- 137 - * THE BRIDGEHEAD IS SECURED, 19 APR 4.5 311. Once the German attacks began to waver, Maj-Gen Vokes v engineers were urged to pross their task. Throughout the last few hours, these roon had worked under intense fire to com plete the bridge. They sufferod a good many casualties but persisted for they realized that now as nevor beforo armoured support was urgently neodod by tho infontry ahead of them (W.Dr., H.Q., R.C.E., 4 Cdn Armd Div, 19 Apr 4.5; also 9 Cdn Fd Sqn, R.C .E., 18-19 Apr 4.5). South of 'bho cMal, two squadrons of 28 . Cdn Armd Regt awaiting tho signal to movo up also took a severe pounding. They had not long to wait: At about oight in tho morning the lead tank of the B~C.Rs inched its way across. Just as it reached the far bank and started to slow over to the right side of the road, it was hit doC\.d on by an 88-rum gun firing straight down tho road. It did not brow up, however, and munngod to got cloar of tho roadway. Colonol Bradburn ordorod a nodium artillery concontration, and under its cover tho noxt tanks camo across full tilt, firing directly up tho 1'0 Gel. In a few minutes tho first troop was succossfully across and into firo positions in ar.1ong the gratoful infantry.
(Cassidy, Warpath op cit, p. 31.5) 312. The arr i val of trotanks gavo now life to the troops in the bridgohead. The corJDnndor of 10 Cdn Inf Bde now nCldo his plans for tho oxploitation o.nd thr.. t norning tho infantry bogan to novo ahoad once nore. Tho I' oaso ns l' or the apparont slowness in the ndvanco to do.to ho.d boon basically o.n organic ono, and the G.S.O. 1 of th0 division later offerod his explan ations: We wore o.n arrlourod div fiGhing in what was, properly spea.1<:ing, inf country Qnd, oarly in this battle, wo began to feol our shortago of info Only so nuch offort could bo expocted fron tho inf resources at our cond, and for ono short poriod tho G.O.C. was reducod to fighting on 0. ono or at tho nost a two-bn front. Further, tho div Wr..lS dofinitely road-bound - a fact of which tho eneny was entiroly aware, and not only were we road-bound, but it was constantly necossary to rebuild tho rds over which tho Div had to adv or actually to construct now roads to pernit further advane os. (liEF: 4.5/4 Cdn Arnd Div/C/W, Docket II: Folio 3, ~ cit, Part II, Para 4) --- The G.O.C., hinself an enginoer, haQ quickly appreciatod tho sit untion regarding his one routo, and at an early sto.ge in the:: battlo he decided to concont~ratohis engineer rosouroes and all available vohiclos wi thin his . forr.w.ti on to nnintain tho route. Thus it was kept open, but 0 y by tho greatest of co-operntive effort on the part of the divisional engineers. (Ibid., Part I, para 11) - 313. As the build-up of our offort in tho bridge- hoad continued, tho flanks of tho cl.ivision wore being constau.t...ly wutchod by Brigadier Moneel's notor battalion. To quote tho Divisional Historic21 Officer:)
* Reforonce nnps as for po.ra 300. 4 Cdn Armd Bde assumed op control of the triangle* 1790 - FRIESOYTHE - Kl-illaPE. The Lake Sup R. (M:>1') which had taken ovor the cOrnr.1i ttmonts of the A. & S .H. of C. in the KA~~E area, also relieved tho fwd coy of the Linc & Wolld R. in thu area 1790. The Lake Sup R. (M)T) wore thus rosponsible for tho irnrnediate right and left flanks of our front. 29 Cdn Arnd Recce Regt co ntinued to operato on thu oxtreno right, with elen onts of 18 Cdn Lrr.ld C. Regt po.trolling tho south bank of tho Kustcn Canal or our extrene left fron below Kanpe to the inter-div bdy of 1 Pol Arnd Div. (Weeky sunnary of ops and activities; 4 Cdn ~rnd Div, Apr-May 45 by Hist Offr op cit, Part I para 9) On 19 Apr a further regrouping roleased other forces for employ m.en t in the bridgehead: 3 and 65 A Tk Btys were moved up from the areas 0783 (MARKHAUSEN) and 0797 ruspoctivoly and cano undor comd 10 Cdn Inf Vdo for onploynent in tho br-hoad in a ground role. Tho Bty fOTI10rly at 0797 was rolieved by sqn of 18 Cdn f~nd C. Rogt, while a second sqn of tho sane regt move fwd PEHEIM 0676 to garrison Gi~nEL. (Ibid) Garrel had beon cloo.red by 29 Cdn Arnd Rocce Rogt and ltD" Coy Linc & Walld R. on 17 Apr. The South Albertans had also contacted Lt-Gen Denpsoy's troops on tho right. Aftor this the arnoured reconnaissance troops advanced oast~~ along tho road G,arrol Bissel (2984) - Sago (3183). Progross along this routo was slow because of the nany ninos oncounturod, bu t by 1500 hours 19 ll.pr Bissol and Sage (3183) woro in our ho.nds ani plans were adjusted for a now advance north tron theso two plo.cos. (W.D., 29 Cdn Armd Recc~ Regt, 17-19 Apr 45) 314. It now renained for thG infantry brigade to enlarge the bridgehead sufficiontly to allow the arnour ro~n on~ugh to de ploy and nanoouvre. Unfortuno.tely the scope of rosistanco and condition of ground did not nake for speed and it was to be 0.1 nost D....ll.othor week befor8 Brigo.dior Honcol WQS given his orders to novo northwards. However, tho intorvGning ti'10 was not spent in idlonoss. ThE) anJ.oured roginont,s wore kept busy supporting Brigadier Jefforson's non by tank-gun firo. (~.D., H.l. 4 Cdn i~r.rl Bde, 19, 20, 22 Apr 45). Couplod vdth this support and that of tho divisional fiold artillery and three nediun reginonts, a spectacular progrlli~o of closo air support had contributed greatly to the results achieved thus far north of tho canal. Ninoty seven sorties were flown on 17 ~pr, followed by another ninoty four on 18 Apr and eighty-sovon noro on 19 Apr; 0.11 achiovod groat succoss and brought heavy loss to the oneny. (Weokly. SULIDo.ry of Ops and ~ctivities, 4 Cdn Arrrl Div, 14-21 ~pr 45 op cit, para 11). 1m adequate tribute to the aircraft and pilots is contained in tho War Diary of 4 Cdn Arnd Div for 19 ~pr which reads:
* Osterloh ~* Refor to nap 1:25,000 Sheot 3016 - Dotlingen. - 139 ,. 4- Cdn Armd Div freoly acknowledGes its debt to air sp during 18-19 Apr, without wl:..ich it is folt the brhead could NOT havo boon. successfully hold.. (W.D., G.S., H.Q.4 Cdn l~nd Div, 19 Apr 11-,) 'Ji OPEru~TIONS ON G~NER\L CREP~R~8 ~;3STERN FLU~K, 12-18 APR 45
315. ~~ilo Lt-Gen SimondS' men hnd boon liberating north-eastern Holland Qnd stc.;:ing further clo.ims on GerElQn soil to tho eo.st, the incursions of 1 Cdn' Corps into the vlOStol"Il Netherlc..nds had met with strenuous opposition. Col-Gen Blo.skowitz, the Genero.l Officer Corffi~Qnding the Twenty-Fifth Germo.n Army and vc.rious subordinnte formations of the enemy~s boleQg~ed garrison, wns under' orders to dispute ou.r passage to the 16.st. (i:.T.D., G.S. (Int), H.Q,. First Cdn Army; Mo.y 19/;-5: Appx 5, First Cdn Army IntelliGence PerioQico.l No.1). Nevertheloss, the effort to thrust his forcos back from the line of communications running north-east from Arnhom wc.s pursued with good success. On tho night of 15/16 Apr 1 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes foug...1}t thoir way to the east bo.nk of the co.no.l at Apeldoorn Vlhere it po.sses thr''Jugh tho suburbs and to the south of tho tovm itself. On tho Division~s left 2 Cdn Inf Bde cloared south warda and on 16 Apr linkod up o.t Dioren (8784.) with eloments of '-".-9 (Vr.R.) Inf Div which had pushod out from tho bridge-hond at Arnhom to cross the high ground north of the road to Zutphon. (Ibid: AEF: 45/1 Cdn Corps/elF, Drnft OutlL'l1e of Ops of 1 Cdn Corps on Cle"'ring Uestern Hollo.nd, Apr L:-5) 316. These encouraging developmonts were to he orploited by a swift attack north and north-wostwo.rds from _\rnhem with 5 Cdn AI'I!ld Div diroctod on tho Ijssolmeor at Ni j~erk (4605) vrith tho objoct of cutting off the enemyYs forces opposed to 1mj-Gon Foster (Ibid') •. On t,he morning of 15 "".pr 5 Cdn Arm.d Bde began to advo.nce north warda through tho woods ctbovo .:~rnhon cnd :lcross- the sandy heath-land beyond and th~t night occupied Otterloo (6591). On the following morning tho ctrmour turned wost warda in tho diroction of Luntoren (.5589) and on tho' so.mo day (16 ..''"pr) , oypnssing Barnevold (5245), cut tho Apeldoorn - L~orsfoort railvny. O~ tho right Voorthuizen (5401) was c~ptured, 8ur t~nks boing thus astride tho main way of oscape for tho enomy troops holding Apeldoorn, from which they ViOro forced. to vvithdruw on 17 Apr. So rapid lUS olir adv~::mce that on tho Eight 16/17 ..:\pr a rabblo of the defenders, attGm~')ting to broak throught the exposod right flank of 5 Cctn Armd Div, throc..toned to ovorrun i.1aj-Gon Eoffmeistor~s Hoad.quartors •. A vigorous local defonce by all units in the :lrea of Ottorloo drove off tho enomy with rronyCaSUQlt. ics c.nd ~rouebt .~n ~ couplo of hundred prisoners. (AEF: 45/5 Odn Arnd DLV/C/F, Docket II; Hi.story of Operations, 5 Cdn Armd DJ. v, NOr'0n-wost huropo.)
