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Notes

I: THE GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY: RESISTANCE OR REVOLUTION?

1. For the Founding Charter of SEKE see KKE Episima Keimena, 1918-1924 (KKE Official Documents), vol. I (, 1964) pp. 5-13. On the history of the Greek socialist movement see Kordatos, Y., Istoria tou Ellinikou Ergatikou Kinimatos (Athens, 1972); Benaroya, A., I Proti Stadiodromia tou Ellinikou Proletariatou (Athens, 1975); Moskof, K., I Ethniki kai Koinoniki Synidisi stin Ellada, 1830-1909 (Athens, 1973). With the notable exception of the book by Elefantis, A., I Epangelia tis Adynatis Epanastasis: KKE kai Astismos ston Mesopolomo (Athens, 1976), there has been no other scholarly study on the history of the KKE during the inter- period. 2. For the text of the decision of the National Council see KKE Episima Kei1:nena, 1918-1924, op.cit., p. 31. 3. For the text of the decisions of the Second Congress see KKE Episima Keimena, 1918-1924, op.cit., pp. 61-2,68. 4. For the text of the resolution of the Third Extraordinary Congress see KKE Episima Keimena, 1918-1924, op.cit., p. -499. 5. KKE Episima Keimena, 1918-1924, op.cit., pp. 523-4, 534-42. See also Loulis, J. C., The Greek Communist Party, 1940-1944 (, 1982) p.1. 6. KKE Episima Keimena, 1925-1928, vol. II (Athens, 1974) pp. 99, 101-2,105. 7. The results of the votes received by SEKE(K)/KKE in the elections held during the period 1923-9 were the following: 1923: 2.25 per cent; 1926: 3.6 per cent; 1928: 1.41 per cent; 1929: 1.70 per cent. By 1931, as a result of the KKE's 'factional struggle without principles' (i.e. the conflict between two factions headed by Political Bureau members Haitas and Siandos), the membership of the party had dropped to 1,500. Tables containing 's electoral results in the inter-war period can be found in the Appendix of Dafnis, G., Ta Ellinika Politika Kommata (Athens, 1961). For a more detailed analysis of the results (returns for each constituency) see Elefantis, op.cit., pp. 387-401. 8. Svoronos, N., Analekta Neoellinikis Istorias kai Istoriografias (Athens, 1987) p. 362. See also Elefantis, op.cit., pp. 104-11. 9. Stavrianos, L.S., The since 1453 (New York, 1958) p. 478; Elefantis, op.cit., pp. 82-3, 110-11, 319-24. As Elefantis, op.cit., p. 375, observes, 'the KKE was the party of the working class and of the proletarian revolution only in a metaphorical sense. The leadership of the KKE wasted its efforts in instilling into the members a "prole• tarian" ideology, which did not reflect the ideological and social reality of the movement'. See also Mavrogordatos, George Th., Stillborn

260 Notes 261

Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936 (London, 1983) pp. 147-52. 10. KKE Episima Keimena, 1929-1933, vol. III (Athens, 1966) p. 99; Bushkoff, L., ', Comniunism and the Revolutionary Tradition in the Balkans, 1878-1924: An Analysis and an Interpretation', East European Quarterly, vol. I, No.1, March 1967, p. 380; Elefantis, op.cit., p. 49. On the 1dionymon see Mavrogordatos, op.cit., p. 336. 11. The Comintern, in an effort to assist the powerful Bulgarian Commu• nist Party, supported the Bulgarian demand for a united Macedonian State composed of the territories of Greek, Yugoslav and Bulgarian . On this see Kofos, E., and in Macedonia (, 1964) pp. 68-89; Barker, E., Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London, 1950) pp. 47-69; Stavrianos, op.cit., p. 670. For KKE decisions on the 'Macedonian Question' see KKE Episima Keimena, 1918-1924, op.cit., pp. 513-18. On the voting behaviour of the see Mavrogordatos, op.cit., pp. 182-225. There is, of course, another reason that explains the failure of the KKE to enlist the support of the refugees. Despite their destitute condition, the majority of them had previously constituted the middle and upper classes of the main towns in and as a consequence had never relinquished their bourgeois mentality. Although the KKE viewed them as 'proletarians', they were in fact 'impoverished bourgeois'. As Tsoukalas 'notes 'it was only later on, when they had abandoned their dream of reconquering the status they had lost, that they started to act and function as a working class'. See Tsoukalas, C., The Greek Tragedy (London, 1969) p. 39; Loulis, op.cit., p. 2. 12. Zachariadis, N., Theseis ya tin 1storia tou KKE (Athens, 1939) reprint 1975, p. 30. This is in fact the 'official' history of the KKE during the , written by Zachariadis in 1939 in prison and published for the first time in 1946. The account is oversimplified and reflects the views of the new Stalinist leadership. Despite Zachariadis' dethronement in 1956, the views of the book remained unchallenged for almost two decades. See, for example, Theseis tis KE tou KKE ya ta Penintachrona tou KKE (n.p., 1968). 13. was born in 1903 in Minor. In 1923 he came to Greece and became a leading member of the KKE's youth organiz• ation. In 1926 he was imprisoned for agitating in favour of a Macedo• nian state. He escaped in 1929 and went to the where he remained until 1931, studying at the KUTV (Communist University of Eastern Peoples). In that year he was appointed by the Comintern as Party leader. In 1935 (Fourth Plenum) he was elected Secretary Gen• eral of the KKE. In 1936, after the establishment of the Metaxas he was imprisoned again and in 1942 he was transferred by the German occupation authorities to the Dachau concentration camp. He was liberated by the Allies at the end of the war and returned to Greece in May 1945, where he resumed the leadership of the KKE. In 1949, after the defeat ofthe KKE in the , he fled to the Soviet Union. In March 1956, through the intervention of the Communist 262 Notes

Parties of the USSR, Rumania, , , and Cze• choslovakia, he was deposed from the KKE leadership and a few months later he was expelled from the Party. He lived as a 'political ' in conditions of inhuman deprivation in a village in North where according to the official KKE history he 'died' in 1973. It has recently been disclosed in the Soviet press, however, that Zacharia• dis in fact committed suicide, after his recurrent requests to the new KKE leadership for his in the Party had been turned down. As with so many others before him, Zachariadis too fell victim to the logic he had so successfully instilled in his party. 14. This line remained the party's policy throughout the period of the Resistance and the Civil War until January 1949 when it reverted for a moment to the slogan of a 'united and independent Macedonia' when the KKE, in desperation, made a last-ditch effort to recruit 'Bulgaro• ' and 'Slavo-Macedonians' in the 'Democratic Army of Greece'. (The 'Democratic Army of Greece', the KKE's organization during the 'Third Round' of the civil war (1946-9) was established in September 1946 under the command of Markos Vafiadis. For the decisions of the Fifth Plenum (January 1949) see KKE Episima Keimena, 1945-1949, vol. VI (Athens, 1987) p. 333. 15. See Deka Chronia Agones, 1935-1945, (a collection of documents published by the Political Bureau of the KKE) (Athens, 1977) pp. 66-7. Emphasis mine. 16. For a more authoritative analysis of the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern see Carr, E.H., The Twilight of the Comin• tern, 1930-1935 (London, 1982) pp. 403-27; for the results of the elections see Dafnis op.cit., Appendix. 17. On the consequences of the world economic crisis on the Greek working. classes see KKE Episima Keimena, 1929-33, vol. III (Athens, 1966) pp. 145-69, 308-30, 421-33, 457-70. On the question of the radicalism of the refugees see Mavrogordatos, op.cit., pp. 214-25, 335-6. 18. In January 1934, the Sixth Plenum of ·the Central Committee of the KKE, one of the most important gatherings in the history of the Party, elaborated the 'character of the revolution of Greece'. The central passage of the final resolution reads: 'The imminent revolution of the workers and peasants in Greece will be of a bourgeois-democratic character'. KKE Episima Keimena, 1934-1940, vol. IV (Athens, 1981) p. 19. Zachariadis, in the Voithima ya tin Istoria tou KKE (the 'official' history of the KKE for the period of the Resistance and the Civil War, written probably by him and/or Bartziotas), n.p., 1956, p. 126, notes that with the assistance of the Comintern the KKE, by 'rejecting the dogmatic, unfounded call for an immediate proletarian-socialist revolu• tion', was able to work out a realistic programme and define its immediate strategic objectives and tactics. The aim of the party was to 'win the majority of the working class and fight against '. 19. This account is naturally oversimplified, as the events that preceded and followed the Greco-Turkish war of 1922 are outside the scope of the present study. For a scholarly study of Greece's disastrous venture in Asia Minor see Llewellyn Smith, M., Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Notes 263

Minor 1919-1922 (London, 1973); Pallis, A.A., Greece's Anatolian Venture and After. A survey of the diplomatic and political aspects of the Greek expedition to Asia Minor [1915-1922J (London, 1937). For the development of the Greek political system during the inter-war period see Mavrogordatos, op.cit.; Dafnis, G., 1 Ellas Metaxy dyo Polemon 1923-1940, 2 vols (Athens, 1974). For the role of the army during this period see Veremis, T., Oi Epemvaseis tou Stratou stin Elliniki Politiki 1916-1936 (Athens, 1977). 20. Under the terms of this agreement, known as the 'Sofoulis-Sklavainas Agreement' (Sofoulis was the leader of the Liberals and Sklavainas the representative of the Popular Front), the Popular Front deputies in Parliament agreed 'to vote for the Liberal candidate for the office of Speaker of the House, and support a government formed by the ' , in exchange for a general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, the abolition of the state security agencies, the suppression of all organizations having 'Fascist' objectives, and most importantly, the repeal of the (in)famous 'Idionymon Law'. See the KKE daily Rizos• pastis, April 3, 1936. 21. Dafnis, op.cit., pp. 415-36, and for election results p. 402. It has been suggested that the King's choice of Metaxas was favoured by the British, obliged by the death of Venizelos to find a new strong man in Greece. Metaxas, for his part, never lost a chance to assure the British government that his government was determined to work in close cooperation with the British. See Kotiopoulos, J., Greece and the British Connection (Oxford, 1977) pp. 59-60. On the Metaxas dictator• ship see also the book by Dafnis and Metaxas' own diary, Metaxas, I., To Prosopiko tou Imerologi6, 4 Vols (Athens, 1974). 22. Patatzis, S., Ioannis Sofianopoulos: Enas Epanastatis Choris Epanastasi (Athens, 1961) pp. 154-6; KKE Episima Keimena, 1934-1940, op.cit., pp. 395-401. 23. Stavrianos, L.S., Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chi• cago, 1952) p. 30; , May 10 and 15, 1936. 24. Something that Zachariadis himself admits in the Voithima, op.cit., pp. 167--8; see also Zachariadis, N., Ta Provlimata Kathodigisis sto KKE (Athens, 1978) (reprint), pp. 76--8; Nefeloudis, P., Stis Piges tis Kakodai• monias: Ta Vathitera Aitia tis Diaspasis tou KKE 191&--1968 (Athens, 1974) pp. 117-19; Bartziotas, V., 'I Politiki ton Stelechon mas sto KKE ta Teleftaia Deka Chronia', Neos Kosmos, , p. 18. 25. Loulis, op.cit., p. 4. According to an estimate of Metaxist propaganda, 50,000 'communists' were eventually arrested and deported to concen• tration camps on some remote islands of the Aegean. 26. Nefeloudis, op.cit., p. 119; Solaro, A., Istoria tou Koumounistikou Kommatos Ellados (Athens, 1977) p. 122; Loulis, J.C., 'The Greek Communist Party and the Greek Italian War, 1940-41: An Analysis of Zachariadis' Three Letters', Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol. V, 1979, p. 168. 27. Loulis, op.cit., p. 168. 28. Stavrianos, op.cit., p. 76. Loulis, op.cit., p. 5. 29. Kousoulas, D.G., Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party (London, 1965) p. 130. 264 Notes

30. Tyrimos, a Political Bureau member and editor-in-chief of Rizospastis, was arrested in July 1939. According to an officer in the Maniadakis police, Tyrimos decided to collaborate with the Metaxist authorities on learning that his brother, who was studying in Moscow, had been executed as a Trotskyist. See 'To Mystikon Archeion', in the daily Ethnikos Kiryx, October 11-13, 1949. Unlike Tyrimos, Michailidis, a member of the Political Bureau, signed a 'repentance declaration' on the orders of Zachariadis, who instructed him to 'reorganize the party'. He was arrested, however, by Maniadakis' police and became a collab• orator. See Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 119, and KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, vol. V (Athens, 1981) pp. 7&-7; Solaro, op.cit., pp. 118-20. 31. KKE Episima Keimena, 1934-1940, pp. 491-6 and KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, pp. 7&-7. The Second Panhellenic Conference of the KKE held in December 1942. 32. Voithima, p. 169; Solaro, op.cit., pp. 121-2. 33. loannidis, Y., Anamniseis: Provlimata tis Politikis tou KKE stin Ethniki Antistasi 1940-1945, Athens, 1979, pp. 68-74 and 503-5. Loulis, op.cit., p. 6. 34. KKE Episima Keimena, 1934-1940, op.cit., p. 463. Emphasis mine. 35. Loulis, op.cit., p. 171 and f.n. 36. Siandos revealed this Comintern directive during his speech at the Second Panhellenic Conference in December 1942. See Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., pp. 141-2. 37. See Degras, J., ed., The 1919-1943: Docu- ments (London, 1965) vol. III (1929-43), pp. 450-1. 38. Ibid., p. 441. 39. KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 9. 40. loannidis, op.cit., p. 64 and fn. After the publication of Zachariadis' 'open letter' in the Metaxist press, the Akronafplia communists sent a second letter on 13 November supporting the position of the KKE leader, ibid., p. 65. Zachariadis in the Voithima, op.cit., pp. 192-3, claims that the Akronafplia group knew already of the line he was about to adopt when they sent their first letter. loannidis in his account, op.cit., p. 65, says nothing of the sort. 41. KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 13, 17-22. 42. On this point see Loulis' article already mentioned and Smith, L. Ole, 'The Problem of Zachariadis' First Open Letter: A Reappraisal of the Evidence', Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Winter, 1982, pp. 7-20. 43. Loulis, op.cit., pp. 7-8. 44. Nefeloudis P., op.cit., pp. 139-42. Contrary to what Elefantis claims in his book, op.cit., p. 286, Zachariadis could not have been informed about the July 1939 directive from Siandos, when the latter was re• arrested and imprisoned in Corfu, because by that time he had been transferred to Athens. 45. Smith, op.cit., pp. 17-20. 46. Voithima, pp. 192-3. 47. I derived this information in conversation with Vasilis Nefeloudis. This is, of course, confirmed by his brother Pavlos Nefeloudis in his book, op.cit., pp. 139-42. Notes 265

48. Something that Zachariadis, a Comintern appointee, may have wished to demonstrate. 49. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., p. 8. 50. Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 65-8. 51. Karas, S., Politikoi Provlimatismoi (Athens, 1975) p. 87. 52. Something that even right-wing historians and politicians have to admit. See Averoff, E., Fotia kai Tsekouri (Athens, 1974) p. 93; Kanellopoulos, P., Ta Chronia tou Megalou Polemou 1939-1944 (Athens, 1964) p. 6. 53. Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 139. 54. Zachariadis, Theseis ya tin Istoria tou KKE, op.cit., p. 48; Loulis, op.cit., pp. 183-4. 55. Voithima, op.cit., pp. 193-4. 56. Ibid., pp. 194-6. 57. Ibid., pp. 194-5. 58. Ibid., p. 195. 59. Loulis, op.cit., p. 9. 60. Partsalidis, Mitsos, Dipli Apokatastasi tis Ethnikis Antistasis (Athens, 1978) p. 23. 61. The premiers of these cabinets were: General G. Tsolakoglou, 7 April 1941 - 2 December 1942; G. Logothetopoulos, 2 December 1942 - 7 April 1943; J. Rallis, 7 April 1943 - . 62. The premiers of the government-in-exile were: E. Tsouderos, 21 April 1941 - 13 April 1944; S. Venizelos, 13 April 1944 - 23 April 1944; G. Papandreou, 26 April 1944 - 3 . 63. KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 39. 64. These organizations were: the Athens organization, the organization, the organization and the Macedonian organiza• tion. See KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 44. 65. For EAM's Founding Charter see KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 54-6. 66. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., p. 42. 67. Stavrianos, L.S., 'The Greek National Front (EAM): A Study in .Resistance Organization and Administration', Journal of Modern History, vol. XXIV, 1952, p. 44. 68. Campbell, J., 'The ', in Luard, E., ed., International Regulation of Civil War (London, 1972) p. 215; Petropoulos, J., 'The Traditional Parties of Greece During the Axis Occupation' in Iatrides, J.O., ed., Greece in the . A Nation in Crisis, (henceforth Greece in the 1940s) (London, 1981) pp. 27-36. 69. Woodhouse, C.M., The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949 (London, 1976) p.35. 70. Woodhouse, C.M., Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in their International Setting (London, 1948) pp. 50-1. 71. On this point see also Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., pp. 21-5; Petropoulos, op.cit., p. 29. 72. Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 75-81. 73. On this point see also Legg, K.R., Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, Ca., 1969) p. 129. 74. Petropoulos, op.cit., pp. 32-3; Loulis, op.cit., p. 17. 266 Notes

75. The best source for EDES is the wprk of its deputy chief, Pyromaglou, K., I Ethniki Antistasis. EAM-ELAS-EDES-EKKA (Athens, 1975); For EKKA see Pyromaglou, K., 0 Georgios Kartalis kai i Epochi tou 1934-1957, vol. I: 1934-44 (Athens, 1965); Kartalis, G., Pepragmena (Athens, 1945). 76. Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 61; Alexander, op.cit., p. 13. 77. Glinos, D., Ti Einai kai ti Thelei to Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (Athens, 1944). 78. Stavrianos, op.cit., pp. 74-5; Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., pp. 18-19, 50-2; Sarafis, S., ELAS: Army (London, 1980) pp. 50, 100,272,328. Sarafis was ELAS's Commander. The position of the EAM Representative was abolished in March 1944 when EAM and the KKE founded PEEA (a kind of provincial govern• ment in the mountains). 79. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 27; 80. Barker, Elisabeth, British Foreign Policy in South-East in the Second World War (London, 1976) p. 148; Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 36. 81. Leeper, R., When Greek Meets Greek (London, 1950) p. 11. 82. Barker, op.cit., p. 157; Clogg, 'The Special Operations Executive', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., pp. 115-16. Woodhouse, in Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 26, rejects the popular view that the operation contributed to the defeat of the Germans in the battle of EI Alamein, noting that it 'came a month late', since the battle began on 23 October 1942. 83. Woodhouse, 'Summer 1943: The Critical Months' in British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in and Greece (henceforth British Policy) eds Auty, Phyllis, and Clogg, Richard (London, 1975) p. 137. Emphasis mine. 84. Myers, E.C.W., Greek Entanglement (London, 1955) p. 189. 85. Ibid., p. 190. 86. Churchill's minute to Eden of June 15, 1943, FO 371137203 R 5552. 87. Leeper, op.cit., p. 30. 88. Myers, 'The Andarte Delegation to Cairo: August 1943' in British Policy, op.cit., pp. 149-50. 89. Woodhouse, 'Summer 1943: The Critical Months', op.cit., p. 123. 90. Ibid., p; 124. 91. Myers, op.cit., pp. 187-201. 92. Ibid., pp. 229-30. 93. Tsouderos, E., Ellinikes Anomalies sti Mesi Anatoli (Athens, 1945) pp. 63-5; Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 187-9; Pyromaglou, K., 0 Doureios' Ippos. I Ethniki kai Politiki Krisis kata tin Katochi (Athens, 1978) (reprint), pp. 101-29. For the texts of Churchill's and Roosevelt's telegrams see Tsouderos, op.cit., pp. 67-8 and Foreign Relations of the , Diplomatic Papers 1943 (henceforth FRUS) vol. II, pp. 915, 933. 94. Clogg, '''Pearls from Swine": the Foreign Office Papers, SOE and the Greek Resistance', in British Policy, op.cit., p. 192. 95. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 56; Barker, op.cit., p. 165. Notes 267

96. Clogg, '''Pearls from Swine": the Foreign Office Papers, SOE and the Greek Resistance', op.cit., p. 194; 97. Myers, 'The Andarte Delegation to Cairo: August 1943', op.cit., p. 166; Woodhouse too, seems to draw the same conclusion when he notes that 'it cannot be disputed that the episode of the resistance delegation made civil war certain'. See his article 'Summer 1943: The Critical Months', op.cit., p. 144. 98. Leeper shared Myers' and Woodhouse's views about the monarchy. He reported to the Foreign Office that the King must agree to remaining abroad until the holding of a plebiscite. See Leeper's telegrams to the Foreign Office: FO 371/37198 R 7516 and FO 371/37204 R 7548 and his letter to Sargent FO 371137204 R 7884 all dated 13 August 1943. Kanellopoulos had estimated that at the outbreak of the war the royalists amounted to no more than 2 per cent of the population as against 60 per cent Liberals and 30 per cent in the Popular Front. See Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 22. 99. Woodward, op.cit., p. 354; Leeper to FO, October 6, 1943, FO 371/37205 R 9785. 100. Eden to Leeper, August 15, 1943, FO 371/37204 R 7548. 101. Papastratis, P., 'The British and the Greek Resistance Movements EAM and EDES' in Sarafis, M., ed., Greece: From Resistance to Civil War (Nottingham, 1980) p. 36. 102. Leeper's minute to Eden, December 7, 1943, FO 371/37231 R 12837; Iatrides, J.O., Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1923-1947 (Princeton, NJ, 1980) pp. 444-5; FRUS, 1943, vol. IV, p. 160. 103. Eden, Antony, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London, 1956) p. 498. 104. Fleischer, H., 'Contacts between German Occupation Authorities and the Major Greex Resistance Organizations: Sound Tactics or Collab• oration', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., pp. 54--6. According to Fleis• cher the Germans not only signed a truce with Zervas but also ordered a simultaneous assault on ELAS and the provisioning of EDES with war equipment. Fleischer's evidence seems to contradict Woodhouse's assertion in Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 168, that 'Greek resistance was diminished by the elimination of all the rivals to ELAS except EDES, which nearly succumbed to combined attacks d Aris Velouk• hiotis and the Germans'. Similarly, Myers, op.cit., r. 263, wrongly notes that the information about Zervas' cooperation with the Germans was 'planted' by the latter. On the question of Zerva,' collaboration with the Germans see also Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 315-H. Sarafis claims that during the Plaka negotiations 'Zervas himself repudiated the EDES Central Committee because of its collaboration'. See also Alex• ander, G.M., The Prelude to the Doctrine: British Policy in Greece 1944-1947 (Oxford, 1982) p. 13. 105. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., Appendix F, pp. 303-4. 106. Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 244--60. 107. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 179. 108. Iatrides, J.O., Revolt in Athens. The Greek Communist 'Second Round' 1944-1945 (Princeton, NJ, 1972) p. 284. 109. Tsouderos, op.cit., p. 78. 268 Notes

