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Spotlight on Global Jihad (June 5-12, 2019)

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Spotlight on Global Jihad (June 5-12, 2019) ( רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" מ( ה ש ל מ כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ו רטל ו ר ט ןיעידומ ע ה ר Spotlight on Global Jihad June 5-12, 2019 Main events of the week The Syrian arena: About a month after the start of the Syrian army offensive in the Idlib region, the rebel groups, led by the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, mounted a counterattack. The offensive was carried out in three efforts, with the goal of retaking several villages east of the southern Al-Ghab Plain and cutting off Road 56, which runs from Hama to the Al-Ghab Plain and from there to Idlib. The Syrian army managed to repel the attacks, apart from the southern effort, where the rebel organizations managed to take over several villages. The rebel organizations and the Syrian army sustained heavy losses. The Syrian army sent reinforcements and is preparing to retake the area that was taken over by the rebel organizations. The Iraqi arena: Terrorist and guerrilla activity continued in the various provinces. This week, routine attacks were carried out in the form of sniper fire, detonation of IEDs, light arms fire and mortar shells. A new modus operandi this week was setting fire to a field of grain and then detonating an IED against a force of the Shiite militias of the Popular Mobilization, which arrived at the scene of the fire. These attacks were accompanied by intensive media activity by ISIS. The main event of the week in ISIS’s provinces outside Syria and Iraq was an attack by ISIS’s Sinai Province on an Egyptian police checkpoint in southern Al-Arish. At the same time, ISIS operatives carried out diversionary action against a nearby checkpoint. According to ISIS’s claim of responsibility, more than 14 Egyptian policemen were killed in these attacks. This combined attack indicates an improvement in the capabilities and daring of ISIS operatives in the northern Sinai Peninsula, and the fact that the Egyptian security forces are finding it difficult to respond effectively. The routine activity in ISIS’s other provinces around the world continued. In Nigeria, ISIS operatives carried out attacks against the Nigerian army and the Niger army in the northeast of the country (dozens killed); In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ISIS operatives attacked a Congolese army base in the east of the country (25 killed and wounded); in 129-19 2 Mozambique, ISIS, for the first time in this country, claimed responsibility for repelling an attack by the Mozambican army; in Afghanistan, ISIS operatives attacked security personnel in the Nangarhar Province; in Pakistan, ISIS continued its activity against intelligence personnel in the Baluchistan Province; and in Kashmir in India, ISIS operatives exchanged fire with the Indian army. Main events in Syria The Idlib region Rebel counterattack in the southern Idlib region About a month after the launch of the Syrian army offensive, on June 7, 2019, the rebel organizations for the first time mounted a counterattack. The purpose of the attack was to retake several villages east of the southern Al-Ghab Plain and to cut off Road 56 leading from Hama to the Al-Ghab Plain (and from there northward, to Idlib). The dominant force in the counterattack was the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham, which was supported by other jihadi organizations and the Army of Glory, which is affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (sponsored by Turkey). At least 500 rebel operatives, supported by tanks and armored vehicles, took part in the counterattack (Sputnik, June 7, 2019). The attack was carried out along three routes (see map): On the northern route, the rebel forces advanced toward the village of Al-Qasabiya (about 3 km north of Kafr Nabudah); On the central route – toward the village of Karnaz, and on the southern route, toward the village of Tal Malah. 129-19 3 Rebel counterattack The three routes of the rebel counterattack (marked in black arrows): the northern route, leading to Al-Qasabiya (2), the central route, leading to Karnaz (3), and the southern route, leading to Tal Malah (1). The area of Tal Malah, taken over by the rebel organizations during the counterattack, is marked in grey. The area of Kafr Hud, which was retaken from the rebels by the Syrian army, is marked in blue (Khotwa, June 8, 2019) Following is the ITIC's overview of the results of the counterattack (updated to June 11, 2019): The northern route – the village of Al-Qasabiya (about 3 km north of Kafr Nabudah): Special forces of the rebel organizations attacked positions of the Syrian army and the militias supporting it. About 13 Syrian army soldiers, including