(Communicated to the Council and the Mem­ bers of the League). C.22. M.10. 1935. VII. Erratum to English text. Geneva, January 14th, 1935. LEAGUE OF NATIONS REQUEST BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE COVENANT Communication from the Persian Government In Line 4, paragraph 8, of page 3, instead of "constitutes a formal and regular undertaking" read ’’constitutes from the point of view of form a regular under taking . Series of League of Nations Publications VII. POLITICAL 1935. VII. 1. Erratum Series of League of Nations Publications VII. POLITICAL S' D. N. 935 (F.) 780 (A.) 1/35 — Imp. de la T. de G. 1935. VII. 1. rf’onirnunicated to the Council and Official No. : C. 22. M. 1 0 .1935.VII. the Members of the League.] Geneva, January 11th, 1935. LEAGUE OF NATIONS REQUEST BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT under Article 11, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant COMMUNICATION FROM THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT Note by the Secretary-General : The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council and the Members of the League the following letter and memorandum from the Persian Government, dated January 8th, 1935. [Translation.] Min ist r y fo r F o r e ig n A f f a ir s . Geneva, January 8 th, 1935. Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 5th, 1934, forwarding to me the communication sent to you by the Government of Iraq for the purpose of drawing the Council’s attention, under Article 11, paragraph 2 , of the Covenant, to the difficulties that have arisen for some time past between the two States in regard to their common frontier. I beg to transmit to you herewith a statement of the Persian Government’s point of view, with the request that you will be so good as to bring it to the notice of the Members of the Council. A copy of this memorandum and its annexes will be handed this evening to His Excellency the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Signed) B. K a z e m i, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Series of League of Nations Publications VII. POLITICAL s. D. N. 935 (F.) 780 (A.) 1/35 — Imp. de la T. de G. 1935. VII. 1. REPLY TO THE REQUEST OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS By letter dated November 29th, 1934, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq referred to the Council of the League of Nations a request which calls for the following observations : It appears from the Royal Government’s request that, according to its statement, the agents of the Imperial Government have violated the frontier of Iraq. Actually, however they have always remained within the Imperial territory, while there have been numerous encroachments thereon by Iraqi agents and tribes, causing very considerable damage and some loss of life (Annex I). According to the Government of Iraq, the boundary was fixed by the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 (Annex II) and by the Protocol signed at Constantinople on November 4th, 1913 (Annex III), by the Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire and the Ambassador of Persia, on behalf of the two Parties, and by the Ambassadors of Great Britain and Russia, on behalf of their respective countries in the capacity of mediating Powers. In virtue of this Protocol, the delimitation was carried out on the ground in 1914 by a Commission composed of representatives of Persia, the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, and Russia.1 In the view of the Iraqi Government, this delimitation became final and unrevisable as and when each part of it was effected. The Persian Government, on the other hand, is of opinion that the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847, the Protocol of Constantinople of 1913, and consequently the delimitation effected by the Delimitation Commission of 1914, have no force, either in law or in equity, to determine the frontier. I. The Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 consists of nine articles. According to Article 2, in the Province of Zohab, Persia and the Porte respectively cede the lowlands and the highlands (Article 2 , paragraph 1 ). Persia abandons all claim to the city and province of Suleimani (Article 2 , paragraph 2 ), while “ the Ottoman Government formally recognises the unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government over the city and port of Muhammara, the island of Khizr,2 the anchorage, and the land on the eastern bank — that is to say, the left bank — of the Shatt-al-Arab, which are in the possession of tribes recognised as belonging to Persia. Further, Persian vessels shall have the right to navigate freely without let or hindrance on the Shatt-al-Arab from the mouth of the same to the point of contact of the frontiers of the two Parties ” (Article 2, paragraph 3). Negotiations, which were conducted under the pressing mediation of the two great Powers, had been lengthy and difficult, lasting four years. The two Contracting Parties were thus obliged to insert a provision to the effect “ that, when the texts of this Treaty have been exchanged, they will accept and sign the same, and that the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged within the space of two months, or earlier ” (Article 9). The Sublime Porte asked for an interpretation, which the Ambassadors gave (Annex IV) in an explanatory note (April 14th/26th, 1847), being the more ready to do so in that the Porte made it an absolute condition of its acceptance. “. on the understanding ”, wrote the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs in his reply to the Powers, “ that the Court of Persia will accept the assurances which have been given by the representatives of the two mediating Courts to the effect that it will raise no claim going counter to those assurances, and on the further understanding that, in the event of any such claim being raised, the Treaty will be deemed to be null and void ” (Annex V). Persia, whose consent the Powers assumed without troubling to notify her, instructed her Ambassador in France, who was on his way to Teheran, to proceed to Constantinople and exchange the ratifications of the treaty of nine articles. The Powers requested him to include the explanatory note in his ratification. To accept that note, which was added to the Convention of nine articles as a supplementary treaty, was to exceed his instructions and his powers. None the less, at the urgent request of the Porte, he took upon himself to give to the explanatory note, in the form of a ratification, an acceptance which required the signature of the Head of the State ; though at the same time he carefully made it clear that his powers did not extend so far, and that his declaration was a purely personal one (Annex VI). The Treaty, which was to be “ accepted, signed and ratified ” (Article 9), was thus ratified without having been accepted. Since the acceptance of the explanatory note was the essential condition of the establishment of the contract, which would otherwise be “ null and void ” according to the Ottoman declaration, that instrument, on which the Royal Government now seeks to base its case, is, as was stated in the Ottoman note, “ null and void ”. 1 It is to be noted that, when reference is made in this memorandum to Great Britain or Russia, such reference applies, not to the present Government of Great Britain or the present Government of Russia, hut to the British or Russian Government of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 1 Now the island of Abadan. II. Despite the efforts of the mediating Powers, the Treaty was followed only by intermittent attem pts at execution, not directed by the common will of the signatory States. From time to time a partial endeavour was made to delimit the frontier, but without result. Persia did not accept the declaration made ultra vires by Mirza Mahommed Aii Khan on January 19th/31st, 1848. The Porte refused to recognise the existence of the Treaty unless it embodied the substantial concessions contained in the explanatory note. Neither of the Parties held himself bound, as the Powers observed with a growing sense that the difficulties were so great as to render success highly improbable. The absence of agreement as to the explanatory note is referred to in the diplomatic correspondence, 1 in addition to the natural and, even more, the psychological obstacles, as being the main source of all the difficulties. Witness the following passage : “ At the same time, it would be highly desirable that the mediating Courts should take the opportunity to clear up the species of discrepancy which is considered to exist between the terms of Article 2 of the Treaty of Erzerum and the explanations exchanged prior to the ratification of the Treaty between the Porte and the representatives of Great Britain and Russia at Constantinople. The insistence of each of the two Parties on his own interpretation is the main source of the disputes that are delaying the progress of joint work on the frontier.” That is an extract from the joint statement addressed by the British and Russian Commissioners to their Governments.2 When Lord Palmerston read it, he wrote to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg : “ The boundary between Turkey and Persia can never be finally settled except by an arbitrary decision on the part of Great Britain and Russia” .3 Difficulties continued. From time to time an “ arbitrary delimitation ” was made, but on each occasion it was immediately repudiated. Lord Palmerston found himself obliged to threaten either Party that might violate the frontier with the provision of “ aid and support ” to the other Party .4 Thus the frontier, in establishing which neither State had secured the consent of the other, could not be fixed.