The Battle for Athens

Anglo-American Policy in Greece (1946-50): A Study on the Politics of Fear, Manipulation and the Origins of the Cold War

Spero Simeon Zachary Paravantes B.A, Thompson Rivers University, 2000 M.A, Simon Fraser University, 2009

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies

This version of my dissertation, though reviewed and edited after my defence, is still not complete and ready for publication. When a version of this dissertation is published, it will likely contain differences from this text. Whether these are differences in sources, arguments, conclusions, formatting, findings, etc., the published version shall be considered and acknowledged as containing my views and findings, and will supersede this version.

ii Abstract

While trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-

American foreign policy in the pre and early years of the Cold War, the role that perception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became a central focus. From this point came the realization of a general lack of emphasis and research into the ways in which the British government managed to convince the United States government to assume support for worldwide British strategic objectives. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this dissertation.

This work attempts to provide a new analysis of the role that the British played in the dramatic shift in American foreign policy from 1946 to 1950. To achieve this shift (which also included support of British strategic interests in the

Eastern Mediterranean) this dissertation argues that the British used Greece, first as a way to draw the United States further into European affairs, and then as a way to anchor the United States in Europe, achieving a guarantee of security of the

Eastern Mediterranean and of Western Europe.

To support these hypotheses, this work uses mainly the British and

American documents relating to Greece from 1946 to 1950 in an attempt to clearly explain how these nations made and implemented policy towards Greece during this crucial period in history. In so doing it also tries to explain how American foreign policy in general changed from its pre-war focus on non-intervention, to the American foreign policy to which the world has become accustomed since

iii 1950. To answer these questions, I, like the occupying (and later intervening) powers did, must use Greece as an example. In this, I hope that I may be forgiven since unlike them, I intend not to make of it one. My objectives for doing so lie not in justifying policy, but rather in explaining it. This study would appear to have special relevance now, not only for the current financial crisis which has placed

Greece once again in world headlines, but also for the legacy of the Second World

War and the post-war strife the country experienced which is still playing out today with examples like the Distomo massacre, German war reparations and on-going social, academic and political strife over the legacy of the Greek Civil War.

iv Preface:

Considering that the origin of the names of Britain, the United States of

America and Russia, are found in Ancient and Byzantine Greek,1 it is perhaps not surprising that these states played such major roles in the history of the Modern

Greek State. As a Greek-Canadian having grown up in Canada, I was presented with the stories of wartime Greece from my father and uncle. After initial studies into the field of Modern Greek studies I realised that the stories I had heard as a child were not just stories, but were their recollections and perceptions of very real events. Upon further studies, though I discovered that in some instances their perceptions differed from actual events, this realization led me to the larger issue of the role that perception plays (not only on an individual level, but also on a collective level) in the formation of ideas and the formulation of policy.

Therefore, while trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-American foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War, the role that perception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became the central focus. From this starting point came the realization of a general lack of emphasis and research into the ways in which the British government managed to convince the United States government to assume support for British objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this dissertation.

1 Russia comes from Ros (Byzantine for Red) America from Amerigio (Italian derivation of Geia) and Britain from (Bretannia) named by an ancient Greek explorer. v During the period under examination, the Security Council became the arena where the Soviet Union and the United States (initially with British urging but then succumbing to domestic anti-communist pressure) ‘felt each other out’ and used Greece to do it. The former Wartime allies finally came to the relationship predicted by Winston Churchill and General George Patton, and

Greece became a pawn the Superpower shuffle that was the beginning of the Cold

War.

vi Dedication

To my mother.

May her memory be eternal.

vii Acknowledgements

First, I must extend my deepest thanks to my supervisor Professor Irini

Lagani. I cannot begin to express the gratitude that I feel towards her for accepting me as her student, for mentoring me, for guiding the progress of my dissertation, and for her constant support. She also accepted me as her student without ever having met me, and aided me greatly in the adjustment to academic life overseas and away from home over the past three and a half years. I will always be grateful.

I would also like to extend deep appreciation to the second member of my supervisory committee Professor Nikos Marantzidis. Like Professor Lagani did, he welcomed me into the department, and has supported and encouraged me at every step though the completion of my PhD. He also gave me my first teaching opportunity, and showed faith in me by allowing me to design the course and the materials. His belief in me bolstered my own. I must also thank the third member of my supervisory committee Professor Theodoseos Karvounarakis. He greatly assisted me with the technical aspects of my dissertation, finding sources that were vital to my research, and, with his comments, helping me to refine and clarify my arguments. I do not know how to repay the kindness and support each has shown me, but I promise to try and become a teacher as dedicated and as competent as they are. I thank you all.

Though it may “go without saying” that one’s family plays a great role in any personal success, I cannot leave that unsaid. Without the love, understanding

viii and support of my father Dean and my brother Nic from the time that I began my

PhD, it would never have been completed. I do not deserve to have been given such a wonderful family, and I fear that I will never be able to repay them for the love, support and friendship they have shown me. I have learned so much from each of you. I would also like to thank my uncle Ted Paravantes for his advice and encouragement throughout the process of finishing my PhD, and to his family for their continuing love and support. Being away from one’s family for so long is difficult, and yet they made it bearable with their support. I know that I would not have succeeded without you. I miss and love you all.

I would also like to thank Professor Eftichios Sartzetakis from the department of Economics at the University of Macedonia for convincing me that I could do a PhD in Greece, and for introducing me to Professor Marantzidis and getting this whole process started. I would also like to express my thanks to

Professor James Pettifer of Oxford University who has become a great friend and mentor over the past year. His comments on my dissertation also greatly helped me refine my research and arguments prior to my defence, and to help me realize just how much work is needed to produce a quality monograph. I would also like to thank my colleague Dr. Stelios Sotirios for welcoming me to the office, for the great office debates and discussions, and for helping me become a part of the

University environment.

Thank you to all of my friends from Greece and Canada for your company over the whole progress of my education. Each of you has helped make this journey bearable. I would also like to thank Sakis, Victoria and Sophia Pichos for

ix welcoming into their family, for making me feel like one of their own, and for their constant support and encouragement.

I would especially like to thank professors Giorgos Skoulas (PaMak),

Thanassis D, Sfikas (APth) and Procopis Papastratis (Panteio), the remaining members of my examination committee, who made themselves available at great inconvenience to themselves, to read my work and offer valuable criticism and comments. They have all helped me to gain a greater understanding of this dark period of Greek history, and have reminded me, through their own work and through their help with mine, of the human cost that is paid conflicts such as these.

Sadly it is a lesson that is seldom learned, and often not given the proper attention.

For my wife I reserve my greatest thanks, and yet the word seems far too insufficient to express how I feel. Without you, this PhD never would have begun, and without your support, faith and encouragement (and criticism), it never would have been completed. My successes only have meaning because I have you to share them with.

x Table of Contents

Disclaimer...... ii Abstract ...... iii Preface: ...... v Dedication...... vii Acknowledgements ...... viii Table of Contents...... xi Glossary ...... xiii Document collections abbreviations / clarification ...... xiv Introduction and Review of Literature...... 1 Chapter 1: Historical Background – British relations with Greece and the United State until June 1945...... 29 The SOE and the BSC: The Impact of British Spies in Greece and the United States ...... 31 Anglo-American Policy Conflicts: November 1943, the Cairo and Tehran Conferences ...... 46 The Lebanon Conference ...... 52 The Percentages Agreement ...... 58 Liberation and Confrontation ...... 61 Anglo-American policy during the December Uprising...... 66 The Varkiza Accord ...... 72 New Players at the Table: Truman and Atlee Take Over ...... 80 Chapter 2: Superpower Shuffle: The Potsdam Conference and Inter-Allied Confrontations...... 84 1946 - January to September ...... 97 1946: October to December...... 126 Chapter 3: A new era of American intervention: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the beginning of the Cold War...... 139 January to March 1947: A Declaration of War ...... 139 April to December1947: A New type of War...... 155 Chapter 4: ‘Please don’t go!’ British Propaganda and American Intervention in Greece ...... 182 1948: January to May...... 182 Palestine, Israel and the Eastern Mediterranean ...... 201 The Effects of the Tito-Stalin Spit: July to October 1948 ...... 208 Rising doubts: October to December 1948...... 217 Chapter 5: The Tide Turns – The end of the Greek Civil War and the Acknowledged supremacy of the United States ...... 232 1949: January to April...... 232 A Critical Month: May 1949 ...... 240 1949: June to September ...... 246 xi 1949 – October to December...... 260 Chapter 6: Detente and the Revelation of the New World Order...... 266 1950: January to June ...... 266 The implications of the crises in Cyprus, China and Korea ...... 278 Conclusion and Future Studies...... 299 Bibliography...... 315 Unpublished Primary Sources ...... 315 American Sources: ...... 315 British Sources: ...... 316 Published Primary Sources...... 319 Diaries and Memoirs ...... 322 Biographies...... 322 Secondary Sources, Books and Articles:...... 323 Appendix 1...... 331 GREECE ...... 331 EUROPE ...... 331 Appendix 2: The United States Foreign Assistance Program as of December 31, 1949 ...... 333

xii Glossary

AMAG American Mission for Aid to Greece

AMFOGE Allied Mission for the Observation of Greek Elections

AMM American Military Mission

BEM British Economic Mission

BLO British Liaison Officer

BMM British Military Mission

BPM British Police Mission

BIS British Information Service

BSC British Security Coordination

DSE Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados Democratic Army of Greece

EA Ethniki Allilegyi National Solidarity

EAM Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo National Liberation Front

ECA Economic Cooperation Administration

EDES Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos National Republican Greek League

ELAS Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos National People’s Liberation Army

ERP European Recovery Program

FARA Foreign Agents Registration Act

FO Foreign Office (British)

GNU Government of National Unity (Greece)

xiii KKE Kommounistiko Kommo Ellados Communist Party of Greece

SB Security Battalions

SOE Special Operations Executive

UNSCOB (I and II) United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans

Document collections abbreviations / clarification

FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States

BDFA – British Documents on Foreign Affairs

BDPO – British Documents on Policy Overseas

Note: Documents cited without these abbreviations are unpublished, and were found in the archives in Kew, Chapel Hill, and the Truman Library.

xiv Introduction and Review of Literature

While trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-

Eastern Mediterranean and of Western Europe.

To support these hypotheses, this work uses mainly the British and

1950. To answer these questions, I, like the occupying (and later intervening)

1 powers did, must use Greece as an example. In this, I hope that I may be forgiven since unlike them, I intend not to make of it one. My objectives for doing so lie not in justifying policy, but rather in explaining it. This study would appear to have special relevance now, not only for the current financial crisis which has placed

Greece once again in world headlines, but also for the legacy of the Second World

One of the most notable nineteenth century British Foreign Secretaries,

Lord Palmerston stated that Britain had ‘no permanent friends, and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests’.2 The obvious question that arises from this statement is has anything changed in the century and a half since it was uttered?

The relationship between Britain and the United States, dubbed first by Churchill as “a special relationship,” has changed dramatically through modern history. The first example of this relationship in action after WWII was Greece. However, in the historiographies of Anglo-American relations and the Origins of the Cold War, the significance of Greece is often not properly emphasised. I believe that Greece has far more importance than has been ascribed to it in these historiographies.

Though their relationship may be partially attributed to similar governmental institutions and economic philosophies, their bond is based on their common language, culture, values, and ‘democracy’. The Second World War tipped the balance of power decisively away from Great Britain and into the hands

2 Quoted by: Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 8. 2 of the Americans and Soviets, but before the shift occurred, Britain had begun to exert her influence on the United States. During the war, that influence was used in order to ensure the very survival of Britain as an independent nation and after the war was over, the influence that the British had exerted over American decision- making was continued and increased in order to safeguard British post-war interests.3 Whether or not the Americans were aware of this influence, and if they were, the reasons for why they allowed it to continue and the effects that this state- of-affairs had on Greece (and the rest of the world) are also important questions for this dissertation.

The Anglo-American relationship has defined the modern world’s economy and politics, and the way in which states now interact. However, what is of equal, if not greater significance than the existence of the relationship, is the question of why it is so. Aside from the reasons listed above and despite their superficial differences particularly since the Second World War, the Anglo-

American relationship can be explained as a creation of British manipulation of US foreign policy. This relationship has been far more pervasive in terms of its effect on other nations than other antagonistic inter-state relations, such as between the

USA and USSR during the Cold War. Other great powers have modelled their foreign policy on that of the USA and Great Britain, but have done so without the firm support of another power. To be sure, there have been periods where the USA has not followed British designs, and vice-versa, but those events have been the exception rather than the rule, in the relations from 1946 until the present, between the two premier Anglo-Saxon nations of the world.

3 I will attempt to prove this in my dissertation. 3 Throughout the Second World War, the US and British governments formulated policy, officially at least, to restore democracy and prosperity in Greece and they began to hold talks on the shape of the post-war world. Though problems between the two arose over whether or not colonial nations would be included in the commitment for liberty and democracy for occupied countries,4 the greatest problem for the two became how to deal with the Soviet Union. The Soviets held radically different ideals for post-war Europe and its people, as they did for dealing with Germany. Another central question of this dissertation is how did the alignment of Anglo-American policy in Greece occur? While Roosevelt felt that the British and the Americans had to come to an understanding with the Soviets, the British took a much different view.5 They believed that an Anglo-American block was needed to counter Soviet influence in Europe and British post-war actions in Greece demonstrate very clearly that point-of-view.6 Furthermore, the

Roosevelt administration had no desire to be physically committed to the security of Europe after the war, instead wanting to rely on the United Nations to keep the peace.7 However, the UN (Roosevelt’s brainchild) was formed in such a way that no decision that it took could be made without the unanimous consent of the Big

Powers. All members were equal in the General Assembly, but the Security

Council and its five permanent members had the final say over everything except for the mere discussion of issues.8

4 Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938, (New York: Penguin Books, 1997) pp. 53-59 5Ibid. 6Gerhard L. Weinberg, Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) pp. 145-47. 7 Ambrose, p. 57. 8 Charter of the United Nations. 4 As an example of post-war divisions amongst wartime allies, as they were planning the prosecution of Axis War criminals, a major division arose in the

Allied ranks as to the definition of Aggression, whether it should be included as a crime, and, if so, how it could be defined. At that time the USSR and the USA were closer in their desire for and definition of the Crime of Aggression, than were the USA and Great Britain, the latter struggling mightily to prevent any such crime or definition from being codified at all. The British staunchly opposed the legal and pragmatic suggestions of the Soviets, offering illogical, impractical, and subjective alternatives instead. However, by 1950, the USA and Great Britain were aligned in their policy and opposition to reaching a definition of the Crime of Aggression, thereby increasing cold war tensions, and contributing to the rapid deterioration in

East / West relations.9 In the absence on the part of the West to guarantee that they would not start a war nor would they support the prosecution of anyone who launched an aggressive war, the Soviets became more entrenched in their positions and the battleground countries of the era, Greece (and looking ahead to Korea,

China, Vietnam and others) suffered greatly as a result.

In terms of Anglo-American policy in Greece, while it is an important historical fact to understand the causes of the Greek Civil War and its chronology, for the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to understand mainly the perceived origins of the conflict and it’s perceived implications. From this, the

9 Maria Pichou, The Notion of Aggression in International Law (Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publications, 2012) Stalin wanted a guarantee that the West would not start hostilities if the USSR did not either. Despite agreeing with the Soviets on this issue immediately after the War, the American position switched to mirror the British who greatly desired to preserve the legal ambiguity that allowed them to continue to use force as a tool of their foreign policy. . 5 analysis of ‘perception’ became a central theme of this dissertation. Recently, it has been argued that the Greek Civil War:

... was caused by a total breakdown of political legitimacy, whose roots can be traced back to the 1930s, when a decidedly moderate left-wing challenge to the established order was temporarily halted by the dictatorship of 1936. The challenge gathered momentum during Greece's occupation by the Axis in 1941—4, when the National Liberation Front (EAM), dominated by the Greek Communist Party (KKE), acquired overwhelming influence throughout the country, while a discredited monarch and the old political world were forced into actual and metaphorical exile.10

However, at the time, the British and the Americans saw the conflict as being fermented by the USSR and its Satellites, and acted accordingly to counter the influence they perceived. Furthermore, though the British continued to support the Royal Hellenic Government with the king, while the Americans favoured the idea of republic, the way that these two nations related to each other continued to evolve and was illustrated by conditions in Greece. What is most demonstrative of this in the case of Greece is that the British could have forced any structure they wanted on the government and they chose to support one that operated in a manner that most closely reassembled their own, i.e; a monarchy.11 Even when the

Americans took over in Greece, they supported the British-moulded government, focussing more on the military campaign, but then eventually they also came to support the Greek Monarchy. Though these events will be discussed in greater

10 Thanasis D. Sfikas, ‘Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations Commission of Investigation in Greece, January - May 1947,’ Contemporary European History. Volume 2, Issue 1993, p.244. 11 The British tradition of passing on government positions from one family member to the other is particularly noticeable in Greek politics to this day with Greek politicians using their position to secure permanent jobs for family and friends, and making it nearly impossible to remove them or reform the system. A strong example is how the House of Lords continues to operate in the UK. 6 detail further in this dissertation, they are important facts to keep in mind in order to proceed.

In regards to the Anglo-American relationship, it has been popularly (and to a large degree academically) presented as being a benign and beneficial one.

However, the relationship changed the way in which the United States behaved and as a result, changed the way in which it was perceived. For example, at the end of the Second World War in Greece the American flag was waved as a symbol of freedom and democracy while on the other side of the world in Vietnam, the communist leader Ho-Chi-Minh stated that the United States was the protector of democracy and the defended of the oppressed.12 Yet, by 1960, the United States would be at war in Vietnam, and in the 1970s, after the fall of the Greek dictatorship, American flags were being burned in Greece. This thesis will attempt to answer, at least in part, how and why this change took place.

In order to begin to answer this question, the post-war objectives of the Big

Three during the War had to be assessed. Though the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent opening of the Soviet archives has made it possible for historians to finally know actual Soviet objectives in the 1940-1950 period, for the purpose of this dissertation (as was stated earlier) what is more important than assessing their actual knowledge, was assessing Anglo-American perceptions of Soviet intentions and how they communicated and reacted to those perceptions. The 1946-50 period was chosen in order to show clearly how far apart British and American policies towards Greece were at the end of the Second World War and to show how closely aligned they were by 1950. During the period under examination, the Security

12 Ho Chi Minh, 1945, quoted in: Ambrose, p. 50. 7 Council became the arena where the Soviet Union and the United States (initially with British urging but then succumbing to domestic anti-communist pressure) ‘felt each other out’ and did it in Greece. The former Wartime allies finally came to the relationship predicted by Winston Churchill and General George Patton, and

Greece became a pawn in the great-power-shuffle that was the beginning of the

Cold War.

In regards to the previously produced literature relating to Anglo-American relations/politics, many historians seem reluctant to admit that the United States’ government may have been controlled from abroad, or to consider the actions of the British government as deceitful and /or manipulative.13 Furthermore, many who specialize in Anglo-American relations refer to ‘a’ special relationship existing between the two nations. Is this actually the case? Another shortfall of the works that deal with the origins of the Cold War, Anglo-American relations, or Greek-

American relations, is that the crucial years of 1946 to 1950 are often ignored or dealt with in limited detail.

Using Greece as the main case-study, the research will begin by summarising Anglo-American-Greek relations up to mid- 1945. Next, it will examine the 1946 to mid 1947 period and the effects that the change from

Roosevelt to Truman, followed shortly thereafter by a change from Churchill to

Atlee (and Bevin) had on Anglo- American relations and policies, and to what degree if any, the British were able to manipulate the Americans into assuming support for British interests in Greece, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.

13 For example, the works of Robert Frasier, Anglo-American Relations, G.M. Alexander: British Policy and the Declaration of the Truman Doctrine and Howards Jones, A New Kind of War. Note: the full references for these works will be given in the Review of Literature. 8 Finally, the 1948-50 period will be examined in order to establish whether or not

Anglo-American policy in Greece, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, if in fact previously on a path to become unified remained that way, or if their policies began to splinter.

There are numerous assumptions about the nature of the relationship between the United States and Great Britain in the 1940s, but I feel that the real nature of their relations is far more complicated than has previously been explained. In terms of Greek-American relations, the works that exist about the subject, have tended to focus on the post-1950 period. However, I believe that

1946 to 1950 were crucial years in Greek-American relations. Lastly, in the analysis of the origins of the Cold War, though Greece (as well as Turkey and Iran) is often mentioned in the discussion of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall plan, what is often overlooked is the role that the American experience in Greece played in the formulation of American Cold War policy generally, and document NSC-68 specifically. This dissertation, attempts to address these gaps.14 This subject is in the field of Diplomatic History and it examines the Interstate and Intrastate relations of Britain, the United States and Greece. The work will also analyze the inter-party politics in the governments of the United States, Britain and Greece in order to asses to what degree if any domestic politics played in the foreign policy of the countries in question.

By surveying what has already been written about British and American policy during the early years of the Cold War and by using newly available

14 These works speak mainly about a US continuation of British Policy without examining in detail the role of the British in getting the US to do it. 9 primary sources in addition to re-examining those which have already been used, it may be possible to create a more clear image of what British and American strategic objectives really were, how they changed, and what the real reasons for these changes were. The main examples for establishing British and American perspectives of Soviet intentions will be the international conferences at Tehran,

Moscow and Montreal, and Soviet actions towards the Greek resistance and government, the Big Three’s involvement in and conflicts over the two UN special commissions for the Balkans, and their increasing conflicts in the UN over numerous issues from 1946 to1950.

Currently there is little scholarship dedicated exclusively to Anglo-

American Policy in Greece between 1946 and 1950 and the continued British manipulation of American foreign policy until 1950. Even less are the attempts that have been made to ascertain the role that the British played in the declaration of the

Truman Doctrine and the origins of the Cold War which as a result provides a fascinating avenue for the focus of this dissertation. By re-examining Anglo-

American policy in a more nuanced way, taking in to consideration the depth of their pre- Cold War engagement in Greece and with each other, the pressures placed on British and American decision makers, and the degree to which British strategic interests influenced the United States, new insights into the origins of the

Cold War and the role the British played in the declaration of the Truman Doctrine may be gained. Though that understanding, it is hoped that this dissertation reminds the readers of the human cost that is paid during times of conflict and although it is necessary to study the individuals who effected the course of events,

10 the people who were affected must not be forgotten. If this study fails to accomplish the later, than I fear the significance of the former will be dramatically reduced and the fault will lie solely with the author.

This work and the existing bibliography:

The existing bibliography has suffered from two main shortcomings. The first is a general lack of communication between the Anglo and Hellenephone historiographies. The second, relating mainly to the British historiography of the

Greek Civil War, particularly those written up to the 1980s, were in many ways dominated by the work and scholarship of C.M Woodhouse. As a result, the acceptance of new findings and theories was limited.15 Additionally, though the role of the British in the origins of the Cold War has been increasingly studied in recent years, the woks that have focussed on this topic have not examined in detail

British defence policy from 1946-1950, nor have they ‘integrated the military and diplomatic dimensions’ of British policy, particularly in relation to their influence on US policy towards Greece.16

To attempt to fill these gaps, this work has been based largely on the British and American primary sources (both printed and archival) relating to the period under examination. This fact and the central theme of the study have necessitated a

15 James Pettifer, ‘Woodhouse, Zervas and the Chams: Exploring the Second World War Heritage,’ Published at www.Professorjamespettifer.com.pp.4-6. 16 For example, see: British Intelligence, Strategy, and the Cold War, 1945-51, edited by Richard James Aldrich (London: Routledge, 1992)

11 presentation of Modern Greek history in the late 1940’s from a mostly non-Greek perspective. I have attempted to reduce this imbalance by using many Greek

Secondary sources, particularly those available in translation and incorporating them into my analysis with the British and American sources.

The focus on British and American relations has been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, the pre-existing analyses of their relations do not appear to have fully analysed the formulation of their policy for intervention in and relations towards Greece. Also, there has yet to be a study that analyses these disputed events by comparing American and British sources side-by-side in order to ascertain the exact nature of their policy formulation, implementation and changes.

Finally, due to the ongoing academic and popular debates in Greece in regards to any issue that touches on the Greek Civil War, it was decided to focus on the events of 1946 to 1950 from the perspective of the Western Powers and in so doing to distance partially the work from this highly contentious subject. There is possible criticism for largely excluding French and Soviet sources from this study, however, that too was a conscious choice dictated by three main concerns, the first or which was of a practical nature in order to keep the monograph focussed on its central theme. Secondly, neither the French nor the Soviets were as involved in

Greek affairs as were the British and Americans. Thirdly was the consideration of access to the Russian sources. Since other authors have already examined the

Soviet Union’s role in this period of Greek history far more competently that I could at this point, there was no practical reason to use more Soviet authors than I already have.

12 The nature of this work also places it at a crossroads of numerous historiographies, the first and most obvious of which is that of Modern Greek history. However, it is hoped that this work will also contribute to the historiographies of Anglo-American relations, Greek-American relations, the

Origins of the Cold War and Cold War History, and also the historiography of

European Identity and Integration (E.I.I) where it examines the early talks on the

Brussels Pact, the Marshall Plan (where it has been argued that Greece was used to justify the extension of aid to Turkey17) and other reconstruction/economic/military programs, and finally how to shed light on how Greece was seen by the Western

Powers, i.e.; Was it part of the West, the Middle East or Eastern Europe? This work also touches on international espionage and propaganda, examining the BSC and SOE and the ways in which they were used by the British to manipulate the

United States, not only into taking over in Greece, but also in the policies that the

US government would adopt in its dealings with the Greek government.

Lastly, this work is also a study on the writing and manipulation of history itself, particularly in regards to the nature of Anglo-American relations in Greece, and more generally about their intervention in the affairs of other nations. This work has focussed on the Anglo-American relationship in Greece because their analysis also provides insight into continuing Anglo-American intervention and relations throughout the Cold War and continuing in many ways to the present day.

17 Vasilis Kondis, ‘Greek Policies regarding the Balkans in the 1980s’ Round Table Discussion, Sunday June 3rd 2012, 12:00 to 14:00 at the conference: War and Political Transformation: Scrambling for Power in the Balkans 1940’s (May 31st to June 3rd 2012, University of Macedonia, Thesssaloniki, Greece.) 13 The Existing bibliography.

Anglo-American Relations:

Alan P. Dobson theorizes that much of the Cold War policy that affected

European Integration and Identity was implemented by the United States and Great

Britain based on their common interests, language and culture, not on their experiences in Greece in the mid-late 1940s. 18 He further argues that theirs is a

‘special relationship’ due to the fact that they have not come into conflict since they switched positions as the world’s dominant powers. By analysing their joint defence, economic and foreign policies and argues that in contrast to what others have stated, the ‘special relationship’ is not dead and that theirs is the most influential bi-lateral relationship in the world today. His methodology is to study the relationship over ‘la longue duree’ and though it covers some 95 years of relations well, the length of time also hinders the amount of detail that the author can provide. Additionally, like many other works dealing with Anglo-American relations in the 1940s, Dobson deals only with the ‘positive / beneficial’ aspects of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and British Security Coordination (BSC), two of the most influential British wartime clandestine organizations

In this work,19 Henry Butterfield Ryan attempts to demonstrate the role that a decline in British power played in the origins of the Cold War. He devotes much

18 Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers. London: Routledge, 1995. 19 Henry Butterfield Ryan. The Vision of Anglo-America: The U.S.-U.K. Alliance and The Emerging Cold War, 1943-1946. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 14 of the manuscript to analysing the attempts the British made during the war to forge closer relations with the United States. Though Ryan examines the early stages of the Greek Civil War (43-44), he neglects to examine the crucial post-

1946 period, which demonstrates much more clearly British attempts to use

American power to rebuild the British Empire. He also believes that the desire of the British to create a permanent Anglo-American alliance was higher even than the British effort to cement the break between the USSR and the United States.

This work presents an opposing analysis and will attempt to show that though the

British greatly desired an alliance with the United States, they pursued a dualistic policy in regards to their anti-Soviet policy, which would allow at least one foreign policy objective to be achieved should the other fail. Ryan’s study differs from this dissertation in another two main aspects. The first, is the lack of emphasis placed on the Anglo-American experience in Greece and the effect it had on their post-war relations. Next is that while the focus on 1943-1946 may have been useful for the technical purpose of being concise, it had some practical problems in terms of limiting the ability of the work to accomplish the author’s objectives.

Though he touches on events outside of Europe in the post-war period,

Norman Moss20 focuses of European events that affected and illustrated the transfer of power from the British to the Americans. He offers a detailed view of the depleted British economy, the war weariness of the British people and then his belief of their initial reluctance, then resignation, with which Britain, loath to think itself so weak, passed the leadership in world affairs to the Americans. It is here

20 Norman Moss, Picking up the Reigns: America, Britain and the Post-War World :1946 to 1949, (London: Duckworth, 2008) 15 where his work and my own diverge sharply. This study will show that the British did not see themselves as transferring leadership. They believed that they could guide US power to support their own objectives. Though Moss does accurately convey some of the feelings associated with the British plan, he attributes it more to a collection of circumstances which the British faced, rather than as a deliberate policy on their part. Moss’ work conforms more with mine slightly in his analysis of US intentions and objectives in taking over from the British. However, the fact that his work differs so completely from my own in analyzing the British objectives relating to the United States, the emerging Cold War and the new world order at this time, dramatically reduces the usefulness of his analysis for my work.

Robert Frasier’s book21, is divided into two parts, the first dealt with British involvement in Greece during the Second World War, and the second with their decision to pull out of Greece in February 1947. For the first section he attempts to prove that had circumstances been slightly different, the British could have succeeded in creating a stable democratic government in Greece. For the second section he theorises that the Americans took over in Greece to rescue the British from the deteriorating situation in which they found themselves. The first main difference between Frasier’s work and my own is in regards to his statement that the British decided to pull out of Greece in February 1947. It actually appears as though the decision was made months earlier, as indicated by the first troop reductions beginning in September of 1946 and the fact that the United States was surprised by the British announcement of their withdrawal. Another difference

21 Robert Frasier. Anglo American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 16 between mine and Frasier’s works, is his use of the sources to put forward the theory that that a secure democratic government could have been established in the wake of the German occupation. I theorize that there were simply too many factions with too many weapons and too much instability in Greece for any government to function in an open and stable manner. In spite of the above differences, Frasier accurately covers the American’s lack of interest in Greece prior to 1947, and his assertion that the US takeover in Greece was a deliberate

British plan does supports the premise of this dissertation. He considers the diplomatic exchanges between Britain and the USA in early 1947, and the significant role Britain continued to play in Greece after March 1947 as prime examples. However, he does not examine the possibility in detail, and then stops the narrative in 1947, just before the real signs of the British plan were demonstrated.

Greek-American, Anglo-Greek relations:

James Edward Miller22 examines the role that the United States played in the development of the post-war Greek State. He theorised that for US decision makers, the United States represented a sort of ‘universal model’ that other nations should emulate. Despite the numerous strengths of his work, he presents two arguments that contrast sharply with this dissertation. The first is treating the

British as ‘neutral’ observers of American-Greek relations when it appears that

22 James Edward Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974 (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2009) 17 they were anything but. The British had significant and well documented interests in Greek affairs and in US involvement in them. The second difference of his work with mine to focus on the 1950 to 1974 period. I believe that the available sources point to many of the key development that defined Greek-American relations occurring prior to 1950. Miller dedicates only 3 pages to the 1946-1950 period in his introduction, but this omission provided an opportunity for this dissertation to fill the gap that he left.

Howard Jones’ work23, argues that American policy towards Greece was a focal point in the development of a global strategy designed to combat totalitarianism. Though the narrative begins in March of 1947, it supports the premise of this Thesis by discussing the negotiations between the United States and

Britain over the American assumption of responsibility for Greece, the most telling part of which was the agreement to keep British troops in Greece into 1948 and beyond. Had the British situation been as desperate as they presented in February

1947, then it is unlikely that significant numbers of British troops would have remained in Greece after March 31st 1947. Jones’ main argument is that had the

United States not assumed the British role in Greece, than the Soviets would have undermined the Greek state by removing the Greek people’s faith in it, leading to its collapse and eventual fall under Soviet domination. Jones continues by stating that the Truman doctrine was a viable response, both ideological and practical, to

Soviet policy in the Balkans and the ‘new kind of war’ that was taking place in

Greece. Jones’ approach to the relevant (the US policy) external and internal

23 Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 18 causes of the conflict in Greece are quite different from those of Lawrence E.

Wittner24, whom, as the title of his work suggests, examines the role the United

States played in Greece from 1943 to 1949.

Wittner points out how US policy makers viewed Greece as one of the fronts against communist expansion, but also how Greece rose in importance as a result of US perceptions about the need to secure access to Middle Eastern oil.

Wittner argues that the United States over-simplified the situation in Greece and based many decisions on simplistic presumptions. Despite the strengths of his work, and the attempt he makes to tie the neo-colonialism the United States began to employ in Greece (a term further developed in American Foreign Policy in

Greece by Micheal Amen) with future events, Wittner, Jones and Amen fall short in two key areas.

First, they do not progress far enough into ascertaining the motivation behind US policy makers assumptions/decisions in Greece, such as whether or not

US policy makers distinguished between leftists and communists (If so/not, why?).

Secondly, by focussing on the United States alone, they provide different and seemingly incomplete pictures of American intervention in Greece. These are differences encountered with numerous other authors who have sought to produce monographs on either British or American intervention in Greece. I believe that only by analysing British and American towards Greece together can either be understood fully. They were too interconnected for too long for either to be fully analyzed alone. Unlike the works of Wittner and Jones, my work also attempts to

24 Lawrence Wittner. American Intervention in Greece. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 19 ascertain the actual goals and perceptions of both British and American policy makers who used the fear of international communism to achieve domestic objectives.

G.M Alexander25 argues that immediately after the Second World War the

British viewed a democratic Greece as indispensable to their security interests.

However, they soon discovered that the ineptitude of the Greek political leaders, economic disaster in Greece, and rampant political radicalization made their intervention necessary, but extremely difficult. Furthermore, he argues that Greek affairs were inextricably linked to the relations between the Big Three, and as their relations deteriorated, so too did conditions in Greece. Though Alexander illustrates how the worsening conditions in Greece and in Britain eventually forced the British to abandon the country to the United States, he views the American takeover as a product of circumstance, not of design. Alexander clearly illustrates the high level of British engagement in Greek affairs, particularly when Ernest

Bevin took office, and how quickly the situation deteriorated forcing the British to declare their withdrawal to the United States. However, Alexander argues that these developments do not constitute a conscious design on the part of the British to manipulate the United States into declaring the Truman doctrine since the

British had no control over US decision-making in Washington.

25 G.M Alexander, The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece: 1944-1947. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) p. 250. 20 Origins of the Cold War:

In his examination of the origins of the Cold War Bruce R. Kuniholm26, takes a regional approach to his analysis, examining Iran, Turkey and Greece, and the efforts made by these countries to remain independent of the Great Powers.

Perhaps the greatest difference between this and Professor Kuniholm’s work, is his position that the Truman administration correctly assessed Soviet intentions in

Greece. Though that may have been the case for Turkey and Iran, it was not for

Greece. It highlights another fundamental difference between his work and my own. I acknowledge that Anglo-American policy was largely based on perception of Soviet intentions, since it was virtually impossible for them at the time to be certain of actual Soviet designs on the region. Perhaps it was a result of the re- escalating tensions of the Cold War in the early 1980s that Kuniholm wished to offer a justification of American policy. Kuniholm also states that there is almost

‘insurmountable difficulty” in differentiating Soviet defensive from aggressive policy, nationalism from idealism, and in terms of the United States, between their ideals and their self-interest.27 However, I believe that the available evidence, particularly when combined with an analysis of British sources, makes it quite possible to distinguish between the characteristic listed above. Furthermore, rather than defining what actual strategic or political objectives existed, Kuniholm simply states them as objectives. The reality seems far more complicated than he asserts, and my work attempts to elucidate those complications. Additionally, when

26 Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980) 27 Ibid., pp. 428-429. 21 discussing the formulation and implementation of American policy, Kuniholm does not analyse the role that various groups within the US government, each responsible for aspects of American foreign policy (such as the congress, different departments, individuals and the conflicts between them) played in policy making.

The author repeatedly refers only to US policy. Sometime this is appropriate, but often it requires more analysis, such as distinguishing between the policy of State

Department and that of the President. Another of the main problems in Kuniholm’s work is to use Iran as an example for events in Greece and Turkey, where the conditions in each nation were far too different for such a template to be imposed.

Also, the author does not examine British sources for the post-1945 period and therefore dramatically lessens the accuracy of his analysis, particularly in regards to Greece, the country to which he devotes the least amount of space in his book.

European Identity and Integration:

Commissioned by President Truman in January 1950 when he ordered a reassessment of the United States’ strategic situation, capabilities and requirements in regards to the Soviet Union and its perceived intentions of world domination,

NSC-6828 became arguably the most influential document of the Cold War. Its findings and proposals came to dominate United States perceptions and planning not only in regards to the USSR but also to Western Europe, until its declassification in 1975 and arguably beyond. While the significance of NSC-68 in

28 National Security Council document 68 (NSC – 68) was arguably one of the most significant and demonstrative documents of the Cold War. It outlined a plan to contain Communism and a key aspect of that containment effort was to rebuild and unite Western Europe. The authors drew heavily on US experiences in Greece in the 1940s, 22 the analysis of American Cold War foreign policy is well known, the actual source of the document’s findings and proposals is not. Many of the authors of the document were heavily involved in US intervention efforts in Greece and the ways in which their experiences attempting to eliminate communism in Greece influenced their work on NSC-68 has not been fully examined. Furthermore, the impact of NSC-68 on American perceptions of, and actions toward, European

Integration and Identity (E.I.I) has largely been ignored.

Michael Creswell29 has contributed much to the French role in the historiography of European integration and Identity (E.I.I) however he has argued that the Anglo-American commitment to European Defence (a key development on the path to E.I.I) was attributed largely to the French, not to the findings and proposals of NSC-68. In another work, though convincingly making the case for a larger French role than has previously been assigned to them, in the end he assigns too much responsibility to the French, and like others, again ignores the

Americans’ perceptions contained within NSC-68.30

In his detailed analysis of NSC -68, Steven Casey 31virtually ignores the origin of the document which in turns means that the US experience in Greece as it related to specific contents of NSC-68, were likewise overlooked. The book

American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 , makes the complete text of

NSC 68 available to readers and accompanies it with 22 commentaries written by

29 Michael Creswell, “How France Secured an Anglo-American Continental Commitment, 1945- 54,” in Cold War History (October 2002, No. 3, Vol. 1, pp. 1-28) 30 Michael Creswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2006) 31 Steven Casey, “Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950-51." Diplomatic History 2005 29(4): 655-690. 23 former U.S. government officials and academic experts. 32 The general introduction by Professor Ernest R. May partially succeeds in placing NSC 68 in its historical context, but like the authors listed above, he does not investigate the specific ways in which US experience in Greece resulted in specific proposals and findings in

NSC-68. This is vital because a proper understanding of the origins of the document would have allowed readers to better understand the policies that the

United States would apply in regards to Western Europe. He, like the other commentators in the book, also neglect (either deliberately or as a result of practice) to place their work in a historiography that connects both the history of the Cold War with the History of European Integration and Identity.

While the works listed above do by no means indicate an exhaustive list of the sources relating to my theme, I feel that they do represent some of the most relevant and works in these historiographies. However, as I have listed above, each contained major methodological, theoretical, and/or factual differences with the theories and results of my work. I have therefore decided to approach this topic from a different methodological and chronological perspective. Firstly, the 1946 to

1950 period in Anglo-American-Greek policy has not been dealt with exclusively before. Other authors have broken the period up differently to suit either in immediate the post-war or the Cold War origins historiographies. Secondly, in my attempts to re-examine Anglo-American policy towards Greece from 1946 to 1950 using both the American and British documents side-by-side, I hope to offer a

32 Ernest R. May, ed. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (London: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press1993) 24 different assessment of Anglo-American policy formulation, implementation and perceptions relating to Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

Methodology:

The methodology for this project will consist of a re-examination of the pre-existing literature on the issue (secondary sources, books and articles) and then proceed to re-examine some of the previously used primary sources, in addition to some lesser-used/cited primary sources. The objective being to attempt to find new ‘links’ between the pieces of information in order to answer the previously mentioned questions, and possibly answering whether or not the British did in fact manage to exercise some degree of control over American policy in the mid to late

1940s.

It is my hope that by analyzing the sources in a new way and by dealing with the 1946 to 1950 period in its entirety, new insights into this period may be gained. The ways in which governments formulated and implemented policy then is not so different from the way in which it is formulated now, and unfortunately, the effects tend to be similar as well. It is also my hope that as Greece is currently experiencing yet another crisis in which external politics have played such a significant role, that my work may in some way assist those living through these events.

Method:

25 Primary sources: Official government records for the time period in question.

American and Greek records primarily but also relying heavily on records from the

Paris Councils of Foreign Ministers.

Method: The most convenient method to search government records is online.

The most notable online sources are:

-National Security Archive, (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv),

-The Woodrow Wilson Centre’s Cold War International History Project

(www.cwihp.org),

-The Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) (formerly: Parallel

History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact) (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch), w

-The Cold War History Research Centre in Budapest (www.coldwar.hu).

-Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)

(http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS- idx?type=browse&scope

=FRUS.FRUS1)

Secondary Sources: To establish pre-existing scholarship about the origins of

NSC-68 in order to properly frame my arguments and analyses and to set up Part

II.

Method: Libraries, research centres, articles.

Outline:

The Dissertation has been divided into 1 thematically and 5 chronologically-based chapters. Though each one is dedicated to a specific year, there are numerous

26 themes that are repeatedly emphasized: bilateral Anglo-Greek, and Anglo-

American policies, the tri-lateral Anglo-Greek-American policies, perceptions of the Soviet Union and Greece’s northern neighbours.

Chapter 1: A survey of the relevant Anglo-American-Greek historical background up to the Potsdam Conference in August 1945, with a focus on wartime Anglo-

American interaction (namely the SOE and the BSC) in order to establish the basis for the contrast with their post-war relations.

Chapter 2: The effects of the transitions from Roosevelt and Churchill lead governments, to those led by Truman and Atlee / Bevin, early confrontations in the

UN, Britain’s declining power (1945-46)

Chapter 3: The Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan, UNSCOB (1947)

Chapter 4: The crucial year. Would the United States continue on its new foreign policy path? The effects of the new American Foreign Policy, the new British role, the effects in Greece, and the meaning of the Tito-Stalin split, UNSCOB II.

Additionally, crises in Italy, France and Palestine and how they reflected / influenced / were influenced by Anglo-American policy in Greece. The

Foundation of NATO (1948)

Chapter 5: The British objective is almost fully realized with the United States fully committed in Greece and internationally against the communists. NATO

Grows (1949)

27 Chapter 6: USA assumes leadership of NATO, Greece and Turkey invited to join

NATO, USA supports Greek Monarchy, look to the future in Greece (Papagos as

PM), internationally with Korean and Vietnam Wars (1950)

28 Chapter 1: Historical Background – British relations with Greece and the

United State until June 1945

The British have a long and well-documented history manipulating the governments of foreign nations. Though the depth and breadth of that manipulation has varied, the predisposition of the British to intervene in the affairs of other states has not. Their intervention has ranged from economic subversion and trade wars to coups (as was the case in Iran in the 1970s) and the installation of rulers, as was the case with Greece in the early 19th century and the installation of King Otto in 1821.

Great Britain and the United States also have a long and unique history and their relations have been as diverse as the counties in which they have become involved. The year 1812 was the last time that Great Britain and the United States come into direct military conflict. A hundred and thirty years later, the Second

World War forever altered not only the way (s) in which the United States and

Britain related to each other, but also and perhaps more significantly, the way in which they intervened in the affairs of foreign states. For the first time in history, two world powers switched positions of supremacy without coming into military conflict but that fact itself caused many problems. It allowed the British to believe that they could regain their pre-war status and it caused the Americans to be more trusting of British intentions, information and policies. These elements were extremely influential, not only to the British and American people, but also to the

29 people of Europe who became pawns in the British and American ‘chess match’ against the Soviet Union and its real or perceived intentions for world domination.

In terms of the United States policy towards Greece, the end of the First

World War saw the Americans, so disgusted with post-war European politics that they withdrew from European politics altogether. By December 1940, after almost two years of War in Europe, the only commitment the US could make was to be the ‘arsenal of democracy’ to provide the supplies needed by the British to fight the

Germans.33 It was not until the Japanese attacked them on December 7th 1941, that

Isolationism was at least officially abandoned and the United States entered into what would become an unprecedented and long-lasting period of direct intervention in European affairs.

Between 1922 and 1939, British policy towards Greece was not overly concerned with Greece’s strategic value because the possibility of war in the

Mediterranean was not taken seriously. For their part, Greek politicians were content to maintain the current level of good relations with Britain because of

British military power in the Mediterranean. However, the traditional economic links of the 19th and early 20th centuries began to wane and by 1935 Greece had closer economic ties with Germany than with Britain due to favourable trading terms established between Nazi Germany and Greece.

In the period between the Asia Minor catastrophe and the start of the

Second World War US interest in Greece waned also. It would not be until after the war had ended that the dramatic reversal of the Anglo-American positions and the perceived threat presented by the USSR and its satellites, that US interest in

33 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Radio Broadcast, December 29th 1940. 30 Greece changed. For the purposes of this work, the most significant developments were those that indicated British intentions to maintain their position of influence in Greece and in the United States. Two of the key developments were the deployment and use of the British spy organizations, the Special Operations

Executive (SOE) and the British Security Coordination (BSC).

The SOE and the BSC: The Impact of British Spies in Greece and the United States

The SOE performed many duties in Greece as it acted as a liaison between the Foreign Office and the beginnings of what would become the Greek resistance groups, in addition to its duties of equipping and training saboteurs.34 The SOE’s activities in Greece were kept secret because post-occupation planning may have implied that the defeat of Greece was inevitable, thereby undermining the will of the Greek military.35 The SOE was also charged with coordinating action against the expected German occupation forces, and to relay intelligence to the British government about the Germans and the Greek Resistance should an occupation occur.36

When Hitler invaded the USSR in May 1941, he turned Stalin into

Churchill’s only remaining continental ally. Despite Nazi-Soviet peace lasting for

34 Nicholas Hammond, Venture In Greece , (London: William Kimber, 1983) p. 13. 35 Richard Clogg, “The Special Operations Executive in Greece,” in Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, Eds., (Pennsylvania, Penn State University Press, 1995) p. 111. 36 William MacKenzie, The Secret History of Special Operations Executive, 1940 to 1945, (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2002) p. 450. 31 nearly three years, the USSR was under-equipped and unprepared to meet the

German offensive. The rapid seizure of most of the Soviet Union’s European territory by the Germans re-enforced the British belief in the utter incompetence of

Soviet military capability, thereby reducing the importance the British placed on them as an ally. This was in turn re-enforced by Churchill’s outspoken anti- communism. This view was not entirely shared by the United States and Lend-

Lease was extended to the USSR.

Though the United States had not yet entered the war, openly through official channels and covertly through the BSC in the United States, the British sought to influence American public and private opinion in their favour. The organization was run by a wealthy Canadian industrialist named William

Stephenson who used a large portion of his personal finances to establish and run the organization, based out of New York and officially known as the British

Passport Control Office. Stephenson hired the staff and personally recruited many of the members of the organization, particularly individuals who were able to cultivate close personal relationships with influential Americans.37 One of the most effective relationships exploited by the BSC was between one of their newer recruits Roald Dahl, an RAF pilot who had served in Greece and who was gaining recognition as a writer of fiction, and an wealthy Texas newspaper man named

Charles Marsh. Marsh, aside from being very wealthy, was well connected to the

Democratic Party, as had access to numerous other influential party members,

37 Jennet Conant, The Irregulars: Roald Dahl and the British Spy Ring in Wartime Washington. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008) pp. xiv-xv. 32 notably Vice president Wallace, and sensitive documents.38 The British would exploit these relationships greatly, not only to gather information, but also to influence American policy.

Once the United States entered the War, both the USA and Great Britain could initially only agree that the defeat of Germany and Japan was their primary objective. There are two main aspects to the British efforts to influence US policy that are truly remarkable. The first is their level of success which was unexpectedly high, and the second was the degree to which the Americans would follow the

British example long after the Second World War was over.39

The fact that Churchill needed to establish an organization, tasked not only with relaying information about, but also shaping US policy, indicates how far apart US and British policy was in the early years of the Second World War. The

BSC was particularly concerned with the United States’ intent to dismantle the

Empire, the commonwealth trade preferences and (by 1943) to dominate post-war air commerce. On December 7th 1941 the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour instantly drew the United States into the War. Despite gaining two allies over a period of 6 months (the USSR and the USA) the British felt that they were in an unenviable position and risked being the ‘odd man out’ in relations and planning conducted between the Big Three. Therefore, by early 1942, Churchill, with the

BSC in the United States, the Foreign office and the SOE in Greece, was working

38 Conant, pp. xiv-xvi. 39 Two of the most significant cases where that were not the case was with the formation of Palestine which the British opposed, and the use of Nuclear weapons in Korea, which was stopped nearly at the last minute by Prime Minister Atlee’s direct intervention with President Truman. 33 to limit communists, isolationists, Axis sympathisers and to bring the United States policy closer towards that of Great Britain.

In the United States, the forces of isolationism, which had prevented the

United States from joining the League of Nations in 1919, were still very strong and were threatening to re-assert themselves once the Second World War was over.40 To counter this, in the first few months after the United States entered the

War, Roosevelt put forward his idea for the post-war era which he called the ‘Four

Policemen.’ His plan was to create an organization, similar to the League of

Nations, but rather than relying on consensus among a hundreed or more members, would have the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and China (which all together represented more than 1 billion people) to be the main decision-makers in the post-war world.41 It was the precursor to the Security Council and formed the basis for Roosevelt’s post-war strategy. In terms of US intentions for Greece, since it had fallen to Germany the previous year and due to the main US focus being in the Pacific theatre, the United States was content to allow the British to continue to deal with the Greek government and resistance.

Politically, in the spring of 1942 official British policy was supporting King

George II and the war effort, but through the actions of the SOE, British policy was actually supporting groups who desired the collapse of the Greek government. SOE agents made contact with Venizelists, communists, and other Metaxas opponents as part of Churchill’s famous plan ‘to set Europe ablaze’. However, it seemed from

40 Stephenson, British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-45 (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 1998), pp. 224-225. See an example of the action the BSC took to counter Isolationists and German propaganda. 41 Susan Butler, ed., My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondences of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) pp. 4-5. 34 the outset that British policy leading up to and during the Second World War was destined to keep Greece as divided as it had been in the 1920s. The SOE worked with republicans and communists because they were the most willing and able to operate underground. On the other hand, most of those loyal to the king and the

Greek government were seen by the British as being satisfied with the current political situation and if they decided to resist the occupation at all, it was decided too late and they were therefore of little use to British intelligence.42 Though the occupying forces presented a common enemy the forces that would rise up to oppose these occupiers had diverging political agendas. The British expected that these agendas would be put aside until the end of the war. In relation to British policy towards the war-efforts of the Greek Government in Exile (the GGE) and the Greek resistance, despite on the surface appearing complementary, in practice these policies were almost completely incompatible. They were flawed from the outset since those upon whom the British relied to fulfill the first were also the least likely to accept or support the second. Not only did this create problems in

Greece, but it created many problems between the main British agencies responsible for operations in Greece, the Foreign Office and the SOE.

The SOE had been in Greece since 1941 training saboteurs and the first

SOE mission to the Greek resistance in the mountains came in October 1942.

Nicholas Hammond, CM Woodhouse and Brigadier ECW Meyers were parachuted into Greece to destroy the Georgopotamos railway bridge.43 On March 8th 1943, Sir

Anthony Eden re-iterated a policy of ‘full support for the Greek King and his

42 Woodhouse, C. M. The Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in their International Setting (London: William Brendon and Sons, 1951) p. 37. 43 Hammond, p. 15-16. 35 government, even at the expense of some loss of active effort against the occupying powers.’44 What Eden and the Foreign Office seemed to ignore was that with some 10-12,000 armed men, ELAS was the only force large enough at the time to do anything against the occupying forces. In Washington, British intervention in the American war effort was proceeding along very different lines.

By the spring of 1943, one of the main British spies in America, Roald

Dahl, had managed to secure a weekly visit to President Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) private retreat in Hyde Park. Though careful not to discuss politics too much (for fear of being revealed as a spy) he was able to gather a significant amount of information for the British. As a result of their spy ring, the British discovered the

Americans’ post-war plan, not only to dismantle the British Empire, but to allow

PAN-AM airways to gain a monopoly of world-wide air travel. In one specific case, Dahl was given a top-secret US Cabinet memo by Charles Marsh. The document outlined the United States’ plan to use the airbases they had constructed world-wide for post-war American commercial use. The British had pressured the

US for the internationalization of these bases, but by December 1942, the British

House of commons was well aware that even the bases constructed on British-held territory were planned for American use. The debate in the United States was headed by American Industrialists on one side, who supported a new American

Imperialism where US industry could and would go anywhere in the world, wresting control of territory from the British. The other side, epitomized by Henry

Wallace, the US vice president, was idealist, and he said that the post war world must be one of equality. Both positions were undesirable to the British, especially

44 Mackenzie, p. 461. 36 to Churchill (and later Bevin) who believed that the Anglo-Saxons were destined to govern the world. The document outlined post-war American policy that was a hybrid of both the Liberal and Industrialist positions. It contained the plans for the de-militarization of Japan, the freeing of British colonies and American control of air routes. Dahl got the document to his contact at the BSC who took it to their headquarters in Washington and made copies. The contact returned within a half hour and gave the document back to Dahl who, ‘without comment’ returned the document to Marsh. Dahl knew that the document would already be on its way to the head of British Security Coordination (BSC) William Stephenson, and then to

Churchill. Reportedly, Churchill was astonished by what was contained in the report.45

The incident did cause some embarrassment for the US Vice President, but amazingly, the source of the leak was never discovered by the Americans, and the

British increased their use of BSC intelligence from this point on.46 In another of his reports, Dahl stated that Roosevelt appeared to be ‘under the spell of Churchill’ due to the number of times FDR referred to the British Prime Minister and to the tone with which he referred to him.47 However, Dahl later reported that he felt that

Roosevelt was aware that he was a spy and, while not divulging too much sensitive information to Dahl, he would use their conversations to prepare the British for something. Of his work he stated that ‘my job really was to try to oil the wheels between the British and American war effort’, which were often strained,

45 Conant, pp. 120-123. 46 From mid-1942 on, Roald Dahl managed to work his way up to contact directly with President Roosevelt, and was therefore able to provide massive amounts of high-level intelligence to the British. Ibid., 47 Conant, p. 137. 37 particularly as a result of diverging post-war aims.48

British knowledge of and control over American intelligence was also demonstrated when the United States began to form the CIA’s precursor, the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS).49 By the time it was established in mid 1943, the BSC had thousands of ‘employees’ all over the Americas, and had spread to two floors in the Rockefeller centre in New York, and to countless other office buildings and hotels. The newly formed OSS, headed by John Foster Dulles, was based on one floor above the BSC at Rockefeller Centre, and the Canadian in charge of BSC, William Stephenson, provided his own staff to ‘help’ the

Americans establish their own spy network.50 The British positioned themselves perfectly to access and influence not only the information collected by the OSS, but also its very organization.