317. During the sa~o night our troops at Voorthuizon beat of-f an' attack by elomonts of 6 Para Div trying to get through to tho west. Although the enomy hold grimly on to Putton (5~09) and tho roctd thenco to Ni jkel~lc, tho' only osco.pe routo to lo.r-.i.lw:lrd still open to the dj 8confitec1 enomy, 5 Ccln Ar!1d Ro(;t roaohod the IjeS801noQr at noon on 17 Apr. By tU1s tine 11 Cdn In! Dde was novinG up towards the const to clear the woods of soattered.fu~ive~
]£ Reference maps: G.S'.G.S. ~·083Ho'lland 1:50,000' Sheets 27 - Hattem, 33 - Zutyhen, LeO -:"rnhem, G.S.G.S. 2541 Holland 1:100,000, Shoet. 2 - Utrecht. - 140 -
Ta.}:el1 at a. sudden c1isndvantage by the speod of the c.rmoured thrust to the north, the Gormans hac lost over 7,000 prisoners, including Q la.rge part of the 346th'~nc1 361st Infantry Divisons (General Crerar's Dospatch 5 Iby ~5, op cit, Para. 31) 318. To the south on Lt-Gen Foulkes' loft flank, further g~lns by 49 (~.R.) Inf Div along the Nodor Rijn TIestward fron ArnhE:w, established the line by dusk on 19 _\.pr through Renkill~ ~nd Ebe (5885), whence it rQn through Barnoveld to tho s:i"'Qll l)ort of Harderv:ijl<:: (5519). Tho enomy troops cc.ught iIi the area betwoon tho lower Ijssol and the co~st ~orc rounded up, and patrols boga.n to test the defences of tho Grobbe Line, in tho eQ.sily flooded country ~rterc~ by tho EeN, Lunterscho Beok and Gro')bo stroams nne. contrad. on tho iIJ.portant r:til\\luy j unction of !~Grsfoort (Outlino of Ops of 1 Cun Corps, ~ cit). I Cdn Corps 110..c1 corD,ploted its taslc; tho lino 011 cOIJ':Llunic:-~tions throu{;llt Arnb:oIll and Zutphon ho..u boen sccured and c,:mlc:' nm"i bo devolopod to main tain tho final st2eoS Oi the cdvanco of 2 Gdn Corps into north wostorn Gonfrnny (Ibid)
THE j\.RMYvS PL'I.NS _\BE RS.\.DJUSTED - 17-19 APR 45
319. In his dispatch to tho Hi~istor, Gonornl Crora.r h:..s oxplainod hon thc fncts I;lllich g07ortl.'cc1 the oporations of 21 ':1rmy G:roup wore ,Put boforo hin by tho C.-in-C. on 12 ..\.pr•
•••Tho socond British ~rmy, co~tinuing its ndvc.nco to tho Elbe, IVQS developing tvro main thrusts c.long tho axis bc.:tv'Jeon Ulzen :.:'.nc1 Domitx', Soltau :tnc.l. Lunoburg. On Lt-Gen Denpseyts left the 30th British Corps was to drive on vlith all possible speed to cnpture Brenen. Should this object not have geen achieved before the nrrivnl of First Cnnadinn .. TI~y in that area, it vms possible th~t the co:aplction of this task might then devolve upon nee In such circLUllstnnces, it vms ex pected thQt one, or possibly two British Infantry divisions in the vicinity woulcl COTIEl under ny cOIQr.J.:1.nd. OperQtions to clenr the west Nothorlnnds, the prh1~ry tnsk of the 1st Cnnndinn Corps and tho sccuring of tho lett flank: of tho Corps 0.1'06. to the west of, the Ijssol and south of the Zuidor Zee, would only proceed to the extent that they were within tho scope of tho liLlit6d resources which Lt-Gen Foulkes h~d Qvailablo to hin. For as soon ns it coul~ be released without dotrll~ont to tho complotion of the opor:'.t ions intonclod to givo us tho route through _\rnhom Oonc1 Zutphon, tho 5th Co.nndian .t':..rr.J.ourcd Division V'VQS to roliove tho formations of the 2nd Cannc1ion Corps, thCll in tho procoss of clearing the north-cnst Netherlands, and would comD diroctly under COl:uilancl of First C2.nnc~iLl.n Arny. Lt-Gonoral SiI:J,onds would then keop tho weight of his forcos on t:10 right and be prepnrod for n possible assnult on 'Brenon. :l.fter the capture of th;,) city, it vms intendecl thnt the 2nd Canndio.n Corps I'lou~ ". c ~ :.:.. ~ =-~ ~::'-~o enem.y froLl tho Wilhelnshnven - Enden F~ninsulOo beforo thrusting boyond the Weser bolow Hnnburg~ cutting off tho enemy's GS- cape route to tho seG. and closing tho Cuxhnvcn·poninsula. (General C:rernr's DespQtch, 5 Mny' 45; ~ cit, para'28; see nlso r:.D.,G.O.C.-in-C.) First ('lrlri ....!"rmy, ~l.~')rl"1 19'~""::>: ~ ... P9X 3 , 'D'lroct'1 vo t0 G•• 0 ct s , 1 and 2 Cdn Corps, 13 ~pr.) - 141 -
320. These further objectives were on the point of be- ing attained on the left by the clearing of the'provinces of Groningen and Friesland by 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Divs, on the right by Maj-Gen Vokes9 progressive attemptto carry the line of the Kusten Canal, and in the centre by the parallel armoured effort of 1 Pol Anna Div. But with affairs standing to such advantage in both Gelderland and the northern provinces, it was possible by regrouping forces to improve the prospects of coning to an early conclusion with the eneny in Germany. On 17 Apr Field-Marshal 1lontgomery haQ informed General Crerar that the Canadian Army would not capture Bremen, but that this task would be left to Lt.-Gen Dempsey O":.D., G.O.C.-in-C. file 1-0) 00 cit, l.fesaage from C.-in-C., 17 Apr). The situation is described by General Creral~ as follows':. On my right flank substantial advances were being uade by the foroes of'Lt-Goneral Dempsey along the'whole of their front. The enemy was being forced to withdraw his salient in front of Cloppenburg, the Elbe had been reached 'and advance elements were within eight m1Jcs, of' Harburg. In view of the existing situation, ,the C-in-C: decided that the Second :3ritish Army would now cap ture and hold 3remen irrespective of the arrival of Canadian elements in the area. It followed that I would not now be reQuired to tako over the' city until I had completed the taslc of cle:lring north-wost Germany up to tho line of. the Heser. It vms still the intent ion, however, th:lt I would then assume responsibility for Bremen :lnd develop operations to clo~r the Cuxh:lven peninsula. In tho m8Clntimo, Lt-General Sim,onds was to continue to Give protection to the left flank of the Second British Army up to the Weser and to overrun the coastal lands to tho north.
(General Crerar 9 s Despatch, 5 May 45, op cit, para 33) 321. In order to improve the situation' for Second British Army in its assault on Bronon, the C.-in-C. directed that 2 Cdn Inf Div be transferred to Lt-General SimondS' rignt flank over towards Oldonburg (Ibid., para 35; W.D., Hist Offr, H.Q. First Cdn Army, 20 Apr).--sGveral days were reQuired for this lengthy move, the brigades travelling east·war ds in succession . to their new area during the period'lS to 21 Apr (2 Cdn Inf Div, Iv~onthly Consolidated Summary of Ops, ,2.£ ,9 it , 1-30 Apr). Stronger forces would also be brought to bBar against the enemy's line of defence across tho Wilhelmshaven'.- Emden peninsula, where press ure had hitherto been sustained by the two armoured divisions only. Tho advent of' 5 Cdn ~'\.rmd Div into the northern Netherlands (319) would release 3 Cdn Inf Div for'the task of destroying the enemy still resisting west of the fins. The resulting relief of 3 Pol Inf Bde would enable Maj-Gon Maczek to concentrate his forces on the right banle of tho Ems for his arnoured' thrust through the fen oountry to Papenburg and the River Loda. When 3 Cdn Inf Div had completed its tas1;: vvnRt of the Ems, Maj-Gen Koeflor ~ould be prepared to take thG port of Leer by an assault across the Ems and tho Leda. (1,'(.D., G.S. H.Q.. 2 Cdn Corps, 21 Apr)
322. The tasks of First Cdn Ar-~ wero to be limited still' further. In a message to General Crerar dated 19 Apr, Field-1mrshal Idontgoillory explained that the allotment of an American force to 21 Arr~j Group would enable the pace of our operQtions to be Quickened considerably. In tho light of this - 142 -
~ovelopnont,1t wou U no longv~ be necessary tor First Odn Amy to cross tho ':Josor and clenr the CuxhQven- Peninsuln (G.O.C.':'in-C. First Cdn Army, filo 1-0, Vol II ~p 0~t, 'folio 36 Mossngo C.-1n~C., 19 Apr). Instend Genernl Crornr vlns":ro nss ur:lO tno nItornntivo rosponsibility of clearing tho islQn1s nt tho onst6rn end of tho Frisian group (ibid, Diroctive 11 57/:' from C.-in-C., 22 Apr).
Tho nctuul directivo rcnds:
The right wing of'CnnQuian ArL~ will opornto strongly against OLD:EJ:lTB1JRG, and south of it, in closo touch with tho loft ,,'ling of Socond Ar y Y:hich is ndvQIlcing on BREMEN'.
As soon ns th2.t '00rt.ion of :3?~:ITI:N on tho south bank of tho Wosor has boen cQ~turod by Socond Army, tho right wing of Co.nadio.n Arm.y v/ill oporo.to northwards to cnpturo ~.ID:EI:.\f o.nd 1:JIUIEU,18_ T ".vim o.nd cloo.r' 0.11 onony from tho poninoulo. botwoon tho rivers VmSER o.nd m.TS. Co.no.dinn Army will study tho problom of ca.pturing those islQnds at tho onstorn ond of tho ~RISI~~T group from which tho onomy could intorfore v/ith tho freo uso of tho "VVESER ostuo.ry o.L. VO,.LG=:ROOGE, ~J:l.d possibly also SPIEI:EHOOG.