110. Ibid., p. 85. 111. Andrikopoulos, Y., 1944, Krisimi Chronia. 300 Anekdota Engrafa apo to Prosopiko Archeio Ouinston Tsorstil ya tin Ellada apo 8.3. eos 5.12. 1944 (henceforth cited as BFOD - British Foreign Office Documents), 2 vols (Athens, 1974) vol. I, doc. 5, pp. 20-1. 112. Ibid., doc. 14, p. 38; Tsouderos, op.cit., p. 114. 113. Keimena tis Ethnikis Antistasis, 2 Vols (Athens, 1981) vol. I, pp. 56--7. 114. KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 373; Bouras, V., I Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis: PEEA. Eleftheri Ellada 1944 (Athens, 1983) pp. 58-60. 115. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., p. 97. 116. Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 221. 117. Rousos, P., I Megali Pentaetia. I Ethniki Antistasi kai 0 Rolos tou KKE, 2 vols (Athens, 1978) vol. II, p. 62. 118. Bouras, op.cit., p. 113. 119. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., p. 97. 120. Tsouderos, op.cit., p. 121. 121. The most detailed account ofthe crisis is provided by Nefeloudis, V., in his books Ellines Polemistes sti Mesi Anatoli (Athens, 1945) and I Ethniki Antistasi sti Mesi Anatoli, 2 vols (Athens, 1981). See also Fleischer, H., 'The Anomalies in the Greek Forces, 1941-1944', Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Fall 1978, pp. 5-36. 122. Churchill, W.S., The Second World War (London, 1952) (reprint 1987), vol. V, p. 481. Emphasis mine. 123. Fleischer, op.cit., p. 31; Nefeloudis, V., Ellines Polemistes op.cit., pp. 61 ff; For details see BFOD, vol. I, pp. 36, 65, 70-1, 88-9,98-9, 108. 124. Leeper, op.cit., p. 47. 125. Fleischer, op.cit., p. 36. 126. Kousoulas, op.cit., p. 187; Churchill, op.cit., vol. V, p. 478: 'they [the troops] are very liable to be contaminated by revolutionary and Com• munist elements there. Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do'; Leeper, op.cit., p. 41. 127. 127 Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 78, rightly notes that 'the theory that the mutinies in the Army and the Navy in April 1944 were organized by the Communists in order to keep them away from the scene of action at the time of liberation is implausible, not least because PEEA quickly disowned the mutineers'. See also Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 305-6. 128. Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, op.cit., p. 484 and entries dated 3, 4, 10, 15 and 18 April 1944. 129. Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 178; Rousos, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 77-80, 147. 130. Nefeloudis, V., Ellines Polemistes, op.cit., pp, 85-114. 131. Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, op.cit., p. 495; BFOD, vol. I, doc. 48, p. 83. 132. BFOD, vol. I, doc. 50, p. 86 and doc. 61, p. 102. 133. Alexander, op.cit., p. 21. Papandreou, G., I Apeleftherosis tis Ellados (Athens, 1948) pp. 54-6. 134. Leeper to FO, April 27, 1944, FO 371143730 R 6763. Papandreou's anticommunist views are contained in his pamphlet The Third War, Notes 269

written during the occupation and published in Athens in 19~8. 135. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., p. 125. 136. latrides, Revolt in Athens, op.cit., pp. 57-8. 137. Alexander, op.cit., p. 23. PEEA was represented by its President, Svolos, and two of its Secretaries, the socialists Angelopoulos and Askoutsis; EAM by its communist Secretary Porfyroyennis and its socialist Central Committee member Stratis; the KKE by the Political Bureau member Rousos and ELAS by its commander, Sarafis, in the role of 'advisory member' to the delegation. 138. loannidis, op.cit., pp. 220-1. 139. Ibid., pp. 229-30. 140. Leeper, op.cit., p. 49. 141. As the EDES delegate Pyromaglou later caustically recalled (I Ethniki Antistasis, op.cit., p. 122), 'we were assembled to hellenize the de• cisions of the British regarding Greece. Everyone, instead of formulat• ing their positions according to a correct assessment of the Greek problem, wanted to know "what Leeper wants", before expressing their views'. 142. Papandreou, I Apeleftherosis, op.cit., pp. 67-8. 143. See FO 371/43731 R 8013, quoted in Loulis, op.cit., p. 129. See also BFOD, vol. I, doc. 103, op.cit., pp. 175-6 and Rousos' report to the Political Bureau, dated May 26, 1944. Rousos, op.cit., vol. II, pp.146-9. 144. Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 69-70. 145. Ibid., p. 68. In private though, Papandreou tried to encourage EDES to attack and dissolve ELAS. When the EDES representative Pyromaglou commented that such an action would provoke a new civil war, Papan• dreou replied: 'then I will dissolve ELAS with the help of the British'. See Pyromaglou, I Ethniki Antistasis, op.cit., p. 122. 146. Rousos, op.cit., vol. II, p. 128. 147. Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 73-80. 148. Ibid., p. 76. 149. Papastratis, 'The Papandreou Government and the Lebanon Confer• ence' in Greece in the 194()s, op.cit., p. 130. 150. Bartziotas, V., I Politiki ton Stelechon, op.cit., p. 49. 151. Rousos, op.cit., vol. II, p. 150 and for the text of the telegram p. 152. See also Sarafis, op.cit., p. 334: 'Svolos was offended at being addressed in this way when he was himself president, and wanted to resign'. 152. loannidis, op.cit., pp. 232-3, 260; Rousos, op.cit., pp. 177-8. 153. KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 406-07. 154. Ibid., pp. 222-5. See also notes 162 and 163. 155. Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 64. 156. Ibid., p. 64. 157. Ibid., p. 70. 158. BFOD, op.cit., vol. II, p. 15. Alexander, op.cit., p. 44. 159. loannidis, op.cit., pp. 250-2, 256-7. 160. KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 239; latrides, Revolt in Athens, op.cit., p. 75. 161. Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 136-55. 270 Notes

162. Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 100. 163. BFOD, vol. I, doc. 95, pp. 149-50; doc. 106, pp. 184-85; doc. 165, pp. 387-9; vol. II, doc. In, pp. 3(}-2. 164. Macmillan, H., The Blast of War: 1939-1945 (London, 1967) p. 575. 165. Sarafis, op.cit., p. 384. Ioannidis (in his memoirs, op.cit., pp. 27~84) recalls that he and Siandos were horrified when they learned of the agreement's terms, especially the fact that a British officer, rather than a Greek one, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Greek army. However, Ioannidis' account of what exactly happened in Caserta seems rather confused and it is clear that Zevgos, a communist hard• liner, was acting in accordance with the line laid down by the KKE leadership after the arrival of the Soviet Military Mission. See Zevgos' wife's testimony to the historian Papapanayotou, in Ioannidis, op.cit., pp.529-30. 166. Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 387-8. 167. The phrase belongs to the communist Kostas Karageorgis (1906-55) who was a member of the Central Committee (from 1942) and editor• in-chief of Rizospastis, (from November 1944). 168. Alexander, op.cit., p. 55. Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 288--90, 296-305. 169. For the Anglo-Soviet agreement of see Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, pp. 197-9; Xydis, S., 'The Secret Anglo-Soviet Agreement on the Balkans of October 9, 1944', Journal of Central European Affairs, vol. XV, October, 1955, pp. 248--71; Xydis, S., 'Greece and the Declaration', The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. XX, February, 1961, pp. 6-24; Barker, op.cit., pp. 14(}-7. The percent• age 'predominance' for the Russians and the 'others' in the other Balkan countries were: 9(}-10 in Rumania, 5(}-50 in Yugoslavia, 5(}-50 in Hungary and 75-25 in Bulgaria. See Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 198. 170. Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 291. 171. Macmillan, H., The Blast of War: 1939-1945 (London, 1967) pp. 588--9. 172. On 9 August 1944, the British Council of Ministers decided that the King should not return before the conduct of a plebiscite. See BFOD, op.cit., vol. II, doc. 177, p. 32. Although Churchill was not initially in agreement with this decision (ibid., doc. 183, p. 46) by 29 September he had agreed with Eden's views on King George's return and thus the King lost his strongest ally (ibid., doc. 277, p. 122). 173. Kathimerina Nea, 27 October 1944. 174. Ibid., 31 October 1944; Alexander, op.cit., p. 64. 175. Rizospastis, 9 November 1944. In summoning the Third Brigade Papan• dreou evidently hoped to intimidate the communists, as the (royalist) Brigade was well equipped, trained and, more importantly, loyal to his government. Probably with the same thoughts in mind, Churchill minuted to Eden on 19 November that the Third Brigade 'are the only solid and apparently trustworthy Greek unit, and under no circum• stances should they be broken up at present time'. See BFOD, op.cit., vol. II, doc. 276, p. 214. Woodhouse, however, Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 215, who knew the political climate far better than most British officials, categorically advised against bringing the Brigade to Notes 271

Greece because such a move would provoke EAM and contribute to its losing faith in the Papandreou government. 176. McNeill, William Hardy, The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath (London, 1947) p. 129; Rizospastis 19 November 1944. 177. Quoted in Alexander, G.M., 'The Demobilization Crisis of November 1944', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 158, See also Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 326. On 17 November summoned all the ELAS Kapetanioi to , where the ELAS HQ had been established, to discuss his proposal for an ELAS attack on Athens. However, since Aris was expressing his own views and not those of the KKE, the other Kapetanioi, and especially Vafiadis, rejected his initiative. See Vafiadis, M., Apomnimonevmata, vol. III (Athens, 1985) pp. 11-15. 178. Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 332. See also pp. 329-33. 179. Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 209-10. 180. Alexander, The Demobilization Crisis, op.cit., p. 164. 181. As McNeill, op.cit., p. 131, correctly observes. Siandos had great reservations about this plan. See Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 332-3. 182. Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 332. 183. Rizospastis, 30 November 1944. 184. Ibid. 185. Leeper, op.cit., pp. 97-8; McNeill, op.cit., p. 132; Byford-Jones, W., The Greek Trilogy: Resistance, Liberation, Revolution (London, 1945) pp. 130-33; This version of events was also presented by Eden in the House of Commons, Hansard 406, cols 603-4. 186. Papandreou himself in his memoirs provides a copy of EAM's text which is identical with the one published in Rizospastis on 30 November, but different from the one he later submitted to the British and his non-EAM Cabinet. See Apeleftherosis, op. cit., pp. 209-10; Alexander, op.cit., p. 75. 187. Ibid., pp. 209-10. 188. Kousoulas, op.cit., p. 200. 189. Ibid., pp. 200-1. 190. See W.O. 204/8903, quoted in Alexander 'The Demobilization Crisis of November 1944', op.cit., p. 165. This telegram fell into British hands. In this telegram, sent to the KKE by someone under the name of 'Stergios' (probably Tzimas, ELAS representative at Tito's HQ), Tito advised the KKE not to disband, but made no mention of Yugoslav support for the Greek communists. 191. Leeper, op.cit., p. 99. The communists objected strongly to Scobie's orders because his power derived solely from the authority the Greek government had explicitly vested in him. In the absence of any such authorization from the government (although Papandreou approved of the move), Scobie had no right to act. Thus, Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 489-91, 'refused to carry out Scobie's orders'. 192. Loulis' argument, op.cit., pp. 170-1, that the two demobilization issues (of the Civil Guard and of ELAS) were separate ones, is hardly convincing since EAM and the KKE obviously didn't think so and neither did Papandreou and the British. 193. Leeper to Foreign Office, 1 , FO 371/43697 R 19802. On 272 Notes

26 November Papandreou was predicting that a resignation of the EAM ministers 'might mean the unleashing of civil war', FO 371143735 R 19341. Quoted in Baerentzen, L., 'The Demonstration in on Sunday the 3rd of December 1944', Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek, No.2, 1978, p. 19. 194. At the EAM's Central Committee meeting of 1 December all its members approved Siandos' proposal for the resignation of the PEEA and EAM ministers from the Papandreou government. 195. Rizospastis, 3 December 1944; Loulis, op.cit., p. 171, considers the resurrection of the Central Committee of ELAS as constituting a 'direct challenge to the Government's authority over its own armed forces', because, 'ELAS was officially under the command of the Government and Scobie as stipulated by the '. Although it is clear that by resurrecting the ELAS Central Committee the KKE was preparing for a clash (see Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 341-4) this act was not in contravention of the Caserta Agreement. Since the PEEA and EAK ministers had resigned, the 'Government of National Unity' had ceased to exist. ELAS, as the army of EAM, could not, therefore, obey orders from a government that did not include EAM, or from General Scobie. The Caserta Agreement rested on the existence of a government of national unity. 196. McNeill, op.cit., p. 137; Papandreou's son, Andreas, in his book Democracy at Gunpoint (London, 1973) p. 58,.maintains that Leeper changed his father's mind on the issue of the demonstration: ' ... Leeper then stepped in and demanded from the government a ban on the demonstration'. 197. There exist a number of eye-witness accounts of the Dekemyriana: For a scholarly study see Baerentzen, op.cit., pp. 3-52; McNeill, op.cit., pp. 137-42; Byford-Jones, op.cit., pp. 138-40. See also Stavrianos, L.S., 'The Immediate Origins of the Battle of Athens', American Slavic and East European Review, vol. VIII, 1949, pp. 239-51; McNeill, W.H., 'The Outbreak of Fighting in Athens, December 1944', Ameri• can Slavic and East European Review, vol. VIII, 1949; Alexander, op.cit., pp. 77-8. 198. Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 252. 199. Ibid., p. 252. 200. Ibid., p. 255; FRUS, 1944, vol. V, pp. 148-51. 201. Ibid., p. 253. 202. , The Daily Herald, The Manchester Guardian, all dated 9 December 1944. On 13 December the Trades Union Congress ex• pressed with an outstanding majority, 2,455,000 votes against 137,000, its regret at the policy of the British government in Greece. 203. Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 254. 204. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 131. 205. Documents Regarding the Situation in Greece, January 1945, Cmd 6592, London, p. 11. 206. Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 347-60. 207. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, op.cit., p. 176. 208. FRUS, 1944, vol. IV, pp. 150-51; Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, pp. 261-2; Notes 273

Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 132; Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, op.cit., pp. 210-30. 209. Leeper, op.cit., pp. 120-31. 210. Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 90; Eudes, D., The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949 (London, 1972) p. 222; What We Saw in Greece: Report of the TUC Delegation (London, 1945). The actual number of persons executed is of course a matter of controversy. For a different account see Richter, H., British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War (London, 1985) pp. 28-9 and fn. 211. For the text of the Varkiza Agreement see KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 411-16. For an English translation ofthe agree• ment see Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, op.cit., pp. 320-4. 212. Various aspects of the Varkiza Agreement are discussed in more detail in the following two chapters. 213. Iatrides, Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 148.

II: VARKIZA: CAPITULATION TO THE BRITISH?

1. Rizospastis, 15 February 1945. 2. Patatzis, S., Ioannis Sofianopoulos: Enas Epanastatis choris Epanastasi (Athens, 1961) pp. 212-16; Eudes, op.cit., p. 248. The central issue of this chapter is partly examined by Richter, op.cit., pp. 71-8, whose analysis of KKE's motives in signing the agreement is basically correct. 3. Notably Zachariadis and Partsalidis who had been one of its signa• tories. Richter, op.cit., p. 71. 4. The discussions that took place during the Eleventh Plenum are exam- ined in detail in the next chapter. 5. KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 425. Emphasis mine. 6. See next chapter notes 52-63. 7. Richter, op.cit., p. 244. 8. Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., p. 272. 9. Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 261; Blanas, G., (nom de guerre Kissavos), Emfylios Polemos 1946-1949: Opos ta Ezisa (Athens, 1976) p. 67. 10. The Central Committee of the KKE held the following Plenums in the period from the Seventh Congress to February 1950: Second Plenum, ; Third Plenum, September 1947; Fourth Plenum, June 1948; Fifth Plenum, January 1949; Sixth Plenum, October 1949. 11. Politikos ton Kommaton tou EAM, Lefki Vivlos. Para• veiaseis tis Varkizas Flevaris-Iounis 1945 (Athens, ), reprint Athens, Ellinika Themata, 1975. 12. Politikos Synaspismos ton Kommaton tou EAM, Lefki Vivlos. Dimo• kratikos Neofasismos Ioulis-Octovris 1945 (Athens, October 1945); reprint, Athens, Ellinika Themata, 1975. 13. Politikos Synaspismos ton Kommaton tou EAM, Mavri Vivlos. To Eklogiko Praxikopima tis 31 Martiou 1946 (Athens, May 1946). 14. Politikos Synaspismos ton Kommaton tou EAM, Oi Pragmatikes Aities tou Ellinikou Dramatos (Athens, ); reprint Athens, Elli- 274 Notes

nika Themata, 1974; Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados, Ya ta Aitia pou Prokalesan ton Emfylio Polemo kai i Gnomi mas ya to Stamatima tou (); reprint, Athens, 1987. 15. La Verite sur la Grece: Livre Blue. Sur l' occupation americano• anglaise, sur Ie regime monarcho-fasciste, sur la lutte du peuple grec, ed. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres du Governement Democratique Provisoire de Grece (n.p., August, 1948); For Peace and Democracy in Greece: Second Blue Book. On the Anglo-American Intervention, on the monarcho-fascist regime, on the people's struggle for , ed., Provisional Democratic (n.p., August 1949) For Peace and Democracy in Greece: Third Blue Book. On the Anglo• American Intervention, on the monarcho-fascist regime, on the people's struggle for liberty, ed., Democratic Organizations of Greece (n.p., September 1950). 16. Partsalidis, M., 'Sirnioma tou Mitsou Partsalidi (14-2-1950)', Neos Kosmos, , p. 482; Richter, op.cit., p. 71. 17. From the Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, Episima Keimena 1945-1949, op.cit., p. 333. 18. Vukmanovic, S., (Tempo), How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece was met with defeat (London, 1985) p. 64. 19. Partsalidis, M., 'Omilia stin 7i Olomeleia tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE (14-18 Mai 1950)" Neos Kosmos, August 1950, p. 486. 20. Karagiorgis, K., Letter to the Central Committee of the KKE pub• lished as 'I Antikommatiki Likvidaristiki Platforma tou Kosta Gyftodi• mou', in Neos Kosmos, August 1950. 21. Rousos, P., I Megali Pentaetia, op.cit., p. 391. 22. Bartziotas, V., Ethniki Antistasi kai Dekemvris 1944 (Athens, 1981) p. 442. 23. For more details about the speeches and reactions of various KKE members during the Eleventh Plenum, see the next chapter. 24. Vafiadis, M., Apomnimonevmata, vol., III., Athens, 1985, pp. 101-5. Vafiadis maintains that he backed down because he knew that Zachar• iadis was coming back and that 'he would solve the problems in the best possible way' (p. 102). This does not make sense because no one in the KKE knew at the time what had happened to Zachariadis. The Party learned that he had been found alive among the survivors in the concentration camp of Dachau on 1 May 1945, that is three weeks after the end of the Eleventh Plenum. 25. Papapanayotou, A., Provlimata tis Istorias tis Ethnikis Antistasis, Dia• logos, 1974, p. 163. Emphasis mine. 26. Zachariadis, N., Deka Chronia Palis: Symperasmata, Didagmata, Kathikonta (Pros tin III Syndiaskepsi tou KKE), Athens, 1978, p. 14. (This article by Zachariadis can also be found in Neos Kosmos, August• September, 1950.) 27. Ibid., p. 14. Emphasis mine. 28. Ibid., p. 15. 29. Ibid., p. 15. The question ofthe amnesty was indeed crucial. During the December battle wholesale arrests had already begun and the Political Notes 275

Bureau wanted to put an end to this and prevent the situation from spreading all over Greece. The British were in favour of a general amnesty because they were in a hurry to reach some compromise but the Greek government representatives would not hear of a general amnesty. See Macmillan, H., The War Diaries. The Mediterranean, 1943-1945 (London, 1984) pp. 685-90. Plastiras' ministers could feel things going their way and kept pressing for what they saw as total capitulation. As Leeper records, op.cit., p. 149, 'in the case of Varkiza the Government was able to dictate terms to EAM'. The outgunned EAM delegation gave up the whole idea of a general amnesty, aban• doning its militants to a ferocious repression or condemning them to exile, but it managed to obtain a limited amnesty which expressly excluded a very wide range of common-law crimes and in the final analysis only protected important party cadres. Siandos, thoroughly demoralized by Dimitrov's brush-off, gave up the idea of a general amnesty for the price of legality. Disowned by Moscow, the KKE leader felt that he could not insist on the amnesty to the point of breaking off negotiations with the Government and the British. 30. Ibid., p. 15. 31. Ibid., p. 15. 32. Ibid., p. 15; Richter, op.cit., p. 73. 33. Hoxha, E., With Stalin: Memoirs (Tirana, 1979) pp. 170-1. Probably the best analysis of Hoxha's regime is that by Arshi Pipa, 'The Political Culture of Hoxha's ' , in Tariq Ali, ed., The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on Twentieth-Century World Politics (London, 1984). 34. See next chapter p. 94 and notes 76 and 77. 35. Hoxha, op.cit., pp. 171-95. 36. Ibid., p. 195. 37. Ibid.,p.195. 38. Ibid., p. 196-7. Emphasis mine. 39. Ibid., p. 198-200. 40. Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 537. For Dimitrov's telegram see note 46. 41. Vukmanovic, op.cit., p. 62. 42. Ibid., pp. 63--4. 43. Ibid., p. 64, from the Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the KKE held in October 1949. 44. Ibid., p. 66. 45. Ibid., pp. 68-9. 46. Papapanayotou, op.cit., p. 164. Emphasis mine. 47. Tito and other Yugoslav leaders showed greater revolutionary consist• ency, although in the end they did little more to help EAM. On 30 November 1944, the Yugoslavs in contrast to the Russians had encour• aged the KKE to resist orders for disarmament. During the December clash they bitterly attacked the British in speeches and radio broad• casts. See Wittner, L.S., American Intervention in Greece 1943-1949. A Study in Counterrevolution (New York, 1982) p. 27. 48. Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 255. 49. Ibid., p. 617. 276 Notes

50. Ibid., p. 266. 51. FRUS: Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 1955) pp. 781-2. 52. Stettinius, E.R., Roosevelt and the Russians: The (London, 1950) p. 21. 53. FRUS Malta and Yalta, 1945, op.cit., pp. 781-2. 54. Ibid., pp. 781, 849. 55. Churchill, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 351. 56. Ibid., p. 430. 57. Ibid., p. 432. 58. Ibid., p. 550. 59. Sassoon, D., The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party (London, 1981) p. 19. 60. Ibid., p 54. 61. Brzezinski, Z.K., The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (New York, 1962) p. 44. For some recent writings on the French Communist Party see: Mortimer, Edward, The Rise of the French Communist Party 1920-1947 (London, 1984); Wall, M. Irwin, French Communism in the Era of Stalin: The Quest for Unity and Integration, 1945-1962 (West• port, Conn., 1983). 62. Vukmanovic, op.cit., p. 4. 63. The British Foreign Office and the US State Department took this possibility seriously enough to warn Yugoslavia-in January 1948 against recognizing the Provisional Government that the KKE set up in De• cember 1947. See Sweet-Escott, B., Greece: A Political and Economic Survey 1939-1953 (London, 1954) p. 65. 64. From 2 December 1979 to 23 January 1980, the KKE Esoterikou (Eurocommunists) published in its daily newspaper, Avgi, a series of documents from its archives related to the Civil War. These documents, edited by Filippos Iliou, contain among other things secret telegrams and memoranda which the KKE leadership exchanged with Stalin, Zhdanov, Tito and Dimitrov. These documents shed a new light on the relationship between the KKE and the leaderships of the Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist Parties and the policies the latter followed in Greece. They contain powerful evidence with which the historian can deconstruct a number of myths related to the events of this period. When quoting from these documents we will use KKE Archives followed by the date of their publication in Avgi. We should perhaps mention that in 1987 the KKE Esoterikou was split into two parties, the larger one changing its name into EAR (Elliniki Aristera, ). 65. KKE Archives, Avgi, 5 December 1979. In his book Emfylios Polemos 1945-1949, vol. II (Athens, 1981) p. 460, Vlandas argues that the report was written by Zachariadis himself, something which sounds very probable. 66. KKE Archives, Avgi, 6 December 1979. 67. KKE Archives, Avgi, 2 December 1979. Emphasis mine. 68. KKE Archives, Avgi, 7 December 1979. 69. Ibid. Notes 277

70. Ibid. Although the telegrams were sent the same day, it is obvious from the way Ioannidis addresses the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaderships, that the former were providing greater assistance to the KKE. On 10 February 1947 Ioannidis informed Zachariadis about the extent of this assistance, adding that 'the British Communist Party has also contributed £100'. 71. Ibid. In the letter Zachariadis informed Stalin that the KKE faced 'serious economic problems' and 'begged Stalin to help the KKE'. 72. KKE Archives, Avgi, 9 December 1979 and 14 December 1979. 73. KKE Archives, Avgi, 12 December 1979. In a telegram to the KKE Political Bureau, dated 4 June 1947, Ioannidis notes that 'we must be fully satisfied with the results of the meeting between Zachariadis and Stalin' . 74. For evidence of this see letters sent by Zachariadis to Tito, dated 12 August 1947 (KKE Archives, Avgi, 25 December 1979), to Zhdanov, dated 1 September 1947 (KKE Archives, Avgi, 30 December 1979) and Baranov (a senior Soviet official, using perhaps a pseudonym) dated 6 October 1947 (KKE Archives, Avgi, 12 January 1980). 75. Djilas, M., Conversations with Stalin (London, 1962) p. 164. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid, p. 165. 78. Barker, E., 'Yugoslav Policy towards Greece', in Baerentzen, L., Iatrides, O.J., Smith, L.O., eds, Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949 (Copenhagen, 1987) pp. 273-4. 79. At the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, held on 28 July 1948, the KKE adhered to the 's Resolution on Yugoslavia but refrained from making public its decision at that time. At the Fifth Plenum, held on 30 January 1949, the same line was maintained. 80. Voithima, op.cit., p. 265. 81. Thus, Dedijer claims that in March 1947 the Yugoslavs received a telegram from Stalin which said that 'what we were doing [namely giving aid to the Greek guerilla forces] was good'. See Barker, E., 'The Yugoslavs and the Greek Civil War', in Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, op.cit., pp. 303-4. On Zhdanov's influence on Soviet foreign policy in the years 1945-7 see McCagg, W.O. Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978) pp. 118-46, 266-84 and Ra'anan, G.D., international Policy Formation in the USSR (Hamden, C., 1983) pp. 47-53, 135-52. 82. Brzezinski, op.cit., pp. 58-64. 83. Ibid., p. 57; Dedijer, V., Tito Speaks (London, 1953) pp. 326-8. In August 1947, Dimitrov and Tito met at Bled and signed a series of agreements which provided for the virtual abolition of formalities on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier, elimination of entry and exit visas, and cultural autonomy for Pirin Macedonia. Three months later, in November 1947, Tito and Dimitrov signed at Evksinograd, near Varna, an agreement of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance. On that occasion, Tito declared: 'the treaty just signed has brought the two countries so close, that a federation would only be a formality'. See 278 Notes