In contrast to expediting BSC’s operations in the US, in Greece, Prime

Minister Churchill made the SOE’s tasks more difficult when he ordered that unless operational necessity dictated otherwise, aid to the Greek resistance ‘would favour the groups willing to support the king and his government.’51 However, this statement was not binding, and beyond stating that His Majesty’s Government supported King George, the SOE was free to work with ELAS. The SOE continued to work with all groups that were opposed to the occupation, and attempted to keep them from turning on each other. Had Churchill’s recommendation been followed

48 Conant, p. 140. Ironically, the clandestine lines of communication were trusted to more accurately convey actual government objectives than were the official ones. 49 Stephenson, pp. 442-43. 50 Stephenson, pp. 447-49, 24-25, 47, 347-52, and, Conant, p. 141. 51 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume II: Before the Storm, (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1951) p. 130. 38 through, it is unlikely that any aid would have been given to any resistance groups throughout the German occupation, during which the British supplied the Greek

Resistance groups with food, clothing, weapons and gold. Despite the conditions of the War in Europe at this time, the amount of aid ELAS and EDES received was impressive, especially considering the logistical problems that were involved supplying them.52

In terms of the American attitude towards the Greek Resistance, it too was greatly influenced by the British. At British insistence, the Americans helped repress news of the Greek Military’s mutiny in the Middle East in order to avoid further damaging the prestige of the Greek Government in Exile.53 Furthermore, the British made it clear to the Americans that they desired the return of King

George to power and though they would not use force to do it, they would instead attempt ‘to sell the King and the Tsouderos government’ to the Greek people, in part, at least, by persuading them that the king intends to rule as a democratic constitutional monarch.’ The Americans agreed with the British and recognized the

GGE and the King as the legitimate government of Greece.54 However, they stressed that the Greek people be given the opportunity to express their anti- monarch feelings and keeping with their own fears of foreign manipulation (which

52 Procopis Papastratis, British Policy Towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941-44 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp. 151-54. *Table: Oct 1943 to Jan 1944 EDES ELAS Food and Clothing 14 tons 34 tons Arms and Ammunition 74 tons 22 tons Gold Sovereigns 18,000 coins 927 coins * * Table reproduced from: Papastratis, p. 155. 53 Kirk to Hull (505) March 13th 1943, FRUS 1943 Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 125. 54 Memorandum, Murray to Hull, March 16th 1943, FRUS 1943 Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 126 39 were well founded) stressed that the ‘selling’ of the Greek King should not be done by a foreign power.55 The Americans feared that foreign intervention would re- stimulate long-standing political divisions in Greece, and that the British belief that only a monarchy would be suitable was supported ‘neither by the facts of recent

Greek history nor by a reasonable analysis of the present temper of the Greek people.’56 Therefore, by forcibly restoring an unpopular government by force the

United States predicted the possibility of armed conflict by organized groups that were prepared to oppose the return of the King and his government. Additionally, the Americans believed that if the Greek people were not supported by the United

States in their right to choose their method of government, then they would likely turn to the Soviet Union for that support.57 Therefore, though the United states followed British policy by recognising and supporting the Greek Government in

Exile and the King, they succeeded in their policy objectives by getting the Greek

King to declare that at the end of the War, he would ‘submit himself to the free expression of the will of the Greek people,’ although the pledge was only for the composition of the government, not its actual form.58 In another memorandum to the United State, the Foreign Office outline the reasons for its support of the Greek

King, amongst which was the fact that the King had stood by England as a ‘loyal ally’ during the early stages of the War, however, they also stated that they needed

55 Memorandum, Murray to Hull, March 16th 1943, FRUS 1943 Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 127. 56 Memorandum, Murray to Hull, March 16th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 126 57 Memorandum, Murray to Hull, March 16th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 126 58 Memorandum of Mr. Foy de Kohler, March 24th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 130. See also: British Embassy to Department of State, April 24th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, pp. 131-32 and, Department of State to British Embassy, July 2nd 1943, pp. 133-34. 40 a strong administration in Greece in order to be able to use the country as a ‘base of operations’ in the later stages of the war.59

However, in Greece, despite some limited successes in coordinating resistance activities against the Axis occupiers, the SOE continued to face the problem of reconciling short-term military objectives with long-term political ramifications. The SOE often pointed out how the policy of the Foreign Office conflicted with the job that it had to do. This in turn allowed the SOE’s enemies in

Britain to assert that it had a policy of its own, and that it was not committed to following the policies of the British Government.60 However, it is important to note that at this time Ambassador Reginald Leeper, based in Cairo, was given complete control over the political aspects of the SOE’s work in Greece.61 Therefore, the

SOE’s task was hindered even further as the often un-realistic political objectives of the Foreign Office (i.e. the return of King George) were forced onto the SOE.

The Foreign Office seemed to be trapped in the old notion of Empire, expecting a post-war return to the pre-war status quo in Greece. The SOE had to deal with the reality that those who resisted did so for their own reasons and to further their own agendas, and between March and June of 1943, British Policy shifted from hostility to ELAS, to support, and then back to hostility to an even greater degree.62

In Washington in the summer of 1943, BSC operative Dahl had integrated

59 British Embassy to Department of State (868.01/397) April 24th 1943, FRUS 1943 Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, pp. 137-38. 60 Bickam Sweet-Escott, “The Special Operations Executive in the Balkans,” in British Policy Between Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece, Phyllis Auty and Reginald Clogg, eds. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1975) pp. 14-16. 61 MacKenzie, p. 463. 62 Woodhouse, “Summer 1943: The Critical Months,” in British Foreign Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece, edited by Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, (London: The MacMillan Press ltd., 1975) p. 117. 41 himself even further into the upper echelons of American industry and politics, getting Charles March to see Dahl as a protégée and by Dahl keeping BSC updated with Vice President Wallace’s statements and meetings.63 This was possible because Dahl had become friends with the vice-president and they played tennis together regularly. Through Dahl and other agents, BSC Chief William Stephenson cultivated numerous sources of information through July and August 1943. BSC provided its operatives with ‘safe’ bits of information64 from the British cabinet to trade for much more vital / sensitive information from the American side.65 The relationships that BSC operatives had cultivated were so strong, that when a scandal broke in Washington in 1943 regarding British officials allegedly bribing

American officials to approve the lend/lease agreement, The British were able to quickly identify the person who started spreading the rumours, who was a previously unknown member of the government.66

While the situation in Europe improved over the summer of 1943 with the defeat of Italy, allied air-raids over Germany, success in the Pacific, things did not improve for BSC in Washington. As the Foreign Office hampered the SOE in

Greece, British politicians were now attempting to exert their control over the espionage duties BSC operatives were carrying out. For example, Roald Dahl was not popular with some of the British embassy staff and was actually transferred back to Britain as a result. He was only saved by the director of BSC, William

Stephenson, who managed to secure a promotion and a re-appointment to

63 Conant. p. 145. 64 ‘Safe information’ meaning intelligence that was presented as being vital/confidential, but was in fact useless and sometimes even false. 65 Conant, pp. 146-48. 66 Conant, pp. 148-50 42 Washington for him. Air Chief-Marshall who had been responsible for ‘firing’

Dahl in the first place was outraged to learn that he had been overruled by a Spy

Chief, and illustrated the intense dislike the mainstream services had for the clandestine, but also the extreme value the British government placed on maintaining their intelligence network in the United States.67

Back in Greece the SOE was faced with a task that seemed increasingly unworkable; to coordinate a unified Greek Resistance as tensions between

EAM/ELAS and the rest of the resistance Groups continued to rise in 1943.

Furthermore, the extent to which EAM had grown since the spring of 1943 was not fully appreciated by the British until the Cairo conference to which Brigadier ECW

Myers brought many of their representatives. It was another situation where political interference made the ‘on-the-ground’ job much more difficult to achieve.

At this point British policy towards Greece and the United States was divided, which is not surprising considering the status of the war, but the Cairo Conference did convince the British of the seriousness of the threat the KKE posed to their post-war plans for Greece. In terms of Anglo-American policy in mid 1943, divisions appeared in two main areas. The first was when the two governments were formulating policy for the liberation of Greece, and the second came with the

Dodecanese Campaign that began with the Italian surrender in September 1943.

In terms of the monarchy, the British insisted that, for both purely military

67 Conant, pp. 180-82. It also indicated the problem in the British government of departmentalism, which many saw as crippling to the Allied War Effort. As had been demonstrated with conflicting jurisdictions between the Foreign Office, SOE and the British Military in Greece, and with the episode involving the, as it turned out temporary, firing of one of England’s most successful spies, Roald Dahl, from the Washington embassy. Each department had its own distinct agenda, and would seldom cooperate with others, guarding their mandate jealously and often to the detriment of the country as a whole. For more information about the departmentalism problem in England in 1943, see: Conant, pp. 183-85. 43 considerations and the fact that it would take time to accurately assess the real feelings of the Greek people about their government, the GGE needed to be fully supported as soon as it returned to Greece in order to resume its functioning as quickly as possible. Furthermore, in contrast to American desires, the British intended to allow King George to return to Greece as the Commander-in-chief of the Greek armed forces. In reference to their feeling of ELAS and EDES, the

British stated that in their opinion, in no way did both groups represent the views of the majority of the Greek people and that there was no reason to expect that the occupation-time cooperation between allied and resistance forces would continue after the occupation had ended. It was therefore in the Allies’ best interests to support a side upon which they could guarantee post-occupation support.68

The United States’ refusal to comment on either the position of the King or the demands of the resistance69 had two significant effects. The first was to fuel speculation that there was a rift between British and American policy (which in fact there was) and second to implicitly allow British policy to dictate the course of events leading up to the liberation of Greece and the status of the Greek

Monarchy.70 The Americans also believed that the violence between resistance groups had begun with the return of EAM’s representatives from Cairo who, after the conference of August 1943, having failed to secure all the concessions that they desired from the Greek government, believed that only by controlling all of Greece

68 British Embassy to Department of State (868.01/391) August 4th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, pp. 137-41. 69 Berle to Hull (868.01/390) August 31st 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 149. See also: Kirk to Hull (63) September 10th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, pp. 152-54. 70 Kirk to Hull (57) September 4th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, p. 150. The rift was apparent in the US congress where the Republican Party used it to attack FDR’s policy. 44 at Liberation could they hope to force their concessions on the Greek Government in Exile. The Americans then stated that they only believed that the situation would be resolved when the GGE issued a clear statement that the king would not return to Greece until after a plebiscite permitted it, which would not occur until the

British changed their policy of support for the monarchy.71 However, the Foreign

Office’s continued support of the Greek monarchy hindered those objectives. The

SOE was aware of ELAS’ strength and numbers, and proposed a plan to separate

EAM from ELAS by creating a Regency Council headed by Archbishop

Damaskinos and the Venizelist General Plastiras.72 However, over the next few months fighting continued between ELAS and EDES, with the greatest number of casualties being among the civilians who were caught in the fighting. Finding a resolution to end the civil war became even more important as the allies planned

Operation Overlord.

The failure of the Dodecanese campaign (with the loss of almost 5 infantry battalions, a hundred aircraft and some warships by the end of November 1943) had been planned over the objections of the United States and the British Chiefs of

Staff.73 This campaign was to be part of Churchill’s larger strategic interests for pressure on the Dardanells (perhaps he was still haunted by the memory of

Gallipoli) and to be able to have a strong British presence close to Turkey which would have the dual benefits of pressuring Turkey and controlling Soviet access to

71 Memorandum (868.00/1340) December 10th 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, pp. 156-57. 72 British Embassy to Department of State (868.01/426) December 22nd 1943, FRUS 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, pp. 160-63. 73 Anthony Rogers, Churchill's Folly: Leros and the Aegean — The Last Great British Defeat of World War II. (Athens: Iolkos. 2007) p. 49. 45 the Mediterranean. However, the US was very sceptical of this plan, seeing it

(correctly) as an operation designed to secure post-war British interests and as a distraction from the planned invasion of Sicily.74 Without adequate allied air support, the Campaign failed, marking one of the biggest British defeats of the war and one of the last German victories.75

Anglo-American Policy Conflicts: November 1943, the Cairo and Tehran

Conferences

The Cairo Conference (codenamed Sextant) took place from November

22nd to the 26th, 1943. Among other things it addressed the Allied position against

Japan during World War II and made decisions about postwar Asia and Greece.

Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China attended while Stalin refused to attend since he believed it could provoke the Japanese, with whom the USSR was not at war due to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of

1941; a five-year agreement of neutrality between Japan and the USSR.

The Cairo Declaration was signed on 27 November 1943 (only five days after the failure of the Dodecanese campaign) and released in a Cairo Communiqué through radio on 1 December 1943. It stated the Allies' intentions to fight until they received Japan's unconditional surrender. The Cairo Conference was organized by the British who also wished to discuss issues surrounding their concerns relating to

74 Rogers. pp. 51–52. 75 It is possible that the failure of this campaign contributed to Churchill’s post-war determination to maintain Greece as a sphere of influence.

46 the USSR alone with the Americans. However, Roosevelt refused to discuss the

USSR, focussing instead on issues relating to Japan and China.

The Tehran Conference was encouraged by Roosevelt who wanted the Big

Three to meet in order to clarify their plans for the rest of the war and to settle post-war considerations. From November 28th to December 1st 1943 Roosevelt,

Stalin and Churchill met at the Soviet embassy in Tehran in order to secure Soviet support for wartime allied objectives. In return for such guarantees, the Soviets asked for post-war considerations, most notably support of the Yugoslav communists and control of the Russo-Polish border. Additionally, the Western

Allies promised the USSR that they would open a Second European front, however, rather than being the Mediterranean front hoped for by Churchill which would protect British interests in the Middle East, it was to be in France. However, despite giving in to US desires on this occasion, the British would not abandon their objectives of securing the Eastern Mediterranean. Believing that the USSR was determined to control Eastern Europe, the British determined that they had to find some way to maintain their presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.76As a result of divided Anglo-American policy and recent Soviet victories against the

Axis, Stalin was also able to secure Western acceptance of post-war Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

76 David Dilks, ‘British Political Aims in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, 1944’ in British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944, William Deakin, Elisabeth Barker, Jonathan Chadwick, eds. (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1988) pp. 25-26. Churchill’s advocating for the second front to be opened in the ‘soft underbelly of Europe’ in the Balkans was a direct result of both his overall strategic desires and of his desire to vindicate his WWI Eastern Mediterranean policy. It is therefore not surprising that as soon as it was possible, the British returned troops to Greece in October 1944.Bevin would share this view. See also: Lars Bearentzen, ‘British Strategy Towards Greece in 1944,’ in British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944, William Deakin, Elisabeth Barker, Jonathan Chadwick, eds. (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp. 145-146. 47 At the Conference the British were increasingly concerned with the post- war world, and how the ‘spoils’ would be divided. One of the main conflicts in the

British government, particularly between Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal, and old British Empire aficionados of the military’s Chiefs of Staff was what to do about American plans to control the world’s airways. Using their spies and influence in the United States, the British government moved to press on the

Americans a joint US-British solution where they could share access on a half and half basis. Quickly the British became aware of the American Business interests that were arrayed against them, and were attempting to manipulate the US government to their side. The president of Pan Am Airlines, Jerry Trippe, was successfully lobbying for low US government regulation of aviation, but heavy protection through policies, pressure and subsidies. The ‘free market’ that the

Americans were stating they desired, and that they criticised the British heavily over as a result of the British empire preferences, was under attack from American business.77

While both the US and British governments’ main concern was to end the war, they also planned for the future and Greece became even more important in post-war planning as a result. As long as the British were ‘on the ground’ in Greece they had a say. Through the winter of 1943/44, with the German army struggling in

Russia, the British re-focussed their attention on the Balkans.

Finally in January 1944, with the British and Americans, the Soviets issued a statement supporting the Greek Government’s initiative to form a Government of

77 American private enterprise, particularly the commercial air travel industry was putting heavy pressure on the US government to force concessions from the British. Also companies like Standard Oil, were lobbying against British interests in the United Sates. See: Stephenson, pp. 145, 149-50. 48 National Unity (GNU) which included all groups and urged the Greek resistance and people to unite and oppose the Germans together.78 This was combined with

British support of Tito, with whom they believed cooperation was vital, in order to occupy as many German divisions as possible in Eastern Europe. To this end, against the wishes of Prime Minister Churchill, the Foreign Office was prepared to accept EAM/ELAS representatives in the new coalition Greek government. After fourteen meetings, and numerous proposals and compromises, and an armistice

(called the Plaka Agreement) was signed on the 20th of February 1944.79

With British urging, by April of 1944 the United States’ government was increasingly concerned with Soviet support of the Left in Greece. Soviet radio and press had been issuing statements of support for the Greek Left which while understandable, greatly concerned the British.80 Ambassador MacVeagh expressed doubt however as to whether or not the Soviet comments in fact represented a

Soviet desire to supplant Britain as the main power in Greece. Furthermore, the

Greek Ambassador communicated to the United States Representative in Cairo,

Mr. Alling, that the Greek Government was extremely concerned about British influence over the Greek military and of Soviet hostility to the Greek government of National Unity, particularly in light of another mutiny of the Greek military in the Far East and the mutineers holding 12 of the Greek Navy’s ships. As a result,

MacVeagh recommended to Secretary of State Hull, that President Roosevelt urge

78 US Ambassador (USSR) to Secretary of State (19) January 4th 1944 , FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, p. 84. 79Elaine Thomopoulos, The History of Greece , series: The Greenwood Histories of Modern Nations (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Imprints, 2012 ) p. 133. 80 US Ambassador (USSR) to Secretary of State (19) January 4th 1944 , FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, p. 85. 49 Stalin and Churchill to meet directly to sort out the situation in and their respective positions on Greece.81 Simultaneously, the US and British governments were negotiating about post-war air commerce.82 When US Ambassador MacVeagh approached British Ambassador Leeper asking whether or not the United States should intervene in the crisis, Leeper said no, stating that the British held the military responsibility for Greece. Leeper continued, stating that the Soviet broadcasts were exacerbating the situation and that if they so desired, the Soviets could solve the situation immediately but were deliberating provoking a confrontation between the British and the Greek armed forces.83 In the view of the

British the Soviet actions were a direct contravention of the ‘spirit of Tehran’ and was ‘in line’ with their intentions towards Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean as a whole.84 This was an extremely demonstrative statement illustrating British perceptions of Soviet intentions and US willingness to accept British direction and interpretation of these events.

The Americans even went so far as to support the British in urging King

George to remove Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and to appoint a ‘stronger

81 Alling to Secretary of State, April 18th 1944 , FRUS 1944 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 99-100. Additionally, through their BSC networks in the United States, The British were successful in achieving some compromises with some of the politicians who had been supporting Pan-Am’s objectives. See: Conant, pp. 184-189. 82 Conant, pp. 239-40, 236. Additionally in May 1944, Lord Halifax lodged and official complaint with the United States government over Vice President Marshall’s pamphlet on what he believed US foreign policy objectives should be after the war, priorities which included massive decolonization. The British Ambassador stated that the timing was very poor considering that the allies were planning Operation Overlord, and tried to make the illogical connection between the Vice President’s statements and endangering the secrecy of the planned invasion of Europe. In addition to trying to influence the United States against its own Vice President, the BSC also surveyed American companies, particularly Pan Am airlines, in order to assess their objectives and to prepare countermeasures. 83 Alling to Secretary of State, April 18th 1944 , FRUS 1944 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, p.100 84 MacVeagh to Hull (120) April 19th 1944 , FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 100-102. 50 personality’ in George Papandreou.85 The Americans supported and relied upon

Papandreou to provide them with information about EAM/ELAS and the disposition of the Greek people towards it. Papandreou informed them that it had ceased being a political movement and was only focused on imposing a communist dictatorship on the people of Greece, the majority of whom “hated and feared” the organization. Having been recommended by the British, his analysis was accepted.86 Whether or not his statements were accurate is irrelevant for this dissertation. What is relevant is the fact that on British recommendation, the

Americans accepted him as Prime Minster and then based their policy towards

Greece based on the information he provided, instead of the intelligence provided by the SOE which had two years of one-the-ground intelligence of the situation in

Greece.

In May 1944 the Foreign Office stated, ‘our long-term political and military objectives are to retain Greece as a British sphere of influence and to prevent

Russian domination of Greece which would gravely prejudice our strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean.’87 The British feared that a Communist- dominated Greece would sever its ties with Britain, become a part of the Soviet world, and cut off British access to Turkey and the oil fields of the Middle East. 88

85 MacVeagh to Hull (120) April 19th 1944 , FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 100-102 MacVeagh to Hull (122) April 20th 1944 , FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 102-103 87Cited in: Papastratis, p. 198. and Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Vision of Anglo-America: The U.S.-U.K. Alliance and The Emerging Cold War, 1943-1946.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 122-23. Ryan also stated "One might note the remarkable extent to which attitudes that characterise what we call the Cold War, and particularly America and the Cold War, can be found in Britain's policy as its officials reacted to the Greek crisis." 88Sir LLewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. II, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Service, 1970) pp. 390-91. 51 A few days later the British, the Greek Government and representative from the

Greek Resistance met in Lebanon to discuss the post-occupation composition of the Greek government. Ambassador MacVeagh recommended that the United

States not send representatives to the conference in order to preserve the prestige and influence that the United States had gained by not interfering in the affairs of foreign governments.89

The Lebanon Conference

Churchill’s disdain for and suspicion of the KKE was equalled only by the

KKE’s mistrust of the British and their post-war objectives. This intransigence and suspicion was highlighted on May 17th 1944 when representatives from almost every political party in Greece arrived in Lebanon for a conference that was intended to create a government of national unity (GNU) in Greece. Over the four days of the conference the Papandreou government, backed by the British, sparred with the KKE over the roles that each would play in the new GNU. In the end, though EAM managed to gain a few vaguely defined ministries, the conference was a victory for Papandreou. Furthermore, one of the main articles in Lebanon charter was the unification of all resistance groups into a single armed force under the control of the GNU.

American support was so strongly desired that all of the participants of the conference, including the EAM representative Professor Svolos, issued a letter to

President Roosevelt, pledging to work together for national unity and imploring the

89 MacVeagh to Hull (150) May 12th 1944 , FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 106-107. 52 US president not to allow the mutinies in the Middle East, fermented by “mad actions of irresponsible persons” to lower his opinion of the Greek people who had resisted the Axis in the ‘towns and mountains’ of Greece.90 President Roosevelt issued a response which pledged full American support of Greek unity and on May

22nd 1944, upon his return to Cairo, minster Papandreou was ‘entrusted with the formation of the Greek government.’91 The British were extremely pleased. Not only had the British secured US support for the Greek government, but they had limited the KKE’s influence and succeeded in having the individual that they desired to be appointed as Prime Minister. The British also informed the United

States over ongoing conflicts with the Russians over control in Romania and asked what the American position would be should the British and the Russians agree to

Soviet ‘controlling influence’ in Romania in exchange for British ‘controlling influence’ in Greece. Secretary of State Hull promised to give the question ‘serious thought’ but informed the British ambassador that it was unlikely that the United

States would abandon its ‘broad basic declarations of policy, principles and practice.’92

The Soviets approved of the agreement providing that the United States also agreed to it. However, knowing President Roosevelt’s distaste for the Spheres of Influence policy, Churchill assured him that the agreement of who would have controlling interests in Greece and Romania ‘would apply only to war conditions,’

90 MacVeagh to Hull (154, 155) May 15th 1944, quoting the Lebanon conference participants’ letter to President Roosevelt, FRUS 1944 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 108-109. 91 MacVeagh to Hull (168) May 23rd 1944 , FRUS 1944 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, p. 112. 92 Report of Hull about meeting with Halifax (870.00/42), May 30th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 112-13. 53 and that the British ‘do not of course wish to carve up the Balkans into Spheres of

Influence.’ They wished only to prevent ‘the divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkans.’93 Though not declared as such, this decision was the precursor to the Percentages Agreement that would be signed in October

1944 between Stalin and Churchill which, aside from deceiving the United States in terms of what this May 1944 agreement actually represented, also cemented the division of Eastern Europe. It may therefore be argued that the fate of the KKE and its armed struggle was sealed before the Second World War was over.

In June 1944 the representatives of the Lebanon Conference returned to

Cairo to confer with the Greek Government. The British and American ambassadors were soon confronted with the fact that despite the positive statements made by the participants of the conference, implementing its results would be difficult. The British attempted again to get the United States to issue a statement to enforce a settlement on the Greeks, but MacVeagh, speaking for Hull, once again re-iterated the American policy of non-interference.94 A few days later,

Roosevelt informed Churchill that the US government could not approve the proposed British and Soviet agreement since they felt that such an agreement would grow beyond military considerations and further divide the Soviets and

British. Furthermore, Roosevelt professed his preference for a consultative arrangement rather than a division of zones of responsibility to which Churchill replied that such an arrangement would be a ‘mere obstruction, always overridden

93 Churchill to Roosevelt (870.00/46) May 31st 1944, FRUS, 1944 Vol. V The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 113-15. 94 Hull to MacVeagh (24) June 10th 1944. The FRUS 1944 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 116-17. 54 in any case of emergency by direct interchanges between you and me, or either of us and Stalin.’ In the end, Churchill suggested to try the agreement for three months in order to not ‘prejudice the question of establishing post-war spheres of influence.’95 This was a very clear statement illustrating British post-war objectives.

The British greatly desired a Spheres of Influence arrangement in order to preserve their influence and their ability to be players on the international level.

Though he agreed to the trial period, Roosevelt continued to oppose the British initiative. The conflict even found its way into OSS and SOE operatives’ relations with the former criticising British policy and action in Greece. American agents’ criticism of the British was so severe that British ambassador Leeper complained to

US Ambassador MacVeagh who personally spoke to the US Army and OSS directors to do all they could to stop ‘an evil highly detrimental to Allied relations.’96

However, the issue of the Anglo-Soviet agreement on the Balkans was not yet settled. Cordell Hull wrote to President Roosevelt expressing his department’s continued opposition to this ‘dangerous proposal.’ Hull reminded the President that although the British stated that their responsibility in Greece had arisen out of their sacrifices for Greece during the military campaign of 1941, they did not refer to the

Greeks’ sacrifices for the British. Furthermore, Hull argued that the British plan was not only for Greece and Romania, but for all of the Balkans and that the

95 Roosevelt to Churchill (557) and Churchill to Roosevelt (700 and 703), June 11th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 117-18, 123. 96 MacVeagh to Hull (190) June 13th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East: pp. 121-22. 55 British used the US position in South America as an example to justify British intention to continue with Spheres of Influence in the Balkans. Furthermore, Hull objected because the British had discussed the proposal with the Soviet Union prior to discussing it with the United States but then tried to present it to the United

States as a “Soviet initiative” that “arose out of a chance remark” of Eden to the

American ambassador in London. Hull advised Roosevelt to confront Churchill about these inconsistencies. Roosevelt then contacted Churchill raising all of the issues that Hull had communicated to him and stating that he hoped nothing similar would occur in the future.97 Churchill responded that not only did he not feel that he had done anything wrong, but he was simply acting in such a way as was established by practice. He re-iterated that the loss of 40,000 British soldiers in

Greece in 1941 gave the British rights in Greece, that the Soviets were already the power in Romania, and although the Americans had given the British the lead in

Turkey, Churchill had continued to advise Roosevelt of his intentions and actions there. Churchill also pointed out that Roosevelt had not consulted him on the message Roosevelt had sent to Stalin ‘quite properly’ about the situation of Poland.

Churchill then stated that clearly both he and Roosevelt were acting unilaterally but in pursuit of winning the war and that all Churchill had been doing in Greece (and in Yugoslavia) was to get the resistance groups and the governments (recognised by the Allies) to work together to prevent Civil War, the outbreak of which would only benefit the Germans. Finally, he stated that both the British and the

Americans had to have an agreement with the Soviets to keep them from

97 Hull to Roosevelt (870.00/497) June 17th 1944, Roosevelt to Churchill (565) June 22nd 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 124-25. 56 continuing to support EAM. Roosevelt’s reply was short, indicating an acceptance of Churchill’s arguments, and he simply stated that both the United States and

Britain ‘should always be in agreement in matters bearing on out Allied war effort.’98 It was an implicit acceptance of the British plan, which although they objected to it, they were not prepared to force the British to back down.

On August 17th 1944, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt seeking to clarify

Anglo-American policy towards Greece once the Germans withdrew from the country. He informed Roosevelt that it seemed ‘very likely’ that EAM would attempt to seize control on Greece at the time of the German withdrawal. He advised that in order to allow the Greeks the freedom to decide between ‘a monarchy or a republic’ and to prevent civil war and the establishment of a

‘tyrannical communistic government’ that the Allies prepared to send troops to

Athens at the time of liberation. Roosevelt approved the plan as well as the use of such American air transport planes, as were available, for the operation.99 The

Americans appeared to have resigned themselves to British control over Anglo-

American policy in Greece.

While it may have been the result of American military concerns being in

Western Europe and the Pacific, the United States was also designing the capture of Germany and what should be done with the German population. Roosevelt ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a plan that ‘drove home’ to the German people that they were responsible for the ‘lawless conspiracy against the decencies

98 Churchill to Roosevelt (712) June 23rd 1944, Roosevelt to Churchill (570) June 26th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 125-26. See also: Memorandum to Soviet Embassy (870.00/ 7-144) July 15th 1944, ibid., pp. 130-31. 99 Churchill to Roosevelt (755) August 17th 1944,Roosevelt to Churchill (608) FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 132-34. 57 of modern civilization.’ Shortly thereafter, a directive labelled “JCS 1067” was drafted and accepted and the military government was to ‘take no steps looking towards the economic rehabilitation of Germany or designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.’100 However, it is important to note that it would not go into effect until 1946.

Meanwhile, on August 19th, after giving in to soviet pressure, EAM joined the GNU and by the beginning of September, the Greek government had flown to

Italy in preparation for its return to Greece. Furthermore, all resistance groups pledged to work together against the occupational forces.101 While all of the public statements seemed positive, the overreaching strategic issues would be settled between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow.

The Percentages Agreement

Although Germany was on the defensive by October 1944, Britain, the

United States and the Soviet Union were still dependent upon each other in the alliance against the Third Reich. Stalin was concerned that the KKE’s actions

100 Quoted in: James P. Warburg, Germany: Bridge or Battleground? (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946) p. 279. A notable protest to the implementation of the plan came after the war was over from the allied General feared most by the German Army, George S. Patton. In June 1945 Patton was named as the occupation commander of Bavaria. He was later relieved of duty after refusing to implement JCS 1067. He believed that with Hitler gone, the German armed forces could be rebuilt and used as an ally in a potential conflict with the USSR. Patton was also highly critical of the Allies’ use of German Prisoners for forced labor. He commented “I’m also opposed to sending PoW's to work as slaves in foreign lands (in particular, to France) where many will be starved to death," and "It is amusing to recall that we fought the revolution in defence of the rights of man and the civil war to abolish slavery and have now gone back on both principles." See also: Walter L. Dorn "The Debate Over American Occupation Policy in Germany in 1944–1945" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 4. (December, 1957), pp. 481–501. And: John Dietrich. The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (New York: Algora Publishing, 2002) p. 127. 101 Doc 868.01/8-1944, August 19th 1944, (281) September 2nd 1944, (295) September 8th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, pp. 133-35. 58 could disrupt the alliance and could force the British and Americans to take serious action in the Balkans. Unknown to the British liaison officers in Greece and to the

KKE, Churchill and Stalin met in Moscow in October of 1944 and entered into secret negotiations over their respective spheres of influence. The plan had been in development since May 1944, and after gaining the reluctant temporary approval of the United States, Churchill proposed that the USSR would have 90 percent influence in Romania, the British would have ninety percent influence in Greece, and in Yugoslavia the influence would be shared on a 50 / 50 basis. Churchill wrote these figures on a piece of paper, added ‘Hungary 50 / 50, Bulgaria, Russia

75%,’ and Stalin put a check mark on the paper with a blue pencil.102

The American government was not enthusiastic about Churchill's agreement with Stalin, fearing that it would lead to future confrontations over spheres of influence. Roosevelt would have preferred a consultative arrangement, where future actions could be discussed to dispel misunderstandings, and to limit the possibility of exclusive spheres. However, as a result of British and Soviet support for the Percentages Agreement, the U.S. government reluctantly agreed to it, but refused to become involved directly in Greek affairs until the British forced their hand by pulling troops out of Greece in 1947.103 It has been argued that the percentages agreement was the embodiment of the British plan to re-establish the empire, and that the people of Eastern Europe were sacrificed for the security of

102Martin Gilbert, The Road to Victory: Winston Churchill 1939-1945. Vol. 7 (Toronto: Stoddard, 1986). See also: Record of meetings at the Kremlin, Moscow, October 9 at 10 p.m.: foreign office papers, 800/303, folios 227-235, pp. 991-992. See also Papastratis, pp. 199-200, and Clive Ponting, Churchill, (London: Sinclaire Stevenson, 1994) p. 662. 103 Jones, pp. 22-23. 59 British communications and access to Middle Eastern oil.104 This agreement was also another example of the US giving in to British demands over Greece.

Whatever the case, this agreement was kept secret, and the KKE continued to hope for Soviet aid.

It has also been argued that Stalin used Greece to entice Churchill into the spheres of influence agreement, guaranteeing him control of Romania, but he had to restrain the KKE for it to work.105 As for the British, the Percentages

Agreement caused them to be overconfident of their position in Greece and they made an immediate blunder after the Moscow conference by deciding to withdraw the SOE. The work that the SOE had done in Greece during the occupation was not enough to keep the British government from relieving it of its duties and in

October of 1944, as Churchill and Stalin were meeting in Moscow, the SOE was pulled out of Greece.

In the process, the British government deprived itself of three years worth of experience and detailed corporate knowledge of the political, social, and militaristic conditions in the country. Just as the labours of the SOE began to yield results, the British government turned all of its operations over to an inexperienced military mission, discarding the relationships and knowledge that SOE agents had built with resistance and community leaders alike. However, Stalin had given them a free hand in Greece, and where British intentions were demonstrated by direct action, American and Soviet intentions were demonstrated mainly by inaction.

104 Heinz. Richter, British Intervention in Greece, From Varkiza to Civil War: February 1945 to August 1946. Marion Sarafis, Trans. (London: Merlin Press, 1986) pp. vii – ix. 105 Stravrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism: 1944-1949, (London: Cornell University Press, 1989) pp. 4, 12-13, 27-29. 60 Liberation and Confrontation

By October 1944, the Red Army had liberated Hungary and Yugoslavia, and was well positioned to enter Greece should it have been ordered to do so.

Instead, the Red Army turned west to continue the assault on Germany, a direct result of the percentages agreement.106 Additionally, Stalin had never been extremely supportive of foreign communist movements. Though he was the ‘de- facto’ head of world-wide communism as leader of the USSR, his attitude towards world revolution was ‘essentially lukewarm’.107 Twenty years after he came to power, Stalin’s sentiments had changed little. He needed the Western Allies to defeat Germany, and the KKE and its requests had to be restrained in order to preserve the Alliance and his hold on Eastern Europe. This is why the KKE was encouraged to participate in the Greek Government of National Unity and the elections, but not encouraged to pursue armed struggle.108

The war in Europe was raging still, and even though the Germans were on the defensive, they were not yet defeated. The Soviets also needed the British and

American allies’ continued support against the Germans on the Western Front, and

106 John O. Iatrides, “Revolution or Self Defence? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War. In The Journal Of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 2005, pp 3-33?” p. 12. 107 Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and his Era. (New York: Viking Press, 1973) pp. 264-66. His ‘Socialism in One Country’ speech, though Marxist in tone, clashed with the traditional communist ideals of uniting with and relying on external communist movements to spread socialism. Stalin was determined to speed up economic development at home, but to many communists, especially Trotsky, ‘socialism in one country’ was an abandonment of the struggle for political revolution abroad. 108 Archives of the Soviet Secret Service, cited in, Iatrides, “Revolution or Self Defence?”, p. 6. 61 it is likely that any confrontation in Greece would have diverted needed men and material from that effort. For their part the British and especially the Americans did not want to appear overly anti-communist at this time because they needed Soviet support as well, particularly in the Pacific. In fact, Roosevelt’s main priority prior to the successful development of the Atom Bomb was to secure Soviet aid in the war against Japan.109

Therefore, as a result of the Popov Mission and the instructions that it conveyed to the KKE, the KKE allowed the British liberation forces to land in

Greece, even though the KKE had the manpower to stop them, at least temporarily.

The British landed in Piraeus in early October 1944, and the first British troops arrived in Athens on the 14th. They were followed by the Greek government on the

18th. Their immediate objective was to disarm all the guerrilla groups, especially

ELAS, since it controlled 75 percent of the country outside of Athens, and to reform the Greek Government.110 From April of 1944 onward, the objective of

British Foreign Policy in Greece was to create a parliamentary democracy and the

Percentages agreement gave them the freedom to accomplish that goal.111

In November 1944 in Washington, while the British were consolidating their position in Greece, the BSC was reporting every development with the pending US elections. Churchill desperately wanted Roosevelt to run and win again, but the Republicans were attempting to get the British to back their

109 Mary E. Glantz, FDR and the Soviet Union: The President’s Battles Over Foreign Policy. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005) p. 250. Stalin used this to his advantage. In a way that was analogous to his vague promises to the KKE, he made vague promises of support against Japan to the Western Allies in order to encourage them to use greater resources to defeat Germany, while committing no Soviet resources to that end. 110C.M. Woodhouse. The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949 (London: Hart-Davis, 1976) p. 112. 111 Alexander, G.M The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece: 1944-1947. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) p. 245. 62 candidate. It is a testament to the efficacy of the BSC that the Republican Party attempted to limit British involvement in the US by telling them that Roosevelt may not run for re-election.112 However, the British were also extremely concerned with Vice-President Wallace, and worried that if he were included on the ballot, he could hurt Roosevelt’s chances. They demanded constant observation of the Vice president whose liberal and internationalist ideals had alienated many domestic

American business supporters.113 The BSC reported to London that the British anti-

Wallace sentiments were echoed by many upper-level US politicians who the

British believed would soon start to pressure Roosevelt to remove the Vice

President.114 The British communicated their opposition to Wallace to FDR and they used the BSC to investigate Wallace’s alleged communists sympathies and supernatural beliefs to further discredit him.115 BSC was so well informed of the

American political climate, that its Chief, William Stephenson, predicted with great accuracy the November 7th 1944 Presidential Election results, a week before the election took place.116 This accuracy was possible as a result of BSC pervasive presence and influence in numerous facets of American social and political life.

However, as would happen with SOE in Greece once the Germans withdrew in October 1944 the BSC was already in the process of being dismantled.

Stephenson was transferring its records to a military complex in Canada and had hired a team of writers who were sworn to secrecy to compile the records into a

112 Quotation listed in: Conant, p. 193. 113 Conant, pp. 191-94. 114 Conant, p. 194. The BSC was correct. FDR would replace Wallace with Truman, who would accede to the presidency when FDR died. 115 Conant, pp. 195, 271-272. 116 Conant, pp. 276-277. He predicted a victory for FDR with a minimum of 32 states and a maximum of 40, with an electoral college prediction of minimum 370 to a maximum of 487. The actual results were 36 states for FDR and an electoral college vote of 432. 63 history of the BSC in America. Once that was accomplished, he had all of the

BSC’s records destroyed because:

Believing the original records too sensitive to risk preserving, particularly the details of British intelligence’s activities prior to America’s entry into the war, during a period of neutrality, which if ever made public would seriously damage Anglo- American relations (and Stephenson) ordered (the whole lot burned). Thousands of tons of BSC documents were heaped into homemade concrete furnaces at the camp, specially outfitted with grate to prevent any partially charred pages from escaping, and went up in flames.117

All that remained of BSC records was to be found in twenty leather bound books printed in Oshawa (a small Canadian city) and called ‘British Security

Coordination (BSC): An account of Secret Activities in the Western Hemisphere,

1940-45. However, most were eventually destroyed, and no surviving copy has been officially identified.118 It was an unremarkable but somewhat appropriate end to such an influential organization; the way it operated and its effects were felt long after its records were destroyed. Anglo-American relations for the rest of the twentieth century were shaped by the covert organization that the highest levels of the British government had created and relied upon to save them from the threat posed by Nazi Germany.

Emboldened by their successes in the United States, British Intelligence continued to report on affairs in Greece, but particularly they advised on courses of action that they believed the British should take in order to achieve their strategic, economic and geo-political objectives. In Greece at this time, the main problem that the British faced while attempting to establish a parliamentary democracy in

117 Conant, pp. 296-300. 118 Conant, pp. 300-301. See footnotes on the bottom of the pages. 64 Greece, was that only the political extremes had armed forces. Therefore, the

British had to support militarily the moderates that they hoped would be able to assume power.119

The Greek moderates were unsuccessful and by December the British would be fighting the KKE in Athens. In Washington the American attitude was to allow the British to do whatever they felt they had to, especially considering that the Germans and Japanese had not yet been defeated. In London, though there was ample opposition to Churchill’s intentions, it came mostly from back-benchers in the labour party. Atlee and Bevin for their part remained remarkably consistent in their support for Churchill.120

MacVeagh commented to Hull that in his opinion the main issue causing civil unrest was the continuing suffering of the Greek people due to the destruction of the Greek economy. He also stated that more problems would result should the government fail to stabilize the currency or to enforce ‘the strict price and other financial regulations’ on which Greek economic stabilization depended and that

General Scobie had thus far proved unable to control ‘demonstrations in the city or in insuring order and public safety.’121 Therefore, from the liberation of Greece the

Americans were well aware of both the British plans for the country and the obstacles to the implementation of their plans.

119 Alexander, p.246. 120 John Saville, “Ernest Bevin and the Cold War: 1945 -1950,” in The Socialist Register (1984) p. 83, and, Andrew Thorpe, ‘In a Rather Emotional State? The Labour Party and British Intervention in Greece,’ in The English Historical Review, Vol. CXXI, No. 493, (September 2006, pp. 1075 – 1105) p. 1078. It is important to note that despite the upper-level labour party support for British Policy for Greece at this time, there was significant ‘lower-level’ labour party opposition to the government’s actions in Greece in December 1944. See: Thorpe, pp. 1079-83, for numerous examples and statistics. 121 MacVeagh to Hull (14) November 9th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, pp. 136-37. 65 Anglo-American policy during the December Uprising

The Battle for Athens took place between December 3rd 1944 and January

17th 1945 and has been described as evidence of Churchill’s planned counter- revolution in Greece.122 It is also important to remember that Greece was an important political tool for both the labour and conservative parties in Britain from

December 1944 to February 1945,123 (and again for use with the Americans from

December 1946 to June 1948). These two critical periods illustrated the divergence of opinion in terms of what Greece represented. For the Conservatives, Greece was a symbol of the pre-war status quo they wished to restore, but for the Socialists, it was a symbol of the failure of the war to move society towards a new era of socialism.124 It was also a very important issue for the labour party in Britain who viewed the conflict as an opportunity that British communists could use to lure

‘grass-roots’ labour support away from the Labour Party. From December 1944 until the end of the conflict in January, the Labour Party, apart from its members who were part of the cabinet, saw the conflict as an attack upon the post-war socialist ideals-based societies (both British and Greek) that they hoped would be established in their respective countries. They saw that Labour values were incompatible with Communist values, but it was a difficult political position to maintain publically, particularly with their support in trade unions in Britain.125

In Western Europe, on December 16th 1944, the course of the Second

122 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord , p. 224. For counter-revolution, see: Saville, ‘Ernest Bevin’ pp.82-84. 123Thorpe, p.1085. 124 Thorpe, p. 1085. Again, Greece was an important political symbol, not just for the government of Britain (and the US) but for the opposition parties there as well. 125 Thorpe, pp. 1092-93. 66 World War was altered by an unexpected German offensive, in the Ardennes and the British could not press their advantage in Greece. The German campaign overran thousands of Allied troops and captured or destroyed tonnes of military material. After the D-Day landings in June, the Allies had believed that the War would be over by Christmas, but the Battle of the Bulge extended the War for another six months. For Greece, the result was that overnight the fighting in Athens took a backseat to the fighting in France and British material and attention was diverted from Greece back to Western Europe. Therefore, the fighting in Athens lasted much longer that it would have otherwise. What is most significant about this conflict is that it made the British believe that the KKE was determined to seize power in Greece, and it proved to the KKE that it could not hope to do so without substantial amounts of foreign aid.126

The American assessment of the conflict as expressed by Ambassador

MacVeagh was that the majority of the combatants with EAM/ELAS were actually patriots who had joined out of a miss-guided fear that the Greek Government intended to restore the King (whom they held personally responsible for the

Metaxas dictatorship) and a Fascist government by force. The other side feared that

EAM/ELAS would install a communist dictatorship. He stated that the mutual suspicion was being exploited by ‘enemy agents and subversive propaganda’ but was now ‘too profound and too firmly sealed by the blood which has now been

126 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defense” p. 10. For a detailed account of this conflict see: John. O. Iatrides, Revolt In Athens: The Greek Communists’ “Second Round” 1944-45 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995) 67 shed’ to be solved by any ‘purely Greek initiative.’127 Therefore, although he had previously stated that the United States’ position of non-interference had benefitted their image, he seemed to be advising the State Department to support continuing

British intervention in virtually all aspects of Greek life. In response to

MacVeagh’s report, the State Department transmitted a declaration to be published in the Communist newspaper Rizopastis. It stated that in conformity of the policy of the United States to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of other nations, the United States had ‘scrupulously’ refrained from interfering in the affairs of nations liberated from the Germans and that unless the military security of the Allied struggle against Germany was at stake, the United States would continue its policy of non-interference.128

However, despite this strong statement, the State Department communicated to President Roosevelt regarding the proposal for a joint Anglo-

American and Soviet committee to mediate a solution in Greece, or for the United

States to take a more active role.129 Roosevelt responded directly to Churchill and stated that although he was sympathetic to the situation in Greece, since he was subject to public sentiment which was increasingly adverse to the British role in

Greece and to the US’ traditional policy of non-interference that it was ‘not possible for this government to take a stand along with you in the present course of events in Greece.’ The advice Roosevelt offered was for the British to encourage

127 MacVeagh to Hull (132) December 8h 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, p. 145. 128 Stetinius to MacVeagh (114), December 12th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, pp. 147-48. 129 Stetinius to Roosevelt (768.00/12-1344) December 13th 1944, Stetinius to Roosevelt (868.00/12- 1344) December 13th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, pp. 148-50. 68 King George to form a Regency and for elections to be set at a fixed date so that the Greek people would know that they will have the opportunity to express themselves freely.130

As the fighting continued, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt thanking him for his moral support and stating that the British would continue to fight for if they were to leave, no doubt there would be a ‘frightful massacre’ and a left-wing dictatorship installed. He also informed Roosevelt that the Cabinet was not prepared to withdraw British forces and that Ernest Bevin had made a speech to the labour conference (which had been very critical of the British government’s role in the conflict) had won ‘universal respect.’ Churchill then stated that the best solution was to have Archbishop Damaskinos appointed as Regent.131

US ambassador MacVeagh responded positively to this suggestion informing the State Department that not only had the most prominent members of the Greek Government endorsed it, despite the opposition of the Greek King, but

Damaskinos felt that he could work with EAM/ELAS. MacVeagh urged the State

Department to support the British and Damaskinos in order to bring a quick end to the fighting.132 The State Department’s reply, though not overly explicit in its approval, described the proposal as ‘most promising’ closely paralleling the State

130 Roosevelt to Churchill (673) December 13th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, pp. 150-51. 131 Churchill to Roosevelt (851) December 15th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, pp. 155-56. 132 MacVeagh to Stettinius (150) December 15th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, p. 156. Damaskinos promised a general amnesty, a re-formed and fully representational government, and no retaliation from the British should ELAS lay down its weapons. 69 Department’s plans which had already been ‘communicated to the British.’133 The

State department also recommended the participation of the United States in the supervision of elections in Greece, should the British and Soviets also be involved.134

On December 26th, the KKE’s leaders attended preliminary peace talks.

However, after two days of discussion Archbishop Damaskinos was nominated as

Regent and the EAM representative, General Siantos, said that they would accept the appointment of ‘generally respected but non-political personalities,’ such as

General Plastiras.135 Churchill also spoke with MacVeagh and asked him to convey to Roosevelt that the British wanted nothing from Greece but ‘a fair share of her trade’ and that neither her airfields nor ports were desired since ‘we’ve got

Cyprus anyhow.’ Lastly, Churchill stated that the British wished only to ‘get out of this damned place.’136 It was a statement that would be contradicted by future

British actions. The Americans also contradicted their policy of non-interference.

On December 28th 1944, Roosevelt wrote to King George and urged him to accept the proposal to nominate Archbishop Damaskinos (who had been personally recommended by Churchill) as regent and to affirm that elections would be held at some fixed date.137 On the 29th of December Churchill returned to England in an attempt to convince the Greek King to accept the creation of a Regency, which was

133 Stettinius to MacVeagh (124) December 16th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, p. 158. 134 Lot 122, Secretary’s Staff Committee Documents 1-45, December 22nd 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East,, p. 165. 135 MacVeagh to Stettinius (189) December 27th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, pp.171-72. 136 MacVeagh to Stettinius (190) December 27th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, pp.172-73 137 Roosevelt to King George of the Hellenes, December 18th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, p.177. 70 accomplished after Churchill threatened to recognize the new Greek government instead of King George. Churchill thanked Roosevelt for his support and asked for the President’s continued support for the Damaskinos government. 138

By January 17th, most of the fighting had subsided and the British began to attempt to rebuild the shattered Greek economy and infrastructure. Throughout the initial stages of the British Clash with ELAS, the press in the USA and Britain were extremely critical of Churchill and the British army repressing what they believed was a popular movement, which had heroically resisted the German occupation. However, once reports about mass abductions and killings and the photographs of dead bodies had begun to circulate, that support diminished. 139

However, in Britain, some of the labour party MPs were extremely critical of the

Greek Government, referring to Plastiras as ‘ reactionary ’ and the Greek government as being ‘ totally unrepresentative ’ and having the ‘ monstrous aims’ to keep the conflict ongoing. On January 15th 1945, two days before the fighting ended in a meeting with Churchill, a member of the labour delegation, Jim

Griffiths, described the importance of Greece to the Labour Party and its vision for the post-war world stating ‘it was immediately (in the moment about) the situation in Greece, but it is much more than that.’140

However, by the end of January, the attention that the Greek conflict had

138 Churchill to Roosevelt (863 and 864) December 29thth and 30th 1944, FRUS 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East, p. 178. 139Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, p 135, and Ryan, pp. 139-145. See also: Winant to Stettinius (451) January 13th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p. 103 and, MacVeagh to Stettinius (70) January 19th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p. 107. 140 Labour delegation to prime minister, 15 Jan. 1945, quoted in: Thorpe, p. 1105. Emphasis and brackets added. The situation in Greece was about the present, but it also was about the future of Socialism in Britain. 71 been receiving was diminishing and the bad press that EAM/ELAS received for its treatment of prisoners during the dekemvriana forced the rest of the Labour Party

(i.e. those not in the cabinet with Bevin and who previously had been very critical of the British government) to join the government in its condemnation of

EAM/ELAS, and vindicated many of Churchill’s policies.141 Furthermore, the

Labour Party released statements that the conflict had ended, thanks in large part to their actions.142 In spite of their stated objectives for Greece, the Labour Party used the conflict for their domestic political gain.

The Varkiza Accord

One of the most important questions for 1945 up to the British elections was what were the real British intentions for Greece? Did the British really work towards establishing a Greek government that could function independently, thereby allowing them to leave, or did they desire to maintain their influence? Did the Labour party, as early as January 1945, commit to remaining in Greece, despite their statements to the contrary leading up to the British elections? If Churchill was capable of bending Allied Policy to his will, was he not capable of moulding

Labour party policy, at least quietly, as well? Illustrating the interplay between

Washington and London, in February 1945, the US State Department stated that the US embassy in London had become one of the United States ‘largest and most important offices’ overseas.143 As a result of this view, the Embassy Staff grew

141 Thorpe, pp. 1097-98. 142 Thorpe, p. 1095, citing Labour Party records from various electoral ridings. 143 National Archives and Record Administration (NARA II), College Park MD, Record Group (RG) 59, Records of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, 1941- 72 steadily in the early post-war years, and it played a key role in the formation of

US/British policy going forward. 144

British Policy in Greece was focussed on establishing a government that included members from the moderate political groups in the country and the British hoped that the Varkiza accord would help accomplish that objective. One of the first conditions of the treaty required EAM/ELAS to surrender its weapons in order to be able to participate in the political process. Partial clemency for those who had participated in the December uprising, the formation of a new non-political Greek army, an Allied-supervised plebiscite and elections within the next year were conditions that were also included in the treaty.145 In a discussion at the British

Embassy in Athens on February 15th 1945, Ambassador Leeper stated that he believed that Varkiza represented the vindication of British Foreign Policy in

Greece despite the criticism that the British had been taking both at home and abroad. This sense of optimism and vindication was echoed in a speech that

Churchill delivered the same day. He talked of Greece’s bright future and of the misunderstanding of the efforts of the British and the Greek Government in many parts of the world. 146 Eden also delivered a short speech expressing his belief that

Greece had found internal peace, unity, and strength. The Ambassador, Prime

1953, Lot 54D224, Box 22, ‘Information for the Survey Group Proceeding to London’, 24 February 1945. 144 Jonathan Coleman, “Portrait of an Institution: The US Embassy in London, 1945-1953.” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, (4, 2009) pp. 339, 360. 145 Leeper to Eden, (Doc R 3056 / 4 /19) February 7th 1945, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part III, Vol. 25, 1945, pp. 72-75. At Varkiza the British agreed to hold the plebiscite before the elections, but would later reverse that decision. See also: Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 229-230 146 Leeper to Eden (R 3559 / 4 / G) February 15th 1945, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part III, Vol. 25, pp 75-78 and (R 4224 / 4 /, 19), ibid., p. 87. 73 Minister, and Foreign Secretary were anxious to close this chapter and focus on defeating Germany.

By early 1945 everything seemed to be in place for Greece to begin to overcome its social schism and to recover from the effects of the occupation. The optimism the British expressed officially was mirrored by EAM after Varkiza and it seemed that the KKE was finally prepared to participate in the new Greek government. On February 15th 1945, the Central Committee of ELAS ordered the demobilization of its remaining forces while reminding its ‘fellow fighters’ to remain vigilant to ensure that the government honoured the articles of Varkiza.147

Just before returning to Britain, the Central Committee of EAM sent greetings to

Churchill thanking him for his role in the ceasefire, pledging to work for peace and reconciliation in Greece and ‘counting on Great Britain’s aid we shall struggle for our country’s immediate and complete restoration.’ However, in contrast to this statement, MacVeagh advised the State Department that the KKE was already rebuilding its ‘cells’ in Athens, forming an organization to subvert the Greek

Armed forces, impeding government authority and preserving the military and political aspects of its ‘revolutionary machine.148

British objectives for Greece were challenged again when on March 3rd

1945, the Central Committee of EAM directed a letter to the Greek government and to American Ambassador MacVeagh complaining that the Articles of Varkiza

147 EAM, (National Liberation Front). The White Book: Documents from May 1944 to March 1945. (New York: Greek American Council, 1945.) “Document No. 118”, pp 120-121. 148 MacVeagh to Stettinius (185) February 16th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 115-16. 74 were not being honoured.149 Prior to the signing of the treaty, the main threat to the

British objective of establishing a parliamentary democracy in Greece came from the Left. However, once it was signed, the main threat came from the forces of the

Right.

Where confronting the Left had been a straightforward objective for the

British government, confronting the Right was far more complicated. The members of the KKE were relatively easy to identify but the members of the extreme right were not. The Right dominated the armed forces, the civil services and the government, and the British could not remove them without dismantling the state machinery that they had been attempting to re-build.150 Therefore, as the

Communists were reeling from the defeat of ELAS in Athens, the British attempted to work with the Plastiras government but the forces of the extreme right began to undermine the Varkiza Accord. This would also invite American intervention against British policy in Greece and the propaganda machine in

Washington and London had to respond. In London at a meeting with various

Labour Party MPs who had been critical of Churchill’s policy in Greece, found common ground with the Prime Minister over the Americans’ criticism of the

British. However, both the British and the Greek Government found it insulting that the Americans would be critical without being involved and sharing the burden in Greece.151 There was also concern that the Plastiras government may be unable

149 MacVeagh to Stettinius (256) March 10th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 116-18. 150 Kirk to Stettinius (882) March 8th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p. 116. See also: Alexander, p. 247. 151 Thorpe, p. 1097. 75 to implement the Varkiza agreement and as a result, delay the economic measures that needed to be taken to avoid another financial crisis.152

However, though Soviet pressure was mounting on the British to begin to withdraw their troops from Greece, both MacVeagh and Kirk advised that it was better for them to stay, at least for the time being, in order to prevent destabilization.153

Ambassador Leeper recommended that the plebiscite should be delayed in light of the current instability and the intense debates going on in the Greek government about the constitution. He informed the Foreign Office that a prematurely-held plebiscite could be detrimental to the parties that supported the return of the monarchy and that it would be wise to delay it until the people were in a more ‘normal’ state of mind, capable of viewing the future of their country with less ‘jaundiced eyes.’154 This was the second significant shift in British policy after the Varkiza Accord was signed, (the first being the issue of forming a coalition that included the KKE), and was the result of the domestic volatility in Greece.

Furthermore, the ability of the British to deal effectively with the growing tension in Greece was undermined once again by developments on the international front.

152 Winant to Stettinius (2630) March 14th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.119-20. 153 Kirk to Stettinius (946) March 12th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 118-119. 154 Leeper to Foreign Office (R 5105 / 4 / 19), March 17th 1945, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part III, Vol. 25, 1945, p. 89. As a result of the atrocities that ELAS had committed towards the people of Athens at the end of December 1944, many Athenians viewed the return of the monarchy as their only defence from the communists. See also: Alexander, pp 92-96. 76 The USSR, having been invaded twice in the previous thirty years through Poland and needing it as a buffer state, invaded and occupied it on March 15th 1945.155

The American assessment of conditions in Greece was based largely on

British reports and held that any activity in which they engaged in regards to the supervision of the plebiscite and elections would be very difficult given the current widespread political and social divisions in the country. Conditions internationally were also affected by Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe and Poland, in addition to American plans for Germany.156 Oscar Cox, the lend-lease administrator, commented in Washington on the situation in Greece: ‘Already, for example, as you are well aware, some of the people on the Hill are asking why lend-lease supplies should be used to kill some of our Greek friends.’157

Even members of the American Congress was taking notes and becoming critical of the British handling of affairs in Greece. Internationally, the USA was showing signs that the wartime alliance was dead, cutting off Lend-lease from the

Soviets on the day that Germany surrendered and from the British shortly thereafter.158 On May 10, 1945 Truman signed the JCS 1067. Those responsible for its implementation ensured that the JCS 1067 was interpreted as strictly as possible in order to reduce the German standard of living.159

155 Lloyd C. Gardner, Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, From Munich to Yalta (Chicago: Elephant paperbacks, 1993) pp. 225-230. 156 British Aide Memoir, transmitted to Stettinius (868.00/6-1645) April 24th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.126-28. 157 Gardner, p. 218, quoting: ‘Cox to Hopkins, December 19th 1944.’ 158 David Childs, ‘The Cold War and the British Road’, 1946-53. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23, Issue 4) October 1988, pp. 554-555. 159 Vladimir Petrov, Money and conquest; allied occupation currencies in World War II. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) pp. 228–229 He further concluded that the Allies ... ‘delayed by several years the economic reconstruction of the war torn continent, a reconstruction which subsequently cost the U.S. billions of dollars.’ 77 At the end of June 1945, the British finally succeeded in getting the United

States to share responsibility with them for the supervision of the Greek elections and plebiscite. The British also advised that the Greek Government should invite the Soviets to participate in order to encourage the Soviet controlled countries to invite the British and Americans to supervise elections there. Although the British believed that the Soviets would refuse to participate for the very reason of not desiring Anglo-American participation in elections in the territories they controlled.160 Two days later the Soviets replied and stated that Allied to supervision of the Greek elections constituted interference in Greek internal affairs, but the United States stated that, based on the Yalta Declaration, it was part of their

(and Allied) duty to supervise elections in recently liberated countries in order to guarantee that free and fair elections took place.161 This was one of the first clear signs that the wartime alliance was breaking down.