( Ibid, folio 39)
~ SECOND BRIT ~UU~{fS OPsR~TIONS, 11-19 ~PR 45 324. Boforo cOY2.sid.ering tho enomyfs situation nt this time, it is necosonry to roviow tho nctivities of Lt-Gcn Dempsoy's troops on 21 Army Group's right flnnk during tho past wook. (Soo Pnrt I Para 198). On 10'Apr, 8 Brit Corps had rocoived orders to socuro Colle (5951), and tho line of the Rivor Allor, nnd then Dross 0:1. to caDture Uolzen (9189) at tho samo tine lwep ing firm contact with Ninth U.s. ·.\rmy. Thoso t::lsks Vioro sub allotted in the follO\"Jing mnnnor. 15([3) Inf Div wo.s responsiblo for tho capture of Cello Qnd Uelzon 2nd for prOViding a class 40 bride;e over the RiVOl" ..:....1101'. 1,:IoaIJ,Y.Thile 11 Brit :l.rrJ.d Div vms givon tho task of Qdv:::'..llcing ::It no.ximum spood to 80izo Borgon (51'71) thus protocting tho loft of 15(S) Inf, Div. In ::.'.ddit::'on Maj-Gon G.P. Roberts V 0..1 _1.rmd Div) must bridgo the Allor nt oither Essol (3056) or YHnson (4755). Lt-Gon E. Ba.rkorfs third forrention (6 Airborno Div) vms to f,:)llo'v1 up :::mct cloar out nny onomy by passod b~T tho nrmourcd division (AEP: 45/Socond ~rmy/C/D, Docket I; 8.1so jj'irst ll.rmy Liaison Ops Roports, .2.1? cit, Illt,20B, G Ops, Socond L.rmy)
325. Class 40 bridgos ncross tho ~llor were ostablishod at Collo on 11 ~pr Qnd at Essol (whero 1 Cdo Bdo h8.d D2~0 its crossing) on tho following dQy. By the morning of 12 ipr tho Scottish Divisi:m htld ono brigCLdo ovor tho Allor and in tho t,ovm of Collo (5951) and, in short arc -'-, dl, uuots wore off towards .Uolzon (9187) 25 milos Q.\"JC.y. Uol2- In "18.S r02.chod on 14 Apr but
. ~ Reforonco tno.ps: G.S'.Cr .S. 4416 Contral Europo '1: 100,000 Shoots M2 '- OldonbLlrg, !·~3 - Boremon, l.14 - Soltd.u, N3 '- rhndon, Nt<- - Hanover, L4 .:. Hamburg, L5 '- Lauonburg, M5 - Salzwedol, W5 - Bro.unschwoig - 143 - there the enemy renctod wiolently. ~nile"15 (S) Div mnde pre pa.rntions to cnpture tho town 11 ~i..rnd Div, having cnptured Borgen nnd the notorious concentrc.tion ccump nt Belsen, crune up on tho left. (Ibid: 121400B, G Ops, Second Army: nlso First Cdn Army Ops Log Q£ cit, 12 ~pr 45, serinls 49, 73, 104)
With opposition looseni~g in front of "11 Armourud Div ision as it got away from tho RAIler, 3 R Tks battle group sped on ~nd at 1700 hrs on 16 Apr enterod Bbstorf. 15/19 H b ttle group wa.s noving on n"Southern axis nnd thnt saDe evening renched WICHTN~B~CK, somo six miles to tJ.le South I'Jest. 15(8) Division objectives on the R Eloo were nt the snllO tliae novod"further north to Lnuenburg 8734 nnd Tbizenburg 9835. The division ho.d instructions to ignoro its riGht flank, for 5 Division, vmich h~d nrrivou from anothor tho6tre, hnd meantime been plnced under comrannd of 8 CorpsA and \1~S to'concontrate South West "of Uelzen betvlOen 10 [mel 20 Apr. This division nnd 6 Airborne Division togethor could denl with the corps right flnnk. . - (AEF: 45/ Second AxmY/C/D Docket I, P. 376) " 326. On 17 Apr ~rnl Dempsey informed the COIM1nnder of 12 Brit Corps that tho Russian offensive towards Berlin ho.d begun on the previous day. The opinion expressed, nt this time, w~s that since tho GOYB2n strength in the east was further to the soath, the Russi:ms might bo ':lble to I:mko good progress. If this wore the Co.so thousands of refugocs fleeing before 1brshnl Stalin's troops wOLud bo driven towo.rds Gonoral Dompsey's a.rea. •. This would complicc\.te ma.tters gre~"tly nne. it wo.s empho.sized tho.t Socond Army must roa.ch the west bank of the Elbe to stop a.ny mo.ss crossings by those refugees. Plo.ns were thorefore co~pleted for the iI~mediato encirclement of Uolzen so that the ~dvo.nce ea.stwo.rds night continue unimpoded. Tho divisicma.l ta.sks were thus defined; 15(S) Division - Be prepu.rcd" .to o.sso.ult Uelzen not before 1200 hrs 17 ~pr 6 Airborne Division - ~o establish itself Enst of the tovm as oarly o.s possible 2nd to YJnke contact with 11 Lrmoured Division o.t mumenc10rf 9095.
11 ArDoured Di~ision - To cstnblish itself firmly in the nreo. Ebstorf~Jriodel 7296 with nctive pntrols to the North. To cut the rond Uelzcn-Luneburg nnd to nnke contQct with 6 .\irborne Division ( Ibid)
Tho opero.tions continued with 15(8) ::::ll Div o.pplying oo-ord lllnted prossure ago.inst Uelzon. About midday on 17 Apr the defenders of Uelzon bogo.n . to reconsider the sitLlC\.tion,~nc1 15(8) Division report ed signs of withc1rc.wnl northwc.rc1s. During th'e e.:.fter noon 11 .f'>.rr.nuroc1 Division ce:t the ranee UelZen-Luneborg) and'15(S) Division enterod nnd begnn to clenr the town. Withcontact cstnblishod betvJ'Oon 11 ...\rl1oured Division nne. 6 ...\iriJorne Division, this tc.sk vms completed on (I 18 Apr CL"1d nrro.ngo:-lonts ·woro "Linde for the division to extend :&..st of tho tovm, relieving clements of 6 ...\.ir borne Division c:mc1 11 ;~rmourecl Division...... ~
- 1/1-4 -
11 ATI~ourod Division mndo iliIQodi~to preparntions to nove North on Lunoburg. Light olonents had enterod the town by 1600 hrs on 18 ~pr ~nQ had seizod tho bridgos iltact. ~t tho S~TIO tiDO an equally forcoful thrust to the west of tho town had brouGht nTI10UrOU olenonts to n point '- bout four miles aL'J.ost clue North of it Xlc1 on tho oast Q battle grou_ hc.rl ca.ptured Noctzo 9322 by tho n'Toni!1£3 bc,!'oro nidni[\ht the river Elbe had loem :i.'oa<:.:'- cd at :;:-li'G/Gbcrgon 9031, ten miles North East of Luneburg.
/~27. On 19 __.\nr,~ covoroc.~ 1oy an arnoured car screon (j?l ) vido 11 ~rnourod Division - To ostQblish itself on the R Elbe frOl"-"~ :::Jpyosito Lo.uonburg to inclusive Hinson 6532 2i1Q to .Drotoct tho corps left flank on a General line southwards froD \'rinscn. 6 ..\.irborne Division - To reI".nin in its present situat ion with rcconnaisco.nco tQsks and to be responsible for the protection of the corps RiGht fln!1~:, (Ibid, p. 377) 328. In the contro 12 Brit Corps haQ ho.d Gro~t jiffic- ulty aroLUld Rothon (1167), ~ut by niclnight 12/13 ~l.pr 53(Vl) Div he.d alnost clcClrcci tho tovm .:li.l:1 ho.(~ :'.. liGht bridgo ab or tho River :l..ller. l1oanvvhilo, e.s 52 (L) Tnf Div hQc1. novoc1 to tho o.roCl GClst of Diophalz, 3 Brit Inf Div was transferrod t a un(~or cOrIT.lo.nd 30 Brit Corps, F.rm 13 to 15 l\,pr tho bricLgohe:'.c;' hold by tho Welsh C.ivision o.cross the ...'i.llor \"[:...... s subjoctod t::) hoJ.vy oonbo.rd-· Dont ~nd sovorJ.l fierco COQDto~-att~cks, but. tho onoDy coula not I.lako any hond1,'!Qy v Subsoquontly c .:L-~_ __ ::",J 1i.pr, 7 .:'",rncl Div took ovor contal of tho bridcohoQd with t~o intention of cloaring tho aroa Rothon - ~'lQlsroc1o in conjunct.on with l55(L) lnf Bele. Progress durinG the initiQl sto.gos of tho broak-out was not ra,Qid, but in the 6.l'tornoon the thrust bOGCln t.o Deet with Doro succoss. V.Jalsrode vrith bridGos into.ct· foll to 7 :i.r,_KHJ.rod Division lo.to on 15 :i.pr. Consider able troublo ...as still bGing' oxperionced fr,JY':" air c.tto.cks on tho Rothen bridGo. _\ nUTIbor of c.i.onolishod bridges J.~d carofully-sited crators wo.s also oncountered - 145 '- and these considoro.bly nffectod the speed of the 0.<..1 vance. The; thrust of L~ li.rnouroc1 Bri[;ndo under cor;lI.1and 53 (VI) Division on the left 6f' 7 _\.rrnurod Division also beGan to Inke good ]rogress. One reGinent had captured Idsincen, SODe six niles north~est of WalsroJe by nic1night 15 ..'\pr. By nidnight 16 ~\pr, . <~ Arnoured Brignde hnd reClched BendinGbostel, 1285, ngainst slight 0ly]osition. At tile' Elane tine 158 BrigClL.c vvns tu.rLing left-hnnderl to Verden, followed by 71 Brig~de, villi6h wns prepnred to pass through to cQ]ture the town. On 16 ~',"pr tl1G ~\rny COTIL1:'.nder orderecl Guarcls ~\ro.oured Division to 'join 12 Corps forthvlith. It was to nove via. Nienburg-Rethen and Walsrocle, concentrate about RetheJ'l and ':ms to be directe<:: on to the Zeven aroo.. This required 0. right hook, but the l'1.rny COLJI.la.nder C011 sidered tha.t gre~ter advnntaGe would result by advanc ing a.s fo.r North ns possible towards HnDburg, bofore . swinging left. It was a'pprcci6.ted. thnt this :::-.light in volve the capture of Rotenburc. After rca.chinG FClllingboste1oClrly on 16 ~pr, progress by 7 :I..rmourcd Division VIClS Clgain checkecl by donolitions Clnd crQtor~, but by evening Dorfr~rk had beon captured. (Ibid, p. 378; 0.180 First Cdn ~rny Ops Log; £2 cit, Tr7i.pr serio.ls 83, 135, 16 Apr sorinl 130) - 329. At this ]oint o.s it W':'!.S J.p)rociQted th2t the tovm of Soltnu vlOul':~ bo strongly cleforh". ed , the follovvinC plcms were fornulo.tccl. 7 lI..E.K"'.. Div 1;'To.S to screo:r~. Soltau (L~-190) v:lith 8 H' while 155 Inf Bde nssQulted the )lnco froIT the south. The re naiader of the Clr::':loured divis ion VlClS to bY-l/o.ss Soltau Ll.UCl.. go on' towo.rds the Elbe River. :i.t the 80.'10 tino Gels ~\.rncl' IIiv vms order ed forvvnrd to o.clvnnc e . on the o.J;:is \'Je.lsrode (2575) - Vissolhovede (2489) - Stnde (1557) t while' 53("1:'[.) I~1f Div co.ptured Verden 6.nd Rotenburg (1102) if possible, prior to followin~ tho Guards. 