshall wrote that, "...the increasing of fire volume must be considered primarily a psychological matter.Writing in The Armed Forces

Officer, Marshall also stated that "the best tactical results [come] firom those dispositions and methods that link the power of one man to that of another.'"’*

Indeed, the organizational changes made by the Army to the infantry squad and platoon during the 1945-1950 period increased small unit cohesion, which in turn increased the number of soldiers who fired their weapons in combat. Thus, one may conclude that the combined effects of the squad's reduction in size and the

Phillip D'Alton, Men in Combat: A Sociological Examination o f the British, American, and German Armies in the Second World War (University of New South Wales, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1974), pp. 258-259.

^ Martin Blumenson, among others, believed that Marshall was somewhat self-serving and was probably trying to take as much credit for the Army’s improvement as he could. Marshall’s author’s note to the 1961 editionof Men Against Fire was perhaps simply another example of this trait. See Blumenson, "Did 'Slam' Guess at Fire Ratios? Probably; A Legend Remembered," Army, June 1989, p. 16.

Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 70.

S.L.A. Marshall, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, DC: OfBce o f Armed Forces Information and Education, 1950, republished periodically through 1988), p. 237.

385 reorganization of the squad and platoon are most responsible for the increase in the ratio of fire observed by Marshall in the Korean War.

This synergistic eJBFect was experienced by all three Eighth Annies. One suspects that it first appeared in Korea around August 1950 and was largely responsible for the first EUSAK’s ability to make such a gallant stand in the Pusan

Perimeter. By November-December 1950, however, Marshall offered significant evidence of its existence on the battlefield with his observations about the increased ratio of fire demonstrated by Eighth Army infantry units. This phenomenon continued to exist on the battlefield during the periods of the second and third Eighth Armies, and Marshall provided fiuther evidence of its existence during his return visit during spring 1953.

This com m onform of synergy was important on the Korean battlefield, but the unique forms of antergy and synergy experienced by the first and second Eighth

Armies, respectively, are perhaps more usefiil in developing an explanation for the differences in combat effectiveness demonstrated by each organization Accordingly, I wfll discuss the first EUSAK’s antergy before examining the second EUSAK’s synergy and the third EUSAK’s lack of any unusual form of either one.

Antergy And the Fate of the First Eighth Army

The first EUSAK began to experience the ül-effects of antergy as early as July

1950. It was during this period that MacArthur and Walker began examining the

386 possibility of launching an amphibious operation to relief the pressure around the

Pusan Perimeter and facilitate a breakout by the Eighth Army. Walker’s Kunsan plan envisaged an amphibious landing around Kunsan as part of an envelopment to capture or destroy the majority of the NKPA, which he believed to be located south of the

Kunsan-Taegue-Pohang-do line. MacArthur’s more grandiose hichon plan required an amphibious landing at the critical port of hichon which would also serve as part of a turning movement intended to force the NKPA out of their positions around the Pusan

Perimeter and allow the “hammer” of the advancing Eighth Army, after having broken out of the Pusan Perimeter, to crush the retreating Communists against the US X

Corps’ “anvil” around Seoul The Inchon plan would put UNC forces in position to quickly recapture Seoul and accomplish the political objective of ridding South Korea of the invaders from the north, thus reestablishing a free and independent, non-

Communist Republic of Korea. Collins, visiting on behalf of the UN, received briefings from both commanders about their plans during the third week of August

1950, and the results of these briefings would set in motion an antergistic force with catastrophic results for the first EUSAK.

The antergy of the fiirst EUSAK began on 23 August 1950 when Walker was unable to persuade Collins to adopt his plan instead of MacArthur’s. Even though he described a plan that was tactically, operationally, and strategically sound,

MacArthur’s presentation was magnificent, and the JCS ultimately approved his plan.^^

Collins, IForin Peacetime, pp. 114-128.

387 While many authors have commented on the advantages and disadvantages of each

plan, no one has yet highlighted the antergistic effects of this decision.

Peihaps the most important antergistic effect o f the decision to land at Inchon

and the execution of Operation CHROMITE was the extent of the threat it

represented to the Chinese Communists. Relying again on the recent work of the Cold

War International History Project, one can now conclude that the Chinese

Communists viewed the Inchon landing as the most provocative possible action that

the UN could take, and that Operation CHROMITE was most responsible for bringing them into the Korean War.