Although the Soviets had signed the Yalta declaration, from this point on they would refuse to honour its commitments towards central and Eastern Europe and the holding of elections.162 Furthermore, the new American president Harry

Truman had adopted a more rigid stance in opposition to the Soviets than had

Roosevelt and moved the United States’ policy closer to that of Britain. In a memorandum sent to President Truman on July 4th 1945, new Secretary of State

Byrnes endorsed US participation in the supervision of elections in Greece with or without the full participation of the Yalta signatories and that even France should

160 British Embassy to US State Department, June 27th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p. 128. 161 ‘US participation in the supervision of Greek elections,’ (868.00/6-2945) June 29th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.128-30. 162 This will be shown in the rest of the dissertation. 78 perhaps be invited by the Greek government to supervise the elections.163 Next the

State Department sent a message to the British embassy in Washington advising them of US participation in Greek elections and that the United States did not consider allied supervision of the elections to constitute interference as the Soviets had asserted.164

By ensuring that Greece could sustain itself and that the communists could not assume power by force, the British would be able to retain Greece as a sphere of influence without having to maintain a strong (and expensive) military presence there. However, these few months were the last for the Churchill Government’s

Foreign Policy decisions for Greece. Varkiza not only marked the end of the

Second Round of the Greek Civil War, but the beginning of the end for Winston

Churchill.

Throughout the course of the war, Churchill had dedicated himself to doing everything in his power to defeat Germany. Flying around the world, meeting with allies and formulating allied policy had left him little time to deal with domestic issues in England. That responsibility he had entrusted to his Labour Party deputy

Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.165 Since the fall of 1944, the British parliament had been setting its sights on an election in 1945 once Germany had been defeated.166 The coalition government, which had set aside political differences to unite the country to fight the Axis had begun to splinter once the defeat of the

163 Byrnes to Truman (868.00/7-445) July 4th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.130-31. 164 State Department to British Embassy (868.00/6-1645) July 5th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.132-33. 165 Kenneth Harris, Attlee, (London: Weidenfled and Nicolson, 1982) p. 244. 166 Henry Pelling, Winston Churchill (London: Macmillan ltd, 1974) p. 548. 79 Third Reich appeared imminent. One of Churchill’s last acts as Prime Minster was to advise President Truman to use the atomic bomb to end the war in the Pacific, but before he could play a more major role in the Potsdam Conference, he was replaced by Clement Atlee whose Labour party won the British elections. This change, combined with a new president in the United States and rising tension between the Soviet Union and the West meant that a change in world politics was virtually imminent.

New Players at the Table: Truman and Atlee Take Over

In Greece, the KKE hoped that once the British elections had been conducted that British foreign policy would become more accommodating. As

Labour Party leader Clement Atlee replaced Churchill a Prime Minister, many expected British-Soviet-Greek relations to improve.167 Zachariades was quoted in

Rizospastis that ‘the British elections will change the system of (foreign) intervention.’168 However, the publically expected pro-left shift did not occur with

Atlee’s election. Despite having pre-eminent Labour leaders as Prime Minister and

Foreign Secretary, British policy in Greece became even more hostile to the Greek communists. This occurred not only because of international developments, but also because EAM/ELAS’ status as an ally had been granted by the previous

British administration. With the change from a Conservative to a Labour government, the pressure to adhere to wartime agreements may have been diminished. However, British policy did not change.

167 Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-1951, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 47. 168 Norton to Foreign Office, July 1945, (R 13134 / 4 / 19), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part III, Vol. 26, p. 44. 80 The hostility to the KKE was also bred out of the realities of what the

Second World War had done to Europe. France had been devastated and deeply divided by the German Occupation. Germany was defeated, broken and defenceless. Italy was bankrupt and Eastern Europe was rapidly being swept up into the Soviet sphere of influence and the new Labour government in England realised that it was going to have to protect itself by participating in the rebuilding of Western Europe.169

British policy towards Greece at this time, more so than any preceding period, was characterised by an increased focus on the preservation of British interests in Greece and in the Mediterranean. However, in order to do so, their

‘special relationship’ with the United States had to be expertly manipulated to get the USA to support British objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean. The new

British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, would oversee an unprecedented level of

British involvement in American policy decisions.

Bevin had grown up in poverty, worked in unions, led trade unions, had been the Minister of Labour during the War, and although he was characterised by others and himself as a socialist, he had no love for communists.170 During the

War, Bevin was outspoken in his support for Churchill’s government’s policy of opposing the EAM/ELAS movement in Greece. He was also a supporter of the

Commonwealth and of a British military and economic presence in the Middle

169 Morgan, pp. 233-234. 170 J.T. Murphy, Labour’s Big Three: a Biographical Study of Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison and Ernest Bevin, (London: the Bodley Head, 1948) pp. 222-223. Murphy wrote of Bevin “He never forgets that he belongs to the working class and to the people with whom he has worked.” 81 East.171 To secure British access to Persia through the Suez Canal, a non- communist Greece was important and it held the added bonus of cutting off the

Soviets from the Mediterranean if the need arose. There was also ample evidence to show that the British had been attempting to direct American Public and Official policy since the early years of the war. 172 In mid to late 1945, Bevin increased

British involvement in Greece with the objective of maintaining a British presence in Europe. However, as conditions both in Greece and in Britain worsened, he sought a policy to solve their economic difficulties without compromising their national security interests. The most logical course of action to accomplish this was to manoeuvre the United States into assuming responsibility for Greece.

Two members of the ‘Big Three’ had now been replaced and as a result of this change and the end of the War, the relations between and the priorities of,

Britain, the United States and the USSR were altered. In the summer of 1945, strategically speaking, Greece was an important but not vital country for the

Americans. The Americans’ main concern at this time was the defeat of Japan, and even after the Japanese surrender on September 2nd, they remained intensely focussed on the pacific sphere. The new threat for the United States looming in the

Pacific was the possibility of a communist China as Mao Tse Tsung was embroiled in a civil war against the nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek. Soon after the armistice with

Japan was signed, the United States began to focus on rebuilding the Japanese economy and government. Following the Allied example of rebuilding efforts in

Western Europe to oppose communist expansion, the United States government

171 Morgan, pp. 235-236 172 See section in this chapter (1): The SOE and the BSC: The impact of British Spies in Greece and the United States. 82 believed that the most effective barrier to communism in the Pacific would be an economically powerful Japan.173 While these developments diverted American attention away from Greece (and Europe as a whole) at the time, the communist threat in the Pacific, would greatly aid the British into securing American involvement in European affairs.

The new government under Harry Truman was also operating quite differently from the wartime administration of Roosevelt.174 As for the Soviets,

Stalin appeared to be comfortable to let events unfold on their own. Though a communist Greece would have been beneficial, Stalin was not willing to jeopardise his claim to Eastern Europe by provoking the Allies and openly helping the KKE.

He continually advised the Greek Communists to participate in the elections and in the government, and he answered their continuous requests for weapons and other supplies with vague statements of future support, giving them enough hope to keep fighting but not enough to actually sustain their efforts.175 On the other side, the

British, who had promised and delivered weapons and funds for Greece in the past, would soon experience severe financial and material hardships, and would be able to offer no promises, vague or concrete for the future and the conflict in Greece was a major risk to the significant economic investments Britain had made to the

Greek government.

173 Morgan, p. 234. 174 Glantz, pp. 1, 179-180. In order to implement his policies towards the Soviets, which often met with fierce resistance from the various bureaucracies in his administration, FDR had reorganised the key departments that dealt with the USSR. By the summer of 1945, the reorganised departments were being replaced by a new bureaucracy; one that was determined to stand against further Soviet expansion. This shift occurred for many reasons but some of the main ones were the US support of global “open door” trade, a shift in public opinion against the USSR, and the Soviet actions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. 175 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defence?” p.18-20. 83 Chapter 2: Superpower Shuffle: The Potsdam Conference and Inter-Allied

Confrontations.

The Potsdam conference took place from July 16th to August 2nd 1945 and it dealt with the issue of Germany’s and Japan’s surrender as well as the settlement of post-war European reconstruction and boundaries. Though article 9 of the

Varkiza Accord stipulated Allied assistance in the holding of elections, the Soviets refused to accept Allied participation. As a result, the State Department recommended proceeding with British and American supervision, informing the

French and Greek governments in order to assure their approval and to keep the

Soviets fully informed of all developments.176 This was a vital development for the

British since by the end of the summer of 1945, elements in the American government seemed intent to free themselves from the wartime alliance with

Britain leaving her alone to deal with a rapidly and aggressively expanding USSR.

As a result, the labour government had to find an issue to keep the United States involved in European affairs, but it was difficult for the British government to reconcile British public opinion which initially desired close relations with the

USSR, and American political opinion which was beginning to view the USSR as a greater threat.177

176 Byrnes to Winant, UK, (6704) August 9th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.134-35. 177 Caroline Anstey, ‘The Projection of British Socialism: Foreign Office Publicityand American Opinion, 1945-50’, Journal of Contemporary History, (Vol.19, Issue 3, July 1984. pp. 417-452). p.435. 84 These realities began to take the gleam off the idea that socialist ideals could bridge the gap between Britain and the USSR, or, in relation to the affairs in

Greece, bring the KKE and its affiliates to participate in the Greek government.

After the election of the summer of 1945, Churchill and Eden were replaced by

Atlee and Bevin, and where the former had, at least officially, been attempting to extricate themselves from Greece, the latter decided to commit more resources to maintaining Greece as a British sphere of influence. 1945 would be a year of extreme turmoil for Greece. Behind Britain’s policy decisions of 1945 was the spectre of Soviet aggression and expansion, and they would have to decide whether or not to expend the manpower to secure the Greek countryside against the rising violence that as taking place. The ‘White Terror’ drove many ELAS members and

Left-wingers into the mountains where they had to band together for protection.

Ambassador Leeper believed the only solution was for the British to assume executive power in Greece because in his view, the country was incapable of generating the type of leadership necessary to help it obtain freedom. However, his plan was not favoured since it would have required an increased role for the British at a time when they were attempting to diminish it. Interestingly, it was perhaps the departed Eden and Churchill who best understood the futility of trying to re-mould the Greeks into a British model. They had believed that it was more detrimental to maintain Greece as a dependent, than to have it engulfed in chaos and lost as an ally. As it came to power by August 1945, the Labour government implemented a policy that precariously combined the non-intervention advocated by Churchill and the assumption of control favoured by Leeper. 178 The Churchill administration’s

178 Alexander, p. 248. This belief may also have been a result of British control of Cyprus which 85 support of the Greek Monarchy had stemmed from the King’s staunch loyalty to

Britain at the beginning of the war, but Bevin’s support of the Monarchy stemmed from the post-war economic and social realities he was facing. In a memorandum he presented to the cabinet on August 14th 1945, he stated that it was vital for the

British to maintain their influence in Greece in order to safeguard their strategic interests in the Middle East.179 Clearly demonstrating the way Bevin had supported

Churchill’s government’s policies later in August at the Labour Government’s first foreign policy debate, Anthony Eden commented about Bevin’s relations with the

Tory government.

Eden. During that period there were many discussions on foreign affairs I cannot

recall one single occasion when there was a difference between us. I hope I

do not embarrass the Foreign Secretary when I say that.

Bevin. No.

Eden. There were no differences on any important issues of foreign policy.180

The former British Foreign Secretary went on record in the House of

Commons and testified to the similarities between the new Labour Foreign minister and the previous Conservative government. For those who had expected a change in British dealings with communists both in Greece and abroad, this statement clearly showed how closely Bevin had agreed with Churchill’s policy generally, and foreshadowed how he would shape policy in the future. On August afforded them a Mediterranean port regardless of developments in Greece. 179 Alexander, p. 129. 180 Cabinet Papers, ‘Foreign Policy Debate,’ London, August 1945. 86 11th 1945, Bevin went on record as saying: “we must maintain our position in

Greece as a part of our Middle East policy and that unless it is asserted and settled it may have a bad effect on the whole of our Middle East position.”181

His biographer, Alan Bullock, states that his consistency to Churchill’s policy was due to two main factors. The first that the Foreign Office was still full of the officials who had staffed it during the war, and the second was Bevin’s constant and long-standing anti-communism.182 These policies continued as foreign observers, including some from the United States, complained that the right-wing forces in Greece were being allowed to consolidate their power and attacking the Greek left.183

In spite of these events, the British and the Americans moved forward with plans for elections in Greece. The British pushed the United States to accept that the elections would take place before the plebiscite and that they would simultaneously issue similar statements about their role as supervisory powers. The

British also advised to leave the French out of the decision making process even though they were to be a part of the supervisory organization and on August 18th

1945, the Greek government officially approved the supervision of the elections by the Allied powers.184 Next, the Secretary of State Byrnes sent a telegram to the

Soviet Foreign Office informing them that as a result of the Crimea and Potsdam

181 Bevin Cabinet Paper, August 11th 1945, CAB 093 3645 182 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951. 3 vols. (London: Heinmann, 1983) Vol. 3, p. 160. 183 Saville, pp. 18-19. 184 Telegrams between Foreign Office and Department of State, August 13th to 18th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.141-43. MacVeagh also informed Secretary Byrnes that the few Communist and EAM representatives that had been part of the Greek government had begun to resign. This was possibly due to the Soviet govt’s refusal to participate in the supervision of Greek elections and may have been interpreted as a sign that the Soviets would assist them, at least indirectly, by not supporting the current government or the Anglo-American plans for Greece. 87 conferences, the United States agreed to assume responsibility to assist ‘the Greek people to express their will freely at the polls.’ Byrnes also wrote to ‘express US government regret that the Soviet government could not see its way clear to participate,’ but that he hoped that the Soviets would ‘adopt friendly attitude toward this duty being undertaken by three of its Allies.’185 This period marked an important change in relations between the Big Three. It was over the issue of allied supervision of the Greek elections that the United States took an anti-Soviet position and aligned themselves fully with Britain. Though the language used by

Byrnes was still conciliatory and hopeful, gradually, through a combination of

British pressure and rising Soviet intransigence, the Americans would align themselves much closer with British policy from this point on.

On August 23rd 1945 the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya (News) printed a column regarding the proposed Allied observation of the Greek elections. The newspaper asserted that any observation in fact constituted control of and interference in the domestic affairs of foreign nations and that the Soviet refusal to participate was based on Soviet foreign policy of “respect for other states large or small...(with) faith in democratic forces and rights of people, whether they be small or large.” The column continued arguing that Britain had imperialistic designs for Greece since it was a key strategic point for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. They Soviets also stated that contrary to the American interpretation of the Allied responsibilities to liberated countries (as outlined by the

Crimea conference) since the conditions required for the establishment of

185 Byrnes to Harriman, USSR (1861) August 18th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p.143. 88 democratic institutions as outlined in the Yalta communiqué did not exist in

Greece, then the observation of elections in Greece “corresponded neither in letter nor in spirit to the Crimea declaration.” In conclusion, the editorial stated that the duty of the Allies was to ensure that the conditions for democratic elections existed and once that was accomplished, supervision would be unnecessary.186 On August

28th 1945, using the Soviet media again, the Soviet government publicly rejected participating in the supervision of elections.187

Meanwhile in Britain, in September 1945, despite rising domestic pressure for the Labour government to extricate themselves from Greece, as a result of

Soviet involvement in Poland and by US involvement in France, Bevin still believed that it was crucial for Britain to maintain her presence in Greece in order to maintain her status in the postwar world order. Atlee and Bevin, committed

Labour Party socialists with a labour party bureaucracy behind them, saw elections as a possible solution to their problems in Greece which they hoped would in turn allow them to deal with the threat of the Soviet Union.188 However, since Greece

186 Harriman, USSR, to Byrnes (3015) August 23rd 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 148-49. The Yalta Communiqué (February 1945) stated: The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations. To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. 187 Harriman, USSR, to Byrnes (3090) August 28rd 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p. 150. 188 Murphy, pp 1-16. 89 was once again in the midst of a massive economic crisis, the issue of holding the plebiscite before the elections was under review. Secretary Byrnes urged

MacVeagh to meet with Archbishop Damaskinos and to ‘discuss most confidentially’ with him the idea of holding the plebiscite after the elections in contradiction of the Varkiza Accord which stated that the plebiscite would be held first. He stated that for some time the State Department had felt that ‘Greek political stability’ would benefit from first having a representative government installed which could then itself ‘prepare questions for submission to (the) Greek people in (a) plebiscite.’ Though he continued, stating that the United States did not wish to dictate to or manipulate the Greek government, he felt that such a comment may assist the Regent ‘crystallize Greek thinking into some formula acceptable to most political factions. 189 A few days later Archbishop Damaskinos flew to London and proposed to Bevin that the allied powers support a plan to delay the plebiscite for three years.

This was a very important time for Greece. After almost a year of lobbying the United States to assume a more active role in Greece, twice since July 1945 the

Americans had taken a strong stance on Greek political issues; the first in relation to the supervision of elections and the second, by directly attempting to influence the Greek Regent. However, even though the plan to reverse the order for the holding of the plebiscite and elections was widely known, the communist press

189 Byrnes to MacVeagh (898) September 1st 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 150-51. 90 abroad was widely condemning the Greek government and the foreign powers that were supporting it.190

In contrast to the previous month where both the British and the Americans had attempted to include the Soviets in discussions about Greek political developments, by September 7th 1945, in regards to the decided change in order of plebiscite and elections, British under Secretary Sir Orme Sargent recommended to

Byrnes that the Soviets not be included.191 British Foreign Secretary Bevin then met with the American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to determine the

American stance on this issue. Byrnes stated that although he was hesitant to delay it for three years, he would assume joint responsibility with the British for the proposal, which is not surprising since he had requested/ordered MacVeagh to propose it to the Archbishop.

On September 12th 1945 the USSR sent a memorandum to the Council of

Foreign Ministers in which they asserted that the conditions in Greece were not appropriate for the holding of elections, especially since the government had still not assumed the composition agreed to at Varkiza. They also stated that the conditions were gravely endangering the Greek people and Greece’s neighbours and that the presence of foreign observers would only serve to “obscure” the internal situation in Greece.192 In spite of the strong Soviet protest, the British and the Americans continued to move forward with their plans to hold and observe

190 Harriman, USSR, to Byrnes (974) September 5st 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p. 152. For the British and the Americans, the Media in communist countries was viewed as expressing official government policy while in contrast, the Media in England and the United states, if not reflecting public opinion, was at least catering to it. 191 Winant, UK, to Byrnes (9163) September 7th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 152-53. 192 Soviet Memorandum, translated and reported to Byrnes, September 12th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 156-57. 91 elections and to delay the plebiscite.193 However, the decision did not improve conditions in Greece, and economic and political disorder grew to such levels that ambassador Leeper believed that the British had to assume executive power in order to save the country.194

King George did protest the decision to hold elections before the plebiscite by informing Secretary Byrnes that the proposal violated the Varkiza accord and in so doing risked greater problems being created in Greece.195 However his protest fell on deaf ears and the Allied plans continued unchanged. Furthermore, the

British were also pressing the Americans to work with their ‘British and French colleagues’ to force the Greek politicians to cooperate for the upcoming elections and once again the Americans gave in with MacVeagh acknowledging Byrnes orders on the matter by September 26th.196 Meanwhile, negotiations with the Greek government continued until the end of September 1945. The Americans desired a fixed date to be set, while the British were increasingly concerned over the rising

Right-wing tendency in the government while simultaneously opposing EAM.197

193 There are numerous dispatches relating to the Anglo-American-French involvement for the supervision of Greek elections and the statements that these governments would draft relating to their participation. See: FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 157-60. 194 George Rosie, The British in Vietnam. How the Twenty-Five Year War Began (London: Panther Books, 1970), p. 92. Simultaneously in Indo-China, the British were using Japanese troops to maintain order against Vietnamese nationalist and Communists until the French could return to govern. They also actively intervened and helped the returning French troops seize Vietnamese government buildings, thereby ending any hope the Vietnamese had for independence, and condemned the country to 25 years of warfare. 195 King George to Byrnes (CFM Files – Lot M 88, Box 31) September 22nd 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.160-61. It is possible that because the Allies did not adhere fully to the Varkiza Accord, that the signatories in Greece may have felt free to disregard it as well. 196 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1082), MacVeagh to Archbishop Damaskinos, (Athens Embassy Files, 800 Elections), September 27th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 164-65. 197 Winant to Byrnes (9875) September 24th 1945, MacVeagh to Byrnes (1077 and 1078) September 25th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.161-64. See also: Lagani, Irini, LES RAPPORTS DE LA GRECE AVEC SES VOISINS BALKANIQUES DE 1941 a 1949. (Doctoral Thesis) Paris: Sourbonne, 1985. 92 Anglo-American policy continued to emphasise the creation of a centrist coalition government, but it either failed or refused to acknowledge that the Greek political system was too fragmented to create one. 198

Internationally, the British were able to use growing Soviet antagonism to their advantage. On October 14th 1945 the Foreign Office sated that Russian

‘intransigence’ was greatly aiding the British efforts to bring the United Sates to the British way of thinking.199At the beginning of October 1945, partially as a result of the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London and partially as a result of widening mutual suspicion, political conditions in Greece worsened.

Ambassador MacVeagh reported that both Left and Right wing newspapers were reporting that since the Council of Foreign ministers had failed, then the likelihood of tripartite (i.e.: joint Anglo-American-Soviet) agreement in Greece had virtually disappeared, which in turn contributed to the likelihood of renewed armed conflict.200 Finally, elections were proclaimed for January 20th 1946, the first general elections in Greece for a decade, but the parties argued over whether a proportional rather than a majority system should be used in order to prevent the

Left from being totally excluded.201

198 Various Documents, September to November 1945, DBFA, Vol. 5, 1945, Series F Europe. Between September and November 1945, the Greek government was re-constituted 3 times. Acting Prime Minister Admiral Voulgaris resigned on Oct 9th 1945, and until the first week of November 1945, no one could be convinced to form a coalition government. M. Sophoulis formed a government which lasted only two days, so the Regent then assumed the presidency until November 2nd. See also: Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp.252-253. 199 Foreign Office to British Embassy in Washington (371/44538/AN 3159), October 14th 1945, BDFA, Series C North America, Part III, Vol. 25 (1945) 200 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1121) October 4th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.167-68. 201 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1128) October 6th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p.169. 93 Furthermore, after a few weeks of choosing the various personnel to head the British, French and American missions, and in accordance with Bevin's plan to hold elections as quickly as possible, at the end of November 1945 advance parties of the Allied Mission for the Observation of Greek Elections (AMFOGE) arrived in Athens. Their preliminary report illustrated the growing role that the Americans would play in the future of Greece. 202

However, AMFOGE’s arrival did not guarantee the endorsement of the elections by the KKE. On December 12th 1945, the KKE declared that it would abstain from participation in the committee for the registration of its members and then from the elections completely.203 Their abstention would make it difficult for the British to show Greece’s communist neighbours that a fair and open election was taking place. However, plans for the election continued in spite of the protests from the KKE.

In terms of American sentiment about the Greek government and the

British role in it, despite becoming involved in the supervision of the elections and the delaying of the plebiscite, the Americans continued to either allow or follow the British in dealing with the Greek government. For example, in one instance the head of the Socialist Party George Papandreou asked US Ambassador MacVeagh to intervene to try and force keep the Voulgaris government in power. MacVeagh

202 British embassy in Athens to Foreign Office (R 155 / 1 / 19, 45) November 1945, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, pp. 40-45. AMFOGE provided for 663 American personnel and 195 vehicles to arrive in Greece to help administer the elections. For the remainder of the year, the main focus of the British was to help prepare Greece for the elections. When AMFOGE left Athens on December 9 1945, they had decided that the British commitment to the elections would be 362 persons and 114 vehicles. AMFOGE returned to Athens on the 29th of December 1945, and its commander, Colonel Fiske of the US Army, declared that his headquarters would be established in Athens in early January 1946. The personnel of AMFOGE were trained in Italy and were then brought to Greece one month before the elections on the 31st of March 1946. 203 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self Defence?” p. 20. 94 refused stating that his orders were only to encourage party leaders to work together, not to ‘intervene (in) local affairs,’ to which Papandreou replied that his

‘British colleague’ (Leeper) ‘regularly engaged (in) such intervention.’204 It was a good example of both what the Greeks expected of Allied intervention and of the state of Anglo-American relations in Greece. The British had managed to get the

Americans somewhat more involved since 1944, but due to both continued

American reluctance to become too heavily involved in Greece and the continuing

British desire to retain Greece in their sphere of influence American involvement continued to defer to British plans.

The British did secure American intervention in November 1945 when, after Archbishop Damaskinos threatened to resign as Regent, Ambassador Leeper

‘begged’ Ambassador MacVeagh to see the Regent and to try to convince him not to resign. MacVeagh said that although he had no ‘instructions or desire to intervene’ in Greek domestic affairs (a line which was used repeatedly just before the speaker was about to do just that) as a ‘friend of Greece’ he felt that the

Regent’s resignation could only hurt the country when elections and Allied observation was so close. After meeting with MacVeagh, the Regent decided to stay in office.205 The fact that this unofficial intervention was given ‘full agreement’ by the State Department also indicated the changing attitude of the

Truman administration to American intervention in ways that were increasingly

204 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1138) October 8th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp.171-72. 205 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1354) November 26nd 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p.183. 95 similar to British intervention.206 However, economic recovery in Greece was severely hampered by a lack of funds. The stalling of Greek economic recovery was also due to the lack of reparations awarded at the Paris Peace Conference, and the government was left with the choice of raising taxes and / or taking foreign loans.207

When the Greek government changed the date for elections from January

20th to March 31st 1946, the Americans were not pleased. The Greek government hinted publically that the date was changed based on pressure from AMFOGE officials, to which the State Department ordered MacVeagh to make public the fact that it was the Greek government who had changed the date. In response to the

American statement, the Greek Ambassador to the US informed Secretary Byrnes that in fact it was the British who had pressed the Greek government to fix a date

‘not later than March.’208

As 1945 drew to a close, Anglo-American policy had succeeded in having elections proclaimed for Greece (although the date continued to be up for revision) but the domestic conditions in the country did not create a sense of optimism. In

206 Byrnes to MacVeagh (1204) November 28th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, p.184. 207 Acheson to MacVeagh (24) January 8th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p.88. See also: Byrnes to Caffrey (5244) November 9th 1945, FRUS 1945 Vol. III, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, pp. 1377-78. In light of Italian inability to pay reparations, Byrnes stated that only Greece and Yugoslavia which had suffered tremendously at the hands of the Germans would also be able to link their claims against Italy with their pursuit of some share of German reparations. However, as the Conference continued, it became clear that Greece would not receive enough reparations to have a significant impact on its economic recovery. See the above volume, pages, 1378-1506. 208 Diamantopoulos to Byrnes (868.00/12-1045) December 10th 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 191.

96 his summary of 1945 in Greece, Sir Reginald Leeper summed up British and Greek sentiment as he saw it.

I do not think that the Greeks yet appreciate how much has been done for them by their British Allies. This arises partly from the fact that they feel we are here primarily in our own interest because Greece is necessary to us…and Anglo- Greek relations have on the whole become less cordial during the past year. The British troops resent the fact that the Greeks do so little to help themselves and expect so much to be done for them by us… It says much for the patience of the British temperament that things have gone as well as they have during the past year…If I believed that Greece was to continue as at present for many years to come, I would take a very bleak view of her future, but I believe that the Greek people are very much better than their present politicians and that if we can help them to stand on their feet again they may produce better men to conduct their affairs. 209

1946 - January to September

In January 1946, US intervention in Greece was poised to grow to a new level. It was also a year where external threats to Greece, namely the territorial violations of Greece’s northern frontiers by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia mirrored the rapidly growing antagonism between the Soviet and Western spheres of influence.

As such 1946 would also be a year of profound change for the world as a whole. 1946 was also a year of extreme change in British and American relations.

In both Britain and the United States there were massive debates over demobilization and reconstruction, and also about the transition from war to peace-

209 Leeper to Foreign Office, December 1945, (R 245 / 1 / 19), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, p.56. 97 time economies. The United States remained central in both political and economic terms, and the subservient role that Britain had assumed during war continued in the postwar years in an economic and political sense in world affairs.

The British were in tenuous positions all over the empire, not only in

Greece, and as post-war tensions between the West and the Soviet Union continued to rise, signs of the coming ‘cold war’ showed themselves. In the United States, public opinion blamed the British for this state of affair and as a result the British kept detailed records of American public opinion and how it could affect their policy implementation there. In late December 1945 a foreign office telegram outlined British feelings of political superiority. While the British acknowledged that at least for the time being Britain and the Commonwealth may be forced ‘to play the role of the second-class power,’ they believed that they still had the monopoly of ‘competent political leadership’ and an immense asset ‘the fundamental unity’ of the British people and with their willingness to abide by the decisions of their elected leaders in contrast to the United States.210 The British

Embassy in Washington informed the foreign office that although diminished

American expectations of British power were damaging to British morale, in the

Middle East it could be to their advantage. The Embassy stated that American belief in diminished British power could encourage them to take an increasing role in the task of dealing with rising Arab nationalism and Soviet pressure in the

Middle East. The embassy further stated that just as Britain was experiencing an identity crisis of some sort, so too was the United States. America was described as

210 Foreign Office to Washington Embassy (No. 2, AN 2851/763/45), BDFA, Part IV, Series C, North America, Vol. 1, p. 7. 98 ‘a troubled spirit’ conscious of its power and keenly aware that she lacked the gift of leadership in many significant fields and was being confronted with severe domestic issues herself.211

In Greece, the holding of elections, which in addition to Bevin’s claims to desire the establishment of an independent Parliamentary Democracy, would allow the British to maintain their position of influence in Greek affairs. Once that was accomplished the British could deal with the plebiscite for the return of King

George which would represent the successful implementation of their longest standing policy objective for Greece; the restoration of the Greek monarchy.

However, the increasing American role was demonstrated on January 12th when the

United States’ government granted Greece a twenty-five million dollar loan in an attempt to mitigate the economic crisis and to create a favourable atmosphere for the successful holding of national elections.212

Following the news of the meagre economic aid the United States had awarded to Greece, on January 19th 1946, Ambassador Halifax reported to the

Foreign Office that the United States military would continue its demobilization, and that it was being completed at such a pace that America’s international prestige was damaged and that the US military’s effective fighting strength had been crippled.213 This would obviously be a major concern to the British who were already in a difficult situation with their overseas armed forces and the British were

211 Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office (No 2, AN 205/5/45), BDFA, Part IV, Series C, North America, Vol. 1, p. 8-9. ‘Domestic issues’ refers to post-war social, political and economic troubles. 212 (no. 12, R 868 / 1 / 19) January 11th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, p. 93, and (No. 10, R 650 / 2 / 19), January 12th 1946, p. 58. See also: Byrnes to Tsouderos (868.00/1-1546) January 15th 1946, FRUS 1946, The Near East and Africa, pp. 95-96. 213 Halifax to Foreign Office (AN 193 / 1 / 45) January 19th 1946, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 1, pp. 47-51. 99 in need of American loans to stabilize their economy. A key obstacle to the approval of the loans was British ‘socialism’ as many American politicians labelled it. Programs of wages and price control, in addition to health care and pensions were labelled by many US politicians a socialism, dangerously close to the Soviet model. Many authors have commented on the fact that the British had to engage a substantial amount of their post-war propaganda efforts to convincing both American officials and the general public that socialism in Britain was democratic, and not so different from American economic and social values.214

The Crisis in the United Nations with the Soviets during the week of

January 21st 1946, and the British ‘calm in the face of soviet allegations has had a stabilizing effect on opinion here as well as tending to a sensible enhancement of our own prestige.’215 This statement clearly illustrates the importance that the

British placed on their domestic and international image. It appeared that the image of Pax Britannica was a key tool in their foreign policy initiatives.

In connection with the Greek Loan the United Sates government agreed to participate in the Greek Currency Committee, which in turn represented another step in their deepening involvement in Greece.216 This was followed by a 10.5 million pound loan from the British Government to stabilise the drachma on

January 24th 1946. Bevin stated that it was necessary to stabilize the Greek economy before the elections could take place but he warned the British Parliament

214 Dianne Kirby, “Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945 -48, in The Journal of Contemporary History, (Vol. 35, issue 3, (2000) pp. 395-412) , p. 396, and, Caroline Anstey, ‘The Projection of British Socialism’pp.420-428. 215 Washington Embassy to Foreign Office (AN 257/ 1/ 45) January 21st 1946, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 1, pp. 51-52. 216 Acheson to Winant (309) January 10th 1945, FRUS 1946, The Near East and Africa, pp. 89-90. 100 that all of the financial assistance they were giving would only be of value if it were part of a larger economic plan. However, this economic aid to the Greek government was overshadowed by a Soviet demand on January 22nd 1946 for

Britain to withdraw her troops, which they stated were preventing the Greeks from obtaining freedom.217 The Soviets continued their attack on the British presence in

Greece by lodging an official protest with the United Nations and by re-iterating their demand for a British withdrawal.218 Meanwhile, the British had already begun to provide the US State Department with assessments of current and possible future conditions in Greece. W.H. McNeil, a British liaison office who had served in

Greece during the war was at this time serving as a military attaché to the

American Embassy in Athens. He wrote a report which was endorsed by

Ambassador MacVeagh, and then sent to Secretary of State Acheson for consideration. In the report (approved by the British War Department) McNeil predicted that the worsening Greek economy, coupled with a British troop withdrawal would lead to a right wing dictatorship which would inevitably lead to more civil unrest, foreign intervention and finally to a Communist takeover. The last stage would then invariably lead Greece, like the countries of Eastern Europe, to fall under the Soviet sphere of influence.219 This report may be interpreted as yet another effort of the British to prepare the United States to continue to assume greater involvement in, if not yet responsibility for, Greece in the near future.

217 (no. 11, R 1352 / 2 / 19), January 25th 1946, p. 59, (no. 12, R 868 / 1 / 19) January 11th 1946 p. 94, (no. 20, R 1375 / 1 / 19) January 19th 1946 p. 98, and (no.40, R 2196 / 1 / 19) February 2nd 1946 p. 105. BDFA Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, 1946. 218 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defence?” p.18. See also: United Nations, official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, page 73. 219 MacVeagh to Byrnes (2100) January 19th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 97-99. 101 In the weekly summary for February 1946, Ambassador Halifax stated that the continued soviet attacks on British actions and presence in Iran, Greece and

Indonesia had drawn allies to Britain, since the British had responded with ‘open- handedness’ in contrast to the Soviets’ methods.220 However, Stalin wished to forestall the Western Powers, particularly the Americans, whom he desperately desired to keep out of the Eastern Mediterranean. He counselled the KKE to seek a compromise with the Greek Government. He was fearful that Yugoslavian support of the KKE could contribute to an escalation of Western Intervention in Greece, and therefore, Stalin looked for ways to limit them as well.221

In terms of the Soviet demand to remove the remaining British troops in

Greece, the Greek Ambassador to London issued a statement to the British press stating that the British troops were in Greece at the request of ‘successive Greek

Governments.’ Leeper believed that this statement would encourage the Greek

Communists even more because they would interpret it as the Soviets saying to the

KKE that their time had come to be high on the list of Soviet foreign policy.222

However, there was considerable fallout from the USSR’s demand. The KKE received powerful ammunition for its escalating propaganda campaign against the

British and Greek governments, and it may have been encouraged by Stalin’s

220 Halifax to Foreign Office (AN 299 / 1 / 45) February 1946, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 1, pp. 56-60. The Soviet methods, whatever they may have been, are not mentioned. 221 Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism: The author mentions many examples of Soviet pressure on the KKE to avoid military confrontation. pp. 48-51, 104-7, 110-12, 120-1, 123-6, 125- 8, 139-40. 222 Leeper to Foreign Office (no. 53, R 2528 / 1 / 19) February 7th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, pp 108-109. 102 comments.223 It is also possible that as a result of the Soviet Union’s statements,

EAM would be encouraged to boycott the elections, just as Zachariadis had been stating it would do since September of 1945.

In February 1946, Soviet attacks on the British presence in Greece continued in the UN, and US representative Stettinius reported to Secretary

Acheson that Bevin stated that while British troops would be withdrawn at the earliest possible opportunity, they were there at the request of the Greek government in order to preserve peace and security and to create and maintain the conditions that were necessary for the holding of ‘fair elections.’ Bevin also attacked the communist anti-British propaganda that was circulating in Greece and continuing Soviet support of the communists, and then asked the members of the

Security Council to give a ‘definite yes or no answer’ to the question of whether

British actions had endangered world peace and security. Stettinius reported that he believed that Bevin’s statement was sound and likely strong enough to prevent further Soviet protests, at least for the time being. American support for British actions was demonstrated the next day when in private meeting with the Soviet representative to the UN, Stettinius informed him that the United States saw nothing in British actions that had endangered world peace and security.224 On

February 5th 1946 the UN Security met to further discuss the ‘Greek Issue’ and again the British and Soviets argued over the British troop presence in Greece and

223 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defence?” p.18. The comments referred to here are from Stalin’s Speech of February 9th 1946 where he declared that ‘peaceful coexistence with the West was infeasible.’ 224 Stettinius to Byrnes (1275) February 2nd 1946, and, Memorandum of conversation between Stettinus (USA) and Vyshinsky (USSR) (USSC 46/13, Conv. 2) February 3rd 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 104-08. 103 what it actually represented. The Soviets asserted that while the troops themselves did not represent a threat to world peace and security their presence created conditions that could threaten it. The solution was to officially publish all Security

Council members’ views on the effect of British troops in Greece and to leave the matter alone.225

The Americans worked to keep the Soviet charges against Britain from heading to a vote in the Security Council or for a resolution in the General

Assembly and Stettinius reported that it seemed as though Britain had been cleared of the Soviet Union’s charges. While Bevin agreed that the British would not seek a formal resolution to clear their name, he did ask for some kind of official statement from the Chair of the Security Council which exonerated the British presence in Greece. However, the Soviets threatened to veto any statement that exonerated the British and demanded a resolution ordering a British withdrawal. 226

Though no veto or resolution was passed, the problems in the Security Council foreshadowed more to come. The news from Greece was not much better as the

Greek Government considered postponing the elections once again. However, under combined British and American pressure, no delay was accepted, and the

Regent signed several decrees at the end of February which defined the total number of seats in the parliament, the electoral districts and confirming the time

225 Memorandum of Security Council meeting, Stettinius to Acheson (USSC 46/9, report 13) February 5th and 6th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp.108-112. 226 Stettinius to Byrnes (1465) February 6th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp.112-15. 104 and date for voting. In spite of these decrees, there was still a high likelihood of some of the parties, particularly on the Left, abstaining from the elections.227

Meanwhile in Washington in early March 1946, the British embassy continued to monitor public and congressional statements relating to a possible formal military alliance between the United States and Britain.228 What was equally important to the British was American economic involvement, since the

Soviets had all but blocked off Eastern Europe to Western trade. What was also deeply troubling to the British was the possibility that German trade may never be allowed to fully recover due to Soviet interference.229 For these reasons, Bevin, with the support of the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of the General Staff, continued to pursue the policies of rebuilding British strength by leaning on the

United States, and by maintaining, wherever possible a British presence, particularly in the Middle East, in order to preserve their strategic interests.

However, it is here that an important division between the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary was revealed.

On March 2nd 1946, Prime Minister Atlee distributed a brief to the Defence committee in which he stated that the British could no longer expect to dominate the Mediterranean and should withdraw troops from the rest of the Middle East, including Egypt and Greece. He concluded this brief by stating that the British should not design their foreign policy based on sentiment (for the Empire) but

227 Rankin to Byrnes (277) February 28th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p.116. 228Washington Embassy to Foreign Office (No 7, AN 649 / 4 / 45) March 1946, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 1, pp. 29-30. 229 Foreign Office to Washington Embassy (No 9, AN 719/36/45), BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 1, pp. 37-39. 105 rather on a rational assessment that the new strategic centre of the world was

America, not Britain as ‘a power looking eastwards through the Mediterranean to

India and the East.’230 The Chiefs of Staff rebutted Atlee’s arguments, re-iterating their beliefs in the importance of the Middle East for world communications and oil supplies. Bevin supported the Chiefs of Staff stating that the British had to have a strong enough military to make their foreign policy credible and that was basically the end of the debate.231

By early March in Greece, it was fairly clear that the Left would boycott the elections. It was a choice that both the Regent and American ambassador explained to the State Department as being encouraged ‘from abroad in order to sabotage the elections, gain time to build up strength and when ready seize power.’232 This interpretation was strengthened when the Greek Ambassador to the

US informed the Secretary of State that the Soviet ambassador to Greece had approached the Greek government in order to increase trade between the USSR and Greece and that such trade could be facilitated by ceding Greek ports to the

Soviets. Prime Minister Souphoulis rejected the proposal, informing the Soviet

Ambassador that Greek ports already had all the facilities necessary to handle increased Russo-Greek trade and that cessation was unnecessary. However, concerned about what the Soviet proposal could mean in terms of Soviet desires for the Dodecanese, the Greek PM ordered the ambassador to inform the State

230 Atlee, quoted in, Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Vol.3, p.242. 231 Atlee, quoted in, Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Vol.3, p.340 232 Rankin to Byrnes (317) March 8th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp.118-119. 106 Department of the Soviet proposal.233 Therefore, by March 1946, the British and the Americans had their suspicions of Soviet territorial ambitions for Greece confirmed and the suspicion they had towards the USSR and its intentions in

Greece continued to grow.

As early as 1939 the USSR had attempted to gain influence over the

Dardanelles, inviting the Turkish foreign minister to Moscow and attempting to get

Turkey to sign a mutual defence treaty with the USSR where both countries would assume responsibility for the defence of the Straits. Turkey rejected this proposal, but 7 years later, Soviet admissions for control of the Straits remained. By

February 1946 the USSR had move troops to the Bulgarian-Turkish border and were pressing for more control of and access through the Straits. In response to

Soviet pressure, the United States would send the Battleship Missouri and two destroyers to Constantinople, officially to repatriate the remains of the Turkish ambassador to the US, but mainly to demonstrate American interest in the Eastern

Mediterranean.234

Churchill’s speech on March 5th 1946, in front of President Truman, recommended a close Anglo-American alliance to combat the expansion of the

“atheist” Soviet regime.235 Though initially sceptical of playing the ‘religious card’ in such a politically charged atmosphere, many in Truman’s inner circle succumbed to the British plan (once again) as demonstrated by the declaration of

Vaughn Taylor, US ambassador to the Vatican who stated, ‘The cause of

233 Diamantopoulos to Acheson (958) March 9th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 119-20. 234 Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972) pp. 58-59, 69-71. 235 Churchill’s Fulton Speech, quoted in: Kirby, p. 391. 107 Communism versus Christianity and Democracy transcends minor differences in

Christian creeds. It is the Great Issue of the future and thus of today.’236 However, these arguments were not enough to insulate the Labour government from being branded as too socialist by various groups in the United States.

In order to counter these accusations, the Foreign Office was advising

Prime Minister Atlee, Secretary Morrison and Minister Bevin to understate or even deny the differences in labour Party policy from the previous Conservative government when communicating with American press and officials. It was all part of the British Propaganda machine in the United States. The Foreign Office advised that it would be preferable to educate the American public and policy makers about Britain in general, and her shared values with the United States, rather than the differences between the Labour Party and the Conservatives. The

Foreign Office felt it was much more beneficial to Britain to show continuity to the

Americans, rather than alarming them that change and major domestic economic intervention were on the horizon.237 As a result, due to external considerations as much as domestic ones, British policy, from the defeat of Churchill in the previous year’s elections to the Spring of 1946, remained remarkably consistent.

It may therefore be argued that British anti-communism, both in Greece and abroad, was also a way for the British to re-direct American attention from British efforts to manipulate their own economy in an attempt to more rapidly (but in stark opposition to American ‘free-enterprise’) assist the recovery of the British economy. Since 1943, the Foreign Office had consistently espoused the need to

236 Taylor to Truman (WHCF Box 44) June 11th 1946, Truman Papers. Emphasis in original. 237 J.C. Donnelly to Patrick Gordon Walker, May 14th 1946, (FO 371/51639 AN 1413/15/45). 108 focus on British interests, rather than the British way of life in order to distance themselves from socialists, both domestically and abroad, that may endanger

American economic aid to Britain.238 The Foreign Office would go so far as to attempt to silence anyone whose views they felt could alienate the American public and policy makers.239 The British were so successful at manipulating the

Americans and hiding their actions that the head of their US spy ring was given a medal by the government upon which he had been spying. The chief spy of the

British in the United States, William Stephenson, was given the Medal of Merit, the highest civilian award the United States could confer, for his vital assistance to the United States in ‘the fields of Intelligence and special operations.’ 240 Greatly benefitting British interests further was the growing animosity between the USSR and the United States.

It is therefore not surprising that the inability of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union to guarantee non-aggression or to sign any agreements of significance would encourage instability in Greece between the forces of the extreme Right and Left. If the patrons of the opposing sides in Greece could not reach an understanding, how could the communists and non-communists be expected to do so? Therefore, the British and American believed that the people of

Greece were faced with an armed faction on the Left that saw the only route to power as only being through violence and a government on the Right that was detaining thousands of people without trial and was incapable of dealing with the economic crisis. Though the various Missions continued their work, their impact

238 Anstey, p.425. 239 Anstey, p.426. 240 Quoted in Conant, Photo # 23, between pages 202-203. 109 was dramatically lessened as a consequence of the British decision to remove their troops.241

Joint Anglo-American pressure was applied to the Greek government which continued to try and delay the elections, but the British and Americans argued that the consequences of delaying them outweighed the consequences of holding them. This was in turn seized upon by the Soviets who called the process for holding the pending elections and the election lists fraudulent.242

When the March 31st election was held, the Leftist boycott resulted in a decisive victory for the Right.243 However, this decision proved costly to the KKE.

Zachariadis had made the success of the Greek Left dependent upon outside factors that he could neither predict nor control, namely the support of the Soviets or other communist nations, and none of them properly assessed US interest in the

Mediterranean and Middle East.244 Though the election had taken place with relative calm, the results spelled disaster for Greece. As Woodhouse stated in reference to the 1945 governments that excluded the communists, the KKE’s boycott of the elections once again freed its members from taking responsibility for

241 Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) p. 158. Another reason for the troop withdrawal was in order to remove the Soviet justification for maintaining their high troop levels in Eastern Europe. 242 Kennan to Byrnes (867) March 19th 1946, Rankin to Byrnes (370) March 20th 1946, Bevin to Byrnes , March 20th 1946, Byrnes to Rankin (352) March 21st 1946, Byrnes to Rankin (365) March 22st 1946, Rankin to Byrnes (383) March 23rd 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 122-28. 243 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defence?” p. 21 244 Ole E. Smith, “Communist Perceptions, Strategy and Tactics, 1945-1949” in Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1995) p. 100. 110 the wellbeing of their nation and shortly thereafter they focussed on pursuing the armed struggle.245

In April 1945, Zachariadis boasted to his potential supporters in the USSR and Yugoslavia that by eluding the provisions of the Varkiza Accord, ELAS had retained a considerable number of machine guns, rifles and other military equipment.246 These statements were confirmed by a report of the head of the

British Police Mission whose units had apprehended a group of Communists transporting weapons after they had attacked the Northern Greek town of

Katerini.247 Throughout March and April of 1946, Zachariadis attempted to enlist the aid of Tito and the Yugoslav communist party since the KKE planned to field an army of fifteen to twenty thousand armed guerrillas but it still needed substantial foreign aid to do so.248 However the KKE had a setback in April when

Stalin ordered the KKE to search for a compromise to prevent ‘an untimely armed intervention by the British.’249 Stalin still believed that the British were determined to hold onto Greece and Bevin’s continued interference in the Greek government seemed to support Stalin’s beliefs. Though Bevin stated that the Greeks had to learn how to form their own government he also believed that the British should

245 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 253, and Smith, p. 96. 246 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defence?” p.20-22. 247 Rankin to Byrnes (449) April 3rd 1946, quoting Charles Wickam, BPM Head, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 130. 248 Smith, pp. 96. Smith states that there is no concrete information about the specifics of the agreements made with the Yugoslavians and that the information he is citing came from Zachariadis’recorded statements from the Seventh Plenum in 1957. In terms of the estimates for the size of the army, Smith cites a ‘Report on the Situation in Greece, September 12th 1946’ which was sent to the communist parties of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Smith does state clearly however that the report does not contain any evidence that assistance ‘had already been discussed and agreed upon.’ 249 Iatrides, “Revolution or Self-Defence?” p. 21. Zachariadis would later choose to ignore the order, submitting an official request to the Soviets on September 12th 1946 for weapons. The KKE requested 8000 rifles, 15 heavy mortars, 50 light mortars, 250 machine guns, 10, 000 grenades and 150,000 dollars per month. 111 have a say in its composition. He instructed the new British Ambassador M.

Clifford Norton to inform Tsaldaris that the most suitable government for Greece would be a broad coalition.250

Meanwhile the USSR continued to attack the British as imperialist, pointing out their large military forces stationed around the world, especially in

Palestine, Iraq, and Greece, and it was not until the Paris Council of Foreign

Ministers in May 1946, that the United States began to take over the brunt of

Soviet hostility from the British. International tension was further increased by the

Soviets’ refusal to sign on to a twenty-five year non aggression pact with the

Western Powers. The situation in Germany was deteriorating as well, as the British and American zones in Berlin began to unify in reaction to the instability in the

Soviet zone and the British and Soviets remained entrenched in their nearly irreconcilable positions in every arena.251 A few members of the US government, seeing through official British policy, stated publically that in Germany the British were engaged in a program that was designed to bring them into conflict with the

USSR. The only encouraging news for the British was that the French constitution, which the British believed was largely sponsored by the Communists, was rejected by the French electorate. 252 This was welcome news to the British and the

Americans who had intervened against the communist in France. Similar to the

250 Bevin to Norton, April 1st 1946 (R 5028 / 1 / 19), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, p. 314. Byrnes to Rankin (438) April 6th 1946, FRUS 1946, The Near East and Africa, pp. 131-32. At the same time, the World Food Crisis of 1946 was, understandably, occupying m British interest whose domestic food situation was worse than it had been the previous year. For insight, see: Halifax to Bevin, April 27th 1946(AN 1269 / 1 / 45), BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, pp. 151-52. 251 Morgan, p. 246-248. 252 Halifax to Bevin, May 13th 1946 (AN 1515/1/45), BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1,pp. 157-159. 112 arguments used in Italy and France to counter Communist influence, in the spring of 1946, the British increased their use of religious groups to provide another avenue through which the British could influence American public opinion, if not directly in their favour, than at least against the Soviet Union. As had been done during the war against the Germans, the propaganda machines in both Britain and the United States portrayed the USSR as the enemy of “Western Christian civilization.”253

Additionally, threats to Greece’s sovereignty were being increasingly noted in the Spring of 1946 as reports filled in from the American and British missions in

Albania and Greece relating to border violations in Epirus and the terrorization of the Greek population there, in addition to stressing the virtual indefensibility of

Greece’s Northern Frontiers should Yugoslavia and Bulgaria attempt to force their territorial demands.254 Therefore by May 1946, the British and Americans were confronted with what they believed to be very real Communist designs for Greece that were manifested by increasing international pressure at the UN level, threats to northern Greece by Greece’s communists neighbours at the regional level and an armed revolutionary force at the domestic level.

However, despite the increasing unity of Anglo-American policy in Greece,

British and American relations were strained by reports and articles written by a

Mr. Lippmann, who argued that in their zone of occupation in Berlin, the British were engaged in actions designed deliberately to provoke the soviets. In an effort

253 Kirby, p.309. Referring to Churchill’s speech of March 5th 1946. 254 Rankin to Byrnes (2531) April 18th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 139-43. There is no mention of Albanian security concerns in the report, nor is he specific about where the quotation came from , other than saying that some Albanian commanders were overheard. 113 to placate the Americans and to demonstrate their commitment to decolonization, the British made the announcement that they would be withdrawing from Egypt.

However, the British were also anxious to note that the withdrawal was to strengthen their position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East against the

Soviets.255

Meanwhile in Greece, on May 13, 1946 with the approval of the British, the

Tsaldaris government announced that the plebiscite would take place on September

4th1946.256 Perhaps believing that it had made a mistake by not participating in the

March elections the KKE began to urge its members to register in order to be able to take part in the plebiscite. However, this measure was taken too late to make much of a difference since the forces of the Right were firmly in control and the

British appeared to continue their preparations to leave.257 However, in order to try and strengthen Greece strategically, the United States and Britain proposed to state that they were sympathetic to Greece’s territorial claims in light of her struggle against the Axis during the War.258

The US military assessed Greece’s claims to make her northern frontier more defensible and concluded that while it could help Greece to a small degree and also encourage Turkey to take more interest in defending her European territories, it was concluded however that Greek claims against Bulgaria would do

255 Halifax to Bevin, May 13th 1946 (AN 1515 / 1 / 45), Paragraphs 5 and 1, BDFA, Series C North America, Vol. 1, pp. 157-159. This was a ‘PR’ manoeuvre for the British since the events of 1954 indicate clearly that they were not prepared to abandon Egypt then, let alone in 1946. 256 Byrnes to Rankin (516) April 19th 1946, Acheson to Rankin (571) May 4th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 144-45, 155. The Americans initially did not favour such an early date for the plebiscite but after consulting with the British changed their position and supported it. 257 Richter, p. 521. 258 Acheson to Byrnes (2074) May 2nd 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p.154. 114 more harm than good in the region. They stated that the territory Greece wished to claim would destabilize the Balkans without contributing to Greece’s defensibility.259 However, the United States did agree to send observers at the request of the Greek Government to supervise the Plebiscite.260 Though the British and Americans agreed to participate in this supervision, the French had not accepted, and so Canada was nominated as a replacement. The British and

Americans greatly desired more than two nations to participate in order to keep the results from being protested. Additionally, the British and Americans favoured the plebiscite being a question of Monarchy or Republic, rather than simply on whether or not the monarchy should return. The Americans also stated that although they would not support Greek claims against Bulgaria, they would not support Bulgarian claims against Greece. They did however suggest that

Thessaloniki be made into a ‘free-zone’ to facilitate Bulgarian access to the

Aegean.261

What was also of significance, not only for Greece but also for all the nations that would be requiring American funds to finance re-construction efforts, was a statement made by John Foster Dulles who, at the time, was serving as the

US ambassador to the UN. He stated that the Kremlin regarded military force as the core of sovereignty. This American belief greatly benefitted the British and their objectives. Therefore, the British carefully monitored US public opinion, and

259 Hickerson to Byrnes (SWN 4279) May 11th 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 161. 260 Acheson to Truman (868.00/5-746) May 7th 1946, Acheson to Rankin (620) May 16th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 157-58, 162-63. 261 Rankin to Byrnes (685) May 21st 1946, Baxter to Byrnes (868.00/5-2746) FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp.164-66. 115 the efforts that the US government put into stopping Soviet power from spreading.262

In a reversal of the position the British had attempted to portray earlier in

May 1946, they now had to show a break with the policies of the past. They could no longer afford to maintain their overseas commitments. In Greece, Britain could no longer manage her affairs the way she had after nearly seven years of being heavily involved. The majority of the decisions the British would now make with regards to Greece were designed to facilitate their exit, at least publicly.263

Developments outside of Greece worked to Britain’s advantage as well as in May

1946, the Soviets sent troops to Manchuria to help the Chinese communists fight the Ku-min-tang. This development further alienated the Americans and the

Soviets, and even pro-soviets newspapers in the United States began to blame the

Soviets for the failure of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers.264 In June 1946, the results of the French and Italian elections gave hope to the British that there were peoples in Europe who feared a communist dictatorship, and that they would take action to vote against them.265 Therefore, the British were able to show the

Americans that in Greece, where conditions were worse than in France and Italy, that only with continuing aid could Greece remain in the western sphere of influence. The British wanted to continue to link British Plans with American intervention. On the 4th of June 1946 Bevin gave a speech to the British House of

262 BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, 1946, Inverchapel to Bevin ( no. 1446, June 29th 1946) Paragraph 6, p. 197-98 and, Inverchapel to Bevin (no. 1927, August 15th 1946) Paragraph 10 p. 212 263 Morgan, p. 252. 264 Halifax to Bevin, May 13th 1946, (AN 1636 / 1 / 45), Paragraph 17, BDFA, Series C North America, Vol. 1, p. 169. 265 Inverchapel to Bevin, June 8th 1946 (AN 1770 / 1 / 45), Paragraph 6, BDFA, Series C North America, Vol. 1, p. 176. 116 Commons in which he stated that it was vital for Britain and the USA to continue to work along parallel lines in terms of their foreign policy and their foreign intervention.266 This was done not only to secure US intervention in Europe, but to help secure an American loan to the British Government who were in an increasingly desperate domestic economic situation.

The US loan was critical for British interests, although, a key condition to the loan was the British agreement to ‘de-imperialize’ and to reduce her commonwealth preferences.267 The British were hesitant to do so, since they were relying heavily on Governmental control of the economy to maintain and perhaps restore some of their lost power.