52(L) Inf Div loss 155 Bao (at present llilder corroo.nd 7 ~TIld Div) was to pass to cOIJI.1and 30 Brit Cor)s. (~\EF: :r.? ISe cond Arny/C/D' Docket I p. 378). These changes the~melves called for renllocat ion of tnsks es~eci~lly so sinco it I~S now knovm that First Cdn ' ArrlY would not opernto Oo.st of the V/eser Rivor. The nevI division al to.sks for 12 Corps were: 7 _'I..rrloured Divrision - ~":..~lvo..nco to R. ~lve on frontaGe Wit18on-Buxtohude 31,;-4. Guards .':.TIloured Division - ~\.dvnncG to seizo Rotonburg 1102 (unless already captured by 53(~) Division) st~_J..ting c.t fir3t light 18 Apr. Thereafter to c~)turc Zoven 0323 - Brcnor vorde 9~~4 and Stado 1557. 53('.'J) Division - Co.pture Verdon. Capture Rotonburc if tho situa.tion looson ed, using 4 ~rDourod BriGade.-~o.ss one brigado group 52(L) Div to scree~ the eo.st ern o.p)ro:l.Cll0S to Branen. FolloVl Guo.rds A:cnouroc1 Div. - 146 ~. 52{L) Division Loss 155 Brigade (still Lillder connnnd 7 ArLlouroc1 Division) to l)ass throuGh emd screon Bronen fron tho cast. (Ibid, p. 379) 330. :stor a rapid advance on 17 .\.pr 7 1I..rI.KL Div ·Vlo.S in Vlollo (3818) sone tVlonty niles due north of Solto.u «.190), \'Ilhich at that tll~O wo.s being invostcd by 155 Inf Bde. By nidnight Soltau v~s clear o.nd 53{V~) Div reportel success in Verden. VIith Verden cleo.r o.nd bri..:l.c;i!lb under constrllCtion 156 Brigado, still t.l.t"lllor COLJIlo.!lU 53CW) Division, sto.rted on 18 ..:';.pr to o.c.vanco north vrost along the Oo.st bank of tho R VIoscr, tOYV8.rds lJ..chin 8791. The sm.le Dorning tho Guards ~rTIourod Division started to uove northfrbn Walsroclo, directed initiall.y on Visselhovede 2tr89. ~t niddny 2 HCR re~orted t~e road Soltau-Nouenkirchon 3294 cloar. With onc battle group wor~ing dua north, hnving reached Ottingen, about tvlO niles south cast of Visselhovodo, Cl second battle grou) s~~ng Gast to cut rond Visselhovodo-Nouenkirchen. 5 Gu~rcs ~rilourcd Bri[ado took 0. wider sweop to tho Enst, noving on 7 .:!"r~2.oured Division's routes as far as Tostedt 3222 and thon turning alnost duo west towards Zevcn. In effoct, therefore, tho Guards'were car~Jing out Q wide pincor novenent fron the J:!jast. With Neuenkirchon captured durinG the evening of 18 ~pr, the Coldn Gels Groups turned south~west tovmrds Vissol hovede. (Ibid, and p. 380) J ..fter twenty-four h~urs hnrd fighting, the GU:1rds reported Visselhovode clear during 19 ...\.pre Further north another of the division battle groups was closinG in on Zeven (0323) fran the east. ( Ib i d. ) 331. Meanwhile on tho left of Maj-d.en ddair's guardsnen ,~ .\rnoured BriGade Vl.'lS thrusting tovva.rc1s Rotonburg fran the south, an Thus ended Q nost satisfactory d~~, eSgecinlly for 7 ~rnd Div Which that night conto.cted 11 ~rrlli·Div of 8 Brit Corps tour niles south-wast ofi,Hnsen {6f17 0:" (Ibid) - 147 - .. , ]£ OP2RATIONS OF 30 BRIT CORPS, 11-19 Apr t r 5 332. j\lonc; tho bounckry botvloon First Cdn and Socond Brit ~rLios, Lt-Gen B.G. Horrock's 30 Corps had sinilarly w~de goed' proGroso but aGainst very stiff resistance on the line Cloppon burG - Quakenbruck (1553) - Vochta (3759). Up to 14 ~pr 30 Corps had Dano.god to tc.ke Q.uo.lmnbruck, out the other tvJO places VlOre still boine strongly defended. New orders woro therofore issued: 3 British Division To soize in succession the following o.roas with the object of screeninf; :arenen fron the south-wost. (a) Tolkenbruck 6592 - Brinkill_ 7091 Grosse}fuckenstodt 6589 (b) Ho.vekost 5388-Hcngster:101z 5387. (c) DolDenhorst. 51 (H) Division To conplete the ca)ture of the aT'eo. Vechta-viildeshausen. To be propnreQ to rolieve 3 British Division on the' left }ortion of their present SQctOT and to bo 'pre pared to protect the left flank of 3 British Division for its attack on DeJI1enhorst. Guo.rds ~YDourod Division To cODpleteoccu~~tion of the _ igh sround west of Clop}enburg. To bo )ro:Jo.reo. to oper.::tt6 in 0. counter attack role north -cast or north-west. 4) Division To co~plete the capture of the area Cloppenburg cross rroads 3177. Opposition in front of 51 (H), GUQrds lUT.10Ured and 43 Divisions loosened considerably during 14 Apr, so that 51 (H) Division cane up rayidly on tho left of 3 British Division. Guards :~rnoured Division cleo.rod"the area north of Vcchta and WGst of 51 (H) Division.without difficulty. On tho left 43 Division entored Cloppenburg early in the day. (Ibid, p. 381) -~. 333. Opposition lr,osened during 14 .L1.pr. The Highland Division advanced r~)idly on tho left of 3 Brit Inf Div, the Guards cleared north of Vechtn and ,43 (~) Inf Div entered Clopp onburg. However O)}osition'to any DOVO NorthWost by 3 British Division was strong. In conseQuence 3 British Division had to pc' put on to 0. narrower front before substantial prog ress could be expected. In a.ccordc\.l1ce Viith ~'\.TI1yt s ]£ Referenco na.ps a.s for para. 324 - 148 - first priority, i.e. the capture of Brenen, 30 Corps issued orders for completion of the clearance of the area west of the R ~eser within the corps boundaries. Villile 3 British Division continued to operate towards Delmenhorst, 51 (H) Division was to make local improve ment of positions and to relieve 9 Brigade (3 British Division) on 16 or 17 Apr having handed over to 43 Division its own left Brigade sector (152 Brigade). 43 Division was to capture the cross roads 3177 and to maintain contact with 4 Canadian Armoured Division which was at that time directed on Oldenburg on an axis parallel with that followed by 43 Division. Guards Armoured Division concentrated and came into corps reserve. By the night of 15 Apr the Vlessex Division had taken the Cloppen burg crossroads and proceeded to relieve 152 (H~ Bde on its left. (~) 334. On the same day 185 Bde of 3 Inf Div attacked the villages of Leeste and Brinkum, but opposition, mainly from SS troops, was extremely strong and it was appreciated that the assault on Delmenhorst, one of the main defensive outposts to Bremen., would require a well supported and concentrated effort. . . During 16 Apr, both 51 (H) and 43 Divisions improved their positions. 51 (H) Division captured Dotlingen while 153 Brigade and 43 Division pushed east from the cross roads 3177 to capture Ahlhorn. The attack by 3' British Division had resulted in the capture of Brink- un, save for a small' corner north west of the tovm, and also in that of Grosse Mackenstedt 6589, where only light opposition was encoillltered. 335. In his inst,ructL::ms to his divisions on 17 Apt Lt-Gen Horrocks' announced his intention to continue the thrust towards Mittels-Huchting (6696) - Stwlr (6892) with 3 Inf Div While the Highland formation pressed on to Harpstedt and Debnen horst. Additional tasks allotted were: 4,3 Division To take over from 153 Brigade and to uove off the route Haselunne-Cloppenburg to allow 2 Canadian Corps unres tticted use of it from the mo~ning of 19 Apr. Guards Armoured Division To pass to under cormland 12 Corps. As a result, during 17 Apr 51 (H) Division advanced about three miles, reaching Ippener 5985. Both these attacks i.e. 3 British and 51 (H) Division continued on 18 Apr, against stiff opp osition and had limited, but nevertheless steady progress. 52 (L) Division v~s already attacking towards Bremen. s.long the north bank of R Feser, having been passed .- 149 - through 53 (V) Division by 12 Corps. The tioe has now come for '~he bremen opeI'atj.on to be co-ordinated under 30 Corps. 52 (L) Division therefore passed to command 30 Corps on 19 Apr. BO';~ll jl (H) and 43 Divisions had c.