Chinese scholar Shen Zhihua presents the most cogent and persuasive

argument in support of the above assertion. Using recently released documents from the Chinese archives, Zhihua concludes that, “[s]ince the outbreak of the Korean War,

Mao Zedong had been carefiiUy considering the question of sending troops to Korea.

After the Inchon landing in mid-September, he seemed to have been determined to do

so,” thus establishing Operation CHROMITE as the proximate cause of China’s decision to enter the Korean War.^^ Furthermore, Zhihua determined that the Chinese

Communist Central Committee agreed on the morning of 5 October 1950 to send troops into North Korea, twenty days after the UNC’s amphibious landing at Inchon

Shen Zhihua, translated by Chen Jian, ‘The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,” Cold War International History Project, Electronic Bulletin, Bulletin 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, cited at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a22.htm, p. 6 .

388 but four days prior to any American units crossing of the 38th Parallel^'* The Chinese

Communists made this decision knowing fiill well that, as o f 2 October 1950, only

ROK troops had crossed the Parallel In fact, Mao’s dairy reveals that he remained uncertain about the location of American units as late as mid-October 1950. IDs entry on 14 October 1950 stated, “it seems that the Americans are yet to decide whether or not and when they would attack Pyongyang ... The American troops are now sdll stationed at the [38th] ParallelZhihua goes on to write that

every time the Chinese leaders mentioned that China would send troops to Korea, they made it clear that a cmcial precondition for taking action was that the enemy forces crossed the 38th Parallel In Zhou Enlai’s meeting with K M. Pannikar, Didia’s ambassador to China, early in the morning of October 3, the Chinese premier particularly ençhasized that if the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had crossed the 38th ParaUel, China would intervene. As of October 2, this precondition had not yet materialized.^®

However, it is clear from the documents cited previously that the Chinese Communists had taken significant action prior to American troops crossing the 38th Parallel: they

^ These forces began immediate preparations to begin operations in Korea by 15 October 1950. Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid., p. 9 and fo 20, cited fromJianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding o f the People's Republic] (Beijing: Central Press o f Historical Documents, 1987), volume 1, pp. 559-61.

Ibid., p. 9, fii 19, and fri 20, cited from Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers o f Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: The Central. Press of Historical Documents, 1990), 25-27, znd Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding o f the People's Republic] (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), volume 1, pp. 559-61.

389 had already decided to send troops into North Korea by 15 October 1950 to help Kim n Sung continue his struggle.

After the American began crossing the 38th Parallel on 9 October 1950, the antergistic forces became even more pronounced, for the increasing tactical success experienced by the first EUSAK served only to provoke the Chinese Communists even further. This dynamic ensured that, unless the UNC was able to completely annihilate the NKPA, the UNC’s hopes for an operational, strategic, or political victory continued to dwindle with every additional tmle that EUSAK advanced north.

Walker’s poor control of his advancing fijrces for the first ten days of operations in

North Korea exacerbated the situation even more, since the ensuing confusion in

P’yongyang helped to confirm the

Chinese Communists’ behef that an American presence north of the 38th Parallel posed a significant threat to the People’s Republic of China’s national security. The

CPVA’s First Phase Offensive in late-October and early November 1950 hinted at just how grave a threat the Chinese viewed the American units’ invasion, and the overwhelming power of the CPVA’s Second Phase Offensive in late-November and early December 1950 demonstrated unequivocally that they were willingly to endure great sacrifices to prevent the United States firom establishing a position anywhere along their border. The first Eighth Army’s ensuing retreat caused western leaders to question whether the UNC could even success in maintaining a presence on the

Korean peninsula at all, representing an almost complete reversal of their overconfidence of the previous two months. This situation of forces working against

390 one another to produce a result that is far less that wdiat was expected is an excellent

example of antergy in action.

In addition, the first EUSAK’s difficulty in breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter

in mid-September 1950 allowed approximately 30,000 NKPA troops to escape to the

north before the UN forces were able to close the gap between the forces advancing

firom the south and the US X corps. These 30,000 soldiers remained largely

ineffective for the next four months, but they provided a base around which to rebuild

so that EUSAK was again facing substantial NKPA units by spring 1951. They also

provided Kim 11 Sung with at least the remnants of his own army, which probably

encouraged him to allow the Chinese Communists to take over while he rebuilt his

army for future operations. Had the UNC been better able to destroy or capture more

of the NKPA, depriving Kim II Sung of his own forces, the North Korean Communists

would have perhaps been less willing to rely exclusively on Chinese forces to continue

their aggression.