Barker, E., Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London, 1950) pp. 103-4; Kofos, op.cit., pp. 161-2. 84. Djilas, op.cit., p. 143. 85. According to Ra'anan, op.cit., p. 139, Stalin was hardly likely to appreciate Tito's sponsoring of Markos, who posed a threat to the Moscovite section of the KKE, led by Zachariadis. 86. Immediately after the Tito-Stalin break in discussion inside the Foreign Office, the point was made that 'the position of Markos must now have become precarious'. Quoted by Barker, E., 'Yugoslav Policy towards Greece', op.cit., p. 280. Vafiadis, however, in his famous 'platform' of November 1948, kept silent about his connections with the Yugoslavs. See Episima Keimena 1945-1949, op. cit., pp. 482-9. There is also nothing in his memoirs about the role of the Yugoslavs in the civil war. 87. Seton-Watson, G.H.N., British Policy, op.cit., p. 293. 88. Djilas, op.cit., p. 164. 89. Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 368; Richter, op.cit., p. 117. 90. Ibid., p. 373. 91. Vukmanovic, op.cit., p. xi. 92. Ioannidis, op.cit., p. 374. Dedijer in his latest book, Novi Prilozi za Biografia Josipa Broza Tita, claims that Tito embarked on his policy to aid the Greek communists for reasons of defensive strategy. The Yugoslav leader saw the between Churchill and Stalin as a British plan to prevent the socialist revolution taking place in Yugoslavia. When the fighting broke out in Athens in December 1944, and again in 1946, Tito concluded that the British were attempting to expand their influence in the Balkans. In Dedijer's words, 'the armed intervention of British troops in Greece in December 1944 in effect opened a second front for Tito'. And when Markos went to the mountains in September 1946, 'when danger threatened not only the Greek people but Yugoslavia also, Tito reached the decision that it was necessary to help the Greek partisans'. See Barker, 'The Yugoslavs and the Greek Civil War', op.cit., p. 301. 93. Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, op.cit., p. 83. 94. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 64; Kofos, op.cit., pp. 123-124. 95. Vafiadis, Apomnimonevmata 1940-1944, vol. II (Athens, 1985) p. 221. 96. Sarafis, ELAS, op.cit., pp. 410-11, 418, 478; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 64; Kofos, op.cit., pp. 125-7. 97. Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, op.cit., p. 112. Gochev himself went to Skopje; his units were disbanded and later enrolled in the Yugoslav army. By 1946, fully trained and indoctri• nated, they were discharged from the Army and were dispatched to join the ranks of the 'Democratic Army'. 98. Kofos, op.cit., p. 136. 99. Barker, 'Yugoslav Policy Towards Greece', op.cit., p. 264. 100. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 159. 101. Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, op.cit., p. 117; Kofos, op.cit., p. 152. 102. Xydis, S., Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947: Prelude to the Notes 279

'' (Thessaloniki, 1963) p. 330-1; Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 189. 103. Rizospastis, August 26, 1945. 104. KKE Episima Keimena 1945-1949, op.cit., p. 180. 105. Vukmanovic, op.cit., p. 72-4. 106. Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, op.cit., p. 118. 107. Vukmanovic, op.cit., pp. 101-10. This, however, in no way suggests that Vafiadis approved of NOF's campaign to have Greek Macedonia annexed to Yugoslavia. 108. KKE Episima Keimena 1945-1949, op.cit., p. 337. 109. Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, op.cit., p. 120; Kofos, op.cit., p. 179. 110. Vukmanovic, op.cit., p. 77. 111. Kofos, op.cit., p. 185. 112. Partsalidis, M., 'Omilia stin 7i Olomeleia tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE', op.cit., p. 486. 113. The 'democratic' line was reflected in KKE's co-operation with the British Military Mission from 1942 and the signing of the Military Agreement of July 1943; in KKE's participation in the andarte delega• tion to Cairo in August 1943; in the Plaka armistice of February 1944 which halted for the time being the civil war between ELAS and EDES; in the setting up of PEEA and the National Council (whose aim was to put on the Government-in-Exile to form an all-party govern• ment); in the condemnation of the mutinies in the Greek armed forces stationed in the Middle East; in the Lebanon and Caserta agreements, in the entry of PEEA into the Government of National Unity in September 1944; and finally in the Varkiza agreement. The 'revolution• ary' line was reflected in the efforts of ELAS to monopolize the resistance and to dissolve the competing resistance movements EDES and EKKA, culminating in the 'first round' of the civil war and the death of Psarros in the spring of 1944; in the condemnation of the Lebanon and Caserta agreements; in the hesitations about entering the Government of National Unity; in the armed conflict with the British in December 1944; and finally in the condemnation of Varkiza and the refusal by some ELAS commanders, like Aris, to lay down their arms. On this see Richter, op.cit., pp. 75--6, who rightly assesses the inconsistency of the KKE line during the period of the occupation. 114. I am refering here to Dimitrov's telegram as well as to Popov's 'advice' to the KKE to join the Government of National Unity formed by Papandreou. See note 46 of this chapter and notes 162 and 163 of Chapter I.

III: FROM V ARKIZA TO THE SEVENTH CONGRESS

1. Efimeris tis Kyverniseos tou Vasileiou tis Ellados [Government Gazette of the ], vol. I, no. 68, 23 March 1945. 2. See pp. 87-8 and notes 40-7. 3. See note 1. 280 Notes

4. On this see Papastratis, P. 'The Purge of the Civil Service on the Eve of the Civil War' in Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, op.cit., pp. 41-53. Greece was the only country in Europe where collaborators were practically exempt from punishment and where communism was considered to be a worse crime than collaboration. By the end of 1945 there were 49,000 EAM sympathizers held in prison, while the corre• sponding number of collaborators was only 1,100. In and the , which had roughly the same population as that of Greece, the numbers of condemned collaborators were 53,172 and 60,000 respectively. The government's record on the issue of trying and sen• tencing collaborators was also a lamentable one. On this see the book by Karkanis, K.N., Oi Dosilogoi tis Katochis: Dikes-Parodia (Athens, 1983); the two White Books, published by EAM in 1945; and the book by Apostolou, L., I Parodia tis Dikis ton Dosilogon kai i Aftokatadiki tis Dexias (Athens, 1945). See also the memoirs of Delaportas, P., To Simiomatario enos Pilatou (Athens, 1978) who, having served as a public prosecutor during this period, reveals the role of the government and the judiciary in this whole affair. Of course the and the atrocities committed by the communists during these events to an extent altered popular attitudes towards EAMIELAS and the need to punish those who had fought against them during the Occupation (collaborators, members of the ). 5. On this question see Jecchinis, C., Trade Unionism in Greece: A Study in Political Paternalism (Chicago, 1967). See also the Report of the International Labour Office: Labour Problems in Greece: Report of the ILO Mission to Greece October-November 1949 (Geneva, 1949) and the article by Pollis, A., 'U.S. Intervention in Greek Trade Unions, 1947-1950', in Greece in the 194Os, op.cit., pp. 259-74, which includes a brief and accurate summary of the developments in the trade union movement in the period up to the elections of 1946. 6. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 145, makes the rather inappropriate claim that 'the white-terror was KKE propaganda'. Chand• ler, in his book, The Divided Land: An Anglo-Greek Tragedy, London, 1959, p. 110, paints, however, a more accurate picture: 'Despite the threat of armed bands, Right-wing confidence grew as their own forces expanded, for they counted the gendarmerie and the National Guard as assets to themselves'. Chandler recounts, op.cit., p. 134, how Kalabali• kis, one of the most wanted right-wing terrorist, was allowed to terror• ize the countryside and was never caught, despite the fact that he 'could be seen drinking at leisure in the village tavernas, sometimes accom• panied by the gendarmes themselves'. 7. The Times, 17 April 1945. 8. On 5 April 1945, Ellinikon Aima, a royalist newspaper, published the text of a letter Plastiras had sent to the Greek Ambassador to on 16 July 1941. Plastiras, then residing in Nice, had condemned the Metaxas dictatorship for rejecting an offer he had made to arrange an end to the war between Greece and through the mediation of Nazi . The publication of the letter, which was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the German invasion of Greece Notes 281

(6 April), gave Damaskinos and the British the pretext for Plastiras' overthrow. The real reasons for his fall must be sought in his failure to purge the state apparatus from former Metaxists, collaborators and extreme royalists. His policy of ostracizing EAM and the KKE could not but strengthen the power of the Right, which, despite his clientelist policy, was thus able to take control of the whole state machinery, including the security forces and the judiciary. Moreover, Plastiras' efforts to pursue a more independent line brought him into direct conflict with Leeper, who was not prepared to tolerate any challenge to his authority. 9. Oi Pragmatikes Aities tou Ellinikou Dramatos (Athens, 1947) p. 8, a memorandum submitted by EAM to the Commission of Investigation. For the English text see Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 93. 10. Ibid., pp. 6-9. See also the memorandum submitted by the Democratic Army in March 1947, published under the title Etsi Archise 0 Emfy/ios (Athens, 1987). 11. See notes 11 and 12 of previous chapter. 12. Eleftheri Ellada, 11 December 1945. 13. As Mavrogordatos, Th.G., 'The 1946 Election and Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 184, rightly points out. Apart from the two White Books, and the two memoranda submitted by EAM and the Democratic Army, already mentioned, see also EAM's Black Book (see note 13 of previous chapter) and the report submitted by Mutual Aid (Ethniki Allilegyi) to the Central Committee of EAM, which contains the most comprehensive statistics of the 'white-terror' throughout Greece, between 12 February 1945 and 31 March 1946. The report, which is quoted in Fivos N. Grigoriadis' book o Emfylios Polemos 1944--1949 (To Deftero Andartiko 1946-49) (Athens, 1975) vol. X, p. 93, gives the following numbers: murders: 1,289 (953 by bandits, 250 by the National Guard, eighty-two by the gendarmerie, and four by the British); attempted murders: 509; wounded: 6,681; tortured: 32,632; rapes: 165; arrested: 84,939; impri• soned (as of 8 May 1946): 8,624; destruction of offices: 677; plunder and destruction of property: 18,767. 14. Alivizatos, N., 'The "Emergency Regime" and Civil , 1946-1949', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 222. 15. Leeper, op.cit., p. 219. 16. Churchill to Sargent, 22 April 1945 (FO 371/48267 R 7423). 17. Leeper, op.cit., p. 204. 18. Mavrogordatos, G., 'The 1946 Election and Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War', Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 191. 19. As McNeill, op.cit., p. 168, observes, 'the force [the gendarmerie] was definitely rightist. No known or suspected Communists were admitted to its ranks, and many gendarmes were closely associated with, or even became members of, extreme rightist organizations such as "X".' 20. Chandler, op.cit., pp. 144--5. 21. McNeill, op.cit., p. 183. 22. Plastiras' anti-communist views were well known to the British and Americans. In a conversation with Leeper, he told the British Ambassa- 282 Notes

dor that he would have preferred EAMIELAS to have been crushed completely by British troops because EAM 'had no roots in Greek soil'. In talks with MacVeagh, he characterized EAM as an 'international menace not confined to Greece alone but threatening all countries' and as being 'not Greek in character'. Leeper to Foreign Office, 12 January 1945 (Fa 371148246 R 893); MacVeagh to State Department, 18 Janu• ary 1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 105. 23. Sarafis, ELAS, op.cit., p. 481. 24. For the activities of IDEA see General Karayannis, G., To Drama tis Ellados 1940-1952 (Athens, 1964); Kanellopoulos, P., Istorika Doki• mia (Athens, 1975); Alivizatos, N., 'The Greek Army in the late Forties: Towards an Institutional Autonomy', Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. V, no. 3, Fall 1978, pp. 37-45; Mouzelis, N., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London, 1978) pp. 105 ff; Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (IDEA): Apokalypseis tou Typou 1951-1962 (Athens, 1975); Gerolyrnatos, A., 'The Security Battalions and the Civil War' (paper presented at the International Conference on the Greek Civil War held in August 1984 by the Department of Modern Greek and Balkan Studies at the University of Copenhagen). It should perhaps be remembered that George Papadopoulos, the dictator of the period 1967-73, was a member of IDEA. 25. Sarafis, op.cit., p. lxxvii; see also Sarafis' other book, Meta tin Varkiza, op.cit., p. 23. 26. Gerolymatos, op.cit., p. II. 27. McNeill, op.cit., p. 164. 28. Leeper to Foreign Office, 3 (Fa 371/48272 R 9539). 29. Chandler, op.cit., p. 144, yet again confirms that 'the gendarmerie collaborated with the "nationalist" bands of Kalabalikis and Sourlas'. Woodhouse, though, in Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 163, finds the reports in Rizospastis 'exaggerated'. See also EAM's White Book, for the period February - July 1945, op.cit., pp. 62-9. 30. Minutes of conference between Leeper, Scobie and officials of the Foreign Office and War Office, 12 June 1945 (Fa 371/48272 R 10452). 31. As Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 257 notes, 'the temper of the time favoured anyone against the Communists, and inclined to identify all forms of with the KKE. In combating this propensity, Sofoulis again found himself handicapped by the insistence of the British Missions upon political neutrality'. Rawlins, rather than dismissing Vendiris, had him transferred to the command of the forces of Macedonia and Thrace. 32. Sarafis, Meta tin Varkiza, op.cit., pp. 201-2, 231. After the failed republican putsch of 1935, General Kondylis purged one fifth of the Greek army, that is more than 1,000 republican officers. Dafnis, G., op.cit., vol II, pp. 359 ff. 33. The election issue is discussed in great detail in the next chapter. 34. A notable exception was that of the liberal politicians Tsouderos, Kafandaris and Sofianopoulos who decided to abstain. On 15 March 1946, only two weeks before the elections, Sofianopoulos.. one of the signatories of the Varkiza agreement and Foreign Minister in all post- Notes 283

Varkiza governments, declared before the Congress of Greek Demo• cratic Associations: 'if I had known that the honoured ELAS arms by which our people resisted the invaders would have been turned over by the State to the "X"ites I would have never signed the Varkiza agree• ment and would have preferred the hard fight to continue'. Quoted in Stavrianos, op.cit., pp. 148-9. 35. Rizospastis, 15 February 1945. 36. Sarafis, ELAS, op.cit., pp. 522-3. Aris initially refused to sign the Order of the Day which provided for the demobilization of ELAS. Under pressure from Siandos, however, he backed down and finally agreed to sign the agreement with Sarafis. See also Sarafis, Meta tin Varkiza, op.cit., pp. 15-16. 37. loannidis, op.cit., pp. 371-2. See also Karagiorgis, op.cit., pp. 21, 42 and Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 252. 38. Sarafis, ELAS, op.cit., p. 524. 39. Ibid., p. 524. According to Sarafis op.cit., p. 525, the arms surrendered were as follows: artillery of various types: 100; heavy mortars: eighty• one; light mortars: 138; machine-guns: 419; submachine-guns: 1,412; automatic rifles: 713; rifles and pistols: 48,973; anti- rifles: fifty• seven; radios: seventeen. 40. Blanas and loannidis in their memoirs' give a detailed account of the whole operation to conceal part ofthe weapons. Blanas, op.cit., pp. 35-7; loannidis, op.cit., pp. 371-5; Vafiadis, op.cit., vol. III, p. 67; Partsali• dis, op.cit., p. 183. Karagiorgis' letter quoted in Richter, op.cit., p. 274, note 24. 41. Kousoulas, op.cit., p. 225. 42. Ibid., p. 217. Zachariadis made this statement at the Third Party Conference in (see Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 15) and not as Kousoulas wrongly states, in his book Provlimata Kathodigisis sto KKE, published two years later. 43. See notes 82-4 in previous chapter. Woodhouse also, in his book Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 138, makes use of Zachariadis' state• ment at the Sixth Plenum of October 1949, to suggest that the KKE was preparing for the third round of the civil war from the time of Varkiza. 44. See Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., pp. 14,34,66-7,69,79. In his book Provlimata Kathodigisis, op.cit., p. 27, Zachariadis again accuses Sian• dos as 'an agent ofthe class enemy'. He repeats the same charges in his pamphlet Provlimata tis Krisis tou KKE, op.cit., pp. 26, 34-5. In a similar fashion Zachariadis at the Third Party Conference also de• nounced Vafiadis, Karagiorgis, Partsalidis, Chrysa Chatzivasileiou, Apostolou and Aris Velouchictis. It is typical of the KKE leader that whenever he referred to Aris, he used not his legendary ELAS name but his real name, Thanasis Klaras, under which Aris had signed a repentance declaration during the Metaxas dictatorship. Zachariadis' comments aside, Siandos did commit a number of grave errors during the Resistance, the most serious being the resurrection, during the December Events, of the ELAS Central Committee and the decision to send the leaders of ELAS, Sarafis and Aris, to fight against Zervas in 284 Notes

Epirus, at a time when all the divisions of ELAS were needed in Athens (see note 59). For a more detailed analysis of the strategic and military mistakes committed by EAMIELAS during the battle of Athens see the recently published report, allegedly written by Siandos himself, I Ek• thesi tou Siandou ya ta Dekemvriana (Athens, 1986). The charge that Siandos was an 'agent' is clearly absurd. On this see loannidis, op.cit., p. 400 and Vafiadis, op.cit., vol. III, p. 39, who of course reject the charge outright. 45. loannidis, op.cit., pp. 292-4, 371; Partsalidis, op.cit., p. 183. Alexan• der, op.cit., p. 112, misquotes Joannidis as saying, 'that the communists concealed sufficient weapons for an army of 30,000 men. Their inten• tion was to smuggle arms into Athens and the major provincial towns in preparation for a resumption of the armed struggle'. (Emphasis mine). loannidis says no such thing. The weapons were concealed, he notes, 'in case they [the British and the Right] tried to fool us' (kanoune kamia koutsoukela autoi). Blanas, op.cit., p. 34, seems to suggest that the order to conceal part of the arms was given in an attempt to reduce the psychological impact of the defeat on the demoralized members of the Party. 46. On the circumstances surrounding Aris' death see Eudes, op.cit., pp. 234-40. See also Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., pp. 140-1. 47. On 12 June 1945, the following note appeared in Rizospastis: 'The KKE publicly condemns Aris Velouchiotis. Comrade Zachariadis has in• formed us that the KKE Central Committee, having discussed reports submitted by various party organizations, has decided to condemn publicly the suspect and adventurist behaviour of Aris Velouchiotis (Thanasis Klaras or Mizerias). Velouchiotis continued his activities even after the conclusion of the Varkiza Agreement. This behaviour, which only helps the forces of the reaction to attack the KKE for a breach of the Varkiza Agreement and thus justify its crimes, must be condemned promptly. As is known, during the Metaxas' period Vel• ouchiotis was arrested and signed a repentance declaration renouncing the KKE'. According to Achileas Papaioannou, Zachariadis, in his 'will' (given orally to him when he visited the KKE leader in his place of exile in October 1963) expressed regret for his decision to denounce Aris. This is what Zachariadis is supposed to have said: 'He [Aris] was a worthy Kapetanios. A popular fighter. He was and still remains a legend. A worthy leader of ELAS ... He was the new Karaiskakis ... I sacrificed him to please the Central Committee. I am responsible for this and I have a guilty conscience. I should have told him to escape to Albania. Later he would have been the natural leader of the Demo• cratic Army'. See Papaioannou, A., I Diathiki tou Nikou Zachariadi (Athens, 1986) p. 47. 48. See the editorials in Rizospastis of 6,8, 17, and 21 March 1945 and the editorial in the March issue of KOMEP. 49. KOMEP, March 1945, pp. 107. 50. Chatzivasileiou, C., 'I Ergatia kai i Dimokratia', KOMEP, March 1945, pp. 138-44; Karagiorgis, K., 'I Diaskepsi tis Krimaias kai oi Peripeteies tis stin Ellada tis Dexias', KOMEP, March 1945, pp.118-37. Notes 285

51. KOMEP, March 1945, pp. 218-19; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 233. 52. Vafiadis, op.cit., pp. 100--05; Blanas, op.cit., pp. 65-7; Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 285-8; Rousos, op.cit., pp. 390--2; Zografos, Z., 'Merika Zitimata tis Politikis mas Grammis', Neos Kosmos, September 1950, pp. 641-60; Bartziotas V., Exinta Chronia Kommounistis (Athens, 1986) pp. 231-2. See also Ioannidis' speech at the Eleventh Plenum reprinted in his memoirs, op.cit., pp. 479-89. 53. Vafiadis, op.cit., p. 102. 54. Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 257; Richter, op.cit., p. 243. 55. KKE Episima Keimena 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 255-6. 56. Ibid., p. 256. Siandos in his report (p. 426) was more specific about the lack of political flexibility on the part of the KKE. He noted that the KKE did not take advantage of some opportunities, like Churchill's dramatic visit to Athens on Christmas Day 1944, to end the conflict under more favourable terms. This inflexibility was the result of the KKE having 'overestimated its strength and underestimated that of the enemy'. 57. In his memoirs Rousos, op.cit., p. 390, tells us that Zevgos during the Plenum discussions had advocated a 'Titoist' line. But this line was rejected by the leadership because 'Greece, for geographic, economic and political reasons, could have never become a Yugoslavia'. See Chatzivasileiou's report, quoted in the article by Zografos, 'Merika Zitimata tis Politikis mas Grammis', op.cit., p. 643. Chatzivasileiou in her speech (ibid., pp. 642-3) rejected the view according to which 'the end of the national liberation struggle should have been the seizing of power by the KKE'. 'The Party was right not to pursue such a strategic aim.' She then went on to discuss the 'lessons' of the December clash. 'The Party', she argued, 'had no clear perspective regarding the pur• pose of the Resistance . . . Our orientation should have been to find a political compromise. . . We could not have tried to prevail. We should have learned from Lebanon ... We were unprepared both ideologically and militarily for the clash with Britain. We committed crimes. The Political Bureau had no clear idea of what we were attempting to achieve ... In December we started the struggle without knowing how and when we shall complete it.' Ioannidis in his speech (ibid., p. 643) repeated Chatzivasileiou's argument about the lack of clear perspective, while Partsalidis (ibid., p. 644) noted that the KKE did not attempt to seize power because Zachariadis' letter (of 1941) specified that the Party should only fight for 'national liberation'. He nevertheless blamed the British 'for creating the [December] situation'. 58. Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 258. 59. On this see Sarafis, ELAS, op.cit., pp. 497-502 and f.n.; Ioannidis, op.cit., pp 487-8. 60. For Ioannidis' speech see Ioannidis, op.cit., pp. 480-81; for Siandos' speech see KKE Episima Keimena 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 432. 61. Luxemburg, R., 'Organizational Question of ' in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks (New York, 1971) p. 118. 62. The composition of the Political Bureau was as follows: George Sian• dos, Yannis Ioannidis, Dimitrios Partsalidis, Vasilis Bartziotas, Yannis 286 Notes