~~so beenv18rned to be pl~epared to assist in the capture of Bremen, from tho ~est and East respectively. (Ibid, p. 382) On the afternoon Oi 19 APT, 51 (a) Div h, d its forward troops in Adelheide (5891) at 0. place about three niles south of Delmenhorst. Further on the' !'ight j a briGade of th~J Vlessex was shifted to cover the east bank of the:; Rivel~ "'\;0881'0 Thore it came under command of t~c Lowland Division, which had itself rocently arrived under Lt-Gon Horrocks 9 cor:.trol and vvas ·l;~.:rusting northward from Verden. (Ibid)* THE ALLIED SITUATION, 19 APR 45 336. ThG All"i.od si-suation o.t this t imo could scarcely havo been better" As ~_f to crOVl!1. OllT efforts in grand- fashion, tho forces in tho Bu~r had capitulatoa. Goneral Eisenhower des cribes the last moments 0f the groQt industrial area in these words: The eastern half collapsod on 16 April, when 80,000 pri~;oners V'lere taken in the 24 hours,. and on 18 April the pocket was finally liquidated. The total bag of prisonel's reached tho L0i10nSe figure of 325,000, includ ing 30 general officers. Originally we had estimated that only 150,000 could be talcen. Tvverity-one divisions were destroYGd~ including three panzer,'one panzer gre!ladier and -(;h1'oe paro.chute divisions, and enormous Quantities of booty fell into our hands. What Hitler may ho.ve p.xpG~ced to pro~e 0. fortress to hold us'back from l .... tl~[<.l Ger:"13.:'1y h" c1 gi-ren way after 18 days, a.nd by nOVI tho main front WQ3 over 100 miles distant to the east. (Eisenhower, £E cit, p. 105) 337. .B.f.:-:lin ·t,horc ari80s tho difficulty of e:x:plaining wry the Germans hW1g O~l for 80 long Ll tho Ruhr when they should have pulled their i'o:~'ces bilck, rrho Supreme Commander suggests JE Paras 324 - 335 ho.vo ~)OEm W.L'itto:n.. mainly according to the account of S8cond ·Arrr.~:- Op3:I'C'.ticD:.'. l;ontained in AEF: 45/Second Army/C/D Docket I, o.nd. eheckod biT "the following references: (1) AEF: 45/Ss'Jord Arny/C/H Docket III. Second Army Sitreps for April 19.5 ~s received at H~Q. First Cdn Amy: Nos 523 & 525 for period 11000j.) . 120001B Nos 525 ' 526 II 1; 120001 ' 130001B Nos 527 .... 528 :1 13000L .... 140001B Nos 529 ' 530 II 11 1400011·. ' 150001B Nos 531 '- 532.11 I' 1.5-0001£ ' 160001B Nos 533 ' .5 34· II II 16000E~ ' '170001B Nos 535 536;J II 17000:i.H ' 180001B Nos 537 538 11 1800011:3 190001B Nos 539 - 540 Il II 190001B - 200001B - 150 - that the enemy prefe~red to follow the ]olicy of fighting where he stood regardless of the odds~ ~.~oreover, General Eieenhower adds: The enemy may have entertained ideas of holding out in the Ruhr for some tine and thus constituting a threat in our rear which would prevent our further progress while his remaining armies regrouped. If so, he had seriously miscalculatod. ~vents were to show that the Ruhr could not support its defenders, despite its arm ament \vorks and fuel production plants ,vlhile the armies to the east ,"rere in no condition to regroup and reform any sort of effective line. Each of them v~s hard yut to maintain its OVnl position, and there was no hope of filling tho gap in the center of the front cr8~tod by the trapping of the 21 divisions of Army Groups' B and H. Through that gap tho Allied armies wore shortly to pour oa.stvlard, sinc 0 the GerIJ.an troops ·.rhi6h should have been ba.rring their path were, instead, on the march to Allied prison camps. 338. Continuing the General states that Immediately tho encircl L~g. move had been cOI1.pleted, operations were instituted to render innDcuous the forces in the pocket. The densely built-up Ruhr area offered IDQny advanta.ges to the defence, and it Vlas my' intention, should the enemy continue to ~esist firmly, to content myself with compressing him into a. small area. where only a few civisions would be needed to con tain him, and there to sta.rve Dim into surrender, Even if the Ruhr itself could supply its garrison with ad equate me2ns of defence, it was clear that so populated an aroa, cont'liniI~g y,K'.ny hungry civilian mouths, could not 21so feed indefinitely the huge aruies vmich it suddenly fOQnd in its nidst. 339. For some tiIJ.e after the jaws of tho 'trap closed, the enemy Qttemptod with groat spirit to break out, first from Hamm, tJen from Siegen: These attempts, ho\lGver, like the cooper::ting counter attacks by the enemy QTIlies outside the pOCket, were a.bortive, and were forced bQck ever~~here except a.long the b::mk of the Rhine. 'l'10unwhile the cunmunit ion fact ories ceased production, and 'o"/ho.t little vias available could not be transported to the front. Fuel and food likowise could not-be supplied where they were'neoded; the rail SYStOlJ. WC.S hn.... foctivo for this purpose sinoe, apart from the damage it had suffored, the network was thinnost vJhore the fig]:: i.~~L ' .. >.J ~lQttest, in the soutl-~ ern Sauor12nd. Shortage of wOQpons was as grave as elsevmoro in the Germa.n ~rniGs, rear echelons were stripped to arm forw~rd orres, but even then the' latter often lackGCl ammunition f the correct calibers. 340. By mid-April, the· end of opyosition in the Ruhr was in sight: '" ~'~1.50'- that the enemy preferred to follow the policy of fighting where he stood regardless of thB odds. Moreover, General Eieenhower adds: The enemy muy have entert~incd ideas of holding out in the RullI' for some tixne and thus constituting a threat in-our rear which would prevent our further progress While his remaining armies regrouped. If so, he had seriously miscalculated. Events were to show that the Ra~r could not support its defenders, despite its arm ament works and fuel production plants, vmile the armies to the east were in no condition to regroup and reform any sort of effective line. Eaoh of them w~s hard put to maintain its own position, and there was no hope of filling tho gap in the center of the front created by the trapping of the 21 divisions of Army Groups B and H. Through that gap the Allied ~rmiGs Were shortly to pour eastvlard, since the German troops" ~"rhi6h should have been barring their po.th were, instead t on the march to Allied prison camps. ' - (Ibid) 338. Continuing the General states that Immcdia.tely tho encircl ihg, move had been completed, operations were· instituted to render innDcuous the forces in the pocket. The densely built-up Ruhr area offered many advantages to the defence, and it ~as my' intention, should the enemy oontinue to resist firmly, to oontent myself vri th oompressing him into 0. small area. V'lhere only 0. fen divisions would be needed to CQIl tain him, and there to starve £lim into surrender. Even if the Ruhr itself could sup.ply its garrison with ad equate me~ns of defence, it was clear that so p6pulo.ted an o.reo., oont'linil'lg nl:--..ny hungry civilicm mouths, could not Qlso feed indefinitely the huge o.r~ies which it suddenly fOQnd in its nidst. ( Ib id) 339. For SOBe tine after the jaws of tho'trap closed, tho enemy attemptod with grent spirit to brenk out, first from Ho.mm, then from Siegen: These attempts, hOYlover, like tho cooper::ting counter a.ttacks by the enemy QYDies outside the pocket, were o.bortive, and were forced bnck ever~~here except along the bcml;: of tho Rhine. "l.:Ieunwhile the ammunition fact ories ceased production, and wh~t little vms available could not be transported to t~e front. Fuel and food likowise could not be supplied where they were neoded; the rnil systel"J. was LTC. foctivo for ttiis purpose s1noa, apart from. the do.mo.go it had suffered, the network wa.s thinnest vlhere the fig}.: ~ .i.~lt_ L~""::; l~ottest, in the south ern Sauerlo.nd. Shortage of weapons wo.s as grave o.s elsewhere in the German ~~ies, rear echelons were stripped to arm forvlard OilOS, but even thon the"latter often lacked nrmnunition of the corroct calibers. 