In Greece through June and July 1946, as fighting between the Communists and various right-wing forces was escalating, Tsaldaris met with various British and American diplomats in his attempts to secure greater foreign loans to rebuild

Greece, to gain further support for her territorial claims and to assure the Western

Allies of Greece’s commitment to them.268 However, the dramatic increase in right-wing violence in Greece had destabilized the country to such a level that increasing British investment was not likely.269 By the end of July 1946, the

Chancellor of the Exchequer informed Prime Minister Attlee that the British ‘had reached a point where we could do no more,’ and ‘for the next year or so we

266 Foreign Office to Washington Embassy June 8th 1946 (AN 1770 /1/45), Paragraphs 10-12, BDFA, Series C North America, Vol. 1, p. 177. 267Inverchapel to Bevin, August 15th 1946, (no. 1927) Paragraph 11c , BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, p.213. 268 Acheson to Rankin (739) June 14th 1946, Rankin to Byrnes (790) June 18th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 170-71. 269 Alexander, pp. 202-206. 117 should have to deny our friends, including the Greeks, any future credits.’ 270

Britain had reached the breaking point financially and though they wanted to be sure that their policy in Greece since October1944 had not been a complete failure they were caught in the post-war economic crisis. Shortly thereafter, the Greek

Government began to look more towards the United States for financial assistance.

Tsaldaris had feared that the British would be offended by his approaching the US for financial assistance but the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied that far from objecting ‘he would welcome such a step’ because at the present time the

Americans were in a better position financially than the British. In Paris, the Greek

Prime Minister spoke with American Foreign Minister Byrnes about future loans from the Export-Import Bank and Byrnes replied that if the Bank began to get short of funds he would ask the US congress for more.271 From this point on the Greek government would increasingly be aided by the United States and this was a significant victory for British plans for American Intervention in Greece, and through it (the British hoped) Western Europe and the East.

The awarding of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece on June 28th 1946 was an important marker of Western versus Soviet action as well. Soviet pressure against Turkey and Greece over the Dardanelles and Straits respectively was decisively rebuffed by the British and Americans.272 Additionally, the British continued to press the United States about the growing Soviet influence in Greece

270 Bevin to Norton (497) July 20th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6, 1946, Doc R 10729 / 8523 / 19, Enclosures 3- 5, pp 38-40. 271Bevin to Norton (497) July 20th 1946 (R 10729 / 8523 / 19), Enclosure 4. BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6, p.39. This promise was not a guarantee that more funds would be available, simply a promise that Greek requests would be evaluated. See: Acheson to Harriman (5358) July 13th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 181-82. 272 Report of Meeting in Paris (868.00/7-146) July 1st 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 174-75 118 and it was having its desired effect. By August 31st 1946, the British Ambassador to Washington would state that the Americans had now developed a growing tendency to link events from one part of the world to another with actions against it or its allies and to lay the blame for undesired events at the feet of the USSR.273

This was not a difficult connection to make as conditions in Greece worsened and showed no signs of abating. On August 13th 1946, Bevin received a dispatch informing him that the first efforts of the Greek government to co-ordinate on a large-scale anti-communist action between the Army and the gendarmes had been largely unsuccessful which was mainly due to a lack of communication and a failure to define which group would have situational control over the other.

Bevin’s Charge d’Affaires D.W. Lascelles, then informed Bevin that the Greek forces in Northern Greece were operating with the powers of martial law but the

Greek Government was not admitting it because it did not want it known that conditions were unsuitable for holding the plebiscite, and Bevin was therefore concerned with the international reaction to the plebiscite when it was held on

September 1st.274 Further complicating matters was continuing Soviet pressure on

Turkey in August 1946, for control of the Dardanelles.275 As a result, maintaining control in Greece was seen as having even greater immediate importance for the

West. This, combined with the Yugoslavians shooting down an American fighter

273 Inverchapel to Foreign Office, August 31st 1946, no. 2657, FO 371/51609. 274 Quoted in: David H. Close, “The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945-1950,” in Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy, John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds. (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1995) pp.134-137. 275 Inverchapel to Bevin, August 18th 1946, (No. 570) Paragraph 14, BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, p. 265. 119 plane dramatically increased international tensions around Greece.276 The

Yugoslavian attack, though unsanctioned by the Soviets, was just another piece of evidence of Communist aggressive intentions. It was put to good use by the British and the Americans. Despite being very hesitant in early July to grant Greece any new loans ‘in the foreseeable future.’ on August 7th 1946, the US Export-Import

Bank granted a 175 million dollar reconstruction loan to Greece, in addition to a

July 31st UNRRA grant to Greece of 293 million dollars.277 The Americans were clearly taking a greater interest in Greece. However, the British and Americans were still not fully prepared to antagonise the USSR, and therefore they proceeded cautiously with the Greek plebiscite.278

Soviet attention to Greece was shown on August 24th 1946 when the

Ukrainian representative to the UN charged the Greek government under Article

34 of the UN charter, stating that its actions against Albania (moving soldiers to the border, threatening to invade Albania), facilitated by the continuing British troop presence in Greece, were creating conditions that could threaten the Peace and Security of the Balkans. The American representative to the UN stated that he believed the charges were frivolous but the State Department advised that every country had the right to present an issue to the Security Council though it did seem strange to them that they were ‘pleading Albania’s case’ and that they should at least then ‘state reasons why Albania was itself not in a position to do so.’ The

276 Inverchapel to Bevin, August 23rd 1946, (No. 581) Paragraph 1, BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, p. 268. 277 Acheson to Harriman (5358) July 13th 1946, Acheson to Truman (868.51/8-746) August 7th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 181-82, 187-88. The US loan was heavily balanced in favor of Greece using the funds to purchase American manufactured goods, particularly war materiel. 278 Though the Big three were not cooperating as they had during the War, they were still not at the antagonistic levels they would reach the next year. 120 State Department then advised that this fact in itself may be used a justification for dismissing the Ukrainian charges. The Americans also instructed their representative to the UN to point out that the Ukrainian allegations against Greece were only ‘part of the picture’ and that more information was required from both sides in order to fully address the territorial and border issues between Greece and

Albania. The Americans also countered the Ukrainian allegations that only the

Right in Greece was engaging in Nationalist propaganda, stating that also the

Center and Left wing media were advocating for Greece’s territorial claims in

Northern Epirus. Finally, in defence of the British presence in Greece, the US rejected the Ukrainian allegations as ‘revives similar charge made by USSR against United Kingdom in January,’ and that they did not consider that any new information had arisen that could blame British troops’ presence for the current situation.279

The following week the State Department instructed the US representative to the Security Council Johnson, to respond to the Ukrainian charges, specifically the ones alleging that the March elections had been fraudulent. The State department stated that the UK, USA and France had observed the elections, had signed the report and sent copies to the UN and that they were ‘available to anybody who will take the slightest trouble to read them.’ Acheson also instructed

Johnson to remind the Ukrainians that as part of the USSR, they had been invited to observe the March elections and had declined to participate. Furthermore, the

279 Attitude to Ukrainian complaint against Greece (501.BC/8-2746) August 27th 1946. Acheson to Johnson (174) August 28th 1946, Acheson to Johnson (179) September 5th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 194-200. This period also presents an important opportunity to reflect on how two sides in a conflict perceive security. What for Greece was ‘Northern Epirus’ was ‘Southern Albania’ for the Albanians. 121 United States had no reason to believe that the results of the plebiscite threatened international peace and that they supported the presence of British troops in Greece as contributing to the peace and security of the country and the region. In regards to the border dispute between Greece and Albania, far more investigation was required before any blame could be assessed to either side and Acheson authorised

Johnson to support the formation of a subcommittee in New York, but not on-the- ground, to investigate the matter further.280 Though the United States was still using cautious rhetoric over Greece to deal with the allegations of the Soviets and their satellites, they were clearly aligning themselves against the USSR.

As for the British, though Bevin was outspoken of his criticism of the

USSR and had stood up in parliament saying that the Russians ‘wanted to go right across the throat of the British Empire,’ and had spent much of his tenure as

Foreign Secretary opposing Russian expansion and influence at every step,281 he had proceeded cautiously in regards the plebiscite to ensure that there could be little or no objection from the Soviets. Fortunately for Bevin, the plebiscite took place without significant incidents, and the result was an overwhelming victory for the Royalists.282 British reports about the levels of violence after the plebiscite however showed that clashes were increasing in Thessaly, the Peloponnese, and

Western Macedonia and that the communists were reinforcing their armed bands.

Though the gendarmes seemed to be dealing with the situation well, the British

280 Acheson to Johnson (183) September 7th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 202-04. 281 Murphy, p. 232. 282 Norton to Bevin (261) September 13th 1946 (R 14061 /1 / 19), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6, pp. 58-59. In the Village of Kotili in Western Macedonia a garrison of gendarmes and soldiers was overcome; and 22 were killed and 21 were captured. The election results were a 68.9% vote in favour of the return of King George, cited in; (R 16571 / 1 / 19), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6, p. 285. 122 observed that the same could not be said of the Greek Army who, ‘appearing to have had little heart for the arduous, dangerous, and often disappointing operations necessary to round up Communist guerrillas during the summer.’283 Furthermore, on September 16th 1946, the British received reports that Albanian and Russian troops were massing on the Greek Border.284 The US received similar reports and also took measures to strengthen Turkey since ‘the Soviet Union appears to be pursuing of (or?) endeavouring to undermine the stability and obtain control of

...Greece, Turkey and Iran.’ These measures included approving loans and the sales of military equipment to these threatened countries in order to ‘strengthen the will and ability’ of those nations to resist Soviet pressure. The State Department also stressed continuing Soviet efforts to destabilize the Middle East and, although the

USSR had placed on demands on Greece or Iran as they had on Turkey, it was vital for US interests to maintain the ‘independence and territorial integrity of Greece and Iran.’285

The week before the Greek Monarch returned to Greece, the American representative in Albania informed the Secretary of State that over the past six weeks, the Albanians had mobilized between 60 and 100 thousand troops with

Soviet and Yugoslavian advisors and materiel. Jacobs also reported that Albanian

283Norton to Bevin (206) July 11th 1946, (R 14232 / 1 / 19), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6, p. 66. There was also talk of cutting diplomatic ties with Franco in Spain as a result of soviet and left-wing pressure against the fascist regime, however this was opposed by the British who stated “an eventual general rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain should be rejected since interference of this kind in the domestic affairs of another country has not proved effective in the past.” 284 Inverchapel to Bevin, September 16th 1946, (No. 606) Paragraph 21, BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, p.287. 285 Clayton to Byrnes (711.68/9-1246) September 12th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp.209-13. 123 Army leaders ‘reliably reported have said “we must attack Greece”.’286 Regardless of actual Soviet intentions, the United States was virtually convinced of Soviet designs for Greece. Therefore, Secretary Byrnes advised that the United States change its pre-existing policy for providing aid based on need, ability to repay and alignment of objectives with those of the USA. Byrnes stated that in the previous months the situation had ‘so hardened’ that in his view, aid must be provided to

‘our friends in every way’ and denied to those whom for any reason opposed ‘the principles for which we stand.’ Byrnes then met with Foreign Secretary Bevin and suggested that the British provide military material to Turkey, while the United

States would provide the financial and technical assistance. Lastly, while the political system of Turkey was ‘more satisfactory’ than that of Greece, Greece’s strategic position was ‘equally great.’287 The State Department then proceeded to produce an analysis of the military, political and economic situation and needs of

Greece and Turkey and once completed, would submit it to President Truman.288 It would end up being the basis for the Truman Doctrine. After nearly two years, the

British, aided simultaneously by their domestic efforts in the US and by Soviet actions in the UN and Middle East, had convinced of the United States of the importance of maintaining Greece, Turkey and Iran in the Western Sphere of

286 Jacobs to Byrnes (487) September 21st 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 222. Though Jacobs states that the inexperience of the Albanian army made it a negligible threat to Greece, he stated that its size and recent movements, which represented a significant economic drain on the Albanian economy, could also mean that an Albanian attack was imminent. He also noted a large presence of Soviet and Yugoslavian military advisors and equipment in Albania. 287 Byrnes to Clayton (4787) September 24th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 223-24. 288 Clayton to Byrnes (711.68/9-2546) September 25th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 225-26. 124 Influence. What had to be accomplished next was a concrete guarantee of action on the part of the US government to achieve this objective.

King George II made his formal entry into Athens on September 28th and

Ambassador Norton felt that it would be difficult to integrate the king into the new

Greek political structure, believing the Royalists would probably become disillusioned with him since he preferred to associate with ‘British officials’ and his ‘English friends,’ and to read his English newspapers. In addition to coping with the return of the King, September 1946 was the worst month for acts of violence directed against the state since the Varkiza Agreement had been signed.289

Though over the previous year British policy had rushed towards the creation of a parliamentary democracy in Greece and a national army to support it (the holding of elections and the plebiscite, and the reformation of the justice system and the economy, were key parts of that plan) these measures became a mechanism not for greater British control, but to help draw the United States further into Greek affairs. They were aided once again by reports of the ‘provocations’ on Greece’s northern borders which MacVeagh stated were designed by ‘Soviet puppets’ to provoke Greece into actions which would then justify ‘Soviet claims that Greece is menace to peace.’ MacVeagh also stated that the Turkish Ambassador to Greece, sharing MacVeagh’s view of the military threat to Greece, said that a British troop withdrawal will be followed by a ‘Yugoslav Army Corps...in Salonika within 24 hours.’290 The threat to Greece, whether it actually existed or not, was easily

289 Norton to Bevin (R 15177 / 1 / 19) September 28th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6. pp. 281-282 and, (R 15503 / 1 / 19), ibid., p. 282. 290 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1307) September 30th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 226-27. 125 apparent the Anglo-American policy makers and the USSR’s continued linking of

Anglo-American policy to the ‘fascist monarchist regime’ in Greece,291 illustrated the gap between wartime allies that would enlarge into the Cold War.

1946: October to December

By October 1946, the Foreign Office outlined its concerns over the popularity of the USSR in Britain and the lack of concern parts of the parliament and the general public felt over Soviet actions.

In Great Britain a general realisation of the pattern of Soviet policy will come about slowly, and while it is forming, every allowance will be made to the Russians and none to the Foreign Office. The result of this will be a split in public opinion between those who blame the Russians and those who blame the Foreign Secretary. If we are to keep this split to the smallest possible proportions — and this we must do if we are to reduce the effectiveness of communist propaganda inside this country — we shall have to show patience, forbearance and a strict correctness in all our dealings with the Russians. We cannot afford to be in the wrong.292

It was also at this time that British influence in American foreign policy decisions became more easily visible. At the British embassy in Washington, Ambassador

Inverchapel stated that the West had to oppose Soviet influence in Greece and

Turkey.293 Furthermore, though they acknowledged American financial and military superiority, they had already clearly expressed their doubts about

American wisdom to use them properly.

291 Dubrow, USSR, to Byrnes (3802) October 10th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 233. 292 Brimelow, minute, September 9th 1946 ( FO 371 56835) 293Inverchapel to Bevin, November 5th 1946 (No. 2640) BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, pp.301-03. 126 America is herself a troubled spirit: Conscious that she has attained greatness but ruefully aware that she is inadequately equipped with gifts of leadership in many fields and confronted with serious domestic problems of her own. Here in itself is an opportunity for Britain to set an example of greater steadiness and sanity to the English-speaking world. 294

However, the British were also extremely concerned about the rapid US demobilization, especially in Europe and the Washington embassy explained the demobilization as a result of more and more US policy makers, favouring financial over military intervention.295 In light of what appeared to be concrete action on the part of the US to invest heavily in the re-construction of Europe, between the return of King George II and Harry Truman’s address in March 1947 the British continued their troop withdrawal from Greece. It was a slow process for many reasons, not the least of which was the right-wing trend of the Greek government, and the rapidly escalating violence between the Greek Army and the Greek Left.

Additionally, though it took 6 months to secure, and only after British Troop reductions had begun in September, in October 1946 the Yugoslavians decided to help the KKE with money and supplies, apparently with ‘international solidarity.’296

Aside from increasing the violence in Greece, the supplies for the DSE and the composition of the Greek government made it difficult initially for the British

294Balfour to Mason (AN 205/5/45), January 11th, 1946, BDFA, Series C North America, Vol. 1, pp. 8-10. 295 Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, pp.370-71 (Paragraphs 13 and 19), See also: (Byrnes to Clayton (4787) September 24th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 223-24) Relating to US favoring financial over military intervention. 296 Smith, p. 97. Smith states that the Yugoslavians tried to ‘cultivate the impression that they had decided to support the KKE... and that their support was motivated by international solidarity.’ He bases these assumptions on the article ‘The Yugoslavs and the Greek Civil War, 1946-49’ by Elizabeth Barker, who based her study exclusively on Yugoslavian sources. 127 to get assurances of aid for Greece from the United States. The United States had serious concerns about Greece’s worsening conditions, both internally and along her northern frontiers, and State Department said that it was ‘prepared to stake suitable measures to support the territorial and political integrity of Greece.’297

However, the United States also communicated to the Greek Government that though it regarded Greece ‘as of vital interest to the United States’ and that it would provided ‘substantial aid’ to Greece to protect its sovereignty and independence, this aid would only be granted if the Greek Government could demonstrate to the American people that is was not ‘oligarchic or reactionary, that the democratic institutions were functioning and that the Greek people, apart from the communists, were united.’298 Furthermore, Ambassador MacVeagh, speaking to Ambassador Norton, said bluntly that ‘the American Government could hardly be expected to rush to the help of Greece while extreme Right-wing elements…held important positions in the government.’299 As the Greek government applied for more loans from the American and British governments,

Liberal and Left wing presses (not specified in the dispatch) wrote that such loans should only be granted if the Greek government broadened its political platform, but the escalating violence throughout the country, while preventing that from happening, also continued to create high levels of anxiety, especially as the anti-

297 Acheson to MacVeagh (1336) October 15th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 235-37. 298 Irini Lagani, ‘US Forces in Greece in the 1950s,’ in U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970. Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds. (Oxford: Westview Press,) p. 310. 299 Norton to Atlee (311) , November 9th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6, Doc R 16571 / 1 / 19, p. 285. 128 government bands seemed to be operating out of neighbouring countries with increasing frequency.300

Despite the stated US reservations about Greece’s internal conditions, the

State Department was by this time totally convinced (rightly or wrongly) of the

Soviet Union’s determination to ‘aggressively attempt(ing) to bring under its control an ever-increasing number of nations’ and they stated that ‘the strategic importance of Greece to US security lies in the fact that it is the only country in the

Balkans which has not yet fallen under Soviet hegemony.’301 These statements clearly indicate the US position and how successful the British had been at getting them to assume it. However, despite the success of their foreign policy, the rising violence from both sides in Greece did nothing to ease British domestic criticism of British policy there, or in regards to her relations with the United States.

In November 1946, R.H.S Crossman, who had become well known as one of Bevin’s strongest opponents stated in the House of Commons debate that Britain had become far too connected to the American system. His criticism broadened into the ‘keep left’ movement that wanted to keep Britain somewhere between both the United States and the Soviet Union and independent to both. This made the work of those in the British government working towards closer US-British relations even harder.302

300 Norton to Bevin (277) November 19th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 6 Doc R 16958 / 1 / 19, pp. 299-300. See also: Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, edited by John O. Iatrides, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980) pp. 701-703. 301 Memorandum Regarding Greece (868.00/10-2146) October 21st 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 240-45. See: Chapter 1, pages, 30, 40-41, 44, 47-51. 302 Saville, p. 95. 129 Though it may be tempting to state that at this time the United States had already decided to assume British responsibility if Greece, British actions would indicate otherwise. While meeting in Paris in November 1946, Foreign Secretary

Bevin and Secretary of State Byrnes agreed that Britain would continue to supply arms to the Greek Government since there were still British troops in Greece and the United States did not want to give the impression that they were ‘carrying on a provocative policy with regards to the Soviet Union and its Balkan puppets.’303

This decision indicated two things; the first was that the British intended to show the US that they intended to stay in Greece (whether they actually did or not) and second, that the United States was still not expecting a British withdrawal at this time. Additionally, this decision also reflected the deep link in Anglo-American planning in Greece. However, this link was a domestic weakness for the Atlee-

Bevin government.

The Greek government forwarded reports to the British and Americans showing that a Yugoslavian general had been dispatched from Belgrade in order to

“take charge of all bandit groups operation in Greek territory.” Furthermore, the

Americans received information that the Communists were intending to sever

Northern Greece from the South which would contribute to growing anarchy and endanger the peace of the region.304 However, in the UN, plans were being laid for the establishment of a committee to investigate the situation along Greece’s northern frontiers. The US again proposed a multi-national committee which

303 Acheson to MacVeagh (Top Secret 868.24/11-846) November 8th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp.262-63. 304 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1604) November 18th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 265. 130 would send observers to Northern Greece and to report back to the UN, under

Article 34.305 Simultaneously, Ambassador MacVeagh reported that the various bandit groups had been re-formed into a ‘self-declared “army”.’306 The Democratic

Army of Greece (DSE) was formed and the ‘Third Round’ of the Greek Civil War was underway.

On December 12th 1946, Minister Papandreou, basically admitting that

Greece was embroiled in war again, said that appeasement was impossible and ‘the question was now whether Greece should defend herself against the KKE or submit to it.’307 The American assessment of conditions in Greece had not changed, and they re-iterated Soviet and Yugoslavian designs on the Dardanelles and Thessaloniki respectively.308 The time was now almost right for the British to force the Americans into assuming control in Greece, but their Prime Minister was still unsure whether or not any foreign intervention could change conditions in

Greece.

At the end of 1946 Atlee stated that in his opinion that the nations bordering the Soviet Union could not be made strong enough to form a barrier that could withstand the Soviets should they decide to invade nor did the British have the resources to make them so. Furthermore he stated that it was difficult to know

305 Hiss (UN) to Acheson (501.BC Greece/11-2146) November 21st 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 266-267. Article 34 of the UN charter allows the Security Council to investigate any situation or dispute that may lead to ‘international friction.’ It was preferred to Article 33 which was more specific, requiring that a dispute be proven to exist before the Security Council could investigate. See also: Memorandum (501.BC/11-2546) Undated, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 268-69. 306 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1628) November 23rd 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 268. 307Norton to Bevin (R 143 / 4 / 19) December 12th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, pp 117-118. 308 Incidents on Northern Greek Frontier (501.BC/12-946) December 9th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, p. 276-77. 131 how much Soviet policy was dictated by fear of attack from the United States and

Great Britain, or by expansionism, and perhaps the British should attempt to reach an agreement with Russia to mutually disinterest themselves from these ‘border’ nations.309 However, Bevin vigorously opposed Attlee's suggestion (which has since been proven correct). Bevin believed that to withdraw from Eastern Europe and the Middle East would be ‘Munich over again, only on a world scale with

Greece, Turkey and Persia as the first victims in place of Czechoslovakia.’ Bevin then stated that to withdraw would also be very damaging on British-American relations, since the British were now dependent upon them economically and militarily and because it had taken great effort to persuade the United States that the maintenance of the British position in the Middle East was in their strategic interests as well. Furthermore, Bevin believed that being linked to the United

States the British would be able to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength.310 As a result of his need of Bevin’s support in the cabinet and upon his influence with the trade unions, Attlee gave way to Bevin's policy, and committed

Britain to the Cold War.311 Therefore, the plan to manoeuvre the United States into assuming support for British interests in Greece, and by extension, their interests in the Middle East and Eastern Europe was almost fully revealed by the end of 1946, but it was not fully manifested until 3 months later.

At the end of 1946, British plan to cling to American power to meet their foreign policy objectives came into focus. Looking at British policy from the start

309 Atlee to Bevin, December 9th 1946, ‘Private Collections,’ Foreign Office, Public Records Office, (London) FO 800, p.475. 310 Bevin to Atlee, January 9th 1947, ‘Private Collections,’ Foreign Office, Public Records Office, (London) FO 800, p. 476. 311 Weiler, pp.161-162 132 of the Second World War to the start of the Cold War it may be said that there was no Labour or Conservative foreign policy, just British policy. It was designed to preserve British interests at the expense of anyone except the British and the social, economic and political cost in Greece was particularly high. Despite differences of individual opinion, British policy continued on its anti-communist path, and drew the Americans along, who followed based on both the information and policy fed to them by the British, and by the domestic politics in the United States which saw individuals and parties use the Soviet threat to advance individual agendas.

On December 1st 1946, Atlee wrote to Bevin who was in New York for a meeting with American Secretary of State Byrnes, laying out the plans for increasing American involvement in Europe. Atlee stated that in his opinion, the

British position in the Middle East was only an ‘outpost position,’ and that he doubted whether or not the Greek ‘game’ was worth the British effort.312 This is not to say that Atlee was sympathetic to the communists, quite the opposite, but he was more pragmatic in terms of his assessment of British capabilities when it came to their foreign expenditures and he was particularly aware of Britain’s domestic situation which he was less willing to sacrifice in the short term than Bevin in order to maintain expensive foreign commitments.313 Bevin rejected Atlee’s

312 Atlee, quoted in, Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p.340. ‘Outpost Position’ meaning in his view that Atlee viewed Britain’s position in Greece as temporary and non-vital. It was in stark contrast to Bevin who believed strongly that a British presence in Greece vital to British strategic interests, he used his considerable influence in the cabinet to overrule the Prime Minister. For an earlier example of Atllee’s view see Chapter 2, pages 105-106, notes 220-221, from March 2nd 1946 where he had a conflict with the British chiefs of Staff over Greece’s importance. 313 Harris, Atlee, pp.297-299. Later, in 1947, Atlee would comment on how inexperienced he believed the Americans to be in their understanding and appreciation of Stalin and Soviet objectives. Into early 1947 Atlee would continue to attempt a serious re-assessment of British Middle Eastern strategic objectives and he heavily criticized the arguments put forward by the Chiefs of Staff, however, he was still unsuccessful at changing the course of British policy. 133 arguments stating that Atlee’s proposal would showcase British weakness which he saw as extremely dangerous considering how tenuous Britain’s Economic and

Military situations were, and that until both were ‘consolidated’ and ‘it has finally become clear to the Russians that they cannot drive a wedge between the

Americans and ourselves, we shall be in a position to negotiate with Stalin from strength.’ He concluded by stating that there was no hurry to alter British Foreign policy since the United States was becoming more involved and the United Nations

Organization (UNO) was gaining strength and therefore the British could ‘hold on to essential positions and concentrate on building up the UNO.’ The next week they had a meeting where Bevin declared that his policy would continue and no

British Troops were to be withdrawn.314

The last statement is particularly interesting, first because it presented a very unusual relationship between a Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, who, although not in title, in action they seemed to have reversed roles and secondly because, despite Bevin’s statement to Atlee that British policy would continue and that no troops would be withdrawn, his statements in February 1947 to the United

States were the opposite. This is a crucial point to the central theme of this dissertation. It is almost proven with these contradictory statements that the British deliberately mislead and manipulated the United States into assuming responsibility for Greece, and though it, for Western Europe and progressing to the

World-wide effort to contain Communism.

In light of the forces and considerations aligned against him, it is unlikely that Atlee could have changed the course of British Policy, particularly as he

314 Clement Atlee, quoted in, Bullock, Vol.3, pp. 342-350. 134 continued to rely so heavily upon Bevin’s support in the British cabinet to remain

Prime Minister.315 Notwithstanding the fact that the British had promised to withdraw from Egypt, they were keen to note that they were not prepared to jeopardise their position in the Eastern Mediterranean.316 In spite of their differences of opinion, it is important to keep in mind that the British were convinced of Soviet intentions to control Eastern Europe and to expand westward.

In regards to Greece, the Bulgarians claimed Western Thrace and the Yugoslavs claimed parts of Macedonia to be incorporated into the Yugoslav People’s

Republic of Macedonia (PRM). This convinced the Greek Policy makers that the communists were determined to attempt a takeover of at least Northern Greece, if not the whole country.317 According to the French Ambassador in Athens, the

Greek government had already renewed its repression of political adversaries and its actions in the field in Northern Greece, limited as they were at the time, increased negative relations between Greece and her northern neighbours.318

As 1946 drew to a close, conditions were not much more promising than they had been a year earlier. The Atlee-Bevin government had worked for a year and a half to bring Greece out of the shadow of the German occupation and the early stages of the civil war during that occupation. Unfortunately, the international

315 Harris, Attlee , p.286, and Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 352. 316 Previously stated in : Halifax to Bevin, May 13th 1946, (AN, 1515/1/45), BDFA, Series C North America, Vol. 1, p. 159. 317 Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967. (London: Routledge, 2006) p.8. The alliance of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments was perceived as major threats to Greece until the Tito-Stalin split in June 1948, which turned Bulgaria and Yugoslavia into adversaries. 318 Lagani, Irini, LES RAPPORTS DE LA GRECE AVEC SES VOISINS BALKANIQUES DE 1941 A 1949. Paris: Sourbonne, 1985, p. 246. Quoting reports of the French Consul in Thessaloniki, AEP, grece, Z 177-1, vol. 155, no 54, Salonique (Consul Roaul Duval, a AEP., August 26th 1946. 135 conditions created by the widening gap between wartime allies contributed to

Britain’s inability to overcome those challenges. As another New Year approached, there was little that could lead to a sense of optimism. In his dispatch to Foreign

Secretary Bevin on December 28th 1946, referring to the constantly changing political and military situation in Greece Ambassador Norton said, ‘Nothing in

Greece seems to stay put for very long, except the Acropolis.’319 The British situation was also desperate as their economy worsened and it seemed as though the British were in as desperate situation as they presented.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer could lend no more money, the people in

England were still using food stamps, even as the violence in Greece was worsening the British continued to remove their troops and everything they had worked for since October 1944 was in jeopardy. Because Greece was the only

Balkan / Eastern European nation (notwithstanding Turkey) to have a diverse democratically elected government it became an important symbol for the West, and the Americans would have to make a decision on whether to support it or not, and as tensions between the USSR and the United States continued to escalate US reservations about helping Greece began to dissipate, in spite of the Greek governmental problems.320 For the United States the Greek Civil War provided evidence of the aggressive intentions of the USSR to control ‘an ever-increasing number of nations’ whose value in strategic terms was crucial to American interests. As a result of this belief, the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

319 Norton to Bevin (R 143 / 4 / 19) December 28th 1946, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, pp 117-118. 320 Incidents on Northern Greek Frontier (501.BC/12-946) December 9th 1946) FRUS 1946, Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 276-77, See also: Ole L. Smith, p. 98. 136 of the State Department recommended to the US government to ‘firmly oppose the

USSR's 'manoeuvres and machinations . . . to expand its power by subjecting

Greece to its will, and then using Greece as an important stepping-stone for a further expansion of Soviet power'.321 In fact, at this time, US hostility to the

Soviets was so high that Secretary Byrnes refused a Greek proposal to hold a meeting between the US, Soviet and British representatives in order to solve the northern frontier issue, despite Molotov’s and Bevin’s support for the proposal.322

For the British and the Americans, it was the Soviets behind the scenes, encouraging Greece’s communist neighbours to act aggressively. The United

States and Britain were convinced that there was a real possibility of ‘all out revolution’ in Greece by April 1947, and foreshadowing the reversal of British and

American roles in Greece, the US secretly agreed to supply military transport aircraft to the Greek military to aid them in combating the insurgents.323

Furthermore, in response to what the US saw as a slow British response to the pressing needs of the Greek military, the United States advised Britain to create a list of all other military equipment needed by the Greek military which the British were unable to supply and to then forward it to the US promptly.324 American reluctance to supply arms to Greece had clearly dissipated as had the British ability

321 Memorandum by the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the State Department October 21st 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa.p. 242. 322For a more complete picture British perceptions of US-Soviet tensions at this time see: Bevin to Foreign Office, December 6th 1946, no. 17677, FO 371/58891. Interview between Bevin and Tsaldaris, December 6th 1946, no. 18531, FO 371/58892. Bevin to Foreign Office, December 7th 1946, no. 17689, FO371/58891. Warner to Williams, December 11th 1946, no. 18129, FO 371/58891. Record of Conversation between Bevin and Molotov, December 9th 1946; minutes of a Conference between Bevin and Byrnes, December 9th 1946. Note by Dixon, December 19th 1946. Minutes by McCarthy, December 19th 1946, no. 18129, FO 371/58891. 323 Note 63 in Acheson to MacVeagh (1583) December 13th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 278-79. 324 MacVeagh to Byrnes (1721) December 16th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 282-83. 137 to supply them. Interestingly, this decision was reached as the Security Council unanimously agreed to form a committee to investigate conditions on the Greek frontier. 325 Though this seemed a positive step to a possible resolution of the dispute, the committee would instead reflect the wide gap between the Soviet

Union and Britain and the United States.

325 Johnson, UN, to Byrnes (983) December 19th 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 284-85.

138 Chapter 3: A new era of American intervention: the Truman Doctrine, the

Marshall Plan and the beginning of the Cold War.

“While Soviet power is impervious to the logic of reason, it is highly sensitive

to the logic of force.”326

January to March 1947: A Declaration of War

Though written in February 1946, the above lines represented fundamental

American thought about the USSR by 1947. As a result, 1947 became a year of profound change in Greece and in British American and Soviet relations. This change was clearly reflected with the work and findings of the UN special commission in the Balkans (UNSCOB) which was formed and sent to Greece to evaluate the validity of the Greek government’s claims against its northern neighbours about their violations of the border in support of the KKE and the DSE though the end of 1945. Although tasked with resolving the situation in Greece, the commission did little more than reflect the deepening division between Britain, the

United States and the Soviet Union. However, it did allow the British to consolidate American military and economic intervention in Greece.

326 Kennan to Byrnes (511) February 22nd 1946, FRUS 1946, VOL. VI, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 696-709. 139 By January 1947, the United States had almost completed one of the most rapid demobilizations of armed forces in history.327 Among the reasons for this was the desire for the Truman administration to cut armed forces expenditures, and it was believed that American possession of the Atomic Bomb would serve as enough of a deterrent to curtail further Soviet encroachment in Europe.328 In

Greece, the Porter Economic Mission arrived in Athens in mid-January 1947 and initiated talks with hundreds of Greek engineers, business men, farmers, workers, organization spokesmen, and economists in order to assess the current Greek economic situation and not to assure American aid to Greece.329 Porter stated that the situation was worse than expected and that the country was on the verge of bankruptcy due to numerous factors such as politics permeating every facet of

Greek life, black marketing, no long-term investment or reconstruction programs

(due largely to a lack of confidence in the government) and that the Greek people had adopted a dependence mentality, believing that the Allies were obligated to help them because of the suffering they had endured during the Second World

War.330 Porter even argued that Greece was not truly a state in the Western

Definition. What he discovered was a ‘loose hierarchy of individualistic politicians,’ who had no interest in reforms, being too preoccupied with their own power.331

327 Ambrose, pp.76-77. The Army was reduced from 8 to 1 million men, the navy from 3.5 to less than 1 million, and the Air Force from 200 combat groups to less than 50. 328 Ambrose, p.89. 329 Jones, p. 29. 330 Jones, p. 29. 331 Porter to Clayton, Feb 14th 1947 and Porter to Truman, March 3rd 1947, Porter Papers, Truman Library, pp. 2-5 140 However, Ambassador MacVeagh disagreed with Porter’s assessment and argued that the greatest threat to Greece was the military situation along the northern border. He believed that if the military situation was solved than the economic and political issues could be dealt with.332 Though both views were accurate, the UN had already endorsed the American plan to form an International

Committee to investigate the military situation on Greece’s northern frontiers.333

As for the British, though Attlee had been looking to disengage Britain from some of her international obligations since mid- 1946, by January1947, the only areas that he felt he could do so were Greece and Turkey because he believed that in these countries the Americans could be persuaded to take Britain’s role.334 The

British intended the UN Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB) to prove to the Americans, but also to the rest of the world that the Soviets intended to take over Greece and were acting through the KKE and Greece’s communist neighbours to do so. UNSCOB was stated as being independent, but not surprisingly the Big Three dominated its activities, thereby ensuring that its conclusions reflected their policy objectives.335

The idea to form a UN commission to deal with Greece’s allegations against its Communist neighbours was put through the UN Security Council by the

United States, and shortly thereafter both the British and the Americans began to

332 Jones, p. 30. 333 'Letter from the Acting Chairman of the Delegation of Greece to the Secretary-General, December 3rd 1946, and Enclosed Memorandum', no. 18181, FO 371/5889, 334 Harris, pp. 299, 304. Although Attlee initially intended to keep to the ‘short and arbitrary deadline’ of March 31st, After Truman’s declaration on the 12th of March, he consented to delaying the complete removal of Britain’s armed forces until the Americans’ aid had begun. Atlee ordered Minister Bevin, who was in Moscow, to inform Marshall that the British would stay in Greece past the March 31st 1947 deadline, to facilitate the transition. For the complete dispatch see: BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12,, Doc R 3708 / 50 / G and Doc R 3935 / 50 / G, pp. 142-143, 335 Sfikas, pp. 244-245. 141 pressure the Greek Government to broaden its composition, and to unite the centrists’ parties in order to isolate the KKE. They also wished to limit the increasing extremism of the Greek Government in light of the international exposure it would be under with the arrival of UNSCOB. The British had placed much hope on both the United States and the United Nations Organisation to stabilize international events in order to buy time for Britain to re-gain her pre-war strength.336 Next, Bevin used his influence over the United States to secure military aid for the Greek government in the event that the Communists broke the ceasefire or the UN commission failed to find a solution to the frontier violations; he wanted the Greek government forces to be prepared and trained for guerrilla warfare.337

Another problem was that the British believed that the anti-communism, corruption and incompetence of the Army, the Police and the bureaucracy were so pervasive that no government could change it.338 Therefore, while the KKE expected

UNSCOB to settle the domestic situation and provide conditions for the KKE to participate in the government, the British and the Americans intended the

Commission to cut off the KKE’s foreign support and they pursued a policy that they hoped would prevent the Communists from replenishing their armed forces by

336 This is a summary of many documents that outline British hopes and objectives at the time. Listed next are some of the most demonstrative dispatches. Memorandum by Sargent, July 11th 1945, Documents on British Policy Overseas (thereafter DBPO),Vol. 1, no. 102 (London: HMSO, 1984). See also Bullock, Bevin, pp. 5-6, Interview between Harvey and Aghnidis, December 28th 1946,(no. 33, FO 371/66994). Inverchapel to Foreign Office, January 1st 1947 (no. 77, FO 371/66994). Norton to Bevin, December 28th 1946 (no. 143, FO 371/66994). Norton to Tsaldaris, January 3rd 1947 (no. 520, FO 371/67049). Tsaldaris to Norton, January 10th 1947 (no. 832, FO 371/67049). Foreign Office to Norton January 8th 1947, (no. 113, FO 371/67049). Foreign Office to Norton, January 19th 1947 (no. 715, FO 371/66996). 337 Memorandum by Bevin, 'Policy towards Greece and Turkey', January 25th 1947, no. 34, CAB 129/16/CP (47). See also CAB 128/9/CM 14 (47), January 30th 1947. See also: Bevin to Norton (384) February 19th 1947 and Bevin to Inverchapel (1634) February 19th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, 1947, pp. 122-125. 338 Lascelles to Foreign Office, January 25th 1947, (no. 1138, FO 371/66997). Norton to Bevin, Dec 28th 1946, (no. 143, FO 371/66994) 142 closing Greece’s northern boundaries. They believed that the sooner the DSE and the military threat it presented was exhausted the sooner the Greek government could exert its authority.339

The UN commission arrived in Athens on January 30th 1947, and immediately issue was raised of whether the domestic situation in Greece fell under its jurisdiction. The British and Americans stated that the Commission’s only role was to rule on Greece’s northern frontier violations, while the USSR,

Bulgarian, Yugoslav and EAM representatives argued that only the conditions in

Athens and south Greece should be examined.340

The commission partially acceded to the demands of the Balkan representatives by urging the Greek Government to suspend executions of left- wing prisoners. The British were not pleased with the ‘independent’ policy pursued by the commission, but US secretary of State Marshal agreed with the commission, arguing that to not support the recommendation would play into the hands of the

Soviets. On February 9th 1947, the UN Secretary General made the recommendation to the Greek government, who reluctantly complied.341 However, the British were experiencing severe economic hardships by mid-February 1947, and though it was still uncertain if the United States would fully take over responsibility for Greece, the British began to see the commission as a way to

339 Ibid, and Sfikas. P. 250. 340 Norton to Foreign Office, February 5th 1947, no. 1809, (FO 371/66999) . Peck to Chancery (Athens), February 5th 1947, (no. 2096, FO 371/67062). 341 Norton to Bevin, February 18th 1948, Annual Report 1947 (no. 51 R 2576 /31 /19) February 18th 1948, BDFA, Part IV, Series F Europe, Vol. 17, pp. 72-94. Peck (Thessaloniki) to Athens, February 5th 1947 (no. 2096, FO 371/67062). MacVeagh to Marshall (169) February 7th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 817-18. Marshall to MacVeagh (146), February 8th 1947 FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 818-20. 143 facilitate their exit with or without American guarantees. Temporarily, UNSCOB was allowed to pursue solutions to Greece’s internal political situation.342

Furthermore, the American Economic Mission to Greece had been keeping the US government informed of developments since late 1946, and they had negative comments about the Greek situation. On February 17th 1947, Paul Porter, the head of the mission, informed the US government that ‘it is characteristic of these people not to take corrective measures until absolutely necessary, and then, only to take a minimum.’343 His reports commented further on the complete disorganization and inefficient bureaucracy that was incapable of dealing with the slightest government initiative. Porter also stated that the short work week allowed for many of the Civil Servants to work other jobs, further reducing efficiency and increasing corruption.344 There was also almost no way to protect the UNRRA supplies that were arriving in Greece from disappearing into the Black Market.

Although the military situation was dire the Americans believed that the most pressing concern was the weakness of Greece's economy. The Americans had kept well informed of the situation there and they believed that without emergency aid and ‘long-range’ economic planning, Greece would collapse and endanger

America's access to oil and its attempts to constrain Soviet expansion.345 Suddenly,

American objectives for Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East sounded like British objectives.

342 Minutes by Selby and Williams, February 17th -19th 1947 (no. 1975, FO 371/67000) 343 Paul A Porter to the US Department of State, February 17th 1947, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, Ethridge Paper Number 3842. 344 Paul A. Porter, ‘Our Chances in Greece,’ August 7th 1947, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, Ethridge Paper Number 3842. 345 Jones, p. 26. 144 Though Atlee had been elected in the near-euphoric period immediately following the defeat of Germany, by 1947 that enthusiasm had almost disappeared ted as the British government finally began to see the results of their anti-Soviet policy and statements were able to make it clear to both the British people and the

United States, that the greatest threat, not only to Britain but to the West was the

Soviet Union. Three days before the British announced their withdrawal from

Greece, Permanent Under Secretary Sir Orme Sargent encouraged the British

Government to use the fear of the Soviets to secure American involvement, first in

Greece, and then in Europe, thereby guaranteeing British interests.346

Britain’s coal reserves, manpower, and assets both domestic and overseas were significantly diminished while her liabilities had increased. Her industry was outdated and British exports were negligible. In addition, with unemployment at 15 percent in 1947 and severe domestic weather anomalies leading to property damage and crop failure, Britain was in desperate condition.347 Combined with a severe fuel shortage, Britain’s economy was reeling and Bevin stated how he believed that in order to survive it was vital to coordinate Britain’s foreign policy with the only country that was capable of exerting significant economic power; the

United States.348

In the beginning of 1947, there was fear in the American government that

Britain could go bankrupt. Britain would face so many challenges all over the world that bankruptcy was a real possibility if they continued to attempt to play

346 F.B.A Rundell, minutes of meeting, February 14th 1947, (FO 371 / 61053 AN 635 / 40/ 45). 347 Jones pp. 31-32. 348 Ernest Bevin, ‘The Effects of our External Financial Position on our Foreign Policy,’ February 12th 1947. (FO 371/62420 UE 678/176/53.) 145 fully the part of world power. The winter of 1946/47 was very severe and it decimated crops across Europe, but it was particularly severe in Britain. The result was to almost exhaust Britain's industry, food and coal reserves, whatever was left in the treasury and these issues were compounded by series of government mismanagement which demonstrated even further Britain's inability to reconcile domestic needs with her international obligations. Britain's position was so unbelievably weak that when British Officials would tell outside observers how weak Britain really was, those same observers had a difficult time believing them.349

Britain's energy crisis was also compounded by her antiquated and out-of- date manufacturing and industrial sector which had not undergone a substantial, rigorous or ruthless enough modernization in over 100 years. Therefore, ‘the gap between policy and resources was not created by the February 1947 energy emergency but was driven home with a force that could not be denied.’350 It became quickly apparent to the Americans that the British may not be able to fill their obligations and they were extremely concerned about the question of how much economic weakness clashed with effective foreign-policy. That weakness was exposed by the ongoing crisis in Greece stated by Clifford Norton who advised London that Greece was in such dire states, that it would not be able to successfully oppose the communist threat unless it received substantial economic

349 Bullock, Bevin, p. 381. In March 1947 Bevin met with Joseph Stalin in Moscow, and laboured to convince him that Britain's stated shortage of coal reserves was real. These issues had been plaguing Britain to some degree since the end of WWII, but by 1946/47 they reached higher levels. See earlier section on British food supply problems in 1946. Page 111, note 240 (Halifax to Bevin, April 27th 1946(AN 1269 / 1 / 45), BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, pp. 151-52) see also references to Britain’s Coal Crisis: Doc 57, February 15th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 10, France, 1947. 350 Bullock, Bevin, p. 362 146 and military aid. It was at this point the Foreign Secretary Bevin had to admit that

Britain could do no more.

The British were aided in persuading the Americans to assume responsibility in Greece by nearly coinciding crises in Poland where the communists seized power, followed by communist victories in Romania and

Bulgaria.351 Moreover, the Bulgarian Prime Minister openly told Britain's acting political representative in Sofia that ‘opposition politicians were saboteurs obstructing the building of a better Bulgaria and that they would deserve the preventative medicine he was preparing for them.’352 All of these events would coincide to help President Truman sell his program of economic and military anti-

Communism to the United States Congress. The British had, at least for the time being, succeeded in procuring American economic and military support for British interests in Greece and through it the eastern Mediterranean in Europe and soon in the Far East.

One of the early tangible signs that the Americans would become more directly involved in Greece came on February 15th in Washington. Secretary of

State Marshall stated ‘it is to the interest of the United States and of all the United

Nations that Greece be assisted to maintain her independence and national integrity.’353 Driven by their economic problems, the British took advantage of the negative American Economic Mission reports and of Marshall’s statement. On

February 19th 1947 Bevin decided that the time was finally right to force the United

351 These crises occurred in the first two months of 1947. 352 Bulgarian Prime Minister to British Embassy, (32, R 2749/889/7) February 17th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV south-eastern Europe, Vol. 12, pp.64-66. 353 Washington Embassy to Foreign Office (UR 1248 / 25 / 851) February 15th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, p. 122. 147 States to directly assume responsibility for British interests in Greece. He instructed the British ambassador to the United States, Lord Inverchapel, to deliver a memorandum to the US State Department regarding the situation in Greece. It expressed the British desire to have the United States to replace the British and assist the Greek armed forces and economy since the country was on the verge of collapse. This aid was recommended because, as the memorandum also stated,

Britain’s aid to Greece would expire on March 31st, after which, the British told the

Americans, Great Britain would unable to grant any further assistance whatsoever.

This memorandum initially shocked the State Department and it quickly decided to convince the American people and Congress of the need to for the

United States to assume a more significant role ‘in the direction of world affairs,’ and to seize the opportunity given to it by Britain's decision.354

Meanwhile in Greece, UNSCOB arrived in Thessaloniki on February 25th

1947 to finally examine and report on Greece’s northern border violations. After failing to meet with Markos Vafiades, by March 12th 1947, the commission returned to Thessaloniki, minus the Polish and Soviet members who remained to meet the DSE leader. When they returned to Thessaloniki they presented the commission with a report outlining the KKE’s records of ‘the White Terror,’ that had followed the signing of the Varkiza accord, and their proposals for an end to the Civil War. However, in the meantime, the Commission had already taken evidence from numerous Greek government witnesses who testified about the

Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav frontier violations, which the British reported as

354 Alexander, pp. 243-244. 148 the focus of the commission’s work.355 Though the Soviets had attempted to keep the Commission in Athens to investigate the domestic causes of the Civil War, the

British and the Americans succeeded on getting it to examine the external causes of the conflict.356 This is a crucial point to remember in order to understand the objectives of the Big Three.

The British and the Americans wanted to maintain Greece as a buffer against communism, and believed that the Civil War had to be contained and isolated from outside influence. The Soviets, also desiring to keep the Civil War from spreading at this time urged the KKE to seek conciliation but also sought to direct attention to the domestic causes, allowing for communist participation in the government which they hoped could possibly lead to a re-alignment of Greek

Foreign policy in the future.357 All three sides attempted to use UNSCOB to support their policy for Greece and in so doing, prevented the commission from actually contributing to a solution.

Back in Washington, the American response to the announced British withdrawal in Greece was rapid. The British declaration, issued on February 21st

1947, was answered by the US State Department on Feb 26th, and Acheson’s domino theory, as it became known, held that should one country fall to the communists, its neighbours would soon follow. On March 12th, in a move that made the Unites States’ opposition to the expansion of Soviet influence official,

355 Norton to Bevin, February 18th 1948, Annual Report for 1947, (R 2576 / 31 / 19) BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, 1948, pp. 72-91. These violations were alleged to have taken place throughout 1945 and 1946. 356 Ethridge to Marchall (227) February 17th 1947, Marshall to Ethridge (200) February 20th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 820-23. Marshall also provided detailed instructions to Ethridge about the expected results of UNSCOB. 357 Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism. pp. 158- 159. For British perceptions, see: Norton th to Bevin, February 5 1947 (no. 1809, F O 371/66999). 149 President Truman addressed the US Congress about ‘giving aid to Greece and

Turkey. Truman informed the US congress that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.’ After summarising Greece’s non-military needs and requests, Truman addressed the military situation in the country.

The very existence of the Greek State is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists, who defy the government’s authority at a number of points particularly along the northern boundaries…the Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance.358

This announcement committed the United States to assume the role that the

British had been performing in Greece since 1944 and the British achieved their objective of turning over their responsibilities in Greece to the Americans. The

British government could no longer justify expensive foreign commitments and when they reached their breaking point, they manoeuvred the Americans into taking- over the job as patrons of a Greece; a role the British had performed for so long. Attlee was anxious to extricate Britain from Greece so his government could focus on rebuilding Britain and Germany. Since it appeared as though the Soviets were going to end up controlling Poland and considering that they already had a foothold in East Germany, Attlee believed that Britain’s security depended on a non-communist Germany which could serve as a buffer against Soviet expansion

358 Truman’s speech of March 12th 1947, quoted in: (R 3426 / 50 / 19), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 138-141. 150 into Western Europe.359

The Truman Doctrine made it clear to the Soviets that the Americans would not tolerate any direct intervention in Greece. Therefore, the Soviets steadfastly maintained their advice to the KKE to seek a compromise just as they had done a year earlier. However, the Soviets exerted some pressure by continuing to state that the cause of the civil war was the repressive right-wing nature of the National

Government, while the British and the Americans continued to stress its external causes.360 As a result, the findings of UNSCOB did little more than re-iterate these differences.

As the USSR continued to expand, American foreign and military policies at this time were sharply opposed. While the Americans desired to contain any further communist expansion, the only deterrent they possessed was the atomic bomb and it seemed to have no effect on Soviet planning. The Truman

Administration saw economic chaos as the key factor in facilitating the spread of communism, so reconstruction in Greece was initially heavily based on economic and political reform.361

One of the most significant differences between official British and

American intervention in Greece was the degree to which they were prepared to become directly involved in the decision-making process. Through late 1945 and into 1946, the British had become increasingly hesitant to order political and

359 Harris, pp. 247-248. 360 Multiple dispatches between Secretary of State Marshall and Ethridge (244, 19, 21, 111, 185) FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 823-30. The Americans even considered a population exchange of Slavophones as a possible solution to the Communists territorial claims on Macedonia. See: ibid., Number 244, p. 823. 361 Ambrose, p. 88. 151 military action. Correspondingly, the Greek elites became less inclined to listen to

British recommendations, and this, coupled with the complete inability of the

Greek military to suppress increasing insurrectionism, and massive power- struggles between political parties, served to paralyse the Greek government and to drive Greece deeper and deeper into chaos. The Americans held no such reservations.

By 1947, they feared that a failure in Greece leading to the loss of Turkey, the Dardanelles, access to the Middle East, and then the loss of Italy, France and

Germany. What would later be called the ‘domino theory’ 362, was the driving force behind American belief that intervention in Greece was vital for the preservation of

American interests. However, there was a division in the US government between whether or not the aid should be military or only economic and political. The latter, supported by George Kennan, was discarded in favour of military aid.363

When the Americans assumed the British role in Greece, they made it clear that continued aid was contingent upon governmental cooperation. In addition, the

United States was using the United Nations to investigate the aid that the Greek communists were receiving from Greece’s communist neighbours.364 Therefore, two months after Truman’s speech of March 12th, the US congress would authorise

400 million dollars of aid to Greece and Turkey. However, at this time the United

362 First used by President Eisenhower in 1954. 363 Ambrose, pp. 79-80. Report by the Policy Planning Staff (PPS – 13) November 6th 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. I, General; The United Nations, pp. 770- 77. See also: National Security Policy (761.00- 2-1747) February 17th 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. 1, General, The United Nations, pp.715-17 and (840.20 – 2- 2647) February 26th 1947, ibid., pp. 717, Ethridge to Marshall (227) February 17th 1947, Marshall to Ethridge (200) February 20th 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 820-23. Kennan to Byrnes (511) February 22nd 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VI, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 696-709. 364 John O. Iatrides, “Britain, the United States and Greece, 1945-9,” in The Greek Civil War: Studies in Polarization, edited by David H. Close, (New York: Routledge, 1993) pp.196-203. 152 States was only in a position to offer economic aid and it is important to examine the international issues that were confronting the Truman Administration, in order to place continuing official and unofficial British involvement in Greece in its proper international context.

On March 13th 1947, the day after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the British Embassy in Washington noted that there appeared to be a genuine desire on the part of Americans in general to share their prosperity and wealth and to resist the Soviets. 365 Further assisting British efforts to secure American aid for

Britain and Western Europe was the belief in the United States that the economy would suffer a serious decline and that in the near future the Europeans would not be able to maintain their current levels of purchasing US products. The huge increase in US production during the war had created a danger of huge export surpluses afterwards, and American business lobbied to keep up and then to increase US foreign aid, which from 1945 to 1947 came to finance about 33 percent of American exports.366 The desires of American business, combined with

British objectives and rising US political anti-communism highlighted by George

Kennan’s famous report on the Soviet Union in which he advocated economic intervention and containment,367 created the perfect conditions for the British to tie

365 Inverchapel to Foreign Office, March 13th 1947 (FO371/ 67035/R3482). Inverchapel to Bevin (615 E) March 13th 1947, pp. 87-89, Inverchapel to Bevin (675) March 18th 1947, pp. 93-98, BDFA Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 2. 1947. Ibid. Note: For an unexplained reason, page 85 (73), document number 17675 and page 86 (74) document number 17675, are not included in this volume of the confidential print series. It is simply stated that they are unavailable. Judging by the time period, they may have contained more dispatches relating to the Truman Doctrine, but at this time I can only speculate. 366 Seville, pp. 23-24. 367 Kennan to Byrnes (511) February 22nd 1946, FRUS 1946, Vol. VI, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 696-709. This document was classified until 1947 when it was publish in Foreign Affairs magazine in July. It subsequently became the basis for US foreign policy toward the USSR 153 the Americans into supporting their objectives and was highlighted by the Truman

Doctrine in March 1947 and the Marshal Plan in June 1947.

In Greece, by the spring of 1947 the only significant remaining British military presence was a small military mission that became responsible for training and acted mainly in accord with the American military mission in Greece.368 Since

1945, the British Military Mission (BMM) had been responsible for the training of the new Greek army but it showed few positive results as shown by the poor performance of the Greek Army until the final year of the civil war. Partially a result of lack of resources, and partly because of a lack of urgency, British training proceeded slowly, and was made even less effective by the fact that the British neglected to train the Greek Army in counter-guerrilla tactics, instead training the recruits for conventional warfare. It was not until the latter phases of the Civil War in 1949, that anti-guerrilla tactics were taught at all, and it was at the time that

Nikos Zachariades ordered the DSE commanders to switch to conventional warfare. Another blunder on the part of the foreign military missions was their inability to rapidly and accurately assess how many regular army troops were needed to chase the enemy and to protect communications, civilians and installations. For example, in early 1947, the National Greek Army had a strength of about 100,000 men, but less than half were combat-ready, and even at full strength, it would have been hard-pressed to accomplish all of its objectives.369

Therefore, as UNSCOB was still struggling to reach a consensus for its report to and was required reading for members of the State Department, despite the Author’s later statements that his meaning of ‘containment’ had been misinterpreted and misapplied. 368 Iatrides, “Britain, the United States and Greece.” p. 207. 369 David H. Close and Thanos Veremis, “The Military Struggle, 1945-9,” in The Greek Civil War: Studies in Polarization, edited by David H. Close, (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 105. 154 the UN and the military situation in Greece was worsening, internationally the

Great powers were in the midst of a dramatic re-positioning.

April to December1947: A New type of War

A new world order was emerging, and, symbolic of the end of the old

Greco-British relationship, on April 1st 1947, King George II died suddenly of a heart attack.370 It was sadly ironic that so much blood was shed in the years following the German occupation, over the return of a king to Greece whose reign would last just over six months. A few days later, the UN commission met in

Geneva Switzerland to assemble to report on Greece.371 What happened next was a crucial point that clearly demonstrates the extent of British influence over US policy.

