Breaking the Silence

BREAKING THE SILENCE Lessons from humanitarian access negotiations under counter-terrorism legislation in north-western Syria Lena Schellhammer March 2021 An institution of MAECENATA FOUNDATION 1 Abstract Access negotiations between humanitarian actors and Non-State-Armed Groups (NSAG) controlling a certain area are a necessary precondition for providing humanitarian assistance to affected populations in that area. However, in practice, there has only been minimal support for humanitarians doing so, and the topic is rarely openly discussed, especially when humanitarian access needs to be negotiated with designated “terrorist” groups that are sanctioned by counter-terrorism legislation. This working paper fills this transparency gap by show- casing the humanitarian access negotiations with Hay'at Tahrīr al-Shām (HTS) and its local governance institution, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), in north-western Syria. Based on a general analysis with the help of the micro-pol- itics theory by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg (1979) and the power-de- pendence theory by Richard M. Emerson (1962), this paper outlines the implica- tions of counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian actors’ ability to pursue these negotiations. First and foremost, they trigger a culture of silence that re- sults in a generally weakened humanitarian negotiation position. However, they also foster problematic humanitarian negotiation strategies like the involvement of intermediaries and the threat to suspend humanitarian assistance. The paper concludes that, besides the use of so-called power networks, especially an en- hancement of information exchange and an open culture of debate on individu- al strategies to humanitarian negotiations, are the most promising solutions to overcome the dilemmas posed by counter-terrorism measures to humanitarian access negotiations. 2 Breaking the silence BREAKING THE SILENCE Lessons from humanitarian access negotiations under counter-terrorism legislation in north-western Syria Lena Schellhammer March 2021 3 1. Introduction For humanitarian actors, negotiating with so-called “terrorist groups” to secure access to civilians in need in areas under their control is a significant challenge because it represents a legal grey area, especially since 2001. After the attacks of 9/11, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 marked the cornerstone of current counter-terrorism legislation implemented by the United Nations (UN) and its member states. It intended to combat and counter terrorism by pre- venting and suppressing the financing of designated “terrorist” groups (United Nations Security Council 2001). However, the resolution was adopted without including an objective and internationally-accepted definition of the term “terrorism”. It simply declares that states shall “criminalize the wilful provision or col- lection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts” (United Nations Security Council, 2001: 2). The lack of a comprehensive and universal definition leads to the fact that the term “terrorist” or “terrorism” is open to normative connotations, associations, motives and characteristics. Consequently, the term is not only used to justify, for example, military strikes against those declared to be “terrorists”, but also for tactical reasons, political purposes and the de-le- gitimisation of various non-state armed groups (NSAG) (Bhatia, 2005: 12; Finlay, 2009: 752 et seq.; Glaser, 2005: 8). The arbitrary designation of certain non-state armed groups as “terrorist” groups by governments has significant impacts on the working environment of humanitarian actors. For example, the provision of training, expert advice and assistance, as well as personnel and transportation to "terrorist" groups controlling humanitarian operating areas – which may be necessary in the course of humanitarian access negotiations – is at risk of being framed as providing direct or indirect support to “terrorist” groups as described in resolution 1373 (Roep- storff, Faltas, and Hövelmann 2020) – and hence can be sanctioned. In countries like the United States, fines and imprisonment can be the consequences (Bur- niske et al., 2014: 3 et seq.). Scholars classify this development as “ironic” and argue that it is “increasingly clear – even for the governments imposing these re- strictions – that engaging with these groups [NSAGs] is politically and practically necessary” for humanitarian actors that want to work in NSAGs-controlled areas (McQuinn & Oliva, 2014: 4). In other words, governments and donors criminalise the engagement with NSAGs classified as “terrorist” groups, although they are aware that engagement with these groups is required to ensure and maintain humanitarian access and to deliver highly needed humanitarian assistance. Figure A: Infographic Syria. Source: Centre for Humanitarian Action. 4 Triple Nexus in Pakistan A 5 Generally, humanitarian actors are normatively guided by the humanitarian imperative and the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and inde- pendence. However, their working environment is more and more restricted by Violations of the counter-terrorism norms and measures. In Nigeria for instance, every human- humanitarian itarian actor that receives funding from USAID has to ensure to exclude those principles from benefitting its activities who “have been formerly affiliated with Boko -Har result in serious am or ISIS-West Africa as combatants or non-combatants” (Anyadike 2019). In consequences addition, the Dutch government restricts “travel – without Dutch government for those living permission – to areas it designates as controlled by ‘terrorist’ organisations” in territories (Hofman 2019). Hence, although counter-terrorism legislation is just one of the under the control many factors that guide the implementation of humanitarian assistance (Quack 2018), ultimately, humanitarian actors are forced to base the selection process of designated of where to deliver their assistance not only on the humanitarian principle of “terrorist” groups. impartiality, i.e. the greatest needs, alone, but also on the basis of donor regu- lations and political constraints. Such violations of the humanitarian principles result in serious consequences for those living in territories under the control of designated “terrorist” groups (Hilhorst and Desportes 2019) as they might be excluded from assistance despite high needs and vulnerability. To date, there are only a few analyses on specific NSAGs and humanitarian in- teractions with them. Humanitarian literature mainly provides handbooks and field manuals regarding the negotiation of humanitarian access in general. Be- yond this background, and with reference to the increasing importance of counter-terrorism legislation in humanitarian access negotiations, this working paper analyses the humanitarian access negotiations in north-western Syria with Hay'at Tahrīr al-Shām (HTS) with a special emphasis on the influence of counter-terrorism measures. The example of the Syrian war is highly illustrative for the increasing difficulties and challenges in the day-to-day interaction of humanitarian actors with NSAGs in light of counter-terrorism legislation. Firstly, humanitarian actors have faced hundreds of NSAGs in Syria. Of those, President Bashar al-Assad has declared nearly all NSAGs in opposition to his government as “terrorists”. The United States and Turkey, too, have declared certain NSAGs as “terrorists”. At the same time, there are 11.06 million people in need of humanitarian assistance spread across territories controlled by these and other conflict parties in Syria (UN- HCR, 2020: 1). However, reaching people in need in Syria is not easy as many conflict parties, including the government, cause severe humanitarian access constraints, for example through ongoing military operations and hostilities that prevent the distribution of humanitarian assistance, restrict movement, inter- fere with the implementation of humanitarian operations and commit violence against humanitarian personnel and facilities. 6 Breaking the silence In north-western Syria – which is often described as the "last rebel stronghold" – 78% out of 69 humanitarian organisations experienced such access constraints in 2019 (UN OCHA, 2019b: 2, 4 et seq.). Most of these constraints are connected to Hay'at Tahrīr al-Shām (HTS), a predecessor of Jabhat al-Nusra and one of the most important NSAGs in north-western Syria. By absorbing several smaller NSAGs, as of time of the study, it controlled up to 65% of the north-western territory and therefore is one of the key players that needs to be considered when planning and implementing humanitarian assistance in the area – and the humanitarian need in the area is immense: of the three million civilians in the governorate of Idlib (mainly controlled by In north-western HTS) two million urgently need humanitarian assistance. Hence, interaction Syria – which is with HTS to secure humanitarian access to these areas and populations is often described considered absolutely essential. At the same time, owing to its increasing as the "last rebel use of violence towards civilians and accusations of being the extended stronghold" – arm of the “terrorist” network al-Qaeda, HTS has been declared to be a so- 78% out of 69 called “terrorist” group by the Government of

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