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Javanese voters: A case study of election under a hegemonic party system
Gaffar, Afan, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1088
UMI 300N.ZcebR PLEASE NOTE: In all cases this material has been filmed In the best possible way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark V . 1. Glossy photographs or pages_____ 2. Colored Illustrations, paper or print______ 3. Photographs with dark background_____ 4. Illustrations are poor copy______ 5. Pages with black marks, not original copy______ 6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page______ 7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages______ 8. Print exceeds margin requirements______ fi. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine______ 10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print______ 11. Page(s)______lacking when material received, and not available from school or author. 12. Page(8) Ifi9,ifi3 seem to be missing In numbering only as text follows. 13. Two pages num bered______. Text follows. 14. Curling and wrinkled pages______ 15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received______ 16. Other ______ UMI JAVANESE VOTERS: A CASE STUDY OF ELECTION UNDER A HEGEMONIC PARTY SYSTEM DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Afan Gaffar, B.A., Drs., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1988 Dissertation Committee: Approved by R. William Liddle Goldie Shabad Richard Gunther Adviser Donald G. McCloud Department of Political Science ACKNOWLEDGMENT Various institutions and individuals helped me in completing this study. It is with my great pleasure to acknowledge their generous support. First of all, I should express my gratitude to Professor R. William Liddle who helped me in many ways both as a teacher and as an adviser. His teachings has shaped my understanding of the politics of the Third World in general and Indonesian politics in particular. His willingness to exchange ideas on the contemporary Indonesian politics from various perspectives has widen my horizon and made my academic endeavour at Ohio State more meaningful and rewarding. I benefitted the advise of my reading committee in developing and improving of the arguments throughout this study. Professor R. William Liddle helped me to grasp the competing models of understanding of Indonesian and encouraged me to make my own decision on the proper way of comprehending the political behavior in Indonesia. Professor Goldie Shabad also helped me in her own capacity both as teacher and adviser since the beginning of my study at the Ohio State, especially when Professor Liddle was away from ii Columbus. I am very grateful to her generous support. 1 am also indebted to Professor Richard Gunther who made critical comments on the draft of this dissertation. Professor Donald G. McCloud is also very genereous of providing his time to correct my ideas as well my "Indonesian" English. I am very grateful for his support. I am also indebted to the MUCIA-Indonesia World Bank IX and World Bank XVII projects, the Ford Foundation, the MUCIA office of the Ohio state University, and the Department of Political Science, at Ohio State University. These institutions provided fundings for my study as well as my research. While doing field research in Indonesia, I benefitted the assistance of several individuals. I must thank the team of Gadjah Mada University students who shared, for only a limited monetary compensation, all the experiences from collection to tabulation of the data. Bambang Purwoko and his team proved to be a very capable assistants delivered high quality interviews and teamwork. I am thankful to them. I am also thankful to local officials, head of the Sub- Distric fcamat), the three Lurah (Village Head) and their staffs (Pamongl as well as numerous village leaders and common people for their valuable contribution. I can not, regretfully, mention the name of those officials to protect identity. iii i I an deeply Indebted to Drs. Josef Riwukaho, MPA., Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University for giving ne the opportunity to take a study leave. My colleagues at the Department of Government gave me the necessary support and encouragement. Mr. Mariun and Drs. Josef Riwukaho, MPA., are the two people who brought me to the academic world. Zt is a great pleasure for me to express my gratitude to both of these teachers. The list of individuals who contributted is too long to be adressed in full. Nevertheless I must take an exception to express my gratitude to Dr. M. Amien Rais of the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University. His support and friendship is very difficult to be revealed in a few words. I am also indebted to Dr. Don G. McCloud and Dr. Terry Begalke, both of MUCIA-Indonesia projects, the Ohio State University, and Dr. Jean Taylor of MUCIA-Indonesia of Madison, Wisconsin. I also must thank several friends. M. Ryaas Rasyid of IIP/Northern Illinois is a sepecial one, he always lending his hand when I need it. Riswandha Imawan encourages me when I am in despair. Budi Rahardjo and his wife(Nunuk), Biran Sarbiran, Yohannes Esomar, Sang Ming Sohn, and Chang Oh. Their friendship helped my life in Columbus less severe. iv To all those individuals, I am grateful. If there is something meaningful in this endeavour, credits must be due to them. All deficiencies of this work are clearly my responsibility. Finally, I am very fortunate to have wonderful family. My wife, Sudjiatmi Purwaningsih (Ning), has to take the burden of becoming a mother and a father of our two children while I am not home. My two children, Nina Ulfah Nulatutadjie and Erlangga Gaffar, are full of understanding by letting their father to be away. They have sacrificed a lot. Therefore, I dedicate this work to my wonderful Ning, Nina and Erlangga. v VITA June 21, 1947...... Born - Tente, Bima, KTB Indonesia 1969...... B.A. Department of Government Gadjah Mada University Indonesia 1973...... Doctorandus, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia 1979...... M.A., Political Science Northern Illinois University 1983-Present...... Lecturer, Dept, of Government Gadjah Mada University PUBLICATIONS Ilmu Politik: Suatu_P_engantar (Political Science: An Intro duction, Wydia Mataram University, Yogyakarta, 1983). FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Comparative Politics Political Development of the Third World Southeast Asian/Indonesian Politics Politics of Post Industrialized Society Minor Field: Public Policy Theory of Public Policy/Policy Making Comparative Public Policy vi TABLE OF CONTENTS AKNOWLEDGEMETS ...... ii V i t a ...... vi LIST OF TABLES ...... xi LIST OF FIGURES ...... XVi CHAPTER PAGE I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK...... 1 Why Study Voting Behavior in Indonesia?... 1 Aims of the Study...... 5 Framework of The Analysis...... 6 The General Models of Explaining Electoral Behavior...... 7 The Sociological Model...... 7 The Psychological Model...... 11 Explaining Electoral Behavior in Indonesia The "Aliran" Perspective...... 16 The Implisit Explanation...... 18 The Explicit Explanation...... 22 The Explanatory Variables of Voting in Rural Java...... 25 Socio-Religious Beliefs...... 26 Party ID and Partisan Choice...... 29 The Pattern of Leadership...... 32 Class and Social Status...... 37 The Hypothesis...... 44 Organization of The study...... 46 II. RESEARCH METHODS...... 49 Introduction...... 49 Sampling Procedures...... 50 Measurement of the Dependent and Independet Variables...... 5 3 Dependent Variable...... 53 Independent Variables...... 54 Socio-Religious Beliefs...... 54 Party ID and Partisan Choice...... 58 The Pattern of Leadership...... 59 Class and Social Status...... 60 Procedures for Testing the Hypothesis 61 vii III. PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM UNDER THE NEW ORDER REGIME...... 63 Introduction...... 63 The Hegemonic Party System: A Brief Overview...... 65 The Foundation of HPS in Indonesia...... 67 The Repressive Apparatus...... 68 Depolitization...... 73 The Emasculation of Political Parties 77 Restructuring Political Parties 89 Political Parties...... 93 The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia...... 93 The Islamic Party of PPP...... 97 The Hegemonic Party: Golkar...... 103 Conclusion...... 113 IV. ELECTORAL LAWS AND ELECTORAL PROCESS IN INDONESIA...... 114 Introduction...... 114 The Electoral Laws...... 115 The 1969 Electoral Laws...... 115 Some Principal Features of the 1969 General Election Laws...... 118 Some Amendments of the 1969 General Election Laws...... 124 The Electoral Process...... 128 The Nominations...... 128 Campaigns...... 136 The Ballots and Election Results 149 Conclusion...... 167 V. VILLAGE OF YOGYAKARTA: THE S0CI0-EC0L0GICAL ENVIRONMENTS...... 168 Yogyakarta...... 168 Population...... 171 The Villages...... 172 Villages in The Colonial Period 173 From Independent to Guided Democracy. 175 Villages Under The NO Government 179 Conclusion...... 181 VI. RESEARCH SITE: THE VILLAGES OF BROBANTI...... 183 Introduction...... 183 Sukaramai Village...... 184 Sukadamai Village...... 188 Sukamulya Village...... 191 Conclusion...... 194 viii VII. THE SOCIO-RELIGIOUS PROFILE, THE GROWTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND PARTISAN CHOICE AND VOTING IN THE VILLAGES OF BROBANTI...... 195 Introduction...... 195 The Santri-Abangan in Brobanti...... 196 The Scale of Religious Orientation... 196 The Religious Profile...... 198 Political Socialization and the Growth of Partisan Choice and Loyalty...... 201 Socialization and Political/Voting Preference...... 211 Socio-Religious Orintation and Voting 217 Party Identification and Voting...... 223 Reasons to Vote...... 227 The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia...... 228 The Golongan Karya...... 229 The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan(PPP) 232 Conclusion...... 234 VII. LEADERSHIP AND VOTING IN BROBANTI...... 236 Introduction...... 236 Leadership and Political Behavior in Javanese Villages...... 237 The Perception of The Quality of Leadership in Brobanti...... 244 Interaction and Obedience/Loyalty...... 258 The Degree of Loyalty...... 258 The Degree of Obedience...... 263 Leadership and Voting...... 272 Conclusion...... 285 IX. CLASS: DOES IT MATTER?...... 287 Introduction...... 287 Class and Voting...... 288 Class and Political Behavior in Indonesia: A Continuing Debate...... 290 Class and Voting , in Brobanti...... 297 Conclusion...... 314 X. DISCRIMINANTS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR IN BROBANTI VILLAGES...... 316 Introduction...... 316 Discriminant Analysis of Voting...... 317 Discriminants of Voting in Brobanti...... 318 Conclusion...... 332 ix XI. CONCLUSION...... 333 Introduction...... 333 Authoritarian Polity and The Hegemonic Party System...... 334 Voting From The Aliran Perspective...... 338 The Santri-Abangan and Political Behavior. 340 Socio-Religious Orientation and Voting.... 343 Reasons to Vote...... 345 Leadership and Voting...... 348 Class and Voting...... 351 Discriminating Voting Preference...... 353 Village Politics and The National Party System...... 354 What is The Future of Elections in Indonesia?...... 356 APPENDIX Questionaires/Interview Guide of the Survey on Electoral Behavior in The Villages Brobanti, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.. 361 LIST OF REFERENCES...... 370 x LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 4.1. Voters turn out in New Order Elections...... 156 4.2. Distribution of Votes snd the Number of Seats Allocated: The 1982 Data...... 161 4.3. The Comparison Between The Threshold of One Seat and The Votes Gained by The PDI...... 165 4.4. Representativeness in Selected Electoral Districts: The 1982 Data...... 167 5.1. The Distribution of Population in Yogyakarta.. 171 7.1. Percentage of Parents Xndluence in Inducing Religious Values...... 203 7.2. Percentage of the Degree of Parents Influence. 205 7.3. Percetange of Respondents Perception on Parents Influence...... 207 7.4. Percentage of Respondents Perception on Parents Influence by Socio-Religious Orientation...... 207 7.5. The Degree of Going to Mosque/Langgar...... 210 7.6. The Congruence of Parent and Respondent’s Party ID in Brobanti Villages...... 212 7.7. The Relationship Between Parents' and Respondents' Voting Preference in Brobanti Villages: The 1971 Elections...... 213 7.8. The Relationship Between Parent and Respondent's Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1977 Elections...... 214 7.9. The Relationship Between Parent and Respondent's Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1982 Elections...... 215 xi 7.10. The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation and Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1982Elections ...... 219 7.11. The Relationship Between Socio-Religous Orientation and Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1977Elections ...... 219 7.12. The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation and Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1971 Elections...... 220 7.13. The Relationship Between Religious Orientation and Voting Preference in Sukaramai Village: 1982 Elections...... 221 7.14. The Relationship Between Socio-Religioous Orientation and Voting Preference in Sukadama Village: 1982 Elections...... 222 7.15. The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation and Voting Preference in Sukamulya Village:...... 222 7.16. The Rleationship Between Party Identification and Voting: The 1982 Elections...... 223 7.17. The Relationship Between The Strength of Party Identification and Voting in Brobanti: the 1982 Elections...... 224 7.18. The Relationship Between Party Identification and Voting: The Santri Identifier...... 226 7.19. The Relationship Between Party Identification and Voting: The Abancan Identifier...... 227 8.1. Ranking of Leaders in Brobanti...... 24 5 8.2. Ranking of The Leaders: By Religious Orientation...... 246 8.3. Ranking of The Leaders in Individual Villages 247 8.4. Ranking of The Leaders in the Villages of Brobanti by Religious Orientation...... 249 8.5. The Strength of Leadership in Brobanti...... 250 8.6. The Concordance of Leadership and Followers.. 251 xii 8.7. Reasons Why A Person is Very Influential 255 8.8. Reasons Why a Person is Very Influential by Religious Orientation...... 256 8.9. The Degree of Interaction Between Leaders and Followers...... 259 8.10. The Degree of Interaction Between The Leaders and Their Followers in Brobanti...... 260 8.11. Purpose of Visiting Leaders in Brobanti 262 8.12. Purpose of Visiting The Leader in Brobanti by Religious Orientation...... 262 8.13. The Degree of Obedience Among Followers in Brobanti...... 264 8.14. The Degree of Obedience Among Followers, by Religious Orientation...... 264 8.15. Respondents Degree of Obedience by Religion and Age...... 265 8.16. The Relationship Between Education and Interaction...... 267 8.17. The Relationship Between Education and Interaction by Socio-Religious Orientation... 268 8.18. The Relationship Between Education and Obedience...... 269 8.19. The Relationship Between Education and Obedience, by Socio-Religious Orientation.... 270 8.20. Respondent's Relation With Leader When They Vote in The Election...... 275 8.21. Respondents Relation With Leaders When They Vote in The Election by Socio-Religious Orientation...... 276 8.22. The Relationship Between Attachment to Leaders and Voting for a Party...... 277 8.23. Attachment to Leaders and Voting: By Socio- Religious Orientation...... 278 xiii 8.24. Attachment to Leaders and Voting: Sukamulya Village...... 279 8.25. Attachment to Leaders and Voting: Sukadamai Village...... 282 8.26. Attachment to Leaders and Voting: Sukaramai Village...... 283 8.27. The Election Results in The Three Villages: 1971-1982...... 284 9.1. The Relationship Between Education and Voting in Brobanti Villages...... 300 9.2. Education and Voting in Brobanti...... 301 9.3. The Relationship Between Occupation and Voting in Brobanti...... 304 9.4. Percetange of Voting From Each Occupation.... 305 9.5. Distribution of Land Among Respondets in Brobanti...... 306 9.6. Land Owenership and Voting in Brobanti. 307 9.7. The Relationship Between Class and Voting in Brobanti: The 1982 Elections...... 309 9.8. Proportion of Class From Each Party..... 310 9.9. Class and Religious Orientation in Brobanti.. 311 9.10. The Relationship Between Class and Voting by Controlling Socio-Religious Orientation.... 312 10.1. Standardized Discriminant Coefficients. 320 10.2. Entry Statistics For Stepwise Slection, Forward Step...... 323 10.3. Entry Statistics For Stepwise Selection, Backward Step...... 325 10.4. Adjusted Standardized Discrimiant Coefficients of Voting...... 326 xiv 10.5. Entry Statistics For Stepwise Selection, Forward Step...... 328 10.6. Entry Statistics For Stepwise Selection, Backward Step...... 330 xv LIST OF FIGURES FIGURES PAGE 1. Indicators of abanoan and santrl's Behavior 55 2. The Scale of Individual Socio-Religious Orientation...... 58 3. The Structure of Village Government in The Post-Independent Period...... 177 4. The Structure of Village Government During The New Order Period...... 182 5. The Pattern of Relationship Between Village and The Type of Leadership...... 243 6. The Relationship Between Voting for Parties With The Discriminant Variables...... 318 xv i CHAPTER I THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Whv Study Voting Behavior In Indonesia? Since the formal transfer of authority from the colonial government in 1949, Indonesians have undergone four general elections for the purpose of recruiting representatives for Parliament. The first general election was held in 1955 within the frame of representative democracy. More than twenty political parties competed to share the seats in Parliament (DPR) and local assemblies. The election result revealed that no political party was able to gain the necessary majority of popular votes to form the government. Four political parties, however, were able to get a significant amount of the popular vote, i.e., the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) with 22.3% of the votes, the modernist Islamic party, MASYUMI, with 20.9% of the vote, the conservative or traditional Islamic party, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), with 18.4%, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with 16.4% of the vote. No other party was able to collect more than 3.0% of the popular vote (Feith, 1957, pp. 58-59). The other three elections were held only after the New Order government assumed political control in 1966. These general elections were conducted in 1971, 1977, and 1982, respectively. Compared to the first election of 1955, the atmosphere and the outcomes of the last three elections were completely different. In 1971, ten political parties competed to share 360 seats of the DPR.1 Following the process of restructuring of political parties in 1973, only three political parties were involved in the general elections of 1977 and 1982, those being the Islamic party or PPP, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and the government sponsored party of Golongan Karya, or Golkar.2 The results of the three general elections under the New Order government indicate that the government party, GOLKAR, has emerged as a new and nearly unchallengeable political machine that dominates the whole political process in 1 .The actual number of seats in Parliament (DPR) are 460. The parties only compete for the 360 seats available since 100 of the seats are already awarded to the Golongan Karya or Golkar, to represent both the military officers and civilians, through the appointment by the President. 2 .In the first general election under the New Order government in 1971, there were ten political parties in volved. In 1972-73, the demand for reorganizing political parties was very strong, especially from the intellectuals and military officers (Liddle, 1973). In response to those demands, all Islamic parties, such as Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Nahdlatul ulama fNin . Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, and Persatuan Tarbvah Islam Indonesia or PERTI, were merged into one party namely Partai Persatuan Pembacrunan (PPP) or Unity Development Party. The secular parties Partai Nasional Indonesia f P N H , Partai Hurba. and The Association to Uphold Freedom of Indonesia (IPKI), and the Christian and catholic parties fPartai Kristen Indonesia or PARKINDO, and Partai Katholic) were grouped into the Indo nesian Democratic Party (PDI). Consequently, in the elections of 1977 and 1982, only three political parties competed to share the 360 seats in the parliament, including the GOLKAR. Indonesia. In each election, GOLKAR has been able to harvest about 62% of the popular votes, while the other two parties, that is, the PPP and PDI collected about 29%, and 9% respectively.3 An Indonesian specialist, Herbert Feith, proposes some interesting topics to be explored in understanding more about Indonesian politics. However, it is surprising to note that Feith (in Anderson and Kahin, 1982) does not include in his proposal the need for the analysis of electoral behavior in Indonesia. From my point of view, this field of study has been neglected by social scientists observing Indonesian politics. The existing studies of general elections emphasize the electoral process itself by analyzing how the election was conducted as well as the results of election (Bone,Jr, 1955; Feith, 1957; Hindley, 1972; Ward, 1974; Liddle, 1978a, and 1978b). These studies do not, however, examine the internal decision-making of the individual and his or her reasons for supporting a certain political party. Therefore, these studies have never been able to answer the questions of why, for 3 . The term party in this study is used in a loose fashion. One can argue, as the military and Indonesian bureaucrats usually do, that Golkar is not really a political party since it is formally an amalgamation of several semi-independent groups. Golkar, however, qualifies as a political party since it is an organization that aspires to acquire and retain power by participating in all aspects of electoral activity. For further understanding and detailed discussion of the political party, Maurice Duverger’s (1954) classical work is still very important. For a more recent analysis, Giovanni Sartori's Party and Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis (1976) is extremely helpful. example, people in some villages consistently support the Islamic party rather than other parties, and why for that matter, they vote at all. Perhaps part of the answer has to do with the widely-held view that questionable electoral practices make voting behavior a suspect subject of study. Furthermore, the nature and characteristics of the New Order government make it difficult to attempt to explore or answer the above questions.4 Given the fact that elections in Indonesia were indeed conducted in a non-democratic atmosphere in which intimidation and harassment were prevalent, it is interesting to note that, in a number of districts in Java and in hundreds of villages, people consistently supported the non-government party over time. In eleven out of 37 districts in East Java, and in six out of 35 districts in Central Java, the government party consistently suffered devastating defeats in each of the 4. Benedict Anderson gives an excellent account of the relationship between the nature of the governments in Southeast Asia and political research. Indonesian political scientists are reluctant to explore several interesting topics that seem to be "sensitive." He encourages giving closer attention to the rise of indigenous studies when he said that "for politics of those countries matter above all to their citizens: they have every reason to study them, and they have the equipment, above all the languages and life experience, to penetrate how power works in their own countries in real culture and historical depth." (Mimeo., 1983). three elections. Moreover, the statistics indicate that Golkar's popularity also declined from election to election in many other districts in East and West Java.5 This study is an attempt to illuminate the phenomenon of the persistence of voting patterns in Javanese villages. The questions to be explored are: Why have people consistently supported and voted for a certain party? What are the driving factors that influence an individual's internal decision making and lead him/her to support and vote for a party? How do these factors affect an individual's decision? These questions are extremely important and must be examined in order to gain a more complete understanding of both electoral behavior and the political processes in Indonesia. Aims of the study More formally the purposes of this study can be formulated as follows: 1. Since analyses of electoral behavior in Indonesia are very scanty and not well developed, this study is an attempt to fill that void. 2. It is my hope that through this analysis I will be able to contribute toward the development of an empirical theory of electoral behavior in Indonesia, particularly in Java. It is generally known that voting in Indonesia is conducted in 5. These data were derived from the report issued by the National Election Board (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum) in 1971, 1977, and 1982; and also Ken Ward (1974). "managed" election formats. Electoral processes in the "hegem onic party system," as I describe it, are organized in order to assure that the government party prevailed. The opposition party leaders in rural Java, however, are able to manoeuvre to challenge the government party. The analysis of these patterns of leadership and their relation to electoral behavior will therefore be very interesting, and this study will attempt to describe them. 3. Finally, this study is an attempt to look at possible alternative ways of establishing democratic political parties. It will do so by specifically analyzing patterns of electoral behavior. Framework of the Analysis As a point of departure for this study the application of both the Western models of electoral behavior and the existing mode of analysis of Indonesian mass political behavior will be utilized. The Western modes will help to explain the general pattern of individual behavior by looking at its social bases, such as religion, class, occupation, and the like, as well as examining the development psychology of the individual in relation to electoral behavior. There are two types of analysis of political behavior in Indonesia. An implicit political behavior analysis was con ducted by Geertz (1960; 1965) by looking at the pattern of individual socio-religious orientation (santri-abangan). It is implicit because Geertz did not directly undertake the analysis of political behavior. The explicit analysis was carried out by Jackson (1978, 1980). He analyzed factors that contributed to the involvement of individuals in the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java by looking at the pattern of relationship between leaders and followers. The General Models Explaining Electoral Behavior By and large, the studies of electoral behavior in democratic countries have been conducted through the application of either of two competing paradigms, namely the sociological model and the psychological approach. Among social scientists in the United States, the former is known as the Columbia School of electoral behavior, while the latter is mainly sponsored and developed by the Michigan Survey Research Center. The Sociological Model The sociological approach originated in Europe, and in the United States this school of thought is very popular among sociologists and political scientists of European background. The sociological approach looks at society through the hierarchy of status, since society is a status conscious entity. The proponents of this school believe that society is a stratified system and that the examination of the occupation and ranking of individuals is germane in understanding electoral behavior. Groupings, such as male-female and older- younger people are also believed to influence political behavior, according to this school of thought. The analysis of organized (formal) groups such as labor unions, churches, clubs, etc., is very important because all of these groups are organizations with goals, leadership, routinized activity, and internal communication systems. These characteristics affect the individual's or group's perceptions of its environment. Further, this approach views society in terms of small (non- formal) groups such as family, friendship groups, student groups. Thus, this approach normally creates a map of society and then applies this map by looking at it as the basis of party support. The sociological approach assumes that political party preference, as well as voting preference, is the product of socio-economic characteristics like occupation, class, religion, and ideology. "Broader social characteristics remain the basic determinants of political preference," James Protho argued firmly (in Kovenock et al , 1973, p.3). One of the pioneering studies based on this approach is the work of Lazarsfeld and his associates. He used a repeated panel interviewing technique and questioned people residing in Brie County in order to explain how they decided for whom to vote in the 1940 presidential election. Lazarsfeld was par ticularly interested in the analysis of the effect of the mass-media on voting preference. The principal questions he and his associates asked were: "What is the effect of social status upon voting? How are people influenced by the party conventions