340. By mid-April, tho ond of opposition in the Ruhr was in sight: 1.51 ..,.. Signs of disintegr2tion wero evident, resistance be coming scattered and tho enomy giving themselves up in such ~l.wnbers that· tho di.sposo.l of the pl~isoners constit utod a difficulty. It v\'as c18ar novi that there would be no question of st~rvinb a stubborn remna.nt into sub mission. Tho nc.in industrial tmlTE in the north were cloared, and an 14 ~pril tho pockot was split into two a.t Ho.gen. This event dictatod but ono po~sonal course to the Gorm~n Command e:':' in the Ruhr cmo, on 10 April Fio} d :Mo.rsho.l ]lCldol corn:mitted suicide. (First Cdn Army Int [\UL'lI:1CLrios .0,l2. cit, 10 A)r 4.5, No.290) 3t;·lQ l·~eo.n'.';1lj,18 the .Arr.Gric~n c..:rid French Armies to the south had run wild. E\:::v:.mth U< S. ld'rny }l.9.d rGo.ched NU1~nburg on 16. Apr and proc eodEdto 0180.:.' t 11.8. t city" The Fronch had seized Budo~-Badon and Kohl Qnd tho way VIQS soon clear for bridging op erations at Str2sbourg to con1ffiuncp~ The enomy in this sector wus retreating in some hnstu Qnd Stuttg2rt was abDut to fall to con-" verging pincers f:;'on the north-east a:1d south-east. . (Eisenhower, op cit, p. 111) (First Cdn Tnt Sur,lillo.rics,.2.£ cit, No. 293,19 Apr 7Ci'~)- r,/ . - 342. Noxt in line of the '\TiotOI'ious plunging foroes was Third U.S. 'Army. After seizing V!c inQI' a't1d clen.ring Erfurt on 11 and 12 : pI', Fatton?[l mon vent on to Jonn nhere Napoleon had long aGo cI'ushed his cnomic,"). By J.J :\.pr J .'no. vias c1cc..r and the arBour \Ins o.t the gates of Ch.:-mnitz. ;.'J:hile XX U.S. Corps swept on along the no~thern frontier of Czochoclovo.kio., General Patton's other f, :;:-mo.tions pushed on throL ["ht 'Neus Go.dt tow2rds tho mounto.ins of Bohemia. '(Eisenhower, £~ ~it, '1'. 107; also Pirst CdnArmy rnt St~o.ries, ££ ~it, Nos 2J7=2E8, 289, d~ted 1(~18 Apr 45 incl) 3f,·3. North of the Third ~".. rmy sector, Genero.l Hodges! troops had started o.n offonsive s,8utb. of the Harz lIount~ins by 11 :..\pr c.nd mo.do such groat progress th::i.t within a weok the enemy's forces in tho mount::>..ins ':Jcro encirclod,. Efforts to' reduce this . large pocket at first ne~ with str2nuaus opposition, but by applying steady .Q::"'OSSlll.'G tho Al'11erincm soldiers succeeded in wonk ering tho defenders. L~st orgnnizod op)osition, howover, did not actuo.1ly disn,Ppca.r uD,t~.l ::1 Ap~('~ "H-3anwhi1o c.n important gain was :l:1Qde in the oCcLlpntion of Loip!~ig, [L bitterly defended stronghold v[hich fell to tho fmilous' Raiil'bow D5v5sion (69 u.s. Inf Div) on . ~9 ...'.pr. (Eisenh6wer~ 9.2".9i~, p. 107; 'also First Cdn Army Intell 19once SUTlmnries, Q£ £~, Nos 292-29), 18-19 Apr 45) . 3'l4. Still furthor to thn north, Ninth U~S •.'l.rrllY, hawing rco.c:!1od the Elbe Ri7er sOllth of Mng'leburg on 11 Apr, YlOnt on to sei~·.8 Brunsviick or: the follov!ing c1.'J.y o.nd at the same tiI!le to esto.i)lish a bridgohec.d 0'I<:..r tho El':Je. }I.. second bric1gohend, south of Wittenbergo on lJ ~pr, \10.0 K2do by XIII U.S. Corps. Magdeburg i ~self fell on 18 ~\.pr to ~~TIC U.:S. Corps. HeanvThile the two bridge- hoads cast of the Elbo River hO.d -:n('(">; 'TTr~rl r.t 11 (>h, dro.stic punishment tllat our troops had. be:::m forced b .... (:1c ~. t o.s Genero.l Eisenhower relates A third at Barby hold firm as enemy attempts to destroy the bridge by flo2ting ~incs dovm the river proved abortivo~ So ro.pid hod been the thrust to roach the Elbe that Q nw~ber of Gorman pockets hc.d been bypnssed on'tho wo.:Yo T~1e foroes in these, before being mopped' up, attempted to hnro.ss·the Allied lines of communica.tion, but with little SUOC0SS. (Eisenhower, .Q£ oit, p. 107) 1.52 - THE ENEMY, 19 APR 4.5 345. As for tho enomy, ho h~d littlo left with which to disputo Allied UD~S. In tho oast tho Russian a~nlancho had tnken on gigan"Clc proportions o.ne. WClS stfJCldily g~ining momentum in the all-out drivo to moot tl18 ":i.moric~n and British Armies. For the western tQsk forces tho battle was now made UP of a series of drills \'lhich 1'ollO"1r.[6d the monotonous pClttorn of pursuit, encirclo ment and napping up. .'..t tho westorn extromity of the front, the Ijssol position, on vrhich t __ o mom:r hCld. formod such high hopes, ho.d beon broken by Gonor~l Crerar?s mono On the Cano.dian right in GermanY proper a si3ilar typo of hopeloss strugglo WClS being wagod Clnd mToryWhcrEJ tho Gor-Jans wore "Joiug driven back. The ap}roo.chos to tho soo. which nay! provided their" only exit were no longer tho responsi0ility of the soldier alone. So.ilors Qnd :r:::JD.r ines h:...d boon brought forw"ard froTI tho naval stations to stem tho tide." Those lClst ronmants ho.d held strongly along tho Kusten C:l!lal, but nOVi the infCllltry bridgejJ.ouds over that obstacle were being enlarged and soon t~e CClnCldian armour would be reaching out to Nnden ClnQ WilhomshaYen. (~irst CaL ~rillY Int SUIT.llilaries ~ cit, Eos.291-292, 17-18 Apr 45) --- 31'r6. On Gonerci.l DeI:lpsoyts fr·)nt, the :rno.in opposition cO.YQO from odd V!ehrno.cht, r::tc..ri"'l.0 and other ho..stily o.ssenhlod o.ssortmGnts of so-called fi.ghting !~lOll unclor Gener8-1 Gunthor Blm::t ontritt. Accordi.ng to 0. later intorrogation roport BIUDontritt'sst~ffcontained only 0. few operational officors and thoro "lNC.S pI'J..cticCllly no BOo.ns of COllIflUn icat.iou. The Genoral purposely org.::mized his now cOrn:land so that he would always bo facing tho Second British ltr.:my." (First Cdn Ar~y Intorrosation Roport aD cit, No. 20, Goneral Gunther Bllli""J.entritt, p. I3)- At his interrogation Blumcntritt recalled tho final tactical order ho had receivod fro~ Borlin: It Wo.s that tho AF~ourecl Division "Clo.us@w1tz" wa.s to be pushEJd through froLl tho ,;,re~:. 301tau X 4·9 Clnd nctko for' tho Harz l.1:olLYltains .lin orc"1.or to cut off tho cOl:municat ions of t~o ~rr~ericans aQvancing on MQgcloburg Y 60. and' to onlible tho TVvelfth Ger:r.:u:m Amy to I,love out of the Harz:! • This so called elivision consisteel of a bout two or threo infantry bnttalions,"about eight guns and sone twenty t~nks of various types. (--.Ibicl) Actuc..lly this elivision got only ~LS f,:::.r as Gifhorn (~r 93). Thore it was sv~~Dped by the strong ;u~erican Forces it was attenpting to pU',~:, o.sido. (Ibid o.nd ~\EF: US/Second ~·i.rD.y/4-F, Docket I; SocondAttly In..~olligonco SunDarics 31 Mar - .5 }I.'lay 45, OIJ cit, Nos 320 of 19 ~pr ~5, 315 of 17 ~pr 45) 347. Tho opposition on the approaches to nain GeTIlan ports renainod fairly stiff. South of Bronen the Gerr2Ql1S Sh01;10d' no indicO-tion to givo U) o'-'sily. II: this 0.. l'eo. Corps Ens V1as try ing dosperCttoly to yvo.rd off tho 3ritis~1 thrust. which ViaS about to cut the Hamburg - Bronen o.utoD:lhn anci" threQten 'BroDon fro~~ the roar. (First Cdn Int SW_Bo.ry, OD cit, No. 29~" 20 Apr 45). On the ext:;,'one left, hOl1over, at Dlo::,lGnhorst (609l) the onemy hac1. slackenod off slightly Qnd prisoners taken O~l 19 ..:'\..pr stated that this relaxation of effort v~s duo to the fQct th~t DeII10~~orst vms 0. h6spito.l 6.ren nnd·w:J.s to be 'nbnndoned. (First Cdn Army Int SUill:nry, ££ cit, No 293, 19 Apr 45) 348. ' Since the Western ~llies had crossed the Rhine five weeks previously the battle of Gerr,lo.ny ho.d completely o.ltered its courso. Tho Allies ho.d swung into terrific stride, exploiting their nobility to the full. At the Sffile tine Doth the Reich o.nd tho GeroQ,n ,:,1.rmy wore being cut up into pockets which for reasons' of supply nlono could not hold out Duch longer. Fncing the Canad ians yms an eneny Who had two choices; surrender or death, the lo.tter either by fire or by wo.ter, for tho sea offered nothing in the way of esco.pe.