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Army Transformation: What Does It Mean? David Jerome University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

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Army Transformation: What Does It Mean? David Jerome University of Arkansas, Fayetteville University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 12-2011 Army Transformation: What does it mean? David Jerome University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Public Administration Commons, and the Public Policy Commons Recommended Citation Jerome, David, "Army Transformation: What does it mean?" (2011). Theses and Dissertations. 176. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/176 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. ARMY TRANSFORMATION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? ARMY TRANSFORMATION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? A dissertation in partial fulfillment Of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy By David Jerome University of Central Missouri Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, 1981 Florida Institute of Technology Master of Business Administration, 1985 December 2011 University of Arkansas ABSTRACT The way in which senior U.S. Army leaders such as the chiefs of staff define transformative change is important, especially if the meaning of that term is to be interpreted as originally intended by Army field grade officers. An Army chief of staff is responsible for creating a vision and establishing goals for the future, and field grade officers are responsible for pursuing that vision and those goals by implementing objectives that endeavor to arrive at the desired ends. By using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this research analyzes what each of the three chiefs of staff, who have served from 1999 through 2011, have said about their vision and goals for transforming the U.S. Army. Additionally, this research analyzes what field grade officers have said about transformation and how they view the Army has transformed over the last decade. The findings in this research indicate that there is a significant gap in how the chiefs of staff have defined transformation and how field grade officers view that same term. This mixed-methods research employed a case study analysis of what the chiefs of staff have said about transformation; a survey of field grade officers who attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and how they view transformation within the Army; and, individual open-ended interviews with CGSC field grade officer students, faculty and staff. The literature that largely informed this research centered on how difficult it is to implement significant change in a large bureaucratic organization; there will always be some level of goal failure. If transformation means different things to different groups within the U.S. Army then the vision and goals may not be achieved as originally intended; a problem that could potentially result in future increased national security risks. This dissertation is approved for Recommendation to the Graduate Council Dissertation Director: ________________________________________ Dr. William D. Schreckhise Dissertation Committee: _________________________________________ Dr. Christopher J. Lucas _________________________________________ Dr. Bradley A. Thayer DISSERTATION DUPLICATION RELEASE I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this dissertation when needed for research and/or scholarship. Agreed _______________________________ David Jerome Refused _______________________________ David Jerome ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks to my wife, Kathy, and to our two children, Julie and Mark, as well as all of our friends and family who have gone through this experience with me. I would like to thank those in my family who have served in the military: My dad, Robert C. Jerome (U.S. Army – Korean War); my uncle, Bill Jerome (U.S. Navy – World War II); my great-uncle, Bob Nimmo (career U.S. Army beginning in World War II); my cousin, Estel ―Skip‖ Jerome (career U.S. Army beginning in Vietnam); my brother-in-law, James Jackson (career U.S. Army serving in the two gulf wars); and my cousin, Jay Mitchell (career U.S. Coast Guard). Thanks also to those that I may have missed. Thank you Dr. William D. Schreckhise for your patience in working with me over the last six-plus years. Not only have you been a great academic advisor and dissertation chair, you have been a great mentor and teacher and I will forever be thankful. Sir, you are the college professor that I hope to become. I truly appreciate your friendship. I would like to thank Dr. Christopher J. Lucas and Dr. Bradley A. Thayer for serving on my committee. I especially want to thank you for your contributions not only to this project, put to the body of literature in your