Zevgos, Stergios Anastasiadis, Nikos Plumbidis, Chrysa Chatzivasi• leiou and Leonidas Stringos. Rousos lost his permanent seat in the Political Bureau and became a subsidiary member. 63. Blanas, op.cit., p. 65. 64. Zachariadis, Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 105. 65. Luxemburg, op.cit., p. 130. 66. KKE Episima Keimena 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 429. 67. Eleftheri Ellada, 25 April 1945. The following parties joined the EAM Coalition: KKE; DRK (Dimokratiko Rizospastiko Komma, Demo• cratic Radical Party, led by M. Kyrkos and A. Loulis); DE (Dimokra• tiki Enosi, Democratic Union, led by M. Proimakis and S. Kritikas); a section of SKE (Sosialistiko Komma Ellados, Socialist Party of Greece, led by I. Passalidis, G. Oikonomou, G. Georgalas); AKE (Agrotiko Komma Ellados, Agrarian Party of Greece, led by Gavriilidis). See Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, p. 316. Strangely enough the KOMEP issue of April-May 1945 said nothing about the formation of the new EAM. 68. Richter, op.cit., p. 246. See Chapter I, p. 24. 69. Vafiadis' letter is reproduced in his Memoirs, op.cit., vol. III, pp. 110-12. Although Vafiadis wrote the letter in the middle of April, he only sent it to the Political Bureau on 28 May 1945, that is after he and the members of the Party had found out that Zachariadis was alive and returning to Greece. One can only speculate on Vafiadis' motives for doing so and whether he would have sent the letter if Zachariadis' fate had been different. In his letter Vafiadis rejects the views of the leadership regarding the question of power, and maintains that after Lebanon, 'the situation had changed . . . and the Party should have attempted to seize power and establish a workers-peasants democratic government based on EAM'. Zachariadis read the letter but as we discuss later in the chapter he dismissed Vafiadis' criticisms. The content of Karagiorgis' letter is not known as the letter is not repro• duced in his book Apo tin Varkiza os ton Emfylio Polemo, published after his death. Aris too sent a letter to the Political Bureau about Varkiza, but in March 1945, that is before the Eleventh Plenum. The content ofthis letter is also unknown. Rousos, however, op.cit., p. 390, asserts that both these letters were very critical of the line followed by the leadership. 70. Vafiadis, op.cit., vol. III, pp. 102-3. 71. Eudes, op.cit., p. 246. 72. Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, p. 329; Eudes, op.cit., p. 246. 73. KKE Episima Keimena 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 431; KOMEP editorial, April-May 1945, p. 233. 74. Rizospastis, 1 June 1945. 75. Zografos, op.cit., p. 647; Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, p. 329. 76. Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., p. 253. The text of the decision was published in Rizospastis on 2 June 1945. 77. Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 19. 78. See Chapter II, p. 61. 79. Barker, 'Greece in the Framework of Anglo-Soviet Relations Notes 287

1941-1947' in Greece: From Resistance to Civil War, op.cit., p. 29. Zachariadis himself alluded to that when in Deka Chronia Paiis, op.cit., p. 19, he said that 'we gave in to the nationalistic pressure of our fellow travellers, believing that in this way we preserve the popular unity of EAM'. 80. For Zachariadis' first public statements see Rizospastis, 2 June 1945. Zachariadis' line of 'integration' into the parliamentary system, is discussed in more details in chapter VI, in the section that deals with the reasons for the abstention of the KKE from the March 1946 elections. 81. Rizospastis, 5 June 1945. Emphasis mine. 82. Vafiadis, op.cit., vol. III, pp. 105-7. See note 69 above. 83. Papapanayotoy, A., '0 Rolos ton Xenon stin Antistasi kai ton Emfy• lio', Anti, No. 180, 19 June 1981, pp. 34-7. 84. On this see Katiforis, G., 'Ya tin Theoria ton Dyo Polon', Anti, No. 187,25 September 1981, pp. 33-5. 85. Rousos, P., 'Ellines kai Symmachoi', KOMEP, September 1944, pp.908-9. 86. Rousos, 1 Megali Pentaetia, op.cit., vol II, p. 214. Rousos in his memoirs (p. 433) notes that Zachariadis' 'two poles' theory had been 'a grave error'. It is only natural that Rousos would have wished to disassociate himself from a theory so similar to his, which after the fall of Zachariadis in 1957, was denounced by the new leadership as 'anti-Soviet' . 87. KKE Episima Keimena 1940-1945, op.cit., p. 431. 88. See note 57. 89. Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, op.cit., pp. 680-1. 90. Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., pp. 269-72. 91. Ibid., p. 273. 92. Ibid., p. 275. 93. Ibid., pp. 277-8. 94. Ibid., pp. 284-5, 290-1. 95. Ibid., pp. 308-9. 96. Ibid., pp. 286-7. 97. Ibid., p. 309. 98. Ibid., pp. 304-5. Partsalidis, in his famous 'memorandum' of February 1950, criticized Zachariadis for his decision to dissolve the Party organizations in the villages. 'This', Partsalidis argued, 'allowed the reaction to say that AKE did not exist, that it was just an annexe of the KKE.' See Dimitriou, P., 1 Diaspasi tou KKE (Athens, 1978) vol. I, p.29. 99. Miliband, R., Marxism and Politics (Oxford, 1977) p. 127. 100. Smith, L.O., 'On Zachariadis' Theory of the Two Poles', Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek, No.5, 1981, pp. 29-35. 101. Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., pp. 293-4. 102. Ibid., pp. 293-4. 103. Ibid., p. 310. See also Zachariadis' speech at the Third Party Confer• ence of October 1950 in which the KKE leader maintained yet again that the 'theory of the two poles' was a realistic foreign policy for the 288 Notes

post-Varkiza period. See Zachariadis, Epilogi Ergon (Athens, 1974) pp. 191-2. See also note 110. 104. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., pp. 141-2; Eudes, op.cit., p. 249; Kousoulas, op.cit., p. 223. 105. Partsalidis' 'memorandum' is reproduced in Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, vol. A, op.cit., pp. 28-33. Partsalidis' comments at the Seventh Plenum of are quoted by Zachariadis in his introductory speech at the Third Party Conference of October 1950. See Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., pp. 24-26. Woodhouse, op.cit., p. 142, wrongly ascribes Partsalidis' actions to Bartziotas, who at the time was still a loyal Zachariadist. 106. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi tou KKE, vol. A, op.cit., p. 51. 107. See also note 86. 108. Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., p. 293. 109. Eight days after the conclusion of the Twelfth Plenum, Rizospastis (4 July 1945) published a resolution of the KKE's Political Bureau, in which the British Missions are characterized as 'British military occu• pation authorities'. Emphasis mine. 110. Despite the fact that Ole Smith has based his whole article on this piece of evidence. In actual fact Zachariadis in another part of his speech at the Seventh Plenum of May 1950, 'confessed' that his 'two poles' theory was meant to define Greece's foreign policy for the post-Varkiza period as well. See Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., pp. 26-7. See also note 103. 111. In the Voithima, op.cit., pp. 225-7, published in 1952, there is no mention of the theory of the 'two poles'. 112. Zachariadis, N., Provlimata tis Krisis tou KKE, 1962, pp. 22-3. 113. Eudes, op.cit., p. 252; See Lefki Vivlos: Dimokratikos Neofasismos, op.cit.; Woodhouse too (in Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 163) admits that, 'careful reading of the press leaves no doubt that up to the end of 1945 at least, so far as political labels could be attached to the per• petrators, the blame for the bloodshed lay primarily on right-wing forces, particularly Grivas's Khi, and on anti-Communists exacting vengeance for earlier atrocities'. This statement seems to contradict Woodhouse' previous claim, quoted in note 6. 114. KKE Episima Keimena 1945-1949, vol. VI (Athens, 1987) pp. 47-50, 54-7. 115. Ibid., p. 47. 116. Ibid., p. 57; Rizospastis, 10 August 1956. 117. See following chapter. 118. Sarafis, Meta tin Varkiza, op.cit., pp. 61-3. 119. Ibid., p. 62. 120. Ibid., pp. 63-5. 121. Rizospastis, 29 and 31 . 122. KKE Episima Keimena 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 60-1. 123. 16i Syndiskepsi tis Kommounistikis Organosis Athinas 28-29 Septemvri 1945 (Athens, 1945). 124. KOMEP, October 1945, p. 891. 125. Zografos, Z., 'To 70 Synedrio kai ta Organotika Provlimata', KOMEP, November 1945, pp. 1032-46. 126. Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., p. 261. Notes 289

127. Eudes, op.cit., p. 253. 128. Ibid., p. 253. 129. To 70 Synedrio tou KKE, Eisigisi kai Telikos Logos tou Nikou Zachariadi (Athens, 1945) p. 17. 130. Ibid., p. 17. 131. Ibid.,p.19. 132. Ibid., pp. 19-21,24. 133. Ibid., pp. 25-6. See also the foreign policy section of the final resolution of the Congress, which again stresses the need for friendly relations with Britain, the USA and France. KKE Episima Keimena 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 84-5. 134. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 135. Ibid., pp. 12-15. 136. Blanas, op.cit., p. 62. 137. The second meeting of the Panhellenic Military Committee is discussed in great detail in Chapter V. 138. Blanas, op.cit., p. 71. 139. Vukmanovic, op.cit., p. 86. 140. Ibid., pp. 92-3. 141. To 70 Synedrio, op.cit., pp. 32-50. 142. Ibid., pp. 51-2; see also Richter, op.cit., p. 275. 143. Ibid., p. 32. 144. See Chapter I, note 18. 145. To 70 Synedrio, op.cit., p. 69. 146. KOMEP, October 1945, pp. 831-79. 147. Ibid., pp. 815. Some parts of Partsalidis' arguments are further elabor- ated in Chapter VI. 148. Ibid., p. 815. 149. Ibid., pp. 820-6. 150. Ibid., p. 830. 151. Ibid., pp. 821-3. 152. Ibid., p. 820. 153. KKE Episima Keimena 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 101-12. 154. Ibid., p. 107.

IV: THE ELECTIONS OF MARCH 1946: PANDORA'S BOX

1. 'Miscellaneous No.5 (1945)', Cmd. 6598. 2. Text in KKE, Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 415-16. 3. FRUS, 1945, Vol VIII, pp. 128-31. 4. See Chapter II note 57; see also Xydis, op.cit., p. 92. 5. Campbell, op.cit., p. 45. For Yugoslav and Bulgarian negotiations for the creation of an all-Balkan Federation see Kofos, op.cit., pp. 137-95. Stalin's decision to denounce Tito put an end to Yugoslavia's aspira• tions, expressed in the August 1947 Bled Agreement, for a Yugoslav• dominated Balkan Federation. 6. Leeper to FO, 15 March 1945 (FO 371148261, R 5105). 7. Ibid. 290 Notes

8. Minute by Sargent, 21 March 1945; minute by Eden, undated (Fa 371/48261, R 5268); Eden to Leeper, 25 March 1945 (Fa 371148261 R 5268). 9. Churchill to Eden, 29 March 1945 (Fa 371/48263, R 5825). 10. Leeper to Fa, 28 March 1945 (Fa 371148263, R 5757). 11. Eden to Leeper, 30 March 1945 (Fa 371/48263, R 5757). Quoted in Alexander, op.cit., p. 105. 12. Eden to Leeper, 29 March 1945 (Fa 371148263, R 5757). Quoted in Alexander, op.cit., p. 105. 13. Leeper, op.cit., pp. 161-2. 14. Ibid., p. 162. 15. Macmillan, H., War Diaries - The Mediterranean 1943-1945 (London, 1984) pp. 732-3. 16. Eden to Churchill, 11 April 1945 (Fa 371148263, R 5989). Quoted in Alexander, op.cit., p. 111. 17. Churchill to Leeper, 22 April 1945 (Fa 371148267, R 7055). 18. Leeper to Churchill, 25 April 1945 (Fa 371/48267, R 7408). Quoted in Richter, op.cit., p. 119. 19. Churchill to Leeper, 27 April 1945 (Fa 371148267, R 7457). 20. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece op.cit., p. 147. 21. Ibid., p. 147; Alexander, op.cit., p. 119. 22. Caccia to Fa, 9 July 1945 (Fa 371148274, R 11825) quoted in Alex• ander, op.cit., p. 121, Richter, op.cit., p. 178. Harold Caccia replaced Leeper while the latter went to London on leave. Leeper returned to Athens in September 1945. 23. Rizospastis, 20 July 1945. 24. News Chronicle, 28 July 1945. 25. Caccia to Fa, 23 July 1945 (Fa 371/48275, R 12219); ibid., 24 July 1945 (Fa 371148275, R 12458). Caccia rejected the demands on the part of the republicans and communists for the formation of a 'political govern• ment' and urged London to back Voulgaris. Although the present government had failed to restore law and order it had succeeded in improving the economic situation. A change in government, Caccia noted, 'would be a gratuitous setback to the country's development' and would also mean the postponement of the plebiscite. Richter, op.cit., p. 107. 26. Caccia to Fa, 30 July 1945 (Fa 371148276, R 13134). According to Greek press reports, the day before the elections Bevin had stated that Churchill's policy towards Greece had had the approval of the whole War Cabinet, of which the Labour leaders Attlee, Bevin and Morrison had been members. 27. Alexander, op.cit., p. 125, quoting a report by the Anglo-Greek Information Service, 22-8 July 1945. 28. Eleftheria, 29 July 1945. 29. Rizospastis, 2 August 1945; KOMEP, September, 1945, pp. 804-7; Alexander, op.cit., 125--6. 30. KOMEP, September, 1945, pp. 805--6; Caccia to Fa, 10 August 1945 (Fa 371148276, R 13496). 31. On 8 August 1945, the Fa informed Caccia that the Labour govern- Notes 291

ment had yet to discuss the future of Greece. For the time being, therefore, Voulgaris should remain in office and the 'service' character of his government be maintained; FO to Caccia, 8 August 1945 (FO 371148276, R 13166). 32. Provatas, A., Politiki Istoria tis Ellados 1821-1980: Nomothetika kai Ektelestika Somata (Athens, 1980) p. 580. 33. Siandos, G., KOMEP, September 1945, pp. 716-17. In a telegram to the State Department MacVeagh commented: 'Following Regent's confirmation service Govt Communist Party has . . . ordered all rep• resentatives on committees for compilation and review electoral regis• ters to abstain from these committees and "to cease participating in this comedy, the aim of which is to falsify the will and the sentiment of the people". Highly advisable Greek left play ball if proposed elections are to secure results generally acceptable to country and foreign opinion'. See FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 136, 140-1. 34. G. Seferis in his Politiko Imerologio (Athens, 1985) quotes Leeper as saying: 'If George comes back, goodbye Greece!', op.cit., p. 110. 35. Caccia to FO, 13 August 1945 (FO 371148276, R 13649); Alexander, op.cit., p. 128. 36. The memorandum contained the following points:

1. We [the British] should press for the elections and plebiscite to be held in Greece as soon as possible. If it can be arranged, the elections should precede the plebiscite, but this is a matter on which the Greek themselves must take the initiative and responsibility. 2. The Voul• garis Government should be maintained in power until the elections. All reasonable steps should, however, be taken to meet justifiable criticism by the Left wing Parties and to ensure that law and order are maintained on an impartial basis. 3. To steady the position in Greece and to assist us in working out a satisfactory Greek policy, the Regent should be invited to visit this country to confer with his Majesty's Government. 4. If continues to press on with her propaganda regarding the position of Greece, it will be necessary to make plain to the USSR our position. 5. We should do our utmost to secure the full support of the Dominions for our whole Greek policy. We should also lose no opportunity of associating the US in all steps we take.

(Emphasis mine.) Bevin stressed that it was essential for Britain to maintain its influence in Greece because the country was vital to Britain's strategic interests in the Middle East. The Cabinet approved the Foreign Secretary's memorandum and six days later (the memoran• dum was approved on 14 August) Bevin appeared before the House of Commons and gave his long-expected statement on Greece which in essence contained all the above points. It is interesting to note that Bevin had reached the same conclusions regarding the election• plebiscite issue before Damaskinos had made his views on the subject known to Caccia. See Memorandum by the Secretary of State for to the Cabinet, 11 August 1945 (FO 371148277, R 13846); minutes of Cabinet, 14 August 1945 (FO 371/48276, R 13689); 292 Notes

FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 136--7; Seferis, op.cit., pp. 19-20. 37. Seferis, op.cit., pp. 19-20. 38. Hansard: 1945-6, vol. 413, cols 289-91. 39. Bullock, A., Lord, The Life and Times of , vol. II (Minister of Labour 1940-1945) and vol. III (Foreign Secretary 1945-1951) (Lon• don, 1967, 1983). 40. Ibid., vol. III, p. 69. 41. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 69-70. 42. Ibid., vol. III, p. 70. 43. See p. 120 and note 26. 44. See, for example, the two telegrams that Zachariadis sent to Laski on 29 August and 1 September 1945 in Sarafis, S., Meta tin Varkiza (Athens, 1979) p. 66 and pp. 69-70. 45. Bullock, op.cit., vol. III, pp. 70--1. 46. Hansard: 1945-6, vol. 413, cols 311-15. 47. Ibid., cols. 312-13. 48. Bullock, op.cit., vol. III, pp. 340--7. 49. Hansard: 1945-6, vol. 413, col. 314. 50. Ibid., cols 314-15. On 10 September 1945, at a lunch given by the Lord Mayor on the occasion of Damaskinos' visit to London, Bevin proposed a toast to Eden with the following words: 'Antony, this is for conti• nuity', Seferis, op.cit., pp. 29-30. 51. See note 36. 52. Bullock, op.cit., vol. III, p. 160. 53. Rizospastis, 22 August 1945. For Moscow's reaction see Harriman's telegram (American Ambassador in the USSR) to the State Depart• ment, FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 148--9. 54. Alexander, op.cit., p. 130. 55. The Times, 22 August 1945. 56. Rizospastis, 25 August 1945. 57. Sarafis, op.cit., p. 84; Alexander, op.cit., p. 121. 58. Ibid., pp. 84-7. 59. In a conversation between Leeper and Seferis, the British Ambassador said: 'The Archbishop thinks that Bevin did not accept his suggestions when he made his statement at the House. On the contrary, Bevin was planning to advocate a postponement of the plebiscite, but changed his mind when he received a telegram from Athens which contained the Regent's views on the matter', Seferis, op.cit., p. 32. 60. Seferis, op.cit., p. 20. 61. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 133. 62. Ibid., pp. 150--1. 63. Caccia to Fa, 5 September 1945 (Fa 371148279, R 15066); MacVeagh to Byrnes, 5 September 1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 152-4. 64. See note 22. 65. Memorandum by Damaskinos, 10 September 1945 (Fa 371/48279, R 15578); Seferis, op.cit., pp. 27-8. 66. Seferis, op.cit., pp. 27-43. 67. Ibid., p. 33; FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 151-7. 68. Seferis, op.cit., pp. 35-8. Notes 293

69. Ibid., pp. 42-3. Emphasis mine. 70. Ibid., pp. 41-2; Bevin to Caccia, 17 September 1945 (FO 371/48280, R 15991). 71. Seferis, op.cit., pp. 42-3 and note. Emphasis mine. 72. The ' Question' remained unresolved. See Seferis, op.cit., pp. 28-43. 73. Leeper, op.cit., p. 180; Rizospastis, 20 September 1945. 74. Rizospastis, 20 September 1945; KOMEP, October 1945, p. 991. 75. Sarafis, op.cit., p. 115; To 70 Synedrio tou KKE, Vol. III (Athens, 1945) pp. 16-19. 76. Leeper, op.cit., p. 181. 77. Ibid., p. 184; FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 168. 78. For the 'fears' of the Left see: 'Apofasi tou Politikou Grafeiou', 6 September 1945, in Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., pp. 325-30; KOMEP, October 1945, pp. 987-91; To 70 Synedrio tou KKE, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 79. To 70 Synedrio tou KKE, op.cit., p. 14. 80. Lefki Vivlos, Dimokratikos Neofasismos July-October 1945, op.cit., p. 36; FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 170; Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 127-35. 81. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 170-1. In a telegram to the State Depart- ment, MacVeagh reported that Leeper 'has sent word to Regent ... to act promptly and that "what would be best with House of Commons" .. . would be announcement 01 formation of new government of Left Center. Suggested Tsouderos as possibly best chance head such govern• ment'. See also Seferis, op.cit., p. 51. 82. See Leeper's proposals to FO: Leeper to FO, 8 October 1945 (FO 371148282, R 17131). 83. Bevin to Leeper, 9 October 1945 (FO 371/48282, R. 17131); FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 172-3; Leeper, op.cit., p. 185. 84. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 172-3. Seferis, op.cit., pp. 53-4. 85. FRUS, 1954, vol. VIII, p. 174. 86. Seferis himself may have had something to do with Damaskinos' decision, op.cit., p. 54. 87. McNeill, op.cit., p. 180. 88. Leeper (McNeil) to FO, 15 November 1945 (FO 371148285, R 19830). 89. Leeper, op.cit., p. 188, Alexander, op.cit. pp. 149-50, and Richter, op.cit., p. 305, in their accounts of the meeting, suggest that it was Damaskinos who presented Leeper with this plan for the dismissal of Kanellopoulos and the formation of an all-party government. Seferis, however, in his account, op.cit. pp. 137-41, argues that it was the British Ambassador who put forward this plan and not the Regent. Seferis' account seems to me the most reliable one for three reasons: 1. It is difficult to imagine that Damaskinos without outside pressure suddenly decided to take such a strong stance on the plebiscite issue, when if anything his reluctance to displease the Populists was well known (see, for example, Bevin's message to Damaskinos on 20 Oc• tober, in which the British Foreign Secretary 'sought unsuccessfully to dispel the fear which seemed to be driving the Regent in the Populists' direction' [Alexander, op.cit., p. 144]); 2. Damaskinos would have 294 Notes

never proposed the inclusion of the KKE in an all-party government. The idea was anathema to him - not so for Leeper, albeit on theoretical grounds; 3. Leeper had a clear motive to present the case as stemming from Damaskinos rather than from himself. This kind of intervention in the affairs of a 'sovereign' state was too high-handed for the British Ambassador to admit publicly. The above seem to be confirmed by the minutes of a second meeting between Leeper and Damaskinos, on 19 November in which Leeper refers again and again to his proposals to Damaskinos. Seferis, op.cit., pp. 142-60. See also note 92. 90. Bevin to McNeil, 18 November 1945 (FO 371/48285 R 19555). See also Seferis, op.cit., p. 67, p. 142 and pp. 211-12. 91. During a speech delivered at a banquet on 15 November McNeil declared that 'Britain was poor and had already scraped the bottom of the barrel to provide money for Greece. She could only offer advice and friendship'. See Seferis, op.cit., p. 66. 92. Damaskinos' reluctance to invite EAM and the KKE to join the new government seems to support the validity of Seferis' account of the meeting between Leeper and the Regent of 16 November. 93. Leeper to FO, 19 November 1945 (FO 371148286 R 20281). For the Greek text of minutes of conference between Damaskinos, Leeper and McNeil see Seferis, op.cit., pp. 142-60. 94. Ibid., pp. 161-5. As agreed the leaders of EAM and the KKE were not invited to attend. 95. Ibid., pp. 69-73 and pp. 166-9; Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 185-93. 96. Leeper, op.cit., 189-91; Seferis, op.cit., pp. 166-74. 97. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 179-80. 98. Seferis, op.cit., p. 69. 99. Leeper, op.cit., pp. 1~1; Leeper to FO, 22 November 1945 (FO 371/48287, R 19793). 100. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 182. 101. Sarafis, op.cit., p. 188. 102. Alexander, op.cit., p. 153. 103. KKE Episima Keimena, 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 152-3. 104. Seferis, op.cit., p. 71 and p. 213; Alexander, op.cit., p. 154. 105. Ibid., p. 71 and p. 214. 106. Ibid., p. 71 and pp. 214-15; Hansard: 1945-6, vol. 416, col. 768. Emphasis mine. 107. Ibid., p. 71. 108. Ibid., pp. 71-2 and p. 216. 109. Ibid., p. 72. 110. Ibid., pp. 72-3 and pp. 216-17; FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 183-4. 111. Hansard: 1945-6, vol. 416, colms 767-74. Emphasis mine. 112. For evidence see Mavri Vivlos, To Eklogiko Praxikopima tis 31 Marti 1946 (Athens, 1946) p. 6. 113. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 185. 114. Ibid., p. 185. 115. Ibid., p. 186. Emphasis mine. 116. Ibid., pp. 185-6; McNeill, op.cit., p. 189; Alexander, op.cit., p. 156. 117. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 187. Notes 295