(First Cdn Arny Int Sumnaries, QQ cit, No. 293, 19 A~r 45). But the Cnno.dinn to.sk wo.s not to be an easy one. As our Intelligence sto.ff observed: The soldiers, p:J.ro.chutist nud so.ilors •••hnve received their orders. They fight because they ho.ve been told to do so o.nd becnuse for so long as they co.n renenber they ho.vo dono nothing n~t obey orders. (Ibid, No. 294, 20 Apr 45) THE SITUATION OF FIRST CDN ARfI:IY, 1200 HRS 19 APR 45 349. It ho.d beon intondod eo.rlior tho.t General Crero.r's troo~s would go past tho River Weser o.s fnr o.s Hnnburg, nnd than cleo.r the Cuxhnven peninsula o.s well o.s the area of ~1den -. Wilhenshaven; o.dditionnl responsibilities wore Frisian Islo.nds, oxclusive of Heligolo.nd. But o.s tho situo.tion developed fresh instructions indico.tod that our first ~riority lay in North-west Gernnny. Thus on this date we see tr-o Canadian right wing ~king steady yet not rapid progress o.long its nctive front, which stret ched fron tho positions presently hold by Maj-Gon Vokes' nnl0ured reconnaissance roginent (29 Gdn An,ld Rocce Rogt) out of.Gnrrel and north of Cloppenburg westwards to 10 Cdn Inf Bcle's now bridge heo.d over the Kuston Co.nal o.t Edewechterdarrrl (no~th of Friosoythe). Fron this point tho position ro.n west o.gain following tho canal line to its jW1ction with tno N1S Rivor, where 1 Pol Arnd Div, in oporo.ting astride tho river, wo.s now o.pplying its strength po.rtic ulQrly along tlie eo.st bnnk. .Of.D, G.S., H.q. Lt Cdn .Armd Bde, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 :~pr t~5; o.lso First Cdn Arr:lY Liaison Offrs Reports ££ cit 191600B G Ops 2 Cdn Corps; o.lso First Cdn A~y/c/H Docket III: Sitreps: Folios 28 & 30, Msgs G.O. 158, 19 Apr 45, 162, 19 Apr 45) 350. West of the ~Js River 3 Pol Inf Bde Gp held 0. .. broken line fo.cing Weener (7408) and Bunde (6810) fron the south. Further-west the front ho.d been stabilized froD Nieuwe - Scho.ns (6409) 'through Oosterwoldo (5~12) on to tho o.ron of Siddeburen (4216), where conto.ct vms being r::J.into.incc1 with eleTtlOnts of 7 Cdn Recco Regt of 3 Cdn Inf Div (First Cdn·~l~lY'OpS Loe £Q·cit, 18 Apr 45; sorials 92;' 19 Apr 45, serials 10'~., 109; 20'Apr 45,--s'8rio.ls 30,40; also W.D., 7 Cdn Rocce Regt, 19 ~pr 45), The presence of 7 Cdn Recce Regt in this sector W[',t~ t~J.";; .Lvoult of certain I10dif ications in tho 0.110cnti02 of respo!sibility to Mo.j-Gen Keofer's troops. When lQ.st Dontioned (17 ~p~), 3 Cdn Inf Div's con~olidated nreas wera uS follows: 7 Cc1n lnf Bde were givon the area fron STE~~vIJK West to the river IJSSEL o.nd South to ~·JOLLE. 8 Cdn Inf BO.o were given the o.ren South of the Hi\RLIN~EN - LEEm~tRDN~ ro..ilwo.y, o.nd the intervening' sector including' tho COo.st line west of the LEBU..J:I..PDEI:J - HEERENVEEN" road. 9 Cdn Inf Bde were givon the t ask of co nsolidating North of the HA.J."'1LINGEN - t,-~p.nNl;RT)EN - Z~,\!AGERVEEN railway, and guard in the coast line. (Weekly Suu~ary of Ops, 3 Cdn Inf Div, ' o~ c~y~ 15 ~pr - 21 Apr 45) 351. Thic allocation, howe\'e:_', had been modifi8d some- what on 18 Apr. On tha'c d ato as the m?ficial summary of operation states: The area ~s fQr EQst ad Gruningen bocamo a 3 Cdn Inf Div respo·.1sibili _'cyc 7 ijcL1 lni' Bdo turned (Ner most of thoir r CSpo!1sj,bili'~y to the' DU'cch Resistance and moved to the now area. 8 Odn Illi~ Bdo somewhat enlargod their sector to ir>cr;:~nde 8~lr,'lO ()f that vactaed by 7 Cdn Int Bde. (Ibid) The only r Gal c banESe in 3 Cdn Inf Viv r s presont disposition was on the right. 7 Od.11 Int Bdo V,T_S new l'aei ng north-cast on the line Hoogezand (3'~08) - Weltcl''':;ll.'1:, 17;~0) ~. :Fraarnklap (2527) (First Cdn Army Op Log, op cit, 2J fJ!r I ~ serial 32; also W.D~., H.Q. 7 Cdn Inf Bde and ur~ft"sT;- In o::,:,de:c to give a more detailed picturo of tho positions hold by B:-:itsadior T.G. Gibson's men, the Rifle Drigade's war diary is quoted R. Wpg Rif were positioned 0n the outskirts of GRONINGEN covering the NORTE-Eji.ST1.~l(N approaches to the t own milo Regina Rif 8 milGs to tho ~On~H controlled re june, villages of VVTNSUM~ 1827:; C)l-,T])'SRDE!,'ID111,1, 2327, and r;rrDDELSTUII1, 2628" I 0 3cot R sono 9 miles SOUTH-EAST of GRONINGEN l.:!.ovod into the towns of HOOGEZilND, 3408 and KOLH.l\N, 3:~10" .h S(;;,'l 7 Reece TIogt and a sqn of RCD were put lndcr 1Ide (;on::':. 8. e", a J:,p of 27 Armd Regt was working with ~" 'Nj!g Bit', Durinf: the afternoon R. Wpg R., 1'.J{L:·" 0 ~:(.::::.:'; ":,J"v':; "'J' -'~~, t:.:::' :", ·-l;,:;;;.'" -(l'::J1agina Rif. ((J.D., H.!!,. 7 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 Apr 45) 352. The T'T:..;V: 0 11 8 c :'cnpant of t.his sector, as has al- In~' roady been related, V:8.S 2 Con Div l bU'(j ,nev,: thnt formation was in the I1C t of moving (01 the d :Lr 0<;':' c','d.e1' of the '., -i n-C.) to Lt-Gen Simonds? right flank (GCJ:1.01.' On 18 Apr, HQ 2 Cdn . Continuing oas L::'IL. Js ov :r l; ',j I .rontier, HQ. 2 Cdn Inf Div passed through ·,~"'..SEN, 1':T'-~,7'I-IALTS and NORDHORN. The River Ems '~'Jas orossed c,; t ")J' LlNG:C;N and the first stago of this long ~ O~lrn(;y f1'C' -' l-.. (uJ.~.J,_ ··,-n ended, after 110 milos neaT HASE,GUNIJF.n (,E UW follow:i..~,:- day (19 Apr) H(,~ 2 Cdn Tnt' Di"J travert', ~d bhe ronaining 37 miles fr~m HASELUNNE, through ]J)NlN-, ijH, to a position :.c q"!:"r.::!'1"O 2676 approximately 5 nilus n.or ~h_on c (Wockly·SUTIL1nry of Ops, 2 Odn Inf Div, 9~ cit, 15-21 Apr 45) As soon us the Di\~sionQl he~dquart8rs arrivod in its noW area on 19 Apr, tho corrrlunder and his stqff began planning for tho ne:;;:t offensive against Oldenburg (l£.id) 2 ,.,:.::.:...:', ,".;:': ','.: .... :.::: :.:.'.::..... :.', ', ... ' .. ,.- .. ', ....:::.-: .. .:' ...... :.-:.... .', . •'-:.,~••,- . ',::':' :.:-:,":: CON H. L.1. Pin9jum oWITMARSUM O.O.R.OF C. - oBLOKZIJL DEVENTER -LEEUWARDEN-GRONINGEN 2 &3 CDN INF DIVS &I POL ARM D DIV 11-18 APR 45 10 0 10 20 30 ; ; MILES'" - ••• ; : MILES HISTORICAL SECTION. G.S. i P;'ENDI XB ...... T 1.0"32 T 2 "0" COY Hoogk(Zrk I CAPTURE OF GRONINGEN 2 CDN INF DIV 16 APR 45 o MILE HISTORICAL SECTION, G.S. np I c SOGEl" - EDEWECHTERDAMM- SAGE 4 CDN ARMD DIV Kustr;n 11-18 APR 4S ( KQmp~ LINe & WELLD I 0 2 3 MILEI •• ; ; 1===:=j~__t MILES Kusten Canal QN~Ubor9~r HQrr~nstQtt~ rf'SPQh~ Wi~st~ HISTORI AL SECTION G.S. I 0,32 OPERATIONS 21 ARMY GROUP NORTH-WEST EUROPE APR-MAY 1945 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 ...... ! ! ! ! MILES"· ••• ! : MILES ~ \ \ \I Bad Segaberg 0 '\ I \ ~LUBECK , t I ',~I I , ~I ~.: ~ I ~ ,,' ;~ .'RatzeburgeSee \~ I SCHWERIN \ I'l' Goldberg 0 o ~ M,'n { \ ,/0 ,Stade HA~BU'RI"'" I ~ \\ / " ~ '~I f~?""" ~ I I Buxtehude I ,~~(~,', ~~, Wittenbu19 I o • 0 HarburgO --__-,.. Q) """'I T ° H Bremervorde ~ I ~ :rc;-ulzo~ <"," I ~ agenow ~ I ,Ce thacht 15r.§? I r ~'>'L ""', v "'\.... I , \\.--- Lauenburg- I ,.i ~ C\~-, L d . I {" l\ ~\\ \, Winsen 0 ~'C.\el'bur9 2 6 B Boizenburg / -:¢" "l;)~ ~o U wigs ust 't ~ HiUber~en ~ Weser - Elbe MAGDEBURG ...... @ PADERBORN @HAMM Compiled by Historical Section G S -_ ... ~-t •• C ~O\\O~ .._.... . M!=' _""O_-j ~:;. ~ ~ ~&G - ~ PART III THE OPERATIONS OF FIRST CDN ARMY, 20 APR - 5 MAY 4,5 Oontents Para Page Polish Operations North of the Kusten Canal, 19-111 Apr 45 354 - 356 156 Intentions of 2 Cdn Corps, 20 Apr 45 357 157 The Advance of 1 Pol Armd Div Continues, 22 Apr 45 3 Cdn Inf DivIs Operation West of the Ems, 21-29 Apr 45 364 - 376 160 • 7 Cdn Inf Bde Shifts to the Right, 23 Apr 45 377 - 379 164 Operations of 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 21-27 Apr 45 380 - 386 165 Disposition and Plans of 3 Cdn Inf Div, 27-28 Apr 45 387 - 388 167 support for Oporations IfDUCK " J 28 Apr 45 389 - 393 168 The Assault against LEER by 9 Cdn In! Bde, 28 Apr 45 170 7 Cdn Inf Bde orosses the Lcds River, 29 l\Pr 45 408 - 416 174 1 Pol lcnnd Div passes through to the North-East, 30 Apr 45 417 177 The Advance on Emden and Aurich by 3 Cdn Inf Div, 1-4 May 45 418 - 433 178 1 Pol lcrmd DivIS Operations, 29 Apr - 4 May 45 434 - 437 Operatiens of 4 Cdn .