and the nominations? What role does formal propag anda play? Where do issues come from, and how? Why do some people settle their vote early and some late? In short, how do votes develop? Why do people vote as the do?." The study created an "index of political disposition," based on the answers of respondents concerning their socio-economic back grounds. Lazarsfeld was clearly a social determinist, especially when he contended that "a person thinks, politically, as he is socially. Social characteristics determine political preference," (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968, p. 27). Seymour Martin Lipset is another scholar who has given great attention to social characteristics (especially status and occupation) explaining voting behavior. He carried the concept of status further and employed it as an organizing principle in attempting to examine the relationship between voter turn-out and party preference. For Lipset, an election is "the expression of class struggle," simply because "parties are primarily based on either the lower class or the middle and upper classes" (1959, p. 230). The works of the above scholars have been followed by many others who have the same interest. Bo Sarvlik, for example, examined the relationship between socio-economic factors and party divisions of the vote in Sweden case. "An analysis strategy pertaining to the utilization of socio economic characteristics (such as occupation, occupational change, and formal education) as explanatory antecedents of individual's party choice" is very important according to Bo Sarvlik (1969, p. 99). In analyzing the German case, Baker, Dalton, and Hilderbrand (1981) examined the impact of social characteristics, particularly class, religion, region, and rural-urban residence, on voting behavior and partisanship. They discovered that the role of class is less significant when compared to religion, region, rural-urban residence with respect to affecting partisanship among the German voters. "German partisanship reflects a social base less and less," they concluded (1981, p. 193). In the Netherlands' case, Miller and Stoudard (1975) examined political consequences of the general decline of religious beliefs of confessional attachment on electoral behavior. They demonstrated that the * secular parties are the greatest beneficiaries of the declining of confe'sional attachment. In the Italian case, Giacomo Sani examined the impact of several socio-economic variables on party preference and was able to establish an integrative model explaining party preference by employing ten variables such as class, economic status, education, and religion (1974, pp. 315-329). A more complex analysis of European electoral behavior was performed by Juan Linz (1976) in a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between social stratification based on land tenure and political behavior among farmers in Europe. Linz argued that "The strength of traditional social economic structures in rural societies accounts for their great diver sity, ..., and for the importance of events of a recent or even not so recent past in explaining present patterns of political behavior among farmers" (1976, p. 366). Similar to the work of Linz, it appears that most scholars are inclined to examine class as one of the major determinants of voting or electoral behavior in addition to other factors like religion, language, and ethnicity. The works of Richard Rose (1968, and 1974), Arend Lijphart (1979), Hazelrigg (1970), and Butler and Stokes (1969) are cases in point. The Psychological Model The second paradigm for explaining electoral behavior is the psychological approach, which developed as a response to the inadequacy of the sociological school in giving an account of voting behavior, especially in the United States. The weakness in the sociological analytical framework stems espe cially from its methodology. Problems in the measurement of class, for example, have been one of the sources of criticism and the problem of functional equivalence is another.6 When measuring the concept of education, for example, are cross- 6. For a further discussion in the problems of doing comparative research one can find in the works of Richard L. Merrit (1970), Arend Lijphart (1971), and a collection of articles edited by Merrit and Rokkan (1966). national factors neutral, or due to the differences in school systems among the countries being observed, does education become a country-specific variable?. Furthermore, in the British electoral behavior, Butler and Stokes have shown that split voting occurred among the British lower class, in the sense that the lower class people do not necessarily vote for the Labor party (Butler and Stokes, 1976). Studies of partisan choice of the postwar Western European countries indicate the declining of class conflict since the relatively new entry into politics of a new generation that has less experience in the work force (Abramson, 1971, 1976, 1978? Baker, Dalton, and Hilderbrand, 1981). The psychological school is an American phenomenon developed in the United States through the work of political scientists at the Survey Research Center, University of Michi gan. Political scientists in Western Europe and other parts of the world, then, attempted to apply this mode of analysis through a comparative perspective. One of the hallmarks of this mode of analysis is the work of Angus Campbell and his colleagues in The American Voter (1960). They examined the voting behavior of the American electorate in the Presidential elections. The American Voter borrowed heavily from the concept of attitude as applied in social psychology. According Campbell and his associates, the behavior of the American electorate could be explained as responses to psychological forces. "The 13 individual attitudes towards the elements of national politics comprise a field of force that determine his action in an immediate sense, and the field's properties account for much of the behavior we observe. In particular, the intensity of attitude helps explain why some people vote and others do not," Campbell and his associates interestingly argued (1960, p. 20). According to the psychological school, an individual's attitude, as defined in terms of orientation and disposition, is the intervening variable that links behavior with other factors. How does attitude arise? The most common explanation is that people learn from social experiences that occurred in the pre-adult period. The concepts of socialization and reso cialization are extremely important for the proponent of the psychological school. The roles of the agents, such as parents, siblings, peer groups, schools, mass-media, political organization, etc., are carefully examined by looking at how the process of inculcation and the transmission of political values and norms occur from generation to generation.7 Party Identification has been the key concept in the analysis of electoral behavior in the United States under the umbrella of the psychological school. By and large, party 7. A number of studies have been done on the role of agents in political socialization in Western political system, including Jennings and Niemi (1968a, and 1968b), Langton (1967, and 1969). Among those studies, the work of Renshon, I believe, is the most illuminating (Renshon, in Paul Alen Beck, ed., 1977). 14 identification can be defined as a "sense of individual attac hment to a party," and "this tie is a psychological identific ation which can persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support" (Campbell, et.al. 1960, p. 121). Party iden tification is believed to be acquired early in life from parents, and, in most cases, it is believed to remain stable throughout life, although sometimes intensifying or declining during the adult period (Philip Converse, 1972). Party identification may influence people's voting preference. According to Campbell and his associates, "the strength and direction of party identification are in fact of central importance in accounting for attitude and behavior" (1960, p. 121). In cases where the issues and the candidate are very salient, the role of party identification may decline 4 or be less significant in explaining voting behavior. Nevertheless, in a situation in which individuals do not have full perception of the issues, the record of the parties, or of the candidates, the role of party identification will be very strong. In this case, the authors of The American Voter argue that "If someone has little perception of the candidates, of the record of the parties, of public issues or questions of group interests, his attitudes toward these things may play less important intervening role between party identification and the vote. Presumably, among people of relatively impoverished attitude who yet have a sense of partisan loyalty, party identification has a more direct influence on behavior than it has among people with a well-elaborated view of what their choice concerns" (p. 136). 15 From this argument, one can see that party Identification has a profound impact on behavior b y ,influencing of attitudes. The application of the concept of party identification has been extended beyond American political studies. Butler and Stokes (1969) used this concept in part to explain voting behavior in Great Britain. Budge, Crewe, and Farlie (1976) attempted to apply this model in a cross-comparative perspec tive; and a number of notable studies on European political systems have been completed, the works of Dennis and McCrone (1970), and Mash (1975) being important cases in point. For Asia, there have been several important studies that have significantly extended the use of this mode of analysis, especially studies conducted by Kubota and Ward on Japan (1970), Richardson (1975), and Shanto Iyengar analyzing the Indian case. The psychological approach, by no means, is without shortcomings. The critics of this school of thought question the relationship between attitude and behavior. Does attitude precede behavior in the process of decision making? In other words, which comes first, the attitude or the behavior of the individual when making a decision?. Furthermore, the psychological school is criticized for giving too much emphasis to the micro-level of analysis, which eventually leads to a level of analysis problem requiring that inferences from the micro level be transposed to the macro level. Do individual attitudes and behavior reflect group behavior and 16 attitudes? Of course, there are problems of measurement as well. For example, the wording of a question can create problems of measurement for certain concepts. Considering these shortcomings, what is important, according to Heinz Eulau, is to determine the social roots of party identification (1963, and 1966). Explaining Electoral Behavior in Indonesia: The "A1 Iran11 Perspective Are the above modes of analysis germane in explaining electoral behavior in Indonesia? From my point of view the answer is affirmative, but with reservation. Recognizing the shortcomings of the models, to rely merely on one of them could be misleading. Seymour Martin Lipset (1963), for example, argued that in the Western democratic world an election can be perceived as an expression of democratic class struggle. The labor group and the lower strata of the society are inclined to support and vote for left-wing or leftist parties, while the upper class tends to vote for rightist parties. In rural Java, however, as in much of the economically uderdeveloped Third World social stratification based on class presumably is less distinct, and subjective class perception is unknown among the villagers, particularly in Marxian terms. If perceived at all classes will be delineated within the bureaucratic framework, not in Marxian socio-economic deter 17 ministic terms. In Java, for example, people recognize only two layers of individuals within a society, namely the wona cilik. or the "little people," and the wona qedhe (big people), that is, the people who occupy bureaucratic positions or the privavi (Sumarsaid Murtono, 1968; Sartono Kartodirdjo, 1984, p. 131). Therefore, such terns as "left," "liberal," "progressive," and their opposites, "right," "conservative," and "reactionary," are not germane in Indonesian political vocabulary. It is also difficult to merely rely on the general model of the American electoral behavior introduced and developed by the Michigan School. For Campbell and his associates (1966) there are three important variables that determine voting preference among the American people, i.e., party identifies** tion, attitudes toward issues, and attitudes toward candidates. In Indonesia, however, issues are less salient because government regulation prohibits opposition parties from criticizing the incumbents and freely choosing certain issues to advocate during campaigns. The candidates also play a less significant role in attracting voters since the latter do not choose their own candidates by using a primary system such as in the United States. The government sponsored National General Election Board plays a significant role in screening persons to be candidates. Nevertheless, this study 18 can draw from The American Voter the notion of partisan choice through childhood socialization in accounting for an individ ual party preference. This study will, therefore, synthesize the two modes of analysis to provide the best framework for understanding elec toral behavior in Indonesia. The sociological approach is germane because it gives focus to the problems of social cleavages in Indonesia, especially socio-cultural cleavages. The psychological approach is important in strengthening our understanding of the development of political socialization and party as well as group identification in Indonesia. The mode of analysis in this study, therefore, can be categorized as the "socio-psychological approach," bringing into account both sociological and psychological factors that influence individual behavior. This approach will closely examine the aliran concept since the latter is the principal source of cleavage in Indonesian society. The Implicit Explanation; Geertz»s Aliran. In order to gain a better understanding of Javanese political behavior it is important to establish a distinct picture of the political culture of the Javanese society because the existing pattern of political culture affects the mode of political behavior in Javanese villages. Within this context, the concept of aliran, which literally means stream, is extremely important. It was Clifford Geertz who introduced this concept in his several books (for example 1959; 1960). The influence of Geertz in analyzing Indonesian politics is very predominant among Indonesian specialists as revealed in the works of Robert Jay (1963; 1969), Liddle (1970; 1972), Yong Mung Cheong (1973), and Emmerson (1976). Even though in his later work Liddle (1977) questions the usefulness of the aliran concept, he also notes that "the aliran are a latent force which may emerge in the future with renewed strength" (1977,p. 12). But it is Ruth McVey (1969), I believe, who most stresses the continuing applicability of the aliran concept in the post- Soekarno era. I concur in this position since the problem of aliran seems to emerge from time to time in the Indonesian political context. • "» In discussing the aliran Geertz argues that "the Javanese village has mainly come in the form of what I have called elsewhere the aliran pattern. Aliran being the general Indo nesian term for a stream or current. An aliran consists of a political party surrounded by a set of voluntary organizations formally or informally linked to it...sharing a similar ideological direction or standpoint," (1959, p. 37), and he goes on to reveal that "An aliran is more than a political party, certainly more than a mere ideology; it is a comprehensive pattern of social integration" (p. 37). From my point of view, the aliran concept refers to the state of mind of any individual in Indonesia, particularly in Java, based on 20 the existence of a religio-cultural pattern. Xn the context of Javanese society, the religio-cultural pattern is revealed in the famous trichotomy between the santri. abanaan. and privavi (Geertz, I960).8 The basic religio-cultural division is between the abanaan and the santri streams in the society. The santri, according to Geertz, are those people "who take as their main pattern way of life orientation, a set of beliefs, values and expressive symbols based primarily on Islamic doctrine," while the abangan are those people "who take the Hinduistic (that is Indian) element in Javanese tradition (along with pre-Islamic, pre-Hindu animistic elements), a pattern sometimes called 'Javanism' (kelawenl because of its emphasis on supposedly indigenous pre-Islamic traditions" (Geertz, 1956, as quoted in Liddle, 1977). The priyayi actually is a distinct social 8 . An Indonesian sociologist, Harsya Bachtiar, has given an interesting criticism of Geertz's trichotomy. For Bachtiar, the privavi is not a comparable category with abanaan and santri simply because privavi pertains to a social class, while abanaan and santri have a strong religious connotation. More recently a number of Muslim scholars have given strong criticism to the work of Geertz in The Religion of Java (KQMPAS. 8 and 9 November, 1985). Their criticisms, however, lack credibility because they seem to be apologetic. They attack Geertz for not understanding Islamic theology. Nur- cholish Madjid, for example, argues that "Geertz apparently has yet not really understood Islam. He also has not under stood Islamic theology (tasawuf) so that many Islamic perform ances are categorically un-Islamic"(KOMPAS. November 8, 1985). In defending Geertz, I would argue that Geertz only grasps the social phenomena and labels them in his well known trichotomy. An abanaan scholar, on the other hand, defends Geertz and confirms that Geertz*s assessment is logically acceptable and helpful (Mubyarto, KOMPAS. November 8, 1985). 21 class in Javanese society because of its more or less bureauc- ratio character and is less prevalent in Javanese villages. The santri Javanese put great emphasis on the doctrine of Islam. For them, a Muslim is one who has to be able to take Islam seriously, and they embrace Islam completely in order to be a true Muslim. Their socio-political behavior reflects this religious doctrine. They believe in the spirit of brotherhood in Islam, and one of the expressions of the brotherhood is found in the form of party and social organizations. They are interested in defending Islam as "a superior ethical code for modern man, as a workable social doctrine for modern society, and as a fertile source of social values for modern culture" (Geertz, 1960, p. 127). The abangan, on the other hand, are interested in only the ritualistic aspects of Islam, such as marriage and circumci sion. They are the nominal moslems who believe in the Javanese religion or keiawen. "a blend of animism and mystic ism, partly Hindu in origin, with a thin Islamic overlay," as Liddle (1984) correctly explained it.9 From the above analysis, one can see that the aliran in Javanese society seems to be one of the many sources of social 9. Hildred Geertz gives further behavioral indicators of the difference between the abangan and the santri culture. For a detailed discussion please see her work in Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia (Vale:1963). An account of the abanaan ex perience is revealed by Soetomo, Growing Up In Javanese Vil lages ( Mimeo. Monash University, Australia, 1985). The most current elaboration on the difference between the abanaan and santri behavior can be examined in the work of Koentjaraningr- at (1985, pp. 316-426). 22 and political cleavage because it can be the basis of social groupings, it creates a sense of togetherness among people of a similar state of mind, and its relationship to political party seems unavoidable. In understanding the political as well as electoral behavior of Javanese villagers, therefore, it is very significant because it uncovers the entire socio cultural framework of the Javanese society. The_Explicit_Explanation: Traditional Authority Karl Jackson (1973; 1980) conducted an analysis of the involvement of Sundanese villagers in West Java in the Darul Islam rebellion in 1948-1962. His analysis is based on the concept of traditional authority prevalent in Indonesia, according to Jackson. A number of other scholars, such as Selosumardjan (1963), Koentjaraningrat (1967), Donald Fagg (1958), Hofstede (1971), and Sartono Kartodirdjo (1984) have also attempted to apply this concept in analyzing the structure of power in Indonesia. What they discovered is that paternalism is a common phenomenon in Javanese society. Throughout his analysis, Jackson applies the above concept, i.e., the concept of traditional authority, which he defines as "the exercise of personalistic power accumulated through the past and the present role of the influences as provider, protector, educator, source of values, and status superior of those who have established a dependency relationship with him" (1980, p.186). This type of authority 23 is called traditional, according to Jackson, because that power arrangement has been practiced over a long period of time and has been inherited across generations (pp. 187-188). Jackson then explains that traditional authority in part takes the mode of patron-client relationships within a society which is vertical, dyadic, and asymmetric (Scott, 1972; Carl Lande, 1965; and Legg, 1979). The only major difference between the patronage relationship and traditional authority, according to Jackson, is that patronage is based on reciprocity, and occurs in a shorter period of time than traditional authority (p.190). Nevertheless, the concept of clientilism is still a significant component of Jackson's analysis of political involvement in the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java. The primary shortcoming of Jackson's study is that he did not really define the concept of traditional leadership in Javanese villages beyond the leader as "the influencer or provider, protector, educator, source of values," and the like. He ambiguously mixes what is called "bapakism" or pater nalism with typical Indonesian respect toward authority of the elders which in fact is a very different concept.10 Further more, Jackson did not address the question of the basis of political leadership in Javanese villages. For example, what 10• Baoakism refers to the prevailing attitude of the In donesian society, particularly the bureaucrats, to act in such a way to make his/her superior pleased. Most Indonesians, however, highly respect authority, but this does not mean that they have the baoakism mentality. are the common bases or foundations of the relationship between leader and followers? Does this have a base in common material interest such as in the patron-client relationship, or does it have more to do with the concept of common political culture between the leader and the masses? In other words, what are the common denominators of the relationship between the leader and his followers? Jackson's concept of traditional authority, therefore, seems very ambiguous, leaving a number of critical questions unanswered. An Indonesian political analyst, Harry Tjan Silalahi, put it into more concrete form when he discussed the outcome of the general elections of 1977. He argued that one major factor that explains the attitudes of the voters in Indonesia is the predominant role of the traditional authority which is revealed in the form of paternalism or "bapakism" (1977). Like JackBon, Silalahi also perceived that the relationship between the leader and follower takes place within the context of a patron-client relationship. "The fact that this relationship entails a reciprocal exchange of rights and responsibilities is clearly seen when we consider that it is in exchange for the care and protection which the father is expected to provide for his children that he, in turn, has the right to expect their respect and obedience," he argued (p. 16). He then distinguished three types of leader in rural areas that play a significant role in elections, that is, the formal, traditional, and religious leaders (p. 17). 25 Silalahi has taken one step farther than Jackson by uncovering the common denominator between leader and follower. However, to perceive the relationship between the leader and follower in the clientilistic form is an oversimplification of the nature of the relationship because exchange (in rational terms) does not always occur in rural Indonesia. Further, his classification of the leaders is unclear because formal leaders can be religious leader as well. Considering the problem with the explicit explanation of electoral behavior, I, therefore, prefer the implicit explana tion argued by Geertz especially in his work of The Social History _of an Indonesian Town (1965). In this study he revealed that each aliran has its own type of leadership, i.e., the abangan, santri, and priyayi leadership. The loyalty and obedience among the follower follow this aliran line, and therefore it is inconceivable for the santri people, for example, to obey orders from an abangan leader. The Explanatory variables of Voting in Rural Java Questions then arise concerning factors or variables that give an account of electoral behavior in Java. Following the above analysis, religio-cultural beliefs would seem to be the first and foremost factor in explaining political behavior in Indonesia, especially in Java. Socio-cultural beliefs including religious beliefs, I would argue, then will condition the pattern of party identification and partisan choice through the process of socialization, making the second important variable in explaining electoral/voting behavior partisan choice. Furthermore, socio-religious beliefs will also determine the pattern of leadership in Javanese villages (Geertz, 1965). Therefore, leadership and/or the pattern of authority relationships is also a significant variable in accounting for political behavior, as indicated by various scholars, in this study. Finally, social status or class may also an important variable, as this is the case in most socie ties, in explaining voting and electoral behavior in Javanese villages. The Socio-Religious Beliefs The role of religious beliefs as one of the explanatory variables in the study of electoral behavior is widely recog nized in the Western world. Philip Converse stressed the importance of this variable when he argued that "If party location alone was at stake as dependent variable, we might have moved religion into the front rank of determinants. This is true despite the fact that numerous polities fail to present the religious heterogeneity that encourages cleavages along this dimension" (Converse, in Richard Rose,ed., 1974 p. 733). In his studying the impact of religion on politics, economics, and family life, Gerhard Lenski (1961) clearly indicates that religious groupings in the Detroit area correlate with party preference (pp. 124-128). Samuel Barnes, 27 in analyzing Italian electoral behavior, firmly believes that any analysis of Italian political behavior must come to terms with the impact of religion (Barnes in Richard Rose, ed., 1974, p. 208), and he demonstrated that there is a strong relationship between the frequency of church attendance and voting for the Christian Democratic Party (pp. 195-196). Arend Lijphart in studying the Netherlands' case recognized that "the first important dimension is the religious secular dimension," and he revealed that "there is a strong relationship between church affiliation and party preference. Catholics support the KVP in overwhelming numbers, members of the Orthodox Refor med Church and about equally prefere nce for the ARP; and almost all respondents without church affiliation support the secular parties" (Lijphart, in Richard Rose, ed., 1974, pp.245-246).11 The same phenomena was found in Sweden as revealed by Bo Sarvlik (in Rose, ed., 1974, p. 415-419). In this study it is expected, therefore, that in the Indonesian case, or at least in Java, santri people will support and vote for the political party that is ideologically based on Islam, and abangan people will support a non-Islamic 13-.In his book The Politics of Accommodation. Lijphart (1968) revealed that in the Netherlands political parties are organized mainly based on religious vis-a-vis secular cleava ges. Every religious group creates its own social and polit ical institution, which Lijphart calls "zuilen," or pillars. So does the secular political group. It seems that the zuilen and verzuilen are similar to the aliran in Indonesia. This phenomen on is not unique, I believe, since the majority of Indonesian pre-war elites were trained in the Netherlands, and, therefore, they adopted the existing party system in the Dutch political system. 