Antergy borders on “what if..” history in that it requires the historian to predict what might have happened and the reader to believe the historian’s predictions,

but, as Eliot Cohen and John Gooch point out, the study of battlefield failure can broaden greatly one’s understanding of the workings of military organizations.^^ The validity of this approach is significantly strengthened by the existence of corroborating

evidence, as in the case of China’s decision to enter the war. While it is difficult to

Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch,Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy o f Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 1-3, 231-233.

391 prove that certain elements or conçonents were actually working against one another, it certainly appears as though the UN’s decision to adopt MacArthur’s hichon plan and. the UNC’s inability to annihilate the NKPA caused the tactical and operational successes experienced by the first Eighth Army to work against its success at the strategic and political levels o f military activity. This circumstance is almost conqiletely opposite of the synergistic experience of the second Eighth Army during the next eleven months.

The Unique Synergy of the Second Eighth Army

As portions of the analysis have showed, the second Eighth Army had two very effective leaders who occupied critical positions within the organization during the period of its existence. The assessments of the other elements of the Eighth Army’s combat power between January-November 1951 also reveal an extremely effective military unit. The concept of synergy can help explain how these forces came together, especially during Ridgway’s time of command, in such a way as to enhance the organization’s ability beyond a level that one could reasonably expect.

As previously described, the second Eighth Army’s operational concept was a collective undertaking that required concerted and sustained cooperation among the units in order to succeed. Ridgway identified the Eighth Army’s poor leadership and morale as its most substantial vulnerabilities when he assumed command and worked tirelessly to correct these deficiencies. In spite of this realization, Ridgway also

392 recognized that the Eighth Army had to execute several successful operations rather

quickly or face the prospect of being forced off the Korean Peninsula. MacArthur

granted Ridgway tremendous latitude during the conduct o f the Eighth Army’s

operations in January 1951, allowing Ridgway to plan his initial operations with

respect to the morale levels and leadership capabilities of each unit, hi this way,

Ridgway protected the Eighth Army’s vulnerabflities by preventing poor leaders from

committing conspicuous battlefield catastrophes that would drive the unit’s morale

even lower and instead focused on conducting operations led by successfiil leaders that would enhance the organization’s esprit de corps.

Ridgway began at the regimental level. He designed Operation Wolfliound

specifically to showcase the leadership abilities of an extremely capable regimental

commander in the US I Corps to show the other commanders that such operations were possible.^^ Buüdmg on the success of that operation, Ridgway ordered his other two U.S. corps to launch identical operations (Task Force Johnson and Operation

THUNDERBOLT) and began to build effective constituencies within each of his three

American corps. As these constituencies strengthened and the influx of new leadership began to improve the units’ battlefield capabilities, Ridgway expanded the scope of his operations until, by the end of January 1951, he was able to attack north with all three

^ This officer was Col. Michael H. Michaelis, a USMA graduate (1936) and young World War n paratrooper hero who commanded the 27th Infantry Regiment between July 1950-May 1951. General o f the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower singled out Michaelis as one o f the top fom lieutenant colonels in the Army after World War II, and Michaelis won battlefield promotions to colonel and brigadier general during the Korean War, retiring as a full general in 1972. The Eisenhower Papers, vol. DC, p. 2253; USMA 1987Register of Graduates and Former Cadets, p. 405.

393 American corps on line (Operations KDLLER, RIPPER, and RUGGED). When Van

Fleet arrived, he continued and improved upon Ridgway’s method of operation throughout the summer of 1951 by conducting operations like Operation

PILEDRIVER.

The catalyst for the synergistic effect experienced by the second EUSAK was the arrival of Matthew B. Ridgway. Only Ridgway was able to become a

“transformational” leader according to the James MacGregor Bums’ definition,^^ and was his kind of leadership, which is in itself another example of synergy, that provided the final necessary ingredient for the second Eighth Army’s remarkable transformation process to begin. The main reason that Ridgway qualifies as such is because he, more than either Walker or Van Fleet, made a conscious choice among real alternatives to rejuvenate the hapless Eighth Army in early 1951, giving the US and UN a viable alternative to MacArthur’s “annihilation or evacuation” options and EUSAK’s soldiers a renewed confidence, spirit, and enthusiasm that increased the capability of the organization as a whole.‘*° This is not to say the Walker and Van Fleet were not capable of being one or that they were necessarily “transactional” leaders. Rather, it was Ridgway who had the motive, resources, and opportunity to become this type of leader. Bums clearly identifies the necessity o f the first two, but he failed to recognize the vital importance of opportunity for a transformational leader."*^ The must exist

James MacGregor Bums, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 22, hereinafter cited as Bums, Leadership.