two officers, were reportedly killed during the attack (Khotwa, June 9, 2019). The Syrian army managed to repel the attack along this route (Muraselon, June 9, 2019). The central route – the village of Karnaz: About 80 operatives, moving in vehicles, took part in the attack. At the same time, a force of about 60 operatives, supported by two tanks, attacked the village Al-Hamamiyat southeast of Karnaz. The Syrian army managed to repel the attacks. The attacking forces sustained heavy losses. Bodies of Uyghurs and Chechens were also found (Muraselon, June 10, 2019). On June 9, 2019, it was reported that the Syrian army regained control of all the sites previously taken over by the rebel organizations. The southern route – the village of Tal Malah: The attack on this route was carried out by the Army of Glory, which is affiliated with the Free Syrian Army. The rebel force managed to take over the villages of Tal Malah, Al-Jubain, Al-Jalamah and Kafr Hud 129-19 4 (the area marked in grey in the above map). The Syrian army managed to retake the area of Kafr Hud several hours after it was taken over by the rebel organizations (Khotwa, June 7, 2019). It seems that the area of Tal Malah is still held by the rebel organizations. During the fighting, the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham employed UAVs for offensive purposes. The Syrian News Agency reported that the Syrian army had downed an aircraft armed with small bombs around the village of Tal Malah (SANA, June 11, 2019). Right: Operatives of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham shooting at Syrian army soldiers in the rural area north of Hama. Left: An Army of Glory operative preparing to launch an antitank missile on the route leading to Kafr Hud on June 8, 2019 (Ibaa, June 9, 2019) According to reports, reinforcements of the Syrian army, under the command of Amid (Brig. Gen.) Suheil Hassan (“the Tiger”), arrived in the battle zone, in preparation for taking over once again the villages of Tal Malah and Al-Jubain, and in order to secure Road 56 leading from Hama to the Al-Ghab Plain (Muraselon, June 9, 2019). The Kabanah area Fighting continued without any major change on the ground in the Kabanah area, on the Kurd Mountains (southwest of the city of Jisr al-Shughur). The Syrian army and the militias supporting it reportedly tried several times to advance, but were repelled by operatives of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham (Ibaa; Enab Baladi, June 11, 2019). The Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham reported that more than eight operatives of pro- Syrian militias were killed and over 25 others were wounded (Ibaa, June 11, 2019). Syrian and Russian airstrikes On June 6-9, 2019, during the rebel counterattack, over a thousand airstrikes were carried out in the Idlib area by Syrian warplanes and helicopters and Russian warplanes (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 9, 2019). The airstrikes were carried out in support of the 129-19 5 Syrian army ground forces at the main fighting zone northwest of Hama and also with the purpose of hitting rebel targets in the Idlib area. The city of Khan Shaykhun, south of Idlib, continued to be a target for (apparently mostly Russian) airstrikes. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that on June 8, 2019, an explosion occurred at an ammunition depot belonging to the Turkestan Islamic Party (Uyghur operatives from China). At least four Uyghur operatives were killed (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 8, 2019). Clouds of smoke rising in the wake of a Russian airstrike in the city of Khan Shaykhun, south of Idlib (Ibaa, June 9, 2019) Rocket fire at the Hama military airbase The Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham announced that on June 7-9, 2019, Grad rockets had been launched at the Hama military airbase. One helicopter was reportedly hit, as well as the airbase radar. Several rockets hit the main runway, and as a result, warplanes could not take off from the airbase for a whole day (Ibaa, June 9, 2019). The Hama military airbase (Google Maps) 129-19 6 Interim summary of the losses in the fighting The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that since April 30, 2019 (the eve of the Syrian army offensive) until June 11, 2019, a total of 1,508 people had been killed. A total of 609 of the dead belonged to the rebel forces, 507 to the Syrian army and the forces supporting it, and 392 were civilians (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, June 11, 2019). Eastern Syria The area between Al-Sukhnah and the Euphrates Valley ISIS continues its guerrilla activity against the Syrian army forces in the area between Al- Sukhnah and the Euphrates Valley: A Syrian force was ambushed by ISIS operatives south of the city of Palmyra.
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