28 party. When Geertz discussed the relationship between religion and politics, he recorded his discussion with the santri Javanese in Mojokuto as the following: "He went on to talk about the ideology and said that Islam means slamet (well being). Thus Islam means to wish in the heart intensely so as to reach slamet. He said (the Islamic Leader): 'if we want a slamet life we must go by the Islamic ideology which is based on the Koran and Hadith. To do this...we struggle in three arenas in the home, in society, and in politics. Politics concerns with how we will be able to group the state. This must be done not by revolt but by election. And if the state is in the hands of Moslems, the fight for slamet life can be carried on through the state police, the civil service, the national radio, the national newspaper...and obviously this will be much faster than merely struggling in the home. The change one person can make in twenty years of effort in the home can be made in one year through politics" (1960, p. 368). It is obvious that for santri people the relationship between religion and politics is similar to the relationship between sugar and its sweetness as the great Kiyai Isya Anshari once revealed (Alan Samson, in Liddle, 1973). The reason is that Islam is a comprehensive guideline for the modern world; it covers all aspects of human life. For the santri to embrace Islam completely they must also support social and political organizations that attempt to promote Islamic values within society. From the above perspective one can see that religio- cultural factors can be the basis of identification for an individual with a certain political party. The santri will identify themselves with a political party that reflects 29 Islamic religious values, or at least with a party that strives for implementation of Islamic values in society, while the abangan will be inclined to identify with a political party that has a secular outlook and at least resembles abangan culture or reflects a non-Islaraic/non-santri political orientation. Party. Identification and Partisan Choice Following the above analysis I will argue that the concept of party identification is very important in this endeavour since it can be the prima-causa of electoral behavior and voting of an individual. Party identification here refers to an individual's psychological attachment to a certain political party or political organization. This attachment is developed early in life through the process of political socialization, that is, the process of transmitting values and norms from generation to generation (David 0. Sears, in Qreenstein and Nelson Polsby, 1975; Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; Langton, 1969; Dowse and Hughes, 1969; and Renshon, 1977). The role of agents such as parents, siblings, peer groups, schools, and political organization are very important in inculcating and transmitting political values and norms in the society.12 12.For a comparative perspective on the role of agents in political socialization in the non-Western world, please examine the studies conducted by Kubota and Ward (1970) on Japan, and Shanto Iyengar (1977, 1979) on India. 30 The study of the process of transmitting values in the Western political system has been thoroughly conducted by a number of scholars, but the work of Jennings and Niemi (1974 and 1981) are the landmarks in this field of interest.13 Both scholars intensively analyzed the dynamics of political learning of the adolescents from their parents and schools. In the non-Western political world Kubota and Ward (1970) revealed how this process occurred in Japan, and Shanto Iyengar (1979) discussed the influence of political party on childhood political learning in India. In the Indonesian case, similar studies are difficult to find. Nonetheless three interesting studies are noteworthy. Hildred Geertz (1961) revealed the process of socialization in the Javanese family, in the first comprehensive study of socialization in Java. According to Geertz, Javanese children are very well protected by their family and relatives who are indulgent and permissive in their behavior (pp. 92-105). Stephen Douglas (1967 and 1972) also conducted political socialization studies among university students in Indonesia by looking at the roles of several agents, especially the mass-media. He'contended that Indonesian children are politically unsocialized, since they are not allowed to par ticipate in the process of decision making which is mostly dominated by the adults. Douglas' analysis is very weak as he 13. Other studies include Easton and Dennis (1967, and 1969), and a number of scholars in North America. 31 does not systematically reveal the process of socialization in Indonesia, and his data were rather sketchy. Donald K. Emmerson, in his study of Indonesia's elites, found distinct processes of political socialization between abangan and santri elites (1976). He showed the different paths each elite group underwent during childhood development and subse quent adolescent periods. The abangan was inclined to be involved in the activities that reflect the Javanese-Hindu world and mythology as in wavana (puppet) performance, and to join secular nationalist organizations, while the santri people tended to join activities that reflect the Islamic world, entering pesantren or Islamic traditional boarding school and engaging in Islamic social and political organization. Through these processes the identification with a certain political party develop, intensify and in some cases decline. Studies of Western electoral behavior indicate the there is a close relationship between the duration of party iden tification and partisan choice. Angus Campbell and his as sociates noted on the American electorate "that group iden tification is a function of the proportion of a person's life he has been associated with the group. The longer a person thinks of himself as belonging to a party, the stronger his sense of loyalty to it will become" (1960, p. 163). Similar phenomena can be discerned in other countries as indicated in 32 the work of Dennis and McCrone (1970, pp. 246-259). The same inference, I believe, can be made for abangan and santri partisan choice in general election. The.Pattern of Leadership Earlier studies of Javanese society, particularly Javanese villages, indicated the prominent role of leadership in shaping individual behavior. The works of Feith (1962-3), Geertz (1960a, 1960b, 1965), Hofstede (1971), Robert Jay (1963, 1969), Koentjaraningrat (1967, 1985), and Sartono Kartodirdjo (1966, 1972, 1973, and 1984) are just cases in point. The Javanese usually conceive the society in two layers, i.e., wong oedhe or prominent people, and wona cilik or common people. The wong gedhe usually were regarded as pemimoin (leader) who have a similar pattern of outlooks, such as urban oriention, "men who know" fwono sing ngerti), "effective decision makers," and "have an authoritative presence on the local scene." The wong cilik on the other hand are the followers that are perceived as passive and indifferent fmasa bodoh), and "men who do not know" fwono sing ora ngerti) as Clifford Geertz interestingly portrayed them (1965, pp. 119-152). Stratification within the Javanese villages might also be perceived within the two layers as mentioned above, that is, the leaders and followers or rakvat. Most of the scholars 33 attempt to portray the relationship between pemimpin and rakvat as the one-pattern of communication in which the pemimpin is always the dominant figure vis-a-vis the rakvat. This type of relationship has been labeled as the patron- client or baoak-anak buah relationship (Karl Jackson, 1980; Silalahi, 1977? and Sartono Kartodirdjo, 1984). In his discussion of West Javanese political participation Jackson argued that "the critical factor for the vast majority who live in villages is that the decisions have already been made for them by their superiors in the networks of previously established superior-subordinate relations that dominate their social and hence their political lives" (1980, p. 185). The problem with Jackson's analysis is that, first, he does not really reveal the bases of authority and political leadership in the villages, and second, clientilism is not peculiarly Javanese, since it can be found in any pattern of authority relationship both in the traditional and modern world. Third, Jackson disregarded the fact that there must be a common ideological factor between the leader and follower to have a common political behavior. He noted that "obedient behavior is not based on agreement with the leader* s position regardless of the ideological contradictory turns that he may take," (1980, p. 186). He also ignored the fact that the follower will not always obey their leader as shown by James Scott (1985). 34 The concept of charismatic authority in a more Weberian sense is much better for explaining the pattern of leadership in Javanese villages. According to Max Weber, the basis of charismatic leadership is in the belief that the leader has an inner determination and special quality that ordinary people do not have, such as supernatural power, and "the charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life...he must perform miracles, and he must perform heroic deeds," and "it is the qualified leader as such who is obeyed by the virtue of personal trust in him and his revel ation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they are found within the scope of individuals' belief in his charisma" (Max Weber, in Gerth and Mills, 1958, pp. 245-249; and Max Weber, 1947, p. 328). In Javanese villages this type of leadership is provided by both leaders who have formal bureaucratic positions such as the village head (lurah) and the leaders outside of the burea ucracy, especially spiritual leaders.14 In this sense, Sartono Kartodirdjo argues that "outside any official governmental structure stand such powerful natural leaders as the local kvai (religious sage), the haii (returned pilgrim), the guru (spiritual teacher), the dukun (magician, healer, and seer)" (Sartono Kartodirdjo, 1972, p. 78). These leaders possess some particular attributes such as iimat (charms) that 14.In Yogyakarta the lurah. or village headman, is popu larly elected directly by the villagers. Nonetheless, the final appointment is dependent upon the Bunati's (head of the district) decision. If the bupati believes that the elec tion was held under suspicious circumstances he can ask for another election or he can appoint a caretaker. 35 offer protection from danger, and they acquire "esoteric arts (ngelmil kadiadayan. ngelinu kaweduhan, or ngelinu kaslamatan^ which gave their practitioners superhuman" power (p. 79). The type of leadership, I believe, plays a significant role in shaping individual political behavior in a developing country such as Indonesia. The principal concern then becomes the common denominator between leader and follower. As Clifford Geertz has argued in his The Social History of An Indonesian Town (1965, pp. 119- 152) the social basis of leadership in Javanese villages is the santri-abangan religio-cultural pattern. The santri are inclined to follow orders that stems from the santri leaders such as kiyai and haji. These leaders are highly regarded because of their wealth as well as their command of Islamic teachings. The abangan. on the other hand, tend to listen and follow the secular leaders, such as the guru and dukun. who are believed to have mastered spiritual teachings in the Javanese belief system fkeiawen). It is very unlikely that the santri will follow the leadership of these spiritual leaders(guru or dukun) because these leaders do not draw their knowledge and strength from sources highly regarded by the santri. This is, I believe, the factor that Karl Jackson did not observe in his studying of participation in West Java. Following Geertz's analysis of the pattern of relationship between leader (pemimpin) and follower (rakyat) within the context of aliran, it is conceivable to distinguish two types of leadership in rural Java, that is, the abanaan and the santri leader. These two types of leadership can also be further distinguished into two categories, that is, the ■ formal and informal leadership. The formal leaders are those "who are holding an official position in the village administration," by virtue of election and appointment from the upper level of bureaucracy, while the informal leaders are those who do not hold an office position but are "recognized as leader either by the particular group or by the entire village community" (Hofstede, 1971, p. 25). It should be noted that formal leaders do not necessarily have the quality of leadership as the informal one, but because of their position, even if acquired by appointment, they are recognized as leaders. Hence the magnitude of influence can be smaller than the recognized and respected informal leaders. Politics in rural Java, therefore, should be observed within the context of this kind of leadership. Opposition will be possible if an informal leader has a stronger magnitude of influence within the population than the formal leader. In Javanese villages, particularly in Yogyakarta, formal leaders consist of the lurah (village head) and his assistants that include chiefs of several affairs, such as security, social affairs, welfare, office clerk, and several heads of « 1 the hamlet who function as intermediaries between village officials and the community. The number of kepala dukuh depends upon the size of the village. All officials are 37 directly elected by the people in the village. The informal leaders include those who have mastered Islamic teachings such as the kvai. ulama. and returned pilgrim, or those individuals who have deep knowledge of Javanese mysticism fkeiawen. kebathinan) or guru and dukun or sorcerer (Geertz, 1960, p. 189). Class_and_Social Status The final possible explanatory variable for political behavior in Java is social status or class. Hildred Geertz (1963) did not observe the distinctiveness of class in Javanese villages. According to her observation, "class stratification within the village is minimal because there is little occupational differentiation and because economic differences fall within a very narrow range...the elite of the village are those members of the landed group..." (Geertz in Ruth McVey, 1963, p. 46). Studies of Western democracies indicate a strong relation ship between class and voting. Paul Lazarsfeld and his as sociates found out that socio-economic status or class is one important variable in explaining the vote in addition to religion, race, ethnic, regional, and rural-urban residence (1954, pp. 54-87). They also revealed that the majority of business, professional, and white-collar groups were supporters of Republican party, while the workers voted for 38 the Democratic party.15 A series of studies conducted by Angus Campbell and his colleagues (1954, 1960, 1966) also indicated that class and voting were intercorrelated. Walter Dean Burnham then reiterated the importance of class in the American electorate. He noted that "Whatever the measurement, since 1930s the Republican party has tended to be favored by members of the middle and upper-class, while the Democratic party has tended to be heavily favored by the working class," (in Richard Rose, ed., 1974, p. 700). Among the scholars, Seymour Martin Lipset I believe has made the strongest pronouncements on the significance of class. For him "elections are the expression of class struggle" (1960). In citing the result of the Gallup Poll on Congressional elections, Lipset (1959) interestingly portrayed the stereotype of supporters of the two political parties in the United states. "...The typical Democrat was...middle class...common people...a friend...an ordinary person...works for his wages.. .average person.. .someone who thinks of everybody," and "The typical Republican, in contrast, is better class...well to do...big businessman...money voter... well-off financially.. .wealthy.. .higher class" (p. 305). Nevertheless one should keep in mind that this type of relati onship has also deteriorated because of the changing economic structure and the type of issues involved as well as the image 15.This study also demonsrated that solidarity among the upper strata was higher than the lower one, and there was a tendency among the latter to split their allegiance. 39 of the candidates. Burnham notes "that class correlation with voting is undergoing a massive transformation from the classical New Deal Model" (in Richard Rose, ed., 1974, p. 700). The significance of class has also been demonstrated in other countries such as in Britain (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Richard Rose, 1968a, 1968b), Italy (Samuel Barnes, 1971, 1974; Giacomo Sani, 1974), the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968, 1974)., Belgium (Keith Hill, 1974), Australia (Autkin and Kahan, 1974), and so on. A number of scholars of Indonesian politics have argued that class is a very important factor in Indonesia. Wertheim (1969), for example, argued that the Javanese society is well structured between the privavi aristocracy and the common people fwong gedhe versus wong cilik}. The similar pattern can be discerned in the village between the nuclear villagers, that is, those who are original settlers of the village, and new comers families who can not control the land but work as share croppers.16 What is interesting in rural Java, according to Wertheim, is that village leaders, who are rich and control a large portion of land, have different political orientations which eventually leads to the polarization of the society, i.e., according to aliran in Geertzian sense. Those 16.This distinction, I would argue, is no longer valid since the newcomers can own land so long as they have the purchasing power. Unfortunately I was not able to find data on landlord absenteeism in Yogyakarta. 40 leaders added another dimension of rural politics, that is, the politics of patronage. It was those leaders who commanded the poor peasantry to take revenge against the communists after the so called unilateral actions (aksi sepihak^ in rural Java and East Sumatra.17 Parties in rural Java, according to Wertheim, in early and mid 1960s had shifted from aliran to class struggle, however. For him, the dimension of class in rural Java is indispensable. He insisted on the importance of a more thorough analysis of the relationship between class and political orientation. "Even in the absence of more concrete data, however, it is possible to elaborate its sociological implications at greater depths," Wertheim argued (1965, p. 5). A more recent plea for the importance of class stems from Richard Robison (in Anderson and Kahin, 1982, pp. 131-148). He faulted analysts who take a cultural approach because "they fail to comprehend the dynamics of politics; and, more important in terms of New Order Indonesia, they fail to provide a means for explaining why power and conflict exist 17.Unilateral action or aksi sepihak was an action taken by the communist peasantry, especially members of the In donesian Communist Party's Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) or Indonesian Peasant Front, against rich peasants, usually from the santri group. The communists in 1963 and 1964 attempted to take over land in Java and East Sumatra. In most cases, however, they failed because the army protected the santri. There were two interesting studies on aksi sepihak. that is, first by Margo L. Lyon, Bases of Conflict in Rural Java (Berkeley: University of California, 1970), and second by Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and landre- form.1959-1965 (Monash University, 1972). Sartono Kartodirdjo in Modern Indonesia. Tradition and TransformationfYoovakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1984) gave a brief description of aksi sepihak. .41 there In their present form," (p. 131). The cultural approach, he said, focuses its attention upon the style of the regime and not the substance, "and it ignores the very real socio-economic dimension of the New Order," Robison argued. The reason is that, "rural society in Java appears quite clearly to be moving in the direction of concentration of land ownership and the attendant polarization of landed and landless," and, "That such a process is of crucial significance for the form of political relationship and the nature of power and conflict in Indonesia," (p. 138). To have a meaningful implication for electoral behavior class has to fulfill the following assuptions: l.The classes constitute the most comprehensive groups in the social structure. 2.The class division concerns social statuses connected by a system of privileges and discriminations not determined by biological criteria. 3.The membership of individuals in a social class is relatively permanent."(Ossowski, 1963, p. 133). What the above assumptions indicate is that in class society there is always an "order" based on economic distinc tion.18 In a class society there is always social "isolation," i.e., every distinct class has its own attributes (behavior, preference, habits, and the like); and finally, in a class society there is always a "class consciousness" of its own identity and solidarity (Ossowski, 1963, pp. 135-137). 18.Max Weber's definition that "class is a product of the economic order" (in Gerth and Mills, 1964, p.94) is undoubtedly echoed by most social scientists. 42 This study assumes that class in contemporary Indonesian politics is relatively less important than other variables * for two important reasons. First, since 1966, especially after the decimation of the communist party (PKI) along with the successful process of depolitization of the rural area, class conflict is virtually inexistent. In the past almost all major political parties had auxiliary peasant organiza tions.19 After 1966 the communist peasant organization was disbanded, and all other peasant organizations were incorpor ated into the government controlled Himpunan Kerukunan Tanl Indonesia (HKTI) or All-Indonesia Peasants Association due to the depolitization process. The second major reason why class politics is less important has to do with the nature of the economic system in rural Java. Following the ideas of Juan Linz (1976), the rural economy in Java is based on subsistence agricultural production. Within this system economic factors play a lesser role in promoting conflict. Rather, "certain non economic factors seem to be important determinants of political behavior. These include: religious sentiment; traditional and ideological loyalties; historical cleavages; 19.The communist party(PKI) had its Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) or The Front of Indonesian Farmers, the modernist Islamic party of Masyumi had Gerakan Tani Islam Indonesia (GTII) or the Movement of Indonesian Muslim Farmers, the orthodox Nahdlatul UlamafNin had Persatuan Tani Nahdlatul Ulajaa(PERTANU) or the Association of the Nahdlatul Ulama Farmers, and the nationalist party of PNI had PETANI, Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia or the Association of Indonesian Nationalist Farmers. 43 urban cultural and ideological influences; ethnic-religious identifications; and so forth," Linz argued (p. 384). The reason is that "The greater independence from market situations probably contributes to this more traditional and ideological politics. The lesser sensitivity to market may also make members of this stratum less concerned with specific government policies, thereby leaving room for more generalized attitudes toward the 'government' (p. 383). Based on landownership, social stratifications can be drawn for several groups, like kuli kencena (the land owner), kuli setencah kencenc (the tenant farmer), kuli naindung tlosor (farm laborer), and the wong ncindunq. or the people who live on other people's land (Sartono Kartodirdjo, 1972, p.77).20 Does class really matter in explaining political behavior in Indonesia? This question emerges because subjective class identification in Java is relatively unknown for the mass public. Other possible questions arise concerning the intensive penetration of the bureaucracy into village life. Class may be a particularly important dimension in relation to bureaucratic intervention. For example, it may be argued that the more an individual controls land, the less dependent he/she is upon the bureaucracy, and hence his/her political behavior will be less subject to political 20.For the classic analysis of social structure in Indo nesian village, particularly in Java, see the work of Sutardjo Hadikusoemo, Desa(1965. Sumur, Bandung). 44 intimidation and harassment. Bureaucratic penetration can take several forms, such as credit systems, central government subsidies, project allocations, as well as overall government management, and the bureaucratization of village officials. Perhaps other factors can also explain individual, polit ical behavior. Nonetheless, the above four identifiable variables, I believe, will be stronger in accounting for electoral behavior in Javanese villages. Variables such as social mobilization and literacy presumably are not as clear and distinct among Javanese villagers. The_Hvpothesis The principal working hypothesis in this study is that social religio-cultural beliefs are the principal determinant in explaining electoral behavior in Javanese villages. The religio-cultural beliefs are inculcated and are transmitted from generation to generation through the process of political socialization, which eventually leads to the es tablishment of an individual's identification with a certain political party and social organization. Santri people will identify with a political party that promotes Islamic values and norms, while the abangan will identify with a secular or non-Islamic party. This study also attempts to test the proposition that the pattern of leadership in villages plays an important role 45 in influencing individual decision making to support and vote for a certain party in general elections. In villages the possibility of the existence of charismatic leaders, both formal and non-formal, in Java is still prevalent. These powerful leaders have the ability to overcome the influences of bureaucratic power and to act autonomously since they command enormous amounts of resources. It is important, therefore, to understand their role in village politics in Java. Class/social status, may also be very important in explaining electoral behavior in Javanese villages. People who have strong control over resources will have more autonomy in making a decision on party preference than landless peasants. The general hypotheses being tested in this study are the following: "Religio-cultural belief, combined with strong party iden tification, leads to support and vote for a certain political party in general elections in Indonesia." "Religio-cultural beliefs, combined with powerful informal local leadership from an opposition party, lead to votes for that opposition party despite the influence of formal leaders and the bureaucracy." "Class or social status can be a distinctive explanatory variable on voting behavior in Java. The landed upper class in rural areas will have more autonomy in making voting 46 decisions. The rich santri and abangan will be inclined to vote for the non-government parties, while the poor lower class will vote for the government sponsored party." Organization of The Study Having proposed the above hypotheses, this study is organized so that the data are presented and the hypotheses tested. Prior to the presentation of the data the first part of this study presents the conceptual framework (Chapter I) and the methodology and measurement of the variables (Chapter II). Part Two of this study consists of two chapters. The first (Chapter III) elucidates the party system under the New Order regime (the Hegemonic Party System), and the electoral processes are described in the second (Chapter IV). The purpose of this presentation is to familiarize the reader with the national settings and political atmosphere under which voting for general elections takes place. The third part is the presentation of the research setting. Chapter V is an introduction to the Special Province of Yogyakarta and its villages, familiarizing the reader with its history and village governmental system. Chapter VI is a description of the research sites where field research was conducted for six months. Three villages were chosen to collect the data, that is, the villages of Sukaramai, Sukadamai, and Sukamulya in the sub-district of Brobanti. 