118. Seferis, op.cit., p. 75. 119. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 188. 120. Ibid., pp. 189-90. 121. Eleftheri Ellada, 11 December 1945. 122. Richter, op.cit., p. 334, quoting The Times of 12 January 1946, gives a figure of 150,000 people. 123. Katsoulis, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 83. Emphasis mine. 124. Eudes, op.cit., p. 255. 125. Leeper to FO, 11 December 1945 (FO 371148288, R 20809). See also Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 209-14. 126. Leeper, op.cit., p. 196; Katsoulis, op.cit., p. 84; Richter, op.cit., p. 336, seems to have misread the formula. See also Alexander, op.cit., p.157. 127. Report of the British Legal Mission to Greece (London, HMSO, Janu• ary 1946) Cmd. 6838, p. 11. 128. Richter, op.cit., p. 343. 129. Alivizatos, N., 'The "Emergency Regime" and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., pp. 222-7; for a more detailed discussion of the emergency laws during the period of the civil war see Alivizatos, N., Oi Politikoi Thesmoi se Krisi, 1922-1974 (Athens, 1983) pp. 451-523. 130. Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 210-11. See also the resolution of the Political Bureau of 18 January 1946 in KKE Episima Keimena, 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 163-5. 131. Leeper, op.cit., p. 196. 132. Sarafis, op.cit., p. 212. 133. Ibid., pp. 200, 204, 217, 220, 225, 235. 134. On 16 January 1946 the decision was reversed. 135. Stavrianos, op.cit., pp. 163-4; Katsoulis, op.cit., pp. 84-5. 136. Sarafis, op.cit., p. 212. Before the Liberals took office they had de• clared that the only way to get correct electoral lists was to compile them anew. After they took office, however, they declared that the existing lists needed only to be corrected and completed. 137. Katsoulis, op.cit., p. 86. More about the AMFOGE report at the end of the chapter. 138. Rizospastis, 30 November 1945. 139. Churchill, op.cit., p. 549; Byrnes, op.cit., pp. 76-7; Xydis, op.cit., pp. 114-15; Yergin, D., Shattered Peace (London, 1980) p. 118. 140. Churchill, op.cit., p. 550; Byrnes, op.cit., p. 75; Yergin, op.cit., p. 114. 141. Byrnes, op.cit., p. 96. 142. Bullock, op.cit., vol. III, p. 130. 143. Ibid., p. 135. 144. Byrnes, op.cit., pp. 98-9. 145. Ibid., p. 122. 146. Gaddis, J.L., The United States and the Origins of the , 1941-1947 (New York, 1972) p. 280. 147. Leeper to FO, 19 February 1946 (FO 371/58676, R 2928); McNeill, op.cit., p. 213. 148. Xydis, op.cit., pp. 140-41. 296 Notes

149. Rizospastis, 1 January 1946. 150. , 30 December 1945; Politika, 29 December 1945. 151. Richter, op.cit., p. 371. 152. Seferis, op.cit., pp. 81-2; Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, p. 379; Woodhouse, op.cit., pp. 258-9; Alexander, op.cit., p. 167. 153. Sarafis, op.cit., p. 248. 154. Leeper, op.cit., p. 199. Woodhouse, op.cit., p. 164, also, supports this point when he says that 'the agents of the government were unable to protect them [the communists] from vengeance, and did not exert themselves to do so'. 155. McNeill, op.cit., p. 188; Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 259--66; Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., pp. 380-4; Leeper, op.cit., pp. 199-:-200. Kousoulas conspicu• ously omits the whole episode in his book. 156. UN Security Council, Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supple• ment No.1, annex 3, p. 73. 157. Rizospastis, 22 January 1946; Campbell, op.cit., p. 45. 158. Rizospastis, 22 and 24 January 1946; Sarafis, op.cit., pp. 261-2 and 269-70. 159. Campbell, op.cit., p. 45; Coufoudakis, V., 'The United States, the United Nations, and the Greek Question 1946-1952', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 278; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., pp. 259-60. 160. For a more detailed account of the Sofianopoulos 'saga' see Patatzis, S., Ioannis Sofianopoulos: Enas Epanastatis choris Epanastasi (Athens, 1961) pp. 244-7; Seferis in his Politiko Imerologio, op.cit., p. 83, in a reference to the Fa's attitude towards Sofianopoulos notes that 'Bevin finds Sofianopoulos' condition very amusing now that he has been trapped'; Alexander's comments on Sofianopoulos' motives are too simplistic, op.cit., pp. 171-2, as indeed is the argument put forward by Richter, op.cit., pp. 388-9, that if the British troops withdrew from Greece at the time there would have been no civil war. One can easily imagine a different scenario in which the Right, having lost the backing of the British, in a desperate move to regain control would have attempted a coup d' etat with the support of the army, not an unreason• able assumption given the nature of the Greek army at the time. For further evidence on this see, Alivizatos, N., 'The Greek Army in the Late Forties: Towards an Institutional Autonomy', Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. V, no. 3, Fall 1978; Mouzelis, N., Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London, 1978) pp. 111-14; Kanello• poulos, P., Istorika Dokimia (Athens, 1979) pp. 23-33. The possibility that the KKE, under Zachariadis' leadership, might also have at• tempted to exploit the situation, should not be excluded. 161. UN Security Council, Official Records, op.cit., pp. 74-88. 162. Vyshinsky made the same comment to Stettinius during their private meeting on 3 February 1946. FRUS, 1946, VII, p. 107. 163. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, op.cit., p. 261. 164. Bevin to Leeper, 8 February 1946 (Fa 371158673, R 1905). 165. Greek Embassy (Sofoulis) to Bevin, 15 February 1946 (Fa 371/58675, R 2633). 166. Minutes by Hayter, 15 February 1946 (Fa 371158675 R 2633); minutes by Sir Orme Sargent, 16 February 1946 (Fa 371158676, R 2634). Notes 297

167. Leeper to FO, 22 February 1946 (FO 371/58677, R 3338). 168. Minutes by Hayter, 21 February 1946; minutes by McNeil, March 1, 1946; minutes by Sargent, 21 February 1946 (FO 371158676, R 3032). Emphasis mine. 169. Mavrogordatos, G., 'The 1946 Election and Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 192. 170. Sofoulis to Bevin, 2 March 1946 (FO 371/58678, R 3462); Bevin to Leeper, 7 March 1946 (FO 371/58677, R 3383); Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, p. 410. 171. On this see Chapter VI. We now know that in his meeting with Stalin in April 1946, a few days after the elections, Zachariadis was severely criticized by the Soviet leader and Molotov for his decision to abstain. Given Stalin's 'direct advice', therefore, it would have been extremely difficult for the KKE leader to have continued to pursue his abstention policy any longer. A postponement of the elections could thus have changed the whole contest and, one suspects, the future course of events. 172. Rizospastis, 8 February 1946. 173. Eleftheri Ellada, 13 February 1946. 174. Ibid., 22 February 1946. 175. Rizospastis, 22 February 1946. 176. Meynaud, J., Oi Politikes Dynameis stin Ellada (Athens, 1966) p. 79. 177. Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, p. 397. The reasons for the KKE's abstention will be examined in Chapter VI. 178. Ibid., pp. 408-9. 179. On 20 February, Sofoulis, following Leeper's recommendation, trans• ferred Merkouris to the Ministry of Public Works and himself took over the Ministry of Public Order. Leeper disliked Merkouris because he belonged to the 'Kafandaris group', and his antipathy to the latter was well known. Merkouris' removal from the Ministry was justified on the grounds that he had failed to consult Sir Charles Wickham, Com• mander of the British Police and Gendarmerie Mission, on plans to reorganize the gendarmerie. 180. Exinta Chronia Agonon kai Thision: Chroniko tou KKE, vol. II, 1945-1978 (Athens, 1979) p. 34; Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, pp. 414--15. 181. Rizospastis, 13 March 1946. 182. Ibid., 15 March 1946. 183. Grigoriadis, S., 0 Emfylios Polemos (Athens, 1979) vol. I, p. 50. 184. Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, pp. 416-18; Eudes, op.cit., p. 262. 185. Partsalidis, op.cit., p. 196. There is no evidence, however, in all KKE material examined, that Zachariadis ever made use of this alibi. Za• chariadis, N., Provlimata tis Krisis tou KKE (Athens, 1978) pp. 20-1. 186. Mavrogordatos, 'The 1946 Election and Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 190. 187. Report of the Allied Mission to observe the Greek Elections (hence AM- FOGE Report) (London, HMSO, 1946) Cmd. 6812, pp. 18,22,23,30. 188. Ibid.,p.19. 189. Ibid., p. 21. 190. Ibid., pp. 19, 21, 31; Richter's estimate of potential illegal votes of 298 Notes

600,000 (op.cit., p. 448) is too high and is obviously and erroneously based on the number of males qualified to be registered (1,989,000 X 30 per cent = [approximately] 600,000). AMFOGE's estimate of 30 per cent was based not on the number of those who were qualified to be registered but on the number of those who actually were registered (1,850,000). 191. AMFOGE Report, p. 22. 192. Ibid., p. 28. 193. The mission, with little knowledge of Greek, had to rely for its activities on interpreters, the majority of whom came from the upper class and had little sympathy for the Left. Richter, op.cit., p. 445. 194. On p. 7 of the AMFOGE Report we read: 'a week of general indoctri• nation followed during which lectures were delivered on the organiza• tion and purpose of the Mission, geography, history, and ...'. One wonders what kind of indoctrination actually took place when the 'X' organization is portrayed in the Report as being one of the Resistance organizations. AMFOGE Report, p. 20. 195. McNeill, op.cit., p. 194. 196. Stavrianos, op.cit., p. 170; for further evidence of right-wing intimida• tion in villages see Chandler, op.cit., pp. 134-6. 197. AMFOGE Report, pp. 20-1. 198. Vradini, 19 March 1946; Akropolis, 23 March 1946; Embros, 22 March 1946. 199. Campbell, op.cit., p. 46. 200. Stavrianos, op.cit., p. 170. 201. Mavrogordatos, op.cit., p. 187. 202. Meynaud, op.cit., p. 79. 203. See Appendix of AMFOGE Report for full election results.

V: THE SECOND PLENUM: TEXTBOOK REVOLUTION

1. Zachariadis, Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 34. 2. Kousoulas, op.cit., pp. 231-2; O'Ballance, op.cit., p. 122; Tsakalotos, op.cit., vol. II, p. 19; Zafiropoulos, op.cit., p. 76; Averoff-Tossitsa, op.cit., pp. 219--20; Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. IX, p. 402; Solaro, op.cit., p. 182; Eudes, op.cit., p. 259. For Eudes' questionable methods of quoting see, Ole Smith, 'On the Beginning of the Civil War', Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek, No.1, 1977, p. 22. 3. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., pp. 171, 175. 4. See for example the recent book by Vlandas, D., 0 Nikos Zachariadis kai 22 Synergates tou (Athens, 1984). 5. Woodhouse, op.cit., pp. 169, 171. 6. Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. II, p. 404. 7. Katsoulis, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 99; Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., p. 220. 8. Zafiropoulos, op.cit., p. 26. 9. Kousoulas, op.cit., p. 232. 10. Smith, op.cit., p. 21. 11. As Smith, ibid., p. 22, correctly points out. Notes 299

12. Vournas, T. Istoria tis Synchronis Elladas: 0 Emfylios (Athens, 1981) p. 21. According to Vournas the journalist that noticed the mistake was Panayotis Zaverdinos. 13. As Richter notes, op.cit., p. 483, had Section 4 contained the decision for civil war 'this would have been kept secret and would not have been directly pointed out to opponents, the Security Police and the General Staff'. 14. Blanas, op.cit., p. 73. 15. KKE Archives, Avgi, 14 December 1980. 16. Voithima, op.cit., p. 260. 17. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi tou KKE, op.cit., vol. B', p. 566. 18. Ibid., vol. A', p. 52. 19. Smith, op.cit., p. 26. On the resolutions of the Third Plenum see Chapter VII notes 99 and 102. 20. Neos Kosmos, June 1956, p. 8. 21. Apostolou, L., '0 Rolos tou Extremismou kai tou Sechtarismou stin Itta tis Enoplis Palis tou 1946-1949 stin Ellada', Neos Kosmos, August 1956, p. 57. 22. Vetas, F., 'Pano stis Apofaseis tis 6is Plateias Olomeleias', Neos Kosmos, September 1956, p. 19. 23. Rousos, P., 'Schetika me tin Prosopolatreia sto KKE', Neos Kosmos December 1956, p. 40. 24. Zografos, Z., 'Provlimata Schetika me to Esokommatiko mas Kathes- tos', Neos Kosmos, December 1956, p. 49. 25. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi tou KKE, op.cit., vol. A', pp. 93-4. 26. Zachariadis, Provlimata tis Krisis tou KKE, op.cit., p. 33. 27. Smith, op.cit., p. 28. 28. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto ' Neos Kosmos, April-May 1957, p. 50. 29. Vafiadis, Apomnimonevmata, op.cit., vol. III, p. 122. 30. Stringos, L., 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', Neos Kosmos, April-May 1957, p. 85. 31. Mavromatis, P., 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', Neos Kosmos, April• May 1957, p. 107. 32. Eleftheriou, L., Avgi, 27 January 1980. Eleftheriou gave me a similar account of the discussions that took place during the Second Plenum when I interviewed him in April 1985. 33. Tsantis, M., Avgi, 10 . 34. Ibid. 35. Partsalidis, M., Avgi, 6 January 1980. 36. Georgiou, V., , 23 December 1978. 37. Vlandas, D., Emfylios Polemos 1945-1949 (Athens, 1979) vol. I, p. 42. 38. Ibid., p. 43. 39. Ibid., vol. II, p. 424. 40. Bartziotas, V., 0 Agonas tou Dimokratikou Stratou Elladas (Athens, 1981) p. 27. 41. Gousias-Vontitsios, G., Oi Aities ya tis Ittes, ti Diaspasi tou KKE kai tis Ellinikis Aristeras (Athens, 1977-8) vol. I, p. 133. 42. Smith, 0., 'The Boycott of the Elections 1946: A Decisive Mistake?', 300 Notes

Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek, no. 6, 1982, note 1, p.69. 43. Compare pp. 29-30 of Bartziotas' book 0 Agonas tou Dimokratikou Stratou Elladas, with p. 33 of Zachariadis' pamphlet Provlimata tis Krisis tou KKE (Athens, 1978). The personal notes which Bartziotas supposedly uses to draw his conclusions are an exact copy - word by word - of Zachariadis' account of the Second Plenum in the pamphlet. In a private conversation with the author, Ole Smith maintained that Bartziotas had told him that when writing his memoirs he had not read Zachariadis' pamphlet. We find Bartziotas' claim difficult to believe. In any case Zachariadis' views were most certainly known to him at the time he wrote his book. 44. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi tou KKE, op.cit., vol. A', p. 92. 45. Bartziotas, op.cit., p. 30. 46. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., p. 50. 47. Vafiadis, Apomnimonevmata, op.cit., vol. III, p. 121. 48. Ibid., p. 121. 49. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., p. 50. 50. Tsantis, M., Avgi, 10 February 1980. 51. Makridis, Th., Avgi, 2 March 1980. 52. Blanas, op.cit., p. 75. 53. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., p. 57. 54. Kikitsas, G., Avgi, 3 February 1980. 55. Vetas, F., 'Pano stis Apofaseis tis 6is Plateias Olomeleias', op.cit., p. 17. Ioannidis was at the time based in Belgrade (together with Rousos) where he had formed a section of the Political Bureau (Zachariadis was to join it in April 1947) to coordinate the KKE's efforts to secure foreign assistance for the 'Democratic Army'. For more on Ioannidis' activities see Chapter VII. 56. See note 14. 57. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi tou KKE, op.cit., vol. A, pp. 52-3. 58. To Ogdoo Synedrio tou KKE, Politikes kai Logotechnikes Ekdoseis (place of publication unknown, 1961) p. 103. 59. Papaioannou, I Diathiki tou Nikou Zachariadi, op.cit., pp. 40-9.

VI: THE DECISION TO ABSTAIN: 'TACTICAL ERROR' OR 'DECISIVE MISTAKE'?

1. Vafiadis, Apomnimonevmata, op.cit., vol. III, p. 133. Emphasis mine. 2. Stringos, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., p. 85. 3. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., pp. 49-50. Emphasis mine. 4. Partsalidis, Dipli Apokatastasi, op.cit., p. 196. On p. 195 the author writes again: 'In Moscow the comrades of the Central Committee's Department of Foreign Affairs transmitted to me the advice of the leadership of the CPSU that we should participate in the elections'. 5. Partsalidis in an interview with Matzouranis in the daily Avgi, 24 February 1980. Emphasis mine. Notes 301

6. Gousias, op.cit., p. 243. 7. Partsalidis, op.cit., p. 196. See also Avgi, 24 February 1980 and Partsa• lidis' 'Simioma' of February 1950, Neos Kosmos, August 1950, p. 482. 8. Eleftheriou, Synomilies me ton Niko Zachariadi, op.cit., pp. 34,48. 9. Stringos, op.cit., p. 85; Apostolou, '0 Rolos tou Extremismou kai tou Sechtarismou stin Itta tis Enoplis Palis tou 1946-1949 stin Ellada', op.cit., p. 58. 10. Vafiadis, Apomnimonevmata, op.cit., vol. III, pp. 133-4. Vafiadis is here quoting from his 1976 article in the journal Anti, no. 53, 4 Sep• tember 1976. 11. Vafiadis, 'Apostoli sta Ouralia', Epikaira, 16 December 1976. 12. Richter, op.cit., p. 500. Emphasis mine. 13. Vafiadis, 'I Opportunistiki Platforma tou Markou Vafiadi', Neos Kosmos, August 1950, p. 478. 14. Khrushchev, N., Khrushchev Remembers (London, 1971) p. 516. 15. To name but a few of the 'Trotskyists', 'opportunists', 'traitors' who were either dismissed from the Party or liquidated by Zachariadis: Siandos, Ioannidis, Aris Velouchiotis, Markos Vafiadis, Karageorgis, Partsalidis, Chrysa Chatzivasileiou, Nefeloudis, Sklavainas, Blanas (Kissavos), Hatzis, Apostolou, Vatousianos, Vetas, Tsantis, Roumelio• tis, Giannoulis and Giorgiadis. For Zachariadis' 'methods' during the 1955 crisis in Tashkent see Dritsios, Th., I Exegersi tis Taskendis (Athens, 1984). See also Bartziotas, 'I Politiki mas ton Stelechon sto KKE ta Teleftaia Deka Chronia', Neos Kosmos, September 1950, pp. 554-79). In this article Bartziotas goes as far as claiming that Velouchiotis, Siandos, Vafiadis and Hatzis were all 'British agents'. 16. Khrushchev, op.cit., pp. 508,514,524. 17. For an analysis of how the ' of personality' developed in the KKE see: Rousos, 'Schetika me tin Prosopolatreia sto KKE', op.cit., pp. 35-45; Zografos, 'Provlimata Schetika me to Esokommatiko mas Kathestos', op.cit., pp. 46-68; Karas, S., Politikoi Provlimatismoi (Athens, 1975) pp. 81-100; Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., pp. 106-15. 18. KKE, Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 9-10. On the question of the 'open letter' see Chapter 1. 19. Quoted in Brzezinsky, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., p. 65. 20. Nefeloudis, P., op.cit., pp. 110-11. 21. It is surprising that Karas, op.cit., pp. 94-5, in his critique of Zacharia• dis finds the latter's work on the Greek poet Palamas, The Real Palamas, so important as to single it out. We personally find this work one of his worst: a crude and in many places erroneous adaptation of Marxist literary principles to a work of art. 22. For example, 40 per cent of Zachariadis' most important theoretical work, Ta Provlimata Kathodigisis sto KKE, is made up of quotations from Lenin's and Stalin's works. Hardly an original contribution to the history of the Greek Communist movement. On the subject of the intellectual mediocrity of most of the KKE leading cadres see Vlandas' book 0 Nikos Zachariadis kai 22 Synergates tou (Athens, 1984). The book is of course full of malicious lies and the intentions of the author are well known. He himself had been at the receiving end on a number 302 Notes

of occasions and his wish to take vengeance is only too obvious. However, it is still interesting to read what a leading cadre had to say about his fellow comrades and Zachariadis' close collaborators. See also Richter, op.cit., p. 249. 23. Vetas, 'Pano stis Apofaseis tis Ektis Olomeleias', op.cit., pp. 1~19. 24. Vafiadis, 'I Opportunistiki Platforma', op.cit., pp. 476-83; Chatzivasi• leiou, C., 'Apo tis Theseis tis Chrysas Chatzivasileiou', Neos Kosmos, December 1956, pp. 80-3. 25. Partsalidis, 'Omilia tou M. Partsalidi stin Evdomi Olomeleia tis K.E. tou KKE (14-18/5/1950)', Neos Kosmos, August 1950, pp. 484-94; Karageorgis, K., 'I Antikommatiki Likvidaristiki Platforma tou Kosta Gyftodimou (Karageorgi)', Neos Kosmos, August 1950, pp. 495--8; Apostolou, L., 'Apo tis Theseis tou Lefteri Apostolou', Neos Kosmos, December 1956, pp. 83-6. 26. Partsalidis, as we know, eventually did attack the KKE leader but only after Zachariadis had been criticized by the Soviet leadership for his actions during the civil war. 27. KKE, Episima Keimena, 1934-1940, op.cit., pp. 1~23. Emphasis mine. 28. Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., pp. 284-5, 28~9, 290. Emphasis mine. 29. An obvious reference to Aris Velouchiotis, who a few days later was publicly condemned by Zachariadis for failing to observe the Varkiza Agreement and lay down his arms. See Rizospastis, 12 June 1945. 30. Rizospastis; 2 June 1945 (quoted in Richter, op.cit., p. 252) and 0 Machitis, 6 June 1945 (quoted in Vukmanovic, op.cit., p. 93). 31. Popular democracy (laokratia) should not be confused with People's Democracy which refers to the regimes established in after the war. Alexander and Loulis in their article, 'The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party 1934-1944: An Analysis of Plenary Decisions', East European Quarterly, vol. XV, no. 3, September 1981, pp. 377-89, fail to differentiate between the two and consequently reach the wrong conclusions. The evidence the writers produce is based on the Pro• gramme of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (1928), on Kuusinen's and Zinoviev's pronouncements of March 1925 and July 1924 respect• ively and on the advice the Comintern gave the Chinese Communists in July 1927. The resolutions, however, of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern () renders all this evidence irrelevant. The strategy of the Sixth Congress and of the Tenth Plenum of the Comintern (1929), for the immediate implementation of the socialist revolution based on a 'class against class' line was abandoned, and the Dimitrov• Togliatti line which involved a policy of class collaboration was advo• cated instead. This line was not simply a tactical move, to be abandoned once fascism was destroyed. It became the fulcrum of communist strategy. It showed the way to the creation of limited objectives which, though not constituting a socialist revolution, would pave the way to . 32. See for example, KKE, Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 150, 209,258. 33. Ibid., pp. 113-45. Notes 303