At a UNSCOB meeting in Switzerland the Soviet and Polish delegates requested that a translated report of the KKE and DSE’s positions on the causes and resolution of the Civil War be circulated to the rest of the committee members.

The British strenuously objected but were over-ruled by a vote of 7 to 4. The

British Foreign Office was incensed and believed that the American representative,

Mark Ethridge as not objecting a strenuously as he should have to the Soviet and

Polish proposal. They asked their representative, Windell, whether or not Ethridge was likely to continue to act in a contrary way, and if so, they would make their

370 Norton to Foreign Office (no750, T6802 / 6802 / 379) April 1st 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, p. 143. 371 Acheson to Ethridge (89) April 1st 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 830- 31. 155 objections known to the US state department.372 Simultaneously the French representative attempted to convince the commission to refrain from reaching any conclusion of blame whatsoever and to allow amnesty and free elections in Greece.

The Foreign Office contacted the State Department and urged the Americans to pressure the members of the committee to reject the French position, which the

British considered to have accepted the Soviet position and to have meddled in internal Greek affairs. 373 Additionally , the British pressured the State Department to force Ethridge to ‘toe the line,’ but he refused stating that he believed that the

‘gangster-like methods’ of the Greek government were responsible for the ongoing

Civil War and northern border violations.374 The British and the State Department however were anxious to spare the Greek government any blame and when

Ethridge included his proposal for amnesty for guerrillas and political prisoners in his draft report they reacted accordingly.375 This proposal was not well received and the British had successfully lobbied for the State Department to oppose it as well.

Marshal urged Ethridge to remove the amnesty clause from the final report since they believed that the guerrillas were acting under orders from the, and

372 Windlel (Geneva) to Foreign Office, April 18th 1947, and Foreign Office to Windel, April 23rd 1947, (no. 5291, FO 371/67065) and Clutter (Geneva) to Williams, May 8th 1947 (no. 6644, FO 371/67068). See also earlier dispatch regarding British instructions to their representative on UNSCOB: Bevin to Windel (61) March 1st 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 132-33. 373 Inverchapel to Foreign Office, April 29th 1947 (no. 5742, FO 371/67066), Bevin to Inverchapel (4241) April 29th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 195-196, and Marshal to Ethridge (253), May 1st 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 837-38. 374 Ethridge to Marshall (274), May 8th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp 845-48. Marshall to Ethridge (349), May 10th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 848-49. 375 Draft Recommendations of U S Delegation, May 2nd 1947, no. 6129, FO 371/67066. Ethridge to Marshall (214), May 2nd 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 838-39. 156 Ambassador Norton blamed ‘Ethridge’s folly’ on the Truman Doctrine getting off to a ‘bad start’ in Greece.376 In the end, the Foreign Office was successful in getting the State Department to modify the commission’s report to include only the mention of a new amnesty law that was being considered by the Greek government.377 Though the final report did satisfy the British and the Americans by containing statements regarding the Yugoslavian, Bulgarian and Albanian material and moral support (via the continuing border violations) to the KKE and DSE and that they had been fermenting separatist movements, the report met Soviet objectives (though they refused to sign it) by stating that the domestic situation in

Greece was also contributing to the situation. In conclusion, the commission recommended that the UN Security Council establish a new commission to monitor the situation on Greece’s northern borders, and recommended that the four

Balkan governments strive to improve relations.378 Additionally, in reading the documents relating to the findings of UNSCOB, the picture that emerges is of the

British, Polish and Soviet representatives refusing to deviate in any degree from their governments’ positions, and the American, New Zealand, Australian and other representatives who attempted to accurately assess the causes of the problems in Greece. However, their voices were silenced and their findings were modified.

In short, the commission’s conclusions simply reflected all of the positions of the

376 Norton to Foreign Office, May 10th 1947, (no. 6345, FO 371/67067). 377 Inverchapel to Foreign Office, May 10th 1947, (no. 6368, FO 371/67003). Foreign Office to Norton, May 13th 1947, (no. 6345, FO 371/67067). Inverchapel to Foreign Office, May 13th 1947, (no. 6749, FO 371/67067). See also: MacVeagh to Marshall (734) May 20th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 174-75. 378 Ethridge to Marshall (299) May 12th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 850-60. Ethridge to Marshall (373), May 20th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 863-64. The Report of the UNO Commission (no. 7244, FO 371/67069) and UNO/S C Official Records, Second Year, Special Supplement no. 2. 157 Big Three without forcing any of them to change their methods of operation in regards to Greece and her Balkan neighbours. The situation was destined to continue, and by failing to make concrete observations and to take the KKE’s position into consideration, demonstrated to the KKE and DSE that peace was not an option. This was also due to the international climate at the time in which cooperation between the United States, Britain and Soviet Union was unlikely.

Further reading of the relevant documents shows also that there was no distinction on the part of the British or the Americans at this time between Tito’s policies and

Stalin’s policies. All of the problems they were facing in Greece were believed to be coming directly from the Soviet Union. This belief in turn made international non-reconciliation with the Soviets translate into non-reconciliation with the DSE in Greece. However, the Soviet Union also bear responsibility for the Anglo-

American failure to distinguish between Yugoslavian and Soviet policy. By refusing to acknowledge any external factors (i.e. the problems with Greece’s

Northern Frontiers) the USSR reinforced to the British and Americans that theirs was the policy being followed by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. Lastly, the fact that the British were successful in pressuring the United States to manipulate the findings of the first UN commission for the Balkans, clearly illustrated the degree of control that they were able to exert two years after the end of the Second

World War. Furthermore, though they had claimed that their aid to Greece was ending March 31st 1947, in June 1947 the British would still be heavily involved in

Greece.379

379 This could also be due to the wartime debates between Britain and the United States over control of International Aviation after the war. As discussed in Chapter 3, the British felt that the more 158 British influence in the United States was still very high in mid-May, and the State Department placed the highest priority on having complete knowledge, not only of British intentions and capabilities, but also on their ‘thinking on world problems.’ Particularly, the Unites States wanted British views about the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and their continuing presence in Greece and

Palestine.380 In response, the American Ambassador to Britain Lewis Douglas stated that the British desired to be partners with the United States to preserve peace until the UN was sufficiently strong to do it, but that like the Churchill administration, the current administration saw the USSR as ‘the only important potential enemy.’ Douglas also pointed out that the British stressed that there could be no ‘Maginot line’ mentality against Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean and that they had to be confronted and that communist influence had to be eradicated there.381 That is exactly what the United States would do.

In keeping with their policy of sharing responsibility with the United States in Greece, at the end of May 1947 the British agreed to extend the police mission for six months. This was a result of negotiations with the United States in terms of what Britain's continuing role would be in Greece. However far from improving, the situation in Greece and the general state of security had actually gotten worse.

By mid-June the coalition government was still unable to effectively counter

territory that existed in which they could exert their influence, the stronger their positions in relations with the Americans would be. Their anti-communism also aided them in convincing the Americans that they were an indispensable ally which also strengthened their position. See Bevin’s speech of September 10th 1947 (AN 3096 / 61 / 45) BDFA Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 2. 1947, pp. 223-25. 380 Acheson to US Embassy in London (2155) May 17th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. I, General; The United Nations, pp. 750-51. 381 Douglas to Acheson (3173) June 11th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. I, General; The United Nations, pp.751-58. 159 insurgency in northern Greece, and the presence of in the northern frontier region had no more than a very temporary calming effect. In terms of the internal situation, the British were convinced still that the Greek state was being undermined militarily and politically by the KKE with support from the

Communist Parties in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Russia.382 The

Americans had also reached the same conclusion and informed their representative to the UN that in their opinion the actions of Greece’s northern neighbours constituted aggression and if continued, may have to be ended with enforcement measures. However, the US did not believe that the aggression had reached such as level as to require intervention under article 7 of the UN charter and should

Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria stop their actions, then a peaceful settlement could be found.383

However, despite the international harmony of US and British policy towards the Greek Frontier issue, the British were still concerned about when the effects of the United States financial aid would be felt in Greece. The British wanted to get the Americans to the point where they would station divisions of

American troops on the northern borders and support the development of an effective United Nations body which could at the very least diminish the amount of aid being supplied to the Communist army from across the borders. The British felt that the situation in Greece was so desperate, that only substantial, rapid and

382 Docs. 25 - 27, May 8 to June 19, 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 198-202. 383 Marshall to Austin (252) June 9h 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp.865- 66. 160 concrete American aid to Greece to prevent infiltration of supplies and soldiers from across northern borders would be up to prevent Greece from falling.384

In light of the British concerns and the recommendations made to the UN by UNSCOB, the State Department immediately began to pressure the Security

Council to accept the recommendations and to take action to stop border violations of the Northern Borders. The United States was convinced that with the support of the USSR, Greece’s communist neighbours intended to separate Macedonia from

Greece and turn it into a new Macedonian state and eventually to set up a communist controlled Greece which would force the country into the Soviet sphere of influence.385 Therefore, Marshall instructed US representative Austin that the

United States (as Britain had done) was not prepared;

... in any way to concede that Greece is guilty in any way of interference in the internal affairs of the other three nations. These three countries however are guilty of armed intervention in Greece and we cannot agree that any developments that may have taken place or are taking place in Greece can be regarded as any justification whatsoever for such intervention.386

Lastly, a Soviet veto on a continuing investigative commission in Greece though would be preferable to the US supporting the continuing presence of an

384 Norton to Bevin (260) June 19th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 202-204 385 This was part of Tito’s plan to establish a Slavic Balkan state with access to the Aegean. As mentioned earlier, the British and Americans did not distinguish between Tito and Stalin policy, and so the Yugoslav plan, though in fact running contrary to Soviet desires, re-enforced the belief that the Soviets were determined to bring Greece under its sphere of influence. For greater detail, see: Marshall to Austin (280) June 26th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 865-68.See also: Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, p. 67 and Ivo Banac,, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split and the Greek Civil War,’ in Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and its Legacy, John Iatrides and Linda Wrigley, eds., (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1995) pp. 259-60. 386 Marshall to Austin (280) June 26th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 865- 68. This quote clearly illustrates the lack of differentiation between Tito and Stalin policy towards Greece. 161 investigative commission while compromising and allowing it to either investigate of Greek internal affairs or the actions of the American aid program to Greece.387

The terms of the American aid program to Greece stated that the government of Greece had to do everything in its power to assist the United States in the implementation of the objectives of the aid program. It also stated the government of Greece was responsible for allowing United States officers to fully monitor the implementation of the program and for the government to maintain full and continuous publicity within Greece regarding activities of the American aid program.388 This is significant because it was much clearer in terms of what it instructed the Greek government to do, than anything that the British had ordered previously. It is significant also because the aid to Greece had been determined prior to the Security Council’s consideration of the UN Committee’s report.

Therefore, the Security Council’s recommendations could not be allowed to differ dramatically from what the British and Americans were already planning to do in

Greece. As a result, the British and American position was clearly presented in the

Security Council and repeatedly expressed to their representatives in terms of what they were permitted to do and support.389 As an example of extra-United Nations’ pressure applied by the United States on foreign governments, the Americans even requested that the Colombian government support their proposals and instructed their ambassador to Colombia to voice their support for the US position in the

387 Marshall to Austin (280) June 26th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 865- 68. 388Details of US aide to Greece, under the conditions authorised by the United States Congress (no. 28 R 8493 / 50 / 19) June 20th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 204-206. The failure of the Greek government to fully implement the conditions outlined in the aid package would be used as justification by Paul Porter (in mid 1949) to withhold funds from Greece. 389 Marshall to Austin (298), July 7th 1947 FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 869- 70. 162 Security Council.390 The Americans hardened their position against the USSR even more by stating that if the Security Council was unable to protect the political and territorial integrity of a member of the UN, then that failure:

...would not, in the opinion of the United States Government, forbid or preclude individual or collective action by States willing to act, so long as they act in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United Nations.391

This statement represented not only the fact that the US was willing to bypass the organization it had formed if it did not reach conclusions that the US desired, but also something far more long-lasting. Marshall’s statement represented the beginning of an American Foreign Policy that first manifested itself in Greece in the late 1940, was repeated in Korea in 1950 and would continue throughout the

20th and into the 21st centuries. It was a policy that would justify bypassing international treaties, organizations and laws whenever they did not coincide with

American Policy objectives. This is why Greece and the role the British played there are so significant. Both simultaneously represented and were direct causes of the new American Foreign policy that manifested itself after the declaration of the

Truman doctrine. The perceived threat of the USSR and its expansion were so great, that the US freed itself from adhering to any organization / body that restricted its ability to counter Soviet influence.392

Simultaneously in the United States, the British were being attacked not

390 Marshall to the US Embassy in Colombia(354), July 9th 1947 (FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 870-71 391 Marshall to Austin (308), July 11th 1947 FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 871- 72. 392 Marshall stated that the US perceived Soviet actions as a ‘world-wide communist effort to subvert governments and institutions not subservient to the Soviet Union.’ Marshall to Austin (280) June 26th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 866-68. 163 only for their handling of affairs in Greece, but also for their inability to manage their own economy, whose slow recovery was used by American Conservatives to argue against further US aid to Britain. The Foreign Office responded that the best way to respond to the criticism was to explain the current difficulties as a direct and lasting effect of the War once again referring to the British stand against the

Nazis, and trying to link the past with the value of Britain in the future as an investment and indispensable ally against the spread of communism.393 However, to do so Britain needed a strong Germany not only as a buffer against the USSR, but also as a trading partner. In light of the rapidly changing international political climate, and after the Morgenthau plan had managed to keep Germany totally crippled and in worse condition than she was in 1945 or 1946, the United States implemented a new German policy.

Until July 1947, the United States had vehemently pursued the industrial dismantling of Germany, in keeping with FDR’s desire to punish the Germans for electing Hitler and causing the Second World War.394 However, as a result of rising tensions with the USSR, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Order 1067 which had directed the American occupying forces to do nothing to aid the economic rehabilitation of Germany was replaced by JCS Order 1779. The new order stated that a prosperous Europe was dependent upon a ‘stable and productive

Germany.’395 Much of the French government agreed that it was necessary to change the pre-existing policy and to focus on re-building Germany since, with a

393 John Balfour to the Foreign Office, August 5th 1947, (FO 371 / 61002 AN 2661 / 1 / 45). See also, Anstey, p. 418. 394 Weinberg, pp. 150-151. 395 Petrov, (quoting, Hammond, American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 443) p. 236 164 population of 66 million, it had huge potential for both the production and consumption of goods.396 Bevin, aware of how such a dramatic change of Allied policy would be received, recommended that the new policy be kept secret for the present time to which the Americans agreed.397 The Communist members of the

UN had predicted that the British and Americans would re-build Germany rather than punish it, and those statements had resonated in France with opponents of the

French government. The French lodged numerous complaints over the new Anglo-

American policy for Germany, but were not successful in changing it.398

The British again took advantage of the change in American attitude noting that there was also a fear in the United States of standing alone against the Soviet

Union. This indicated to the British, not only that they had an opportunity to continue the role of the United States’ best and most reliable ally’, but also to profit from it.399 From this point on, though they would disagree from time to time,

Britain and the United States linked their foreign policy to a degree never before seen between two world powers. Furthermore, as a result of their shared objectives,

Britain’s post-war weakness and the presence of a common foe, they switched positions as the premier world power without ‘firing a shot.’ As stated in the

396 Murphy to Marshall (1569) June 3oth 1947, Caffrey to Marshall (2775) July 11th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. II, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, pp. 977-86. 397 British Embassy to Department of State (862.6362/7-1547) July 15th 1947, Marshall to US embassy in France (2605) July 15th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. II, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, pp. 986-88. This decision would eventually lead to the British and Americans dismissing claims for War reparation against Germany, and the US dismissing reparations against Japan. See: Franks to Bevin (399) May 23rd 1949, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North American, Vol. 3, 1949, paragraphs 3, 5 and 6, pp. 177-179. 398 Bidault to Marshall (711.51/7-1847 and 1947) July17th 1947, Caffrey to Marshall (2863) July 18th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. II, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria pp. 991-96. 399 Inverchapel to FO, August 23rd 1947, Foreign Office Records, (61056/AN2982). Balfour to Bevin (2037) August 23rd 1947, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 2, 1947, pp. 219- 222. 165 introduction, this was the first time where two superpowers switched positions without coming into armed conflict with each other.

However, due to the delays and manoeuvring in the Security Council, the

American Aid program to Greece was delayed and the fact that the Americans arrived in Greece late, meant that the entire summer of 1947 was virtually lost to begin reconstruction.400 Therefore, the official reason for UNSCOB being in

Greece in the first place (i.e. to assist the Greek government and people in the reconstruction of their country) was subverted and transformed into a vehicle through which the Big Three could sort out their post-war positions and policies towards each other. As a result of the Security Council’s inability (according to the

US) to assign blame under Chapter 7 for a threat to the peace being perpetrated by

Greece’s Northern Neighbours, the US stated that it would have to bring the issue before the General Assembly.401

The US continued to argue for a chapter 7 violation being perpetrated against Greece by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania since both UNSCOB and the subcommittee had not only found evidence of their support of the DSE, but they had also denied the UN subcommittee the right to investigate conditions in their territory. The State Department argued that as established by the Havana

Convention of 1922 and various treaties of 1933 between the USSR and other

European states that assisting a rebellion in a foreign country constituted ‘an act of aggression or a threat to peace.’ The US concluded that in spite of these actions,

400Rapp to Bevin (no. 30) July 22nd 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 212-214. 401 Marshall to Johnson (333) July 30th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 875-77. The United States would use the same argument and procedure to justify their intervention in Korea three years later. 166 the Security Council refused to take action under Chapter 7, instead favouring a non-military solution, prescribed under chapter 6 which ‘in the spirit of conciliation’ the US accepted, but the motion was still defeated by the Soviet Veto.

Therefore, the US stated again that in spite of the Security Council’s decision, the

UN still had a responsibility to act.402 The next day, Marshall ordered

Representative Johnson to propose a resolution that would make the Soviet position on Greece clear by getting the Soviet veto on the record.403 Where the previous year the State Department wanted to find proposals which would prevent a Soviet veto, by August 1947 it forwarded proposals designed to provoke a veto in order to force the USSR to publicly demonstrate that it would not cooperate internationally and in so doing, justify the increasingly ‘hard-line’ approach the

British and Americans were taking towards them.

In light of the repeated impasse in the Security Council over the issue of passing a military resolution under Chapter 7, many ‘friendly members’ were questioning the Unites States continued insistence on the point, ‘even as a built up to a case before the General Assembly.’404 Next, the US secretly contacted the

Security Council representatives who had been voting with the US over support for action under Chapter 7, to explain why they were supporting the Greek

Government, and secondly to reassure them that in spite of the Soviet veto ‘we have a definite plan of action in mind.’ Marshall continued, stating that far from

402 Marshall to Johnson (333) July 30th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 875-77. Marshall stated: ‘That veto (from the USSR) does not remove obligations of members of the UN nor does it prevent them from supporting to the fullest extent purposes and principles of Charter.’ 403 Marshall to Johnson (334) July 31st 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, p.877. 404 Austin to Marshall (712) August 6th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 879-80. 167 being a useless gesture, the continuing support for intervention under Chapter 7, in spite of the repeated Soviet veto, would:

...demonstrate to the world the determination of nine of the eleven members to prevent aggression, whereas a failure by the Council to meet the issue squarely would be a signal to aggressors that they could act with impunity, secure in their belief that their actions would be tacitly condoned.405

Marshall continued, re-iterating how important it would be for the majority of the Security Council to stand together on the issue because it would dramatically strengthen their arguments and possible resolution if and when the issue was brought before the General Assembly. However, he also stated that at this point the US must not yet ‘harden our thinking to the exact type of action that the

General Assembly might take,’ since in his opinion that still depended greatly on the course of events in Greece.406 A State Department release of August 12th, 1947 stated:

It is the view of the United States government that Greece is in grave peril. This peril results from the guerrilla warfare now being waged against the Greek government by communist -led bands actively supported by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and by the Communist party of Greece. It is perfectly clear the governments of these three northern countries are working in close conjunction with the Greek communists with a common objective - the establishment in Greece of a minority totalitarian government which would be subservient to the communist- controlled countries.407

405 Marshall to Certain Diplomatic Missions (501.BC – Greece/8-947: Circular Telegram), August 9th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 880- 81 406 Marshall to Certain Diplomatic Missions (501.BC – Greece/8-947: Circular Telegram), August 9th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, p.882. 407Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949, Vol. 1 (New York: Arno Press, 1971) p. 765. 168 Though this statement clearly illustrated the Americans’ intentions of assuming a new role in world affairs, the British were not prepared to accept a greatly diminished role. British foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had stated in

Parliament they rejected the view that Great Britain had ceased to be a great world power.

We regard ourselves as one of the powers most vital to the peace of the world, and we still have our historic part to play. The very fact that we have fought so hard for liberty, and paid such a price, warrants us retaining this position; and, indeed, it places a duty upon us to continue to retain it. I'm not aware of any suggestion, seriously advanced, that, by some stroke of fate, as it were, we have overnight ceased to be a great power.... I must say, it is never occurred to his Majesty's Government, nor, I believe, to the British people…408

His statement was manifested by the role the British would continue to play not only in Greece but internationally. In terms of the military situation in Greece, in August 1947, British projections for the rest of the year's campaign against the insurgency were dependent upon the amount of foreign aid that was continuing to get through Greece's northern borders. The British had very low expectations for the success of the Greek forces for the rest of 1947. And that they did not expect any American economic help until the spring of 1948. Another problem facing the

Armed Forces was the miss- use, as the British put it, of the gendarmerie. They had been reorganized into a unit that ended up working in competition, as opposed to in cooperation, with the Greek army. The British also made recommendations about

408 House of Commons debates (437), May 16th 1947 ( fifth series, collection, 1965). This statement illustrated the continuity of British policy, and in some ways foreshadowed British actions in the 1950s in Egypt. 169 increases in the Greek forces to the American chiefs of staff.409 However, by the end of August 1947 they were being pressed by the deteriorating security situation in Greece. The insurgents were taking advantage of limited British troop withdrawals and the immediate lack of American military assistance, and looted over 30 villages in central Greece between the 13th and 20th of August. In the

Security Council, events had also deteriorated.

The Syrian member of UNSCOB threatened to abstain from the vote in early August 1947, and the State Department moved quickly to threaten the

Syrians with ‘corrective measures’ if they did not vote in favour of the American /

British initiative.410 Though the Syrians quickly changed their stance, the Soviet veto of the American proposal on August 19th 1947, forced the United States to go to the General Assembly to get its resolution passed. By August 29th 1947, the

State Department had used its embassies in 44 countries to convey the American

‘desire’ to have their support for the vote in the General Assembly.411

409 Reilly to Bevin (1486, R 10421 / 230 / 19) July 29th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 214-215. This document demonstrates how after persuading the Americans to assume responsibility for Greece, the British still felt able and entitled to offer advice on how the Americans should proceed. They recommended to the United States their estimates for the proper size and equipping of the Greek Army. 410 The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Legation in Syria (178) August 18th 1947 FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 882-83. The US ‘reminded’ Syria that they were acting to protect smaller nations from outside influence, implying that they were also setting a precedent to protect Syria from Soviet pressure. 411 The Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Missions (501.BC – Greece/8-2947: Circular Telegram), August 29th 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 883-85. Since 1947, the USA has only deferred to the General Assembly on a few occasions, and only when resolutions couldn’t get forced through the Security Council. Interestingly, when the UN General Assembly has proposed resolutions, aside from being un-biding under the charter of the UN, the members of the Security Council have almost always ignored them. Members of the Security Council have only used the General Assembly as a mechanism to support their policies, never as a source for international consensus. The 2nd time that a General Assembly resolution has been considered binding was in 1950 when the US Secretary of State went to the General Assembly to get a resolution that supported Peace Keeping forces in Korea. Britain engaged in similar manipulation, but tended to so out outside of the United Nations. For an 170 The new division in the world that was reflected in the deliberations of the

Security Council was expressed by the State Department as a regrettable but undeniable reality to which the United States had to respond not only for her own interest and well being, but also for those of the non-Soviet world.412 This belief is what would lead the US to bypass the very organ it had helped form (the Security

Council) in order to safeguard that which it perceived as being an issue vital to the security of the ‘free world.’

A few weeks later the State Department drafted a resolution for the Greek

Case to be presented before the General Assembly which found Albania,

Yugoslavia and Bulgaria guilty of contravening the UN charter and called upon them to immediately desist their military and trans-border aid for the DSE.

Furthermore, the resolution called for the Greek government and the Governments of Albania Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to meet and find a peaceful solution to their disputes and to normalize relations. Marshal further advocated the cooperation of the four governments, with a second UN special committee, thereby allowing it to carry out its prescribed functions.413 Meanwhile, in Washington, the issue of aid to

Europe as a whole was being examined with urgency.

As a result, by the end of September 1947, with the cooperation of the

American government who was equally anxious to get the US Congress to support the European aid program, the Foreign Office stressed the need to push anti-

example, see British actions towards the unification of Greece and Cyprus discussed in Chapter 6, section: June 1950: The implications of the crises in Cyprus, China and Korea. 412 Memorandum of the Consular of the Department of State, August 30th 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. I, General; The United Nations, pp. 763-65. 413 Marshall to Lovett (868) September 23rd 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 886-889. 171 communism. Dispatches were sent to British embassies to be used in informal meetings with US diplomats and reporters, outlining the dangers of giving in to

Soviet pressure and stressing the vital role the United States should play in

European security to oppose Soviet influence.414 This tactic was successful. It was also aided by the formation of the COMINFORM in Poland in September 1947, who had members from most of the Eastern European nations and who attacked the French and Italian communist parties for not being revolutionary enough. This urge to militancy was also taken by the British Communist Party (BCP)415 and undoubtedly aided the propaganda machine of the British government who pointed to communist subversives in their own country. As a result of the Labour Party’s alliance with what the British communists called ‘the imperialist camp,’ the BCP attacked the government’s foreign and domestic policy.416 The labour government was able to use their opposition to the BCP as evidence to the United States that they were staunchly opposed to communism both abroad and at home, sharing the same core values as the Americans, and sharing their view of the threat that the communists posed. Their response was to purge the civil service and the Trade

Union Council (TUC) of communists, and even their own party members who favoured the BCP ‘line.’417

Back at the United Nations, on September 25th 1947, the United States presented another resolution, this time to the General Assembly, proposing for

414 Lord Inverchapel to British Consuls in the United States, September 13th 1947, (FO 371 / 62416 EU 8789 / 168 / 53). 415 David Childs, Britain Since 1945: A Political History, 3rd Edition (London: Routlage, 1997) pp. 555-556. 416 Childs, p. 556. 417 Childs, p. 557. In the United States the Republican party was attacking the Truman Government for working so closely with the British whose state they argued was little better than the Soviet Union. See also: ‘In defence of British Socialism’ by Caroline Anstey. 172 another UN special committee on the Balkans, UNSCOB II, and called on the

Yugoslavs, Albanians and Bulgarians to desist any further aid to the DSE.418 On

October 21st 1947, the resolution was passed and the UNSCOB II was formed.

However, with the Communist members of the General Assembly refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the resolution, it had no effect on the situation of

Greece’s northern borders. As a result, the (second) UNSCOB II was ‘confined

...to findings and proposals similar to those of its predecessor.’419 Meanwhile, in

Washington, the British Embassy reported to the Foreign Office that the Americans were more likely to support Allies based on their ideological compatibility with the

United States, rather than their economic viability.420 It was welcome news to the

British for both their domestic needs and for their foreign commitments, notably,

Greece. Additionally, the United States bypassed the Security Council and the power of the Soviet veto using the General Assembly to force through their policy.

As a result, the British finally saw tangible results in their long standing efforts to manoeuvre the United States into a strongly anti-communist stance.

This stance was taken, not as a result of American belief in a war with the

USSR since they believed correctly that the USSR had no desire for a military conflict with the West. Rather it was taken through the belief that the Communism would spread locally, through domestic communist groups, and although the USSR would do everything it could to conceal its role, it would likely order the communists in France and Italy to ‘resort to virtual civil war.’ As a result, they

418 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, September 23rd 1947, editorial note, FRUS 1947 Vol. V, The Near East and Africa, pp. 888-89. 419 Sfikas, p.260. 420 Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, ‘Weekly Political Summary’, September 4th 1947 (FO 371/61056 and AN 3069/40/45). 173 believed that Greece was in danger and that Czechoslovakia would be crushed since the USSR would consolidate its hold on Eastern Europe. They also believed that the economic intervention they had provided so far was the main reason that the spread of communism into the West had been slowed and that the promise of continuing aid would continue that trend. Though they acknowledged that their continued use of the UN to mobilize world opinion against the USSR could result in the latter leaving the organization, the US believed that they could ‘bring communist expansion to a halt’ by continuing and expanding upon their political, economic and military assistance / intervention plans.421

In Greece in November 1947 the first American troops began to arrive and the Greek army was reorganized with American aid allowing for a permanent increase of 10,000 soldiers to 120,000 men. However, the ongoing corruption, infighting and favouritism of the Greek government were problems that plagued the military mission. However, the British maintained a strong position of influence as General Rawlins, Chief of the British military mission, and General

Livesay, military advisor to the American mission of aid to Greece, had discussions with the government on appointments of generals for the new Armed

Forces.422

1947 closed with Greece in a worse state than it had been in 1946. The military and the government continued to be completely ineffective in dealing with

421 Report by the Policy Planning Staff (PPS – 13) November 6th 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. I, General; The United Nations, pp. 770- 77. The Planning committee also forecasted severe troubles in Palestine and acknowledged that China had been lost to the West. This would provide major political ammunition for the Republican Party in the United States who blamed the Democrats for being ‘soft’ on communism. 422 Norton to Bevin (no. 390 R15014 / 34 / 19) November 7th 1947, pp. 223-24, Norton to Bevin (no.132 R 14595 / 2219 / 19 – weekly summary) October 30th 194, pp. 264-65. BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, 1947. 174 any crisis whatsoever. The Americans pressured the Greeks to form a coalition government that squeezed out many of the smaller parties. Meanwhile the

Communist army was estimated to have 300,000 members.423 Furthermore the government policy of amnesty succeeded mainly in having members of right-wing band surrender themselves, rather than members of the DSE. Though the government had begun to release political prisoners, the release was done in such a haphazard and disorganized way, that many of those released simply left prison and rejoined the bandit groups. British Ambassador Norton also doubted whether any Greek government however it was composed would be capable of rising above

‘considerations of selfish and sectional political interests’ to deal with the daunting problems facing Greece. He believed that was why the American mission had produced little or no visible effects up to this point. He also stated that many

Greeks believed that since the United States was so heavily committed to Greece that they could not afford to withdraw. Therefore, the Greeks could wait for the

Americans to do all the work. The ambassador was also critical of the American mission taking three months to present an economic program to the Greek government and that they had not made any effort to make an adequate exchange of information and policy with the British economic mission. He stated:

Our invaluable experience was largely wasted in major and interesting difficulties arose at the start it was soon realized that the cost of the military operation would far exceed the original American estimates that it would almost certainly

423 Aside from this estimate being more than ten times larger than the actual DSE strength at this time, it illustrates again how great a role perception played in Anglo-American decision-making. It is an example of the exaggerated perception of the actual danger the communists presented and also provides the opportunity to reflect on the perception of Anglo-American intentions by the Bulgarian, Albanian and Yugoslavian governments. Apparently they too felt threatened by increasing Anglo-American criticism and involvement in the Balkans. 175 be necessary to reallocate the military partners funds earmarked for reconstruction.424

What the Americans implemented echoed the calls of the IMF and the EU today in Greece. At that time the Americans pressured to Greek government to reduce the civil service as part of their economic drive. There was mass to satisfaction with the skills of pay and conditions of work including the abolition of overtime that was drawn up in consultation with the American mission. Much as would be the case 60 years later, civil-service strikes and demonstrations paralyzed with little effectiveness the government had.425 On December 13th 1947, two weeks before the Communist formed the government of free Greece in Macedonia,426

United States ambassador Mr. Douglas contacted Foreign Minister Bevin in

London, raising the question of integrating the military missions in Greece. Once again, the British successfully altered American Policy to suit their interests. Bevin stated that he was hesitant to unite the missions, arguing that it was contrary to the

Ministry of Defence policy, and that the British prefer the Americans deal with

‘supplies and operations and things of that character,’ that the British would confine themselves to training.427 By maintaining separate missions, the British prevented the Americans from having the ability to order the British forces, and kept cooperation reliant upon requests.

424 Norton to Foreign Office (392) November 11th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 225-226. 425 Norton to Bevin (392) November 11th 1947, Norton to Bevin (134) November 6th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp.227, 264-265. In an interesting development, the Canadian Minister of trade and commerce, Mr. J.A MacKinnon, visited Athens in late October 1947, in order to increase Canadian imports from Greece. Ibid., p. 265. 426 Domestically in Greece, Markos Vafiades formed a Communist government in Northern Greece in December 1947, but not surprisingly, the Americans and British did not recognise it. 427 Douglas to Bevin (2159) December 13th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, p. 229. 176 However, British training of the armed forces came under attack on

November 13th 1947 by members of minister Zervas’ national party. They stated that the British military mission had failed to properly train the Greek army for guerrilla warfare. They further attacked the government, stating that it was overly subservient to the American mission.428

It is interesting to note the British Intelligence continued to provide information to the United States about conditions in Greece until the end of the

Greek Civil War.429 An explanation for this was that due to the dissolution of the

OSS, the newly formed CIA was not yet developed enough to take over responsibilities from the British. It is also interesting to note that Britain, greatly benefitting from American involvement, not only in Greece but in Western Europe, would continue to provide the intelligence that would keep the United States involved. One of the most telling signs of this arrangement came from British activities in the American Embassy in London. Before releasing a document to the

US, British officials presented and explained documents with senior members of the US Embassy staff the day before they were to be released.430 Though not officially explained as manipulating the American diplomats, it was an action that seemed to indicate the British intent to ensure that the interpretation of the documents would be to a British standard. The British also paid close attention to the American Congress which, after the end of the war, had come to play a much more significant role, especially when it came to financial matters. However, the

428 Norton to Bevin (139), November 13th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 267- 68. 429 Close and Veremis. “The Military Struggle,” p. 113. 430 Coleman, p.355. 177 British also gained official American support when it came to anti-communist measures such as NATO and the Marshall Plan.431 As a result, the Americans became more involved in the Greek frontier commission in mid-November 1947.

Although the attacks on the British military missions failure to properly train the Greek army for bandit warfare, the United States government had decided to create a joint planning staff which would incorporate all the American Air Force

Naval and military personnel in addition to American military advisors, and attach them to Greek army units. The British had been arguing for such plan since the summer 1947. However, despite the apparent failures of the British to properly train the Greek army, the Americans refused to take over the training of the Greek armed forces.432Additionally, the economic situation continued to worsen and there were rumours that the Greek government would resign if the United States did not allow the government to resume the sale of gold by the Bank of Greece. The next week this issue was resolved when United States government agreed to exchange gold for the Greek government however this gain was limited by increasing public- sector anxiety. Threats of strikers were extremely high, so much so that the government has handed strike legislation that even impose the death penalty should violence result from one of the strikes.433

Previously, in mid-December 1947, the United States had sent eight senior officers to Athens to establish the ‘advisory group on Greek army operations’ as

431 Anstey, p. 420. 432Greece: weekly summary (139) November 26th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 267-268. That is until the British finally removed all of their remaining soldiers in November 1948. See next chapter. 433 Greece: weekly summary (143) December 11th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 269-270. 178 part of the military section of the American military mission to Greece. However, at the close of 1947 conditions and Greece (as they were in Britain) were much worse than they had been in 1946. The labour situation had improved slightly by civil servants receiving a bonus although with only half of what they would have normally received and inflation continued to be an incredible problem with a requiring 200,000 drachmas to buy one gold sovereign.434

As 1947 drew to a close it seemed to indicate that facilitation of British policy for the next decade gone was the belief that Britain could quickly reversed very postwar devastation to resume her status as a great power. Gone was Britain's belief that she could remain outside European economic recovery and still rebuild her economy quickly.435 Most importantly, the British belief that they could determine their own destiny independently had disappeared. All of these were replaced by greater confidence in and growing dependence on American economic and military protection. As for the Americans, they had now reached the conclusion that the:

...objectives of the European Recovery Program (ERP) are of such importance that they must be achieved by every means possible short of serious depleting our own natural resources. (Furthermore) National Security requires adequate reserves of strategic and critical materials...There should be no restriction on increased production for United States requirements of these materials.436

434 Norton to Bevin (146) December 24th 1947, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 12, pp. 270- 271. 435 Previous references to Anglo-American financial agreements are in Chapter 2. See: Anstey, p.245, and Inverchapel to Bevin, August 15th 1946, (no. 1927) Paragraph 11c , BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 1, p.213. For records of amount of financial aid to the UK from the USA in 1946, and available until March 31st 1947 see: Balfour to Bevin (No. 1776 E) July 22nd 1947, BDFA, part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 2, pp. 210-13. 436 National Security Resources board to President Truman, December 4th 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. I, General; The United Nations, pp. 777-78. 179 The demobilization begun in 1946 was about to be reversed in dramatic fashion as the British had desired. They had successfully played the part of loyal friend and advisor and this, combined with perceived Soviet objectives would get the US to commit to unprecedented levels of military spending and intervention.

Another factor that aided British policy was the split between Yugoslavia and Moscow, which earlier in the year had been dismissed as implausible at best, but was now a reality. To the Soviets, it was clear that through its aid and actions in support to the Greek Communists, Yugoslavia had encouraged American intervention in the Balkans.437 Thus it could also be said that the success of British policy in the Balkans and in Greece in particular, was also aided by Tito's aggressive foreign-policy. The hardening of the line between the Soviets and the

Americans in Europe greatly benefited long-term British interests. British policy through 1948 would also be driven by the British knowledge that their financial dependence on the United States radically weakened their international leverage.

As a result the British would pursue a new multifaceted foreign policy. On the one hand they would attempt to draw closer to Europe to aid in economic reconstruction and mutual self-defence, and on the other would continue to attempt to get American guarantees of military economic aid not only for themselves but for the European nations that would serve as a barrier to communism namely

Germany and Greece.

In December 1947 at the London Council of Foreign ministers, the British held secret talks with the French and the Americans regarding opposition to any

437 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to Khrushchev, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999) p.127. 180 further Soviet expansion. In light of the situation in Greece, in Eastern Europe and in the Far East, the policy was well received, although the French were still upset over the Anglo-American plan to re-build Germany. Bevin stated to US Secretary of State Marshall how he felt that Western Europe could be ideologically / spiritually united and outlined his plan for ‘not a formal alliance, but an understanding backed by power, money and resolute action’ which could guarantee

Western European security and prevent the Soviets from expanding into Europe further.438 It was the groundwork for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

438 Anglo–US–French conversations, British memorandum of conversation, Top Secret, December 22nd 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. II, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, pp. 815-22, and: Gallman to Marshall (6585), FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, pp. 1-2. 181 Chapter 4: ‘Please don’t go!’ British Propaganda and American Intervention

in Greece

1948: January to May

Though the Cold War began in 1947, the following two years solidly established it. The Czechoslovakian coup in 1948 essentially formalized division of Europe, which was further demonstrated the following year by the formation of

East and West Germany and the founding of NATO.439 Based on the previous year’s developments, the National Security Council (NSC) concluded that the security of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean was vital to American security, and should any one of Iran, Italy, Turkey or Greece fall under Soviet influence, it would threaten the security of the whole area. The NSC also concluded that the United States must use all of its economic and possibly military assets to guarantee the security of the region by strengthening the nations in question.440 This was completely in line, not only with British strategic interests for the area, but also for future British planning. In January 1948 Bevin Stated:

It is not enough to reinforce the physical barriers which still guard our western civilisation. We must organise and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent in this western civilisation of which we are the chief protagonists. This in my view can only be done by creating some form of union in Western Europe, whether of a formal or informal character, backed by the Americas

439 NATO would represent basically the opposite of the UN which was Roosevelt’s vision post-war international relations. Truman’s vision was NATO. 440 Report to the National Security Council (NSC 5) January 6th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 2-8. 182 and the Dominions.441

Bevin was clearly linking the future of Britain with the involvement of the United

States and the remaining countries of the commonwealth in guaranteeing European security. He also illustrated the role he saw for Britain, for which he and his government had been manipulating the United States by stating that:

Material aid will have to come principally from the United States, but the countries of Western Europe which despise the spiritual values of America will look to us for political and moral guidance in building up a counter-attraction to the baleful tenets of Communism within their borders and in recreating a healthy society wherever it has been shaken or shattered by the war.442

Bevin continued, to assert that Britain could harness American Power, and rebuild.

Provided we can organise a Western European system such as I have outlined above, backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americas, it should be possible to develop our own power and influence to equal that of the United States of America and the USSR. We have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them ....we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union.443

Bevin could not have stated British objectives more clearly. He directed

British foreign policy to direct the Americans to assume support for British interests and Greece was a key part in his plan. Interestingly, just as US foreign policy was affected by the domestic political conditions and the republican charges

441 Bevin to the Cabinet. ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, January 4th 1948, (CP(48)6, CAB 129/23) 442 Bevin to the Cabinet. ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, January 4th 1948, (CP(48)6, CAB 129/23 )(Ibid.,) 443 Bevin to the Cabinet. ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, January 4th 1948, (CP(48)6, CAB 129/23 )(Ibid.,). 183 that the democrats were ‘soft’ on communism, Bevin had to resist charges that his government was allowing itself to be overtaken by American policy. He would later state that Britain must aggressively promote the British way of life and British policy. It was a policy Bevin designed to align Britain with the United States without alienating his own party.444

Since the Marshall plan had not yet been approved by Congress, the British still believed that in order to continue to align British and American policy to encourage the Americans to follow the British, it was vital to continue to stress the communist Threat. In January 1948, Bevin commented on the threat that communism posed in the Far East stating:

in the Middle East and possibly in certain Far Eastern countries such as India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China, Communism will make headway unless a strong spiritual and moral lead . . . is given against it, and we are in a good position to give such a lead.445

Therefore following British policy objectives, being able to have the

Americans to commit to Greek, and through it, Western European defence, the

Middle and Far East could also be guarded against further communist expansion.

Furthermore, Bevin advocated for a more integrated Europe, which appealed to the

United States and was designed to encourage American aid to Europe generally but to Britain specifically.446 Bevin proposed the idea of a Western Union, backed by

444 Anstey, pp. 432-435, and Kirby, p. 405. 445‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy’, January 4th 1948 (CAB 129 23, CP (48) 8) 446 (NSC 5) January 6th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Multilateral Relations, pp. 2-8. British success at persuading the Americans to support unity of policy with British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean is shown in a secret National Security Council (NSC) document from January 1948. In the document the NSC stated that for US security interests to be achieved, it would be vital for the US and Britain to work ‘along parallel lines.’ See also: Kirby, p. 407. Kirby reflects on whether or not Bevin had any real intention of following through on his statements, and quotes the Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak as stating how 184 the ‘power of the United States and the Dominion’ to shore-up the countries bordering the Soviet sphere in the East. In outlining his plan, Bevin clearly stated that both the USA and Britain should lead the proposed union, and that those nations which had experienced firsthand Nazi occupation would likely be the most willing to support Anglo-American, and to a lesser extent French leadership in such a union whether it was formal or not.447 Therefore, despite Anglo-American frustration over the Greek situation, Greece was still seen as vital to their interest.

The US Director of Near Eastern and African affairs stated that the United States decision to protect Greece had to be stronger than the Soviet will to conquer it in order to prevent the outbreak of a new World War or at least the loss of the Middle

East, the Eastern Mediterranean and possibly even Europe. He therefore recommended that the US prepare ‘under certain circumstances’ to send troops to

Greece. His recommendation was made as a result of the DSE’s declaration of the

‘Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece’ with the support of the

Communist Balkan governments, and due to their continued open flouting of

UNSCOB II’s directives. He felt that the situation needed clear and urgent direction from the United States to restore Greek morale and to prevent the USSR from recognizing the provisional government; such was the perceived importance and symbolism of the struggle in and for Greece.448 Despite the importance they

puzzled he was that Britain never followed through on and sometimes opposed European Integration 447 Inverchapel to Marshall (840.00/1-1348) January 13th 1947, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 3-6. 448 Henderson to Marshall (711.69/1-948) January 9th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 9-14, subsequent letters, pp. 15-18. Though the US would decide that only clear and external military aggression against Greece would necessitate an armed American response, it was still considered as a real possibility. It is also important to keep in mind that there was still no distinction between Tito and Soviet policy. 185 placed on Greece, the British and Americans remained intensely frustrated with the domestic situation there. Minister Bevin summarised conditions there;

The Greek government are making great difficulties for their friends...I am more alarmed by the dissention within the Greek ranks than by Markos (Vafiades) and the rebels....To sum up the Greek government in moribund....Every day that passes is likely to increase the popular demand for a radical, i.e., semi- dictatorial solution. The present government is dying not so much from disunity or internal dissention as from inanition, senility...449

Officially, blame for the situation, delivered thought the findings of

UNSCOB II as well as British and American embassies, was assigned to the continuing material aid the DSE was receiving from the communist Balkans states.

Simultaneously but unbeknownst to the British and the Americans, Stalin was putting intense pressure on the Yugoslavians to desist their aid to the Greek

Communists. He believed very firmly that the Great Britain and the United States would never permit a break in the lines of communication from the Mediterranean, and that Tito’s actions would only cause an escalation of Western intervention in

South-Eastern Europe..450

Referring to the provisional government as the ‘Markos Junta,’451 the

Americans moved quickly to prevent any foreign recognition of the title which they believed would be disastrous and reported that more American officers were being deployed to advise the Greek Army in its actions against the guerrillas, in

Everything that was taking place with regards to Greece’s northern neighbours was seen as being dictated by Moscow. 449 Ernest Bevin/ Foreign Office to Athens Embassy , November 8th 1948, FO 371/72249/R12662. 450 Fernand Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (Farmsworth: Middlesex, 1975) pp. 488, 493 and, Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: 1983) pp. 175, 179-82. 451 Formed in December 1947. 186 addition to training them with new weapons. Additionally, they stated that a key part of the aid to Greece and Turkey (and to Western Europe as a whole) was affected by the fact that the American public had to know ‘that the recipients of aid from this country (USA) were doing the utmost to help themselves.’452 Next, with

American approval and a promise of a similarly strong statement in the near future,

Foreign Secretary Bevin issued is statement in the House of Commons that Britain, having already guaranteed Greece’s territorial frontiers, ‘would take a firm stand now against any new attempt to dominate free and independent countries.’453

The United States then made the decision that the destruction of the guerrilla forces had to become the top priority in order for American aid to Greece to have the desired results. The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was ordered to therefore subordinate any other objective until the destruction of ‘rebel forces’ had been completed.454 A key step towards establishing a strong military in a weak country was implemented a few days later when the head of AMAG informed Secretary of State Marshall that unless they supported the military effort, the economic and reform measures would not be emphasized.455 This decision marked the beginning of the American focus on stability in Greece, rather than democracy, though it was not officially stated as such.

452 Memorandum of Conversation (711.68 / 1-948) January 9th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 18-21. There was also the continuing debate of whether or not the US was prepared to use American combat troops in Greece and whether or not they should make their decision public. See: Report by the Policy Planning Staff, January 10th 1948 (PPS/18) FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 21-26. 453 Inverchapel to Marshall (869.00/1-1648) January 16th 1948, Marshall to Inverchapel, January 20th 1948, (FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1- 732) pp. 30, 33. 454 Marshall to Griswold (Gama 41) January 12th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 27-27. 455 Griswold to Marshall (Amag 82) January 14th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp.28-29. 187 In January 1948 in a meeting with his colleagues in the Cabinet, British foreign Sec. Ernest Bevin presented as he saw the most pressing international problems:

… the United States proposals for assisting economic recovery appear crystallized the opposition of the Soviet government any closer organization of the democratic states of Western Europe; and it was clear that, although the recent Soviet attempts to stir up trouble in France and Italy had largely failed, some loser form of union should be created in Western Europe in order to resist the increasing penetration of Soviet influence.456

Bevin believed that Britain had to exercise its moral authority to cement anti-Communist sentiment in Western Europe not only because he believed that these nations held values that were closer to those of the British and American but because he also believed that the possibility existed to increase Britain's own strength again to allow it to become an international power on equal terms with the

Soviet Union and the United States. Through the first half of 1948, Bevin would speak very plainly, more than he had ever before, about the methods employed by the Soviet Union; methods according to Bevin, intended to limit opposition and to intimidate weaker neighbouring states. 457 Though he properly assessed Communist interest in supporting the insurgency in Greece he mistakenly ascribed the primary support to Stalin, and not Tito in Yugoslavia. What he also failed to notice was that

Stalin's anti-American strategy was based upon the effort to prevent Washington from expanding to areas and issues that were viewed as vital to Soviet interests, while simultaneously maintaining the possibility of a ‘general agreement

456 CAB 128/12 (CAV 128/12 Cabinet minutes held at United Kingdom public records office, Kew), CM 2 (48) 5. 457 Bullock, Bevin, p. 519, 188 recognizing American predominance’ in other areas and other issues such as the southern Balkans.458

Despite British recommendations the United States, the Americans were still frustrated with the lack of concrete results in Greece. Ambassador Clifford

Norton explained that the failures were a result of the amount of money that the

United States government could spend in Greece being limited by the US

Congress. He stated that the amount the American Congress allocated for aid to

Greece was no greater than help the Greece had previously been receiving from the

United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration, Britain and the United

States combined. As a result there was exactly the same amount of funds which were being distributed for military use and rebuilding efforts.459 They argued that it was unreasonable to expect different results with the same level of funding.

In order to foster the impression that external threats were the exclusive reasons for the domestic situation in Greece (as they had done a year earlier with the first UN committee in the Balkans) the British and the Americans coerced members of the UNSCOB to ‘correct’ their reports or suggestions from deviating from British and American policy for Greece.

In February, the Australian representative to UNSCOB II issued recommendations similar to those put forward by the KKE in 1947, which to the dismay of the British and Americans, included international administration of

458 Claudin, p.493. See also: Peter J. Stavrakis, ‘“Soviet Policy in Areas of Limited Control: The Case of Greece, 1944-1949,” in Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy, John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., (Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1995, pp. 227-257) p. 227. Based on his research in the Soviet archives, Stavrakis argues that Soviet policy towards Greece was based on attempting to eliminate or at least reduce ‘western presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East.’ 459 Norton to Foreign Office (51) February 18th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, p. 73. 189 western aid to Greece, amnesty for combatants and political prisoners, internationally supervised free elections, and consultations with Greece’s Balkan neighbours to ease tension and improve relations. Secretary of State Marshall refused these recommendations stating that it would be ‘unfair’ to the Greek government since the KKE was just an object of the Soviet Union.460 However,

Marshall did advise the Greek Government to begin to make some reforms, especially in terms of the prisons and the composition of the government. In the end, the UNSCOB II was simply a tool used by the Big Three to justify their positions in Greece. Though members of the initial commission and later

UNSCOB II, did see that the domestic conditions had a direct effect on the

Situation on the Northern Borders, the Big Three refused to accept any compromised solution. Furthermore, though the UNSCOB II reflected the policies of the powers involved in its creation and failed to solve any of the issues for

Greece, it had a far more wide reaching impact than might otherwise have been expected; it codified the split between the communist and non-communist worlds and set up the UN as an arena for their conflict. From the perspective of this dissertation, it also illustrated clearly the influence that the British could exert over

American policy and the way the two nations would continue to operate against the

Soviets.

To continue to motivate the Americans into action, British Intelligence sent a report to the American consulate in Thessaloniki in February 1948, and

460 Drew to Secretary of State, February 3rd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 225-26. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia, February 5th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 226-28. 190 commented on the state of affairs as being a major contributing factor to the popularity of the Communists, particularly in Northern Greece. They stated:

It is hoped that Mr. Marshall’s recent advice on social and economic reforms might curb the unnecessary and luxurious living in one district in Athens where the inhabitants live better than practically anywhere else in Europe and show little interest in the situation except to gamble on the gold market according to the ups and down of the ‘nerve war’. This aspect of tactless and ostentatious display of vast limousines and quantities of luxury goods are definite factors contributing to communism and the bad feelings between northern Greece and the capital.461

The situation was particularly dangerous to British ambitions to tie the United

States to the defence of Western Europe, and they believed that if the Americans left Greece it would be the first step to having them leave Europe. So how would this play out in Greece? Conditions were so bad that both Britain and United

States began to consider (or at least to threaten) removing themselves entirely from

Greek affairs.462 However, on the whole the United States decided to adopt the view:

...that our policy with respect to Greece and Italy, and the Mediterranean area in general, should be based upon the objective of demonstration to the Russians that: a) the reduction of the communist threat will lead to our military withdrawal from the area; but that; b) further communist pressure will only have the effect of involving us more deeply in a military sense.463

461 American Consulate in Thessaloniki to the US Secretary of State, ‘British 10th Infantry Brigade fortnightly Intelligence Report from 4th February 1948’ , US National Archives, Washington DC, 868.00/2-448. 462 The National Security Council did consider the Withdrawal of US support for Greece as an alternative to their current actions, but also stated that to do so would lead not only to the loss of Greece and ‘American prestige,’ but also of the whole Middle East. (NSC 5/2, paragraph 8 a) February 12th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 46-51. 463 Quote of ‘Views of the Policy Planning Staff on the Mediterranean Area’ (868.00/2-1648) , FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 53-55. 191 Therefore, the attitude that would endure throughout the Cold War, was first codified in regards to the conflict in Greece. Though actual American military intervention would never reach the levels (in terms of soldiers fighting’ on-the- ground’) of their involvement in the later Civil Wars in Korea and Vietnam, the precedents and justification for action there were established in Greece.464

In terms of Anglo-American relations, the plan for the British to manipulate the United States, though well-underway in many ways since the beginning of the

Second World War, was concretely stated in February 1948 by the Foreign Office which stated:

On the whole the Americans seem to be very ham-handed in their anti-Communist and anti-Soviet publicity...we should hope however by consultation in suitable cases to prevent our getting in each other’s way. We also — perhaps rashly — rather hope to be able to influence them imperceptibly in the direction of greater subtlety.465

The statement, though understated, shows clearly British intentions, and foreshadowed the diverging paths the two countries would take from this point on as the Cold War progressed. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia caused the

Americans to radically revise their appreciation of the international situation, challenging earlier assumptions that the Cold War would almost certainly not end up in a military confrontation. The sense of crisis generated by this event, combined with the Berlin blockade meant that the United States would inevitably judge the Western European powers by what they could contribute to Western defence. Even in Britain, the labour MPs that had been most critical of Bevin and

464 The United States had no combat troops in Greece during the Greek Civil War, but in Korea they sent 300,000 soldiers, and in Vietnam they sent 537, 000. 465 th C.F.A. Warner to Sir John Balfour, February 26 1948, (FO 953 128) Emphasis Added. 192 Atlee’s Foreign policy since 1945, changed their opinions publically to opposition of the Soviets and to support, not only of Atlee and Bevin, but of Truman as well.466 However, there were forces in the United States that were aligned against either granting the British any further aid whatsoever, or at least aiding other nations first.

Lord Inverchapel believed that Britain`s current stability may encourage the

United States to give priority to other nations that were in immediate and obvious danger of falling to communism. He also believed that many Americans argued against further aid to Britain because they believed that Britain was so far gone economically that she was beyond help. Finally:

...in their perhaps excessive zeal for the unity of democratic, Americans are apt to minimize the politics and strategic importance of enabling Britain to maintain her imperial responsibilities. As matters of presence and Americans have recently emerged from a happy security of the world policed by the Royal Navy, a world in which the pound sterling seemed impregnable, fully to appreciate the cataclysm which would fall upon it if United Kingdom were no longer able effectively to play her part as a world power.467

According to Inverchapel Britain did however possess an advantage, which lay in its unique access to United States government. He felt they should exploit this advantage to the full and prove to those who mattered in the United States, that the most critical problem facing them was the possible chaos which would come from any further weakening of Britain's economic and imperial influence.468

466 Morgan, Labour in Power, pp. 238, 276-7. 467 Inverchapel to Foreign Office (24) May 13th 1948 , BDFA, Series C, Part IV, Vol. 3, pp. 77-82. 468 Inverchapel to Foreign Office (24) May 13th 1948 , BDFA, Series C, Part IV, Vol. 3, pp. 77-82. 193 However, his emphasis on restoring the Empire was out of keeping with the new realities of Britain's official relations with the United States. Officially at least, the British had to appear to accept the part of a diminished world power partnership with United States. To secure their objectives they continued to manipulate American public and political opinion to maintain the maximum leverage possible. They next forwarded the idea of forming an Eastern

Mediterranean Bloc, formed of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the Arab states to oppose Soviet Expansion. The Americans considered the idea as ‘hopeful’ but had not yet given it enough thought to endorse it. They did however state those closer economic relations could benefit Greece while closer political relations between

Italy, Greece and Turkey could be used to ‘prevent them (the Arabs) from following an unwise foreign policy.’ This could also lead them to being a successful ‘bridge’ between the Arab states and Britain and the United States.469

Though not surprising, this statement not only illustrated the ever growing fear of

Soviet interest in the Middle East, but also on American and British intentions there as well.