47 The fourth part consists of four chapters for data presentation and testing the hypotheses. Chapter VII profiles the socio-religious characteristics of the respondents, political socialization, and the growth of party identifica tion and partisan choice. The hypotheses are tested on the relationship between socio-religious beliefs and the pattern of voting in general elections. It will be argued that the growth of socio-religious beliefs through the process of political socialization is the key variable in explaining voting in Javanese villages. Chapter VIII deals with the other core concern of this study, that is the relationship between leadership and voting in Brobanti. I argue that villagers in Java are inclined to follow.their leaders because they respect and trust then. I also argue that if strong informal leaders emerge and are able to match the leadership of village officials in a certain village, the popularity of the government party (Golkar) will decline. Do classes make a difference in explaining political behavior as well as voting behavior in Javanese villages? This is the question that I deal with in Chapter IX. It will be argued that people in Java are not familiar with subjective class perceptions, and, combined with the fact that no political parties advocate class struggle, class will be the least important variable in explaining voting. Chapter X presents a discriminant analysis of the variables that I believe explain voting behavior in Javanese villages. By looking at the discriminant scores, this chapter will reveal which variable provides the greater explanation for voting behavior. In essence, this is the procedure of comparing variables believed to explain voting. In concluding the study, Chapter XI will review the entire argument presented in the pervious chapters and some conclusion will be drawn; and finally I will propose some of the arguments concerning the possibility of establishing a more democratic party system in the future. CHAPTER II RESEARCH METHODS Introduction This study was conducted by utilizing survey research methods. Survey research methods were applied in collecting the original data because the population being studied is too large to be observed directly (Babie, 1983). Doing survey research on political behavior, as well as electoral behavior, in Indonesia, is novel and required tremendous effort. Before going to the research settings of Brobanti, the research proposal and questionnaires (interview guide) were presented to the government authorities, i.e., the Director of Social and Political Affairs at the office of the Governor of the Special Province of Yogyakarta.1 In order to gain clearance from the government I did not present questions that might be considered sensitive. ^•.This directorate is a branch of the office of the Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs, Department of Home Affairs. An army officer usually heads this office. For more description of the function of this office see Chapter III. 49 50 Sampling Procedures Due to budgetary and time constraints, it was necessary to limit the investigation by focusing the observation on three villages in Brobanti sub-district, i.e., the villages of Sukaramai, Sukadamai, and Sukamulya.2 These villages are appropriate objects of study because, first, they can be considered as representative of village settings in Java. Second, the electoral process in these villages can be regarded as representative of democratic elections in Indonesia since the opposition parties had some room to maneuver during campaigns. Third, they are chosen in such a way that each of the villages reflects a pattern of strong or weak performance of each party. The village of Sukaramai, for example, is the stronghold of Golkar, and Sukamulya traditionally belongs to the Islamic party, while Sukadamai is an arena in which all political parties can compete. It was the place that the Islamic and the national ist parties competed in the 1955 elections. With assistance from ten students from Gadj ah Mada University of Yogyakarta3, 570 respondents were interviewed 2 .To protect individuals who either directly or indirectly support this endeavour it is necessary not to put the real name of the Sub-district and the villages. 3.A11 of the assistants are Javanese and they are able to speak Javanese at all levels(ngoko for the low level and kromo for the higher level. The kromo consists of kromo roadva and kromo inggil). Since I am not a Javanese, I can only communicate at the ngoko level and part of the kromo. in five months. Before going to the villages, I designated that the youngest respondent must be at least 25 years of age or already married, as the voting age is seventeen and/or already married4 , and the last general election was in 1982. Among the respondents 43.86% (250) were from Sukaramai, 27.19% (155) from Sukadamai, and 28.95% (165) from Sukamulya. In addition, 8.25% (47) reported that they voted for the PDI, 53.68% (396) for Golkar, and 38.07% voted for the Islamic party or PPP in the 1982 elections. The Sukaramai respondents represented 11.19% of the people who voted in the 1982 elections there. Comparable percetage for Sukadamai and Sukamulya are 6.00% and 5.10%. The differences in the proportion of voters in each village is due to the difficulties in reaching the voters. Some voters wanted to be interviewed, while others avoided talking to my interviewers. The characteristics of the respondents are the following. They represent various occupational backgrounds, that is, 36.67% are farmers, 30.34% farm laborers, 11.66% retailers, 13.33% civil servants, and 8.10% other occupations such as artisans and people who are involved in the service economy. Their educational backgrounds are varied. 6.30% attended college, 10.88% finished high school, 24% attended junior high school, 30.50% finished primary school, and 4 .Getting married at a young age in Indonesia is commonly accepted, especially in rural areas. With the intensificat ion of family planning program, the government attempts to campaign for postponing marriage for younger people. 52 28.20% did not go to school at all. In terms of land owner ship 6.63% (24) of the respondents had more than one hectare of irrigated land, 22.65% (82) had between .50 to 1.00 hectare, 36.74% (133) controled between .25 to .49 hectare, 18.51% (67) had less than .25 hectares, and 15.47% (56) were landless. Since the non-Muslim population is insignificant in terms of numbers, and my interest is in the santri-abanoan behavior, they were not included in the study.5 Therefore, all of the respondents are Muslim but 32.63% (186) of them were identified as abanoansf and 67.37% (384) were santrls. Finally, in terms gender, the majority of them are male (67.43%). Extra effort was expended to insure that the respondents were indeed "scientifically" representative. Nevertheless, I have to confess that at the beginning some of the respondents were suspicious because they thought that the interviewers and I were representatives of high ranking officials or the tax collector.6 They hesitated to talk about politics because for them politics is something dirty because that is what village officials told them. Some of the respondents asked my assistants to show identification and permit from lurah. Quite a number of them were very humble and willing 5.There were 30 respondents mistakenly included in the sample, all of them either Christians or Catholics and from Sukaramai village. 6 .The lurah(village head) of the three villages provided every assistant with a letter to insure the interviewee that our efforts were permitted by the lurah and legal. to support by guiding us in the darkness of the nights in Brobanti without any monetary compensation* Therefore I advised my assistants not to behave conspicuously as urban people or college students. After some weeks, most of my assistants won the hearts of the people. They became involved in sports (volley ball, and table tennis) and social activities such as the youth pengaiian (Islamic study group) at the prayer house or langgar and mosque (mesi idl. The key to our successful interview was that two of my assistants were campus activists. They had been able to make good contact with local youth leaders and it was the latter who helped us to make good contact with informal village leaders. Measurement of the Dependent and Independent Variables Dependent Variable The dependent variable in this study is voting in general elections. At the present time there are three political parties that compete in elections, that is, the Partai Demokrasl Indonesia (PDI) or Indonesian Democratic Party, the Islamic party of PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. or Unity Development Party), and Golkar or Functional Group. This variable is measured on a nominal scale. For the purposes of analysis, however, the PDI is coded as I, the Golkar as 2, and the PPP as 3. It is important to note that in the 1971 elections there were ten political parties competing for the seats in parliament 54 (DPR). Since 1973 those parties were merged into three parties. The coding procedure, therefore, will be conducted accordingly. Those who voted for the Islamic parties of NU, Parmusi, PSII, and PERTI will be included in the PPP category. Respondents who voted for the Partai Naslonal Indonesia (PNI), MURBA, IPKI, and the Christian (Parkindo) and Catholic fPartai Katolik) parties will be included in the PDI category, while those who voted for Golkar will be coded in the similar group. Independent Variables In this study there are four explanatory or independent variables, the socio-religious beliefs (abanaan-santri). party identification, the pattern of leadership, and class or social status. These four variables are measured in ordinal and/ or interval scales, and will be individually discussed on the procedures of coding and scoring. Socio-Religious Beliefs To measure this variable I attempt to observe the behavior of the respondents on their commitment to Islamic religion. In addition to Geertz's mapping of the abangan and santri as the principal source of this behavior I also applied Koentjaraningrat*s concepts (1985, pp. 316-386). Several indicators can be applied to differentiate between abanaan and santri people as shown in the following diagram. Indicators Abangan Santri ISLAMIC PILLARS l.a. Praying Five Times a Day - + b. Conducting Friday Pray — + c. Fasting During Ramadhan — + d. Paying Alms(zakat) - + e. Other Islamic Teachings “ + 2.a. Active in Islamic ceremonies b. Social organizations rummat) JAVANESE RELIGIOUS TRADITION 3.a. Practicing Keiawen + — b. Make Offering to ancestor + - c. Seek Spiritual Teacher(Guru ) + - d. Practicing Special Ritual or Nolakoni + Figure l: Indicators of abangan and santri»s behavior The respondents were asked whether they were abangan or a santri. then they were asked how strongly they practice Islamic teachings. Do they regularly pray five times a day as required by Islam? Do they go to mosque or langgar (prayer house) every Friday? Do they regularly fast during the month of Ramadhan? Do they pay the alms fzakat fltrah) at the end of the fasting month? Do they practice other Islamic teachings?. They were asked also whether they practice the keiawen or not. All indicators were scaled with the Likert scale range from very often, often, occasionally, seldom, to never. The highest score is 4 while the lowest score is zero (0). It means that the score of 4 in santri indicator means that a respondent practices all Islamic indicators. One should bear in mind that actually the abangan and santri behavior are not mutually exclusive. Some abangan still practice Islamic teachings and some santris also practice Javanese mysticism. Therefore, the following procedures are employed in scoring individual's performance of the respon dent: a. Identify the respondent as either abangan or santri. b. The calculation of the overall raw scores of either santri or abangan behavior, divided by the number of questions. The highest possible score for a santri is 4, while the lowest is 0. c. The calculation of the other practices (for example, the santri respondent who practices abangan*s behavior, or the abangan who practices santri behavior. d. The calculation of final score by substracting c from b.7 7.Example: a.If a santri respondent very actively practices all santri indicators(5), his raw score is 20. Then his score is divided by the number of indicators. Thus his actual score then becomes 4. b.If he practices some abangan indicators, for example going to the cemetry and nglakoni very often, his raw score in this category is 8 then divided by all indicators in the 57 From the above indicators the respondents are identified and categorized as Strong. Moderate, or Weak santri and abangan. A strong santri. for example, is an individual who wholeheartedly believes in Islam and practices Islamic teach ings in every day life and is fully committed to the Islamic community (ummat) while trying to avoid abangan religious practices. A moderate santri is an individual who believes in Islam and practices Islamic teachings but does not have full commitment to the ummat. The weak santri is an in dividual who believes in Islam but does not fully practice Islamic teachings nor has the commitment to the struggle of the ummat. A strong abangan is an individual who never practices Islamic teachings, has negative perception of ummat, and strongly believes in the keiawen or Javanese religious practices. A moderate abangan. on the other hand, is an individual who practices keiawen and casually practices Islamic teachings but does not have negative perception on Islamic community, while the weak abangan is one is willing to accept both Islam and kejawen practices and tolerate the existence of the Islamic community. The following diagram will show the above description. abangan, his score in this category is 1.6. c.His final score is 4.00-1.6=2.4. 58 Strong Mod. Weak Weak Mod. Strong | 1 1 1 , 1 1 Abangan Santri Figure 2: The Scale of Individual Socio-Religious Orientation Part_y_Identification and Partisan Choice To measure party identification and partisan choice the respondents were asked the following questions: - What political party do you feel close to? - How strongly do you feel close to that political party? - Do you think your parent,and brothers/sister, arealso close to the same political party, and how close are they with the party?8 - Do you and your parents always vote for the same party? - In addition to voting, what kind of activity do you frequently do for the party?.9 8 .Initially, the respondents voting records were traced since 1955 but only a small number of them recalled what party the voted in 1955. Hence it was decided to limit to 1971, 1977, and 1982 general elections. 9 .In addition to voting, six other indicators were included such as paying fee or other contribution, par ticipating in political rallies during campaigns, participating in party meetings, active membership, and 59 Except for the first indicator, all other indicators were measured on the Likert scale with the highest possible score four (4) and the lowest zero (0). The Pattern of Leadership In this study there are two types of leadership that are being observed, that is, the formal and the non-formal leaders. The formal leaders are those individual in the village that have formal position or office in the village administration. Included in this category are the village headman (lurahl and his staff plus the hamlet heads or keoala dukuh. The non-formal are those who are prominent in the village community but do not have formal position or office in village administration. The kvai. the haii. the spiritual teacher Iguru), healer or sorcerer (dukunl, and school teacher are included within this category. Each respondent was asked to define the requirements for being regarded as a leader in the village, who they regarded as leaders, how often did they see their respective leaders, what kind of advice do they seek from their leaders, do they always follow the leader's advice/suggestion, and do they listen to their leaders when they vote in general elections. From these questions I was able to measure the frequency and intensity of the relationship between the leader and his followers. The frequency of interaction was measured in others. 60 ordinal and interval scales, such as every week is included in "very often," every month ("often"), every three months ("occasionally"), once in a year ("seldom"), and hardly ever or never; those categories were given the number of 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0, respectively. The level of obedience and loyalty toward the leaders were measured in similar manner. Class_and Social Status Rather than measure subjective perceptions, class was measured in an objective manner. Several indicators were applied to measure class or social status in the analysis, including land ownership, occupation, and level of education. The use of education follows Clifford Geertz (i960, 1965) who perceived class in javanese society in two principal layers, i.e., the wong aedhe for the upper-class and wona cilik for the common people or the lower class. In the Western democracy, the application of education as indicator of class is no longer accepted but in Indonesia it is still widely applied. The national census categories were utilized in measuring land ownership. Those categories are one hectare or more. .50- one hectare. .25 - .49. less than .25. and landless. In terms of education, the respondents are placed in five categories such as College. High School. Junior High School. Primary School. and No School. Occupations are divided into five categories, such as civil Servants 61 (including retired civil servants, school teacher, and active or retired members of armed forces), Farmers, Farm laborers. Retailers, and Other for people who made a living in the service economy (bicycle, motorbike, radio, and TV repair service), artisan, and tailor. From the above indicators, respondents were divided into three classes, that is, the upper, middle, anf lower classes. Those who controlled one hectare or more of land, had good education, and were also member of village administration were included in the upper class, and are assigned the score of 3. Respondents who had between . 50 ■ and one hectare of land, finished high school, and worked as farmers or as artisans were included into the middle class category with the score of 2; and for those who controlled less than .50 hectare of land, finished junior high school or less, and worked as farmers or farm laborers were the lower class people with a score of l.10 Procedures for Testing The Hypothesis One important consideration to be borne in mind is that the choice of a certain method of testing hypotheses is determined by the pattern of measurement of the dependent and 10.It is important to note that since most respondents, except civil servants, do not have fixed monthly revenue, income as an indicator of class in modern society is not included in this analysis. 62 independent variables. If both variables were measured in interval and ratio scales, for example, the appropriate method of testing of the hypotheses is correlation and regression analysis (Blalock, 1979). In this study the dependent variable (voting) is measured on nominal scale, while the independent variables are measured on ordinal and interval scales. The analysis of cross tabulations between variables is the most appropriate method. In looking at the strength of the relationship between variables, the Chi Square and Tau^ and other descriptive statistics will be employed. Nevertheless, in looking at the relative contribution of each independent variable in explaining the dependent variable, I will attempt to utilize Discriminant Analysis. CHAPTER III PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM UNDER THE NEW ORDER REGIME Introduction Since independence, Indonesians have experienced three different types of party system. The Liberal Democratic period (1945-1959) was marked by the existence of a multi party system as parties mushroomed with great autonomy in a competitive atmosphere. More than twenty five political parties and voter associations were established, and the pinnacle of this era was reached in the first general elections in September 1955.1 Unfortunately no party was able to gain a simple majority. The governments were established based on coalitions of major parties especially between the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) that gained 22.3% of the popular votes, the MASYUMI with 20.9%, and the Nahdlatul Ulama or NU with 18.4%. The communist party of PKI with 16.4% of the -i-.For a comprehensive analysis of the 1955 general elections see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornel University Modern Indonesia Project, 1957). 63 64 popular votes was excluded from the cabinet. Consequently, political stability was very difficult to accomplish and maintain.2 A "No-Party System" existed under Guided Democracy (1959-1965).3 A number of political parties still existed during this period, but their role was dramatically reduced.4 Politics under Guided Democracy was characterized by a tug of war between President Sukarno, the army, and the communist party. The level of competitiveness among political parties became very low, since they played only a supporting role for the three principal poles of the system. While local elections were held in Java in 1957, nation-wide general elections were never carried out. 2 . Herbert Feith gave a detailed analysis of the political dynamics of the liberal democratic period in his book The Decline of constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962). For a partial analysis of politics in this era also see the work of George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia," in George McT. Kahin (Ed.), Maior Governments of Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963, pp. 555-635). 3. The term No-Party System is not originally mine. I adopted it from Richard Gunther's study of the public policy process in Spain under the Franquist regime. For further analysis see Gunther, Public Policy in The No-Partv state (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1980). 4 . Daniel S. Lev gave an excellent account of the dynamics of politics prior to the termination of parliamentary democracy and the adoption of Guided Democracy in his book, The Transition To Guied Democracy: Indonesian Politics. 1957-1959. (1966), Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, New York. For a brief analysis on the politics of Guided Democracy please see George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia," in George McT. Kahin (ed.), (1963), Maior Government of Asia. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press. 65 When the government sponsored party, Golkar, over whelmingly won the second nation-wide elections in 1971, a new party system was established, that is, Hegemonic Party System. With support and assistance from the army and the bureaucracy, Golkar became the hegemonic party and had been able to set the tone for the political agenda of the entire country, including the conducting of general elections, reorganizing political parties, and management of mass organizations. This chapter attempts to describe the nature of the hegemonic party system under the New Order. Several important questions need to be answered: What paths did Golkar follow as it emerged as the hegemonic party? What contributing factors led to the creation of the hegemonic party system in Indonesia? And, what are the consequences of the development of such a party system?. The Hegemonic Party System: A Brief Overview La Palombara and Weiner (1966) briefly introduced the concept of a hegemonic party system. They noted that a "Hegemonic system would be one in which over an extended period of time the same party, or coalitions dominated by the same party, hold governmental power. Hegemonic systems involving one party in exclusive control of the governmental machinery..."(p.35). Unfortunately, they did not further elaborate the components of a hegemonic party system. 66 It was Wiatr (1967) and Wiatr (in Allard and Rokkan, 1970, pp. 312-321) who developed a more comprehensive analysis of the nature of hegemonic party system (HPS) when he described the characteristics of the party system in Poland. For Wiatr, the HPS stands in between the Mono-party and the Dominant Party system. ''Under the Mono-party system there is no competition for power within the system, and no acknowledged opposition. In the dominant-party system, a single party secures for itself permanent political leadership, despite the existence of other political parties and groups," Wiatr argued (Allard and Rokkan, 1970, p.318). In Poland, the Polish United Worker's Party is the hegemonic party, while two small parties, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, play only minimal roles, social organizations and interest groups are also important only in shaping mass opinion in the agenda setting stage of the decision process. Giovanni Sartori developed a more recent analysis of the HPS. Sartori credited Wiatr for his initial definition, but it was Sartori, I believe, who provided the comprehensive characteristics of the HPS: 67 The hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a defacto competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis. Not only does alternation not occur in fact; it cannot occur, since the possibility of a rotation in power is not even envisaged. The implication is that the hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is liked or not. While the predominant party remains submissive to the conditions that make responsible government, no real sanction commits the hegemonic party to responsiveness. Whatever its policy, its domination cannot be challenged (1976, p. 230). Sartori then concluded "Clearly, not only the alternation but the very premises of competition are ruled out" (p. 231). What Wiatr and Sartori have elucidated seems to fully describe the present party system of Indonesia's New Order. In Sartori's terms, Golkar, in the present party system in Indonesia, is a "pragmatic hegemonic party," since Golkar does not claim to have a clear ideological orientation. The Foundation of The Hegemonic Party System in Indonesia The party system under the New Order regime resulted from several factors which were well designed by the government. These factors are the following: (1) The creation of a repressive security apparatus in order to establish and maintain political order and stability in the country; (2) The process of depolitization of the masses in order to focus more completely on economic policy and development; (3) The emasculation and forcefully restructing of political parties; and, (4) the 68 creation of electoral laws and electoral processes that insure that the government/military sponsored party, Golkar, wins in the general elections.5 The Repressive Apparatus. The New Order regime has frequently been designated, despite different labels and terminologies, as an authorita rian regime by scholars of Indonesian politics. The works of Jackson (1978), Crouch (1979), King (in Anderson and Kahin, 1983), and Liddle (1984), are cases in point. This type of regime becomes concerned primarily with the preservation of stability and order. From the outset, General Suharto has reiterated the importance of "five forms of order," that is, political, economic, social, legal, and security (Feith, 1978, p.94). To obtain these goals, the government created agencies such as the BAKIN (State Intelligence Agency), KOPKAMTIB (Operation Commands For The Restoration of Security and Order), OPSUS (Special Operation Agency), and DIRJENSOSPOL (Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs) within the Department of Home Affairs.6 5 . Because of the importance of this subject, this part of the analysis will be more extensively examined in Chapter IV. -6.These agencies are in addition to the Police and Armed forces. The chief of each agency is usually recruited from the army. The DIRJENSOSPOL was intially known as the DITSUS or the "Special Directorate" within the Minister of Home Affairs. 69 The Kopkamtib is an agency within the defense system in Indonesia. It was initially established in the post coup period to handle and destroy the remnants of the communist party and its sympathizers. Communist political prisoners, for example, were classified by Kopkamtib in three principal categories (A, B, and C) in accordance with the degree of their involvement in the attempted coup. Its functions became much wider with the passage of a Presidential decision on March 3, 1969, which ranged from classification of political "crimes" to supervision of mass-media to control of print news that threatens national security. This agency is headed by the President himself. Daily operations, however, are delegated to the Chief of the Armed Forces or PANGAB. At the local level, the commanders of KOWILHANs (Defense Regional Commands) and KODAMS (Military Area Commands) are designated as "special executors" (or Pelaksana Khusus. LAKSUS) in charge of safeguarding internal security.7 Under the flamboyant General Sumitro, Kopkamtib became highly politicized and fully assumed the role of the army intelligence in supervising the country's political affairs. Thus "it soon emerged as the most repressive and most feared agency of the regime, interfering in political activities of 7 . There were five KOWILHANs throughout the country, but since 1984 they have all been dissolved. There are eleven KODAMs at the present time. For a detail study of the structure of the armed forces organization please see Sundhaussen in Jackson and Pye (1978), and Sundhaussen (1982), The Road to Power. 