40 Bums,1 Leadership., pp. 20, 36.

Bums, Leadership, p. 12. 394 both, a need and a desire to be transformed for a transformational leader to appear.

While one may debate whether the other EUSAK commanders had the motive and charisma to become transformational leaders, it is clear that Van Fleet and, to a lesser extent. Walker lacked the opportunity to do so. In addition. Walker exhibited a bit of tyraimical leadership with his “stand or die” order of 29 July 1950.

The renewed spirit o f the Eighth Army brought about by Ridgway’s arrival and his transformational leadership was evident in battles such as Chipyong-ni in February

1951 (the critical battle that demonstrated the emergence of a “new” Eighth Army), the April defense of Seoul against the CPVA’s Fifth Phase offensive, and the battles for Bloody and Heartbreak ridges, each of which were significant UN victories. There was no way that one person could have motivated each individual soldier assigned to the Eighth Army during this period to perform such spectacular feats. By exploiting

MacArthur’s latitude and support, Ridgway was able to develop and sustain an effective network of internal constituencies through which he and Van Fleet could design and implement an operational concept that protected the unit’s weaknesses.

These internal constituencies allowed the Eighth Army’s subordinate leaders to turn the “meat grinder” concept into a formidable method o f attack that resulted in one of the most remarkable battlefield turnabouts and subsequent combat performances in the annals of military history.

This synergistic effect occurred in many other areas as well, such as between the administrative effectiveness goal of acquiring manpower in the required quantity

395 and quality, and the leadership effectiveness objective of providing superior motivation and training for its members. The table below presents other examples of possible two-dimensional synergistic interactions within the Eighth Army’s elements of combat power during January-November 1951 (highlighted in dark gray). The intent of this table is not to identify every possible instance of this phenomenon; rather, it is to demonstrate that numerous opportunities existed for synergistic interaction and to highlight several areas in which it might have occurred.

396 Leadership E f f e c t i s e n e s s

N eu Rciutionsliip Internal Technical Motisation & Protection of Missions or with Constitiien- L \p i rtise T raining Vulnerable T ask-s Superior Admw

£ir«power

Maneuver

Table 36. Examples of Possible Two-dimensional Synergistic Interactions Between Leadership and Other Elements of Combat Power

The Eighth Army capitalized on many opportunities similar to those highhghted in. the above table. Besides producing a synergistic effect, certain aspects of the Eighth Army’s military effectiveness were also able to make up for leadership

deficiencies and vice versa. Simply put, the synergy among the elements of the Eighth

Army’s combat power augmented the unit’s overall battlefield performance by enhancing its strengths and compensating for its weaknesses, and making its total combat power greater than the sum of its parts. This synergistic effect allowed a unit like the Eighth Army, dispirited and close to defeat in January 1951, to recapture

397 almost all of Soutli Korea and bring the Communists to the negotiating table by the beginning of July 1951, and thus complete one of the most remarkable battlefield turnarounds ever recorded.

The Third Eighth Army and the Absence of Synergy and Antergy

Van Fleet’s third Eighth Army was the least distinctive of the three EUSAK’s in Korea because it experienced neither the debilitatmg effects of antergy nor the exhilarating influence of synergy. For the period 13 November 1951 to 30 June 1952, the results of the third EUSAK’s efforts were remarkably linear, meaning that its mput largely equaled its output at all four levels of military activity. For almost the entire eight months, this level of activity was also infuriatingly low, giving the third EUSAK soldiers httle opportunity to spark some kind of synergistic response. As a result, a

“tit for tat” situation developed during which both sides experienced relatively low levels of attrition that satisfied the political and strategic leaders but aggravated the soldiers at the operational and tactical levels of military activity. In his most unique operation during this period. Van Fleet produced the results that one would expect with his unconventional Operation CLAM UP. Ladeed, the symmetrical nature of his efforts with respect to their outcomes became increasingly firustrating to Van Fleet, and he was constantly planning and proposing high profile offensive operations to disrupt this equilibrium. However, the existing state of equality on the battlefield best served the strategic and political concerns during the first half of 1952, causing

398 Ridgway and Clark to continue reigning in Van Fleet and the third EUSAK. The

Communist propaganda victories that resulted from their charges of biological warfere

against the UNC and the prisoners’ revolt at Koje-do were small instances of antergy,

but the period of the third Eighth Army’s existence was largely devoid of any

nonlinear or asymmetrical influences.