34. Carr, E. H., The Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-1935 (London, 1982) p.412. 35. For a criticism of this line see Vukmanovic, op.cit., pp. 47-69. 36. Togliatti, P., 'La Politica Nuovo', in Opere Seelte (, 1974) p.372. 37. Togliatti, P., 'La Politica di Unita Nazionale dei Communisti', in Opere Scelte, op.cit., p. 304. 38. See note 30. 39. For the first document see note 33; for the second, entitled 'To Pro• gramma tis Laikis Dimokratias', see Deka Chronia Agones, op.cit., pp.258-64. 40. I Ekti Syndiaskepsi tis Kommounistikis Organosis Athinas 28-29 Sep• temvri 1945 (Athens, 1945) pp. 80-99. The same views are expressed by Zevgos, Y., in his article 'Dimokratikos kai Epeita Sosialistikos Metas• chimatismos', in Neos Kosmos, August 1945, pp. 606-14. 41. Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, October 1945, pp. 813, 816-18, 820. Em• phasis mine. 42. To Evdomo Synedrio tou KKE, vol. V (Athens, 1945) p. 28. Emphasis mine. 43. Ibid., p. 16: Katsoulis, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 65. Emphasis mine. 44. 'Politiki Apofasi tou Evdomou Synedriou tou KKE', in Saranta Chro• nia Agones, op.cit., p. 537. 45. Apostolou, 'Apo tis theseis tou L. Apostolou', op.cit., pp. 8H6; Chatzivasileiou, 'Apo tis theseis tis C. Chatzivasileiou' , op.cit., pp. 80-3; Partsalidis, 'Apo tis theseis tou M. Partsalidi', Neos Kosmos, November 1956, pp. 63-4; see also editorial in Neos Kosmos, of June 1956, entitled 'Me Romaleo Pnevma to KKE Prohorei stin Efarmoghi ton Apofaseon tis Ektis Olomeleias', p. 8. 46. Voithima, op.cit. Of course the 'decisions' of the Plenums are not necessarily the real ones. This is the history of the KKE as interpreted by Zachariadis. 47. Apostolou, op.cit., p. 85. 48. Voithima, op.cit., pp. 233--5. Emphasis mine. 49. Ibid., pp. 240-2. Emphasis mine. For the resolutions of the Third Plenum see also Chapter VII, notes 99 and 102. 50. At the time of the Third Plenum the Political Bureau of the KKE was divided into two Sections (Klimakia), one being stationed in Belgrade and the other in Athens. The Belgrade Section was headed by Ioannidis and Rousos. It was later joined by Zachariadis (April 1947), Stringos and Vafiadis. The Athens Section was headed by Chatzivasileiou, Partsalidis (until his arrest on 9 July 1947) and Anastasiadis. Other members included the communists Vlandas and Paparigas. 51. See for example the 'Report of the Athens Political Bureau' published on 27 July 1947 and written by Chatzivasileiou which is contained in the KKE Archives, Avgi, 28 December 1979. See also Chatzivasileiou's letter to the Political Bureau of September 1948 in which she criticized the decisions of the Third Plenum for being based 'not on existing conditions but on conditions to be created', 'Apo tis theseis tis C. Chatzivasileiou', op.cit., p. 81. Naturally Chatzivasileiou was in turn 304 Notes

severely criticized by Zachariadis. See, for example, Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 38. Emphasis mine. 52. Voithima, op.cit., p. 245. For the resolutions of the Fourth Plenum see KKE Episima Keimena, 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 266-75. 53. Ibid., p. 253. Emphasis mine. For the resolutions of the Fifth Plenum see KKE Episima Keimena, 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 322-47. The resolu• tions were also published in Dimokratikos Stratos, February 1949, pp. 3--17. 54. Ibid., p. 266 and p. 268. Emphasis mine. 55. Ibid., p. 269. Emphasis mine. 56. Ibid., p. 272. The Democratic Party was an alliance of Left-wing parties and included the parties of Sofianopoulos, Svolos and Grigoriadis. For election results see Meynaud, op.cit., pp. 85-8. 57. For the decisions of the Third Party Conference and the Second Plenum of 1951 see Voithima, op.cit., pp. 279-315. For the decisions of the Third Plenum of 1952 see Gousias, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 77-9. The Fourth and Fifth Plenums (1953 and 1955) simply confirmed the de• cisions reached by the previous ones. It is obvious that the leadership of the KKE maintained this illusory position in order to justify its 'revolu• tionary line' during the period of the civil war. 58. Zachariadis, Provlimata Kathodigisis, op.cit., pp. 81-90. Emphasis mine. The whole passage contradicts, of course, Zachariadis' own statements at the Twelfth Plenum. See p. 199 and note 28. 59. Zachariadis, N., 'I Simerini Katastasi stin Ellada kai ta Provlimata tis Laikis Dimokratias', Introductory Speech at the Seventh Congress of the KKE, Athens, 1945, pp. 32-48. For a detailed analysis of Greece's economic development during the period between Varkiza and the March 1946 elections see the following books and articles: Hatziiosif, Ch., 'Economic Stabilization and Political Unrest: Greece 1944-1947' in Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 25-40; Ta Prota Peninta Chronia tis Trapezas tis Ellados (Athens, 1978) pp. 237-80; Venezis, I., Chronikon tis Trapezis tis Ellados. Istoria mias Eikosipentaetias, 1928-1952 (Athens, 1955) pp. 318-32; Zolotas, X., Nomismatikon Provlima kai Elliniki Oikonomia (Athens, 1950); Angelopoulos, A., To Oikonomiko Provlima tis Ellados (Athens, 1945); Candilis, W.O., The 1944-66. Efforts for Stability and Development (London, 1968) pp. 23--39, 67-85. See also FRUS 1945, VIII, pp. 201-99. Valuable material is also contained in the books by McNeill, Sweet-Escott, Alexander, Wittner and Richter already mentioned and the journal Nea Oikonomia, especially the issues of April, May and July of 1946 which contain among other things the views of Varvaresos, K., the of the and Minister of Supply and Vice-Premier in Voulgaris' Cabinet (from 2 June until 1 September 1945). The main features of the economic policy pursued by the various Greek governments of this period can be summarized as follows: following the 'December Events' and until the appointment of Varvaresos in June 1945 the Greek economy went through a phase of complete 'laissez-faire', with the various Ministers of Finance (Sideris, Mylonas, Matzavinos) relying on the British, and Notes 305

especially UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admin• istration), to tackle Greece's mounting economic problems (galloping inflation, scarcity of essential commodities and huge budget deficits). By the end of May 1945, notes in circulation had increased from 126 million drachmas in November 1944 to 25,762 million, while govern• ment deficits amounted to 15,633 million, with public revenues covering only 10 to 25 per cent of expenditures. The price of the sovereign increased from 2,100 drachmas to 19,000 during the same period, and the cost of living went up two and a half times. In the absence of any clear policy, the ministers' only initiative was to keep printing new drachma notes and pressing the British to increase the volume of relief supplies. For the first six months of liberation the responsibility for relief distribution rested with ML (Military Liaison). In April 1945, as a result of an agreement between the Greek government, ML and UNRRA, it was decided that UNRRA should take over the tasks of ML. Responsi• bility, however, for the distribution of relief supplies rested with the Greek government. This arrangement, however, led to the creation of black markets, as the government, contrary to the wishes of UNRRA, sold these supplies at uniform prices, taking no account of the differ• ence in incomes between rich and poor. Thus, rich merchants made large profits by buying UNRRA supplies from the government and holding on to them until the price of the drachma began to rise, as it inevitably did. As a result, and despite the fact that by April 1946 UNRRA had brought into Greece no less than 1,400,000 tons of food (ML brought in an additional 387,000 tons), masses of people con• tinued to live on a bare subsistence level. (According to estimates by the Bank of Greece, 50 per cent of the rural population and 35 per cent of the urban population were living in conditions close to starvation and were unable to buy even the bare essentials, while rich merchants and manufacturers, comprising less than a half per cent of the population, enjoyed over half of the total money income.) A determined attempt to solve these problems was made in June with the appointment of Varvaresos, whose first step was to announce a number of emergency decrees designed to stabilize the market and raise the income of workers. He fixed new higher ceilings for wages and salaries and he reduced the prices of a number of UNRRA foodstuffs distributed by the state and imposed price controls on twenty-one basic items. For the purpose of ending price speculation he announced that the government would buy up all available supplies of olive oil and control its distribution. Furthermore, Varvaresos proclaimed a ban on transactions in gold, fixed the new parity of the drachma at 2,000 to the pound instead of 600 drachmas to the pound, and imposed a heavy tax on all industrialists and merchants. The Varvaresos reform programme, although economically viable, was destined to be short-lived. Both the communists and the Right greeted these measures with extreme hos• tility, the former denouncing Varvaresos as 'an economic dictator', the latter calling for a return to 'laissez-faire' policies. The industrialists and merchants objecting to paying higher taxes and selling at fixed prices began, hoarding their stocks. By the first week of August, prices rose 306 Notes

again and most essential foodstuffs disappeared from the market. The situation became explosive on the olive oil market where Varvaresos' plan to barter with the peasants by giving them clothing in return for oil failed. Although the first quantities of cotton were in fact distributed to the textile manufacturers at the beginning of July, they boycotted the agreement they had signed with Varvaresos (under which the state would provide the raw materials in exchange for the finished goods, granting the producers a sufficient margin for profit) and refused to start production. This development, coupled with the anticipated rise in the price of oil, induced the peasants to hoard their production, or to sell only to black marketeers. Supported neither by the British (who felt uneasy about his confrontation with the industrialists and the upper middle classes) nor by the public, Varvaresos resigned. In an article in Nea Oikonomia (April 1947), he blamed for his failure 'the conscience• less economic oligarchy which, after its collaboration with the enemy during the occupation, took advantage of the shortages of goods after the liberation in order to accumulate riches'. Following his departure and up to January 1946, complete monetary anarchy prevailed, and no programme was either instituted or even hinted at. Not surprisingly, Kasimatis, Varvaresos' successor in Kanellopoulos' Cabinet, reverted to the policies pursued by Sideris and Matzavinos. He lifted all price and production controls, raised the prices of relief supplies and abandoned Varvaresos' plan for the manufacturing of UNRRA imported raw materials at government expense. In addition, he requested from the British a loan to boost the country's foreign exchange reserves and to finance reconstruction. As the Greek econ• omy moved towards collapse, with the cost of living rising tenfold between. August 1945 and January 1946 and the price of the sovereign reaching 180,000 drachmas, the British and American governments decided to take drastic action. In January 1946 the Greek government received a £10,000 million loan from Britain and a further $25,000 million from the United States Export-Import Bank, accepting in exchange the establishment of a Currency Control Committee with one British and one American member, who could veto all economic measures proposed by the Greek Finance Minister. But as the political situation remained critical, the loans failed to restore public confidence in the currency. By the end of 1946, and although Greece was now ruled by a right-wing government, Greek reserves in gold and foreign exchange had been exhausted and Greece was once again in the midst of an economic crisis. Fortunately for Tsaldaris, the Americans had by this time come to the conclusion that Greece's problems were basically the result ofthe 'manoeuvres and machinations ofthe Kremlin' (FRUS 1946, vol. VII, pp. 240-1). In February 1947, as Britain realized that it could no longer afford to keep the Greek economy running and was preparing to pull out of Greece, the Americans were ready to assume the burden. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine was only a few weeks away. 60. Batsis, D., 1 Vareia Viomichania stin Ellada (Athens, 1947) p. 453. 61. As Richter, op.cit., p. 275, rightly points out. Notes 307

62. See Chapter V, note 16. 63. KKE Archives, Avgi, 12, 13, 14 December 1979. 64. See Chapter V, pp. 186-7 and notes 54,55,56. 65. See notes 48 and 58. 66. Vafiadis, 'I Opportunistiki Platforma tou M. Vafiadi', op.cit., pp. 476-80. The nature of the boycott mistake is an issue that also Smith elaborates in his article 'The Boycott of the Elections 1946: A Decisive Mistake?', op.cit., pp. 69-88. 67. See note 7, 'Partsalidis' 'Simioma', op.cit., p. 482. 68. Ibid., p. 489. It should be remembered that on the same occasion Partsalidis also called into question the Varkiza Agreement. This change of opinion was as we saw the result of Soviet criticism at the Moscow meeting of between the leaderships of the CPSU, the KKE and CPA. Zachariadis in his speech at the Third Party Conference attacked Partsalidis for suggesting that the abstention from the elections had been a 'decisive' mistake. Although from the available published sources we cannot tell at which point Partsalidis made this new statement (see note 5), we must conclude that since Zachariadis strongly criticized him for doing so, he was the first KKE member to characterize the abstention as a 'decisive' mistake. See also notes 11 and 12. 69. Karageorgis, 'I Antikommatiki Likvidaristiki Platforma tou Kosta Gyf• todimou (Karagiorgi)', op.cit., p. 496; Apostolou, Neos Kosmos, De• cember 1956, p. 84. Apostolou's letter although written in 1950, remained unpublished until 1956. 70. This would seem to explain Partsalidis' statement in his Second Speech at the Seventh Plenum - 'Defterologia' - that 'it would have been a mistake to say that we shouldn't have taken up arms'. See Neos Kosmos, August 1950, p. 494. On this point see Smith, 0., 'The Boycott of the Elections in 1946: A Decisive Mistake?', op.cit., p. 69. 71. Eleftheriou, Synomilies me ton Niko Zachariadi, op.cit., p. 48; see also note 3. 72. Zachariadis, Epilogi Ergon, op.cit., p. 163. 73. Zachariadis, Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 21. 74. Ibid., pp. 20-1; emphasis mine. 75. Ibid., p. 21. 76. Eleftheriou, op.cit., p. 45. 77. Zachariadis, Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 21. 78. Smith, 0., 'The Boycott of the Elections 1946. A Decisive Mistake?', op.cit., p. 73. When I interviewed Alekos Papapanayotou he suggested that Zachariadis' insistence that the boycott mistake had been a 'tacti• cal' one was based on the fact that the Soviets knew and approved of his plans to start the armed struggle. The fact that Zachariadis never used this argument to silence his critics seems to point to a different explana• tion: Zachariadis took this line to protect his position within the KKE. See also Papapanayotou's interview in Anti, no. 178, May 1981, pp. 40-1. 79. Voithima, op.cit., p. 258. 80. Zachariadis, Provlimata Kathodigisis sto KKE, op.cit., pp. 87-8. 81. For the way Vafiadis, Partsalidis, Karageorgis, Chatzivasileiou and 308 Notes

Apostolou were treated see: Gousias, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 27-52; Bart• ziotas, V., 'I Politiki ton Stelechon sto KKE ta Teleftaia Deka Chro• ma', op.cit., pp. 9-58; 'Apofasi tis III Syndiaskepsis tou KKE', ibid., pp. 3-15; Karageorgis, K., Apo tin Varkiza os ton Emfylio Polemo (Athens 1977) p. 39; Zachariadis, Epilogi Ergon, op.cit., pp. 169-201; Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. N, pp. 45, 61. 82. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. A', pp. 94-5. 83. In a memorandum to Bevin, dated 18 October 1945, Damaskinos predicted that under a system of proportional representation the KKE would win more than 100 seats in the parliament, that is more than 30 per cent of the popular vote. See Seferis, op.cit., p. 208; Richter, op.cit., p. 505. 84. See note 73. 85. KKE Archives, Avgi, 2 December 1979. See also Chapter II, p. 69. 86. Djilas, op.cit., p. 167. See also Chapter II, pp. 70-1. 87. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. B', pp. 565--6. 88. Ibid., p. 566. 89. Smith, op.cit., p. 74. 90. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. A', p. 52; emphasis mine. 91. Ibid., pp. 52-3. 92. Neos Kosmos, June 1956, p. 8. 93. Ibid., p. 8. 94. See note 713. 95. Apostolou, '0 Rolos tou Extremismou kai tou S'echtarismou stin Itta tis Enoplis Palis tou 1946-1949 stin Ellada', op.cit., pp. 49-59. 96. Ibid., p. 55. 97. Ibid., p. 57. 98. Vetas, 'Pano stis Apofaseis tis 6is Plateias Olomeleias', op.cit., p. 22. 99. See note 92. 100. Rousos, 'Schetika me tin Prosopolatreia sto KKE', op.cit., p. 40. 101. Zografos, 'Provlimata Schetika me to Esokommatiko mas Kathestos', op.cit., p. 49. 102. Zografos, Z., 'I Alithia Akolouthei to Dromo tis', Neos Kosmos, February 1957, p. 44. 103. Koliyanms, K., Neos Kosmos, March 1957, p. 65; emphasis mine. 104. Ibid., p. 65. 105. Ibid., p. 65. 106. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., p. 49. See also Chapter V, notes 29, 46, 54. 107. Ibid., p. 51; thus, Ole Smith's argument that at the Seventh Plenum no one explicitly said that 'the specific error of abstention had decisive importance', op.cit., p. 81, is not confirmed by the evidence. 108. Partsalidis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', Neos Kosmos, April-May 1957, pp. 40-4. 109. Theos, K., 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', Neos Kosmos, April-May 1957, pp. 73-81. 110. Stringos, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema,!, op.cit., pp. 82-8. 111. Rousos, P., 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', Neos Kosmos, April-May 1957, pp. 89-97. Notes 309

112. Mavromatis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., pp. 98-104. 113. Zografos, Z., 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', Neos Kosmos, April• May 1957, pp. 105-13. 114. Mavromatis, op.cit., pp. 101-2. 115. Koliyannis, K., 'Ekthesi tis KE tou KKE sto 80 Synedrio' in To 80 Synedrio tou KKE, op.cit., p. 102. 116. Ibid., pp. 101-3. 117. Ibid., p. 156. 118. Zachariadis had refused to attend the Sixth Plenum. 119. Zachariadis, Provlimata tis Krisis, op.cit., pp. 17-18. 120. Ibid., pp. 19-20. 121. Ibid., pp. 30-1.

VII: FROM LIMITED SELF-DEFENCE TO CIVIL WAR

1. Partsalidis, op.cit., p. 199. 2. From Zachariadis' speech at the Seventh Plenum of 1957, quoted in Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. A', p. 94. 3. Ibid., p. 95; Partsalidis, op.cit., p. 199; Eleftheriou, op.cit., pp. 33-5. Partsalidis claims that Zachariadis met Tito in Belgrade in his way back to Greece from Prague. Eleftheriou, though, notes that Zachariadis met Tito twice, both times in Belgrade, before and after his trip to Prague. The first meeting, according to Eleftheriou, took place at the end of March 1946 and the second sometime before 9 April 1946, the day Zachariadis arrived back in Salonica. The first meeting, however, could not have taken place in Belgrade because according to Rizospas• tis (21 March 1946), Tito had left for Prague on 20 March 1946, when Zachariadis was still in Greece. If this meeting took place, it must have taken place in Prague sometime in April. 4. These articles were published in Avgi on 27, 29 and 30 January 1980. In 1986 these articles appeared in the book, Synomilies me ton Niko Zachariadi. Moscha Martios-Ioulios 1956 (Athens, 1986) to which we have already referred. Although Zachariadis has never mentioned this meeting, there is little doubt that Eleftheriou's account is true. 5. Eleftheriou, op.cit., pp. 34-5. 6. Ibid., p. 34. 7. See Chapter II, note 70. 8. It is worth recalling (Chapter II, note 67) Stalin's November 1946 message to the KKE, in which he made it clear that he was 'against any expansion of the armed struggle' and urged the Greek communists to 'give priority to mass political struggle'. 9. Eleftheriou, op.cit., p. 36. See also Chapter V, pp.186-7 and notes 54, 55. 10. Wittner, op.cit., p. 46. 11. See Chapter V, p. 187 and note 56. 12. I Panelladiki Organotiki Syskepsi 15-17 Aprili 1946, KKE Central Committee, Athens, 1946, pp. 5-15, 36-45. 13. Ibid., pp. 30-2. 14. See Rizospastis, 7 May, 8 June, 13 July, 1946. 310 Notes

15. Vlandas' comments cited in Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p.176. 16. Alexander, op.cit., pp. 187-93; Richter, op.cit., pp. 519-21. 17. Wittner, op.cit., pp. 41-3. 18. Alexander, op.cit., p. 193. 19. Richter, op.cit., pp. 521-2. 20. Alivizatos, Oi Politikoi Thesmoi se Krisi, op.cit., pp. 461-5,496-506. 21. Alexander, op.cit., p. 201. This is what a British observer wrote at the time about these laws: 'There was some attempt to give an outward show of impartiality to these measures, and prices were put on the heads of bandits of Left and Right alike; but at the same time it was secretly understood that the latter should not be harmed, while the war against Communism should be waged unrelentingly'. Chandler, op.cit., p.155. 22. Report of the British Parliamentary Delegation to Greece (London, HMSO, 1947) p. 6. On 5 July 1946 a bill was passed for the deportation of families of all army deserters who had joined the armed bands, and on 14 July another bill proposed that all collaborators, even if serving sentences, should have their cases reviewed and be released or sent for retrial by ordinary courts. Richter, op.cit., p. 525. According to the official report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, by June 1948 the total number of exiles in the islands of , Ikaria, Yaros and Chios, was more than 16,000. See Alivizatos, op.cit., p. 466. If one adds to this figure the thousands of conscripts who were interned in the island of Makronisos to be 'reformed' and the thousands of men and women who were exiled in various other islands (Limnos, Leros, Trikkeri [only women], , etc.) the number of exiles is much higher. By the summer of 1949, in Makronisos alone, there were more than 20,000 citizens. In addition, between 1947-1950, 27,000 soldiers and 1,100 officers ofthe reserve were also interned in Makronisos, each for a different period of 'reformation'. See Zafiropoulos, op.cit., p. 212. 23. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., pp. 52-3. 24. Ibid., pp. 53--4. 25. Blanas, op.cit., pp. 73--4. 26. Gousias, op.cit., pp. 137-8. 27. See Chapter V, note 54. 28. See Chapter V, note 55. 29. See Chapter V, note 30. 30. See Chapter V, note 58. 31. See Chapter V, note 31. 32. Stringos, op.cit., p. 86. 33. Blanas, op.cit., p. 77. On this see also Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., pp. 54-5. 34. Ole Smith in his article 'A Turning Point in the Greek Civil War 1945-1949: The Meeting Between Zachariadis and Markos July 1946', Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek, No.3, 1979, pp. 35-46, claims that Zachariadis in fact ordered a much more extensive mobilization than what has been suggested, and that his orders were by-passed by members of the Political Bureau, and especially by Markos, who Notes opposed his plans. Smith bases his conclusions on Zachariadis' apologia at the Seventh Plenum of 1957 and parts of Blanas' memoirs. These conclusions, however, are very questionable indeed. First, Zachariadis' statement at the Seventh Plenum of 1957 that 'he agreed with the Yugoslavs to organize an army of 20,000 ELAS fighters' and that 'Markos, Gousias and Koliyannis did not carry out this line' (Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. A', p. 95) should be read with great caution. Having been accused by Markos, Koliyannis and others that the Party lost the civil war because he did not take the necessary measures early in 1946, it was only natural that Zachariadis would try to blame others for what happened. Zachariadis himself later in his speech contradicts his previous claim, when he states that the reason why he did not go to the mountains in April 1946 (ie. give up legality and launch an all-out revolt) was that 'the small and big comrades that were helping us were against such a move' (Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. A', p. 96). Further, in his speech at the Third Party Conference, in October 1950, Zachariadis admitted that the responsibility for the delay in the move• ment of party members from the towns to the mountains lay solely with the Political Bureau which 'proved unable to transfer the centre of its work early enough from Athens to Free Greece and help experienced Party cadres to join the Democratic Army' (Zachariadis, Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., pp. 38-9). In this speech Zachariadis blames Siandos for the delay, but from the time of Zachariadis' return in 1945, Siandos had lost most of his power in the Party. After his death in 1947, he naturally became a useful scapegoat for Zachariadis. Secondly, the number of 20,000 ELAS fighters which Zachariadis refers to is the number con• tained in the memorandum Ioannidis sent to the Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaderships in 13 September 1946. (See KKE Archives, Avgi, 2 December 1979.) In this memorandum, Ioannidis states that 'for the guerilla struggle to achieve its aim under the present political situation, the number of guerillas must be raised. We believe that this number could reach 15,000-20,000 men'. But this increase, Ioannidis argued, 'could not be achieved without the appropriate assistance from the fraternal parties'. Although the Yugoslav reply is not known we do know that of the 'big comrade' , which came on 10 November 1946, and as we have already noted advised the KKE to 'limit the extent of the guerilla struggle'. It would be foolish to assume that Zachariadis ig• nored the Soviet 'advice'. We should also note, that Ioannidis here speaks of the 'prospect' (prooptiki) for the 'Democratic Army' to reach a combat strength of 20,000 men, a prospect that was made conditional on foreign assistance. Thirdly, it is absurd to suggest that Markos or anyone else by-passed Zachariadis' orders, especially these kinds of orders. Until his dismissal from the leadership of the 'Democratic Army' in November 1948, Markos always gave in to Zachariadis' various strategic and military initiatives. (See further in the Chapter the discussion about the resolutions of the Third Plenum of September 1947 which among other things decided for the conversion of the 'Democratic Army' into a conventional force.) Despite his rupture with Zachariadis over questions of tactics, Markos had always been 312 Notes

obedient to the directives of the Party. Before rushing to accuse Markos of '', one should remember that it was he who in November 1944 stopped Aris from attacking Athens, on the grounds that such a move had not been authorized by the Party (see Chapter I, note 181). Finally, Markos' account, despite being confirmed by a number of different testimonies, is consistent with Zachariadis' own ideas about 'urban revolution' and the need to keep the party cadres in the towns. In 1947 Zachariadis modified this line, but only after he realized that his original plan could not succeed. Even so, the trans• formation of the 'Democratic Army' into a type of force, amply demonstrates that Zachariadis never gave up his Stalinist convictions. 35. See for example Rizospastis 8 June, 13 July and 12 September 1946. 36. See Chapter V, pp. 178-9 and note 25. 37. KKE Episima Keimena 1940-1945, op.cit., pp. 221-2. 38. Alexander, op.cit., p. 209. 39. Report of the British Parliamentary Delegation to Greece, op.cit., pp. 4-5. 40. Alexander, op.cit., p. 209; MacVeagh in a telegram to the State Department on 28 July 1946, reported that 'the Government's "law and order" measures were largely in [the] hands of unscrupulous reaction• aries with restoration aims'. See Iatrides, Ambassador Mac Veagh Re• ports, op.cit., p. 696. 41. See MacVeagh's telegram to the State Department on 28 August 1946. Iatrides, op.cit., p. 696. 42. Ibid., p. 600. See also Chandler, op.cit., pp. 163-4. 43. FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 186--7. 44. Seferis, op.cit., p. 110. 45. In early August Chandler had sent a report to Norton, urging the British Ambassador to consider a postponement of the plebiscite, 'as conditions under which a fair plebiscite was possible did not and could not exist before September 1st'. But the reply he received confirmed his suspicions that 'the main outcome of my letter would be that I had let off steam rather than effected any result'. Chandler, op.cit., pp. 163-4. After the plebiscite Chandler noted: 'It was clear that armed fomented by KKE would have been certain under any circumstances; that rebellion should become civil war had never been necessary. By seeing only the possibility of the one and failing to see the germs of the other we had lost our chance of influencing events and shared the responsibility for tragedy'. Ibid., pp. 188-9. 46. Wittner, op.cit., p. 42. 47. FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, p. 206. 48. This supplement was never published in the FRUS records. See Mavro• gordatos, 'The 1946 Election and Plebiscite', op.cit., pp. 375-6 and note 17. Emphasis mine. 49. Report of the British Parliamentary Delegation to Greece, op.cit., pp. 6--7. 50. Mavrogordatos, op.cit., p. 376, concludes that, 'without monarchist control of the armed and police forces, and without the "" of 1945-6, a Republican victory would have been certain'. 51. British officials in Athens reported that the farewell meeting of the Notes 313