British concerns were also raised by British intelligence which estimated the DSE strength in March of 1948 at 26,000 in all of Greece, and a month earlier,

British Intelligence officer stated that if Markos Vafiades continued to fight a small guerrilla campaign, he could end up winning.470 Reports such as this, combined with the February 25th 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia, put much pressure on the

469 Memorandum of Conversation: American views on the Formation of an Eastern Mediterranean Bloc (890.00/2-448) February 4th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 41-43. 470 NARS 868.00/2-1748, 10th Infantry Brigade’s Fortnightly Intelligence Review; NARS, RG 319, P&O, 091, Greece, TS Entry, 154, Box 13. 194 Truman Administration, both internally and externally. The effect in Greece was increased Anglo-American pressure on the Greek Government and military to dramatically improve their performance. However, this pressure did not yield improved results in the field. The British also believed that the only guarantee that would simultaneously allow them the time and financial security to restore their power and to provide for the successful defence of Western Europe was a plan in which the United States was a key part. This became one of the key focuses in talks over the Brussels pact in March 1948. The British key clause contribution was known as the ‘commitment clause article 5,’ that pledged individual and joint action against an aggressor perpetrated on any one of the signing powers. Though modified in subsequent months, this key change in politics, represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy (guaranteed American military intervention in Europe) and is recognized as the peak of Bevin's achievements as foreign Secretary.471 In order to continue to exert influence and relay information in the United States, the Foreign Office controlled British Information Service

(BIS) had a staff of 200 people and a budget of over one million dollars.472 The

BIS organised staff exchanges to Britain, it wrote and distributed pamphlets and

(shown by examining the FARA 1938 records for the first nine months of 1948) was capable of massive amounts of information distribution.473

Bevin’s success was strange because, in spite of his strong commitment to establishing a system of Western European collective security against the Soviets,

471 Bullock, Bevin, p. 645. 472 BIS Services, FO 953/116 PG 1451/10. BIS Staff, FO 953/8 and FO 953/454. Its propaganda efforts greatly resembled those of BSC. 473 Pamphlets – 25,000, Films – 100, magazine Articles – 500, radiobroadcasts – 100, Statistics in: ‘FARA 1938’, Department of Justice records, National Archives, Washington D.C 195 he was very hesitant, as were many in the British government, to encourage, much less tie himself and his country to any of the European unification policies. Part of this was due to 600 years of British Policy to never become too involved in continental alliances, but part was also due to different ‘folk’ memories of Britain and the continent. Bevin saw the British government and its institutions as having held off and then defeated the Nazis, while on the continent, populations remembered how poorly their governments had fared against the Germans. For

Bevin, this came to mean that the British Government had a much greater degree of legitimacy as a protector not only of the British people but also Western

Civilization. Additionally, Bevin’s vision for the future of Britain, born out the past greatness of the Empire which he felt could be rebuilt and therefore eliminate the need for closer relations with continental Europe.474

After the communists assumed control in Czechoslovakia on February 25,

1948 by deposing the President and assassinating the Foreign Minister, a shock went through the West. The result was that in the United States, anti-Communist economic action was rushed forward. The Senate approved the Marshall plan by a vote of 69 to 17. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia also scared the United

States Britain and France into a mutual defence treaty known as the Brussels

Treaty, which was the precursor to NATO. The next international threat came with the upcoming elections in Italy.

474 It is important to note that Bevin never acknowledged Greece’s unique position, i.e. that the Greeks had fought German soldiers on Greek soil. Though Britain was bombed, it was never occupied, and though Bevin was quick to praise Britain’s sacrifice for the Allies and for Greece, he was much more reluctant to acknowledge with words, let alone with action, Greece’s sacrifice for the Allies. 196 The United States was so worried about possible communist victory in

European elections, that President Truman broke American law to send arms covertly to Italy in order to allow the forces of the government to prevent a

Communist coup.475 What was known to the British but not the Americans at the time, was just as he had done in Greece, Stalin had ordered the French and Italian

Communists to participate in the democratic process and not to engage in violence, in order to prevent a war between the West and the East.476 British intelligence, being far more adapted, advanced and competent than the fledgling CIA, was much more forthcoming with the information provided to the British which they were often hesitant to share with United States, especially information that may have reduced American intentions to intervene against Soviet expansion.477 However, this was not the view that the British shared with the Americans. Britain showcased her centuries of world-wide diplomatic experience to the Americans, who as a result, believed that their liaisons with the British were particularly valuable and were successfully manipulated by the British.478 Through the CIA, the United

States placed millions of dollars in the hands of anti-Communists and Democrats who ended up winning the election. (This was the beginning of covert CIA interference in foreign politics that would re-occur in 20 century history over and over, particularly in South America).479 Shortly thereafter, the United States

475 James E. Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” Diplomatic History, Vol. III (1983) pp. 48-51. 476 Ambrose, pp. 92-93. 477 Bullock, Bevin, p. 557. 478 Coleman, p. 359. 479 Lovett to US Embassy in Greece (411) April 3rd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 68-70. The State Department also ordered the Embassy to inform the Greek government that they had aided the non-communists in Italy in order to reassure the Greek Government that the US would oppose communism everywhere. 197 Congress approved $4 billion for Truman's policy of containment.480 Also, the

Americans used the situation to indicate to Greece the fragility of the European political and economic systems. Therefore, they assured Greece that they would continue to oppose communism and support economic development and in light of the possible Economic bloc with Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the US encouraged Greece to drop its claims against Italy for War reparations.481

The British used the crisis in Italy to further encourage US continued intervention on the continent. After Bevin was informed of the Communist coup in

Prague, he informed the American ambassador in London Lewis Douglas, that

‘Italy might go next.’ If the Americans were engaged in Greece and could be further engaged in Italy it was less likely that they would abandon Greece.482 The

British manoeuvre worked. Though many US officials felt that the relationship between Britain and the US was beneficial and open, there were American

Embassy staff in London who felt that the British exercised control, or at least possessed too much influence, over the affairs of the embassy.483 However, domestic British issues had some to the forefront. In the House of Commons in

March 1948, Prime Minister Atlee issued a declaration banning known members or associates of the BCP from working in any post ‘vital to the security of the state’ and had them removed or re-assigned.484 This represented a climax of sorts for the

480 Ambrose, pp. 91-94. 481 Lovett to US Embassy in Greece (411) April 3rd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) p. 69. 482 Dixon (Prague) to Bevin (8) February 25th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 14. 483 Richard M. Bissell, assistant to the deputy administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, quoted in: Moss, pp. 133-134. 484 Childs, pp. 557-558. A similar action had been initiated in the United States the previous year (1947). See: Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President (611.20) February 7th 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. I, General, The United Nations, pp. 712-15. However, the height of loyalty tests 198 late 1940s. From 1948 onward, the immediate post-war cooperation (1945-47) between communist parties and the respective governments, would diminish as

US/Soviet antagonism rose.

The British purge, coupled with the communists’ coup in Prague and the

Soviet blockade of Berlin, aided the British attempt to appear to the Americans as the leaders of anti-Communist forces in Europe. The day after the coup in Prague

Bevin met with US ambassador Lewis Douglas stating that he wanted a conference between Britain, the United States and other Western governments in order to quickly and strongly counter the Communist offensive.485 Greece became even more important for the British as a symbol because the Civil war there was easily marketed as continuing evidence of Soviet plans for world domination. As a result, the British cabinet authorised Bevin to do whatever was necessary to address the

‘Threat to Western Civilization.’486

This was a high point for British policy in the late 1940s and was the culmination of the agreement the British had solicited from the Americans on

March 11, 1948 when, after Bevin proposed a scheme to guarantee Atlantic security to George Marshall, the Americans responded promptly and positively stating that they were prepared at once to be enjoyed discussions on what would become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.487

for government positions occurred in 1950 , with the McCarthyism movement. In June 1950, the United States passed legislation requiring non-communist oaths. See. Franks to Younger (499) June 20th 1950, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 4, 1950, p. 93-98. See Chapter 5 for more information. 485 Douglas and Bevin, Top Secret record of conversation, February 26th 1948; FO 800/460. 486 The Threat to Western Civilisation’, March 3rd 1948, (CP(48)72, CAB 129/25). See also, Kirby, pp. 408-09. 487 Marshall to Murphy, Germany (403) March 6th 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, p. 389. 199 An interesting symbol of change in Anglo -Greek relations occurred in

April 1948, with the Greek celebration of the union of the Dodecanese islands with

Greece. The British ambassador noted that the British were not singled out for any praise public or private from the Greeks regarding their efforts to capture the islands of the contribution of the British government towards the union with

Greece. The British ambassador believed that that was possibly due to the Greek government being uneasy in the presence of Americans praising the British contribution for the liberation of the islands in light of Britain's declining, and

America's ascending role of aid to Greece.488

Militarily, by mid-April 1948 the Greek government had an army of

180,000 troops. They were finally receiving the new American weaponry and

Tsaldaris paid a visit to Foreign Minister Bevin in order to discuss the continuing

British role in Greece. Tsaldaris asked Foreign Minister Bevin if he believed that the latest developments in Berlin and Vienna were backed by the Soviet Union, and whether they were an indication that the Soviets were no longer concentrating their efforts on Greece. Bevin stated that he had no way of knowing for sure but felt that there was the possibility that the Soviet Union may be reconsidering their general foreign policy. 489 It is also important to note that the Americans pressured the Greek government to renounce their claims against Italy for war reparations, possibly for US leverage against Italian communists. In the spring of 1948 there was a key vote in Italy and the West was very alarmed that the Communists could succeed in capturing that country as they had done in Czechoslovakia. The

488 Norton to Bevin (125) April 9th 1948 , BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, p. 119. 489 Record of Conversation (225) April 16th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp.122- 23. 200 Americans, taking advantage of their leverage in Greece, pressured the Greek government to leave the question of reparations alone for the time being.490

This international development was complemented by Greek and Turkish talks about issuing a joint declaration with the Arab countries of the Eastern

Mediterranean regarding the proposed economic and political bloc that had previously been discussed. According to US reports, the Greeks and Turks had made great progress towards reaching an agreement, but when they approached the

US for approval and recognition, they were told to put the initiative on hold.491

Palestine was about to change everything.

Palestine, Israel and the Eastern Mediterranean

In addition to south-eastern Europe, challenges faced the British and the

Americans in the Middle East. Determination of the British mandate in Palestine and the Israeli declaration of statehood on May 14th 1948 was the occasion for a lengthy report from the British Embassy on US policy in Palestine. The British

Embassy was very critical about American policy in the region which was not surprising considering Britain's distaste for UN plan (which Truman favoured) which advocated the division of Palestine into two sections; one Jewish and one

Palestinian. Britain’s primary objection to American policy was based on its lack

490 Since November 1947, US strategic interests in Italy had grown and they had pressed for the ‘relaxation of unduly onerous terms of the Italian Peace Treaty’ in order to speed up Italian economic recovery. See: Report by the National Security Council (NSC 1/1) November 14th 1947, FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, pp. 724-26. 491 Lovett to US Embassy in Turkey (203) April 23rd 1948, Lovett to US Embassy in Greece (411) April 3rd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 79-80. 201 of decisiveness. This was a result of domestic American political conflicts between those like Secretary of State Marshall who supported the temporary trusteeship following British withdrawal from Palestine while a longer-term solution could be found and others like Truman who favoured the partition plan.492 There was also the opportunity for the British to solidify their relations with Arab States but US action in regards to Palestine precluded that possibility while simultaneously eliminating the Mediterranean Bloc idea. The British firmly believed that the situation developing in the Middle East represented a grave threat, and they have since been proven correct.493

Though it is cannot be said for certain whether or not the British embassy in

Washington knew of the major disagreement between Truman and Marshall regarding the Israeli declaration in the United States (followed by American recognition of Israeli statehood which Marshall vigorously opposed) the embassy’s report contains information about the internal American discord over the issue while making clear the British Embassy’s distaste for Truman's policy. When the

UN had announced its plan to partition Palestine in November 1947 it had been a political vacuum which the Zionists quickly rushed in to fill. ‘in the resulting vacuum, the Jews were able to achieve the de-facto partition of Palestine and to represent that they were doing no more than give effect to the recommendations made by the United Nations... American policy has followed events rather than directing them, largely,’ the Embassy believed, and by a desire not to be put in the

492 British Embassy to the State Department (G2/-/47) FRUS, 1948 Vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pp.533-36. 493 British Embassy to the State Department (G2/-/47) FRUS, 1948 Vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pp.533-36. 202 position of having to commit any troops to the region. All in all, it was a

‘melancholy story of indecision and weakness.’494

This dispatch is significant for Greece because it illustrated the British lack of faith in American decision making. The British were sure of the proper course of action and were frustrated by the American inability to use their power, as the

British put it, ‘wisely,’ but which was can be interpreted as the belief that the

Americans weren’t using their power the way the British desired. Additionally, the

American Policy Planning Staff foresaw a dramatic loss of US prestige in the area.

They also believed that the USSR would gain an advantage with the UN Partition

Plan because of the resulting strife in the area and that it would come at the expense of the United States. The report also stated that supporting Partition in

Palestine could lead to similar proposals in Greece, Turkey and Iraq and that supporting the plan had already caused severe damage to the US strategic position in the Middle East. Giving weight to these fears was, while talks on Palestine were continuing, Tito had increased his aid to the DSE and KKE both in material (hard power) and propaganda (soft power) by partially recognizing the Provisional

Government of Northern Greece under Markos Vafiades and increasing shipments of war materiel to the DSE.495 Additionally, the author of US policy on Soviet containment George Marshall stated that supporting the creation of Israel would be at the cost of US relations with the British and the Arabs. He was proven half

494 Balfour to Bevin (848) May 24th 1948, BDFA, Series C North America, Part IV, Vol. 3. Doc No. 26, May 24th 1948, pp. 97-101. The Arab states were also fearful that a Jewish state would use its position to expand at the expense of the surrounding Arab states. See: Lovett to US Embassy in Pakistan (31) January 28th 1948, FRUS, 1948 Vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pp. 569-71 495 Cannon, Yugoslavia, to Marshall (272) Marsh 22nd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 62-63. 203 right.496 For these reasons Marshall strenuously opposed the Plan, but Truman, wanting to gain two million Jewish votes in the next American elections, supported the UN plan.

Not surprisingly, most of the European Jews who had survived the

Holocaust had no desire to return to their old countries and many went to Palestine where a large Jewish population had been growing since the beginning of the 20th century. Britain had been governing Palestine and had attempted to prevent increased Jewish immigration to the area in order to safeguard their oil interests in the Middle East. However, as they were exhausted in Greece, the British were also exhausted in Palestine and turned the problem over to the United Nations. After confronting each other in Western and Eastern Europe, the Soviets and the

Americans came to an agreement and decided to divide Palestine in order to create a Jewish state along the Mediterranean. On May 14th 1948 Israel declared its independence in the UN and the United States and Russia were the first countries to recognize the new state. The Egyptians, Jordanians, Lebanese, Syrian, and Iraqis formed an alliance intent on wiping out the newly formed state. The Israelis appealed to the United Nations for aid once again the United States and the

Russians forced through a cease-fire which gave time for the Israeli army to rearm.

When the fighting resumed, the Israelis ignored the UN imposed boundaries and continued their conquest of Arab territories. When the armistice would be signed in

496 Report by the Policy Planning Staff (PPS/19) January 19th 1948, Kennan to Lovett (PPS 19/1) January 29th 1948, FRUS, 1948 Vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pp.546-54, 573. George Kennan analysed the impact of American support of the creation of a Jewish State and said that it had severely damaged US prestige in the Arab world, which after WWI and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, had seen the US as a liberator and guarantor of freedom, without political motivation. 204 January 1949 Israel, aside from having much larger borders and were originally envisioned, was also home to many thousands of Palestinians. This would lay the foundations for the troubles that persist in the area to this day, and although

Truman attempted to get the first Israeli prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to give concessions on both the refugee and boundary issues present in Palestine, the

Israeli prime minister responded by threatening the American president that the

American Jewish community would turn against him if he continued to insist on the concessions.497 Not only had the creation of a Jewish state forever altered the relations between the Arab and Anglo-American worlds, but it also sealed the doom of the proposed Eastern Mediterranean economic bloc; the results of which would never be known. However, considering the rich trading history of the

Eastern Mediterranean, it is possible that had the Palestinian question been handled differently and economic and political relations between Italy, Greece Turkey and the Arab countries of the Eastern Mediterranean been developed and formalized, then many of the problems that have persisted there since 1948 may have been solved or even avoided entirely. Lastly, Greece was again encouraged to drop its claims for reparations against Italy with the promise of a regional economic union that in the end, would never materialize. Understandably, the Greek foreign minister was very concerned with what international developments would mean for not only for Western aid to Greece, but for continuing economic development. In

June the Tsaldaris met with Foreign Secretary Bevin in attempt to re-start talks on the proposed Greco-Turkish economic pact with the Arab states of the Eastern

497 Ambrose, pp. 99-101. 205 Mediterranean but again the Greeks were told to wait due to the continuing problems in Palestine.498

Into the summer of 1948, in spite of the ongoing domestic failures of the

Greek government, the British were able to take advantage of international developments to draw the United States further into its commitment to Greece. The amount of US support given to Berlin during the Soviet’s blockade was astonishing and the British were able to use this crisis to increase American support not only for Greece but for Europe as a whole. The crisis also provided the opportunity for the United States to place bombers in Germany and the Americans dramatically increased their ability to launch atomic strikes against the Soviet sphere. The crisis also expedited the development and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization the next year.499

The blockade also gave the Americans and the British the excuse they needed to allow strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons to be stationed on

English soil. The crisis also allowed the British to accelerate the talks of the

Brussels Pact into something that would end-up resembling the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization. 500 This period (1947-1950) saw Britain’s position in the world ‘eased but not transformed’ as she was able to rely more on American

498 Bevin to Norton (225) April 16th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp. 122-23, June 4th 1948 (no. 313 R 6756/3668/19) p. 132. On June 2nd 1948, there were far less comprehensive agreements signed separately between the United States and Greece and between the United States and Turkey where the countries only promised to ‘respect economic cooperation.’ See: Editorial note in document (1211) June 30th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) p. 114. 499 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British policy and world power in the 20th century, (London: Longman, 1991) p. 176. Furthermore, the departure of British ambassador Lord Inverchapel from Washington in June 1948, and his replacement by the pro-American Sir Oliver Franks, symbolized the close relationship between the two governments at this time. 500 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 176. 206 intervention in Europe, particularly in Greece, and the rising general population’s fear of Soviet expansion allowed the Atlee government to justify its defence spending and continuing to ‘lean’ on the Americans for support and British policy makers still believed that by following their current plans they could return to

Great power status.501 However, this period also marked the beginning of the end of the Americans following British Policy. Though the British had used their influence effectively to convince the United States of the threat posed by the

USSR, thereby having the US assume responsibility for British strategic interests, the disagreement between the two over Palestine and the resulting failure of the plan for and Eastern Mediterranean bloc clearly show that the United Sates, vulnerable to domestic pressure from special interests, was going to follow its own path more and more. What the British would attempt to do would be to continue to guide them as much as possible, while tying British fortunes to American ones to avoid being left behind and ignored completely.502

However, the United States military commitment to Eastern Mediterranean was un-jeopardized and the US congress approved 200 million dollars of military aid for Greece and Turkey. Additionally, the military situation in Greece had improved and the US, having been informed of rumours that the DSE was considering surrender, anticipated the military conflict in Greece coming to an end in 1948.503 The Americans also believed that strong demonstrations of their support for Greece and public declarations of their optimistic appraisal of the military

501 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 177. 502 These special interests included Big business such as Pan Am airlines, Zionists, and Oil companies. 503 Marshall to Griswold (Gama 885) June 4th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 102-03 207 situation could have a positive effect on the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments and their decisions on whether or not to continue to assist the Greek communists.504 In light of the positive progression of events for Anglo-American intentions in Greece, the US congress approved 225 million dollars worth of aid for

Greece and Turkey for 1949. However, despite their success on the military front, the Americans realized that the troubles in Greece would still persist, particularly economically and politically and to deal with them effectively, a left-centre government (as the British had proposed) would be the government with the most likely chance of dealing with the economic and social problems, where a right- wing government would ‘carry on a “blood feud” against all Greeks who do not agree with them politically.’ The Americans felt that if they did not intervene deeply enough in Greek politics then the ‘Greek rightist parties’ would continue to keep Greece in ‘turmoil indefinitely.’505

The Effects of the Tito-Stalin Spit: July to October 1948

By this time, the tensions growing between Stalin and Tito had reached a head. In July, Tsaldaris approached Secretary Marshall and informed him that the

Soviet ambassador had secretly approached him in June, immediately prior to the

COMINFORM’s denunciation of Tito, and proposed to settle the outstanding issues between them and the Greek Government, especially the issue of Cyprus.

However, illustrating the reliance the Americans still felt for the British in Greek

504 Rankin to Marshall (1066) June 12th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 105-07. 505 Marshall to AMAG (Gama 1001) June 23rd 1948, Griswold to Henderson (868.00 / 6-2448) June 24th 1948, Marshall to US Embassy in Greece (856) June 26th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 108-09, 112-14. 208 affairs, ordered the US Embassy in London to inform Bevin and to take no other action until the British Foreign secretary had expressed his opinion about how to proceed. However, the Secretary did state that in his opinion no Soviet proposals should be rejected outright in order to create the best chances for the resolution of any outstanding issues.506

Bevin replied that although he also supported at least listening to Soviet proposals, that they should be viewed with scepticism and were likely just an attempt to discredit the Greek Government and individual ministers by approaching individuals secretly, rather than by approaching the government as a whole. Furthermore, Bevin stated that Tsaldaris should express clearly to the

Soviet Representative who approached him that his was not prepared to discuss

Cyprus, which was not surprising since looking ahead, it would become clear that the British intended to hold on to Cyprus for as long as possible, especially in light of the loss of their influence in Egypt and Palestine. In summarising the US position, Marshall stated that unless Tsaldaris was already aware of it, it was better for Ambassador Douglas not to inform him that the US and Britain were coordinating their policy on this issue, nor to inform him about Bevin’s attitude regarding Cyprus.507 However, despite the progress on the military front in Greece, the ‘right-wing’ tendency of the Greek government was making it difficult for the

US to domestically justify its continued presence in Greece.

506 Marshall to US Embassy in London (2846) July 21st 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 115-16. 507 Marshall to US Embassy in London (1080) August 2nd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 117-18. 209 The doubts of the previous year of whether the US would stay in Greece or not, resurfaced in August 1948. Marshall informed the US embassy in Athens that the American public was increasingly feeling that ‘American ideals’ were being compromised by supporting the current Greek government. Thought the US supported the Greek Government’s demand for unconditional surrender, they were extremely concerned about how the government would treat surrendering guerrillas, especially since executions were still taking place regularly. Therefore

Marshall ordered the embassy to inform the Greek Government that the American government wished them to ‘re-examine’ their policy regarding court-martial sentences to eventually ‘halt the cycle of killing in Greece.’ This was especially important to the US in light of the upcoming General Assembly meetings where they were anticipating communist attacks on the Greek government and Anglo-

American support of the regime.508 The US also wanted the Greek government to deal with continuing problems with Albanian assistance to the DSE in the UN, however Minister Bevin felt that this would cause unacceptable delays in implementing possible solutions. Tsaldaris met with Bevin and he agreed to consider the Greek request to make a formal diplomatic complaint to the Albanian minister in Belgrade, since the British had no direct link of a diplomatic representative in Albania itself.509

508 Marshall to US Embassy in Athens (1124) August 6nd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp.118-19. 509 Bevin to Reilly (442) Record of Meeting, August 25th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp. 140. The Greek government also approached the US asking for them to raise the issue with the USSR to see if the Soviets could get the Albanians to disarm the DSE in their territory but the US refused saying that it would by ‘inappropriate’ to ask the USSR at this time. See: Memorandum of Conversation, August 10th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp.122-24. 210 By mid August 1948, the US believed that their efforts since the declaration of the Truman doctrine had largely been successful and that at present, notwithstanding a complete change in Communist tactics (all out invasion, etc...) that Greece was no longer in danger of falling to the Communists. Therefore in their view, which was also mirrored by the British, Greece was no longer a ‘special case’ demanding ‘special consideration and treatment as opposed to the nations of

Western Europe or the Middle East. Though there was still and internal military threat, it was believed that the Greek Military could now deal with it. Furthermore, they believed that the Greek economy, though still weak, was in no danger of complete collapse and could ‘at least be held together for the next four years’ assuming that the European Recovery Program (ERP, unofficially known as the

Marshall Plan) was continued and that the Greek government continued to cooperate with the US. One of the most interesting sections in the dispatch related to the eventual size of the Greek Military and the prospect of decreasing US military aid to Greece. The author stated that the eventual reduction of the Greek military would be opposed by the majority of Greek political and military leaders and that even with victory in sight, they were demanding new weapons and increasing the size of the military to respond to possible future aggression.510

Though easily recognized in others, the United States would use the same argument to justify increasing the size of its armed forces in peace time. It was a trend that continues until today. In a dispatch a few days later Marshall stated that

510 McGee to Lovett, August 11th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 124-29. To clarify, though talks were held in August 1948 regarding reducing aid to Greece, the proposed reductions would not take place until 1950. In 1948 American shipments of supplies (money, materiel, food, clothing) were still increasing, based on estimates from previous years. 211 even a dramatically reduced Greek military ‘would constitute a serious drain’ on

Greek financial resources, so the US would have to exert the control she had over

Greece based on the agreements they had signed in order to control Greek expenditures as much as possible, in addition to taking into consideration these facts when calculating future amounts of aid to Greece.511

Relating to the military conflict, by the end of August 1948, the US had reliable information that the Soviets were pressing the KKE to pursue a political solution in the opinion of the British and Americans, to preserve at least some communist presence in Greece.512 This desire for preservation highlighted the two completely incompatible visions that the Soviets and Anglo-Americans held for

Greece. The British and American vision was for the unconditional surrender of the KKE, which would likely lead to their eventual eradication.

The renewed Soviet focus on conciliation meant that externally at least, it was fairly clear that the DSE had lost. Now the policies of the Big Three relating to

Greece would focus on how to present the situation internationally; namely in the

General Assembly. The British were nervous that in light of the favourable military conditions in Greece that the US may consider removing AMAG. Through

Ambassador Franks, Bevin informed the State Department that he believed that the continued presence of the British and American military missions in Greece constituted a ‘steadying influence’ in Greece. This was especially important he argued, considering that attacks ‘from within and without’ would continue for the

511 Marshall to Us Embassy in Greece (Gama 1246) August 16th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 135-37. 512 Grady to Marshall (1640) August 21st 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 138-41. 212 foreseeable future, and that the Atlee-Bevin administration could hardly justify continuing a British military presence in Greece should the US remove their presence. Marshall informed Franks that there would be no discussion of reductions until at least December 1948, when the situation in Greece would be re- examined. Off the record, Marshall offered a final ‘reassurance’ to the British.

...if we find it necessary to withdraw our military mission from Greece, I fully expect that the US Government will give the British Government more notice of this intention than Mr. Bevin gave me in February 1947 in regard to the necessity of the British Government to discontinue its support to Greece.513

Though they had worked and would continue to work together in Greece,

Marshall’s statement was a clear indicator of US opinion. They would make the decision independently of British desires and they were still angry to some degree about the timing of the British declaration from the previous year. It also re- enforces a central issue of this dissertation; that in February 1947, the State

Department was in fact shocked by the British declaration to leave Greece. Some authors have stated that in February 1947 the Americans were already well aware of the British intentions to leave Greece, but Marshall’s comment over a year and a half later indicates otherwise. The fact that Bevin was also needing to justify a continuing British Military presence in Greece at this time indicates firstly, that the

British had deceived the Americans in February 1947 about how weak they really were at the time and secondly, that well into 1948, Bevin was still holding onto the notion that Britain had to maintain a troop presence in Greece to have a say

513 Memorandum of Conversation between Franks and Marshall, September 7th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) p. 147. 213 internationally with the Soviets and Americans. However, American attention was diverted by the murder of one of their citizens in Thessaloniki.

In September 1948, American attention in northern Greece was focused on the murder of the American journalist Mr. Polk. Members of the American military, such as Gen. Donovan, heavily criticized the Greek police authorities, but the Greek ambassador told British Ambassador Riley that the Thessaloniki gendarmerie directorate had given useful assistance to the investigations and the

American Embassy believed that it would soon produce results.514 What they did not know and would not be revealed until many years later, was that the police would resort to torture to extract a forced confession from a Greek to accept blame for the murder in order to placate the American overseers in Greece.515 The head of the British police mission in Thessaloniki supposedly provided an account of the

Polk murder to the British ambassador Mr. Riley. However, interestingly, that report is not found in the confidential print series.516 Here the British influence on the Americans, and the Americans’ aid to Greece was so high, that none of them would accept anything to disrupt the plan of action. They therefore allowed an innocent man to accept the blame for a crime he did not commit, in order to placate the public back home, and allow the superpowers to continue their policies unhindered.

514 Riley to Foreign Office (301) September 15th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp. 196-97. 515 Andre Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis Black Terror: The Greek Civil War And the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943-1949. (New York: Basic Books, 2004) pp. 188-192. 516 Riley to Foreign Office (301) September 15th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, p. 197. It seems that whatever is contained in it is still too sensitive to be released the general public and the only hope that in future years will be made available to see what information the British and Americans actually had in terms of a person who is actually guilty of committing the Polk murder. 214 On September 28, 1948, Tsaldaris met with Foreign Secretary Bevin and implored him to discuss the Greek military situation with Mr. Marshall of the

United States. The Greek ambassador was conveying the desire of the Greek government to rapidly train another 70,000 soldiers, who could be used in the

Peloponnesian campaign in November. The cost would be US$10 million, but the

Americans initially denied the request, and considered using United Nations peacekeepers. By this time the British and American governments had sent diplomatic notes to Albanian government protesting the Albanians allowing the

Greek communist military forces to use Albanian territory and to freely cross the

Albanian frontier as a tactic against the Greek national army.

Shortly thereafter, Secretary Bevin met with Mr. George Marshall in Paris to discuss the conditions in Greece. Marshall informed Bevin that there was a continuous divide between American military and reconstruction policy, with the heads of both missions arguing over who should appropriate the necessary funds.

For Bevin, he was still under intense pressure from the British government to remove the few remaining British troops that were in Greece, notably two garrisons in northern Greece in camps just outside of Thessaloniki. It was the

British foreign secretary's desire to see the military situation resolved before the economic situation, so that he could finally remove the day remaining British troops from Greece and in so doing, alleviate domestic British political pressure.

As a result, Bevin presented Tsaldaris’ request to the United States to rapidly

215 mobilize thousands of more Greek soldiers in order to enlarge the forces that were available to confront the communist guerrillas.517

However, anxious to begin to reduce the Greek armed forces, at least to some degree, Marshall stated that budgetary, morale related and combat considerations had been taken into account by American military personnel in

Greece and that the Greek military did not need to be increased currently.518

Furthermore, in conversation with Tsaldaris, Marshall explained that he believed that at least for the foreseeable future the United States and the USSR would not have a rapprochement. However, he believed that in time ‘the truth must prevail’ and that ‘the force of world opinion’ would force the Soviets and their satellites to change their policies. Until then, the United States would continue to provide funds and material to others, despite the difficulties involved.519

However, into the fall of 1948 the British continued to observe problems between the various American missions and the Greek government. In particular the military and economic missions were finding it extremely difficult to work with the Greek government who continually opposed such American concerns as price control, decentralization, and over-employment by government corporations. The

British had had the same experience in trying to deal Greek politicians who continually rushed into action and then complained loudly when they did not ‘get their own way. The Americans were further frustrated by ‘fantastic’ Greek

517 Record of Meeting between Minister Tsaldaris and Foreign Secretary Bevin (498) September 28, 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp. 198-200. 518 For reports on US studies relating to possible reductions in the Greek Armed forces see: Grady to Marshall (Gama 1282) September 20th 1948, Grady to Marshall (Amag 1581) September 29th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1- 732) pp. 151- 53. 519 Memorandum of Conversation between Marshall and Tsaldaris, September 30th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 154-55. 216 demands for ‘thousands of miles of roads, reconditioning of ports to a standard higher than existed in the United States, and so on. They were completely unrealistic.’ The Americans aroused further Greek anger (and non compliance as a result) by insisting the Greek newspaper printers would have to pay full market price for their paper rather than the government subsidize half price that they had been used to paying. Further aggravating American-Greek relations, was the secretary general of the trade union federation in Greece sending violent telegrams to the State Department and to the trade union organizations in the United States,

‘alleging that the American mission was endeavouring to keep wages down.’520

The Truman administration was receiving criticism from all sides, both from within Greece and from without.

Rising doubts: October to December 1948

Despite the successes of the summer, through the fall of 1948, conditions worsened even more and both the British and the Americans had serious doubts about whether or not they could stay in Greece in any capacity, though both still believed that the country was important to Western interests. Marshall reported that morale was extremely low not only in the Greek government, but in the British and

American military missions. Both the Anglo-American missions and the Greek

Military were extremely frustrated that the DSE was still able to use the Albanian and Yugoslavian borders and that the UN had been unable to take any action to

520 Norton to Bevin (95) September 29th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp. 200- 01. 217 stop them.521 As a result, Marshall endorsed the Greek request from the summer to increase the Greek military by 15,000 men, if only to improve morale and allow for the rotation out of the most tired and demoralized of the troops. He also re-iterated the fact that Greece, like Berlin, was a single point in Soviet Strategy, but that they were all interconnected and the way the US reacted in one area had repercussions in Greece. In a meeting with Tsaldaris, Marshall stated that although for the time being the Greek Government did not have to worry about a reduction of the armed forces, but that the most important thing was to focus on ‘refreshing’ the troops from top to bottom; i.e. allowing them to rest and giving them reasons for optimism. Furthermore, the US noted that despite continuing Albanian and

Bulgarian aid for the DSE, Yugoslavian aid had diminished, possibly as a result of the Tito-Stalin split, but that it was too early to tell if it was a real change in

Yugoslavian policy or just limited local developments.522

Ambassador Norton described the military situation as ‘deteriorated’ again in October 1948, where the guerrillas succeeded in the Peloponnese ‘in producing these conditions of anarchy, economic chaos, lawlessness, misery and uncertainty, which are the ideal breeding ground of communism.’ Subsequently, Greek attitude

521 Bevin to Reilly (498) September 28th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp. 198- 99. The British and Greek governments were still uncertain whether or not the Yugoslavian border was actually closed, but they believed that supplies were still coming to the DSE via Albania. The Greek Government requested that the British consider ‘some kind of control’ of the Albanian coast to prevent arms from being shipped there. 522 Marshall to Lovett, October 20th 1948, Memorandum of Conversation, October 21st 1948, Lovett to US Embassy in Turkey (A-176) October 21st 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 162-67. The documents about this time reveal a very confusing picture about understandings of actual conditions on the Greek-Yugoslav border. The British and Americans were not sure of Tito’s intentions. Furthermore, as recent investigation has shown, despite Tito’s guarantees to the British, Greeks and Americans about returning the Greek children, the evidence has shown that he held 1000s of children against their will, attempting to make them become Slavs, in his attempts to use them in the future for claims against Macedonia. See: Irini Lagani, ‘To Paidomagoma’ kai oi Ellino-Yugoslvikes Skeseis – 1948-52 (Sideri: Athina, 1996). 218 towards Britain and the United States in the Greek media was rapidly worsening as both were accused of having made mistakes in the past which contributed directly to the ‘present Greek tragedy’ and of having:

…aggravated the situation attempts at reconciliation with the Communists in the early days after world war, and of having finally failed to sanction the increase in size of the Greek army and provided with the necessary equipment for the overthrow of the Communists.523

The last comments reveal the indignation of the British felt at not being given praise for the efforts they had made in Greece in the mid to late 1940s.

Numerous dispatches contain ambassadors’ and consuls’ opinions about public sentiment towards Britain, indicating that it was an extremely important consideration for the British government. It was also frequently noted the status of public opinion and public and army morale, which was understandably low by the end of 1948, as it had been basically since the German occupation of Greece in

1941. However, it does not appear that this was done only for vain reasons of pride. In many of their diplomatic reports from embassies all over Europe and in the United States, British diplomatic staff was extremely careful to note public opinion as they perceived it from numerous sources; newspapers, magazines and other diplomats. The purpose seems to have been not only to keep Whitehall appraised of up-to-date currents of feeling but also to identify how best to respond and if needed, counter the opinions being spread.524 It was not as easy for the

523 Collard to Norton (74) October 12th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, p. 202. 524 The British government believed firmly in the power of Public opinion in not only their own country but in others and kept appraised of it in order to know how to best deal with those countries’ officials. This ‘defensive realist’ action is supported by Ian Hall who argues that realism rather than liberalism dominated post-war British Policy. See: Ian Hall, ‘Power Politics and 219 British to do this in Greece as it was for them in the United States, due to the language difference. American diplomats, echoing sentiments from the British

Foreign Secretary, stated repeatedly how much easier and more efficient was communication between each other than it was with other nations because of the ability to converse and consult with one another in their mother tongues.525 It was an advantage the British would adeptly use to their benefit.

On November 1st 1948, in the USA, the British were keenly aware of their new relation to the Americans and William Edwards, the head of the British

Information Service in the United States, summed up the new power-balance as follows:

Whether we like it or not, we have to admit in this stage of our history, that the United States has assumed such a dominant place in the world, and our affairs are so inextricably linked with hers, that British policy can never totally be effective unless it has the tacit support and backing of the American people – or at least it is not actively opposed by them.526

In London, US Ambassador Douglas reported that Britain's Government believed that the country’s decline was temporary and that in combination with the dominions and what remained of the Empire they could regain enough economic strength to deal with the United States on relatively equal terms. 527

appeasement: Political Realism in British International Thought, c. 1935–1955.’ (British Journal of Politics and International Relations (BJPIR), 2006, vol. 8, issue 2). 525 Coleman, p.356, citing: “Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing,” p. 243. 526 William P.N Edwards to Ambassador’s Staff Meeting (Notes from meeting in the USA) November 1st 1948, FO 953/130 P 9826/151/950 527 Douglas to Marshall (3625) August 11th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, pp. 1113- 17. Later, in London in August 1948, the American ambassador Lewis Douglas was taking note of the distinct anti-Americanism that was very strong, and reporting it to Washington. It proved to be very problematic for the British diplomatically, who were still trying to reconcile internal politics 220 In Greece, by the end of November the communist army was still making gains in the North and in the Peloponnesus and the progress of national army, in the words of the consul general of Athens WLC Knight, ‘was nothing short of lamentable.’ As winter approached, both the Americans and British believe that the communist forces had re-gained the initiative in the conflict.528 As the campaign worsened for the GNA, the Greek government requested even more men and material but Ambassador Grady rejected the request. He stated that already the national Army was trained by the Americans and British, and everything from their daily meals to the animals they used to transport supplies were paid for and provided by the United States. He also stated that it was impossible to understand how such a force, supported by a Navy and Air Force, numbering almost 300,000, could not defeat a force of 25,000 with far less food and supplies. Therefore in his opinion, the lack of success could not be attributed to insufficient numbers and material and was mostly due to a lack of leadership and ‘fighting spirit.’ He also stated that the Greeks were far too dependent upon foreign assistance and lacked the will to implement solutions on their own. Lastly, he stated that while there continued to exist a military threat to Greece, the US congress would likely continue to support Greece, increasing the military at this time would only hurt

Greece’s economy without making significant gains on the military front.529

with foreign needs. See: Douglas to Marshall (3625) August 11th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, pp. 1113-17. 528 WLC Knight to Foreign Office (53and 37) November 4th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp. 203-04 529 Grady to Marshall (Amag 1613) October 22nd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp.168-70. 221 However, unbeknownst to them, the DSE was in such a poor condition that talks for a ceasefire were already underway within the KKE.530

An explanation for the poor performance may also be found by examining an event in the Northern Greek Town of Katerini which was the site of an

American Military base. There, a national militia was created in order to demonstrate a National Government presence to the locals. The men were appointed to guard an armoury and were given ‘foustanellas’ as uniforms and newly acquired American-made weapons. They had no training whatsoever, and aside from having no knowledge of how to use their weapons, they would sleep through their shifts.531 It was just another example of the incompetence of the

Greek military at the time and the misuse of American aid.

After almost 5 months of waiting, there were renewed talks about forming a defensive pact between Turkey, Greece, Iran and Egypt with US-backing. It was still part of a wider problem for the United States, summarised by the Director of

Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA). He also stated the problem of having the

US tie itself to a Western European defence pact without including weaker nations from elsewhere in the world could be interpreted as the US having less interest in those weaker nations. That would in turn provide the USSR with the opportunity to influence and then dominate those nations. The NEA therefore recommended a comprehensive policy that would include any nations threatened by the USSR. 532

530 Bullock, Bevin, p. 630, and Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, pp. 171, 178. 531 Vagelis Athanasios, Pichos, Verbal interview regarding the Greek Civil War and Foreign Powers in Greece: 1941-1949. Interviewed, Saturday, July 23rd 2011, 10:30 to 12:00 PM, Katerini, Pieria, Greece. 532 Memorandum (840.20/10-2648) October 26th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp.172-76. 222 Not only does this report illustrate how the US was taking hold increasingly and firmly of British desires to tie the US to European (and by extension world-wide) anti-communist efforts, but also the formulation of US foreign policy that would continue to evolve into greater and greater levels of intervention in foreign countries and regional politics.

However, despite their growing interventionism generally, at this time the

US was still hesitant to appoint a government in Greece. A political crisis in

November 1948 which threatened to collapse the government did provide the US with the opportunity to ‘step in at any moment and attempt to constitute a government’ but Ambassador Grady advised that it would only be temporarily beneficial to do so and that it would cause more problems in the long term. He also stated that the US desired a constitutional and non-dictatorial solution and that they would continue to monitor the situation to ensure that such was achieved. Grady even stated that it was in Greece’s best interests to be forced to find a solution on its own rather than being permitted to ‘turn to us for direction.’ In a statement often repeated by British and American officials alike, Grady stated that the main problem was that Greece had no capable and selfless statesmen around which a consensus and functioning government could be formed. 533

American projections for Greece into 1950 were stated in a National

Security Council (NSC) report that stated that by then, Turkey would have greater strategic importance to the US than Greece and that if Turkey is granted greater

533 Grady to Marshall (2246) November 6th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 180-81. 223 assistance as a result of its higher degree of strategic value, than it would assume a

‘position more comparable to western countries than to Greece.’534

These assumptions were also based upon the continued poor performance of Greece’s large army and once again plans began to circulate about switching tactics and reducing the size of the armed forces. Additionally, even though the US was bearing the direct cost of the military, they stated that the indirect costs of so large an army was ‘staggering,’ due in large part to the fact that those in the army, representing the sector of the Greek economy who should be among the most productive ‘became non-producers when serving in the army.’ Grady stated that according to the US Military mission officers in Greece, far from helping the military situation, regular increases in the size of the army made the Greek soldiers less willing to fight, making them believe that the conflict was ‘America’s war rather than Greece’s.’ Grady also wrote that while the previous year Greece was a focal point ‘on the democratic front,’ by now it ‘deserves only secondary consideration.’ For them, the democratic defence of Europe now ‘hinged on

England and Turkey.’ Should hostilities erupt, in his estimation Greece would be of very little value, but should the ‘Cold War’ continue, the Communists must be prevented from assuming power. He also stated that the political establishment in

Greece was incompetent and incapable of implementing effective measures to deal with both the economic and military problems. Therefore, in his opinion, US aid to

Greece should not be increased, merely maintained.535

534 McGhee to Lovett (868.20/11-1948) November 19th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pp. 184-86. 535 Grady to Marshall (Amag 1652) November 22nd 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 187- 91. Despite his views being accepted 224 Next the Joint Chiefs of staff supported Ambassador Grady’s statements, saying also that Turkey was not only more valuable to Greece strategically, but in the event of a shooting war, Turkey’s ‘high national spirit and geographical situation makes it possible now for that nation to resist Soviet aggression.536 These are very revealing dispatches since not only do they illustrate the changing geo- political reality of the Balkans and the way Greece’s political situation was viewed from abroad, but also how the British had achieved their objective of having the

US view them as indispensible to European security.

Another bright point for the British was that as a result of the Tito-Stalin split, there was an opening to bring Yugoslavia closer to the western sphere. At the end of December 1948 Secretary Bevin informed Ambassador Norton of the

British desire to encourage Greek and Yugoslavian relations to the point where the two governments could reach an agreement and settle some of their outstanding differences in order to achieve a political solution and an end to Yugoslav support the Greek Communists. The dispatch next revealed a fascinating aspect of the

British designs for Greece in their foreign-policy. Bevin informed the Greek ambassador that the internal situation, in the British few, was ‘most unsatisfactory.’

He asked the Greek ambassador:

Had the Greek government considered that the Americans, as very close to those of the State Department, his recommendation for aid of 150 million dollars was seen as too low. 200 million was approved for Greece into 1949. See. McGee to Lovett, November 24th 1948, ibid., pp. 192-95. After having observed the Greek National Army in action, he commented that the Greek Artillery Corps was shooting off expensive ammunition carelessly, ‘much in manner of American children setting off firecrackers on July 4th.’ Grady to Marshall (Amag 1657) December 7th 1948, Ibid., pp. 210-12. 536 Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence (SANACC 358/8) November 24th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 191-92. For comprehensive US analysis of situation in Greece see: Report by the US Policy Planning Staff on US aid to Greece (PPS 44) November 24th 1948, ibid., pp. 195-203. 225 who have now accepted wide commitment throughout the world, might tire of their efforts to achieve a solution in Greece? The Americans have shown that they were quite prepared to cut their losses. So far as the United Kingdom was concerned, they should realize that the continued presence of British troops in Greece was an embarrassment to his Majesty's Government and I would find it increasingly difficult to defend to the Labour Party their maintenance there for much longer. On the other hand, I certainly wanted to see Greece kept free from communism, and I was there for speaking frankly and as a friend of the Greek people. I have every confidence in the Greek people and their soldiers, but the political leadership of Greece seemed to be in it to the point of your responsibility. The situation must be taken in hand at once and I'll be glad to learn M. Pipenelis (the Greek Ambassador to Britain) ideas for a possible solution. 537

The Greek ambassador replied that in his belief, problems had arisen because the recommendations of the Greek general staff had not been met. The

Greek government desired simultaneously to have a free hand in planning military operations, and then to expect the Americans to give them whatever supplies and funds were required without any accountability on their part. Bevin then informed the Greek ambassador that President Truman had heavily criticized Greek action or lack thereof, and that if his negative reports were to be translated into congressional action, it would be very difficult to change them in Greece's favour at a later date. Bevin then urged the Greek ambassador on his return to Greece to inform the government had Bevin's personal opinion was that there should be ‘no delay in showing that the Greek leaders really intend to take grip on the situation.’538 Bevin believed this was vital so the American State Department could make a strong case to Congress for continuing aid that was still needed in Greece.

537 Bevin to Norton, Record of Meeting (620) December 29th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp 212-213. 538 Record of Meeting (620) December 29th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, p. 213. These statements seem to echo today with the EU’s statements to the Greek Government. 226 Bevin told the Greek Ambassador that he believed this was a critical time for

Greece. Bevin believed that if the Greeks were able to reach an agreement with

Yugoslavia and settle the issue of the northern borders then real progress could be made on the military front thereby improving their image that they were taking control of the situation in their country and as a result, justify continuing and further American intervention in Greece. Not surprisingly, Bevin expressed his views as beneficial for Greece; however, every statement was also intended to motivate the Greek Government into action in order to solidify American commitment in Europe and by extension, supporting the British interests in the

Mediterranean.539 However, it is important to note, that despite British claims and

American discussion of the possibility of withdrawing from Greece, there seemed to be no real possibility that it would happen. By this point the United States had simply invested too much in Greece to leave. Bevin’s threat’s and Truman’s statements should therefore be seen mainly as expressions of frustration and tools to attempt to motivate the Greek government to follow Anglo-American policy.540

Despite American predominance in Greek affairs, the British still exerted a fair amount of influence up to the end of 1948.

British influence in Greece was shown again when Bevin stated that there were two ways to strengthen the internal political situation. The first way was for the British and the Americans to suggest a particular individual to be made Prime

Minister, and the second was to leave it to the Greeks themselves to form the

539 Record of Meeting (620) December 29th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, p. 213. 540 For US discussion of using the threat that they suspend aid or leave Greece entirely and why in the end it would be counterproductive to US interests, see: McGee to Executive Secretariat, November 26th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 203-04. 227 government but for the British and Americans to advise the Greek king, who would then relay it to the constitutional authority of the Greek government. In both cases

Bevin stated that intentionally or not, the British would continue to exert significant control over Greek decision-making, although Bevin stated that he had no desire for Britain to intervene and ‘make and break governments.’ However he stated that he did not understand how at a time where the very future of Greece was at stake, that politicians could not move past their party differences and work together for the benefit of their country and their people. He said that his greatest disappointment was not in the Greek army, the American intervention, or the

Greek people, but in the Greek politicians. He also stated that it was wrong for the politicians of Athens to believe that whatever the actions they took they could continue to rely on American and British aid without making any sacrifices themselves or subduing their party and personal ambitions in order to provide a strong and effective government for Greece during the crisis. Once again Bevin told to the Greek ambassador that if worse came to worse, the Americans could be tempted to simply leave and ‘cut their losses.’541 The frequency with which Bevin related to American perceptions of Greek failures, and the possibility that

Americans were prepared to cut their international responsibilities if the costs outweighed the benefits, shows how deeply the British believed that their fortunes were intertwined with continued American intervention. This was not lost on

American politicians.

Lewis Douglas, the American ambassador to the United Kingdom produced a report in attempt to identify the source simultaneous feelings of American-

541 Record of Meeting (620) December 29th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, p. 214. 228 dependency and of anti-Americanism that he was perceiving in both the British government and the British people. He stated:

Britain accepts our assumption of world leadership in face of Russian aggression, and Anglo-American unity today is more firmly established than ever before in peacetime. But Britain has never before been in a position where her national security and economic fate are so completely dependent on in that the mercy of another country's decisions. Almost every day brings new evidence of her weakness and dependence on the US. This is a bitter pill for a country accustomed to open for all of her national destiny.542

Douglas also identified the British desire to understand the current situation and come up with a plan to improve it and to restore them to their former international position of prominence.

While they do not expect to regain their former relative supremacy, with help from the US they are confident that in conjunction with the British Commonwealth and Empire they will again become a power to be reckoned with, which, associated with the US, can maintain the balance of power in the world.543

At the end of 1948, although the British still clung to those hopes, correctly outlined by Douglas, their ability to achieve them was in doubt, especially in

Greece. Ironically, it was also in Greece that their hopes would be realised, and their manipulation of the United States would be most effective.

While committed to at least maintain their current levels of involvement in

Greece, the United States was also tying itself into Mutual Defence agreements that Bevin had envisaged. The Vandenberg Resolution had provided for US

542 Douglas to State Department (3625) August 11th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, p. 1113. 543 Douglas to State Department (3625) August 11th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, p. 1113. 229 participation in regional organizations that affected American national security such as the Brussels Pact and the State Department acknowledge that such steps constituted a ‘radical departure from past American peacetime policies.’ Both the

Greeks and Turks had expressed their desires to be included in a possible North

Atlantic Pact, but at the time the US said that their participation was unlikely due to their geographical location. However, they were free to pursue their own mutual defence pact and informed that when the time was right the US would examine that proposal.544

Therefore, but the end of 1948, despite the disappointments in Greek politics, economics and the military situation, the United States was just as committed to Greece as they had been then previous year, if not even more so.

Though their estimation of Greece’s strategic value had diminished, Greece’s value to the British had increased. Getting the US involved in Greece had led to firm US guarantees for protecting Western security interests in Europe, the Eastern

Mediterranean and the Middle East. Though the issue of Palestine had deeply divided the US government, the British and Americans, and the West with the

Arab world (divisions which continue to this day) it did not bring about a change of policy in regards to their intervention in Greece. However, it did destroy the possibility of re-invigorating Levantine trade and the possibility of creating deeper and longer-lasting bonds between Greece and Turkey.

However, from the British perspective, 1948 had to be considered a success for British policy. They were seen as the key to Western European Security and

544 Lovett to US Embassy in Turkey (588) December 15th 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-732) pp. 213- 230 though years and anti-Soviet pressure both domestically and internationally, had nearly succeeded in the creation of a mutual defence pact that would tie the United

States to Western European Defence. Ironically, the formation of NATO represented essentially the antithesis of the United Nations. The former attempting to preserve peace through the threat of the use force, while the latter attempting to preserve peace preventing the use of force. 1948 also acknowledged the dramatic change in US foreign policy to unprecedented levels of foreign intervention.

While they still opposed the possibility of a dictatorship in Greece and viewed it as eventually leading to Communists control of the country, their insistence on democracy would eventually change to be an insistence on mere stability.

231 Chapter 5: The Tide Turns – The end of the Greek Civil War and the Acknowledged supremacy of the United States

1949: January to April

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be formed, signed by Britain and the United States and Canada, and supplemented by

Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Norway. However, what occurred in the preceding four months (January to

April in Greece) illustrated British designs on manipulating the Americans further to guaranteeing British interests not only in the Mediterranean or in Western

Europe, but in the whole world. Foreign Secretary Bevin’s speech to the Greek ambassador in December 1948 and parliamentary records from Britain in early

1949 indicate that Lewis Douglas was correct in his assessment of not only the current British situation but their designs for the future. Additionally, Britain began to change its opinion from early 1948 that economic union with Western Europe would benefit them.

By early 1949 Britain was moving away from economic union with

Western Europe believing that a Western European economic collapse would be disastrous for Britain if they were too closely tied. Instead Britain began to pursue a military alliance with Western Europe, at that time called the Atlantic pact.545

Furthermore, in January 1949, the non-communist nations withdrew from

545 Weiler, Ernest Bevin, pp. 116- 117, 232 membership of the World Federation of Trade Unions. This was representative also, not only of the rift between the communist and non-communist worlds, but also between Britain and Europe as Britain’s economy and organizations moved closer to those of the United States. 546

In general, from January to March the military situation for the Greek government’s armed forces improved. The British Consul in Patras, Mr.

Crosthwaite, explained how regions were being cleared and that those Communists who remained in hiding ‘are slowly being liquidated by the gendarmerie mobile patrols, which are scouring the countryside in the wake of the Army.’ The

Communists who were surrendering were also informing the government forces of the disintegration of the guerrilla forces.547 As previously stated, a major contributing factor was the previous year’s Tito-Stalin split which by January 1949 had manifested itself into a purge from the DSE of all the pro-Tito factions. The

Titoists were denounced for having lost in December 1944 to the British among other allegations, and the result was an ‘anti-Tito body’ on the border of

Yugoslavia.548

Ironically, the massive pro-Stalin movement in the DSE, created within the

KKE (although encouraged indirectly by the Tito-Stalin split) added to the perception of the British and Americans that the Soviets were still determined to control Greece. Very quickly, Tito was courted by the West, Yugoslavia officially at least closed its borders and the DSE found it much more difficult to receive the

546 Childs, p. 560. 547 Crosthwaite to Foreign Office (58) March 19th 1949,BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, p. 78. 548 Amikam Nachmani, ‘Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49’, Journal of Contemporary History, (Volume 25, Issue 4, October 1990) pp. p. 511. 233 supplied it needed to carry on the armed struggle.549 Had they remained aligned with Tito, it is possible that his ‘rapprochement’ with the West could have secured a better peace for the DSE, however, their fanatical devotion to Stalin helped the

Greek Government maintain Western support. Therefore, although some authors have stated that the Tito-Stalin split eliminated the DSE’s chances for victory, it may be more accurate to state that it was the DSE’s reaction to the split that resulted in their destruction, not the split itself.

In terms of US-Greek relations, in January 1949 the US was clearly frustrated with the Greek government and politicians whom in their view, rather that attempting to effectively use the aid already being supplied, focussed most of their efforts on acquiring even more aid from the United States. Additionally, while still committed to Greek political and territorial integrity, the US was not prepared at this time to support the creation of a Mediterranean Pact. The possibility of the

US being associated ‘for reasons of defence with nations outside of the Western

Hemisphere,’ again was explained as being a ‘radical departure from traditional

American foreign policy,’ for which they were not prepared, at least the time being.550

The Americans also informed Tsaldaris of their displeasure with the Greek government not doing enough to make use of the aid that had already been

549 However, new research uncovered by examining the Czech archives, has shown that the DSE had received massive amounts of foreign aid from COMIFORM nations, both before and after the Tito-Stalin split. Nikos Marantzidis and Kostas Tsivos, The Greek Civil War and the International Communist System: The KKE within the Czech Archives 1946-1968 (Alexandria Publications, 2012) pp. 193-201. Tables of amounts of aid given to the KKE, dated July 31st 1950. Marantzidis and Tsivos argue in fact, that had the DSE not been so supported by COMINFORM nations, that the Civil War, if it could have started at all, could not have continued until 1949. 550 Satterthwaite to Lovett, January 3rd 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 227-30. The fact that Greece was considered to be outside of the Western Hemisphere also demonstrated US opinion about the country and its place in the new geo-political order. 234 supplied, which was currently ‘higher even than the rate for China.’ The Acting

Secretary of State also informed the Ambassador that the US government was extremely alarmed about the number of refugees in Greece that had grown from three to seven hundred thousand over the past year. The fact that the government had been unable to deal with either the social or military situation effectively, despite the aid being provided by the United States would be revealed to Congress at its next session. This ‘reprimand-of-sorts’ was followed by the statement that

Greece and Turkey would not be invited to sign the Atlantic pact since they ‘could certainly not be considered in the North Atlantic family of nations.’551

The first indication of a change of US policy relating to the Greek government occurred when, after more infighting and Greek government inaction, the Greek King suggested the appointment of a non-elected joint Papagos-

Markezinis coalition, which upon further investigation would have been a near dictatorial solution, ruling in the name of the king. Though the Americans did not wish at this time to support any ‘extra-parliamentary’ solution, instead favouring attempts to make the government more efficient by eliminating certain ministries, the US ambassador to Greece stated that the situation in the future may change as to require the US to support a non-democratic solution. The State Department agreed with the Ambassador and advised that he meet with his British counterpart to coordinate joint Anglo-American analysis of and recommendations for the

551 Memorandum of Meeting between Greek Ambassador to US and Acting Secretary of State, January 4th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp.231-33. The language here is also demonstrative. Using ‘family’ to describe the Coming Atlantic pact members indicates again how Greece and Turkey were really viewed. Though not in the Soviet sphere, they were not yet in the Anglo-American family either. 235 situation in Greece.552 This was the beginning of the US shift from emphasizing a representative democracy in Greece, to emphasizing only stability. The fact that the State Department ordered coordination with the British also indicates the importance the Americans were still placing on British influence in Greece.