Antergy, Synergy, and the Korean War

What becomes most evident about the influence of antergy and synergy in

Korea is that both were dangerously destabilizing forces. Since both sides wanted to

prevent the Korean War from escalating into World War m , it is surprising that they

were not more cognizant of the potential of these forces to bring about a condition

that no one wanted to face. It is also remarkable how careless each side was when

under the influence of these forces. Perhaps reflecting the century’s preoccupation

with fighting larger wars for more total objectives, each commander tried to secure the

most advantageous condition for him and his command on the battlefield, regardless of

how destabilizing the resulting situation may have become. MacArthur is perhaps

most guilty of this charge, as his actions both widened the war considerably and

greatly decreased the value of the war’s final outcome for the UN and America.

Clausewitz’s concept of fiiction, a close relative of antergy, and the idea of

opportunity can help explain why the forces of antergy and synergy affected the three

Eighth Armies differently. Although the opportunity for synergy to develop existed

399 during 1950, given the relatively hnmature nature of Walker’s first EUSAK and his level o f inexperience as an army commander, it appears as though Walker was not able to use practice and experience to overcome the effects of antergy on his first Eighth

Army. By the time Ridgway, who proved to be a more talented army commander than

Walker despite his relative inexperience at that level of command^ arrived in Korea,

EUSAK had acquired a great deal of combat experience so that his second Eighth

Army was able to overcome the antergy of the first Eighth Army and seize upon the existing opportunity to allow the forces of synergy to manifest themselves during spring 1951. While Van Fleet was also a very capable army commander and had an extremely experienced army, his third EUSAK was never presented with the opportunity to develop synergistic forces. One may conclude that a commander must perform well at the specific echelon in which he commands, the military unit must have a certain level of experience, and the opportunity must exist for the forces of synergy to exhibit their power. These conditions came about during the early part of 1951, and

Ridgway was able to exploit them to their fiiUest extent in a way that neither his predecessor nor his successor was able to do.

It also appears that, aside from the common synergy experienced by all three

Eighth Armies, the forces of antergy and synergy are not particularly well suited for a limited war. The destabilizing power of these iofluences can provide one side with a potentially overwhelming advantage, which in turn can result in the other side’s abandonment of its limited ahns to prevent its own destruction or being forced to endure an unacceptable strategic or political outcome. These forces in fact produced

400 three entirely new wars during the period 1950-1952: one that significantly fevored the UNC in fall 1950; one that significantly favored the Communists in winter 1950; and one that favored neither side by fall 1951. Thus, it requires a leader and an organization with prudence, control, capability, and opportunity to experience and successfully handle antergistic and synergistic situations, and it appears that the second

Eighth Army, led by Ridgway and Van Fleet, was just such an organization.

401 CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION: THE THREE EIGHTH ARMIES OF THE KOREAN WAR

It appears that Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins remarks of May

1953 regarding the three distinct armies mobilized and sent to fight in Korea were very accurate indeed. * The first Eighth Army that existed during the period 13 July-25

December 1950 was distinctly different firom the second Eighth Army of 26 December

1950-12 November 1951, and both o f these organizations were significantly different firom the third Eighth Army of 13 November 1951-30 June 1952. Although each shared certain commonalties in terms of organizations, soldiers, weapons, and equipment, the unit referred to as EUSAK changed dramatically over the course of the

Korean War’s first two years. While this observation is not surprising firom an organizational sense, it challenges the prevailing view that American armies change only in degree over the course of a given conflict. What the preceding analysis had shown is that the three Eighth Armies that fought in Korea during the war’s first two

' Remarks by General J. Lawton Collins, Armed forces Day, Houston, Texas, 15 May 1953, Oral Histories, J. Lawton Collins, HRC 350.001, CMH.

402 years were as dififerent as the Allied armies examined by John. Keegan in his book. Six

Armies at Normarufy?’

This study has brought to light several interesting points that bear repeating or exphch mention in the final chapter. First and foremost, the concept of opportunity is essential to this analysis in both the leadership and combat effectiveness portions.