Soviet Ambassador with Greek officials was 'very polite and amiable', while the Yugoslav Ambassador 'had been very rude'. Wittner, op.cit., p. 57. On this see also Woodhouse, Strugglefor Greece, op.cit., p. 192. Rodionov, the Soviet Ambassador, returned to Athens on 27 January 1947. Cankar, the Yugoslav Ambassador, remained in Belgrade. 52. United Nations Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, Supplement no. 5, Annex 8, pp. 145-51; no. 7, pp. 173-97. 53. For a detailed account of the Greek claims at the Paris Peace Confer• ence see Xydis, op.cit., pp. 270-85, 318--35. 54. United Nations Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, no. 7,pp. 174-97; no. 8,pp. 200-12; no. 9,pp. 214-56; no. 10, pp.260-81;no. 11,pp.284-97;no. 12,pp.300-21;no. 13,pp.324-41; no. 14, pp. 344-64; no. 15, pp. 365-92; no. 16, pp. 393-422. 55. Blanas, op.cit., p. 82; Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 270. 56. Blanas, op.cit., p. 84; Maltezos, G., D.S.E. Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados (Athens, 1984) p. 58. Three days later a Political Bureau resolution dismissed the charges 'of the agents of the enemies of the people that the KKE had authorized the formation of a new ELAS'. See Rizospastis, 31 October 1946. This statement seems to contradict McNeill's claim, op.cit., p. 199, that 'in September the communist leaders in Athens openly acknowledged their connection with the bands, and claimed that 10,000 men had again taken to the hills of Greece, forming a new ELAS'. 57. Chandler, op.cit., pp. 185-6; Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 270; Campbell, op.cit., p. 48. 58. The Commission carried out its task between 30 January and 23 May 1947. On the findings of the Commission see Campbell, op.cit., pp. 50-5; Coufoudakis, op.cit., pp. 283-5. Djilas, op.cit., pp. 131-2, notes that although the findings of the Commission were bound to embarrass the Yugoslav government, the Soviet Union left Yugoslavia 'to face the music alone at the United Nations'. For the complete report including annexes, see United Nations Security Council Official Records, Second Year, Special Supplement 2, 3 vols., 'Report to the Security Council by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents'. The majority report (the Soviet Union and Poland opposed it and France abstained) concluded that Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria, had provided moral, material, and logistical support to the guerillas as well as sanctuary. The report also found that the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments had supported separatist movements among Slav minorities in Greek Macedonia. It concluded that although Greece 'was not in a state of civil war', the Greek Communist Party was responsible for most of the unrest in the country. The minority report, submitted by the Soviets, naturally rejected all the findings of the majority report and attributed the tensions in the Balkans to the policies of the undemocratic Greek government and the presence of the British troops which kept it in power. On 27 July 1947 the American resolution, which adopted in substance the findings of the majority report, was vetoed by the Soviet Union, while a few days later the Soviet resolution was rejected by the Western members of the 314 Notes

Council. While the functions of this Commission came to an end, on 21 October 1947, the Americans brought the Greek question before the General Assembly so to neutralize the Soviet veto. There, after bitter debate, it was decided (by forty votes to six with eleven abstentions) to create a United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UN• SCOB). The work and findings of this Committee fall outside the scope of this study. 59. Rizospastis, 22 December 1946. 60. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., pp. 53-4. 61. Ibid., pp. 55-6. 62. Maltezos, op.cit., pp. 60, 92. Markos, ibid., p. 55, claims that by October 1947, the 'Democratic Army' had 25,000 regulars. This esti• mate seems exaggerated. According to Blanas, op.cit., p. 119, 'Vafiadis' report at the Third Plenum of September 1947 on the strength and activities of the Democratic Army was not objective; it was "inflated"'. Blanas' testimony is confirmed by Gousias, op.cit., p. 249. See also note 101. 63. Zafiropoulos, op.cit., p. 178. 64. Grigoriadis, F., op.cit., vol. X, pp. 89-90,96. 65. Iatrides, J., 'Civil War 1945-1949: National and International Aspects', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., p. 216. See also Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 199. 66. Yergin, op.cit., p. 280; Wittner, op.cit., pp. 64-6. 67. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, pp. 44-110. On the Truman Doctrine see Jones, J.M., The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1964). 68. On 15 October 1946 Acheson notified MacVeagh that a document on 'specific steps to implement active US interest in Greece' had been approved by Secretary of State James Byrnes. The State Department felt 'that strained focusing on Greece may result in [an] early major crisis which may be a deciding factor in [the] future orientation of Near and Middle Eastern countries' and was prepared 'to take suitable measures to support [the] territorial and political integrity [of] Greece'. These measures, outlined in a memorandum dated 1 November 1946, included: public and private statements of support for Greece; active support of Greece in the United Nations when the occasion arose; pressure on the Export-Import Bank and the Interna• tional Bank to resume economic assistance to Greece; relief assistance following cessation of UNRRA activities; the possibility of increased military sales to Greece until UN military forces are prepared to undertake guarantees against aggression; economic advice through the dispatch of an economic mission; information to the American public of US policy towards Greece and reasons for it. FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 234-7, 240-4, 255, 262-3. On 11 February 1947, the State Depart• ment received a cable from MacVeagh which argued that in his and Mark Ethridge's view (Ethridge being the American representative in the UN Commission of Investigation) both the UN Commission and the Porter Economic Mission were facing 'fundamentally the same external threat', namely 'the prospect of eventual Soviet control'. Porter, the head of the American Economic Mission, had apparently made 'strong Notes 315

recommendations' for immediate assistance, and MacVeagh concluded by endorsing them: ' ... if Greece falls to Communism the whole Near East and part of North Africa as well are certain to pass under Soviet influence and to prevent this and the world-wide complications it would entail, a premium of not only five but many times 5 million dollars would seem cheap insurance for the US'. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, pp. 16-17. On this see also Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of (Oxford, 1982) p. 23 and note. 69. On the issue of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece see the article by Frazier, R., 'The Bevin-Marshall Dispute of April-November 1947 Concerning the Withdrawal of British Troops from Greece', in Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 249-261. Although Bevin initially intended to withdraw the British troops by September 1947, the last British combat troops did not leave Greece until January 1950. 70. Stavrianos, op.cit., p. 182. 71. Wittner, op.cit:, p. 83. 72. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, pp. 21-2. See also Porter's article in the Septem• ber 1947 issue of Collier's, reproduced in Eudes, op.cit., p. 300, in which the head of the American Economic Mission, using very emotional language, denounced 'the privileges of the small clique of businessmen and bankers which constitute the invisible power in Greece'. 'The members of this clique', Porter noted, 'want to maintain a fiscal system which favours them personally to a truly scandalous extent . . . and have never considered investing their profits in their own country to help its economic recovery'. 'What was really terrible', Porter con• cluded, 'was the contrast between that meal [a sumptuous banquet in the villa of one of the leading bankers] and the streets of Athens, where children were still dying of hunger'. 73. Alexander, op.cit., p. 239. 74. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, pp. 17-22, 24-5. Comments by Mark Ethridge, the American representative on the UN Commission of Investigation. For a similar view see also Acheson, op.cit., p. 219. 75. Wittner, op.cit., p. 84. 76. Katsoulis, op.cit., vol. VI, p. 159. 77. KKE Archives, Avgi, 16 December 1979. 78. KKE Archives, Avgi, 14 December 1979. Emphasis mine. 79. Until the end of 1947, the authorities in Greece did not know of Zachariadis' whereabouts and thought that he was hiding somewhere in Athens. On 22 March 1947, Zachariadis attended a funeral service for Yannis Zevgos, a member of the Political Bureau, who had been assassinated in Salonica two days before. Zevgos had been one of the critics of Varkiza, but he had endorsed the Caserta Agreement. (See Chapter III for more information about Zevgos' stance at the Eleventh Plenum, in April 1945.) 80. KKE Archives, Avgi, 9 December 1979. Emphasis mine. 81. Ibid. 82. KKE Archives, Avgi, 11 December 1979. 83. See for example, the March 1948 editorial of the second issue of the 316 Notes

'Democratic Army's' official journal, Dimokratikos Stratos, pp. 74, 76 and Zachariadis' article in the April issue, pp. 107-12. See also the article by Bartziotas 'Na Katachtisoume ti Staliniki Polemiki Epistimi kai ti Laikodimokratiki Techni' in Dimokratikos Stratos, February 1949, pp. 107-9. 84. Zachariadis, op.cit., p. 110. 85. See note 78. 86. On 4 June 1947, Ioannidis sent a telegram to the members of the Athens Political Bureau from Belgrade informing them of the meeting between Stalin and Zachariadis: 'From the results of this meeting', Ioannidis noted, 'we must be entirely satisfied.' See KKE Archives, Avgi, 12 December 1979. See also Gousias, op.cit., p. 209, for further evidence of the climate prevailing in the 'Democratic Army' in the summer of 1947. 87. A memorandum, dated 12 June 1947, and entitled 'Report on the Belligerent Forces in Greece' urged the Soviet leadership to step up their assistance as the 'Democratic Army' 'was not properly equipped ... had no heavy artillery ... and no money to buy food, clothing and footwear'. See KKE Archives, Avgi, 19 December 1979. See also the letters Zachariadis sent to Zhdanov, dated 1 September 1947, and to 'Comrade Baranov', dated 6 October 1947, both published in Avgi, on 30 December 1979 and 12 January 1980 respectively, as parts of the KKE Archives. Zachariadis concludes his letter to Zhdanov as follows: 'Please you should forgive us for making new requests every time we write to you, but you must understand how vital your assistance is to us, together with the valuable help given to us by our friends from other countries, especially by our Yugoslav and Albanian comrades.' 88. KKE Archives, Avgi, 21 December 1979; Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., p. 212, and Eudes, op.cit., p. 296, note wrongly that Zachariadis attended the Congress. Although Rizospastis, on 26 June 1947, claimed that the KKE leader had attended the Congress this was done in order to justify Zachariadis' long absence from Athens. At that time Zachariadis was in Belgrade. See KKE Archives, Avgi, 20 December 1979. 89. KKE Archives, Avgi, 22 December 1979. Strangely enough, Partsalidis ends his telegram, dated 5 July 1947, by noting that 'everybody is enthusiastic about Strasbourg'. Perhaps this comment was a reference to EAM's reaction to Porfyroyennis's statement about the possibility of a compromise. 90. KKE Archives, Avgi, 23 December 1979. On 9 July 1947, Ioannidis sent a telegram to Markos in which he notes that 'as a pretext [for the arrests] the government claims to have in its possession a written order from General Markos for a revolt in Athens'. 91. Ibid. 92. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, pp. 231-2. 93. Ibid., pp. 243-4,251,300. 94. See Iliou's comments in Avgi, 23 December 1979. 95. KKE Archives, Avgi, 25 December 1979. That the KKE was not seriously considering the possibility of reconciliation can be demon• strated by the fact that while in their discussions with Sofoulis they Notes 317

indicated their willingness to cooperate with a 'centre government' in which the KKE would hold no Cabinet posts, a few days later they demanded the formation of an all-party government. 96. See note 77. - 97. KKE Archives, Avgi, 25 December 1979. 98. Ibid. That the KKE was planning a major attack on Salonica by the end of 1947 is also suggested in Zachariadis' letter to Tito (of 12 August 1947), in which the KKE leader noted that the 'political and military preconditions for the creation of a free and permanent area with its own government had matured' and that the KKE, therefore, 'was taking all the practical measures, in combination with the military operations of the Democratic Army, to achieve in two or three months a concrete result'. Emphasis mine. 99. KKE Archives, Avgi, 3 January 1980. See also Chapter VI, note 49. 100. Dimitriou, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. A', pp. 22-3. For Chatzivasileiou's reactions see Chapter VI, note 51. 101. KKE Archives, Avgi, 1 January 1980. 102. KKE Archives, Avgi, 6 January 1980; Voithima, op.cit., p. 241; Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., p. 59; Gousias, op.cit., pp. 249-50; Blanas, op.cit., p. 120; Bartziotas, op.cit., p. 41. Eudes' claim, op.cit., p. 303, that Markos 'disagreed violently with Zacharia• dis, and refused to report to a Central Committee shorn of three• quarters of its members', is obviously wrong. 103. For more details about the 'Lakes Plan' see KKE Archives, Avgi, 6 January 1980. 104. See notes 78 and 80. 105. KKE Archives, Avgi, 11 January 1980. 106. Typically, in another letter from Zachariadis to the CPSU, dated 6 October 1947, that is one month after the endorsement of the 'Lakes Plan', we learn that the Soviet Union had informed the KKE that 'it could not satisfy the Democratic Army's needs in clothing and foot• wear' and that 'the Yugoslavs had exhausted all their supplies'. See KKE Archives, Avgi, 12 January 1980 and Chapter II, note 74. In yet another letter from Zachariadis to the CPSU, dated 11 October 1947, the KKE leader complained that the Bulgarians 'in contrast to the Yugoslavs and are not helpful to our struggle' and urged the Soviets to step up their assistance. In the same letter, Zachariadis noted that the Hungarians, the Rumanians and the had sent very little or nothing to the 'Democratic Army'. See KKE Archives, Avgi, 13 January 1980. 107. A letter by Zachariadis (or loannidis) to Markos, dated 4 November 1947, shows the disappointment of the KKE leaders with the extent of foreign support: 'We will do our best to hasten the delivery of ma• terials. This is the only thing I can keep saying as a reply. Everything proceeds so slowly and I can understand your distress'. See KKE Archives, Avgi, 12 January 1980. 108. Zafiropoulos, op.cit., p. 125. This figure does not include the numbers for the navy, the air force, the gendarmerie, the National Guard and the civil police. 318 Notes

109. Rizospastis obviously published an edited version of the resolutions of the Third Plenum. For the original text see KKE Archives, Avgi, 4 January 1980. 110. For more details about the American involvement in this affair see FRUS, 1947, vol. V, pp. 253-4, 264, 280, 286, 295-6, 303, 309-13, 318-27, 333-4. 111. In the new Cabinet the Right held thirteen seats and the Liberals eleven. Tsaldaris remained Vice-Premier and Foreign Secretary while the royalist Mavromichalis retained the Ministry of Interior. Stratos, another royalist, became the Minister of War. 112. Stavrianos, op.cit., p. 189. 113. KKE Archives, Avgi, 15 January 1980. 114. Vafiadis, 'Omilia Pano sto Proto Thema', op.cit., p. 58. 115. See Vafiadis' 'platform', Neos Kosmos, August 1950, p. 478. See also Gousias, op.cit., pp. 292-4. 116. KKE Archives, Avgi, 19 January 1980. 117. Dimitrion, I Diaspasi, op.cit., vol. A', p. 24. 118. Vafiadis, 'I Epichirisi tis Konitsas', Dimokratikos Stratos, January 1948, pp. 4-10; Gousias, op.cit. pp. 287-8. For a different account see Zafiropoulos, op.cit., pp. 301-22. 119. See Vafiadis' 'platform', Neos Kosmos, August 1950, p. 480. 120. For an analysis of these measures see Alivizatos, Oi Politikoi Thesmoi se Krisi, op.cit., pp. 511-23. 121. Zachariadis, Deka Chronia Palis, op.cit., p. 41. The question of whether the Greek National Army made use of Yugoslav territory, with the consent of Yugoslav officers, to 'stab the "Democratic Army" at the back' is discussed in great detail by Papapanayotou, A., in his book I Alithia ya to "Pisoplato Chtypima" (Athens, 1974). Papapanayotou rejects Zachariadis' thesis, as indeed does Vukmanovic in his own book. See Vukmanovic, op.cit., pp. 117-19. 122. The figures cited by various authors and authorities differ widely. The Greek government claimed that 40,000 combatants had been killed, while Anglo-American observers give a figure of 158,000. Given the large number of unrecorded civilian deaths, the latter figure seems more reliable. On this see Tsoucalas, op.cit., p. 114; Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, op.cit., pp. 285-6; Chandler, op.cit., pp. 195-6; 0' Ballance, op.cit., pp. 192, 202; Xydis, op.cit., p. 541. On the problem of the 'displaced persons' see the article by Laiou, A.E., 'Population Movements in the Greek Countryside During the Civil War' in Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 55-103. According to Laiou in May 1949 there were 684,000 'displaced persons' who received some form of government aid plus 150,000 who did not receive any. By the end of 1949 the number of these refugees had reached 850,000. On the controversial issue of what right-wing and left-wing authors alike call the 'paidomazoma', (each side accusing the other of 'abducting' rather than 'evacuating' the children) see the article by Baerentzen, L., 'The "Paidomazoma" and the Queen's Camps', in Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949, op.cit., pp. 127-55. By 1952, when the work of the Interna- Notes 319

tional Red Cross ceased, only 538 children had been reunited with their families. On the 'paidomazoma' see also Bartziotas, V., 0 Agonas tou Dimokratikou Stratou Ellados, op.cit., pp. 128-32. According to Bart• ziotas the number of children that were evacuated by the 'Democratic Army' was 25,000 (and not 28,000 as the government claimed), 5,000 of whom were eventually reunited with their parents. On the long-term cultural repercussions of the civil war see the article by Tsoucalas, C., 'The Ideological Impact of the Civil War', in Greece in the 1940s, op.cit., pp. 319-41. 123. Thucydides, lstoria Peloponnisiakou Polemou (Athens, 1956) Book III, 82, 83. For the English text see Burn, A.R., The Pelican (London, 1982) pp. 268-9. Bibliography

UNPUBLISHED RECORDS

British State Papers at the Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey.

PUBLISHED SOURCES Official Publications

1. Greek Communist Party (KKE)

KKE Episima Keimena, 1918-1924, vol. I (n.p., Politikes kai Logotechnikes Ekdoseis, 1964). KKE Episima Keimena, 1925-1928, vol. II (n.p., Politikes kai Logotechnikes Ekdoseis, 1965). KKE Episima Keimena, 1929-1933, vol. III (n.p., Politikes kai Logotech• nikes Ekdoseis, 1966). KKE Episima Keimena, 1934-1940, vol. IV (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 1981). KKE Episima Keimena, 1940-1945, vol. V (Athells: Synchroni Epochi, 1981). KKE Episima Keimena, 1945-1949, vol. VI (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 1987). To KKE apto 1931 os to 1952 (Vasika Documenta) (n.p., KE tou KKE, 1953). KKE 1931-1936: Pente Chronia Agones (Athens: KE tou KKE, 1946). Theseis ya ta 50 Chronia tou KKE (n.p., KE tou KKE, 1968). Theseis ya ta 40 Chronia tou KKE (n.p., KE tou KKE, 1958). Voithima ya tin Istoria tou KKE (n.p., KE tou KKE, 1952). Chroniko tou Agona (1878-1951). Documenta kai Ylika apo tin Istoria tou Laikou mas Kinimatos (n.p., KE tou KKE, 1952). Deka Chronia Agones, 1935-1945. To KKE stis apofaseis ton Synedrion, ton Syndiaskepseon kai ton Olomeleion tis Kentrikis Epit;opis (Athens: Poreia, 1977). Exinta Chronia Agonon kai Thysion: Chroniko tou KKE, 1918-1945, vol. I (Athens: KE tou KKE, 1978). Exinta Chronia Agonon kai Thysion: Chroniko tou KKE, 1945-1978, vol. II (Athens: KE tou KKE, 1979). Pros tin 6i Syndiaskepsi tis Kommatikis Organosis Athinas (Athens: KOA,

~. - I 6i Syndiaskepsi tis Kommatikis Organosis Athinas 28-29 Septemvri 1945 (Athens: KOA, 1945). To 70 Synedrio tou KKE, 5 vols (Athens: KE tou KKE, 1945). I Panelladiki Organotiki Syskepsi 15-17 Aprili 1946 (Athens: KE tou KKE, 1946). To Ethniko mas Provlima kai to Kommounistiko Komma tis Ellados (Athens: KOMEP, 1943). 320 Bibliography 321

Keimena tis Ethnikis Antistasis (EAM, EEAM, ELAS, EA, EPON, Kinima Mesis Anatolis, PEEA, Ethniko Symvoulio), 2 vols (lstoriko Tmima tis KE tou KKE) (Athens: 1981). Istoria tis Ethnikis Antistasis 1940-1945 eds Zoidis, G., Kailas, M., Mamatsis, T., Athanasiou, F., Asouras, G. (Athens: Nea Vivlia, 1974). Kommounistiki Epitheorisi tis Epochis tis Fasistikis Katochis 1941-1944, 2 vols (Athens: Kazantzas, 1976). Kommounistiki Epitheorisi tis Metadekemvrianis Periodou 1945, 2 vols (Athens: Kazantzas, 1976). 'Apofasi tou Politikou Grafeiou tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE', Kommou• nistiki Epitheorisi, no. 34 (Trikkala: February 1945). 'Apofasi tis His Olomeleias tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE', Kommounis• tiki Epitheorisi, no. 36-37 (Athens, April-May 1945). '1 Hi Olomeleia: Ya to Xerizoma tou Fasismou kai ti Niki tis Dimokratias' , Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, no. 36-7 (Athens: April-May 1945). 'Apofasi tis 12is Olomeleias tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE', Kommounis• tiki Epitheorisi, no. 39 (Athens, July 1945). 'Pros to 70 Synedrio tou KKE', Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, no. 40 (Athens: August 1945). 'To Katastatiko tou KKE', Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, no. 41 (Athens: September 1945). 'Proschedio Programmatos tou KKE', Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, no. 42 (Athens: September 1945). 'Apofasi tou 70u Synedriou ya to Agrotiko Zitima', Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, no. 43 (Athens: November 1945). 'Kanonismos Kentrikis Epitropis Elenchou', Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, no. 44 (Athens: December 1945). Kommatiki Epagripnisi Organosi Periechomeno (Athens: KOMEP, 1946-7). 'Apofasi tis 2is Olomeleias tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE', Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, no. 3 (Athens: March 1946). 'Apofasi tis KE tou KKE pano sti Politiki Katastasi', Kommounistiki Epitheorisi (May 1946). 'Apofasi tis 3is Olomeleias tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE', Avgi, 3 January 1980. KKE Archives, Avgi (2 -23 January 1980). Pour la Liberte du peuple grec, pour la paix. Resolution du 4eme Plenum du CC (n.p., 1948). 'Apofaseis tis 5is Olomeleias tis KE tou KKE mazi me tin KE Elenchou tis 30-311111949', Dimokratikos Stratos, no. 1 (January 1949). 'Apofasi tou Politikou Grafeiou tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE ya tin katastasi kai ti douleia tou Archigeiou Roumelis', Dimokratikos Stratos, no. 5 (). 'Apofasi tis Politikou Grafeiou tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE tis 25 Avgoustou 1948: 1 Epopoiia sti Voreia Pindo. Politika kai Stratiotika Symperasmata kai Didagmata', Dimikratikos Stratos, no. 9 (September 1948). 'Apofasi tou PG tis KE tou KKE ya tin katastasi sto Archigeio Anatolikis Makedonias-Thrakis 3-9-48', Dimokratikos Stratos, no. 10 (October 1948). 'Apofasi tis KE tou Kommounistikou Kommatos Elladas ya ti douleia tou 322 Bibliography

klimakiou tou Gen. Archigeiou Notias Elladas', Dimokratikos Stratos, no. 12 (December 1948). 'Pio Psila ti Simaia tis Palis: Prokirixi tis KE tou KKE pros 010 to lao tis choras', Dimokratikos Stratos, no. 12 (December 1948). La Verite sur la Grece: Livre Blue. Sur ['occupation americano-anglaise, sur Ie regime monarcho-fasciste, sur la lutte du peuple grec (ed. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres du Governement Democratique Provisoire de Grece, n.p. 1948). For Peace and Democracy in Greece: Second Blue Book. On the Anglo• American intervention, on the monarcho-fascist regime, on the people's struggle for liberty (ed. Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, n.p. August 1949). For Peace and Democracy in Greece: Third Blue Book. On the Anglo-American intervention, on the monarcho-fascist regime, on the people's struggle for liberty (ed. Democratic Organizations of Greece, n.p. September 1950). Ya ta Aitia pou Prokalesan ton Emfylio Polemo kai i Gnomi mas ya to Stamatima tou (Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados, 1947); reprint (Athens, Glaros, 1987). 'Apofasi tou PG tis KE tou KKE ya tin opportunistiki platforma tou Markou Vafiadi 15.11. 1948', Neos Kosmos, no. 8 (August 1950). 'Apofasi tou PG tis KE tou KKE ya ton Kosta Gyftodimo (Karagiorgi) 6. 6. 1950', Neos Kosmos, no. 8 (August 1950). 'Anakoinosi tou Proedriou. Prokirixi tis 3is Syndiaskepsis tou KKE 16 Okt. 1950', Neos Kosmos, no. 10 (October 1950). 'Apofasi tis 3is Syndiaskepsis tou KKE Pano sto Proto Thema', Neos Kos• mos, no. 10 (October 1950). 3i Syndiaskepsi tou KKE 10-1411011950: Ta agnosta praktika mias skinothe• timenis dikis enantion ton proton kommouniston tis amfisvitisis (Athens: Glaros, 1988). '0 D. Partsalidis spekoulantis tou kinimatos mas, echthros tis Sovietikis , tou KKE kai tou Laou mas', Neos Kosmos, no. 2 and no. 3 (February 1953 and March 1953). 'Anakoinosi tou Proedriou tis 6is Plateias Olomeleias tis KE tou KKE', Neos Kosmos, no. 4-5 (April-May 1956). 'Symperasmata tis 6is Plateias Olomeleias tis KE kai tis KEE tou Kommou• nistikou Kommatos tis Elladas', Neos Kosmos, no. 4-5 (April-May 1956). 'Me Romaleo Pnevma to KKE Prochorei stin Efarmogi ton Apofaseon tis 6is Olomeleias', Neos Kosmos, no. 6 (June 1956). 'Ylika tis 7is Olomeleias tou KKE', Neos Kosmos, no. 3 (March 1957). 'To Ergo tis 7is Plateias Olomeleias tis KE tou KKE', Neos Kosmos, no. 4-5 (April-May 1957). To 80 Synedrio tou KKE (n.p., Politikes kai Logotechnikes Ekdoseis, 1961).