70 every socio-political organization and arresting people at will," Sundhaussen succintly observed (1982; and Sundhaussen in Jackson and Pye, 1978, p.64). Before and after the Jakarta riots in January 1974, (the Malari Affair) political activists frequently questioned the legality and constituti onality of this agency. They claimed that the formation of Kopkamtib was absent from the 1945 Constitution, and therefore it was illegal. The government just disregarded these claims, but General Sumitro was sacked and resumed his army career, according to Sundhaussen (1982). The second repressive apparatus is the state Intelli gence Agency, or BAKIN. Many people fear this institution because of continuing reports and rumors of harassment and intimidation. This is in part due to the abuse of power within the agency by some of its staff. Bakin is headed by an army general who is responsible directly to the President. According to Sundhaussen (1978), several key positions within the agency are held by intelligence personnel from the armed forces. Bakin's primary function is to collect political intelligence and to provide the government with assessments of the political situation in the country. Its functions, therefore, tend to overlap with Kopkamtib, the police, and the armed forces as well. During the first decade of the New Order, the Special Operations Agency became popularly known among both political activists and the academic community as OPSUS. Unlike other agencies, OPSUS maintained an extremely low profile, in part because it did not clearly have an office or headquarters. It was directed by General Ali Murtopo, who had a long association with Suharto and became part of the principal braintrust of the President. OPSUS was strengthened because Ali Murtopo had great access to the President as a member of the "Super Cabinet," or Personal Assistants to the President, ASPRI. He was later rewarded with a ministerial position in the cabinet (1978-1983). In addition, Ali Murtopo played prominent roles in several other governmental agencies, including the Body to Manage The General Election (BAPILU) of Golkar, and chief of the logistic division of the General Election Institute (LPU), a lucrative position that generated funds for the operation of OPSUS. At the beginning, OPSUS was a special agency that carried out special foreign policy programs for the President, such as securing a favorable outcome of the Act of Free Choice in West Irian (Irian Java). it also handled the repprochment activity with Malaysia (Crouch, 1978, p.308; Sundhaussen, 1978, pp. 64-65). After these two operations were completed, OPSUS then turned to domestic affairs such as interfering with the internal affairs of political parties, including the selection of national leadership of the PNI and Islamic Party or Parmusi (Ken Ward, 1970? Crouch, 1978). OPSUS also made efforts to assure that the MPRS session went smoothly with a favourable outcome for the New Order regime in 1968. It is 72 popularly known that the agency generously provided funds for certain organizations and groups in the country. After the flamboyant All Murtopo lost his cabinet position in 1983 (and eventually died in 1984), the most talked about agency in Jakarta became virtually nonexistent. The last special organization created within the govern ment buraucracy was a special directorate within the Department of Home Affairs, i.e., the Directorate General For Social and Political Affairs, or DIRJENSOSPOL. The role of this institution in Jakarta politics is not as prominent as that of other agencies described above. At the local level and in rural areas, however, the DIRJENSOSPOL is extremely strong. It is the most feared agency in local governmental affairs.8 The agency is headed by an army officer nominated by the Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM) usually holding the rank of Major General, while provincial and district offices are headed by officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel/Major and Captain, respectively. This agency has become the "eyes and ears" of the government for monitoring political activity. Its functions are broadly 8.This information stems from my personal observation in several local areas and personal correspondence with functionaries from the Department of Home Affairs. In one province, for example, the head of the DITSOSPOL summoned several functionaries of a private university to his office because of the conflict between segments of the group that established the university. The local official was afraid that conflict would bring about political unrest in the area. 73 defined from giving permits for university students who want to do field work and collecting data to direct involvement in the student organizations' internal affairs.9 Depolitlzatlon Depolitization became a top priority in Indonesia after the Hew Order regime assumed political power. Depolitization had to do with the fulfillment of creating and maintaining stability and order to better insure full implementation of the Five-Year Development Plan. The instruments for insuring that depolitization took place were Kopkamtib, Bakin, Opsus, and Dirjensospol, in addition to the army and the state police. When in late 1969 Suharto met members of the High School Student Action Front (KAPPI, Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelaiar Indonesia) at the Merdeka Palace he told them that demonstrations and protests were "unsuitable" and that it is about time for the youth to prepare and equip themselves for the demands of national development (van der Kroef, 1971, 9 .The conflict within the Islamic Student Association(HMI) functionaries in Yogyakarta is a case in point. In early 1986 the local Ditsospol offices in Yogyakarta would not give formal recognition to the elected leaders because those who were elected had been involved in protests challenging the government policy of making Pancasila the sole ideology for all social organizations. Instead, the local official recognized other non elected leaders. It should be added that without governmental approval, local organizations will not get any permit for their activities, which means they are illegal. 74 p.68). As a Javanese he did not have to talk in "forceful" tones, instead he gave then hints and he expected then to understand. The new regine has been fully comnitted to econonic rehabilitation and enhancing the quality of life of the people, since Sukarno bequeathed a devastated economy and state. A leading regional politico-economic magazine observed that: "At the end of 1965 the consumer price index (1950=100) had stood at 36.347, with prices seven times the level of the previous January. Inflation spiralled in 1965 at a rate of 594% as against 135% in 1964 and 128% in 1963. The index of real income for labourers in Jakarta (1958=100) stood at less than 40; the money supply rose over 1965 from Rps.675.107 million to Rps.2.587.014 million."10 Confronted by these economic difficulties, the govern ment put the supremacy of econonic development above all other problems of state operation, especially at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan. "Development, yes,-- Politics, no," was the slogan that became the rallying cry of the time, replacing "revolution," or "The Year of Living Dangerously," or "The Five Magic Charms of Revolution," and other slogans of the Old Order. The philosophical position of the new regime was shared and endorsed in intellectual circles all over the country. "They see no possibility of economic development without the exercise of effective 10. Far Eastern Economic Review. 13 February, 1969. I 75 governmental leadership, both In the narrow sense of planning and bureaucratic Implementation of development projects and In the broader sense of Involving the whole population In the development effort," Liddle succintly observed (1973, p.. 185) . This type of economic development policy resembled what Huntington and Nelson (1976) labelled the "Technocratic" model. Indonesia is now in its Fourth Five-Year Plan and can boast remarkable achievements in economic growth. In the last firteen years, the production of rice, for example, has doubled from 12,249 thousand to 24,006 thousand metric tons, and in 1985 the government declared that there was no longer a need to import rice.11 With the assistance of generous Western donor countries,12 and other international organi zations, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, the economy has grown at an annual rate between six to eight per cent, and income per capita has increased from a mere $100 in 1965 to approximately $650 in 1985. Furthermore, the quality of life has also improved 11.Indonesia Development News. November/December, 1985. 12.Those countries belong to the so called IGGI, or Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, which consists of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, and the United States. Other countries joined as observers including Austria, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland. The purpose of this group is "to exploit the mechanisms of the international economy as much as possible to help in attaining Indonesia's national economic goals," according to Posthumus, Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971, p. 7). 76 following the completion of each Five-Year Plan as revealed by the former Ambassador of the United States when he noted that "In the 1960s, travel was difficult— roads if there were any were bad— and people in the villages had to work hard for a living. Now a dramatic change is visible almost everywhere. There are better roads, better housing and far better educa tional and health facilities."13 In strictly economic terms, the economic growth record is strikingly impressive. Indonesians, however, have paid a high price by giving up their basic rights to an effective and highly repressive state apparatus. Freedom of assembly has been virtually curtailed as well as freedom of expression. National and local newspapers have been given strict warnings if they question government policy and have been eventually banned if they print something that embarrasses the President, his family, or other high ranking officials.14 Individuals and groups having the courage to criticize the government have been the subject of intimidation and harassment. And 13.Edward Masters, the former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, gave his impression when he was asked to comment on the economic growth under the New Order government in Focus On Indonesia. Spring 1986, p.14. 14 .Several national newspapers have been banned permanently by the New Order government, including Harian ABADI that represented the Muslim community, Pedoman that reflected democratic socialist ideas, and Harian Kami which was influential among political activists. 77 above all, the university, which usually has stood as the symbol of liberty has lost its autonomy because of bureaucra tic penetration of all aspects of campus life. Consequently, the discrepancy in respective shares of the national economic pie between the rich and the poor has widened since there is no control outside of the bureaucracy. The economy is virtually dominated by a small group of individuals who are associated with the military and the bureaucracy and represent the newly emerged indigeneous enterpreneurs, the military enterpreneurs, and the Chinese business community (Robison, 1978). The Emasculation of Political Parties. The sentiment against political parties developed long before the New Order regime came into being, especially when a number of party leaders were involved in rebellion against the central government (Lev, 1966). With the successful consolidation of power of the New Order regime, the anti political party campaign reached a new peak, and the process of emasculation of political parties became the primary agenda of the army and New Order government. Political parties were confronted with their "sinful11 behavior of the past. The charges especially came from the army radicals led by Major Generals Dharsono and Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, supported by intellectuals who were leaning toward 78 the old socialist party of PSI. R. William Liddle gave an excellent account of those charges which can be summarized as the followings: - The parties are ideology rather than program oriented; - The parties exacerbate ideological tensions among Indonesians at both the elite and mass levels; - The parties create organizational tensions in society, since they maintain popular support as much as possible, for both the electoral process and to show one's strength to competing Jakarta elites; - The leaders are essentially self-seeking opportunists, interested only in their own welfare and that of their close associates rather than the public good; - The havoc wreaked by the party system is not limited to the party organizations but to other institutions as well; - Finally, a system of many parties is thought to have been a principal cause of the instability of the parliamentary regime (Liddle, 1973, pp.182-185). Among the major parties, the Partai Nasional Indonesi (PNI) became the primary target of army radicals. It started right from the beginning of the New Order era. The reasons are manifold, having mostly to do with its close association with Sukarno. It was the PNI that formed the major pillar of Sukarno's NASAKOM, the idea that nationalists, religious people, and commmunist could unite. Its members were un reserved supporters of Sukarno with their famous chanting "Live or Die, Defend Bung Karno." Furthermore, the PNI could not deflect Sukarno's support for Marxism within its ideology, represented in the concept of "Marhaenism." The army always took a strong stand against Marxism. 79 Prior to the attempted coup, the party's leadership was sharply divided into two different camps. One group, led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and the general secretary of the party, Surachman, espoused the radical nationalist spirit, becoming the backbone of Sukarno's campaign against neo-colonialism and imperialism. The second group was led by Osa Maliki and Usep Ranuwidjaja and had an anti-communist outlook but did not get much respect from Sukarno. These two groups were in conflict concerning the appropriate relationship between the party and the communists. Little progress had been made to reconcile them even though older statemen of the party attempted to do so (McIntyre, 1972). Only after the army became involved in the "reunification" of the party did the conflict come to an end. A few days after he received an executive order fSupersemar) from Sukarno, giving him de facto exectuive power, General Suharto took a decisive action by bringing the two groups together. He made them agree to hold an extraordinary congress. The "reunification" congress was held in Bandung, West Java, in April 1966. Suharto demanded that the party "must always be in accord with the wishes of the people," and if not, "it will be corrected by the people; it will even be put to death by the pedple themselves." (Crouch, 1978, p.254). Consequently, the Osa Maliki group was easily elected to lead the party since they were in accord with the wishes of the people, as articulated by the New Order, while 80 the All camp was put under constant pressure by the army and the anti-radical student action front (KAMI). Delegates of the Ali group had difficulties in attending the congress, and some of them were turned away at the gate even though they had the necessary credentials. The Ali delegates attending the congress became the targets of heckling by the KAMI students, who were allowed to enter the building (McIntyre, 1972? Crouch, 1978). Although the new leadership was approved by the New Order regime, the PNI remained under constant pressure from the army. In 1967, the army commander in East Java froze several local branches of the party. The North Sumatra commander took the same action in September 1967. In Aceh province, the army encouraged Moslem factions to apply strong measures against the PNI, so that the party had little choice but to disband itself in April 1967. Only after a change in local army commanders was the PNI allowed to resume activities in 1969/1970 in those regions (Feith,1968? Hindley,1970? and Crouch, 1978). In September 1969, Osa Maliki, the party chairman, died of an apparent heart attack, and again, the party was confronted with two contending leadership groups. The first was under Hardi, a lawyer by training and former Deputy Prime Minister in the parliamentary democracy. He was far more popular than his competitor, Hadisubeno Sostrowerdojo. The latter, however, had a slight advantage because he was close 81 to General Suharto, as they had worked together for the Central Java local administration in the 1960s. Prior to the party congress in Semarang, Central Java, it seemed that Hardi would prevail. The government, however, did not want this, and with the engineering of Ali Murtopo's OPSUS government made an all out effort to assure Hadisubeno's victory. It was reported that the delegates were briefed in Jakarta and were intimida ted by OPSUS to increase support for Hadisubeno (Crouch, 1978, p.258) . To make things worse for the PNI, the government launched a strategy of weakening political parties by introducing the concept of "monolovaltv" for the civil servants and individuals who worked in or for state related agencies. It all began at the Department of Home Affairs under the well known "bulldozer," General Amir Mahmud.15 Through this policy, all civil servants, particularly at the Department of Home Affairs, were ordered to terminate their party membership and to join the Association of Home Affairs Civil Servants, or KOKARMINDAGRI, which then became the seed of the better known KORPRI, or The Corp of Civil Servants of the Republic of Indonesia, one of the most important factions within Golkar. 15.Minister Amir Mahmud did not mind being called "Bulldozer." He said "I don't worry about being called bulldozer...! have been said to play unfairly... It does not matter. What is clear is that I am going ahead for the sake of development. Furthermore, as a follower of Islam, in keeping with my religious convictions, as a human being I shall answer directly for my responsibility to God, in keeping with my deeds" (Sinar Harapan. 26 April, 1971). 82 Since one of the principal sources of recruitment for the PNI had been the civil service, the monoloyalty policy was a major blow for the party. As the 1971 general elections drew nearer, the process of depolitization was expanded and intensified, especially after the passage of Presidential Decisions No.6, 1970, and No.82, 1971 which stated .that "Civil servants in all depart ments were denied the right to engage in political activity (read party activity) and were required to show 'monoloyalty* to the government (Golkar read)" Emmerson observed (in Jackson and Pye, 1978, pp. 106-107). With the passage of the Presiden tial instruction, KOKARMINDAGRI became the nucleaus of the larger group, KORPRI. This strategy was in part designed to protect the bureaucracy from being politicized by the parties. The government did not reveal that a more basic goal was to insure that the parties lost their respective constituencies and at the same time the government party, Golkar, would become the hegemonic party. In pursuing this goal, the government actively campaigned for KORPRI. The civil servants were required to sign a form before their superior, pledging that they would no longer hold membership in a certain party. Those who refused were fired (Emmerson, in Jackson and Pye, 83 1978). Newly recruited civil servants were also sworn in after completing the probation period of one year.16 As mentioned earlier since the principal supporters of the PNI are civil servants, especially the pamonqpraia corps in the local administration, the PNI became the principal victim of monoloyalty. Its impact can easily be discerned the in 1971 general elections in which the party only gained 20 seats in the DPR (Parliament), much lower than the 75 seats it held in the previous DPRGR. As a consequence of a well designed depolitizatlon and the emasculation of political parties, for the first time since independence the PNI became a minor party. Another major party, Nahdlatul Ulama fNUl, was not as badly affected by the anti-party movement, since NU was wel- known for its opportunistic outlook. Its president, Idham Khalid, was one of Sukarno's supporters, and soon after the New Order assumed power he became a major component of Suharto's consolidation process. The only drawback for NU 16.KORPRI is organized in accordance with the structure of governmental bureaucracy. At the national level ministers and heads of agencies become the supervisors of KORPRI within their respective departments, while the President is the grand superviser. At the local level, the governor, head of the district, and the mayor are responsible for supervising KORPRI in their region. Members of the corps have to wear uniforms, made of batik, at least once a month, on the 17fch of the monthly calendar. Those who are not obedient are the subject of administrative sanction. KORPRI is the most visible faction of GOLKAR compared to its other elements. Among the 236 elected members of GOLKAR in the DPR, for example, 128 were from KORPRI in 1971, while in 1977 there were 122 members of KORPRI out of 232 elected members of GOLKAR (Awad Bahasoan, 1981). 84 was that the party lost control of the Department of Religious Affairs. The party, however, was still able to maintain its regular ties with the traditional religious boarding school, the pesantren. in rural areas, especially in Java. The local religious leaders, the klvais. are the principal supporters of NU and have built and control their own constituencies that are difficult to penetrate by the bureaucracy. The other Islamic party, the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, or Parmusi, however, had a much different experience. Since it was initially expected to be the new Masyuroi, the party was not able to separate itself from the image of Masyumi, especially when it was confronted by the abanaan Javanese officers who suspected the former Masyumi leaders of plotting to create an Islamic state. The following accounts reveal the interaction between the reformist Masyumi leaders and the army. Shortly after the Masyumi leaders such as Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Muhammad Roem, and others, were released as political prisoners, the Muslim community who could not channel their aspiration through the existing Islamic parties (NU, Perti, and PSII) expected the former Masyumi members to attempt to revive Masyumi. They claimed that the dissolution of Masyumi was illegal and unconstitut ional, and therefore, they hoped Masyumi would be rehabilitat ed. Their optimism, however, turned to frustration because the army was not prepared to accept Masyumi. General Suharto 85 bluntly stated that "Judicial, constitutional and psycho logical considerations have brought the armed forces to one viewpoint, that is, the party cannot be rehabilitated," (Ward, 1970, p. 26). The formation of the new party, however, was not a problem, but the government made it clear that the first ranking Masyumi leaders17 could not be included as party leaders, since those leaders were regarded as having been associated with the PRRI rebellion in the late 1950s, and they still did not want to condem the PRRI. It should be noted that a number of soldiers had become victims of the civil war in the late 1950s (Ward, 1970; Crouch, 1978). After long and tenacious negotiations, the new Islamic party was eventually established under the leadership of Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun of the Muhammadvah and supported by fifteen Islamic mass organizations, including Djaelani Naro of the Jamiatul Al-Waslivah.18 The latter appeared to be a government nominee. On February 20, 1968 the government finally gave legal recognition to the party. The leaders of Parmusi, however, did not want to lose the Masyumi image. It is quite understandable since the 17. Included in this category were Muhammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusamito, Sjafruddin Prawirangera, Muhammad Roem, Kasman Singadimedjo, Dr. Sukiman, and several other members of the chief executive council of Masyumi. They played a very prominent role during the revoltionary period (1945-1949). 18.For a complete list of the organizations that supported Parmusi and its functionaries please see Ken Ward (1970), The Foundation of Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. latter had a very strong support from the Islamic community or ummat Islamf especially in the outer islands. When the party held its first Muktamar (congress) in Malang, East Java, in November 1969, Muhammad Roem, the former diplomat and member of various cabinets as well as top ranking Masyumi leader, was elected President of the party. After being informed of this new development, General Alamsyah Ratuprawi- ranegara, State Secretary, informed the party that the government could not approve the new leadership, since it was dominated by Masyumi and Roem was the first ranking Masyumi leader (Ward, 1970; Samson, 1972); the party, therefore, had no choice but to accept the pre-congress leadership. The problem of bearing the Masyumi image continued after the passage of the new electoral laws at the end of 1969. In mobilizing the masses for general elections, Djarnawi and his colleagues wanted to rely heavily on Masyumi leaders. In this regard Crouch noted that "A General Election Committee was established, headed by Roem, former Masyumi figures were appointed to leadership positions in the region, and prepara tions were made to include senior Masyumi leaders in the party's list of candidates for the elections. At the same time Masyumi local leaders became critical of the govern ment," (1978, p. 261). Alarmed by this uneasy atmosphere, suddenly on October 17, 1970 the accommodationist group led by Djaelani Naro and Imran Kadir took over the party leadership. Naro and his 87 group argued that Djarnawi's leadership was hostile toward the military and the party was in danger of conflict with the government (Samson, 1971, p. 558). In attempting to solve the existing conflict, the government then appointed Minta- redja, a Muhammadyah activist from West Java, as the new party chairman. The Muslim community did not approve the government intervention but the Naro group wholeheartedly supported it. According to Harold Crouch, the Naro and Imran Kadir "coup" was the result of Ali Murtopo's OPSUS behind the scene maneuvers.19 The question then arises why did the military interfere within the Islamic party affairs? There are several plausible explanations to this question. First, we have to examine the authoritarian nature of the regime itself. One of the un~ written requirements for political recruitment within this type of polity is the willingness of the regime to recruit individuals or groups that are willing to cooperate with the regime. History indicates that the Muslim reformist groups, especially from the Masyumi faction, were inclined not to cooperate with the government. Second, the army perceived the well-organized Islamic party as its principal rival, since the possibility of Muslim support from the community is greater than any other group, since the majority, at least 19.Djaelani Naro then became the permanent chairman of the Islamic party and was rewarded with the position of Vice- speaker of Parliament. He recruited his son as a member of the DPR in the 1987 general elections while the conflict within the Islamic party still goes on. 88 statistically, are Muslin. Third, past experience indicated that a politically conscious and well organized Islamic group was more willing to impose its own political values and norms on the community than any other group. Their call for applying Islamic law (svari’ah) within the constitution, was a trauma tic experience for the army, the abanaan radical nationalist faction, as well as the minority religious groups such as the Christians and the Catholics.20 The army would not tolerate any group that was willing to campaign for the implementation of Islamic laws, since this would endanger the integration of the country. Finally, the conflict drew strength from the culture of the army officers, especially the "center" group around Soeharto, in Faith1s term. Most of them are from Central Java and have an abanaan outlook. According to Alan Samson, the abanaan army officers regarded the Moslem santri as aliens with an arabic outlook. Furthermore, a highly politicized Muslim group was regarded as the potential political rival for the abanaan (Samson, 1971). Hence it was important for them to keep the Islamic group off balance and weak. The saga of military intervention in the internal affairs of political parties in Indonesia continued, even 20.It was reported that when the effort to rehabilitate Masyumi was underway, the Christians and Catholic groups were working behind the scenes to influence the army to prevent the rehabilitation of hasyumi and its political leaders because the minority groups were afraid of growing fanaticism among the reformist Muslims (Samson, 1968; Ward, 1970; Crouch, 1978). 89 after the government succeeded in restructuring political parties. The purpose of continued intervention was very clear, that is, to deny them control of the legislature and to make sure that certain individual party leaders would cooperate with the regime. Restructuring Political,Parties After the overwhelming victory of Golkar in the 1971 election, the drive to regroup political parties gained new impetus. The restructuring had begun three years earlier but had not been completed because the government had other political agendas. According to Liddle (1973), the intellectuals made the drive toward simplification of the party system possible. They held political parties responsible for the failures of the past. To achieve political stability, they argued, the creation of a new party system was necessary. In order to achieve this goal, they proposed dissolving the existing party system and the creating of electoral reform through a single member district system. They came to the conclusion that the creation of a one party system seemed undemocratic, but the preservation of the multy-party system would lead to instability of the system. Liddle concluded that: 90 "the only practical solution was the two-party system, which had already proved its worth in the most advanced and politically successful countries of the West. In particular, a two-party system arrangement would not only be more appropriate to the presidential system of the 1945 Constitution but also help the growth of pragmatic rather than ideological parties, assuring Indonesia a stable government majority and a constructive political atmosphere for the development of moderni zation politics," (1973, p. 187). Since ten political parties (Golkar included) already existed, then the question emerged concerning the grouping and the types of political parties for two party system. The first possibility was to group the existing parties into two groups, the Nationalist which consisted of the PNI, IPKI, Murba, and the like, and an Islamic party (Sjamsuddin, et al. 1972, pp. 16-17).21 The problem then was to find a place for the Christians and the Catholics as well as the functional group, Golkar. Since the above formula was inconceivable to the army, the second possiblity was to put them into two groups, including a coalition of parties minus Golkar in one group, and the functional groups that consisted of Golkar and other non-party organizations. Meanwhile, the principal protagonist of the two party system, General Dharsono, Commander of the Siliwangi Division of West Java, went ahead by creating a two-group movement in 21.IPKI or Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (The Association of the Upholders of Indonesian Independence) was a political party created by the army in the late 1950s with the purpose of containment of the influence of the communist party; while Murba was a party with a socialist outlook. 