respective areas of expertise. Thanks also go out to Dr. Will Miller, Dr. Margaret Reid, Dr. J. Brinck Kerr, Dr. Todd Shields, Dr. Val Hunt and others in the Political Science Program and the Public Policy Program who, together, made this possible. I am particularly grateful for the graduate assistantship that made this entire experience possible. I would like to thank all of my colleagues at Missouri Southern State University. In particular, I appreciate both Dr. Conrad Gubera and Dr. William Delehanty for their wisdom which caused me to remain focused. Dr. Gubera serves as a great role model of what a classroom professor should be to students. I would also like to thank Dr. Norton Wheeler, Dr. Ann Wyman, Dr. Jill Greer and Dr. Bob Markman for their friendship and encouragement throughout. Dr. David Locher, Social Sciences Department Head, thank you for allowing me to be a part of your team and for the friendship that you have extended to me. Thanks to Dr. Ralph O. Doughty (MG USA, Retired), Ms Maria Clark and Mr. Ralph Reed as well as Mr. Terrell Bruner and Dr. David Bitters at the United States Army Command and General Staff College for assisting me in this research. I would also like to thank all of the anonymous survey and interview participants. Without your support, this would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to thank Nick Myers, CPA, Matt Blunt, former governor of Missouri, and Dr. Roy Shaver, as well as a special thank you to Carolyn Sorrells, Brenda Lasiter and Linda Sprague, all of whom made it feasible for me to pursue such a path in the first place. DEDICATION This dissertation is first and foremost dedicated to my loving wife, Kathy. We have been married since we were 18 years old, and all I ever wanted to do was the best I could for you. You understand all of my strengths and weaknesses, and you understand that I am passionate about the things that I believe are important. Thank you for supporting me throughout this and all that we have been through together. My wife understands how much I care about the U.S. Army and for those who have served and are serving now - this dissertation is also dedicated to you. It is my sincerest hope that this research might be used as at least a single data point that will serve to make our Army just a little bit better. Thank you for your service and thank you for your sacrifice. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. Implications of U.S. Army Transformation 2 B. U.S. Army Transformation Research Goals 4 C. U.S. Army Transformation since 1999 6 D. Problems in Defining Army Transformation 8 E. The U.S. Army as a Bureaucracy 12 F. Policy Implications 15 G. Limitations of the Study 16 H. Research Approach and Overview of Relevant Work 17 I. Organization of this Research 18 J. Conclusion 20 K. References 21 II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION 23 A. Military Transformation: A History of Change 24 1. World War I 24 2. The Inter-war Period: 1918 – 1941 27 3. World War II 29 4. Vietnam: A Commander-In-Chief‘s Unconventional Vision 31 5. Post-Vietnam Era 33 6. Post Desert Storm (1991 – 1997) 35 B. The Road to the Current Transformation Effort 37 C. Conclusion 40 D. References 44 III. LITERATURE REVIEW 46 A. The Difficulty of Defining Goals 48 B. Army Transformation: A Principal-Agent Challenge? 50 C. Bureaucratic Aspects of Army Transformation 55 1. Bureaucratic Culture 56 2. Bureaucratic Innovation 58 3. Bureaucratic Communication 60 4. Bureaucratic Consensus 62 5. Army Transformation as a Wicked Problem 65 D. Army Transformation: Problem Definition 67 1. Conceptually Defining Army Transformation 68 E. General Limits of Change in the Military 72 F. Past Commentary on Current U.S. Army Transformation Efforts 76 1. The Role of Future Combat Systems 80 2. The Role of the Entire Organization 82 G. Previous Empirical Examinations of Military Change 84 H. Conclusion 95 I. References 98 IV. HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 102 A. Type of Study 102 B. The Case Study 111 C. The Survey Instrument 112 D. The Open-ended Interview 123 E. Research Considerations 126 1. Data Analysis 126 2. Limitations of the Research 127 3. Ethical Considerations and Reciprocity 128 F. Summary 129 G. References 130 H. Appendix A 132 I. Appendix B 136 J. Appendix C 143 V. ARMY TRANSFORMATION: THE CASE OF THE THREE CHIEFS OF STAFF 147 A. General Eric. K. Shinseki: The Army Must Remain Relevant 148 B. General Peter J. Schoomaker: A Modular Approach to Transformation 155 C. General George W. Casey, Jr.: Transformation is a Process 164 D. Army Transformation: An Analysis 171 E. Conclusion 178 F. References 182 VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 185 A. A Description of the Survey Participants 186 B. Participants‘ Views of Army Transformation 191. C. Participants‘ Perceptions of the Basis of Transformation 198 D.
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