The crisis in the Greek government was so grave that the British

Ambassador to Greece said that the current efforts to re-shuffle and improve the functioning of the government could be the last chance for a parliamentary democracy in Greece. The British and Americans also agreed that the Greeks had to be ‘shocked into a sense of reality’ which could be accomplished by an official joint Anglo-American protest of the inability of the Greek government to subdue personal differences and political considerations for the good of the country.553

The Americans were further aggravated in a meeting with General Papagos where he stated that he had only agreed to assume to post of commander-in-chief if he was given an army of what he considered adequate size. Furthermore, he said that the current size of 250,000 men was inadequate for the task which Britain and the United States were expecting of it. Ambassador Grady wrote ‘not only what

Papagos said, but the tone in which he said it, deeply disturbed me. In the vernacular, he was telling us off.’ Papagos’ statements angered the US ambassador so much that he informed the State Department which ordered him to convey to the

Greek government that not only would the US refuse to finance or allow an increase in the size of the Greek Military, but that the Anglo-American military

552 Grady to Lovett (24) January 5th 1949, Lovett to Grady (27) January 7th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp.233-36. 553 Grady to Lovett (74) January 12th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, p. 236. 236 missions would continue to have a say in the Military campaign, despite the statements of General Papagos to the contrary. Furthermore, that while the US had confidence in Papagos’ military capabilities, his statements created an ‘unfortunate impression’ in the United States.554 In essence, this statement meant that the head of the Greek military had jeopardised his country’s continuing aid by insulting the very country that was providing it. Luckily for Greece, due to on one hand to improvements in the effectiveness of the Greek Military and on the other to the effects of the DSE purge of pro-Titoists, the military situation for the Greek government forces was improving.

On February 17th 1949, President Truman ordered a reassessment of current

US-Yugoslavian and Greco- Yugoslavian economic and political relations. The

British and Americans therefore decided to try and use the opportunity to not only normalize Greece’s relations with Yugoslavia, but possibly also with Bulgaria and

Albania. In this capacity Greece re-gained some of her lost importance in Anglo-

American planning since the normalization of these nations’ relations with Greece could provided the British and Americans the opportunity to make diplomatic advances into the Soviet sphere.555

Although the full effect of the DSE purge would not be felt until the summer, by March 1949, the British Military advisors who were part of the joint

British and American training units were finally reporting positive results from the previous year’s decision to improve the training and moral of the GNA, rather than

554 Grady to Acheson (228) February 7th 1949, Grady to Tsaldaris, February 15th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp.245-49 555 Cannon (Yugoslavia) to Acheson (161) February 16th 1949, Drew, UNSCOB II to Acheson (308) February 19th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 250-56. 237 simply spending more money to increase its size.556 The Americans noted that by not denouncing Tito as the COMINFORM had done, that Markos Vafiades

‘became especially reprehensible.’ The Americans speculated (and would later be proven correct) that it had led to his dismissal and replacement by Zachariades.

Though they could not be certain of it at the time, they also stated that any attempt of Moscow to turn the KKE against Tito would only strengthen the American and

Greek position and could possibly lead to a normalization of Greco-Yugoslav relations.Joint Anglo-American action in reference to the political crisis of the previous month was also showing benefits as the new Greek Government was described as being the best since the elections of 1946. Ambassador Grady also stated that agreement with the British was vital for success, even though US policy

‘was determined independent (ly) of British views and not influenced by them.’

Grady also stated that public opinion favoured both the new government and the

United States because it had come about out of normal parliamentary procedures and was ‘not an American creation.’ He also commented on Papagos’ suitability as head of the Greek Armed forces, but not for politics, and of how Greece was an example of the new American role in the ‘free world.’ This role, brought about by

America’s post-war prosperity, required a degree of statesmanship and wisdom

556 Report on Greece by the British Chief of Imperial General Staff, (March 1949), FO 371 / 78348 / R3285 / G. The Greek Government had repeatedly pressed both the British and the Americans for increases in Military strength since the end of 1947. However, by September 1948, the Americans had been planning reductions of the armed forces. See Chapter 4, Section: 1948, January to May, Note 479. Record of Conversation (225) April 16th 1948, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 17, pp.122-23. 238 they had ‘never before been called on to display.’557 It seemed as though the

United States was now fully aware of her place in the world.

Rising Soviet-Yugoslav tensions were observed when the USSR began moving troops into Romania and by increasing economic pressure being levied against Yugoslavia. The British also theorized that they could be in support of a possible ‘Macedonian’ state, but both the US and Britain had already guaranteed that they would never recognize a state that laid claim to Greek Macedonia.558 The

Americans received reports that the Yugoslavians were secretly proposing to meet with the Greek government to ‘discuss the possibility of “entente” between the two countries.’ The Americans also received confirmation of a split between the

Soviets and Yugoslavs and began planning to take full advantage of it.559

By the spring of 1949, Ambassador Grady was reporting that the military situation in Greece was the most promising it had been since the inception of the

Marshall Plan. Furthermore, he stated that morale was high, the Greek government was ‘promising’ and that the United States was ‘now getting good returns for the money invested.’ He therefore recommended that the US Congress continue to

557 Grady to Acheson (319) February 19th 1949, FRUS 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 256-57. The fact that Grady felt it necessary to state that US policy had been developed independently could be interpreted to mean that he felt the opposite, or at least that there was that perception in circulation. Grady also cautioned against allowing anyone to use America’s power to impose American will ‘on a people we are trying to make free.’ It was a remarkably prescient statement in light of how US foreign policy has transformed since 1949. Many would argue that US foreign policy since had been focussed solely on using US power to impose American will on foreign states. 558 British Embassy (US) to State Department, March 17th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 265-67. See also: Memorandum of Jernegen, March 10th 1949, ibid., p.261. 559 Grady to Acheson (516) march 18th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 267-68. 239 supply aid in order to finish the job they had started in Greece.560 The improving military situation in Greece also coincided with both the signing of the North

Atlantic Charter on April 4th 1949 and the easing of International tensions a short time later when the Soviets lifted the Blockade of Berlin on May 12th 1949.

A Critical Month: May 1949

After the lifting of the Berlin Blockade, the Soviets altered the outlook for the Balkans by reversing their previous position, proposing an immediate end to the hostilities in Greece and by volunteering to participate in international committees to solve the Greek Issue. The Soviet representative to the UN approached the British and American representatives with a ceasefire proposal for

Greece. Though the terms stipulated that the KKE be treated as a government was rejected by the British and Americans, they were at least interested to hear what else the Soviets proposed. The Soviets recommended new elections with a ‘higher body’ formed to oversee them and when asked about Greece’s northern frontiers,

Soviet representative Gromyko, basically accepting the current borders said

‘Greece has its boundaries and we are talking about the boundaries of Greece.’

American Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicated that Gromyko’s comments seemed to indicate that the USSR would not support a ‘free Macedonia.’

Rusk also theorized that with the easing of the situation in Berlin that the USSR was attempting to settle its European political situation in order to focus on developments in Asia. Lastly, Rusk stated that perhaps the US could use Greece as

560 Grady to Acheson (Amag 36) March 30th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 281-85. The good political situation would not last as infighting paralysed the government until mid-April. For details see: Rankin to Acheson (774) April 16th 1949, ibid., pp. 295-97. 240 a way to discern Soviet intentions to the West, possibly leading to an eventual reduction in the amount of aid the US was providing. A few days later Rusk,

McNeil, the British representative and Gromyko met again to discuss the Greek situation which had bogged down in the UN Conciliation Committee’s talks.

Gromyko presented three proposals to solve the situation which were almost identical to the proposals advance by the British and Americans two years earlier.

He suggested joint Anglo-American-Soviet supervision of elections and patrol of

Greece’s northern borders, followed by a complete withdrawal of all foreign military assistance in Greece. Though the discussion was unbinding and informal, it added to Anglo-American belief that something fundamental had changed in the

Soviet Union’s foreign policy objectives.561

Immediately prior to the commencement of the Council of Foreign

Ministers (CFM) in Paris, the Americans re-stated their desire to use Greece as a way for the Soviets to demonstrate their intentions. However, Acheson also stated that while the US would not negotiate with the Soviets without Greece’s participation, he also hoped not to have developments within Greece come up at the conference which could undermine Greek morale or damage chances for peace in ‘delicate contacts with the Soviets.’ For their part, the Greek government informed the State Department that they had no desire for their situation to be discussed ‘behind closed doors at the CFM, but rather to keep everything in the open in the General Assembly. This position was fully supported by the British and

561 Memorandum of informal discussion on Greece, May 5th 1949, Editorial note in Austin to Acheson (598) May 14th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 303-09, 319-21. For details of UN Conciliation Committee negotiations see ibid.: Document 906, May 7th 1949, pp. 312-14, Document 696 May 10th 1949, pp. 315-16, Document 586 May 12th 1949, pp. 316-17, 241 American governments, 562 but these exchanges represented a dramatic shift in the

Big Three’s policies towards Greece. Where over the previous three years it had been the British and Americans that were pressing for Big Three consensus in settings like the Security Council or the Council of Foreign Ministers (i.e. less representative bodies) relating to Greece, now it was the Soviet Union that was attempting to reach a ‘quick fix’ by imposing a superpower-approved solution.

Though the sudden willingness of the USSR to discuss and participate in a resolution to the ongoing struggles in the Balkans, the Big Three could still not reach on consensus on what positions to take to do so. Furthermore, as Greece,

Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria argued back and forth over the exact wording and content of various draft resolutions proposed by the UN Conciliation

Committee, the local situation in the Balkans remained unsettled. These factors, combined with the continuing Greek Civil War meant that at the domestic, regional and international political levels, there was no consistency or stability relating to

Greece.

The State Department outlined the US position on Gromyko’s suggestions stating that the Soviets could greatly benefit the situation by exerting their influence on the countries that were supplying aid to the KKE, but that the US did not recognise the DSE as ‘having any status under international law’ nor did they subscribe to the sphere of influence notion, or consider Greece’s northern borders

‘as a dividing line between two such spheres.’ The State Department wrote that new elections under foreign observation would be ‘retrogressive and unwarranted’

562 Acheson to US Embassy in Greece (749) May 19th 1949, Minor to Acheson (989) May 19th 1949, Memorandum (Rusk) May 19th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 322-25. 242 since fair elections had been held in 1946 when the Soviets had had the chance to participate. Additionally, the Yugoslavian-Soviet split had greatly improved the likelihood of achieving their objectives for the Balkans and ‘projecting Western policy in the area through the intensification of psychological warfare, utilization of economic leverage and political activity.’ Furthermore, due to current developments, the option was now open for:

...some face-saving formulae (which) might be acceptable to the Russians. This possibility should be explored since we would welcome a solution of the Greek problem, which now requires a diversion of our military resources from more profitable areas.563

In later discussion with the Greek Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State

Rusk assured him that no negotiations about Greece would take place without

Greece’s participation, that the British and American positions had remained essentially unchanged since the first UNSCOB mission and, likely due to the problems with Tito, that it seemed the USSR recognized Greece’s borders as they stood currently. Lastly, Rusk theorised that the USSR was likely trying to preserve some level of communist presence in Greece which is why they were pressing for conciliation and new elections in which they were now prepared to play a part.564

563 Preliminary US Reaction to the Gromyko Balkan Proposal, may 20th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 326-30. Emphasis added. The use of the word profitable opens numerous questions as to ‘real’ US intentions in Greece. The fact that the document was sent ‘top secret’ to the British Foreign Office and to the Greek Prime Minister, could indicate that it was not meant to mean that the US saw Greece only as either a money-making or money-losing situation. However, if they really were in Greece to protect Greek independence and Western civilization by opposing communist expansion as had been publically and secretly stated many times before, then perhaps the words ‘vulnerable’ or ‘productive’ would have been used instead. 564 Memorandum of Conversation between the Greek Ambassador and the assistant Secretary of State, May 20th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 330-33. 243 In Greece, the DSE was reported as having offered repeated peace proposals (which were rejected) to which ‘unconditional surrender’ was the consistent Greek Government response. Though the Greek Government’s response was officially accepted as both ‘legally’ and ‘morally’ justified, the US representative on UNSCOB II felt that the demand was unrealistic and could damage the actual achievement of an end to the military struggle.565 Despite the cautiously-optimistic American appraisal of the situation, the British were much more suspicious of Soviet intentions.

The Foreign Office believed that there was no evidence that the USSR really wished to bring an end to the turmoil in the Balkans and that they were only now acting as a result of recent failures in Greece. They also argued that any response to the Gromyko proposals should come directly from the Greek government as conditions that would follow a ceasefire /surrender, not as conditions for a ceasefire. The British also argued that any proposal be subject to

UNSCOB II permission to investigate into Albanian, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian territory whether all aid to the Greek Communists had in fact been ended.

Furthermore, all Soviet pressure against Turkey and any Soviet involvement in

Cyprus must end.566 However, despite joint Anglo-American statements to the contrary, it seemed as though the British were prepared to discuss these issues at the Big Power level. It also seemed as though the British were still not fully

565 US representative Drew (UNSCOB II) to Acting Secretary of State (1026) May 25th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 339- 566 Enclosures A and B in: Miller to Rusk (G.10/ /49) May 25th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 341 – 44. Cyprus was still very important to the British as a strategic point in the Eastern Mediterranean. They would not tolerate any threats to their position of influence there, as would later be demonstrated by the issue of Greek-Cypriot unification. 244 satisfied that their Eastern Mediterranean interests had been adequately guaranteed for them to support any Soviet proposal, even in light of possible Greek and

American tentative support.

The Americans were not in favour of Big Power talks on these issues, and issued an internal statement that not only was the British proposal contradictory to their earlier statements of working out issues in the United Nations, but also that

‘unrelated questions of Corfu, Turkey and Cyprus as implying propriety great power forum for such problems.’567 Essentially, although the US had already made and acknowledged their new foreign policy, they were not prepared to publically contradict themselves or to unilaterally act on certain issues. Furthermore,

Ambassador Grady recommended a cautious approach since ‘time will reveal reasons for altered Russian tactics.’ He also stated that Greece was a powerful example of success at this time for the United States and a major reason for what he saw as American success against Communism. He also reported that the Greek government was in favour of holding elections once the Civil War had ended and that he recommended international supervision of the elections. However, Grady also stated that in his opinion Greece would remain vulnerable even after the end of internal hostilities and that the US should continue material military assistance.568

Ambassador Grady approached the Greek Government regarding possible international involvement in Greece regarding the supervision of elections,

567 Webb to Acheson (Telac 13) May 25th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 344-45. The US would dramatically reverse this policy in the 1970s, unilaterally encouraging the Turks to invade Cyprus. 568 Grady to Webb (1032 and 1046) May 26th and 28th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 345-49. 245 amnesty and the outlawing of the KKE. He reported to the State Department that the Greek Government would strongly resist any foreign supervision, especially one that included the USSR, but may accept it under joint Anglo-American pressure. Since the KKE had advocated armed insurgency against the Greek

Government, the State Department supported the Greeks’ decision to keep it outlawed, however, the US agreed with an earlier British proposal ‘not to let the situation in Greece drift’ and to work with the USSR to find them a ‘face-saving’ opportunity to get out of Greek affairs and to achieved a peaceful solution.569

Whether or not that was achievable remained to be seen.

1949: June to September

By mid June, the furor created by the Soviet peace initiative in May had calmed slightly. The State Department stated that while sympathetic to the Greek

Government’s position, they could not refuse any possibility for peace and ordered the US embassy to inform the Greek Government that they also had to clarify their position regarding an amnesty for the DSE in order to mitigate foreign criticism.

The State Department also informed Ambassador Grady that the head of the AMM had advised maintaining the current levels of aid to Greece until at least 1950, keeping the Greek army at its current strength until then.570 However, Prime

569 Acheson to Webb (2204) May 31st 1949, Webb to Acheson (Telac 51) June 3rd 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 350-53. 570 Webb to Grady (A-404) June 18th 1949, Acheson to Grady (941) June 23rd 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 358-60. Simultaneously, there were discussions about appointing an individual to lead conciliation efforts in the Balkans. The first suggestion was for William Lyon McKenzie King, the former Prime Minster of Canada, to take the position. See: Memorandum, June 17th 1949, ibid., p. 357. Domestically in the US, anti-communist legislation was passed on June 20th. Previously referenced in Chapter 3, page 199, note 474: Franks to Younger (499) June 20th 1950, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 4, 1950, p. 93-98 246 Minister Souphoulis died on June 24th 1949 and his death sparked another crisis in the Government over who would assume leadership.

Tsaldaris claimed the position as head of the largest party in the coalition

(the Populists) but he was opposed by Sophocles Venizelos, head of the Liberal

Party, whom the Americans desired to see only as a deputy. The State Department was extremely concerned that this instability could lead to populists ceasing control, taking advantage of public uncertainty and eliminating competent ministers from other parties from the Cabinet. Therefore they instructed

Ambassador Grady to inform Venizelos of their disappointment in his position, and they would hold him responsible and ‘place on him personally, full responsibility for consequences prolongation of crisis.’ Contradicting earlier statements about allowing the Greek Government to solve problems on its own, the British and

Americans openly displayed their influence. They offered two ‘solutions’ to

Tsaldaris and Venizelos. Both included the continuance of the Cabinet as constituted by Sophoulis and supported by the King, the first option with Tsaldaris as Prime Minister and Venizelos as deputy and the second with a reversal of the roles. On June 30th the agreed solution was to appoint Alexander Diamedes as

Prime Minster and to have Tsaldaris and Venizelos acting a Deputy and Second

Deputy Prime Ministers respectively.571 This incident clearly demonstrated not only the weakness of the Greek political system, but also the willingness, despite

571 Acheson to Grady (976) June 29th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 362-63. This ‘solution’ was remarkably similar to the 2011 appointment of Papadimos in November and Papandreaou and Samaras serving as deputies to deal with the Greek Financial Crisis. 247 statements to the contrary, of the British and Americans to impose solutions on the

Greeks.

In regards to the improving situation with Yugoslavia, the British Embassy in Washington informed the State Department that Tito was anxious to receive aid from the West, and to achieve it he had already cut off supplies to the DSE and offered to prevent any DSE guerrillas who crossed into Yugoslavia from Greece from returning to Greece. This was made official in a speech Tito made in Poland on July 10th where he announced the closure of the Greco-Yugoslavian frontier. 572

Despite Tito’s statements, UNSCOB II stated that they had evidence that aid was still making its way into Greece from Yugoslavia, but they may be in a ‘twilight period’ in Yugoslavian policy where the central government had changed its policy but the border areas were still unable or unwilling to enforce it. However, UNCOB

II also reported that KKE radio broadcasts clearly indicated a break in relations between them and Yugoslavia which would only continue to widen.573

By mid-July 1949 the Greek government proposed an economic policy to their American overseers which they stated would encourage the functioning of the

Greek government. The proposal contained two elements the first of which was that exchanges sold to importers would be subjected to a tax, the proceeds of

572 Peake to MCNeil (14) Yugoslavia, Annual Review for 1949, January 27th 1950, BDFA, Part IV, Series F Europe, Vol. 27, 1950, pp. 163-69. In the Annual Review, the Ambassador Peake stated that there was a difference between Tito’s official statements about closing the border and the practice of Yugoslav soldiers stationed there who had been working with the DSE for numerous years. He also stated that the British would likely not see an actual change in attitude between the Greek and Yugoslav governments until 1950. See also: British Embassy to State Department (760.H68/6-3049) June 30th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 363-64. See also: Memorandum of Conversation, August 16th 1949, FRUS 1949, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Vol. V, pp. 924-28. 573 UNCSCOB II to Acheson (1335) July 12th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 366-67. This break however had taken a year to show results and Tito attempted to play both the East and West against each other. 248 which, perhaps not surprisingly, would be used to meet the promised increase in civil servants’ salaries. As millions of Greeks were still suffering from the effects of the Civil War, the German occupation, and had strict food rations, and thousands of Greeks had been forced to leave their homes and with thousands of kilometres of road still destroyed and villages obliterated, the Greek government came up with a tax program to increase their own salaries. Understandably this proposal was not supported by the Americans. As a result the Greek Deputy Prime

Minister met with the British ambassador Norton to discuss this proposal. Norton quickly rejected it.574 This event, while relatively insignificant, was still indicative of two underlying principles of this study. Firstly, the frequent unity of British and

American policy towards the Greek Government, and secondly, the seeming unending detachment of Athens from the rest of Greece and the problems that were created as a result.

By July 1949, the GNA was also holding the initiative and aggressively engaging the DSE in the north. However, the DSE continued to use the tactic of withdrawing into the mountains and then over the border into Albania or Bulgaria, and when they did so, the GNA asked the British and Americans what to do next.

This frustrated both British and American observers since;

It is a great pity that the Greeks should ask advice on this point (of following the communists across the border). They would have done much better to have simply kept quiet and pursued the rebels into Albanian territory in order to destroy them. It is almost excessively good behaviour on their part to ask our opinion.575

574Norton to Bevin (120) July 13th 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, 1949, pp. 87-88. 575 Minutes of the Foreign Office, July 1949, FO 371/78443/R7136. 249 In order to continue to control as much as possible the international reaction to events in Greece, the United Nations was brought under the influence of the

United States who was its major financial backer. As a result, UNSCOB II became a tool to complement the intervention outlined by the Truman Doctrine and

Marshall Plan.576 It was exactly what the British desired. The United States was financing and guaranteeing Western European and Mediterranean security, with the British following closely behind advising on courses of action.

In Greece, the lack of external pressure on the government to control the extreme Right was being shown by a new wave of White Terror. Even in Northern

Greece where the KKE had been so strong, right wing paramilitary groups were able to exert their own policies. For example, in Katerini, Pieria, the right-wing

Group ‘VEN’, officially formed as a support group to the Greek Army, was able to force the locals to carry a second Identity Card issued by them instead of the

Government.577 The importance of this example of weak internal Greek

Governmental authority was lessened by Britain’s new interest an improving relations with Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile, explaining the DSE’s loss of its most consistent backer, the

British Embassy in Belgrade quoted the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj as stating:

The Greek Communist leaders had forgotten the interests of the democratic movement in Greece and judged participation in the struggle against Yugoslavia more important than the struggle against foreign involvement

576 Nachmani, p. 500. 577 Vagelis Athanasios, Pichos. Verbal Interview regarding the Greek Civil War and Foreign Powers in Greece: 1941-1949. Interviewed, Saturday, July 23rd 2011, 10:30 to 12:00 PM, Katerini, Pieria, Greece. 250 in Greek affairs.578

Though Yugoslavia had been lost to the DSE and under intense British pressure the Greek Government had begun to pursue the resumption of diplomatic relations with Tito, Albania and Bulgaria were still offering assistance to the DSE.

The United States ordered their embassy in Belgrade to praise Tito’s decision remarking that it also indicated a success in their Policy towards Yugoslavia, while also using the opportunity to press Tito to normalize relations with the Greek government and to implement the returning of the abducted Greek children; negotiations in which the Greek government was willing to participate immediately.579 However, recent research into Yugoslavian treatment of the Greek children held there, shows that Tito lied to the Greeks, British and Americans when pressed about retuning the children. He kept the children and attempted to prevent them from speaking Greek, intending to use them to create and then introduce a

Slavic population into Greek Macedonia to support his territorial claims there.580

On August 2nd 1949, UNSCOB II presented its signed report to the General

Assembly which was subsequently unanimously accepted. Aside from summarising its formation and activities from 1947, it also outlined in detail, the aid for the DSE that was still coming into Greece, namely from Albania.581 Shortly

578 British Embassy, Belgrade, to Foreign Office, July 25th 1949, (FO 371/78448/R7166). 579 Acheson to US Embassy in Belgrade (372) July 12th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 369-70. 580 Irini Lagani, “The Education of Children of the Civil War in Yugoslavia as a point of discord in the relations of the KKE and CPY after the Tito-COMINFORM split (1948-1956) in The Gun at the Ready: The political Refugees of the Greek Civil War in Eastern Europe , Eftichia Voutira, Vasilis Dalkavoukis, Nikos Maranzidis and Maria Bontila, eds. (Thessaloniki: University of Macedonia Press, 2005) pp.125-146. 581 Editorial Note #2 in: Minor to Acheson (542) July 29th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 376-80. 251 thereafter, in discussion with Tsaldaris, the British Charge D’affairs informed the

State Department that both their and the French government believed that the

Greek army was planning an attack on Albania. Contradicting Minster Bevin’s statements from July, the British advised that they move quickly to prevent the

Greeks from attacking Albania and that they had advised the Greeks that should they get into a conflict with Albania no military or diplomatic support could be guaranteed to them.582 In mid-August 1949 Tsaldaris met again with Mr. Bevin in

Strasbourg, in order to discuss what could be done internationally about the

Albanians’ continued assistance to the Greek communist forces, as an alternative to

Greek military intervention in Albania. He stated that if the Communist forces continued to retreat into Albania to launch attacks from that country, regardless of whether or not it was clear that Albanian forces were actually taking part, that the incident would cease being only a Greek one and would move into the international sphere of aggression by one state against another, and suggested the matter should be taken up in the United Nations with Britain and the United States leading the action against Albania. Bevin informed Tsaldaris that regardless of

Yugoslav designs on Albania (which the Americans believed existed) or Albanian provocations, the best defence that Greece had was continuing British and

American involvement and the Anglo-American policies relating to Greece.583 He

582 Memorandum, August 5th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 381-84. 583 Bevin to Crosthwaite (214) August 16th 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, p. 142- 43. The concept of using another state's territory as a staging ground to attack another as grounds for charges of aggression under international law, is a valid one, but was not made so until the definition of the crime of aggression under international law was agreed in the summer of 2010. For greater detail, analysis and explanation of the definition of the crime of aggression, punishment, and enforcement, see: Maria Pichou, The Notion of Aggression in International Law (Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2012) For American assessment of Yugoslavian plans for Albania and their report of 252 therefore implied, as the British embassy in Athens had done, that it would be unnecessary and potentially dangerous internationally (in light of Soviet-Albanian mutual defence treaties) for the Greeks to attack Albania. At the end of August

Tsaldaris met with Assistant Secretary of State Rusk to obtain some clarification of the American position on the same issue. Rusk stated that the US could not support the suggestion that Greece meet with UN members to find a solution to the

Albanian problem, because there was no clear plan of action and it would therefore be pointless to sit with other nations to merely discuss the issue.584

However, the Americans believed that getting Albania to stop supporting the DSE was the key to ending the Civil War and supported by the British and

French, they were willing to approach the Albanian government to negotiate improved Albanian status internationally should they prevent the DSE from re- supplying and re-grouping in their territory.585 Therefore, the British and

Americans offered the possibility of Albania joining the UN should they takes the necessary steps to inhibit the DSE from using their territory. The British stated that should the Albanians provide proof that they were in fact disarming and interning the members of the DSE in their territory, it would also greatly benefit Albania’s chances of being admitted to the UN.586 As negotiations were progressing with the

French assessments see: Memorandum, August 5th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 382-84. In November of 1949, the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia met with Tito, the latter who claimed that the Albanians were attempting to provoke the Yugoslavs at the border. Peake to Bevin (1035) November 2nd 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, 1949, p. 279. 584 Memorandum of Conversation, August 29th 1949, Memorandum, August 5th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 389-92. 585 Acheson to US Embassy in London (3099) August 29th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 392-93. 586 Holmes to Acheson (3598) September 3rd 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp.398-99. 253 Albanian Government, there were also indications that the Bulgarian government was ready to cease its ‘intervention in Greek affairs’ although they were still only vague rumours at this time.587

In preparation for the discussion of the Greek case before the General

Assembly, the United States prepared a resolution calling on both Albania and

Bulgaria to desist all aid to the DSE. Coinciding with what the State Department called ‘outstanding progress’ of the Greek Army to destroy the few remaining DSE units and with the Yugoslavia-COMINFORM split, the United States felt that their policy in Greece had been successful. Greece was no longer faced with a ‘solid bloc of equally hostile states at her northern frontiers.’ Then, in a line that clearly expressed American priorities with their post-WWII style of Foreign Policy, the

State Department said that their objective was to bring about a settlement to the

Balkans’ dispute that the General Assembly could endorse ‘on terms satisfactory to the United States (first) and to the Greeks (second).’ The State Department also ordered that attempts be made to further implicate the USSR in ‘the plot against

Greece’ to ensure support for the US resolution in the General Assembly.588

Though not surprising, the State Department openly declared that its priority was a settlement favourable to the United States before the considerations for the nation

(Greece) to which it had publically declared its support. Furthermore, the State

Department was using the same fear in 1949 in the General Assembly to achieved

587 Memorandum of Conversation, September 8th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 401-04. 588 State Department to the US United Nations Delegation (SD/A/C.1/272) September 9th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 404-09. ‘First’ and ‘second’ in brackets, added by author for emphasis. 254 their policy objectives as the British had used against them in the 1943-46 years;

The fear of communism.

While the United States was prepared for the General Assembly (GA) to consider a resolution; i.e. one that allowed both internal and external factors to be dealt with to settle the Greek problem, the Greek government officially requested for the General Assembly to consider only the issue of continuing Albanian and

Bulgarian interference in Greek affairs. The US refused the Greek request and also made numerous ‘suggestions’ to the Greek Government in preparation for the UN

General Assembly:

...prior to the meeting of the GA, Greek Government (GG) should announce, on its own initiative, policy it will follow in treating guerrillas after main fighting has ceased. This should be as lenient as possible....GG might announce program for political rehabilitation and economic reestablishment (of) former guerrillas.... statement by GG that it would welcome observation and advisory assistance of UN rehabilitation program...GG should announce intentions to hold new elections within specified period....would be excellent political move if elections be accompanied by plebiscite on question (of) whether or not KKE should be re-legalized...Greeks be prepared to accept this (international supervision of elections)...589

The point being made is not whether to not the Greek government was ethically or legally correct in its desire to prevent any foreign ruling on its domestic affairs or if the American ‘proposals’ were justified. What is significant about the above statement is the United States’ open disregard for the expressed interests of the Greek government in favour of US interests. Again, though not surprising, the fact that it was clearly stated by the State Department allows us to conclude without a doubt what American intentions towards Greece were. They were not

589 Acheson to US Embassy in Athens (1503) September 10th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 409-12. 255 prepared to allow Greek sovereignty to impede their objectives. They felt no reservation about ordering the Greek government into a specific course of action.

With the American position clearly established, all that remained, aside from having the General Assembly accept the US resolution, was to get British and

French support as well. No longer taking much guidance from the British in regards to Greek Affairs, the US now needed them mainly for support.

Though generally supportive of the US position was not in support of either allowing Russian participation in any supervisory body because of the trouble that they could cause and they were far more concerned with the opinion of the Greek

Government than were the Americans, stating that they believed that no resolution should be forwarded without consulting the Greeks and obtaining their approval.590

On September 14th , 1949, British Ambassador to the United States, Sir

Oliver Franks reported a conversation he had with Dean Acheson in Washington.

The two discussed possible reconciliation between the Greek, Albanian and

Bulgarian governments. Acheson believed that a possible way to settle the frontier concerns of the Greek government was to establish a meeting with the Soviet,

British, French and American governments, in addition to the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Greek governments, under the auspices of officials of the United Nations.

Bevin and Acheson agreed that if the opportunity arose they should try to ‘bring down’ the Albanian government, but that they would have to proceed cautiously and wait to see how affairs in Greece and Yugoslavia played out.591

590 Memorandum of Conversation, September 13th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 412-14. 591 Memorandum of Conversation, September 14th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp.414-16. For the British perspective of these talks see: Franks to Bevin 256 A week later, Greek officials met with the United States Secretary of State at the Astoria hotel in New York. Tsaldaris, informed them that the Greek government was very anxious to prevent the 10,000 or so estimated bandits who had escaped into Albania from reforming to launch another attack on Greece. He also stated that there was some sentiment within Greece that the Greek army should simply pursue the bandits into Albanian territory. Mr. Bevin questioned whether or not there was actual evidence that preparations for a new attack from

Albanian soil were being made in the Greek ambassador admitted that there was none. Mr. Bevin then stated that he had seen reports stating that the Albanians were attempting to inhibit the rebels from using their territory. The Greek ambassador replied that if this was true then it was satisfactory but there had to be some solid proof and the Greek government could not ‘believe Albanian statements to the effect that they would disarm the rebels’ and therefore argued for some sort of

United Nations control. Bevin was not supportive of the Greek proposals, and he camouflaged his opposition by stating that he could not proceed ‘without consulting my colleagues in the cabinet.’ This statement is extremely insightful since in the past Bevin had had no problem forcing his policies through the cabinet and even upon the Prime Minister. The fact that here he stated that he could not proceed without consulting them indicates his opposition to the Greek proposal.

Furthermore, Bevin told Tsaldaris that at the recent London Ambassador’s meeting

(4412) September 14th 1949, and, Record of Conversation between Acheson and Tsaldaris (14) September 20th 1949, BDFA, Part IV, Series F Europe, Vol. 22, 1949, pp. 145-47. 257 ‘Greek affairs had not been considered’ which indicated how other events had superseded Greece on the list of importance for the British.592

Similar to the Albanian statements, the Bulgarian government was also stating that they were disarming any rebels who crossed into their territory. Bevin stressed that the Greek government should proceed with the utmost caution, ‘and above all they must not embark on any ventures themselves,’ because to do so could threaten British interests in the region. It was also revealing that Minister

Bevin did not say that the Greek government did not have the right to present a resolution to the United Nations, he simply tried to stress to the Greek ambassador that he did not believe the Americans would support the draft as prepared.593 Under international law every nation has the right to present a resolution to the General

Assembly and to the Security Council, and Bevin stated that his main problem with the resolution that the Greeks had prepared for possible action against Albania for not disarming the Greek rebels using their territory, was that it seemed ‘to contemplate enforcement measures and these are a matter for the Security Council rather than the assembly. The first step must be before the United Nations to establish if the threat to peace existed. After that they could proceed to consider what steps should be taken.’ 594 However, once again, international developments and the Nuclear race between the USA and the USSR, overshadowed events in

Greece, even as the Greek national army had already won a significant, (and what

592 Bevin to Crosthwaite (214) August 16th 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, pp. 142- 143, and, Memorandum of Conversation, September 14th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp.414-16. 593 Record of Conversation between Acheson and Tsaldaris (14) September 20th 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, 1949, pp. 146-147. 594 Record of Conversation between Acheson and Tsaldaris (14) September 20th 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, 1949, pp. 146-147.

258 turned out to be the decisive) victory over the Greek communist forces a month earlier in August of 1949.

The United States had based its defence against possible Soviet aggression, on the use of the atomic bomb, or rather the threat of using the atomic bomb. Great

Britain had hoped that NATO may counterbalance Soviet numeric advantages in

Europe, but the Americans intended to rely on an expanded air force and increased the production of atomic bombs. Many US officials believed so much in the advantage of the nuclear bomb that they encouraged the American Congress to deny President Truman's request to fund NATO to the fullest extent. However, on

September 22, 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb thereby negating the American advantage in nuclear threat. Six days later, the American

Congress approved the funds that the president had requested for NATO.595

Meanwhile in Greece the American embassy was instructed to inform the

Greek government not to attack Albania. President Truman endorsed the State

Department’s position saying that Greece ‘was like any other dog who has been down in a fight and then gets on top,’ and therefore the US should do anything it needed to restrain the government, both in possible military actions and in its treatment of DSE prisoners whom the Americans feared would all be ‘slaughtered’ otherwise. 596 By the end of September 1949, the only area were the English and the Americans had witnessed their investment in anti-communism pay off was in

Greece, but internationally they were faced with the problem of Soviet superiority of numbers and equity in atomic weaponry. With their apparent failures in Eastern

595 Ambrose, pp. 105-06. 596 Memorandum of meeting with President Truman, October 1st 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp.427-28. 259 Europe and China, and atomic parity with the USSR, Greece maintained its position as an important anti-communist symbol for the British and Americans.

1949 – October to December

The end of the military conflict in Greece was tentatively identified by

Ambassador Grady who also reported optimistic economic conditions finally appearing, due mainly to continuing international economic aid, the end of the military conflict and the devaluation of the Drachma. Grady also predicted strong

Greek opposition to American military aid cutbacks due to their ‘nationalist purposes and reasoning that a large army will force us to give large aid.’ He recommended therefore to not only reduce military aid to Greece, but also the size of the Greek army by 50,000 men by January 1950. Confirming Grady’s communication, the KKE broadcast a statement ending the armed struggle on

October 16th 1949. On the 19th of October, Dean Acheson stated that he believed the conflict in Greece to be over and that the next logical step was to gradually reduce US military expenditures there.597

As a result of the end of the armed conflict in Greece and needing to re- enforce British Garrisons in the Middle East and Asia, especially Hong Kong, the

British announced that they would be withdrawing their remaining troops from

Greece. 598 In light of the current situation in Greece, Ambassador Grady felt that the withdrawal of British troops now was not only convenient, but would be beneficial to international public opinion since it would coincide with American

597 Grady to Acting Secretary of State (3084) October 3rd 1949, Acheson to Grady (1789) October 20th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 431-35, 36. 598 Memorandum of Conversation, October 20th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 435-36. 260 military reductions in Greece. Furthermore, Grady recommended to Ambassador

Norton that the British embassy should announce the withdrawal of the whole

British battalion, not a gradual reduction.599 In spite of Grady’s statements the US joint Chiefs of Staff were not pleased with the British withdrawal. Unbeknownst to

Grady the Joint Chiefs had requested that the British notify them in advance of their declaration whether they would do a withdrawal in stages or all at once, however, less than 24 hours after sending that request to the British, the British had simply presented the US with another ‘fait accompli’ similar to what they had done in 1947. However, due to political considerations and the fact that it would still take some months to withdraw all British forces from Greece, the Joint Chiefs said that they would only communicate their displeasure ‘through military channels.’600

In light of the British withdrawal and pending US military reductions in

Greece, the Greek government approached the US in relation to the Greek desire to enter the North Atlantic Pact. Again, Acheson said that at this time the US could not support Greece’s petition for membership and reassured the Greeks that the US would not permit all of its investments to be jeopardised by external threats and would come to Greece’s aid should such a threat arise.601 Reflecting the success of

Churchill’s and then Bevin’s efforts to tie the United States and Britain together based not only of shared strategic interests but on their shared culture, the US

599 Grady to Acheson (2144) October 21st 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, p. 437. 600 Memorandum of Conversation, October 27th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 445-47. 601 Memorandum of Conversation, October 29th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 447-49. 261 Military planning committee for Greece sent a Top Secret message to the

Department of the Army stating:

...the English speaking world must stand solidly together in support of these strategic concepts. Specifically the US and British Commonwealth must be solidly unified militarily and must pursue this common objective on a combined basis. However, the US is financing the program necessary to mould this belt of nations into a unified whole. Thus, the US must hold the predominant position on all fronts in the establishment of policy...602

These words echo Bevin’s and Churchill’s statements from the mid 1940s and show how successful the British were at shaping US policy, not only for

Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean, but for the world as a whole. Though the

United States had clearly eclipsed Britain as the West’s leading power, there can be little denial of the profound role that the British had played in the way that transition occurred.

In November, the General Assembly accepted the proposed resolutions both for peace in the Balkans and the resolution calling for the return of abducted

Greek children.603 On 22 November 1949 the official celebration for the departure of British troops from Greece took place. Ambassador Norton talked of ‘poignant memories of the campaign in 1941 and of the ‘salvation’ of Greece from the

Communists in December 1944, (and) were combined with recognition of the fact

602 Head, JUSMAPG to Department of the Army (L 4192) November 7th 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 453-57. 603 For full text of the General Assembly Resolutions of November 17th and 18th see: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, resolutions, pp. 9-10 262 that it happens in Salonika British troops had stood on guard during the past long period of internal trouble and anxiety.’604 He continued:

The event was a great success and a marked tribute to the consistently good conduct of British troops in a foreign country. It was a glorious sunny Athenian on day; very large crowd gathered in the streets and warmly applauded the smart bearing and drilled the troops…. This time they showed their sincere appreciation of what the British army had meant for Greece by the applause and cheering which could be heard from the distant streets through which the troops marched. I have learned from many quarters, both high and low, and the fact is evident from the sympathetic articles in the newspapers, that the withdrawal of British troops as a matter of keen regret…. It was felt that this was the end of the chapter, and though the immediate future of Greece looks fairly rosy so long as American help continues on its present scale, the Solomon memorable celebration has caused the view of hard searching, coinciding as it does with the approaching day for elections and a new confrontation of economic and social problems, to say nothing of the clouds in the northern horizon.605

Though the military situation had been resolved, there were still daunting threats to Greece, namely economic, and they coincided with communist expansion in the Far East. As a result of British and American fears that internal problems could once again lead to communist gains, The Americans began to consider that it was better to aid the Greek army in order to allow it to respond to ‘internal’ threats to the country, which, meant that ‘on the level of Greek external security,

Washington felt that not much could be done.’606 By the end of 1949, the American

604 Norton to Foreign Office (221) November 22nd 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, p. 150. 605 Norton to Foreign Office (856) December 3rd 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, pp. 150-151. 606 Evanthis. Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967. (London: Routledge, 2006 ) p. 11 263 Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they believed that Greece’s borders were indefensible.607

The last issue to confront the British in Greece in 1949, was the issue of

Greek and Cyprus unification and the British response clearly showed how much influence they still exercised, not only on the Greek government, but also on the

Americans and other foreign governments. The British were angered at some unauthorized and un- authenticated newspaper articles stating that enosis between

Greece and Cyprus was fast approaching. Ambassador Norton stated that the Greek government would be well advised to announce that all Greeks either in Greece or

Cyprus, who agitated for immediate action on the unification of Cyprus and

Greece, were doing disservices to their countries. However, when Tsaldaris stated that possibly a joint British and Greek declaration regarding the matter could use tensions. Ambassador Norton objected, stating that to issue a joint statement

‘would look like commitment on the part of his Majesty's Government.’ In keeping with long-standing modus operendei, the British wanted to preserve their interest in the Mediterranean but the same time wanted to make it appear as though they were not directing any events from abroad. The British Embassy staff communicated with United States Embassy and the South African Embassy in order to get statements of support to pressure the Greek government to issue a statement against Greek and Cyprus unification and to recommend to the Greek

607 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, From Civil War to Cold War: Greece and the Allied Factor, (Athens: Proskinio, 1999) pp. 29-30, 39, quoted in: Hatzivassiliou, p. 11. For US notification to Greek Government and plans for Greek National Army, see: Grady to Diomedes, October 23rd 1949, Grady to Acheson (2164) October 14th 1949, Webb to Grady (gama 59) November 22nd 1949, FRUS 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. VI, pp. 440-45. 264 government ‘this was no time to seek to weaken British influence there (in the eastern Mediterranean.)’608

It was indicative of British policy to be very active behind the scenes, on the surface maintaining the image of impartiality and ‘hands-off.’ However the

Cyprus issue was an important issue for British interests in eastern Mediterranean, since by maintaining Cyprus as a protectorate, they maintained a strategic point to monitor shipping routes and they protected their access to the Suez Canal.

However, as a final catastrophe to British and American policy in the Far

East in 1949, in December Chiang Kai Check was forced to flee to Formosa. This event became a rallying cry for anti-Truman forces in the United States, and had a dramatic impact on Anglo-American relations, with massive repercussions for the rest of the world as a result. In Greece, the result was for the Right to be given a carte-blanche and the divisions that had plagued Greek society since the inception of the modern Greek state would continue.

608 British Embassy (Athens) to Foreign Office (856) December 3rd 1949, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 22, pp.151-52. 265 Chapter 6: Detente and the Revelation of the New World Order.

1950: January to June

While in 1946 the British had struggled to convince the United States of the danger presented by communist expansion, by 1950 they were struggling to restrain American anti-communism.609 Though the British would use the Crises in

China and Korea to demonstrate to the United States that they were their most reliable ally, aside from the massive reversal in Anglo-American roles, what is also notable about this period are communist motives and objectives. Stalin refused to allow Soviet representatives to participate in the UN Security Council hearings on

North Korea, since they could involve China and through the recently signed Sino-

Soviet pact, draw the USSR into a war with the West, which Stalin had demonstrated on numerous occasions, he was very anxious to avoid.

In Greece in early January 1950 the main problem was not a military but a social problem. The Greek government was faced with about 10% of its population still living as refugees. International aid and Greek government programs were barely sufficient to clothe, feed, and provide shelter to these Greeks while they were waiting to be repatriated. Though the American ambassador stated that finding a solution to the refugee problem in Greece was a top priority for the

American mission, no further American funds were ‘necessary in view of the

609Bullock, Bevin, pp. 790-795. 266 generous contributions from the Economic Cooperation Administration (E.C.A).’

610

Behind closed doors the Americans informed British that they had misgivings about the Greek Minister of the economy. The UNISYS embassy informed British in confidence that Minister Karamanlis, a populist, was against the repatriation of Greek Refugees because he felt that if the winter were overly difficult the repatriated peasants might vote for the opposition parties feeling that the government had not done enough for them. Norton concluded this dispatch by stating that at the end of 1949 Greece was reaching the recovery point that Western

European nations had reached in 1946, and he stated that it would be many years before Greece could dispense with international assistance. 611

However, the inability of the international community come up with definite plans to safeguard the northern frontier caused public opinion to become negative. This negativity was echoed all over Greece and culminated with King

Paul dissolving the government on January 7, 1950 and having the head of the caretaker government declare elections for 45 days later. In the words of

Ambassador Norton once again, this time referring to the election results,

‘the results have indeed disappointed those who wish to see a strong and stable Greek government tackling economic and social problems of the country; the one may well ask how any such government could have emerged from the existing parties.’612

610 Norton to Atlee (1E) January 4th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 49-50. Ambassador Norton continued his dispatch estimating property damage caused by the Communist forces at 90 million British pounds. He also stated however, that the average Greek peasant ‘does not expect much from the Greek government, and most of those already repatriated appear to be accepting the inevitable hardships of this first winter fairly cheerfully.’ (Paragraph 8) 611 Norton to Atlee (1E) January 4th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 50-52. 612 Norton to Bevin (74) March 16th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p.58. 267 Once the general public of the elections became known by the British and the Americans, both quickly ‘formed the impression that a coalition… was the right answer for both internal and external reasons.’613 Indicating the relative decline of Greece’s importance to the British, Yugoslavia was described by British

Ambassador Sir Christopher Peake as being ‘today the most important pillar of peace in this part of Europe. The Yugoslav government's actions would fail to please only those who did not want peace in the Balkans,’ i.e. the COMINFORM, which had been attacking the Yugoslav-Greek peace initiative. The British ambassador continued, stating that the Greek Civil War had been a direct consequence of COMINFORM policy and that peace had been made possible by the Greek and the Yugoslav people who had traditionally lived in friendship. The

Yugoslav government also pledged to assist the Greeks who were demanding the return of their children that were still being held in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian government informed the British ambassador in Belgrade, the good relations with the neighbouring countries would greatly improve the chances for peace and security of Yugoslavia. 614

By the end of January, the de-mobilization of the Greek armed forces was proceeding as scheduled, but the Greek Government was not diverting the extra funds to the economic recovery programs. Furthermore, the Greek Government refused to commit to the cuts desired by the United States. Grady, who was serving simultaneously as both Ambassador and as the Administrator of the US aid program to Greece stated that almost a third of Greece’s budget was being spent on

613Norton to Bevin (120) April 28th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p. 66. 614 Peake to Foreign Office (383) BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, May 17th 1951(1951 is likely a typing error since all of the other documents in this section are dated 1950), pp.67-68. 268 the military and it was an amount that the economy simply could not support. He was also continually frustrated by the unwillingness of the Greek Government to make any concessions for the good of the Greek people. Therefore he strongly recommended that the United States reduce military aid to support an army of only

70-90 thousand troops who would be able to maintain internal security and deal with guerrilla attacks but little more since he believed (as did the joint Chiefs of

Staff) that should Greece be invaded, no Greek army of any size could withstand it.

The Assistant Secretary of State also supported this view since the evidence available to them at the time indicated that the USSR had withdrawn its interest from Greece. Even though American and Greek relations with Bulgaria were still tense, overall it seemed as though the situation in the Balkans had been settled.615

In terms of the state of Anglo-American relations, an appraisal of the State

Department rated Britain as ‘our strongest and most reliable ally.’ Furthermore, by

February 1950, the United States had fully committed to the protection of the

British Isles saying:

We are fully committed to the protection of the British isles, in the event of an attack. Even without commitments, the British Isles are an essential base for a successful counter-attack on the continent and their control of areas all over the world which are necessary to us in a global war, make it a primary objective to protect them.616

The British had been successful, not only at having Britain viewed as the

US’s best and most reliable ally, but they also achieved US guarantees for military

615 Grady to Greek Prime Minister Theotokis, January 17th 1950, Grady to Acheson (213) January 30th 1950, Memorandum of Conversation, February 3rd 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, pp. 335-40. 616 Satterthwaite to Thompson (740.5) February 8th 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 143-44. 269 intervention in Britain and Western Europe and US recognition of those parts of the British Empire / Commonwealth that were still under British control and/ or administration. It was a huge success for British policy, since just three years earlier, the British had still been struggling to combat negative views in the United

States government of Britain as a strategic partner.617 Greece had been a huge part of that achievement.

Coinciding with the improved regional situation and after the elections of

March 5th 1950 had been held with relative calm and freedom (as evidenced by the wide distribution of votes among parties and a general shift from the right to the centre of the political spectrum618) the United States forecasted reduced amounts of aid for Greece heading into the summer of 1950. They forecasted that by 1951 the military aid to Greece could be cut in half, and that economic reconstruction could be increased. However, the US also predicted that Greece would still require substantial amounts of economic aid into 1952, but decided not to tell the Greek

Government that because they did not want its members to feel that they could rely on international aid indefinitely.619

Regarding the internal situation in Greece, the National Security Council stated that although the US had been somewhat successful in decentralizing the

Greek government and reforming the fiscal and civil services, the Greek government would continue to be problematic and to ‘remain below Western

617 Cross referenced with Chapter 3 (1947) : Balfour to Bevin (2037) August 23rd 1947, BDFA, Part IV, Series C North America, Vol. 2, 1947, p. 222. Balfour stated, ‘Our critics and detractors in the United States are constantly on the watch for the opportunity to assert that American confidence in Britain is misplaced...we should be at peculiar pains to comport ourselves in such a manner as to make ourselves proof against such slander.’ 618 See editorial note, FRUS 1950, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, p. 341. 619 Memorandum of US policy in Greece, March 6th 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 342-45. 270 standards.’ In terms of the Tito-COMINFORM split, US under Secretary of State

Webb stated that perhaps this event ‘tipped the scales in our favour.’ The split, combined with a strong US stand on Greece (which Webb also credited as a crucial factor leading to the split) made US policy in Greece ‘successful beyond expectations.’620

However, at the end of March, renewed political intrigues in Greece went against American expectations and desires. There had been a plan in place to form a coalition government under General Plastiras with the leaders of the other major parties serving in the cabinet. This plan was welcomed by the US as being representative of the will of the Greek people after the elections. However, after pledging to support the government, Minister Venizelos suddenly withdrew his support and with the approval of the king, stated that he intended to form a government which would constitute only about 20% of the popular vote. Prior to

Venizelos’ decision, Ambassador Grady had clearly expressed the US’s views on how the new government should be formed, and the move by Venizelos and the king seemed to them as designed to exclude the prominent Centre- Left wing leaders from the government. However, again clearly indicating the US shift from an emphasis on democracy to desiring only stability,621 the State Department said that the US would work with any Greek government ‘which enjoys the support of the Greek people expressed trough their duly elected parliament and which is

620 Memorandum of US policy in Greece, March 6th 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 342-45. The feeling of success in Greece (at least from the perspective of keeping the country out of the soviet sphere of influence) was a leading factor in the development of NSC 68 which would be given to President Truman in April 1950. 621 Lagani, ‘US Forces in Greece.’ p. 310 271 desirous and capable of carrying out objectives of US aid program.’622 It was a carefully worded response that, while not explicitly supporting or condemning the new formation of the Greek Government, also made it clear that the main basis for continuing support was its adherence to US financial objectives for Greece. A few days later Ambassador Grady informed Venizelos that, while the US was still concerned that the government he proposed to form was not the natural result of the elections, the most important factor for the US government was the ‘stability and effectiveness of any Greek cabinet.’623 However, the political situation of

Greece continued to frustrate the United States to such a degree that they threatened to withhold funds earmarked for the construction of four hydro-electric dams until the Greek Government could assure that the funds would be used successfully for their intended purposes. Both Ambassador Grady and Paul

Porter624, who had come to Greece to head the economic recovery program, were extremely frustrated by the ‘irresponsible politicians and stubborn monarchs’ that in their opinion were holding back Greece’s economic recovery, in order for the king to implement a plan to install General Papagos as Prime Minister. However, in spite of all of the American concerns and frustrations, they did not plan to cut off aid to Greece completely. They decided was that no new plans would be approved until the current political situation was resolved.625

622 Minor to Acheson (639) March 23rd 1950, Acheson to US Embassy in Greece, March 24th 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 351-53 623 Grady to Acheson (666 March 27th 1950), (703 March 31st 1950), (776 April 5th 1950), (852 April 17th 1950), FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 354-57, 361-62, Emphasis added. 624 Not the same Paul Porter who had compiled the first reports on Greece in 1945-46, but a colleague of his. 625 Grady to Acheson (666 March 27th 1950), (703 March 31st 1950), (776 April 5th 1950), (852 April 17th 1950), FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 354-57, 361-62, 272 In the United States, opposition pressure was had been steadily rising against Truman for months. There was a widespread assumption among Americans that with their policies and strength of will, the United States could control developments anywhere in the world. Part of this was due to American success in the first and second world wars and the rest of the feeling of power of their monopoly of the atomic bomb. After the loss of China to the Communists and the

Russians demonstrating their possession of the atomic bomb, the explanation for the failure of American policy that resounded with many Americans was that the

United States had been betrayed by communist sympathizers. McCarthyism found support in the Republican Party who believed that they now had an issue that could bring them back to power. In response the federal government increased loyalty investigations, and were bewildered by the Republican attacks that they had been soft on communism.626 On January 30, 1950, Pres. Truman authorized the Defence and State departments to review and reassess America's foreign and defence policies since the loss of China and the Soviet acquisition of nuclear power. The result by early April of 1950 was a report from the US National Security Council which became known as NSC number 68. This document advocated an immediate and large-scale build-up in the US military and general strength and that of US allies with the intention of altering the balance of power and through means other than all-out war, to change the nature of the Soviet system.627

364-65. Emphasis added. The crisis was largely initiated because the King objected to Plastiras becoming Prime Minister, because in 1923 he had abolished the monarchy and exiled the king’s family. NOTE: The Venizelos government proved unable to last the month and resigned on April 17th 626 Ambrose, pp. 108-111. 627 NSC 68, April 14th 1950, FRUS Vol. I, 1950, National security affairs; foreign economic policy, pp. 234-92. NSC 68 also clearly identified the economic potential of the US and Western European 273 It was not totally clear how the change in the Soviet System was to be achieved , but the authors of NSC 68 theorized that the United States could rearm itself and Western Europe and wait for the Soviets to weaken, simultaneously ensuring that the Soviets and their influence would not spread beyond their current borders. In essence it represented the next step in the expansion of the Truman doctrine which until this point had been limited to Europe in its application.628 The

Republicans were satisfied by the objectives laid out in NSC 68, however they were not prepared to allow the government to abandon Eastern Europe, Russia and

China to communism. However they presented no clear idea on how they were planning to liberate these countries. NSC 68 forecast that it would cost at least $35 billion per year to implement the program agree arming NATO and the United

States, but also stated that eventually more could be spent since it was assumed that United States was rich enough to use up to 20% of its gross national product for weapons without causing national bankruptcy.629

Truman recognized what the document meant and wrote that it represented a great effort militarily in peacetime and therefore meant dramatically increasing the budget and taxes and imposing incredible economic controls which was a drastic change for Americans in peacetime. With only two and a half years left in his term, Truman was uncertain whether or not he could get the US Congress to commit to implementing the plans of NSC 68. Therefore it was put aside for the

economies to be converted to War economies (ibid., pp. 256, 262, 282 specifically). It may be argued that significant increases in military spending in the West was initiated and has continued as a result of NSC 68’s conclusions. 628 Ambrose, pp. 111-12. 629 Ambrose, p. 112. 274 time being until another crisis would bring it to the forefront of US anti-communist policy.630

Back in Greece in the wake of the collapse of the Venizelos government, the State Department endorsed Ambassador Grady’s recommendations for the re- constitution of the government which, although the State Department was concerned that it could be construed as interference, included forming it under the plans previously agreed to with Plastiras as Prime Minister. Despite protests from the King and the Right, the proposal was approved and the State Department decided to fully support Grady and to ‘ignore criticisms and direct appeals from the monarchy or rightist elements to force Ambassador Grady to alter his present policy line.’631 This dispatch is important, not only because it shows the rare occurrence of an Ambassador being able to make and implement foreign policy decisions, but also because it shows another step in the direction that US foreign policy was going, with them beginning to dictate policy in foreign states. The relevant consideration for this work is to show the circumstances and resulting decisions that both led the US to, and indicated, the dramatic change their foreign policy had experienced over the previous decade. By April 1950, American pressure had dictated the composition of a foreign government.