91 his territory, particularly in the local legislatures. However, it did not last long since Dharsono relinguished his position to become ambassador to Thailand in April 1969 (Feith, 1968? Liddle, 1973). In 1970 President Suharto summoned the leaders of nine political parties to his office. He suggested the groupings of party into three groups, the Nationalist, the Spiritual, and the Karva or functional groups. He also appointed three of his staff as liaison officers with the parties to work out the details. At the beginning, Suharto's proposition was warmly welcomed, but the place for the Christians and the Catholics still became a problem. The Catholics bluntly rejected the idea of joining the spiritual group, expressing a preference for joining the Nationalist party. On March 4, 1970, the existing political parties, except the IPKI, agreed to the three way grouping, the Democratic Development, the Unity, and the Functional groups. The first two groups acfreed that their groupings were cooperative and confederative in nature not permanent organizations. The IPKI, however, claimed that it was impossible to join the Democratic fraction because of ideological and strategic differences. Confronted with the stalemated situation, the Minister of Home Affairs bluntly responded that the govern ment effort in grouping the parties had failed (Sjamsuddin,et al., 1972, pp. 16-17). 92 Meanwhile, with the overwhelming victory in the 1971 elections, the Golkar and the government had a free hand to set the political agenda for the country, including the regrouping of parties. The new National Assembly (MPR) reelected Suharto and firmly decided that for the next general election only three political parties would be allowed to compete.22 Consequently, the existing parties did not have much choice but to comply with the MPR decision. Finally following long negotiations, in January 1973 the new party system came into being in Indonesia. On January 5, 1973, the Islamic parties, NU, PSII, Perti, and Parmusi agreed to form a new party called the Partai Persatuan Pembancruan (PPP), or Unity Development Party. They were followed by the announcement of the formation of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), or Indonesian Democratic Party, on January 10,23 which was supported by the IPKI, Murba, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, and PNI (Fachry Ali and Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, 181; Manuel • * Kaisiepo, 1981). 22.See the MPR decisions No.III/MPR/1973 on the Broad Outline of State Policies, and No. VIII/MPR/1973 on General Elections. The latter made it clear that only two political parties and GOLKAR would be allowed to participate in elections. 23.Parkindo or Partai Kristen Indonesia is a Christian party, and Partai Katolik was a party developed and supported by the Catholics faction in Indonesia. 93 Political Parties The Partai Demokrasl IndoneBis fPDH . As noted above, the PDI is an amalgamation of several political parties, the PNI, IPKI, Murba, Partai Katolik and Parkindo. Among those parties, the PNI, Parkindo, and Partai Katolik were represented in the parliament, while IPKI and Murba failed to gain enough support in the election (400.000 votes/seat), and they therefore were not represented in the DPR. The ideological orientations of the supporting parties were also different. The PNI and IPKI were nationalist in their outlook, Murba was socialist, while Parkindo and Partai Katolik were confessional in their outlook, supported by the Catholic and Christian churches. Those parties reflect ed the abanaan pillar or aliran in Indonesia. Hence, the PDI undoubtedly becomes the new abanaan pillar in the novel party system. Because of the varying backgrounds of the parties combined in PDI it has experienced continuing difficulties in maintaining its existence. From its inception the party has been marked by its internal turbulence which has been compound ed by the willingness of the government to interfere in its affairs. Two kinds of conflict have occured within PDI. First, the conflicts within the former PNI have continued to destabilize the party, and second, the conflict among major groups that intially supported the PDI have greatly reduced it effectiveness (van Dijk, 1981; Kaisiepo, 1981). 94 The conflict between the two major factions of the PNI element, the Usep Ranuwidjaja faction and the Isnaeni faction, concerned who would represent PDI as Vice-Speaker of the DPR, a position conventionally allocated to the PNI. With the approval of the government, Isnaeni prevailed and became the Vice-Speaker of Parliament. The disagreement did not stop there, but escalated when each faction created its own national council. Some members of the DPR were subsequently "recalled" from service and replaced by others.24 The second conflict is between PNI and the non-PNI elements in the PDI. The PNI made up the biggest portion with twenty members in the DPR, followed by Parkindo and Partai Katolik. By convention, therefore, the PNI should become the dominant group. The first two positions in the National Board (DPP), for example, were to be under control of the PNI, while the position of general secretary went to Parkindo. The vice secretary is also for PNI. The other parties, therefore, play minor roles in party decision making. After its second Congress, Ahmad Sukarmadidjaja (IPKI) and Muhiddin Nasution (Murba) accused the PNI faction of abusing its authority in preparing for the MPR/DPR session in 1978, since neither Usep nor Sanusi, the party president, would clearly express their 24.In the Indonesian legislature, there is a rule that members of the DPR can be discharged by their party which is known as "recalled." The implementation of the recall only took effect with the passage of Presidentian Decision. The purpose of this policy is to control the behavior of individual member that is unwilling to cooperate with the regime. 95 choice for candidates for President of the country of Vice Speaker of Parliament. Ahmad and Muhiddin certainly saw this as an opportunity to gain favor with the government by supporting the candidacy of Suharto. Parkindo and Partai Katolik, however, did not support their adventures (van Dijk, 1981). Because of its implications for national politics, at least from the government point of view, the government did not want the conflict within the PDI to continue. Although from the outset the people in authority declared that they did not want to be involved in PDI affairs, there were indications that officials close to the President, such as Generals Daryatmo and Sudjono Humardani, did play "behind the scenes" roles. In one of his public statements, Sanusi complained that the President had not been frank in this affair. The government interference became clearer when on January 16, 1978, BAKIN summoned all factions and "helped" them compose the new PDI leadership. Sanusi was still chairman of the party but some personnel were changed. This new leader ship did not last long, however. On November 24, 1978, Isnaeni and Sunawar were discharged from their positions. Then they made a counter attack by relieving Sanusi from his position. There was a popular impression that the Isnaeni faction was encouraged by the government. Frustrated by this endless stalemate, Sanusi finally decided to resign on 96 October 16, 1980. When the PDI held its second congress in January 1981, following Sanusifs resignation, it was clear that the Isnaeni faction was in charge. Sunawar was elected General Chairman, indicating that the PNI and Parkindo elements still dominated the party. The electoral strength of PDI remains very weak. In the 1977 general elections, for example, the party managed only 9% of the popular vote. According to Donald Hindley (1972) the PNI or PDI has lost its raison d'etre. In the past, the PNI had been able to exploit the spirit of anti-colonialism and imperialism for its followers, the Front Marhaenis. Those sentiments were no longer issues, since society had become preoccupied with a newly created myth, i.e., development. The other important factor was that the PDI was a primary victim of the government's electoral strategy. Because of the monolyalty process the PDI was no longer capable of recruiting members from the civil service. And finally, unlike the Islamic party, the PDI does not have a clear picture of its own image and identity. While the islamic party can rely on exploiting religion to raise sentiment, the PDI does not have that luxury. Its ideology is a mixture of many elements. On several occasions, the party has attempted to exploit Sukarno's image, but the government's tight policy with regard to Sukarno made this difficult. Hence, PDI's weak performance in election is hardly surprising. In the general 97 elections of 1977, the PDI only managed 9% of the popular vote, while in 1982 its performance was worse, with only about 8% of the registered voters supporting PDI. What role can the PDI play in national Politics? In the hegemonic party system the role of this type of party is very limited. It remains peripheral to the political debate in the system, since it is difficult for such an oppositon party freely to articulate alternative policies which might draw more support. The skill and expertise of its leader cannot match the ruling party which draws upon the expertise from both the military and civilianbureaucracy. In observing this phenomenon, Liddle noted also that we can not expect too much from this party since "the Indonesian Democratic Party is under close supervision, its leadership subject to government approval and its financial viability dependent on government handouts."(Liddle in Jackson and Pye, 1978, p. 194). The Islamic Party of PPP The PPP represents a merger of four Islamic parties, i.e., the NU, Parmusi, Perti, and PSII. Islam is the principal ideology of these parties, and their purpose is therefore to enrich the values of Islam in the community. Since they bear the name of Islam those parties were also very much dependent upon the support of religious leaders, scholars falim ulama and kiyais^, and the santri community in Java as well as the Muslims from the outer islands. Before those parties were merged the NU had the largest mass support, followed by Parmusi, PSII, and Perti, respect ively. The NU drew most of its followers from East and Central Java, and South Kalimantan. The adherents of Parmusi came from Aceh, West and South Sumatra, Jakarta, and Maluku. The PSII built its mass bases mainly in North and South Sulawesi, while the majority of Perti members came from Aceh.25 Among those parties, NU was regarded as the party with an orthodox outlook because of its inclination to preserve Islamic traditions and its ability to command support from the traditional boarding school, that is, the Pesantren. The other three parties were regarded as modern and reformist. This difference in outlook and orientation has brought about endless problems for the party in the past and even at the present time (Fachry Ali and Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, 1981). It is interesting to note that since the PPP bears Islam in its mission, the structure of its organization also reflects the influence of Islam. The leadership is consisted of two boards or Mailis. that is, the Mailis Svuri'ah. and the Mailis Tanfidvah. The former is in charge of soliciting and giving advice to the latter particularly on religious affairs, while the Tanfidyah will be in charge of implement 25.This geographical outlook and strength was drawn from the 1971 general elections results. For a detailed analysis see A. A. van Marie, "Indonesian Electoral Geography Under Orla and Orba," in Oey Kong Lee, (1974), Indonesia After The 1971 Elecionsf Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur. 99 ation. The Syuri'ah is a council that consisted of religious leaders under the leadership of the "Rois Aam". or Principal Leader, and several vice "Rois.» Their decisions must be implemented by the Tanfidyah. Furthermore, the symbol of the party itself clearly reflect Islamic values, that is, K a 1abah. a holy shrine that resides in Mecca.26 Similar to the PDI, the PPP from the outset has been marked by internal conflict that elicits outside (the govern ment) interference. The interparty conflict has usually taken place between NU and Parmusi leaders and has focused on the strategy of the party for proper relations with the govern ment, and concerning recruitment of leaders for membership in the legislature. The visibility of NU was very high in the early development of PPP. Because of NU's opportunistic post, it was anticipated that the PPP would be accommodative in its outlook. But by the late 1970s another pattern had developed. During the 1978 MPR session, for example, members of the MPR from the NU faction protested a government sponsored bill on mysticism, or Javanese beliefs, keiawen. For NU it was a matter of principle not to place mysticism at the same level with religion (Islam). They perceived that mysticism was against religious belief and was part of a 26.Since the passage of a new law No.3/1985 on Political Parties, the parties have adopted Pancasila as the sole and only focus of their ideology. Hence Islam becomes, at least in formal terms, secondary for the PPP. The Law No. 1/1985 also required parties not to use symbols that do not reflect Pancasila. Hence the PPP has abandoned the Ka'abah (the black shrine) and replaced it with a star. ioo government sponsored process of de-Islamization of the country. A second instance of NU's antagonistic stance was reflected in its disapproval of the 1980 election laws. For NU the election law was too heavily weighted in favored of the government and did not reflect the aspirations of the political parties. Parmusi, however, did in fact take on accommodative stance in its relations with the government. Parmusi did not condone NU's agressive behavior toward the government, and the government rewarded its leaders with several positions in the DPR, such as chairmen of commissions. Consequently, NU accused Parmusi leaders of being oriented toward the interest of "outsider," i.e., the government (Fachry Ali and Xqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, 1981). The Parmusi leaders, on the other hand, condemned NU leaders as endangering "Pancasila Demokrasi,"27 and therefore, not deserving any position either in the DPR or the party’s national board.28 By applying Alan Samson's category (in Liddle, 1973), Fachry and Iqbal argued that the main problem of the Islamic party is dealing with two different types of leadership, 27.Pancasila Demokrasi became the label of the political process in the New Order as contrasted to the Guided Democracy under Sukarno. It stresses deliberation toward achieving consensus. It does not recognize any kind of political opposition since it does not fit national political culture according to the government. This is indeed a process in an hegemonic system as revealed by Sartori (1976). 28.With the help of GOLKAR, Parmusi was rewarded with five chairs out of thirteen commissions in the DPR in exchange of its reconciliatory stance. 101 i.e., the relatively radical group represented by the old- timers both from the MU and non-NU factions, and the accom- modationists who are relative new comers. The latter were trained in the relatively secular educational system. They always want to present themselves accordingly in order to survive within the present political system. And yet Fachry and Iqbal further argued that the existing national political pressures force a more cooperative leadersip, making them take an accommodative outlook. One could expect a negative impact from PPP's internal conflicts. The masses interpret the conflict to mean that the party only serves the interests of its own leaders instead of the interests of the ummat. Consequently, the relations between the party and its mass base social organizations has become less cordial. Meanwhile non-party elites suspect the PPP of becoming the "agent" of government. These critics feel that the PPP indeed no longer represents the interest of Muslim community. Nevertheless, the electoral strength of the PPP has been quite impressive, especially if one considers that elections were not held in a democratic manner. Because of its ability to exploit its symbol (ka'abah), the PPP was able to increase its popular vote in the 1977 elections by 2.07 per cent. In Parliament the party gained fifteen seats, increasing the number from 84 to 99 seats, while the PDI lost four and one seat, respectively (Harry Tjan Silalahi, 1977). Furthermore, 102 at the regional level, the PPP was also able to defeat the other two parties. In 1971, Golkar won In all provinces but Aceh. But in 1977 the PPP captured most of the votes in two provinces, i.e., Aceh and Jakarta. Moreover, in several districts and cities in Central and East Java the part has also been able to maintain its strength. It is fair to say that the merging of Islamic parties into one party is a blessing for the Islamic community in Indonesia insofar as the election is fair and democratic. It seems to be that conflict at the national level was not translated at indivi dual level in rural areas. The political strength of PPP in national politics was relatively stronger than the PDI. Even though to some people the PPP becomes more and more "Golkarized," in some political agendas, especially concerning issues on the regulation of religious life, which the PPP has been able to challenge the government. The enactment of the laws on political parties and election laws are cases in point. It took quite some time to reach agreement on both laws because of several crucial points, such as whether voting should be a right or an obligation, the position of civil servants, and the supervis ion of and during elections. Intensive discussion and lobby ing between the PPP and the government were held to reach agreement on those issues (Boileau, 1983, pp. 71-75). After the Parmusi element took control of the party's leadership, the PPP then became more opportunistic and 103 accommodative, due to the fact that the government has helped this fraction (especially led by Naro and Sudardjl), to gain Influence In the party. The future of the party, is now un certain because of the low quality of its leadership and the limited resources available. If this trend continues the party will eventually no longer get much support from the Islamic community. Ihe_Hegemonlc Party; GOLKAR Although the present GOLKAR has its roots in the mass- based social organizations that were created in the period of both Parliamentary and Guided Democracy, it was formally established on October 20, 1964.29 initially it was called Sekretariat Bersama GolonganKarva (the Join Secretariat of Functional Groups). In the beginning, Sekber Golkar was created to protect several groups from intensified intimidat ion and harassment stemming from the communist party in early 1960s. Golkar is "A party built from above,M according to Masashi Nishihara (1972, p. 17). This is particularly true since Golkar from the outset enjoyed the full support both from the armed forces and the bureaucrats. Three mass organi zations, i.e., the SOKSI (All Indonesia Organization of 29.According to Masashi Nishihara (1972, p.17), the army attempted for quite some time to include the functional groups in Parliament. The officers corps, led by General Nasution, wholeheartedly supported Sukarno's decision to include several functional groups in Parliament in 1957. 104 Functionaries), the KOSGORO (Cooperative For All Mutual Assistance Endeavours), and the MKGR (Family Mutual Help Association) were the "core" organizations of GOLKAR when it was initially organized, and all were led by military officers. Golkar is an amalgamation of various social organiza tions with numerous interests in society, including labor, civil servants, teachers, peasants, artisans, students, women, intellectuals, enterpreneurs, fishermen, and veterans. When it was established in 1964, 64 functional groups were registered. The number rose to 128 in 1966, and 257 in 1967. In 1968, however, the number of mass organizations declined to 249 due to the fact that the President issued a decree (Keores No. 70/19681 to purify the real Golkar. Some Islamic organizations separated from Golkar. The number of functional groups then rose again to 269 when the party consolidated its organization in July 1969 (Nishihara, 1972, p. 18; Boileau, 1983, pp. 60-61).30 In its early development, according to some observers such as Nishihara (1972) and Boileau (1983), Golkar was not an effective political organization. Its influence outside Jakarta politics was very weak even though it had branches throughout the country. In order to be recognized, it relied 30.The number of functional groups that support Golkar sometimes is disputed. Bahasoan (1985, p.282), for example, revealed that in 1969 210 organizations were affiliated with Golkar. 105 heavily upon the support of local army officers, while other mass organizations and political parties had mass-based support. Furthermore, its affiliated organizations (particu larly the big three of SOKSI, KOSGORO, and MKGR) operated independently with great autonomy from the Joint Secretariat. When the decision to conduct general elections in 1971 was made, Golkar was upgraded. In its search for political legitimacy, the government decided to have its own political party and Golkar was well suited to the purpose. In order to increase its efficiency, especially for the 1971 elections, Golkar consolidated its organizational structure. A special committee was created to carry out the restructuring. On November 22, 1969, a special committee (Komite Lima) recommended that functional organizations should be clustered into seven "Parental Bodies" or KINOs, including KINO SOKSI, KINO KOSGORO, k i n o MKGR, k i n o g a k a r i (Gerakan Rakvat. People's Movement), KINO ORMAS HANKAM, KINO PROFESI, and KINO Development Movement (Gerakan Pembangunan).31 All of the KINOs were headed by military officers, except the KINO Gerakan Pembangunan which was entrusted to a civilian (Nishihara, 1972, p.19; Boileu, 1983, p.61). 31.Included in the KINO ORMAS HANKAM are the Association of The Wives of Armed Forces Services, PIA ARDHIGARINI (Air Force), YALA SENATRI for the Navy, PERSIT KARTIKA CHANDRAKIRANA (Army), and WANITA BHAYANGKARI (State Police). Included in KINO Profession are Economists, Doctors, Lawyers, Engineers, etc., while the Gerakan Pembangunan consists of businessmen, intellectuals, and so on. 10 6 As general elections cane closer, the government, especially military officers, increased their efforts to insure that Golkar would win the election. Among those military officers, two army generals must be given special credit for their contributions, i.e., Amir Mahmud and All Murtopo. Amir Mahmud was Minister of Home Affairs and Chairman of the General Election Committee. He used his great authority so well he was given the nickname "Bulldozer" because of his success in emasculating political parties. First, he issued an instruction known as Permen 12 fMlnister- ial Regulation No. 12), and second, he pushed very strongly the monoloyalty program for civil servants. Amid protests from political parties, Amir Mahmud through Regulation 12 tried to "purify" Golkar by eliminating the remaining influential elements of political parties. "Functional membership would thus be purified of men who were political (in the sense of belonging to political parties) rather than functional (in the sense of not belonging to parties). Permen 12 was aimed partly at providing the impetus for the establishment of province and branch Golkar organiza tions," Ken Ward reported after observing the phenomena (1974, p. 11). Permen 12 changed the political balance in the regional legislatures (DPRD) completely. Before the decree, Golkar only shared on the average 30% of power in the DPRO, but following Permen 12, all members of the DPRD from social organizations were forced to join Golkar. From then on, 107 political maneuvering shifted to Golkar (Ward, 1972, pp. 19- 20). All of these were the result of Amir Mahmud's efforts and his influence did not diminish until he left his minister ial position and became the speaker of the DPR. Major General Ali Murtopo also played an important role similar to Amir Mahmud. He was the chief of OPSUS, Special Assistant to the President, adviser to the Golkar Election Board (BAPILU GOLKAR), and chief of the supply division of the General Election Institute a lucrative position for raising funds for Golkar and OPSUS. He was popularly known as the master of political intrigue in Jakarta politics.32 Nishihara excellently described Ali Murtopo's position in Jakarta politics "as a point of linkage between the civilian bureaucracy, the military, the Presidential Office, and the government party, Ali Murtopo came to assume a key supervi sory role over the whole administration of the elections and all Golkar campaign operations," (1972, p. 21). Golkar owed him much for its tremendous success. Because of its political machinery supported by its tremendous financial resources (Liddle, 1973; Hindley, 1972, Ward, 1972; Nishihara, 1972), Golkar was able to outdistance its rivals. In the first general election in July 1971, Golkar received 62.8% of the vote, gaining 236 seats out of »» 32.In the latter part of his career, Ali Murotopo seemed to become a liability for Suharto. He was very bitter when Suharto did not reward him with a lucrative position. He was then appointed as a member of the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbanaan Aciunq. or DPA). 108 360 seats in the DPR being contested.33 It should be added that to draw more support from the Islamic community Golkar revived GUPPI (Gabuncan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan. or The Association of the Effort of Educational Reform in Indonesia) with the help of another Presidential personal confidant, General Sudjono Humardhani. GUPPI was a channel for financial assistance to Muslim schools. The drive for consolidation was further strengthened soon after the election even though Golkar won by a very large margin. Again, the reason was "to increase its organizational efficiency," (Nishihara, 1972, p. 53) since there were 250 functional groups scattered around the Joint secretariat, and "Some of the larger KINOs had developed independent stances and tended to operate with a high degree of autonomy," Boileau observed (1983, p. 65). Therefore, the seven KINOs and their affiliated groups were dissolved and replaced by 13 coordinating bodies which then were grouped under five secretariats in charge of handling labor, civil servants, armed forces, youth and women, and intellectual affairs. Furthermore, a national council of five members led by 33 .Some argue that the Golkar victory in the 1971 elections was also due to the dissatisfaction of the people toward the political parties. For this position see Harry Tjan Silalahi, "The 1977 General Elections: The Result and the Role of Traditional Authority Relations in Modern Indonesian Society." The Indonesian Quarterly. Vol. V, No.3, (July, 1977). 109 Lieutenant General Sukawati was added to the organization plus a 17 member "Advisory Board" of prominent national leaders. Further consolidation was also needed to unify • and strengthen the leadership of the organization. Golkar held its first Musvawarah Nasional (Munas I) or National Confer ence in September 1973. It should be added that prior to the Munas several occupational groups organized and formed a new coordinating body. The scattered labor organizations, from Islamic and National groups, were dissolved. The same thing happened to peasant and fishermen organizations. Hence, the FBSI (All Indonesia Labor Federation), HKTI (Peasant Brother hood Association of Indonesia), and HNSI (Association of All Fishermen) came into being. Furthermore, the federation of youth organizations, The KNPI (Indonesian Youth National Committee) was also formed. Although none of these organi zations were formally affiliated with Golkar, in reality they are the fertile sources of Golkar support. One of the impor tant results of the first Munas was the institutionalization of the civil servant group in Golkar under the banner of KORPRI. Further development has shown that the KORPRI faction become the dominant group within Golkar (Liddle, 1984). The second general election was held on May 2, 1977, and the results were officially announced on June 8. Golkar gained 62.12% of the vote, slightly lower than in the previous election (62.8%). Golkar also lost four seats in the 110 DPR (from 236 to 232) and was defeated in Jakarta and Aceh as well as in several districts in East and Central Java, even though both the military and the bureaucracy put out a strong effort to insure that Golkar prevailed.34 Another Munas was held in Denpasar, Bali, on October 20- 3, 1978 (Munas XI) to evaluate why Golkar had performed poorly in the elections. According to Boileau, strong critic isms were expressed by leaders of the Trikarva group who recognized that "Golkar was not yet rooted in the hearts of the people, its capabilities were still limited," and also "it was too dependent on the backing of ABRI." Boileau observed the criticisms during the Munas II and noted: "Its organization was not responsive to the needs of the people because of the way it was structured. The tendency of Golkar to function in a bureaucratic manner meant that decisions were made at the top and passed down in a command strcture that provided few, if any, channels for information and suggestions to come up from the lower levels of the organization." (1983, p. 83). Improvements in organizational structure resulted from Munas II. A Dewan Pembina (Supervisory Council) was added at the national level, and President Suharto was elected chair man. He had full authority to select members of the Dewan Pertlmbangan. At the Provincial level, a Dewan Pertimbanean 34.The other two parties disputed the election results and questioned the fairness of the elections. Reports of intimid ation and harassment were easily discerned. The PPP published a book on the irregularities in the electoral process, Dokumentasi Pandanuan dan Saran. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan dan dan Pemilihan Umum 1977. Penerbit Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Jakarta, 1978. Ill (Oversight Council) was added, while a Dewan Penasihat (Advisory Council) was also added at the district level.35 At Munas II, it was also decided that all Golkar principal functionaries must solely devote their time and energy for the party. It further formulated party goals for the next five years, i.e., "To build a Golkar more strongly rooted amongst the people, to be able to cultivate, accommodate and channel the people's aspiration and be able to play an active role in the leadership of the nation," (Boileau, 1983, p.84). These goals were formulated in response to strong criticism of poor showing in the general election. The question then arises concerning the problem of institutionalization for Golkar.36 Golkar remains a young organization, but has had tremendous success in controlling the country's political machinary. Does this means that the organization has been fully institutionalized within the political system?. Golkar is not an autonomous organization and still does not have a well developed mass base. The people accept Golkar because they fear the negative government consequences 35.A11 of these dewans have the function of giving advise as well as supervising the executive council in their respective regions. Dewan Penasihat, for example, has the authority to give advice and supervise the executive council at the district level. This structure undoubtedly reflects the bureaucratic structure of the coountry. 36.I am using the term institutionalization in a pure Huntingtonian sense. For further explanation of institutionalization see Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies. (1968) New Haven, Yale University Press. 112 stemming from rejection of its programs. It is still the party built from above. It was the military especially the army that had the greatest interest in Golkar, since it is impossible for the army to be directly involved in daily politics. The army, therefore, created a political instrument to dominate the political process. From its inception as Sekber Golkar, the army officers with the rank of Lieutenant General were assigned to lead Golkar.37 Golkar and the army are very tightly linked, despite their ostensibly different missions. Suharto has made it clear that Golkar "is a sibling of the armed forces" (A.Syamsuddin, et al., 1972, p. 15), a view that was reiterated by the chief of the armed forces, Panggabean, in 1978 when he said that "ABRI and Golkar are and will continue to be mutual friends and faithful partners who supplement and love each other."38 Golkar also receives support from the entire bureaucratic structure from the highest echelon to the vilage areas. One can conclude that since 1969 Golkar, with help from the army and the bureaucracy, has become the hegemonic party in Indonesia. In the hegemonic system competition and rotation of political leaders does not take place. The future of Golkar is not yet secure because much will depend upon the 37.The first chairman of the executive council was Sukowati who died in 1973. The second was Amir Murtono(1973-84), then Sudharmono. All of them had the rank of Lieutenant General before they retired. 38.TEMPO. 4 November, 1978, as quoted from Boileau, (1983), p . 8 4 . 113 post-New Order political constellation in the 1990s. There seems to be at least one element within the army that wants to reevaluate the army's political involvement (Jenkins,1985). If Golkar cannot build its own structure that is firmly rooted in the community the possibility remains that Golkar will face the same fate as the old PNI. Conclusion The purpose of this chapter has been to elucidate the national political environment in which elections or voting have been held by introducing the party system under the New Order. In doing so, the concept of the hegemonic party system, that seems to fit the party system at the present time, has been introduced. There are four contributing factors that have led to the formation of a hegemonic party system in Indonesia: the creation of a repressive government apparatus to secure political order and stability, the process of depolitization of the masses in order to implement economic development programs, the emascu lation of political parties and at the same time the creation of the hegemonic party (Golkar), and the creation of electoral laws and electoral processes that insure Golkar's victory in general elections. CHAPTER IV ELECTORAL LAWS AND ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN INDONESIA Introduction This chapter will be devoted to a historical analysis of the electoral laws and electoral processes in Indonesia. Unlike the electoral processes, the electoral laws remain a neglected subject of study in Indonesian politics. Therefore it is important to make a thorough analysis of that subject. The first part of the chapter will examine the 1969 electoral law and its subsequent replacements. The second part will explore the electoral processes such as nomination, campaigns, voting, and electoral results* Finally, the analysis of the electoral laws and electoral processes will be brought together in the conclusion. 114 115 The Electoral Laws1 The 1969 Electoral Law After being eclipsed during the Guided Democracy era, the issue of elections arose again during the 1966 MPRS session.2 It was decided that elections should be held on July 5, 1968. The new general election bill was sent to the DPRGR on August 1, 1966. The government planned for a six month ratification period, but because of political turmoil, the debates began on November 24, 1966.3 At the same time, skepticism increased outside the legislature. Student activists, working together with the intellectuals, demanded that ratification of the general election bill be postponed "since it does not guarantee the 1 .Douglas Rae defines electoral laws as "those which govern the processes by which electoral preferences are articulated as votes are translated into distributions of governmental authority (typically parliamentary seats) among competing political parties." (1971, p. 17). For further understanding of electoral laws please see Douglas Rae, (1971), "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut. Also Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), 1986, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. Agathon Press, New York, provide a comprehensive understanding of electoral laws and their basic principles. 2. The MPRS stands forthe Provisional People's Consultative Assembly that replaced the Constituant Assembly. By decree on July 5, 1959, Soekarno dissolved the Konstituante or Constituant Assembly and appointed the MPRS pending the general elections. 3. This bill actually was drafted during the Sukarno era. It was prepared in 1959 - 1963 but it never was be discussed on the DPRGR, a parliament created by Sukarno. 115 victory of the New Order," the Bandung student group argued. It "did not suit the ORBA and people's aspirations," the Jakarta intellectuals insisted. The weekly student magazine Mahasiswa Indonesia stated that "Any way, the bill that is going to be ratified must be evaluated as an effort to cement the position of the remnants of the existing Old Order. Thousands of election bills will relatively generate the same result as long as the present political structure has not been changed," the Bandung group concluded.4 Major political parties, however, urged ratification of the bill as soon as possible, since they were confident of their mass support (Ward, 1974, p. 7). In order to avert a stalemate, for strategic reasons, the government sent three bills to the DPRGR, the new General Election (GE) bill, a bill on the status of the legislatures (DPR/MPR), and a bill regulating parties and mass organiza tions. The Special Committee was created in anticipation of the debate of the bills. During 1967, this committee met simultaneously to discuss the bills, particularly the GE bill. However, several controversies on "crucial points" developed during the debate, especially concerning the electoral system to be adopted. Elements of the New Order wanted to adopt single-member constituencies, making district (kabupaten) the constituency unit. That idea was initially 4 . Mahasiswa Indonesia. West Java Edition, quoted in A. Samsuddin, et.al, Pemilihan Umum 1971. Lembaga Pendidikan dan Konsultasi Pers, Jakarta, 1972, p. 23. 116 proposed by the array in 1966. The NU and PNI leaders certainly opposed the idea, since Java would be under represented. They supported the adoption of a system of proportional representation (PR) instead (Feith, 1968). The controversy over the bill on the status of the legislatures was more heated. The disagreement stemmed from several issues including "(1) the numerical balance between political parties and functional groups in the MPR; (2) the numerical balance between the military and non-military members of functional groups in the MPR, DPR, and DPRD; (3) the number of appointed members in the DPR; (4) who would have the right to nominate the non-military members of functional groups for the MPR, DPR, and DPRD; (5) the number of regional delegates in the MPR; (6) the replacement of members of the MPR and DPR; and (7) the status of those central government officials— military and non-military— who would become members of the MPR, DPR, and DPRD" (Nishihara, 1972, pp. 6-7).5 By late 1967, the debate on these issues was in stalemate. Outside the parliament, the Bandung students, sponsored by Major General Dharsono, Commander of the Siliwangi Division, protested and demanded the adoption of single-member constituencies, instead of the PR system. The 5 . Nishihara however was erroneous when he included these issues in the controversy of the GE bill, since all of these crucial points were on the bill concerning the status of the MPR/DPR. If one examines the GE law, non of these problems were included. 117 government then decided to withdraw the GE bill in order to prepare another. Hence the postponement of elections became inevitable. Meanwhile, the MPRS held its fifth session in March, 1968. After electing general Suharto as permanent President it was decided that the election would be postponed but must be conducted no later than July 5, 1971. In the mean time, the Special Committee monitoring the three bills and representatives from the government continued to seek consensus over the bill on the status of the legislatures. When the DPRGR met again in January 1969, the committee identified four "crucial points" as stumbling blocks toward the ratification of the bills, that is, (1) the number of appointed members, both civilian and military personnel; (2) the number of regional representatives appointed by the government; (3) the problems of the electoral system; and (4) the assurance of the right of assembly as stipulated by Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution (Samsuddin, et al., 1972, p. 42). It should be added that conducting of elections in 1968 was not supported by Suharto's civilian circle. They were afraid that the elections would slow or obstruct stabili zation of the economy. Suharto and his military advisers were more concerned with the "technical reasons" to postpone elections. Technically, the government was not ready to hold an election in 1968 because of the problems of preparation, 118 including voter registration and supplying the ballots. But the most important consideration was that if an election had been held in 1968, the parties would be the winner because of their ability to command support from the masses. Hence, postponing elections and at the same time weakening the parties was the rational choice made by the New Order regime. The year 1969 was characterized by intensified meetings between representatives of the parties and the government to discuss the bills. Finally after three years of strenuous and rigorous debate, the legislature and the government were able to reach consensus on "crucial points." They agreed that (1) the election format would adopt the principle of PR system instead of the single-member constituency, and (2) to "safeguard" the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution, one-fifth of the DPR/ DPRD would be appointed by the government. In November 1969, the election bill and the bill on the status of the legislatures were ratified and became laws number 15 and 16 respectively. Some Principal Features of the 1 9 6 9 GE Law Unlike the 1953 GE law, this new election law is very short, having only 37 articles compared to the first law with 136 articles. Overall it consists of fourteen chapters , 37 articles, and 97 paragraphs. One of the principal features of the 1969 GE law is that it left a wide range of room for the government, especially 119 the Minister of Home Affairs and the President, to make further arrangements when conducting elections. The following examples are just cases in point. - Article 8, par. 8, "The President will give the final decision concerning the unresolved disputes within the Institute of General Election." - Article 8, par. 10, "The structure and the procedures of the Institute of General Elections and other Committees as stipulated in par. 4 will be determined by the government." - Article 20, par. 2, "Everything concerning the conduct of campaigns including the ethics and procedures of campaign, and its time limit will be determined by the government." And several other articles, including article 21 par. 5, 22 par. 3, 23 par. 2, and 25 par. 3. The new GE law also gave a strong indication that all citizens who were members of the PKI and its mass organizations either directly or indirectly involved in the "Contra Revolutionary movement of the G 30 S/PKI" would not have the right to vote or to stand as a candidate. No organizations would be allowed to nominate those people. The most controversial issue concerned an additional stipulation in article 2, paragraph (1) and Article 10, par (2a), which said "or other unlawful organizations." Then it was followed by article 12 paragraph (1) which stipulated that "The government will inform the LPU of the names of former members 120 of the PKI and its mass organizations either directly or indirectly involved in the 'Contra Revolutionary movement of G 30 S/PKI" and/or other unlawful organizations (sic)." The wording of p.ther unlawful organizations invited much controversy and created a wide ranging debate. The government apparently had in mind to open the old wounds of those people who were the leaders of the Masyumi or PSI. It was important for the government to draw them away from the masses to prevent factions of the Masyumi or PSI to involve in election. Certainly, this policy drew strong protests from former members of the Masyumi (Crouch, 1978; Feith, 1968). Since a portion of seats in the legislatures (DPR/MPR) would be awarded to the armed forces (75), the 1969 law stipulated that members of the armed forces would not vote and would not be elected (Articles 11 and 14). The law gave the following reasoning: "Considering the Dwi Fungsi (dual functions) of the armed forces, that is, as defender of the state and as social forces, it must be a solid and unified force in order to defend and protect the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. The armed forces therefore will have special regulation. The functions and aims of the armed forces will not be achieved if the armed forces (ABRI) participate in elections because it means that members of the ABRI will be divided in terms of voting for parties in the society. It is, therefore, decided that members of the ABRI will not apply their voting right as well as the right to be elected for the MPR/DPR. They however will be represented in both institutions through appointment. The appointment of the representation of ABRI is possible because of the Pancasila Demokrasi that allowed all political forces to be included in the legislatures." 121 The law also gave a wide ranging franchise since it lowered the voting age to 17 and if already married. To be nominated, a person was required to be 21 years of age, legally as well as correctly registered. Disenfranchisement applied to members of the communist party and its auxiliary organizations and other unlawful organizations. Citizens who are mentally handicapped, convicted of crime including a jail term, and people whose voting right have been revoked by the court, were also disenfranchised. The law adopted a variant of the d'Hondt system of Proportional Representation (PR). The province would be the electoral district for members of the DPR. The rate per seat, according to the 1969 law, was 400.000 citizens for one seat and every district fkabupaten) will have at least one representative. For example, the province of West Nusatenggara automatically had at least six representative because the province had six kabupaten. Article 6 makes an interesting point by stipulating that the number of members of the DPR from Java would be equal to the number of representatives from the outer islands, taking into consideration the balance between Java and the outer islands. Otherwise, there would have been an added disadvantage for the less populous provinces of the outer islands. The President, according to the law, forms the Institute of General Election (LPU) that is responsible for planning and preparing for elections, leading the several committees that assist the Institute, and collecting all necessary information. The Minister of Home Affairs was designated Chairman of the LPU and was assisted by several committees, including the National Election Committee (PPI) • This committee is in charge of planning and supervising elections for the DPR and the DPRD at the province and kabupaten levels. The committee was also responsible for administering elections. To assist the PPI, the First Local Election Committee (PPD-I) was created for every province, chaired by the Governor. A Second Local Election Committee (PPD-II) was also established in every kabupaten, chaired by the Head of the district (Bupati). Under the local committees, a Polling Committee was created for every sub-district (kecamatanl and headed by the Camat. And finally, in every village a Voter Registration Committee (PPP) was established, chaired by the village head. Altogether in 1969 there were 26 PPD-I, 286 PPD-II, 3184 Polling Committees, and 48,471 voters' registration committees. The structure of these committees paralleled the structure of the bureaucracy in that the chief executive of the local government unit was the ex-officio chairman of each committee. According to Nishihara, the election committee structure reflects also the character of the military structure in the country: "The General Election Institutes 123 assumed the character of a military command with local chief executive as local commanders and election committees as their staffs" (p. 13). Unlike the 1953 election law, this new law prohibited individual candidacy. Only political parties or functional groups are allowed to nominate individuals (Articles 15 and 17). Those candidates must be 21 years of age and not involved either directly or indirectly in the G-30-S/PKI movement or other unlawful organizations. They must also be literate, have proven loyalty to the state ideology, have been not convicted of criminal offense, and must be mentally sound (Article 16). The nomination procedures are long and tedious, since the individual is required to provide detailed information about him/herself by filling out forms that must be signed by two party chairmen. The 1969 law did carry over several provisions from its predecessor. For example, it prohibits a political party from using as a symbol (a) the coat of arms of the Republic, (b) the coat of arms of foreign countries, (c) the national flag of the republic, (d) the national flag of foreign countries, and (e) a picture of an individual. The symbol must not be similar to that of another party. The LPU is authorized to judge any disputes concerning the dispute symbols. The 1969 law, on the other hand, gives more authority for the government to interpret and to maneuver in the conduct of elections both the campaigns and election results. 124 Some Amendments to_the_1969 GE law Since the 1971 elections proved too favorable to the government, the non-government parties sought to improve the situation before the next election by proposing amendments to the 1969 general election law. Some fundamental changes, therefore, were inevitable when the legislature passed Law No. 4, 1975. This is not an entirely new law, but the parties were able to force concessions from the government even though some provisions that give most room for the government to maneuver still remained. The first fundamental change concerned the franchise. As already noted, the 1969 law forbids all members of the Communist party and its mass organizations as well as other unlawful organizations to be involved in any election. It was reported that in 1971, more than two million people for various reasons were not given the right to vote or to run for office (Nishihara, 1972, p. 12). The majority of these people were members of the PKI in several categories, roughly such as A, B, and C.6 Article III, paragraph (3) of the new law changed article 10 par. (2) of the 1969 law by stipulating that "The conditions as required by article 10 par (2) no longer exist for those people who have been denied 6 .Unfortunately I did not have sufficient information on this classification. Approximately, the A category were those members of the PKI and its auxiliary organizations at the national level(Politbirol, the B category were active members at the provincial and district levels, while the C category were the regular members. 125 their voting right." Further examination indicates that this article gives full authority to the government to carefully scrutinize members of the PKI with the C category only and give them the franchise, while the other two categories were still not considered eligible for the franchise. The second amendment concerned the number of political groups allowed to participate in the election. The 1969 law recognized ten political groups to compete in the election, but the amendment law recognized only three political parties (Article 2, par. 4). This resulted from the government's successful campaign to simplify the political party system. The three parties are the United Development Party (PPP), the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and the Functional Group or Golkar. The amendment law also upgraded the educational requirements for candidates from merely the ability to read and write to at least finishing secondary school. After the 1977 elections, the government was compelled by the opposing parties to reform the 1969 law. A new bill then was introduced. The opposition parties demanded more fair and honest elections, particularly demanding an increased role in the election process. Under continuous pressure from the parties, the government agreed to endorse the bill and it became a law on March 20, 1980. One of the most significant concessions the government made to political parties was the creation of the "Supervisory Committees" (SC) at each level parallel to the 126 electoral committees. Hence besides the National Election Committee, the First and Second Electoral Committees, and the Polling Committee, it was also agreed to form a Supervisory Committee for the Conduct of Elections fPanitia Penaawas Pelaksanaan Pemilul in Jakarta, and in every province, district, and sub-district throughout the country. The SC is to supervise the election in each respective . area. It consists of one chairperson and vice-chairperson plus several representatives from government, political parties, and the armed forces. Although this was a major concession, the committee could not alone insure fair and unbiased elections. For example, the representatives from the independent parties are often outvoted by representatives of the government and armed forces, who support Golkar. Also in terms of organizational structure, the committee is responsible to the electoral committee that it is supposed to supervise. The 1980 electoral law was designed to improve the organization of the LPU. The new LPU consisted of an Executive Board chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs plus several members from other committees. The Advisory Council, led by one person plus four vice-chairpersons and representatives of political parties and the armed forces, was added to the executive board. The secretary general of the LPU was finally added and placed in charge of daily operations of the LPU (Article 1, par. 2). The 1980 law clarifies the range of acceptable conduct during the caapaigns. Article 1, par. (13) adds paragraph la for article 20 of the 1969 election law, stipulating that "(a). During caapaigns it is forbidden to question Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; (b). Campaign’s theme in the election must be about programs of parties that must be related to national development." Furthermore, paragraph lb stipulates that "In the campaigns the people have the same opportunity and freedom to participate." These stipulations indicate, first, that the government wants to warn parties that during campaign they are not allowed to "question the existence, to abuse and to disregard the meanings and the nature of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution." The principal targets of these regulation are the Muslim groups considered antagonistic to Pancasila since they base their appeal on the tenets of Islam. Second, these stipulations indicate the government did make concessions since in the previous election there were numerous reports of local officials who banned followers of the opposing parties from campaign rallies (Nishihara, 1972; Oey Hong Lee, 1974; Ward, 1974; Crouch, 1978). Finally, the 1980 election laws (Article 1, par. 2) provided the opportunity for party representatives to witness in the conduct of voting and to counting of the election results. This is also a clear indication of the government's concession to political party demands for participation in 128 counting the ballots that grew out of improprieties in past election conduct. Again, I believe that the people will question the impact of the present eyewitness since representatives of the opposing parties would be also outvoted by the officials who represent the government, the army officers, and certainly the Golkar people as well. The final change in the electoral 1969 electoral law was the 1985 electoral law amendment approved on January 7, 1985. This amendment did not make significant changes except for the clarification of several wordings that seemed ambiguous. It also stated that all parties must apply the symbol that reflects the spirit of Pancasila as the sole ideology of the country (Article 1, par. 10). The Electoral Process The Nominations One of the controversies of the 1971 election concerned the nomination of candidates. Unlike the previous elections, parties in 1971 did not have autonomy in choosing their own candidates even though the limitations were not clear at the beginning. Procedures for selecting candidates were complicated, and they were required to complete applications and present them to the Central Election Committee (PPI), the Provincial and Kabupaten electoral committees. There were 129 other documents and certain credentials as required the law.7 The PPI examined the technical requirements then conveyed the applications to the Command for_the Restoration of Security and Order, or KOPKAMTIB. At this stage a prospective candidate faced the risk of being "scratched" out if they had not met the government requirements. From the outset, the government made it clear that members of banned organizations were not allowed to participate in the election. The question then arose about former leaders of the Masyumi and PSI. Were they to be treated the same as PKI leaders? In February 1970, the Minister of Home Affairs and Chairman of the LPU announced that 2.500 ex-Masyumi and PSI leaders would not qualify as candidat. The decison was designed to discourage supporters of political opponents of Golkar and to recruit more cooperative members of the legislature because "Any candidate construed as a threat was also liable to disqualification by the various Kopkamtib authorities," Ward argued (1974, p. 16). In January 1971 nine parties and Golkar presented their initial list of candidates. There were 3.789 prospective candidates presented to the PPI and Kopkamtib, and 684 were 7 . Candidates for the DPR presented their applications to the PPI while for the DPRD-I, and DPRD-II to the PPD-I and PPD-II, respectively. The credentials included the proof of non-involvement in the G-30-S/PKI, and other unlawful organizations, school diploma, letter of good behavior provided by the local police officer, etc. 130 directly scratched, while 3105 were shown in the Provisional List (Daftar Calon Sementara). With assistance from PPI and LPU, particularly generals such as Ali Murtopo, and Amir Mahmud, Kopkamtib examined further these candidates. The official list was finally made public in April 1971 with 3021 candidates after an additional 84 had been eliminated (Nishihara, 1972, p. 25).8 At the outset, the government explained that those candidates were disqualified because they did not meet administrative requirements. General Ali Murtopo, for example, on March 12, 1971 explained that those candidates were eliminated because in part they did not pass administrative and technical requirement, but they also were against the government.9 Other criteria were also applied, including the lack of positive support of development, lack of support for Pancasila Demokrasi and the 1945 Constitution, and involvement in the Darul Islam. Tentara Islam Indonesia. PRRI/PERMESTA. South Moluccan Republic, and the Papuan Rebellions.10 Those candidates (768) who did not qualify were in either one of these categories. 