Anglo-American Policy in Greece (1946-50): A Study on the Politics of Fear, Manipulation and the Origins of the Cold War By Spero Simeon Zachary Paravantes B.A, Thompson Rivers University, 2000 M.A, Simon Fraser University, 2009 DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies © Spero Simeon Zachary Paravantes 2013 UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA THESSALONIKI June 2013 All Rights Reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or by other means, without permission of the author. Disclaimer This version of my dissertation, though reviewed and edited after my defence, is still not complete and ready for publication. When a version of this dissertation is published, it will likely contain differences from this text. Whether these are differences in sources, arguments, conclusions, formatting, findings, etc., the published version shall be considered and acknowledged as containing my views and findings, and will supersede this version. ii Abstract While trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo- American foreign policy in the pre and early years of the Cold War, the role that perception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became a central focus. From this point came the realization of a general lack of emphasis and research into the ways in which the British government managed to convince the United States government to assume support for worldwide British strategic objectives. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this dissertation. This work attempts to provide a new analysis of the role that the British played in the dramatic shift in American foreign policy from 1946 to 1950. To achieve this shift (which also included support of British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean) this dissertation argues that the British used Greece, first as a way to draw the United States further into European affairs, and then as a way to anchor the United States in Europe, achieving a guarantee of security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of Western Europe. To support these hypotheses, this work uses mainly the British and American documents relating to Greece from 1946 to 1950 in an attempt to clearly explain how these nations made and implemented policy towards Greece during this crucial period in history. In so doing it also tries to explain how American foreign policy in general changed from its pre-war focus on non-intervention, to the American foreign policy to which the world has become accustomed since iii 1950. To answer these questions, I, like the occupying (and later intervening) powers did, must use Greece as an example. In this, I hope that I may be forgiven since unlike them, I intend not to make of it one. My objectives for doing so lie not in justifying policy, but rather in explaining it. This study would appear to have special relevance now, not only for the current financial crisis which has placed Greece once again in world headlines, but also for the legacy of the Second World War and the post-war strife the country experienced which is still playing out today with examples like the Distomo massacre, German war reparations and on-going social, academic and political strife over the legacy of the Greek Civil War. iv Preface: Considering that the origin of the names of Britain, the United States of America and Russia, are found in Ancient and Byzantine Greek,1 it is perhaps not surprising that these states played such major roles in the history of the Modern Greek State. As a Greek-Canadian having grown up in Canada, I was presented with the stories of wartime Greece from my father and uncle. After initial studies into the field of Modern Greek studies I realised that the stories I had heard as a child were not just stories, but were their recollections and perceptions of very real events. Upon further studies, though I discovered that in some instances their perceptions differed from actual events, this realization led me to the larger issue of the role that perception plays (not only on an individual level, but also on a collective level) in the formation of ideas and the formulation of policy. Therefore, while trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-American foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War, the role that perception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became the central focus. From this starting point came the realization of a general lack of emphasis and research into the ways in which the British government managed to convince the United States government to assume support for British objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this dissertation. 1 Russia comes from Ros (Byzantine for Red) America from Amerigio (Italian derivation of Geia) and Britain from (Bretannia) named by an ancient Greek explorer. v During the period under examination, the Security Council became the arena where the Soviet Union and the United States (initially with British urging but then succumbing to domestic anti-communist pressure) ‘felt each other out’ and used Greece to do it. The former Wartime allies finally came to the relationship predicted by Winston Churchill and General George Patton, and Greece became a pawn the Superpower shuffle that was the beginning of the Cold War. vi Dedication To my mother. May her memory be eternal. vii Acknowledgements First, I must extend my deepest thanks to my supervisor Professor Irini Lagani. I cannot begin to express the gratitude that I feel towards her for accepting me as her student, for mentoring me, for guiding the progress of my dissertation, and for her constant support. She also accepted me as her student without ever having met me, and aided me greatly in the adjustment to academic life overseas and away from home over the past three and a half years. I will always be grateful. I would also like to extend deep appreciation to the second member of my supervisory committee Professor Nikos Marantzidis. Like Professor Lagani did, he welcomed me into the department, and has supported and encouraged me at every step though the completion of my PhD. He also gave me my first teaching opportunity, and showed faith in me by allowing me to design the course and the materials. His belief in me bolstered my own. I must also thank the third member of my supervisory committee Professor Theodoseos Karvounarakis. He greatly assisted me with the technical aspects of my dissertation, finding sources that were vital to my research, and, with his comments, helping me to refine and clarify my arguments. I do not know how to repay the kindness and support each has shown me, but I promise to try and become a teacher as dedicated and as competent as they are. I thank you all. Though it may “go without saying” that one’s family plays a great role in any personal success, I cannot leave that unsaid. Without the love, understanding viii and support of my father Dean and my brother Nic from the time that I began my PhD, it would never have been completed. I do not deserve to have been given such a wonderful family, and I fear that I will never be able to repay them for the love, support and friendship they have shown me. I have learned so much from each of you. I would also like to thank my uncle Ted Paravantes for his advice and encouragement throughout the process of finishing my PhD, and to his family for their continuing love and support. Being away from one’s family for so long is difficult, and yet they made it bearable with their support. I know that I would not have succeeded without you. I miss and love you all. I would also like to thank Professor Eftichios Sartzetakis from the department of Economics at the University of Macedonia for convincing me that I could do a PhD in Greece, and for introducing me to Professor Marantzidis and getting this whole process started. I would also like to express my thanks to Professor James Pettifer of Oxford University who has become a great friend and mentor over the past year. His comments on my dissertation also greatly helped me refine my research and arguments prior to my defence, and to help me realize just how much work is needed to produce a quality monograph. I would also like to thank my colleague Dr. Stelios Sotirios for welcoming me to the office, for the great office debates and discussions, and for helping me become a part of the University environment. Thank you to all of my friends from Greece and Canada for your company over the whole progress of my education. Each of you has helped make this journey bearable. I would also like to thank Sakis, Victoria and Sophia Pichos for ix welcoming into their family, for making me feel like one of their own, and for their constant support and encouragement. I would especially like to thank professors Giorgos Skoulas (PaMak), Thanassis D, Sfikas (APth) and Procopis Papastratis (Panteio), the remaining members of my examination committee, who made themselves available at great inconvenience to themselves, to read my work and offer valuable criticism and comments. They have all helped me to gain a greater understanding of this dark period of Greek history, and have reminded me, through their own work and through their help with mine, of the human cost that is paid conflicts such as these.