While opportunity is a largely neutral factor, with the appropriate confluence of conditions, it can give rise to the powerful forces o f synergy and antergy, wbich are decidedly destabilizing and unpredictable. It was the existence of opportunity, a talented commander, and an experienced army that allowed the potent energy of synergy to arise, but without opportunity, the other two conçonents were not sufiBcient to induce the emergence of synergistic forces by themselves. The old adage about opportunity coming to the prepared was certainly borne out on the Korean War battlefields, hi the end, this concept of opportunity has much in common with

Clausewitz’s idea of chance, suggesting that it is something of an enduring quality for units in combat.

Another important point made by this study is that the second EUSAK was the best of America’s three armies in Korea, and it had the best opportunity to demonstrate its martial prowess. The high levels o f leadership and combat effectiveness combined in such a way and at such a time as to provide Ridgway with the exact instrument necessary to take advantage o f the potential that the battlefield

^ Keegan examined American, Canadian, Scottish, English, Polish, and Free French, and German units, but I felt that only the Allied armies were suitable for comparison. John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation o f Paris (New York: Penguin Books, 1982).

403 presented in early 1951. In feet, one would be hard pressed to identify another Cold

War-era military organization that was able to achieve its strategic objectives so

completely. Ridgway also emerges as the best EUSAK commander of the war’s first two years as weU. IBs ability to become a transformational leader elevated him to a

category above that of Walker and Van Fleet, and allowed him to rebuild the Eighth

Army quickly and effectively in the midst of a host of disadvantages. These

conclusions, however, lead one to ask. Was Ridgway’s success partially a function of his short time in command? Would he have been as successful if he had commanded

EUSAK longer and had to have faced the challenges presented to Walker or Van

Fleet? This is a difficult question to answer, and somewhat beyond the scope o f this study. Nevertheless, it does appear that a unique mixture of leadership, combat effectiveness, and opportunity existed in Korea during the first four months of 1951, and that Ridgway was able to harness these disparate elements and forge them into a field army of unprecedented and virtually unstoppable power.

Ridgway also enjoyed the best command relationship with his superior o f the three EUSAK commanders during the war’s first two years. After carefiil scrutiny, it appears that the best command relationship was the MacArthur-Ridgway team, followed by the Ridgway-Van Fleet team and the MacArthur-Walker pairing. Most strikingly, since the US X Corps was a large organization (approximately 70,000 soldiers and Marines), approaching the Eighth Army’s pre-war strength of roughly

83,000 troops, MacArthur’s unwillingness to make it subordinate to the Eighth Army clearly demonstrated MacArthur’s lack of faith hr Walker. After analyzing Walker’s

404 performance as an army commander, controlling multiple corps, as compared to his performance as a corps commander, controlling numerous divisions, however, I am more and more convinced that MacArthur made a good decision. This conclusion is all the more surprising when one considers the criticism that MacArthur’s decision to retain the US X Corps as a separate tactical element had generated and which continues to appear almost fifty years after it was made. In the end, I beheve that

Walker was an excellent tramer and a superb corps commander, and he was successful whenever he functioned in either one of those roles. After the first EUSAK’s breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, however. Walker was forced to perform as an army commander responsible for maneuvermg corps instead of controlling individual divisions, fit this capacity. Walker was not very successful, and his performance continued to deteriorate throughout the remainder of 1950 until his untimely death.

Had Walker given up command of the Eighth Army in early September 1950,1 believe that he would have been remembered as one of the greatest heroes of the Korean War.

IDs subsequent performance after Operation CHROMITE and the unfbrtunate destruction of his personal papers during the transit of his body back to the United

States virtually ensured that Walker’s enduring reputation has been somewhat inaccurate and perhaps a bit too critical when viewed in the Korean War’s larger perspective.

The second Eighth Army had an additional intangible in its favor: a strong and positive bond of comradeship. Writing about his experiences in World War H, philosopher J. Glenn Gray observed that comradeship within a military unit develops

405 as a result of the soldiers’ proximity to one another, the shared sense of purpose pursued by the men, and a common experience of danger or hardship provided by their actions in training and combat/ Although all three armies had proximity and common experiences of danger or hardship, the second EUSAK had the best shared sense of purpose and more positive commonexperiences from which to draw. The first

EUSAK’s shared sense of purpose changed radically during its period o f existence, and its retreat during late-November and December 1950 was actually a negative commonexperience from which it was difficult to recover and that significantly hindered the development of comradeship. No one likes to be associated with a losing team Because of the large and continuous personnel turnover rate and the fact that the war devolved into mostly small-unit actions by 1952, the third EUSAK never acquired the vitally important common experience of danger or hardship that so effectively bound together the soldiers of the second Eighth Army and prevented a similar type of reaction from occurring among the men of the first EUSAK. While difficult to quantify, the soldiers of the second Eighth Army felt like winners, and they acted like it in combat as well.