2. National Liberation Front (EAM)

Lefki Vivlos: Mais 1944-Martis 1945 (Trikkala, February 1945); reprint (Athens, Klepsydra, 1975). Lefki Vivlos: Paraveiaseis tis Varkizas Flevaris-Iounis 1945 (Athens, June 1945); reprint (Athens, Ellinika Themata, 1975). Bibliography 323

Lefki Vivlos: 'Dimokratikos Neofasismos' loulis-Oktovris 1945 (Athens, October 1945); reprint (Athens, Ellinika Themata, 1975). Mavri Vivlos: To Eklogiko Praxikopima tis 31 Marti 1946 (Athens, May 1946). Oi Pragmatikes Aities tou Ellinikou Dramatos (Athens, January 1947); reprint (Athens, Ellinika Themata, 1974).

3. Great Britain

Documents Regarding the Situation in Greece, Cmnd. 6592 (London: HMSO, 1945). Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report (Hansard), Fifth Series. (London, HMSO): vol. 402 (1944); vol. 406 (1945); vols 413, 416 (1946). Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Greece, 12th December 1944 to 9th May 1945 (London: HMSO, 1949). Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections, Cmd. 6812 (London: HMSO, 1946). Report of the British Legal Mission to Greece, Cmd. 6838 (London: HMSO, 1946). Report of the British Parliamentary Delegation to Greece, August 1946 (London: HMSO, 1947). What We Saw in Greece: Report of the TUC Delegation (London: TUC, 1945). 1 Krisimi Chronia. Triakosia Anekdota Engrafa Apo to Prosopiko Archeio tou Quinston Tsovtsil ya tin Ellada, 2 vols (ed. Andrikopoulos, G.) (Athens: Diogenis, 1974). Mystika Archeia. Foreign Office: Fakellos Elias (Athens: Nea Synora, 1972).

4. United States

Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944. vol. IV (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966). Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944. vol. V (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965). Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of (The Conference), 1945, 2 vols (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960). Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955). Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East and Africa, 1945. vol. VIII (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969). Foreign Relations of the United States: Council of Foreign Ministers, vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970). Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East and Africa, 1946, vol. VII (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969). Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East and Africa, 1947, vol. V (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971). 324 Bibliography

5. Soviet Union

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Correspondence between the Chairman of Minis• ters of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Minister of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965). The Communist International 1919-1943. Documents (ed., Degras, J.) (Lon• don: , 1965).

6. United Nations

United Nations Security Council Official Records, First Year, First and Second Series (and Supplements) (London, 1946). United Nations Security Council Official Records, Second Year, Special Supplement no. 2, 'Report to the Security Council by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents' (Paris, 1947). Labour Problems in Greece: Report of the ILO Mission to Greece, October• November 1947 (Geneva, International Labour Office, 1949).

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NewspapenYJournws

Anti Avgi Dialogos Dimokratikos Stratos Eleftheria Eleftheri Ellada Eleftherotypia Epikaira Foreign Affairs I Aristera Simera Kathimerina Nea Kommounistiki Epitheorisi Kommounistiki Politiki kai Theoria Manchester Guardian Nea Nea Oikonomia Neoi Protoporoi Neos Kosmos New Left Review Politis Rizospastis Spartakos The Times World Marxist Review World Politics

INTERVIEWS

The following people were kind enough to make themselves available to me for interviews:

Orestis Chatzivasileiou Yannis Chotzeas Babis Drakopoulos Lefteris Eleftheriou Kostas Filinis Yannis Georgakis Solon Grigoriadis Fillipos Iliou Panayotis Kanellopoulos Giorgios Mavros Vasilis Nefeloudis Alekos Papapanayotou Michalis Raptis Markos Vafiadis Giorgis Zoidis Index

Abyssinia 67 Nations; World War Two Acheson, Dean 113-14 Bulgaria 12,43,44,64,66,69, 72,73, Agnidis, Ambassador 129, 157,159 74-5,114, 125, 132, 152-3,154,158, Agrarian Party of Greece (AKE) 24, 99, 215,233-4 111,226 see also Dimitrov Albania 61,70,72,154,214,215, Bullock, Lord 124 233-4,243 Byrnes, James F. 129, 130, 152-3, 159, see also Hoxha, Enver 228 Alexander, Field Marshal 52 Allied Mission for the Observation of the Caserta Agreement 44-50, 59, 78 Greek Elections (AMFOGE) 145-8, Chatzivasileiou, Chrysa 89, 190, 193-4, 151-2,158, 167-70,222,231-2,257 198,206,213,242 American Misson for Aid to Greece 64, 73, 258 (AMAG) 243 Churchill, Winston 81-2, 100, 152, 236 amnesty, the 148-50 and the Greek monarchy 28-30, 32, Antifascist Council of National Liberation 33-5,37-9,50-3,116- 20,125-7, (AVNOJ) 36 141, 143,252-3 Apostolou, Lefteris 193, 198, 210- 11, and Stalin 65-7 213,217-20,223 Anglo-Soviet percentages deal 43-5, Asia Minor 9,12-13 100 Atlee, Clement 102-3,124-5,134 Civil War and Stalin 69-73 Badoglio, Marshal 67 Battle of Athens 50-4, 65 Bakirtzis, Colonel 36 First Round 30-5 Balkan Communist Federation (BCF) 7 guerilla activity 234-43 (1912-13) 12 Second Round 34,39,53-4 Bartziotas, Vasilis 59,89,174, 182-3, Third Round 243-7 184,196,204-5,209,229,244 see also Communist Party; Battle of Athens 50-4, 65 Litochoron attack; Varkiza Bevin, Ernest 81,83,103-4,120 Agreement; Zachariadas decision to postpone plebiscite 141-5 Communist Party of Greece (KKE) 8- policy towards Greece 123-38, 153, 11,14,74-7,119, 128, 129, 131-4,136, 157-63, 167,227-8, 255-6 138, 150, 152, 154, 156, 159,257-9 Blanas, Giorgis 87,89,92,108, 184, Comintern directive of 1939 17- 20 186,229 decision to boycott plebiscite 120-1 Bosnia 72 dominates the resistance 21-54, Britain 250-2 Anglo-Soviet percentages deal 43-5, Eleventh Plenum of 89-96 51 Fifth Plenum of 17 debate at UN 155-60 and Litochoron attack 171-6, 188 ends funding to Greek government and March 1946 elections 119, 128, 236-7 129, 131-4, 136, 138, 140, 145, invasion force in Greece 44-54, 56, 147-8,163-4,166-7,171 64,71-2,81-3 nature of mistake to boycott 209-24 and March 1946 elections 113-55, who took decision to boycott 189-98 160-7 why KKE abstained 198-209 member of AMFOGE 145-8 policy from Varkiza to the Eleventh policy towards Greek resistance Plenum 86-9 movements 28-42 and the Provisional Democratic see also Atlee; Bevin; Churchill; Civil Government 244-5 War; Communist Party; Eden; United Second Plenum of 171-88, 256-7 346 Index 347

Seventh Congress of 105-12,133 240 signs Varkiza agreement 55-65, 72, 73-4,77-9 General Confederation of Workers in Third Plenum (Sept. 1947) of 242-3, Greece 166 256-7 General Federation of Greek Labour Twelfth Plenum of 96-105 (GSEE) 79, 232 under Metaxa dictatorship 15-21 George II, King 13,14-15,28,46, 47, see also Civil War; Zachariadis 51-3,86,110,116-18, 120, 122-3, Communist Party of the Soviet Union 126-7, 252, 255 (CPSU) 172,190-2,219,221 government in exile 21-42 Constantine I, King 12-13 plebiscite 128-31, 139-45,227-8, CPSU see Communist Party of the Soviet 231-3 Union returns to Greece (Sept. 1946) 233 48 Germany 17,21-6,31,45,55,56 Cunningham, Admiral 38 see also World War Two 166,214,225 Gheorghiou-Dej 176-7,216-17 G1ezos, Manolis 23 Dalton, Hugh 236 G1inos, Dimitrios 24, 27 Damaskinos, Archbishop 33,51-2, 102, Gomulka, Wladyslaw 197,249 116-17, 120-4, 132-45, 155,164,166 Gousias-Vontitsios, Giorgis 174, 182, visit to London 127-32 184-5,193,229 De Gaulle, President Charles 68 Grady, Henry 145-8 Demertzis, Professor 14 13 Democratic Army of Greece 57, 62, 72, Greco-Turkish war (1922) 9 74,76-7,80,109,176-7,180,186, Griswold, Dwight 243 190-1,194,205-6, 208,210,218,229 Grivas, George Theodorou 79-80 aim to liberate 46, Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich 233 235-6, 238-46 Group of the Democratic Armed Dimitrov, Georgi Mikhailovich 62, 64-5, Persecuted (ODEK) 185-6 69,70,72,73,201, 214,225,252 Dimokratikos Stratos 180-1,239-40 Hoxha, Enver 61-4,73-4 Djilas, M. 70-1,74 Indonesia 157 Eden, Antony 30,33-4,35,42,51- 2, Ionnidis, Yannis 16-17, 36, 40, 43, 45, 116-18, 125-6, 141, 143 57,59,62,69,87-9,91-2,108,166, elections (March 1946) 174,187,202-3,227,240,242,244 and the EAM 121, 123, 128-9, speaking at KKE conference 104-5 133-4,138,141,143,147- 8,150-1, speaking at Seventh Congress 110, 163-4, 166-7 112 and the KKE 119,128,129,131- 4, 136, 138, 140, 145, 147-8, 163-4, 68-9,156-7,159 166-7,189- 224,257-8 Italy 17-20,43,56,63,67-8, 157 British attitude towards 113-55, Communist Party 201-2 160-7 65 member of AMFOGE 145-8 results 167-70 Kafandaris 24,56, 119, 122, 134, 138-9, see also individual parties and 146, 157, 165,213-14, 218 persons Kalamata Incident 151,155-60 Eleftheriou, Lefteris 180-1, 193, 225 Kanellopoulos, Panayotis 24, 83, 85, 86, Ethnikos Dichasmos () 135, 139-40, 148, ISS, 157, 160, 164, 11-13 167, 170, 231,237 Federation of Communist Youth of Greece government of 134-8 (Omospondeia Kommounistikis Karagiorgis, Kostas 57-9,61,73, 86-7, Neolaias Ellados-OKNE) 18-19, 89-90,93,95,106, 175,197-8,210-11, 20-1 213,223 France 63,67-8,124,130-1,134, 201-2, Kardelj, Edvard 70-1, 73 348 Index

Khrushchev, Nikita 195,197-8,221, 224 (EDES) 27,29,31,34,35-6, 44, Kikitsas, Georgios 186,229,234 46-9,51,91 KKE see Communist Party of Greece National Democratic Liberation Kohler, Foy D. 145, 147 Front(EDAM) 26 Koliyannis, K. 219-21,229 National Liberal Party 116, 148 Kommounistiki Epitheorisi (KOMEP) 88-9, 105, Ill, 122, 174,203 National Liberation Front (EAM) 64, Kondylis, General 13 91-5,97-8,101-4,106-8, 110, 155-6, Koryzis, Alexander 21 159,202-3,220, 232,237,248-9, Kousoulas, D. George 48-9,87,100, 251-3,259 171-2,174 and the March 1946 elections 121, 123,128-9, 133-4, 138, 141, 143, Lakes Plan 242-3 147-8,150- 1, 163-4, 166-7, 190-4, Laparre, General Arnaud 145 213-14 Laski, Harold 125,129 persecution of 79-82, 104, 149, Leeper, Reginald 28,32,35,37-8, 40-1, 228-9, 240-1 48-51,81,83-5,94, 160,162-4,172, resistance group in WWII 24-53 228,231, 254 signsVarkiza Agreement 53-8,60- 2, and the Greek Monarchy 116-19, 73-4, 78-9, 86, 89 122, 129-45, 155, 157 National Liberation Front (NOF) 76- 7 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 63-4, 195, 201 National Mutual Aid (EA) 24 Liberal Party (Republican) 12, 14, 155, National People's Navy (ELAN) 79 161, 170 National (Ethniki Po/itiki Litochoron attack 171-6, 188 Enosi-EPE) 164 National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) Macedonia 9-11,12,19,61,74-7, 104, 60-5,71-2,87,91-3, 103,117,120, 114-15, 154, 186-7,226, 228-30,234-5 186-7,226-30, 235,239-40,251-2 Macmillan, Harold 44,46,51-2,89, and Macedonia 74-5 118-19 Litochoron attack 171-2 MacVeagh, Ambassador 128-9, 132-3, persecution of 79-84,102,149, 228 142, 145,231,236-7,241, 243 resistance group in WWll 24-54 Makridis, Thodoros 108, 174,184-6 signs Varkiza agreement 56, 58, Malenkov, Georgi 61, 72, 198 60-5,71-4,78-9,86,88-9 Manetas, General 85 National Workers Liberation Front Manganas 155-6,214,215 (EEAM) 24 Maniadakis 15-18,20-1,250 Nefeloudis, Pavlos 15,19-20,38, 91, Manuilsky, Dmitri 233 197-8 Mavromatis, Panayotis 213,222,229 Nefeloudis, Vasilis 18-19,99 Mavromichalis 1l6, 121,230-1 Neoskosmos 89,95,177,186,217-19 Maximos, Dimitrios 237, 243 Noel-Baker, Francis 129, 151 McNeil, Hector 136-45, 161-3 Norton, Sir Clifford 228, 230, 235 Metaxas, Ionnis 100Il, 14-21,25, 28, 123,228,231,250-1 Old Central Committee (Palaia Kentriki Michailidis 16-18, 20 Epitropi-OCC) 15, 16-18 Molotov 61, 132, 152-3, 192-3, 198, 12 211,225,240 Mussolini, Benito 67-8 Panhellenic Military Committee 109, Mustafa Kemal 12-13 180,182,184-8,220 Myers, Brigadier 25, 29-32 Papandreou, George 24,38-42,86, 116, 121-2,128,138-9,155, 157, 160, 164, National and Social Liberation (EKKA) 170,231,237,252,254 27,31,34,35-6,40, 139 Government of National Unity 44- (EP) 79 52,90 National Democratic Greek League Partsaldis, Mitsos 15,64, 100-1, 1l0-12, Index 349

151,156,181-2,197- 8, 203, 223, 240-1 Sofoulis 14,24,56,80,119,134, 231 and the Battle of Athens SO, 73 government of 82,83,85-6, 121, and the March 1946 elections 166-7, 136,138-9,141,145-55, 157,160-7, 190-4,210-4,216-17,219,221 170,241,243- 5,253-8 and the Varkiza Agreement 58-9, Soviet Union 50-1,53,109, 113-15, 60-2,77-8,87-8 126, 138, 152, 156-60,233-5, 237,243, Paul, Crown Prince 230 246,258 Petrov, Comrade 192-3 and KKE decision to boycott elections Plastiras, Colonel 13,80,120, 157,241 190-8,215-16, 219 government of 52, 83-4, 88-9, Anglo-Soviet percentages deal 43-5, 115-17, 143 51 plebiscite (l Sept. 1946) 26,32, 42, see also Stalin 116-23,128-31,139-45, 227-8,231-3 Spain 125 see also Damaskinos; George II Special Operations Executive (SOE) 23, Poland 66, 125, 157-8 28-30, 32, 35 Political Committee of National Liberation Stalin, Joseph 43, 45, 114-15, 152, 158, (PEEA) 35-44,47- 9, 97-8,100-1, 181, 187, 192,208,211, 225,227,237, 203,228 240,242,244-5,252,258 Popov, Colonel 43,45,52 and Greek Civil War 65-75,175-6 Popular Party (Royalist) 12,14 criticises Varkiza agreement 61- 4 see also individual persons feud with Tito 71-2,74,245 Porfyroyennis, Militiadis 240, 244 repression by 194-8 Poner, Paul 237 Stavrianos, L.S. 9 Pravda 64,65 Stringos, Leonidas 99,110-11,180, 182, Psarros, Colonel 27,40 190,193,221-2,229, 242,244 Svolos, Professor 36, 41, 43-4, 48, 92, Rawlins, General 85 121,164 Rendis 81, 139, 157, 161-2 Svoronos, N. 8 Rizospastis (KKE daily) 16, 20, 48, 55, 59,87,88,93,100,102, 127,166,174, Tempo 61-4,68,70,73-7, 109 175, 230, 234- 5, 243 Temporary Administration (Prosorini Rodionov, Admiral Konstantin 154 Diikisis-TA) 16-18,20-1 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 32,33,43, 51,67 Theos, Kostas 221-2 Rousos, Petros 41,43,89,91,95, 99, Theotokis, John 14 221-2,240,242,244 Thorez, Maurice 68,69, 225 Rumania 161,163 Thucydides 246-7 Tito, Marshal 36,49,61,69-70, 214, Scobie, General 44,47,48-53,119- 20 225-6, 242, 258 Siandos, Giorgis 15, 17,36,42, 45,47, and Macedonia 74-7 49,59,60,99,166-7, 190, 193,201-2, feud with Stalin 71-2, 74, 245 223, 226, 239 meeting with Zachariadis (21 April and Varkiza Agreement 55-7, 78 1947) 238-40,242-3 at Eleventh Plenum 86-96 Togliatti, Palmiro 68,201-2,225 at Seventh Congress 106, 121-2 Tripolitania 153 Siavo-Macedonian (SNOF) Truman, Harry S. 66,70, 114,152, 74-6 236-8,258 Siovania 72 Tsaldaris, Constantinos 170,227- 37, Socialist-Agrarian Party 14 243 Socialist Labour Party of Greece Tsaldaris, Panayis 12, 13, 26, 120- 1, Sosialistikon Ergatikon Komma 127-8, 140, 154 Ellados-SEKE) 7 Tsantis, Michalis 181, 184-6,213 Socialist Party of Greece (SKE) 24 Tsouderos, Emmanuel 21,32,37,56, Sofianopoulos, Ioannis 14,56,93, 121, 80,119, 138-9, 149, 164-5, 241 139, 146-7, 149-50, 152, 157, 160, 166, 9,12,236 214 350 Index

Ukraine 157,233 Windle, R.T. 145 Union of Popular Democracy (ELD) 24, Woodhouse. C.M. 25,28.32,34. 100, 148 160.172-3.177-8 Union of Popular Democracy- Socialist World War One 12 Party of Greece (Enosi Lailds World War Two Dimokratias- Sosialistiko Komma Anglo-Soviet percentages deal 43-5 Ellados- ELD-SKE) 93,102, 104, British invasion force in Greece 44-54. 120-1, 148,163-4,166 56.64.71-2.81-3 United Nations 155-60 Caserta Agreement 44-50, 59. 78 United Nations Special Committe on the Italy invades Greece 17-20 Balkans (UNSCOB) 80 Lebanon Agreement 31-44. 59 United States of America 43,45, 50-I, mutiny of Greek forces in Middle East 53,66,72,113-14, 124,128-34,156, 37-9.43 227-8,241 Plaka Agreement 34-6 support for Greece 236-9,243-6 resistance in Greece 21-54 see also Roosevelt; Truman; World War Two 'X' Organisation 79-80,132,155-6, 161.254 Vafiadis, Markos 57,59,61-2,72, 78, 87,90-1,93,174,197-8, 213,217 Yugoslavia 36.43.49.64.69-71, 73. and armed struggle 180, 184-6, 109.154,156.205.215- 16.233.235, 190-1,228-30,234-6,238- 40,242-8 244 and the elections 193-4, 209-10, see also Tito 220-3 Varkiza Agreement 53-61,72,79-80 Zachariadis, Nikos 8. 10, II, 15- 16, 26, non-Greek critics of 61-5, 73-4, 36.45,69-76.92. 125.131-2,154,158, 77-8 163. 164-7,249-50,254-5 see also Communist Party and the Varkiza agreement 57 -61, Velouchiotis, Aris 47,57,61,78, 86-8, 65,77-8.87-8 91,98-9,197.239.254 and armed struggle after 1946 elections Vendiris. General 83-5,234 225-47 Venizelist Uberals 155 and decision to boycott 1946 elections Venizelos. Eleftherios 9-14.26 189-224, 257-8 Venizelos. S. 37-9.86. 116. 138. 139, Hoxha criticises 61-4 154-5.157.164,170. 231.254 Open Letter of 18-20 Vetas. Fokos 186-7.218-19.229 released from Dachau 93-6 Victor Emmanuel, King 67 Second and Third Letter of 20-1 Vlandas. Dimitris 173.174,179. 181-2. and Second Plenum 172. 174-88 227.244 and Seventh Congress 106-12.133 Voithimo 174.176-7,204-6,212-13 speeches toSixth and Seventh Plenum Voulgaris. Admiral Petros 83-5. 89. 172-3,178-179.211-12 102-3,157 Theory of Two Poles 95.100-2. government of 118-24. 128. 132-5 106-8 Voumas, Tasos 175 and Twelfth Plenum 96-105 Vukmanovic, Svetozar see Tempo see also Communist Party Vyshinsky. Andrei 157-9 Zervas, General 27.34,44.148. ISS, 241 Wallace. David 33 Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich 72. 'White Terror' 79-86.214-15 225,240 Wickham. Sir Charles 85 Zografos, Zisis 89.105.177-8, 213. Wilson, General 44 219-20.222