630 Ambrose, pp. 112-13. 631 Memorandum Re: Grady and re-formation of Greek Government, April 18th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 365-67. The Plastiras government was ‘well received’ in the United States and the Prime Minister set to work immediately to implement economic reforms in Greece which he felt would be the ‘best defence against communism’ and could allow Greece to be a strong positive example for the West. See: Memorandum, April 21st 1950, ibid., pp. 367-69. Later the State Department sent official letters to the King and Venizelos, thanking them for their ‘support’ of Plastiras, thereby contributing to a ‘presumably more stable coalition.’ Webb to US Embassy in Greece (838) May 8th 1950, ibid., pp. 369-71. Emphasis added. 275 Meanwhile in Europe in May 1950, the chief of France's planning commissariat, Jean Monnet, urged France's Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to place all of German and French coal and steel production under common high authority within the framework of an organization that would encourage the future participation of other European nations.632 In essence, this agreement was a step towards the European Union. Considering that the US Secretary of State Dean

Acheson urged the French government to encourage the integration of the German

Federal Republic (i.e. West Germany) into Western Europe, the plan was welcomed by the Americans. The West German chancellor also supported what became known as the Schuman Plan, however, the British were much less enthusiastic to the idea.

The upper levels of the British government did not conceal their resentment that France which they had long ‘held in contempt for lacking a spine,’ had taken the initiative on a significant economic plan that was, in their view, reserved for a country (Britain) that had the right to refer to itself as a leading power of Europe.633

Basically, the British were insulted that they, unlike the Americans and the

Germans, had not been informed by the French prior to the declaration of this plan.

The French explained that this plan was followed in order to deprive the British government of the opportunity to modify or defeat the French initiative.634 As Cold

632 Richard Vaughan, Postwar Integration in Europe, (London, 1976) pp. 51-56. Reprinted memorandum, sent by Jean Monnet to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, May 4th , 1950. 633 John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 238. 634 Record of a meeting at No. 1 Carlton Gardens on 10 May 1950’ Doc 3, D.B.P.O., series II, Vol. I, p. 6. At the same time, the leader of the Liberal Party in Greece, Venizelos, had still refused to join the government because, he stated, that he could not work with Deputy Prime Minister Papandreou. The US Ambassador then approached the King and Queen and asked them to press Venizelos to join the government which they agreed to do. The US had serious doubts about 276 War tension increased, both the British and the Americans became more inclined to loosen their control over the Federal Republic of Germany in order to facilitate the German reconstruction to procure material and human resources for Western defence.635 It was in this context of the French felt that they could put forward their plan, which had the added benefit for them controlling the Ruhr and limiting the chance of Germany using it for aggression against them once again.

The main problem for the British was their postwar national strategy to focus on the Commonwealth and transatlantic obligations which ranked above those of their continental European commitments. French policy was starkly opposed to that.636 For the rest of 1950, Greece would struggle to have its objectives addressed by the British and the Americans, and instead of using the newly found and costly achieved peace in Greece to finally begin economic reconstruction, the likes of which had been taking place in Germany and Italy,

Greece was left to flounder and its economy to limp along a pre-war levels.

Meanwhile, up to the end of May 1950 the British were continuing to work on improving Greek and Yugoslav relations in an effort to widen the gap between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs, thereby bringing the Yugoslavians ever closer to the Western sphere. The British encouraged the resumption of numerous lines of

Venizelos calling him ‘capricious’ and lamenting his ‘manifest incompetence’ they were fairly certain that he would harm the Greek government personally, but they felt that his party had to participate. For Details see: Grady to Acheson (852) April 17th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, p. 364, Minor to Acheson (1081 May 11th 1950) and (1098 May 13th 1950), Acheson to US Embassy in Greece (901) May 18th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 371-73, 375-76. Ironically, Venizelos, who in April and May was seen as incompetent and self-interested, would four months later be supported by the British and Americans, simply because he stated that he was staunchly anti-communist. See page 287 and the fall of the Plastiras government. 635 William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954, (University of North Carolina Press, 1998) pp.119-120 and 124-125. 636Minute from Strang to Younger, June 2nd 1950, DBPO, Series II, Vol. I, pp. 133-34. 277 communication between Greece and Yugoslavia such as rail service, postal service, telegraph and telephone service, and possibly opening up a free trading zone in

Thessaloniki. However, the British did stress the priority of addressing the return of the abducted Greek children as a ‘moral and humanitarian question’ and they were assured that the Yugoslavian government felt the same way. However, there was a reassertion of the Yugoslavian demands for the official recognition of the

‘Macedonian’ Slavic minorities in northern Greece. The British immediately reassured the Greek government and made their opposition to the Yugoslavian demand known stating ‘this subject did not exist and that the reference which had been made to it was contrary to the spirit of the relations which were being inaugurated.’637 This was a significant statement for the British to make. It meant that under no circumstances, even considering the possibility of bringing

Yugoslavia closer to the West, were the British prepared to recognize anything that would threaten Greece's territorial or political integrity on the borders of the Iron

Curtain. However, this rare instance of support was overtaken by conflict over the unification of Greece and Cyprus.

The implications of the crises in Cyprus, China and Korea

In June 1950, the Greek Cypriots sent a delegation to Athens to speak with the Greek government and to lobby for support from Great Britain the United

States, France and elsewhere to encourage the unification of Cyprus with Greece.

Ambassador Norton stated that he had made clear that the British government opposed to such a union and that ‘intelligent Greeks may realize that the agitation

637 Record of Meeting (58), BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, May 27th, 1951 (This is likely a typing error since all of the documents in this section are dated as 1950) pp. 69-70. 278 is untimely, unwise, and liable to create a rift between their country and Great

Britain.’638 The British felt that their continued support amongst the Greeks was a direct result of their ‘unremitting defence’ of the Greek cause in the international sphere, and the long-term presence of British troops and missions in support of the reconstruction and protection of Greece during the chaotic years following the end of the second world war, which were not diminished by Greece's dependency on

American military and economic aid.639 This telegram was quite revealing about

British intentions. Copies of it were sent to the British governor of Cyprus and to the head of the British Middle East office in Cairo. The ambassador’s comments illustrate how Britain was vigorously maintaining any strategic positions that it still possessed and one of the most significant for them in the Mediterranean was

Cyprus. They would not surrender it.

Meanwhile in the United States, Truman was still receiving much criticism for being soft on Communism. Though he had initially ‘shelved’ NSC 68 as being too expensive to implement, by June 1950 international conditions had changed.

He needed an incident to spur the Congress into action and he received one on June

25th 1950 when the North Korean army crossed over 38th parallel and invaded

South Korea.

638Norton to Foreign Office (158) June 29th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp.72- 73. 639 Norton to Foreign Office (158) June 29th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp.72- 73. The situation in Cyprus would not stay calm for long in 1955 and Eaton, who became a minister, ordered the arrest of Archbishop Makarios, the spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement. This caused widespread violence in Cyprus, resulting in hundreds of deaths before the Zurich agreement of 1959 made Cyprus an independent state within the British Commonwealth. Specials arrangements were made in order to placate the Turkish minority, such as maintaining the British naval bases on Cyprus, and an American endorsement of the plan in part to fast-track decolonization. However, the British would have their hands full with the Cyprus issue over the next decades, and their failure to settle the issue earlier set the stage for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1972. For more information see: Childs, Britain Since 1945: A Political History. pp.98-99. 279 Where the crises in Greece had helped President Truman secure the funds from the United States Congress to implement the first stage of the Truman doctrine, the North Korean invasion of South Korea gave him the leverage to get

Congress to approve the funds for NSC 68. Truman also had the opportunity to finally secure funds to aid Chiang Kai-shek who was tenuously holding onto his position in Formosa. Though both Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tom Connolly stated in May

1950 that the South Korean elections may force the United States to abandon South

Korea, these statements ran contrary to the program outlined in NSC 68 and combined with the current trend of McCarthyism rising both in the government and the general population, it would have been political suicide to sacrifice South

Korea and Formosa to the Communists.640 On June 25, 1950 when the North

Korean army invaded South Korea the American president moved quickly.

He forced a resolution in new United Nations Security Council and the

General Assembly condemning the attack and branding the North Koreans as aggressors. He demanded the cease-fire and immediate return of North Korean forces behind 38th parallel.641 On June 26th 1950 President Truman released a statement formerly extending the Truman doctrine to the Pacific and pledging

United States military to intervene against any further Communist expansion in

Asia.642

640 Ambrose, p.116. 641 This was the first and only time in history for United Nations had actually taken concrete steps to punish and halt aggression. 642 Ambrose, p. 117. 280 As a result of what to them were much more pressing concerns, the State

Department instructed the Greek government to cease and discourage any talks of unification with Cyprus. While the Department stated that it could understand

Greek frustration with the British position on Cyprus and continuing Yugoslavian references to ‘Greek Slavophones,’ Acheson stated that neither constituted an immediate threat to Greece. He continued by stating that Greek nationalism would only play into the hands of the USSR and that Greece should refrain from engaging in any policy which may ‘alienate actual and potential allies.’ Acheson also criticised the Greek government for not exercising its ‘undoubted influence over

Cypriot ‘ethnarchy’ to stop enosis agitation at its source.’ He concluded by saying that the US was struggling to keep Greece afloat and could not continue to do so ‘if

Greeks continue to exhaust themselves and embarrass us by heading for such distant shores as Cyprus.’643 The British (aided by developments in Korea) managed to secure US support for another of their Eastern Mediterranean objectives. Acheson ordered another state (Greece) to alter its policy, control its population and to exert its influence over a third state (Cyprus) to achieve Anglo-

American objectives there, threatening alienation and loss of future support for

Greek failure to follow US instructions. The result of the Anglo-American decision to settle the Cyprus issue at this time without addressing any of the underlying conditions, guaranteed that conditions would worsen there over the next quarter of a century, culminating in the American-approved Turkish invasion of the island.

643 Acheson to US Embassy in Greece (1292) June 27th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 378-79. 281 Domestically in Greece, the Plastiras government was attacked as being infiltrated by Communists. It was a charge often levelled against it and echoed by the former head of the American Military Mission in Greece Lt. General Van Fleet.

He sent a message directly to the State Department which greatly alarmed the

Secretary of State who immediately sent a dispatch to the US embassy in Greece asking for clarification. Van Fleet wrote that ‘communists and fellow travellers’ had gradually regained their positions under Plastiras, and after meeting with

General Papagos, he was convinced that the current government was ‘dangerous.’

In response, the US embassy sent a somewhat contradictory dispatch to the State

Department. Firstly, seeming to support the Platiras government, they stated that they had no idea how Van Fleet, after having been absent from Greece, could possess more accurate information that they did. Charge D’affaires Minor also stated that he was disturbed that Van Fleet had not discussed any of these issues with him at the American Embassy though he had been ‘uninterruptedly on spot’ since the inception of the Plastiras government and had watch all developments closely. Minor also stated that both he and Porter had closely observed the current

Greek government and were much more qualified to comment on it than Van Fleet.

As for the comment about the ‘communists and fellow travellers,’ Minor stated that they had no evidence of this being true, and had in fact discovered that the

‘Greek Rightists’ tended to use these terms very loosely in connection with anyone who disagreed with them. Though Minor acknowledged that in a few cases, especially in labour-related positions, ‘dubious persons’ had been appointed, the

US embassy had successfully lobbied against their appointment and had them

282 removed. Finally, Minor also stated that in general the Plastiras government had followed US policy to attempt ‘reconciliation and pacification to a degree compatible with national security,’ ultimately leading to peace.644 However, after these supportive statements, Minor also stated that there was however a danger of renewed communist influence in Greece.

He said that while the Plastiras government may have taken the best path to meet Greece’s internal needs, the international situation had changed so much again (vis-a-vis Korea) that Greece had to pay more attention to external needs

‘like every other nation’ and re-focus on the ‘Communist menace.’ Minor therefore concluded that in light of the international communist threat, the Plastiras government ‘may not be the best instrument to carry out this policy.’645 The US embassy was advising the State Department that although the Greek government was following the correct path for internal Greek policy (peace and reconciliation) that international US anti-communist interests may supersede Greek domestic interests and implied that a change may be necessary. Not only does this dispatch show the beginning of the trend in US foreign policy to sacrifice the domestic good of foreign nations to satisfy US foreign policy objectives (the way the British empire had operated for centuries) but also something much more basic; individual self-interest. Though seeming to defend the Plastiras government at first, Minor’s comments seemed designed more to defend his actions in relation to the Greek

Government. He expressed insult, not only at Van Fleets conclusions, but also at

644 Minor to Acheson (222) July 19th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 380-82 645 Acheson to Minor (167), quoting Van Fleet (L576) July 17th 1950, Minor to Acheson (222) July 19th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 380-82. 283 not being consulted before Van Fleet sent them to the State Department. He then made statements to justify his course of action in relation to the Plastiras government, rather than justifying the actions of the government itself. Finally, fully demonstrating his instinct for self-preservation, he stated that international concerns had to take precedence over domestic Greek concerns, thus protecting himself from being labelled as soft on communism; a charge that was being used frequently in Washington at that time. Once again, the people of a small country were to suffer for the perceived interests of a much larger one.

British assessments of the latest Greek political crisis revolved around what they described as the ‘uncertain attitude of M. Venizelos’ whose actions were largely dictated by his dislike of Papandreou. However, though the British also acknowledged that Plastiras was no communist, because he had spent his political career ‘having fought...against the Right,’ he had ‘old friends’ who were suspected communists sympathisers. Norton also said that because Plastiras was ‘not an intelligent man’ there was the risk that he might follow the advice of these old friends and act too leniently with known communists.646A few days later, Plastiras issued a press release stating that due to international developments, leniency measures would not be extended considerably. Despite this statement, Minor stated that he felt that ‘the Prime Minister’s views on both economic and security questions indicated a lamentable (i.e. low) amount of realism.’647 On July 30th former ambassador Grady was described as reacting ‘violently’ to Van Fleet’s

646 Norton to Younger (169) July 7th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, 1950, pp. 73- 74. 647 Minor to Acheson (147) July 26th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 386-87. 284 letter, saying that Van Fleet allowed himself to be used to discredit the Plastiras government, probably by Queen Frederica. Grady stated that although Plastiras was sometime ‘fuzzy-minded...in his traditional liberalism’ he was a patriotic, non- communistic Greek. However, the State Department stated that while Van Fleet’s conclusions were more urgent than reality suggested, the US should be prepared to support a ‘stronger type of government,’ possibly under Marshall Papagos, should the Plastiras government disintegrate.648 Only a few months earlier the United

States had exercised its influence over Greece to help bring Plastiras to power and now it seemed as though they were preparing to remove him. Additionally, the

Cyprus issue would not subside.

There was significant public support in Greece for the Greek Cypriot majority to be reunited with Greece. A massive public demonstration was held on

July 21st 1950. Numerous newspapers were urging people to attend this event.

There are differing reports on the amount of people that attended, the British reporting that generally the crowd was ‘somewhat apathetic,’ but immediately prior to stating that ‘very large crowds were certainly present.’ On July 24th when the Archbishop of Athens asked to see the assistant to Ambassador Norton, Mr.

Crosthwaite, with the leader of the Cypriot delegation, the British diplomatic officer refused to meet with them. The Archbishop dropped off a separate resolution stating that Cyprus should be unified with Greece. As the Bishop turned to leave the diplomatic officer stopped him ‘explaining that I was sure that he would not expect me to enter into a discussion on the whole question of Cyprus,

648 Memorandum, July 31st 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 395-96. 285 but I wish to make one observation to him in my personal capacity.’ The diplomatic officer stated that he regretted that the Bishop had felt compelled to support the Cypriot initiative for union with Greece at the present time. He told the

Archbishop that international situation at present time was very dangerous (again referring to the war in Korea), and that it was wrong to divert the attention of the

Greek people from their far more important economic recovery to the issue of union with Cyprus. The diplomatic officer noted that Archbishop Spyridon had made similar visits to the American and French embassies as well.649

The American ambassador, following instructions from Washington (which was following British requests) informed the Greek government that officially

United States policy expected Greece to ‘concentrate all her energies on essentials rather than to follow a course from which no one would benefit except the

Russians.’ With that, the British and the Americans firmly opposed furthering the cause of Greek nationalism, ensuring that it would be an issue for future governments to deal with. In August another Cypriot delegation made its way to

Greece to lobby for union with Greece. Under pressure from the British, the

Americans, and the South Africans, the Greek government refused to endorse the demands of the Cypriot delegation. As a result the Cypriot delegation was angered and embarrassed. 650

649Crosthwaite to Bevin, (193) August 4th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 83- 84 650 Crosthwaite to Bevin, (193) August 4th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 83- 84. On August 17, 1950, Bevin intervened on behalf of the Greek government with the Bulgarian ambassador in London. Bevin questioned the ambassador on the status of the Greek children who were still being held in Bulgaria and when the Bulgarian government intended to repatriate them to Greece. After some weak denials, the Bulgarian ambassador admitted that there were still some Greek children in Bulgaria but that he did not know when they would be returned to Greece. The foreign secretary urged the Bulgarian ambassador to pressure the Bulgarian government to expedite 286 In August 1950, industrial production in Greece finally passed its 1939 levels. It was a long process but finally the British and the Americans saw some results with their massive economic aid and investment efforts in Greece.651

However these gains were threatened by considerations of dramatically expanding the Greek army due to fears of a renewed communist threat like Korea breaking out in the Balkans. Though the State Department had fully supported Grady’s assessments and policies, they decided that due to the situation in Korea, they now had ‘serious reservations about the Plastiras government and is presently considering alternative solutions.’ Greece’s new value to US strategic interests was not as a democratic example of anti communism, but rather being able to provide armed forces, which in combination with Yugoslavia, could number over 1 million anti-Soviet troops in the Balkans. Therefore, aside from abandoning the troop reductions planned the previous year that had been seen as vital to Greece’s economic rehabilitation, the United States was planning to diverted funds and supplies to increase the Greek army, immediately to 200,000 men with the possibility of another increase to 400,000.652

Politically, the anticipated crisis arrived on August 17th 1950 when

Venizelos and the Liberal party withdrew their support from the government, reportedly due to its leniency ‘towards former communists and their supporters.

the process, since the political benefits to such an action ‘might be considerable.’ See: Bevin to Mason (103) August 17th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, 1950, p. 89. 651 Crosthwaite to Bevin (190) August 4th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p.79. Indicative of Anglo-American priories, Germany and Italy had passed their pre-war economic output almost three years earlier. 652 Memorandum, August 4th 1950, Memorandum August 10th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 397-99. In this memorandum Van Fleet is quoted as saying that Venizelos may be the best choice to head a new government, despite his known weaknesses, because of his outspoken anti-communism. 287 Venizelos, whose government in April of 1950 had been described by Ambassador

Grady as ‘weak and irresponsible’653 was seen to be the choice to replace Plastiras, along with other ‘palace choices.’ Plastiras resigned on August 18th 1950, and almost immediately King Paul gave Minister Venizelos ‘the mandate to form a new government “of national union.”’654

In response to Minor’s notification, the State Department replied that they supported a government that was not headed by Plastiras and that though they supported the constitutional process to re-constitute the government under

Venizelos, they would also support new elections should Venizelos be unable to form a government. The State Department also ordered the Embassy to ‘use strongest possible influence (to) secure a majority system’ in order to avoid wide right versus left polarization that could result by maintaining the proportional electoral system.655 Though the same dispatch stated that the US was still not prepared at this time to accept Papagos as Premier (except through his participation in elections) the US was not only prepared to accept a politician they believed to be was incompetent simply because of his political stance, but they were also prepared to force Greece to change its electoral system to achieve the results they desired.

However, in order to make up for the funds that would be lost to reconstruction as a result of increasing the Greek Army, the US embassy in Greece

653 Grady to Acheson (852) April 17th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, p. 364. See reference on page 276, note 624. 654 Crosthwaite to Bevin (89) August 23rd 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, 1950, p. 89 655 Minor to Acheson (549) August 18th 1950, Acheson to Minor (513) August 19th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 399-403. 288 suggested that they make it clear to the Greeks that the crisis had to be met with

‘better collection of taxes and an increase in direct taxation.’ The embassy argued that it was a reasonable course of action in times of emergency and since it was being done back in the United States, in his opinion there was no reason why it should not be attempted in Greece. It was also suggested that such a plan be presented in a patriotic way; i.e. in support of the army, rather than focussing on increasing taxation to help reconstruction.656 Notwithstanding the fact that only the

Soviet Union had been more economically devastated by the Second World War than Greece and that the Greek people had very little, if any extra to give in taxes, it was clearly stated in the dispatch that military spending would take precedence over reconstruction, that taxes should be collected in support of military spending, and that support for the program had to be generated though a focus on patriotism.

Although by now the United States had clearly ascended to predominance in Greek affairs, the British still exerted considerable influence there as well. As a result of the Tito-Stalin split, the British government (moving to solidify its relations with possible adversaries to Stalin who were not as yet associated with

United States) pressured the Greek government to improve relations with

Yugoslavia. In September 1950 Bevin summoned the Greek Ambassador for a meeting with the British Parliamentary under-Secretary and the US Secretary of

State. 657 Bevin took the opportunity to impress upon the Greek ambassador the importance that the British government felt regarding the normalization of relations

656 Minor to Acheson (637) August 26th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 403-04. 657 Bevin to Norton (244) September 6th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 92-93.

289 between Yugoslavia and Greece. Bevin stated that in his view it was the duty of the

Greek government, in light of current world events, to reconsider the state of their relations with the Yugoslavian government. Bevin suggested that if during the next

‘4 to 5 weeks the Yugoslav and Greek governments could restore the diplomatic relations this would make the most favourable impact on the development of our common affairs.’ Bevin further stressed to the Greek ambassador that if

Yugoslavia ‘could be firmly aligned in our camp it would be a triumph for the democracies.’ In addition to the political benefit, Bevin stated that he was anxious to see an increase in tourist traffic between the two countries and that he wanted

‘ordinary British people to be able to travel freely throughout the Eastern

Mediterranean.’ He reiterated that he believed that the Greek government would have a greater chance of retrieving the children that were still being held in communist countries if they were to improve their relations with Yugoslavia and stressed again to the Greeks that should they move rapidly to normalize relations with Yugoslavia they would make a major contribution ‘to the common cause,’658 which for Bevin was British interests in the Balkans. It seemed like quite a leap of hope that the Greek government could accomplish such huge tasks in such a short time while still dealing with rebuilding its economy which only by this time had its industry surpass its 1939 levels of production.659

The Greek Ambassador responded to Bevin by stating that the Greek government had been trying for quite some time to normalize relations, but those

658 Record of Meeting (244) September 6th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 92- 93. 659 Crosthwaite to Bevin (190E) August 4th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 79- 82.

290 attempts had been hampered by the Yugoslavians ‘putting forward unacceptable claim in relation to Macedonia which, in the opinion of the Greek government, constituted a menace to their security.’ To this Bevin stated that he expected the

Greek government, rather than looking to the past, to look to the future and consider the larger issue of the West's common security requirements. Bevin and directed the Greek ambassador to accompany the British Parliamentary Under-

Secretary Mr. Davies into another room in order for Mr. Davies to convey to the

Greek ambassador, the assurances that the British had received from the

Yugoslavians regarding their intentions toward Greece. Mr. Davies assured the

Greek Ambassador that he was personally satisfied regarding the sincerity of the

Yugoslavian leaders when they asserted their desire to restore relations with

Greece. He also stated that he believed that Marshal Tito had offered personal guarantees to the British regarding the status of the territorial claims they were making in Macedonia. In addition, the respondents had requested the British

Parliamentary Secretary to convey these assertions to the Greeks directly. Mr.

Davies concluded by stating that the assurances were valid and saw no reason why the Yugoslavians communicate them directly to the Greek government. The Greek ambassador asked Mr. Davies why the Yugoslavians were unwilling to notify the

Greeks directly about their assurances which he found suspicious, particularly considering that, ‘the Yugoslavs were notoriously untrustworthy.’660 Davies replied that if the Greek government were to continue official policy based on the view that the Yugoslavian government was untrustworthy then regardless of the assurances given to the Greeks by the British, and by whatever means they were

660 Bevin to Norton (244) September 6th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p.93. 291 conveyed, nothing would be sufficient to convince the Greeks of their validity.

Davies continued stating that he simply believed that the Yugoslavians were hesitant to repeat their guarantees directly to the Greek government because it would ‘touch their pride to do so.’ Mr. Davies concluded his conversation by stating that the ‘touchiness’ of the Yugoslavians had to be tolerated, and he urged the Greek Ambassador to recommend to the Greek government to take the

Yugoslavians at their word.661 The British were forcing an ally to humble itself diplomatically in order to appease a country that until very recently had been considered an enemy because immediate British interests were better served by courting the Yugoslavians rather than supporting the Greeks. The effects of the

United States’ involvement in Greek politics were continuing to be felt at this time.

On September 12th the Venizelos government fell and was replaced with a new three-party cabinet, although Venizelos remained as Prime Minister. The

United States also informed Greece that aid would be reduced from 274 million dollars to 218 million because successive Greek governments had been unable to fully utilize American aid. 662 As a result, the Greek people would suffer the consequences on continuing foreign interference in Greek affairs that while making

Greece more dependent on foreign aid, made her less likely to be able to survive

661 Record of Meeting (244) September 6th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 92- 93. 662 Minor to Acheson (859, 899) September 14th and 16th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 405, 406-07. From January to September 1950, the Greek government was re-formed 6 times. In light of such domestic instability it is not suppressing that the Greeks were unable to fully / properly utilize the aid that was coming into the country. British sources list the Venizelos government falling on September 9th 1950. Norton to Bevin (101) September 11th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p. 93. For British reports of the reduction of American aid to Greece and the Greek public’s reaction to it see: Norton to Bevin (281) November 29th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 108-09.

292 without it. Additionally, they would be represented by a government headed by an individual externally viewed as incompetent, yet externally supported because of his political (i.e. anti-communist) views.

On September 20, 1950 in New York City after a meeting of the UN

General Assembly, Bevin spoke with a representative of the Greek government M.

Kannelopoulos and stated that he was more convinced than ever that Greece had to come together and resume their diplomatic relations because ‘the Russians were endeavouring to lull us into a false sense of security and that this might well mean trouble either for the Greeks or the Yugoslavs.’ He continued claiming that it was his belief that it was vital to the security of Europe that the coast of the

Mediterranean should be strengthened from Italy to Turkey.663 In private discussions with the United States in London, the Foreign Office stated that they would attempt to prevent the Cyprus issue from being raised in the General

Assembly, not only because of Turkish issues, but because Cyprus ‘had considerable value’ as a military base. In reference to the Military situation in the

Balkans they agreed that in the event of an attack on Greece, UN action similar to that taking place in Korea was likely the best solution, although they believed that such an attack was not likely at the time. Additionally, though both Britain and the

United States favoured increasing economic and diplomatic relations between

Greece and Yugoslavia, Tito was making rapprochement more difficult because his

663 Record of Meeting (no. 27, RG 10392/101) September 27th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, pp. 99-100. 293 territorial claims against Greek Macedonia and the 10 to 20000 Greek children that were still missing.664

1950 was clearly a year of transition in American policy towards Greece.

Prior to 1950, the Americans favoured ‘moderate’ and representative governments, however, the arrival of the new US Ambassador John Peurifoy on September 22nd

1950, demonstrated clearly the shift from democracy to stability in Greece that had been growing in US policy.665 On September 27th 1950 the Greek ambassador informed Bevin that Tito was making use of the Greek minority in Yugoslavia to organize anti-Greek government newspapers. He also stated that the Yugoslavians were actively unsettling the Macedonian minority in northern Greece and as a result no Greek political party would be able to survive an election if it were to support the resumption of Yugoslavian and Greek diplomatic relations without first having resolved the issue of Yugoslavian intentions towards northern Greece. In

New York Ambassador Politis also stated that in his view the Yugoslavians knew that in order to receive Western aid they had to provide assurances of their intentions. However, these assurances had no relation to actual alterations in their behaviour. The Ambassador concluded by saying that as long as the Yugoslavians continued to act in this manner, any government would be unable to explain to the

Greek Parliament and Greek public why they were compared to resume diplomatic relations. He also stated that it was not Greece's interest to settle these issues while

664 Memorandum, September 16-23 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 407-09. 665 Lagani, ‘US Forces in Greece.’ p. 310. See also: Peurifoy to Secretary of State (1055) September 27th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 416-17. 294 it was the Yugoslavians who would benefit most.666 Bevin stated then that if indeed the Yugoslavians were behaving in such an aggressive manner then it appeared as though the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two Balkan nations would be impossible at the time being and stated that he would report the developments to the British government.667

Next, Greek ambassador Politis met Bevin in New York to discuss Greece's admittance into NATO. Probably as a result of the Greek government's negligence to force the issue of reconciliation with Yugoslavia Bevin stated that it was not the right time for Greece to enter the Atlantic pact. He stated that since she was

‘already in a very special position vis-a-vis the United States in that she had

President Truman’s security guarantee and also a special vote of Congress, as a result of which she was receiving equipment and economic help. Bevin stated that therefore Greece could receive no preferential treatment and would have to wait and take her place in the line-up with the other European countries.668 Where in the past Bevin had demonstrated his power by forcing issues through the Parliament,

Cabinet, the Prime minister and even the government of the United States, in this instance, as he had done the previous year, he used omission of action and feigned weakness to punish Greece for not following his policy objectives in regards to rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

However, in a departure from unanimity with the British, the US was preparing to consider Greece’s entry into NATO, but first wanted Greece and

666 Record of Meeting (no. 27, RG 10392/101) September 27th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p. 99. 667 Record of Meeting (27) September 27th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p. 100. 668Atlee to Norton (266) October 4th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p. 104. 295 Turkey to come to some sort of military understanding. They approved Greek initiatives to approach the Turkish General staff and the US ambassador in Ankara reported that the Turks were ‘friendly’ to the idea, but for them an agreement was contingent upon US participation, and though initially reluctant to promise such participation, by the end of October 1950, both Greece and Turkey were given invitations by the United States to enter NATO and to coordinate in Eastern

Mediterranean defence.669

Anglo-American policy had successfully kept Greece from falling into the

Soviet sphere of influence, but the prosperity and cohesiveness of the Greek government and society were sacrificed to do it. A meeting between King Paul and US Ambassador James Peurifoy on November 3rd 1950, clearly illustrated not only the American focus on stability over democracy, but foreshadowed the steps that would be taken that would lead Greece to the crisis over Cyprus and the dictatorship of the 1960s.

The King informed the ambassador that although he had given the Mandate to Venizelos to form a government (again) he did not expect it to last very long. If and when it fell, the king would ask George Ventiris to head a caretaker government which would govern until elections could be held 45 days later. In these elections he would ask Marshall Papagos to form and lead a Nationalist Party to compete and the king was certain that ‘the majority of Greece’s best men would flock to the Field Marshal’s banner.’ Ambassador Peurifoy told King Paul that he

669 Webb to Peurifoy (1088) October 4th 1950, Peurifoy to Acheson (1182) October 5th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp.424- 26. Turkey was invited September 19th 1950 and Greece was invited On October 16th 1950. 296 believed the king to have arrived at the best decision for Greece and that he could count on the US embassy’s full support.670

With the State department supporting Peurifoy’s statements, the United

States paved the way for the Greek military to enter politics again. Despite concerns over steps that Papagos had already taken to control the gendarmerie in addition to his control of the army, the US State Department said that provided he entered politics freely (i.e. without control from the king and resigning as head of the military) and that he was democratically elected, they would support any strong and stable Greek government.671 The shift in US foreign policy was virtually complete. Not only had military spending taken precedence over economic rebuilding, but the nature of the democratic process in Greece was subjected to international political and military concerns. Perhaps the strongest proof of British influence over US policy in Greece was that by November 1950, the United States was supporting the Greek Monarchy where in 1945 they had disagreed with the

British over their support of King George. The British assessed the new Venizelos government as weak, and needing American and British advice to help it deal with

‘this tangle of internal Greek politics.’672

Perhaps most significant result of this Anglo-American ‘advice’ and support of King Paul’s initiative was maintaining the possibility for military officers to enter Greek politics. Papagos would resign from the military and

670 Peurifoy to Acheson (1503) November 4th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 432-33. 671 Acheson to Peurifoy (1547) November 9th 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 433-35. 672 Norton to Bevin (281) November 29th 1950, BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 27, p. 110.

297 become a minority Prime Minister in May 1951. By November 1952, he would lead a majority government in the Greek Parliament.

As Papagos was making his political career a reality, just as the Americans had done with Greek claims for War reparations against Italy and Germany, in

September 1951 the Peace treaty between the United States and Japan dismissed

British, Australian and Chinese demands for reparations.673 American estimations of the value of Germany and Japan as barriers against communism, vital to

American national security interests, easily superseded not only the legal rights and economic needs of Allied / occupied nations for reparations, but the basic need and moral right for their people to receive justice. The shift to the ‘new’ American foreign policy of the second half of the 20th century had taken place, and its effects would be felt for decades to come.

673 Ambrose, p. 123. 298 Conclusion and Future Studies

This dissertation attempted to add a new dimension to the historiography of the period from 1946 to 1950 in Greek History. The events that took place in

Greece during this period had a profound impact on international events and therefore requires much more investigation and revision. Additionally, the historiography of Anglo-American relations has not completely examined the dynamics of Anglo-American relations in Greece, the effect these relations had in international developments, or the ways in which their relations in Greece shaped their relations for the rest of the twentieth century.

In examining the history of Anglo-American policy in Greece from 1946 to

1950, and the associated developments world-wide during this period, it seems that

Churchill’s classification of the relationship between Britain and the United States as “a special relationship” was incorrect. Based on the preceding analysis, in combination with knowledge of Anglo-American relations in over the second half of the 20th Century, it seems much more accurate to classify theirs as ‘the’ special relationship of the latter half of the 1900s. If one considers ‘special’ to also include influence, not only on events but also on methods of intervention, interaction and diplomacy, and considering the way in which other powers have followed Anglo-

American examples in their foreign policy, then the suitability of the above classification becomes clear.

299 By 1950, the shift from the US being the ‘arsenal of democracy’ in

December 1940 to the arsenal for containment was virtually complete, and the success of British manipulation of American politics in the late 1940s can be seen by every US president since Truman basically maintaining the policies that he implemented with their ‘assistance.’ In order to see clearly the degree of influence that Britain had over American policy, and the degree of consistency in British policy throughout the 1940s, consider the following table:

Country Years Party Desired / Desired / supported supported international Policy regime type in Greece Britain 1940-45 Conservative Monarchy Empire / Alliances

1945-48 Labour Monarchy Empire /Alliances

1948-50 Labour Monarchy Empire / Alliances / Cold War

United 1940-45 Democrats No interest/ Isolationism / States democracy Winning the War

1945-48 Democrats Republic / Internationalism democracy (UN), Containment

300 1948-50 Democrats Monarchy Alliances / Empire

Considering how far apart British and American policy were in 1945, both in regards to Greece and in relation to international policy, the shift in US policy to support British objectives was remarkable. Aside from the international ramifications of the Cold War, the effects on the people of Greece were equally dramatic. Once the US was assured of Greece’s position in the Western sphere of influence, they became much less willing to accept Greek government proposals.674

As has occurred repeatedly with Greece’s current commitments to implement financial reform, in the late 1940s, the more Greece committed to one side (i.e. the

West) the less willing that side was to offer better terms / considerations.675

Another important effect of the British use of Greece to anchor the

Americans to involvement in European affairs can be seen by examining the document NSC-68. It is here that the importance of the American and British experience in Greece must be stated. Many of the conclusions of NSC 68 were drawn from the United States’ experience in Greece. The document echoes the thousands of dispatches and reports processed by the State Department from 1946 until 1949 and formed the basis for American foreign policy for the next 50 years.

It appears as though NSC 68 was the result of the British successfully linking

674 See Page 256. 675 Ironically, the EU/IMF / WB offer less flexibility to Greece the more its politicians commit to the austerity package and reforms. 301 British and American interests in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean.676 The effects in Greece were equally significant.

Compared to the massive amounts of aid given to Greece by the British and the Americans, the aid provided to the KKE by the USSR and other Communist nations was insufficient to secure a KKE victory. The KKE consistently opposed

British initiatives in Greece, particularly where the economy and government were concerned, based on the assumption that when the time came the Soviet Union would lend its assistance. Therefore, it may be argued that the success of British

Policy in Greece was at least partially due to Stalin’s fear of giving the British and the Americans an excuse to become involved in Eastern European affairs.

The war had bankrupted the Albion, and though it had managed to survive, and though it was successful in many of its objectives for Greece and its strategic interests in the Mediterranean, British success did not come without a price. It was paid not only by the British, but by the people of Greece, and for them British

Policy must be considered a failure. Though it was the politicians who lamented the loudest about the injustices of the postwar period in Greece, and while the leaders of the various factions on all sides of the political spectrum in Greece fought amongst themselves, their people were suffering, it was the common Greek who went without food, clothing, medicine and security, and it is in their memory that this study was undertaken.

What is also remarkable was the short-sightedness of the British and

American governments with respect to many of their policies. Certainly, the British

676 Examining the ways in which NSC-68 revealed US perceptions of and intentions towards European Integration and Identity, would form an excellent basis for future studies in this field. 302 were attempting to return their country to greatness, or at least to prevent further degradation of their power which was a long-term objective, but the methods with which they pursued that objective were extremely ‘present-oriented.’ Was the inability of these states to plan for the long-term a reflection of the fact that their elected officials were in place for only 4-5 years? In comparison, some authoritarian states planned for the long-term while the democracies’ leaders did not. As a result, British and American policy as it related to Greece in the early years of the Cold War, and to the rest of the world for that matter, repeatedly failed to achieve stability. Soviet policy on the other hand, was remarkably consistent by comparison.

Another direct consequence of British manipulation of the United States was that by manipulating the Americans into assuming responsibility for

“safeguarding Western freedom” against communist expansion, for both American and British form policy for the next 50 years. When Pres. Truman was elected in

1945 he led a country that fully expected to return to the traditional military and civil relations and the historic American foreign-policy of non-intervention and isolation. He began and completed the most rapid demobilization of armed forces in modern history, yet when he left the White House there was an American military presence on every continent on the earth. There was an enormously expanded weapons industry. He gave the United States nuclear bombs and he rearmed Germany. He forced through peace treaty with Japan that dismissed

Chinese, Canadian, Australian, and British demands for reparations. By placing

American military bases all over the world he successfully hemmed in Russia and

303 China. Though Korea taught the Americans not to push into communist territory, he also showed the communists that any expansion would not be tolerated and would be met by force. The measure of the success of his policy is that every subsequent American president up to the present has followed in his footsteps, however, the price of his policy is difficult to ascertain.

The untold billions of dollars spent on the military for Cold War objectives may never be known. Dwight D. Eisenhower's farewell address that stated ‘in the councils of government, must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought by the military-industrial complex,’ was quickly forgotten and replaced by Kennedy's inaugural address ‘let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty. This much we pledge - and more.’677

For Great Britain the continued success of their policies were now permanently tied to United States financially and militarily. Pax Brittania was replaced by Pax Americana, and the British never realized their objective of regaining their preeminent status on the world stage. The world the British found themselves in was hanging between United States on one side and Communist

Russia and China on the other. In the middle was Europe and the Third World who would be used as pawns is a new method of warfare was experimented with time and time again.

Greece was the first country to experience these policies and their effects.

Greece was the first country where the post-World War II foreign-policy of

677 Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, quoted in: Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, pp. 122-126, 151, 171. 304 superpowers was implemented. The success of these policies will depend upon the criteria used in the definition. If success is defined as being anti-Communist, as the

British and the Americans defined it, then the story of Greece is a success.

However, if success is defined differently, if it is defined as being able to successfully and rapidly rebuild economic and social stability, than British and

American foreign policy was a catastrophic failure for the new style of foreign- policy that was being attempted there. Only Russia was devastated more than

Greece by the Second World War, and by the mid-1950s Greece was still 10 years behind in its recovery than the rest of Western Europe. There were still close to 1 million refugees, and twenty-eight thousands of children were still missing from the Civil War. The government’s right wing tendencies were filling Greece's prisons, and when the British and Americans have the opportunity in the summer of 1949, once the communist insurgency was defeated militarily, to help the

Greeks build a representative, modern, impartial and functioning government, they failed. They turned their attention to the other ‘hot spots’ in the world and allowed the Greek government and people to flounder. Greece was also severely damaged by British and American denials of Greek claims for German and Italian reparations. Anglo-American policy placed much greater importance on war-time enemies’ reconstruction efforts than those of their wartime ally, and it can be argued that Greece is still paying the price today.

With British urging, the Americans provided money and weapons to the

Greek government which once it was done in fighting the communists, would be turned against its own people for the next 25 years. Though not the same extent as

305 the atrocities that occurred in Latin America under American stewardship, the right-wing Greek government, overseeing the country that invented democracy, either by deliberate action, or blinded by years of hatred and fear deprived its people of the concept their ancestors invented.

The official British memorandum to the State Department indicating that they were unable to aid Greece any further, was the first concrete evidence of the

British plan to manipulate the United States into assuming support for their strategic interests.678 Furthermore, the fact that in the spring of 1948 the British informed the Americans that they would allow their troops to remain in Greece for an indefinite period also indicates their manipulation of the United States into believing that the British situation was more desperate then it actually was.679 The

British were able to exercise such control over the Americans at this time due to the wartime efforts of the BSC (the wartime British spies in Washington) and the postwar BIS, both of which were incredibly successful, not only at manipulating officials in office (like the role they played in helping remove Vice President

Wallace from office in 1944) but also from their knowledge of and control over

American Public sentiment. In wartime Greece, the SOE played a similar but more military role in Greece, and the British translated that wartime power into post-war influence through the British army, through British funds, and then by manipulating the United States into taking over.

Despite the promise of American aid, the British still played a significant role in Greece beyond October 1947 when the American aid program actually

678 Frasier, pp.179-181. The debate on these issues is ongoing, exemplified by the works of Frasier and Alexander. 679 Jones, p. 154. 306 began. The United States had no established intelligence service the likes of which

Great Britain possessed, and as a result they were dependent upon Britain for intelligence, not only in Greece, but in Europe as a whole. As the Soviet threat continued to grow in 1947, the Americans finally decided that it was time to take action and they did so in an overwhelming manner, sending millions of dollars in aid and military supplies to fight the DSE. As it was for the Axis in the Second

World War, once the Americans became involved it was only a matter of time for the DSE until it was defeated. With little significant international aid, the DSE was unable to last the decade in Greece being defeated in November 1949. Whatever the motivations and fears of the parties involved in Greece, the end result of the actions the KKE and the three superpowers was that many Greeks suffered and died. There were almost a million casualties in the occupation and civil war out of a population of only eight million, and that, more than anything else seems to be the sad truth of this ‘moment’ in time. Perhaps Britain’s Ambassador, Sir C.

Norton, delivered the best summary of this dark chapter in Greek history.

The sufferings caused by the war and occupation, the growth of the Greek maquis, its demolitions and the inevitable German reprisals, the final outbreak of civil war and its suppression by British troops have left, besides material destruction, black memories, vendettas, fears and hatreds which will not die out in our time.680

Unfortunately, he was right.

As for the Soviet Union, of the three great powers involved in Greece, only it experienced the total failure of its foreign policy. Stalin was extremely cautious when dealing with Greece because he did not wish to encourage western

680 BDFA, Series F Europe, Part IV, Vol. 5, Doc R 8332 / 1 / 19, p. 327. 307 intervention. However, he was so cautious that events in Greece overtook his policy decisions. The outbreak of Civil War at the end of 1946 convinced the

United States of the USSR’s militaristic intentions, whether they were real or perceived, and as a result, the “strategic commitment” of the United States to

Greece that Stalin had hoped to avoid was realised. 681 Though the Soviet Union officially maintained its "hands off" policy towards Greece from 1944 until the end of the Civil war in 1949, the Greek Communists received aid from neighbouring communist countries, but it was not enough to compete with the American financial and military aid that was guaranteed to the Greek government.

The answers to the question of whether or not British foreign policy in

Greece from the beginning of the Second World War until the beginning of the

Cold War was adopted / copied and implemented by the United States will vary depending upon the criteria used in the analysis of these events. From the outset, the Foreign Office was determined to re-install King George and that objective was accomplished. In addition, the British were determined to prevent Greece from falling under the Soviet sphere of influence and, whether that occurred because of the percentages agreement and the resulting British actions in Greece, the US involvement in Greece or a combination of the two, they were successful in this objective as well. Also, if in the long-term, Britain failed to exclusively retain

Greece in her sphere of influence, it was at least kept in the Western sphere of influence. And whether or not the Americans felt manipulated, they did assume

Britain’s responsibilities in Greece. 682 American involvement in Greece also

681 Stavrakis, “Soviet Policy in Areas of Limited Control,” pp. 228-229. 682 Frasier, pp. 145-154. 308 represented a change in the balance of power in the world as the pre-war superpowers of Britain, France and Germany were replaced by the Soviet Union and the United States.

However, the British maintained their roles as advisors in Greece, and they observed reported on and recommended courses of action to deal with the worsening conditions of the escalating civil war. Underscoring these developments was the fear that the British and the United States had of the USSR and its rapid expansion. Greece was a problem for the West, and both the Americans and the

British experienced their share of successes and setbacks in their policies there.

Although the British played a significant role in designing American policy, especially for Greece, the impact that domestic US considerations had on official American policy cannot be ignored. The political benefits of an increasing

Cold War were exploited by both Republicans and Democrats in their efforts to gain control of the white house and congress. Therefore, the wellbeing of the people of Greece was tied to political expediencies of the government of the USA.

Looking ahead to the early 1950s and the ascension of Greece into NATO and the changes that brought about in Greek Foreign Policy, it is also important to note the conflict that arose between Greece and Britain over Cyprus. As a result of their believe in their ability to restore the British Empire and their determination to regain their Great power status, in the mod 1950s the British were determined to retain their influence in the Middle East and especially in Cyprus. When the pressure for unification with Greece rose and the Greek government was claiming

309 Cyprus, the British unsurprisingly opposed Greek Policy.683 The British determination to retain Cyprus after having given up their influence in India and

Pakistan, the ‘Crown Jewels’ of the British empire, is a good indicator of how desperate the British were to maintain their position in world affairs.

In the final analysis, what essentially occurred between December 1946 and

November 1950 was, in essence, a ‘perfect storm’ for the British to get American financial and military guarantees against the USSR. From the domestic interests in

Britain that were more willing to accept American aid than to reduce foreign expenditures, to American business that was dependent upon US government aid to foreign governments to purchase their products, to the Czechoslovakian coup and the Berlin Airlift which convinced even the most ardent critics or Atlee and Bevin of the Soviet’s plans of conquest. Greece was caught in the middle of the game played between the superpowers, and the brief period of early 1948 when the

Americans considered pulling out of Greece, quickly disappeared in the conflagration of international politics. The resulting method of intervention has been repeated numerous times since. It was a system of foreign intervention, beneath the surface of the official explanations, to create a system of government- sponsored commercial consumption, and 70 years later, the same thing is taking place in Tibet, Iraq, Georgia, and Afghanistan.

It is a system propagated by unmitigated greed, and the apathy of the general public who refuse or are unwilling to hold those they elect or allow to be elected responsible for the decisions they make. In the words of the 5th US president, James Monroe,

683 Hatzivassiliou, p. 3. 310 it is only when the people become ignorant and corrupt, when they degenerate into a populace, that they are incapable of exercising their sovereignty. Usurpation is then an easy attainment, and a usurper soon found. The people themselves become the willing instruments of their own debasement and ruin.

Referring once again to the farewell address of President Eisenhower in

1961,684 looking not only at Greece since the end of the Second World War, but the rest of the world as well, it would seem that humanity has not been vigilant and has allowed undue influence to permeate almost every facet of life on Earth. The question for future historians will be what did humanity do about it? A society must be judged, not by the health of its military, but by the health of its people.

In can therefore be argued that in the case of Greece, American military aid virtually guaranteed that political and social development would be held back. The entire machinery of government from taxation to the military could function as it willed to the detriment of the Greek people, because as long as Greece was not communist, the US would continue to supply money and equipment to the military.

The Greek Government was never forced to embark on sweeping reformation in order to be able to be self sufficient. Those in positions of power in Greece were kept there by external influence, free to continue their self-gratifying, fruitless and destructive games of politics while the Greek people were left in a vacuum with no voice and correspondingly, little control over their lives. By 1950, incompetent

Greek politicians, so often blamed by the British and Americans for their lack of ability to accomplish the most basic of reforms, found themselves not only

684 Previously cited on Pages 303-04. He warned against such a degradation, saying that the price of freedom was vigilance ‘against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex.’ 311 employed, but supported in a system maintained by those who had previously heavily criticized them. It was done to maintain the size and strength of a Greek army, that, while well trained and equipped, was known to have no chance of stopping a possible Soviet invasion of Greece.685

Though the fear of communism was used both publically and in secret by the British and American governments to both design and justify their foreign policy, there seemed to be another factor involved. When examining the British and American documents from 1949 and 1950, neither government believed that a communist invasion of Greece was likely and yet they continued to use the threat of such an invasion to motivate their own governments and populations to action.

In much the same way as the fear of bankruptcy is being used to force

Greeks into accepting foreign economic directives now, in the late 1940s the fear of Communism was used it to try and increase and reform taxation. The Americans also cancelled a substantial amount of aid that had been promised to Greece because the Greek government had not been efficient enough at implementing the measures of the aid agreement. The cut off was intended to be ‘a solemn warning to the Greek political world that the United States government was not prepared to waste money in Greece.’ Furthermore, if Greece wanted to continue to receive aid, then its government would have to agree to numerous concessions.686

685 One needs only to look at the debt burden of these nations today to see the legacy of accepting, bearing and continuing to waste unknowable amounts of money on the indulgence of fear, continued trough manipulation, and sold to the public through politics. 686 See Paul Porter’s reports from 1950. Norton to Bevin (281) November 29th 1950, BDFA, Series F, Part IV, Vol. 27 1950, pp.60-61, and, Report Regarding the Greek Aid Cut, October 20th 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. V. The Near East, South Asia and Africa, pp. 426-31. It may lead one to wonder if reparations were denied to Greece, not for the benefit of having Germany and Italy as economic bulwarks against communist expansion, but rather to keep Greece weak and dependant on foreign aid. 312 The conditions of 2013 are not so different from those of 1950 and once again Greeks find themselves bombarded with fear and uncertainty, feeling powerless, at the mercy of foreign countries that make money off the ‘aid packages.’ They are also lead by what is seen as a powerless government that is often perceived as being unable to maintain internal order in Greece. The British and the Americans sacrificed the long-term well-being not only of the Greeks but of their own people for the sake of a war that would never come.

In the end, perhaps the answer to the question of whether or not the

Americans were truly manipulated by the British into changing their policy towards Greece and their international policy, is best left open to debate. The is answer is based on interpreting 1000’s of documents produced during this period and tracking the often subtle changes in US policy after British action. Though there is no American document that I have found that specifically states that they were manipulated, this is perhaps not so surprising since no government would like to admit foreign control. However, there are some who may say that because such a document does not exist (or at least has not yet been found) that the conclusions of this dissertation are not proven. That may be true. However, much of the work of a diplomatic historian must be done without grand, all-confirming statements, simply because governments either avoid making them, or classify them until everyone who could be affected by them is dead. Lacking such direct and revealing sources, the sources I used, nonetheless, seemed to indicate British manipulation of

US policy throughout the 1940s. I must leave it to the reader to draw his or her own conclusions.

313 314 Bibliography

Unpublished Primary Sources

a) The National Archives (TNA) Kew, England b) National Archives in Washington c) The Truman Library d) North Carolina University

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Future Foreign Publicity Policy’, January 4th 1948; CAB 129 23, CP (48) 8

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317 Letter from the Acting Chairman of the Delegation of Greece to the Secretary- General, December 3rd 1946, and Enclosed Memorandum', (18181, FO 371/5889)

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330 Appendix 1

GREECE EUROPE

1936 1936- German troops re-occupy the Metaxas takes power and outlaws the Rhineland KKE. 1939- Germany invades Poland. 1940 1940 Oct 28th, Italy invades Greece. Aug 12th, Germany launches Operation 1941 Sea Lion. Jan , Metaxas refuses British offer of Aug 25th, Britain begins to bomb Berlin. aid. Aug to Sept, British win the Battle of Jan 29th, Metaxas dies. 58, 000 British Britain. troops are sent to Greece. 1941 April 20th, Greece surrenders to April 6th, Germany invades Greece Germany. through Yugoslavia. April 27th, Germans occupy Athens. June 22nd, Germany invades the May 30th, Germans capture Crete. USSR. Sept, EAM formed by the KKE. Sept 3rd, Germans reach Leningrad. 1942 Dec 7th, Japan attacks US navy at Pearl Spring, King George II and P.M Harbour. Tsouderos visit the Middle East. Dec 8th, Britain and USA declare war on Summer, 1st ELAS battalions take the Japan. field in Mt. Olympus region. Dec 11th, Germany and Italy declare Aug, Zervas begins to organise EDES. war on USA, which reciprocates. Sept, Gorgopotamos railway bridge 1942 destroyed in first and only joint Greek Sept 13th, Germans launch main attack resistance action. on Stalingrad. 1943 Oct 23rd, Axis withdraws across North July, National Bands Agreement is Africa to Tunisia following the Battle of brokered by BLO’s to coordinate El Alamein. resistance between Right and Left wing Nov 8th, Allies launch Operation Torch Andartes. and land in North Africa. Aug, First armed clashes occur Nov 19th, the Red Army launches a between ELAS and EDES. winter offensive that surrounds the Oct, after the Italian Government’s German troops at Stalingrad. surrender, the Italian forces in Greece 1943 are disarmed, and in some cases Jan 31st, General Von Paulus executed. surrenders the German forces at 1944 Stalingrad. May 17th – 21st, Lebanon Conference Feb-May, RAF begins massive attempts to reconcile differing parties bombing campaign on German cities. and to form a Government of National May 2nd, USSR announces the unity. dissolution of the COMINTERN. Sept 26th, “Casserta Agreement” May 12th, Axis armies in North Africa defines the areas in which the surrender. resistance groups could assert July 10th, Allies launch Operation Husky themselves while simultaneously and land in Sicily. placing them under the command of July 5th –10th, German Army launches 331 GREECE EUROPE

General Scobie. an attack at Kursk in the largest tank Sept, Germans withdraw from the battle of the War. Peleponnese. Oct 13th, Italian Government Oct 18th, Government of National Unity Surrenders. lands in Piraeus just as the last German Nov 28th to Dec 1st, Tehran Conference troops are leaving Greece. takes place in Iran Dec 3rd, Demonstration in Athens leads 1944 to the outbreak of hostilities between June 4th, Allies enter Rome. EAM/ELAS and the British. June 6th, Operation Overlord begins 1945 with the D-Day landings in Normandy. Jan 1st, Archbishop Damaskinos Aug 22nd, Allies enter Paris. nominated as regent. Sept 29th, Red Army invades Jan 8th, ELAS leaders agree to end Yugoslavia. hostilities by midnight on Jan 15th. Oct, Red Army invades Hungary. Jan 10th, Former EAM/ELAS members Dec 16th, Germans launch an offensive Stratis and Tsirinokos defect and form that became known as the Battle of the their own parties. Bulge. Feb 12th, Varkiza Agreement signed 1945 and outlines the program of the new Feb 4th-11th, Yalta Conference takes government. place. May, Nikos Zacharides, prewar leader Feb 15th, Allies reach the Rhine. of the KKE returns to Greece. April 20th, Red Army enters Berlin. June, Aris Velouchiotis killed near Arta April 30th, Hitler commits suicide in fighting the National Guard. Berlin. 1946 May 2nd, Berlin surrenders. Jan 21st, Greek Government declares May 7th, Germany surrenders martial law in the Southern unconditionally. Peloponnese. June 5th, Allies finalise the division of Jan 24th, Anglo-Greek pact gives Germany into US, British, French and Greece 10.5 million pound loan. Soviet zones of occupation. Mar 31st, Greek general election held on July 17th to Aug 2nd, Potsdam recommendation of the British, despite Conference takes place. Coincides with a boycott of the elections by the KKE. the British election that elects Attlee as Apr 18th, Tsaldaris becomes Greek Prime Minister. Prime Minister. Sept 2nd, Japan Surrenders Sept 1, Greek Plebiscite paves the way Nov 20th, Nuremburg trials begin. for the return of the Greek Monarchy. 1946 Coincides with intensified fighting st between the Right and Left. Jan 1 , Soviet-Polish pact confirms the th Curzon Line. Sept 28 , King George II returns to th Athens. Mar 5 , Churchill gives a speech in the 1947 USA that calls on western democracies th to oppose the USSR. February 19 – Britain informs US State th department that it can offer no further July 15 , Truman signs a bill of credit for 3.75 billion dollars for Britain. assistance to Greece whatsoever. nd April 14th, Markos Vafeiades, leader of Dec 2 , Byrnes (USA) and Bevin the DSE ordered to switch from guerrilla (Britain) agree to the economic fusion tactics to conventional warfare. of the US and British zones of 1948 occupation in Germany. 1947 Mar 12th, Truman Doctrine declared. 1948 332 Appendix 2: The United States Foreign Assistance Program as of December 31, 1949

From: FRUS 1949, Vol. I, National security affairs, foreign economic policy, p. 754.

333