Book Reviews Kari Alenius, Unselfishly for Peace and Justice
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Book Reviews Kari Alenius, Unselfishly for Peace and Justice—And against Evil: The Rhetoric of the Great Powers in the UN Security Council, 1946–1956. Turin: Societas Historica, Fin- landiae Septentroniu, 2014. 248 pp. Reviewed by Martin McCauley, University of London The United Nations (UN) Security Council was the international forum for the first skirmishes in the Cold War. Whereas negotiations involving the great powers were held behind closed doors, the Security Council was the first venue in which debates Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/22/2/181/1860578/jcws_r_00946.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 transpired in public. The Soviet Union and the United States took the Security Coun- cil very seriously. The United Kingdom normally played a supporting role to the United States, and France and China (represented by Taiwan until 1972) were often bystanders. Kari Alenius, in this groundbreaking study, attempts to unravel the techniques deployed by the various actors in the drama. He examines in considerable detail the various facets of rhetoric that were deployed. Rhetoric can be seen as consisting of three parts: the personality of the speaker; pathos or attempts to involve the listener emo- tionally in the argument; and the logic of the argument. Alenius uses the metaphor of the fairy tale to dissect many of the speeches. Rhetoric employs various dichotomies: good versus evil; logical versus illogical; beneficial versus inimical. One’s own argu- ments are always positive, and those of the opponent always negative. This leads to the creation of an enemy image. The goals of the enemy are depicted as dangerous, damaging, and having long-term consequences. The enemy image did not appear fully formed in 1946 but took shape as the Cold War intensified. A recurring discourse is one that presents the delegate’s policies as “just, honest, and unselfish” (p. 233). An- other rhetorical tactic is to represent one’s country as neutral. The objective is to solve the problem under review. Aleniu examines the Iran crisis of 1946, the Palestinian crisis of 1948, the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949), the Korean War (1950–1953), the crisis in Guatemala in 1954, and the Hungarian and Suez crises of 1956. He concentrates on the first month of each crisis. I would have liked the Greek Civil War to have been included. Aleniu quotes no speeches in the original Russian and appears to rely solely on English and French translations. The term “propaganda” appears often. The problem with using that word is that the English meaning is normally negative. However, in Russian, German, and other European languages it does not have inherently negative connotations and normally means “information.” In Russian, “propaganda” was linked to agitation and agitprop and was of great importance. Propaganda inculcated the value system of Marxism- Leninism. It was always hostile toward Western “bourgeois” ideology. Civility was observed by all during the Iran crisis, but this mask was dropped as the Cold War heated up. The fairy tale approach is evident: one’s own side is all good, and the other side is all evil. Other countries that are on the evil side are seen as being duped or used or coerced by the evil one. Alenius states that Soviet rhetoric was 181 Book Reviews “demanding and commanding and unfailingly contained elements constructive of the enemy image” (p. 234). One can add to this that Soviet officials negotiated rather than bargained. Initially, they would put forth a demand, and then a threat. If that was not successful, they would come up with a bigger threat. Soviet officials shared information only with those they trusted, not with strangers. Trust is based on personal contacts. This explains why the Soviet Union devoted little time to compromise, concession, or understanding the viewpoint of the opponent. Alenius also emphasizes that leaders in Moscow believed the USSR’s enormous loss of life during World War II conferred Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/22/2/181/1860578/jcws_r_00946.pdf by guest on 24 September 2021 on it a special status. It did not regard other states as its equal. The United States, by contrast, sought a win-win situation. Bargaining, concessions, and the like were important. The British set out to avoid giving offense to anyone and sought to win by logical argument. They assumed that everyone was a rational actor. The French exuded self-importance and emphasized their role as a world power. China appeared to regard itself as supernumerary and was often reluctant to say anything. Normally the United States and Britain were on the same side. The exceptions were the Palestinian crisis and the Suez crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union were the virtuous ones. In the former case, Britain was the evil one, and in the latter case that role was played by both Britain and France. The seeds of the Cold War were evident in the Iran crisis. Abuse, impugning the integrity of the other side, and insults became the order of the day afterward. One intriguing point that Alenius does not examine is why the Soviet Union stayed away from the UN Security Council until August 1950. This permitted the United States to put together a UN military coalition to fight against North Korea through the Uniting for Peace resolution. Why did Moscow not return immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950? Soviet diplomats could then have vetoed the resolution. All in all, the conclusion reached is that the Security Council was a weak institution. 182.