Another critical factor in determining the overall combat effectiveness of these three organizations is the role that public support plays in society’s acceptance of

America’s fighting forces. EGstorian James McPherson observes that public support is

J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflection on Men in Battle (New York; HarperCoIIins, 1959), pp. 40-46.

406 more tied to battlefield victory than anything else/ Taking the converse of this position, one can deduce that the American public wfll reject armies that are not

successfiil in battle. Applying this proposition to the Eighth Armies of Korea leads

one to conclude that the public support of the Eighth Army was probably at its height

in the immediate aftermath of the hichonlanding and breakout from Pusan, and that it

was at its lowest during the Eighth Army’s retreat from North Korea at the end of

1950. Given that the American public is notoriously fickle and that final impressions

generally become lasting inçressions, it appears that Walker and the first EUSAK,

despite enjoying the Eighth Army’s period of highest acclaim, went out on a low note

of public support. The second EUSAK, however, provided a constant stream of victories around which public support could rally, beginning with Operation

THUNDERBOLT and ending with the successful capture of Heartbreak Ridge.

Owing again to the different political situation and the lack of opportunity, the third

EUSAK was not able to produce any dramatic victories to increase the public’s

support. Instead, the Communists’ POW’s revolt at Koje-do and their capture of

General Dodd was perceived largely as a defeat by the American public. The most

compelling evidence in support of this assertion is the overwhelmingly negative

response that Truman’s attempt to take control of the nation’s steel mills generated in

spring 1952. Whereas he was allowed to assume control for the country’s raflroads in

August 1950, after Walker and his first EUSAK stopped the NKPA’s attack and

assumed a strong defensive position around Pusan, Truman was prevented from takmg

James M. McPherson, Drawn With The Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 134. 407 a similar measure with respect to America’s steel mills during a nation-wide strike in

April 1952. By this time, America had turned its attention away from Korea and began focusing on domestic issues instead. The American public was also better able to focus its attention on the second Eighth Army. This was because the first EUSAK had to compete with the US X Corps, which executed the most notable actions of

1950, and the third EUSAK had to compete with the on-going peace negotiations, which seemed to hold more promise for ending the war than anything Van Fleet and his army were allowed to do. The second EUSAK also enjoyed a pubhc support advantage because it was led by the highly charismatic Ridgway, as opposed to

Walker, who was not an inspirational figure to his soldiers, personable, or good with the press, or Van Fleet, who became increasingly bitter and resentful of the restrictions placed on his actions throughout the war. Thus it appears that the second Eighth

Army was again the beneficiary of yet another intangible but very important force.

Finally, the first and second EUSAKs were able to employ “positive goals” while attempting to achieve their objectives, while third EUSAK was forced to pursue

“negative goals” to accomplish its objectives. Compelled to employ a less desirable, from the contemporary military leaders’ point of view, strategy of attrition, the second and third EUSAKs had substantially different battlefield tasks than the first EUSAK, which was able to pursue the twentieth century American’s Army’s more familiar strategy of annihilation. The greater difference among the three organizations, however, was that the second EUSAK was far more successful at achieving its

“positive goals” than was the first EUSAK, despite being able to use similar methods,

408 and the third EUSAK’s “negative goals” appeared to many to be a “substitute for victory” and were thus largely fiustrating and dismissed by many. Here again, like

Napoleon’s Grande Armée, fortune seems to have favored the Eighth Army of 195 L

All of these points support the assertion that the Eighth Army was a remarkably effective military organization between January-November 1951. As the preceding analysis has shown, the unit experienced a confluence of unusually talented leaders and an extremely high level of combat effectiveness during this interval These two aspects joined together and produced a synergistic effect that complemented and enhanced each element’s individual effectiveness, while also increasing the unit’s overall combat power as well It was the emergence of this synergistic effect and its resulting augmentation of the Eighth Army’s leadership, combat, and overall effectiveness that allowed the unit to transcend its apparent capabilities and transform itself into one of the most potent combat forces that America has ever assembled.