~d Div, 20 Apr - 4 May 45 438 - 456 29 Cdn Armd Recoe Regt1s Independent Rele, 19-25 Apr 45 475 - 463 191 4 Cdn Armd Bdo takes the Lead, 25 Apr t.5 46t. - 476 194 4 Cdn I~md Div Rogroups, 26/27 Apr 45 477 - 479 198 The Mvanoe Continues, 27 l,pr 45 480 - 493 199 The Final Stages, 29 Apr - 5 May 45 494 - 509 204 Intentions 4 Cdn Inf- Div, 1 May 45 510 210 - 2 - Contents Para Page Operations of 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-4 May 45 511 - 518 210 4 Cdn Armd Bde turns East, 2 May 45 519 - 523 213 The Southern Flank, 25 Apr - 3 May 45 524 - 526 215 Concluding Operations of 4 Cdn Armd Div, 3-4 /fay 45 527 - 532 216 2 Cdn Armd Bde Closes th e Left Flank, 3 May 45 533 - 534 218 The Last Few Miles - Operations 4 Cdn Armd Div, 4 May 45 535 - 554 220 The Operations of 2 Cdn Inf Div, 19-30 APr 45; Situations and Plans, 19-20 Apr 45 555 - 558 226 Divisional Plans, 21 Apr 45 559 - 561 228 The Advance by 5 Cdn Int Bde, 22 Apr 45 562 - 564 229 The Attqok by 6 Cdn Inf Bde, 22 Apr 45 565 - 580 230 5 Cdn Inf Bde cuts the Road Delmenborst Oldenburg, 24 Apr 45 581 - 593 235 Operations of 4 Cdn Inf Bde on 25 Apr 45 594 - 597 239 Patrol Action and Rcgrouping Opsrations 5 and 6 Cdn Inf Bdes, 25 Apr 45 598 240 The Attack Continues, 26 Apr '~5 599 - 609 241 Plans for too Attack on Oldenburg, 27 Apr '.5 610 - 614 244 The Approaches to Oldenburg, 28 Apr 45 615 - 618 246 The Thrust to Oldenburg Commenoes, 29 APr 45 619 - 633 247 The Fall of Oldenburg - Operations 2 Cdn Inf Div, 1-4 May 45 634 - 644 252 The Crossing of the Kusten Canal and Hunte River by 2 Cdn Inf ~lv, 3 May 45 645 - 649 256 4 Cdn Inf Bde Moves into Oldenburg, 3 May 45 650 - 658 257 Operations of 5 Cdn Armd Div - The Move from Wostern Holland to the Groningon area, 20 Apr 45 659 - 668 260 The Dolfzijl poekot: Topography 669 - 670 264 Ths Deitzijl Pocket; Enemy Stre:lgth 671 - 673 264 The Clearing of the Delfzijl Poekot: Phase I, 23 Apr 45 674 - 698 266 - 3 - Contents Para ~ Olearing of tho Delfzijl Pockot: Phase II 29 Apr 45 699 - 717 273 Operations of 1 Odn Oorps 19-27 Apr 45 718 - 721 280 The Last Ad vance to the Grobbo Line, 21-27 Apr 45 722 - 724 282 The Maas River Line, 22 ~pr - 4 May 45 725 283 Trueo in the Western Notherlands, 28 Apr 45 726 - 737 284 Operations of Second British J~, 20 Apr - 4 May 45 738 - 763 288 Russian Oporations on the Eastern Front, 1-4 May 45 764 - 766 297 Germany's Position with rogard to Sea and Air Power. 4 May 45 767 - 770 298 The Surrender in tbo South 2-5 Mey 45 771 - 772 299 The Surrender in the North 2-5 May 45 773 - 776 299 Cease Fire for tho Canadians, 4 May ~5 777 - 784 301 Tho Situation of First Cda Army at 0800 Hours 5 May 45 785 - 791 303 Conclusion 792 - 800 305 - 4 - hF?E1IDICES - PlillT III Appendix "Aft, Hap - 1 pol l.rmd Div advances to Lede R. and Hesel, 19 - 1 l:oy 45. Appendix "Bn) 1:!ap - Oporutiol1S of J Cdn Int Div west of the Ems, 21 - 29 Apr 45. Appendix "G", Hap - Ol'erations 3 Can Tni' Div east of the Ems, 28 :.pr - .. lloy 45. !~:ppcndix "D", Map - 4 Cdn lJ'md Div, EdewcchterdD.Ir.m to Zwischenahner meeT, 19 ~~r - 3 Mey 45. f~ppendix "En J He.p Operations 4 Cdn .rmd Div, 20 :.pr - I. lIay 45. Oparutions 1 Pol :~d Div, 29 Apr - 4 May 45. l.. ppendix "F", Hap - Ol-er~tions 2 Cdn Tni' Div, 19 .l~pr - 4 Uay 45. 1.Pl:endix "Gil, Map - Operations 5 Cdn i.rmd Div J Northern Netherlands, 20 - 26 Apr 45. Appendix "H", h!D.p - The DeIfzi j 1 Pocket, 5 Cdn li.rmd D1 v 23 Apr - 2 Eey 45. l1.ppendix "J", Mn:tJ - First Cdn l'..rmy forward line :Jf troops, 5 llay 45. Appendix lfK", MOP - o '<.:rE.:.ti·')ns 21 !,;ray rr')up J North-west EUrope, i ..pril - ~Iay 1945. Cons~lidated Casu - ~h~ Lnemy tlnd Air picture fron Day to Day. - 156 - PIJlT III The Operations of First Cdn f~y, 20 Apr-5 May 45 353. The topography of the area through which the maia Canadian advance was moving lent itself to detence and as General Crerar states in his dispatch The enemy was able to block the approaches to his positions through the surrounding peat bogs with -'. barriers and mines and to cover these with concentrated fire. Notwithstanding the collapse of the Garman armies elsewhere on the western front, the 2nd Para chute Gorps was still maintaining good control. In part the troops available to defend this territory and the parts lying on the sea coast were composed of naval units. These nautical elements sh~/ed more spirit than d~erity in their unaccustomed role as infantry. But in the bitter struggle being waged between the lower reaches of the weser and Ems the parachutists still fOUght with their accustomed fanaticism and skill at arms. (General Crerar's Dispatch, 5 May 45, £E cit, para 34) True enough, the Bwkword nature of the terrain bad slowed up opsrations into North-western Germany, but, even coupled with fanaticism and skill at arms, it was not enough to divert the deluge which was steadily engulfing the enemy's forces. POLISH OPERATIONS NORTH OF TIlE KUSTEN CANAL, 19-21 APR 45" 354. 10 Pol Armd Bde Gp established a bridgehead across the Kusten Canal west of Haer (7639) at 1030 hours on 19 Apr. Progress was good for by 1350 hours a bridge had been completed and a squadron of armour was over the canal. (First Cdn Army Liaison offrs reports, £E cit, 1?1600D G. Ops, 2 Cdn Corps). It was expected that the oppositlon would soon crumble and that the two brigade groups would proceed northwards unhindered. (Ibid). Having no wish to give up ground so eusily however, tne-onemy contested the edvunce towards Aschendorf (7395) more heavily, ulthough the Polos managed to ceptt~e Lehe (7289). (First Cdn Army Ops Log, April 1945, £E cit, 19 Apr 45, serials 104, 107, 108, 20 Apr 45, serial 2) ---. 355. Shortly after midnight 19/20 Apr, one of the polish armoured groups (1 Pol /U'md Rcgt and 1 Pol Inf Bn) reported that the woods south-west of Neu Herbrum (7592) were clear and that the attack on the Village Aschs~dorf (7595) would follow. A great deal of pressure was required ~long this route and numerous skirmishes with th0 Gcrmna reur guards took place " Referenc" maps: G.S.G.S; 4416, Central Europe 1:100,000 Ml - Croningen, M2 - Oldenburg, L2 VlilhelmShavenj also Appx "Au. - 157 - before Aschendorf (7395) wes finelly captured by 1830 hours 20 Apr. Meanwhile a report had arrived at 2 Cdn Corps Headquarters stating that 24 Polish Lancers had broken away to the right of Aschendorfer Krunpc nnd werG heading for the BorgGrwald-popenburg road. An armoured group thereupon thrust forwaru, leav.1ng two companies of 9 pol Inf Bn to cleor hschendorf. The roads lending from this small community to the bridges over the Ems on the west and north were quickly secured by consolideting the main road Aschendorf-Rhcde (6896) and seizing the villege of Tunxdorf (7199). (First Cdn Army Liaison Offrs R~port, ££ cit, 201630B, SO 2 Cdn Corps; also First Cdn [~my Ops Log, ££ ci~at 20 Apr 45, serials 29, 38, 51, 63, 85, 94, 104) 356. The advance continued during the night 20/21 Apr, and on the morning of 21 hpr 3 Pol Inf Bde (partially relieved of its commitments west of the Ems River by 3 Cdn Inf Div) crossed the Kusten to reinforce the mein effort. This group assumed the task of clearing the erGO immediately north of the conal in the triangle Neulehe (7789) - Wildes Moor (8193) Borgermoor (8391) and of opening the route Borgermoor Papenburg. Meanwhile the armoured brigade, haVing reached the outskirts of Papenburg, had passed its infantry through to clear the way. It was understood that a regrouping would take plece as soon as the poles were fully relieved west of the Ems. At that time the armoured brigade group would toke over the respon sibility of the entire area bounded by Papenburg - Borgermoor Bockhorst (8991) - Rhaudermoor (8805) while the infantry group would press on eastwards to secure the next main route north of the cenal from Sedelabere (0093) to Bollingen (9604). (First Cdn [~y Liaison Offrs Reports, ££ cit, 211300B, G. Ops 2 Cdn Corps; also First Cdn [JIDY Ops Log, ££ cit, at 21 Apr 45, serials 34, 88) INTENTIONS OF 2 CDN CORPS. 20 APR 45" 357. Lt-Gen Simonds had on 20 Apr told the Polish Commander that his immediate tasks (after papenburg was clear) would be to probe for a crossing of the Leda river on the road to Leer, but, if this route proved to be too strongly held, then the main weight of the polish effort must be transferred towards Varal. On thc same day t»d G.O.C. 2 Cdn Corps had conferred with the commanders of 3 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn [~md Div to impress upon them the importnnce of the completo relief of 3 Cdn Inf Div by the troops of Maj-Gen B.M. Hoffmeistor's formation. This would free the infantry division for its task of first mopping up west of thc Ems River and then following the Poles with its object of taking on Leer if that pIece called for en infantry attack. The war diary of 2 Cdn Corps outlined the tasks as follows: (0) 3 Cdn Div to relieve 1 Pol Armd Div complete WEST of R EMS and clear onemy from pockets in thet aren, also to prepare for inf bde CSSQult across R Leda into Leer and open WEE~lffi - LEER rd, then to advenco vic AURICH on to EMDEN. (b) 4 Cdn l~md Div to complete crossing of KUSTEN Kt.N..\L, advance on 2l'iISCH:ENAHNER MEEH, strike El.sT to OLDENBURG and if it is too strongly held for an armd div to cepture, to capture and seal off northern exits and closo up to R VlESER. " Reference maps as for para 354.