This examination produced only a limited test of this method of evaluation’s ability to accurately assess a combat unit’s leadership and combat effectiveness. Had this assessment covered the entire course of the Korean War, the results would have been somewhat different. The major emphasis for future research should be an evaluation of the Eighth Army’s leadership and military activities throughout the entire

Korean War, considering not only the U.S. Army units assigned to the Eighth Army, but also the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units as well as the UN aUies’ contributions. Research in these areas will allow one to examine the combat

409 eJBEèctiveness of the entire UN effort in Korea and provide a balanced and conçlete

evaluation of the Eighth Army’s leadership and military efforts in that endeavor.

Similarly, this method of assessment needs to be extended to other units and other wars to determine the vahdity of the assessment that it produces. By applying this model to different organizations and situations scholars can not only test its validity, but they may also employ it as a vehicle to discover new information about past units and conflicts. This process might also elucidate certain lessons hidden within the mass of data available to modem researchers and allow Americans to refresh their memories ofunfamiliar events like the ‘Torgotten” Korean War.

410 APPENDIX A IMPORTANT EIGHTH: ARMY LEADERS IN KOREA

Eighth Army Commanders Walton BL Walker 15 September 1948-23 December 1950 Matthew B. Ridgway 26 December 1950-14 April 1951 James A. Van Fleet 14 April 1951-February 1953 Maxwell D. Taylor February 1953-War’s Ead

I Corps Commanders JohnB. Coulter 2 August-10 September 1950 Frank W. Milbum 11 September 1950-18 July 1951 John W. O’Daniel 19 July 1951-28 June 1952 Paul W. Kendall 29 June 1952-10 April 1953 Bmce C. Clarke 11 April 1953-War’s End

IX Corps Commanders Frank W. Mdbum 10 August-11 September 1950 John B. Coulter 12 September 1950-30 January 1951 Bryant E. Moore 31 January-24 February 1951 Oliver P. Smith (USMC) 25 February-4 March 1951 William M. Hoge 5 March-23 December 1951 WUlard G. Wyman 24 December 1951-30 July 1952 Joseph P. Cleland 31 July-8 August 1952 Reuben L. Jenkins 9 August 1952-War’s End

X Corps Commanders Edward N. Almond 26 August 1950-14 July 1951 Clovis E. Byers 15 July-4 December 1951 Williston B. Palmer 5 December 1951-14 August 1952 I D. White 15 August 1952-War’s End

411 1st Cavalry Division Commanders Hobart Gay September 1949-Febmary 1951 Charles Palmer February-July 1951 Thomas Harrold July 1951-March 1952 Arthur Trudeau March 1952-March 1953 William J. Bradley March-April 1953 Joseph P. Cleland April-June 1953 Armisted D. Mead June 1953-War’s End

2d Infantry Division Commanders Laurence B. Keiser Aprd-December 1950 Robert B. McClure December 1950-January 1951 Clark L. RufiBier January-August 1951 Thomas F. DeShazo August-September 1951 Robert N. Young September 1951-May 1952 James C. Fry May 1952-March 1953 William L. Barringer May 1953-War’s End

3d Infantry Division Commanders Robert EL Soule August 1950-October 1951 Thomas J. Cross October 1951-May 1952 Robert L. Dulaney May-October 1952 George W. Smythe October 1952-May 1953 Eugene W. Ridings May 1953-War’s End

7th Infantry Division Commanders David G. Barr May 1949-January 1951 Claude B. Ferenbaugh Janaury-5 December 1951 Lyman L, Lemnitzer 5 December 1951-8 July 1952 Wayne C. Smith 8 July 1952- Arthur G. Trudeau

412 24th Infantry Division Commanders William. F. Dean October 1949-20 July 1950 John H. Church. 21 Jidy 1950-25 January 1951 Blackshear M. Bryan 26 January-19 December 1951 Henry L Hodes 20 December 1951-8 February 1952 Paul D. Adams 9 Febraary-5 March 1952 George W. Smythe 6 March-6 October 1952 W. E. Dunkelberg 7-30 October 1952 Charles L. Dasher 3 November 1952-War’s End

25th Infantry Division Commanders William B Kean August 1948-February 1951 Joseph S. Bradley February-July 1951 Ira P. Swift July 1951-July 1952 Samuel T. Williams July 1952-June 1953 Louis T. Heath June 1953-War’s End

40th Infantry Division Commanders Daniel Huddleson 1 December 1947-1 June 1952 Joseph P. Cleland 2 June 1952-19 April 1953

45th Infantry Division Commanders James C. Styron 5 September 1946-20 May 1952 David L. Ruffiier 21 May 1952-15 March 1953 Philip D. Ginder 16 March 1953-War’s End

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