8 . For a more detailed analysis of the screening process please see Nishihara's mimeograph; also table III of van Marie, in Oey Hong Lee (1974), gave different number of candidates that were being scratched out. I presumed that Nishihara*s account is more accurate. 9 . Berita Yudha. 12 March, 1971. 10. Sinar Harapan. 4 March, 1971, and Merdeka. March 5, 1971. 131 Two political groups seemed to be the main targets of screening. The Muslim parties, particularly the Parmusi, that came with individuals with national political reputation reaching back to the parliamentary democracy period such as Muhammad Natsir, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Kasman Singodimejo, and Muhammad Rum. These were immediately eliminated. They represented the first iayer of Masyumi leadership and had been involved in the PRRI rebellions. They were not only disqualified but were also prohibited from all electoral activities. A total of 131 Parmusi candidates were eliminated from the initial list, 51 of them from Java. The PHI was also the second target of government scratching. The party lost 164 candidates from the initial list, 76 of them from East and Central Java (Nishihara, 1972, p. 26-27). One of the peculiarities of Indonesian elections was that some candidates shown in the list did not really intend to be elected. They were listed merely to reflect the image of the party. This is especially the case of Golkar. Four types of candidates were nominated by Golkar. First, Golkar nominated leaders having national recognition but also with very strong local ties. The nomination of the Sultan of Yogyakarta was the case in point. Second, Golkar sought national leaders with very high visibilities but not really having strong local bonds. Adam Malik, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was nominated for the North Sumatra Province. Third, Golkar selected prominent figures who were 132 known for their expertise, such as Emil Salim and other technocrats. These leaders were nominated merely as "vote getters" in order to attract mass support at the grass roots level. Their names were at the top of the list. The fourth type of nominee was the real candidate fcalon iadi). The majority (94 per cent) of them had very strong local ties. This was a very good strategy to attract voters in a society such as Indonesia where traditional authority remains very strong (Harry Tjan Silalahi, 1977). The other parties, however, were not able to match Golkar's strategy because they were unable to recruit qualified candidates. Between 72 to 89 percent of their candidates had local ties while they "had to depend upon Jakarta as a source of candidates for the rest," according to Nishihara (1972, p. 30). It should be added that a designated candidate did have to be a resident of an electoral district in which he is nominated. It is also interesting to note that the NU party was very much dependent upon leaders with the title of Hail (returned pilgrim). They are the leaders who indeed have traditional authority in the Islamic community. The nomination process in the 1977 election was not as heated as previously because the political parties had been reduced to three, i.e., the Islamic party or PPP, the Indonesian Democratic Party, and the Golongan Karva (Golkar). Furthermore, parties were restrained in nominating persons likely to be immediately rejected by Kopkamtib and PPI. On 133 January 1, 1977, Admiral Sudomo, Commander in Chief of Kopkamtib announced the provisional list of the candidates after only nine of them had been eliminated. The PDI and Golkar lost four candidates while the PPP lost only one. They had been disqualified because they did not fulfill technical requirements, according to Sudomo.11 All three parties disputed Sudomo because, according to party leaders, the motive behind the scratching was government uneasiness concerning the influence of those candidates. They were leaders with great influence at the grass-roots level. The higher their status and influence the greater the possibility of being scratched out by Kopkamtib, they argued (Crouch, 1978). It is striking to note that most complaints of tight screening came from Golkar, especially at the lower levels. It seemed that intra-party rivalry between Golkar activists and its executive board contributed to the complaints. Golkar candidates were rejected by the Golkar National Election Committee (Bapilu Golkar) on the basis of protests from local constituencies. Hence, Kopkamtib played little role in disqualifying Golkar candidates. Ethnic consideration also seemed to be taken into account in screening Golkar candidates. Jacob Tobing and Tambunan, for example, were nominated to represent South Sulawesi and Nest Java, respectively. Those two individuals 11. TEMPO. 1 jANUARY, 1977 134 are Notfch Sumatran Bataks as well as Christians, while South Sulawesi and West Java are known for its past Islamic rebellions. Therefore, Tobing and Tambunan were removed and became candidates for other regions. Finally in February 1977, Admiral Sudomo announced the official list of all candidates (Paftar Calon Tetao), containing 1630 candidates representing the three parties. The PPP turned out 590 candidates, Golkar had 580, while the PDI nominated 460 candidates.12 Nevertheless, the official list was not final. Even though a thorough examination had been made by Kopkamtib, the mass-public was allowed to give opinions on the candidates. If the public had very strong evidence against those being nominated, they could have been disqualified, according to Sudomo. Apparently there were no reports against the designated candidates. The nominations for the 1982 elections were largely matters for party domestic affairs since the parties, again, were unlikely to confront Kopkamtib screening. Within the PPP, for example, all nomination processes were dominated by John Naro of the Parmusi fraction. Naro's main purpose was to get rid of the NU's hegemony of PPP by disregarding the traditional consensus giving NU a strong voice within the party. Instead of supporting the regular NU activists, Naro favored the NU youth organization, Pemuda Ansor, to represent 12. TEMPO. 26 February, 1977. 135 NU. "Naro did not even consult the NU when he drew up the candidate list," Suryadinata observed (1982, p. 40). To make things worse for NU, Vusuf Hasyim, the famous ulama from East Java and a son of the NU founder, was listed in much lower rank to represent East Java so that it was impossible for him to be elected.13 Naro's arbitrary and bold action was certainly protested by NU leaders. They threatened to withdraw support for the PPP.14 Only after long discussions did they decide to remain with the PPP, while waiting for an appropriate time to review NU's relationship with the party.^ The candidate selection process also brought about conflict within the minority party of PDI. It occurred both among elements of the PNI and between the PNI and non-PNI groups. Former PNI activists such as Usep Ranuwidjaja and Abdul Madj id were excluded from the list because they had challenged the leadership of Sunawar Sukawati and Isnaeni (Kasiepo, 1982). The non-PNI elements (Christian, Catholic, etc) protested because of the PNI attempt to dominate the Party. They demanded more seats in the legislatures, 13. One should bear in mind that Jusuf Hasyim is also the owner of the wellknown Pondok Pesantren Tebu Irencr of Jombang, East Java. There was speculation that Naro got the hint from the security people to make it impossible for Yusuf Hasyim to be elected because the latter led the NU faction that walked out the MPR session in 1978 in protest of the controversial issue of Javanese mysticism. 14. KOMPAS. 30 January, 1982. 15. Sinar Haraoan. 1 February, 1982. 136 especially at the regional level. It was reported that the Catholic and Christian groups from South Sumatra withdrew their candidates in protest over the PNI domination.16 It is clear that the nomination process for elections in Indonesia is not open to competition. There are two institutions that do play a major, or even decisive, role in this process, the party leaders and the security agency (Kopkamtib). The role of the latter agency is more dominant. Campaigns Campaigns in the New Order era are completely different than under the previous regime. The political climate has changed, the military is the driving force for more control and above all it has its own party, Golkar. From the outset of the 1971 elections it was clear that the military and the government would make a strong effort to ensure a Golkar victory. By law, the campaign was to take place for two months (April 27 - June 25, 1971) followed by a seven day respite (minggu tenang). Actually, the government started far in advance of the day set by law, through the process of "monoloyalty,w and "bulldozing" political parties. The general election law itself stipulated 13 prohibitions and consequences of violations which could be summarized as follows: 16. Sinar Harapan. 31 January, 1982. 137 1. Deliberately giving incorrect information about oneself (1 Year jail term). 2. Forging the necessary documents (5 Years). 3. Using false documents (5 Years). 4. Deliberately obstructing general election proces (5 Years). 5. Preventing voters from voting by force or threat of force(5 Years). 6. Bribing or accepting bribes in the election (3 Years). 7. Using trickery to cause damage to voter (3 Years). 8. Claiming to be someone else ( 5 Years ). 9. Infringing on regulations to take part in elections although clearly involved in the G 30 S/PKI (5 Years). 10. Giving out more ballot papers than needed (5 Years) 11. Thwarting the ballots. 12. Employer's granting no opportunity to their workers to participate in the election (5 Years). 13. Negligence in administering election (Fine Rpiooo). The government then made further campaign restrictions by passing regulation No.l, January 1970, that stipulated that "In election campaigns it is prohibited to reason about or to discuss Pancasila Principles and the 1945 Constitution, to slander, show contempt or disrespect of the government or government officials, individuals, groups, organizations, or a foreign country, or to commit any other acts/activities contrary to the ethics/moral code of Pancasila Principles," (Quoted from Donald Hindley, 1972, p. 58). Moreover, in campaigns it is strictly prohibited to insult the President/Vice President and their families/relatives, to infringe religious freedom, racism, regionalism, and the like. It was also forbidden to use President Sukarno's name and his teachings and "To say or do anything that could 138 contribute to a comeback of the forces of the Old Order, the PKI, foreign subversion or groups that were anti Pancasila," (Oey Hong Lee, 1974, p. 32). Furthermore, the government required that all parties sponsoring campaigns had to obtain in advance permits from the authorities (police officers, local military commanders, subdistrict heads, etc.). These officials had full authority to determine the time and place, and the route for political rallies, especially considering "security" concerns. Also all the necessary campaign materials, such as posters, phamplets, leaflets, fliers, and the like were to be submitted in advance to the authorities (Nishihara, 1972; Oey Hong Lee, 1974; Ward, 1974). These regulations were applied more strictly for the opposition parties than for Golkar. The latter, with the help of military and civilian officials, applied all measures, ranging from subtle pressure to coercion, including harass ment, intimidation, exhortation, and arrest of party activists, to secure the victory.17 Popular Indonesian terms such as dikoramilkan (summoned to the office of local 17. Opposition newspapers such as Abadi. Harian Kami, Merdeka, Duta Masvarakat. reported many instances of govern ment coercive actions during the election. For further information please see Keneth E. Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia : An East Java Case Study. Monash Paper on Southeast Asia, #2. 139 military commander for interrogation), and diamankan (to be interrogated) only applied to opposition parties, not to Golkar activists.18 When the end (April 27) of the campaign arrived, the political atmosphere had become heated and the military authorities tightened security measures. Deceptive information was spread. Golkar was fully aware that the big three parties (PNI, NU, and Parmusi) were its principal rivals and therefore applied more pressure to them, including creating rumors about armed struggle in Central Java (to discredit Parmusi), raiding party activists' houses, as well as arresting people. Sukarno's children were not allowed to campaign "because of their agitation for Sukarnoism." It is difficult to trace the amount of Golkar resources used to win the election. Its financial resources are unaccountable because no public records are available. The ministers, governors, district and subdistrict Heads actively involved in the campaign for Golkar often used government facilities for transportation, parties, accommodations, and political rallies. There is no information on the amount of individual contributions, if there were records, must have been sketchy and unaccountable.19 18.It was reported that Islamic Party activists left their villages to seek protection in Jakarta (Ward, 1974). 19.0n Golkar's financial resources Nishihara said that "It would be a formidable task to work out the size of Golkar's campaign fund, since the fund was closely tied in with money from the Home Affairs Department and the General 140 For political rallies throughout the country Golkar sponsored the so called "safari rally." All movie stars, popular singers and rock music stars were subtly invited to participate in the rally. They could not decline the invitation otherwise they would be deprived of performing on the state controlled TV and radio stations, which would eventually mean the end of their careers. What is left for the non-government parties? For parties that did not have clear ideological stance it was hard to gain influence, since they lost their reasons to attract voters and left them without any option but to survive. They have nothing to offer since they cannot provide alternative policies since they did not dare to criticize the government (Oey Hong Lee, 1974, p.32). It is quite different, however, for the Islamic parties and the PNI. The PNI came with the idea of using Sukarno's teachings and other of his legacies, such as marhaenism as a rallying symbol. This is understandable since Sukarno was still very popular among the Central and East Javanese. Hadisubeno, chairman of the PNI, argued that if the government disbanded Sukarno's teachings it also should disband the PNI, because Election Institute appropriated for electoral administration, as well as with the Defense and Security Department's security maintenance expenses. Informed sources in Jakarta regarded the "private contribution" of Lieutenant-General Ibnu Sutowo, president director of state oil company Pertamina, as a major source of Golkar funds. Other sources told the writer that Golkar asked foreign companies operating in Indonesia for contributions." (1972, pp.33-34). 141 the PNI doctrine remained based on Marhaenism. He reminded PNI members to stick with Marhaenism because after elections the PNI will save Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Fearing the impact of Hadisubeno's appeals, the military quickly responded by insisting that the spreading of Sukarno's teachings is still unlawful.20 Hadisubeno insisted, however, that the PNI would stick with Sukarno's teachings and he said: "Six years ago, we were called false Marhaenists, with communist-phobias. When that was over, we were called 'PNI ASU.* Now there is another accusation, that the PNI follows the teachings of Sukarnoism. Never mind the PNI, Bung Karno himself never said *1 am Sukarnoist,* but always 'I am a Marhaenist.*"21 The military finally reprimanded him because it was a direct challenge to General Suharto.22 It was indeed Hadisubeno who dared to challenge the regime. He declared that general elections were the only right the people had left and these must be defended to death. He also reminded PNI members who had been forced to join Golkar to vote for PNI. "If you are told to join the Kokarmendagri. just join it. If you are told to sign it, just do it. But don't forget that on July 5, 1971, our symbol is 20. Sinar Haraoan. 19 January, 1971. 21. k o m p a s . 16 January, 1970. 22.It was the commander of the Java and Madura Territorial Command, KOWILHAN II, that announced that Hadisubeno was reprimanded. KOMPASr 28 January, 1970. 142 number 8," he said.23 Unfortunately he died soon after. The PNI then tried to exploit other elements of Sukarno's legacy, such as, his children, Guntur Sukarnoputera and Rachmawati.24 Again, the military made it clear that the party would not be allowed to apply Sukarno's legacy (Ward, 1974, p. 154). Consequently, the PNI was in despair throughout the election. The Islamic parties, especially the Nahdlatul Ulama. exploited Islam in appealing to the voters. The Muslim leaders insisted that the general election was a test of faith, that is, it was the responsibility of Muslims to support and vote for the Islamic parties. Voting for the Islamic cause is considered beramal ibadah or worship which will be rewarded in the future. In April 1971, about seven hundred NU ulamas (religious scholars) met in Jombang, the center of NU support in East Java. They isr.< u .. religious decision or fatwa concerning the election, declaring that it was obligatory for Muslims to vote for an Islamic party.25 The NU launched its campaign through religious rallies, or pengaiian.26 an effective institution to cement the 23. KOMPAS. 6 January, 1970. 8 was the assigned number for PNI in the ballot paper since there were ten political parties. Each party was given the assigned number, starting with the Catholic Party. 24. KOMPAS, 26 May, 1970. 25. KOMPAS. 25 April, 1971. 26. Pengajian is an institution created to promote the understanding of Islam. But it became a means for holding political rallies in East Java. For further information please see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Chicago: 143 relationship between the Ulamas and their followers. The pengajian started with reciting the Koran which was followed by two or three speakers. The key note speakers of the rally usually from Jakarta. As Golkar effectively used its paramilitary youth organizations,27 so the Islamic parties relied on their youth organizations, including remnants of an old party system, such as Pemuda Ansor (NU), Pemuda Muhammadvah. and Pemuda Muslimin (PSII). They were the frontrunners of campaign engineering because of their ability to mobilize the masses. They were in charge of guiding and securing political rallies. These youth organizations provide the mass-basis of support for Islamic parties throughout the country. The youth organizations also guarded against election irregularities. A group of young self-conscious student activists established a solidarity group to protest the election since they were disenchanted with the political process during the elections. Instead of voting for the available political parties, they tried to create their own identity, calling themselves aolongan outih (elite group, i.e., without a ballot symbol) because they did not want to vote for any existing party. Another group of youth wanted to Chicago University Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1960). 27. Some of them are associated with the army. The Anakatan Huda Siliwanqif • for example, is related to the army Siliwangi division of West Java. Such is the case with the Anokatan Muda Piponegoro of Central Java and Yogyakarta, as well as the Angkatan Muda Brawldiaia of East Java. 144 be referees at polling stations during the elections since the did not trust government officials to referee fairly.28 The 1977 campaign a repetition of the prior election process. To secure the victory for Golkar, the government and military officials applied old strategies of intimidation, harassment, and even physical punishment. Admiral Sudomo, Chief of Staff of the Kopkamtib, warned parties to follow the government regulation No. 1/1976 and came out with four "don'ts," including "don't intimidate your opponents; don't offend the dignity of the government and its officials; don't disrupt national unity; and don't criticize the policies of the government," (Liddle, 1978a; and 1978b). He pointed out several unlawful activities conducted by the non-government parties. Other officials charged that the Islamic splinter group, Komando Jihad, received weapons from an unknown source in East Java. To overcome the problem during election campaigns, Sudomo formed the Forum of Contact and Communication that consisted of government officials, Kopkamtib, and the parties.29 Political parties protested the intimidation, harassment, and dishonesty of the referees (the government 28. KOMPAS. 27 April, 1971. 29. Party leaders doubted the effectiveness of the Forum. One PDI leader complained by saying "To day we meet and discuss but tomorrow intimidation goes on," TEMPO, 16 April, 1977. 145 and military).30 They complained that no action had been taken toward Golkar activists who committed unlawful behavior. "No one was put on trial in the case of destroying the PDI symbol. But if the berinain (Golkar symbol-sic) was touched, in a few days they would be put on trial, such as the case in Bali," one PDI leader complained, "because the referees are dishonest. They should be fired if they did not obey the rules," he said.31 The restructuring of the parties was a blessing for the Islamic faction because it enabled them to speak with one voice (Liddle, 1978b). They skillfully exploited the ka'abah (shrine), symbol of the PPP to attract Muslim voters. Ka'abah became a new unifying symbol for the Islamic community, replacing the old, Crescent and Star. When voting for the ka'abah, the Muslim gains a strong awareness of being Muslim and show the non-Muslim that "You will witness that we are all muslims flshadu be anna Muslimun)". the former Masyumi leader, Muhammad Natsir insisted.32 The Muslims reiterated that as Muslims they should be able to worship Allah only by saying that "It is 30. TEMPO, 26 February, 1977 revealed that the Islamic party leaders made a statement concerning "intimidation." Two members of PPP in Situbondo, East Java, must be put in the hospital because they were brutally punched by village officials, and three others were kicked on February 5, 1977. Similar numerous incidents were reported in national newspapers in Jakarta. 31. TEMPO. 16 April, 1977. 32. TEMPO. 19 Maret, 1977. 146 indeed that my praying, my worship, my life for Allah, and I will die just for Allah." Therefore, they should vote for the ka'abah the argument goes. The Muslim groups came out with campaign slogan that was very attractive. "Islam is my religion, Muhammad is my prophet, and ka'abah is my choice", "The great community of ka'abah vote PPP," "Once ka'abah always firmly with ka'abah," "Welcome to the region of ka'abah," and several other slogans that were placed on posters and banners in strategic places. It was clear that the principal feature of the campaigns in 1977 was the confrontation between the government and the Islamic group. Uneasy about the growing strength of PPP supporters, the Golkar revitalized the GUPPI (Union for the Improvement of Islamic Education, or Gabunaan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam, and other Islamic leaders to counter the PPP kiyais. A respected kiyai from Jakarta, Habib Muhammad A1 Habsyi, campaigned throughout Java and declared that "it is forbidden fharam) to stab the Ka'abah."33 The government also argued that if the muslims win the election they will replace Pancasila with Islam and create an Islamic state. The PPP kiyais accused the GUPPI group as kivai bavaran or 33. Haram is the highest level of sinful commitment by Moslem. Within this category including eating pork, premarital sexual intercourse, etc. He did say that "It is forbidden to stab the symbol of Ka'abah," TEMPO. 19 Maret, 1977. 147 "bought kiyais," because they lend their support to gain short term reward such as funding for their oesantrens or pilgrimage to Mecca. The 1982 campaign was also a repetition . of prior elections. However it became clearer that the rivalry between the government party and the Islamic party increased. Old tactics and strategies were reiterated by all groups. But the confrontation between Golkar and the Islamic party seemed to be unavoidable and led to physical confrontation. On March 18, 1982, Golkar launched a massive campaign at Laoanqan Banteng a main square in Jakarta. Golkar, however, could not continue its rally because it was "reportedly" disrupted by PPP supporters. It ended in a riot and angry masses destroyed cars, buses, shops, and offices in Jakarta and three hundred people were arrested. Conflicts also occurred in other places. On March 27, While the PPP campaigned at a small town, Kotagede, northeast of Yogyakarta, a group of hecklers disrupted the rally which ended with physical conflict between paramilitary youth groups of the competing sides. In the evening, about twenty unknown people raided the PPP headquarters southwest of the city. One Muslim activist was brutally killed, "it was similar to the Entebbe raid," a local Muslim leader stated.34 34• TEMPO. 3 April, 1982. 148 The heated campaign and conflict also occurred in Solo, Central Java, but it happened between the supporters of PDI and Golkar.35 It appeared that the rivalries between parties only occurred on Java. The opposition parties on the outer islands did not have the courage to challenge the military sponsored Golkar, because they were under constant pressure by both the local officials and the military.36 It is also important to note that in the 1982 elections one can observe the significant existence of the aolonaan putih. People who joined this group were very critical of the government and existing political parties. They were very disenchanted with the election laws and the present political process. They are former activists of the old PNI, retired generals, members of the Petisi 50. and students. The government accused them of being unfaithful and ungrateful to God. "To follow golongan putih means to commit sinful behavior," the Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Mahmud, denounced them.37 35. Silirpun ikut tergoncanc. or "Silir also shaken," the TEMPO (3 April, 1982) magazine reported on the confrontation between the PDI and Golkar in Solo, Central Java. Silir is a red light district in the city of Solo/Surakarta. 36. From observation I discerned minimal electoral activities in the outer islands, both prior to and during the campaign period. I have traveled in two provinces during the period, that is, Bali and West Nusatenggara. 37. TEMPO. 13 March, 1982. 149 The Ballots,and Election results On July 3, 1971 for the second time in the history of the Republic, Indonesians went to polling stations throughout the country. For the conduct of general elections 687,990 Ballot Boxes, Kotak Surat SuaraP were provided, and the people went to 228,974 voting stations (Tempat Pemberian Suara) under the direct-ion of the Voter Registration Committee (Panitia Pendaftaran Perailih) and 3,184 Polling Committees (Samsuddin, et.al.. 1972, p. 145). The voting was conducted in an orderly fashion throughout the country. On election day, the President accompanied by Home Minister Amir Mahmud, Secretary of the Cabinet Sudharmono, the governor of Jakarta, toured the city of Jakarta and made inspections at several polling stations. "So far, no one has disturbed the operation of the polls, except for the burning of one polling station by a person against whome measures have been taken," he said.38 Ambassadors of friendly countries were given a chance to observe the elections, as were ministers from neighbouring countries. The procedures for giving the ballot were almost exactly the same as the one in 1955. The atmosphere was different. Some voters felt under pressure because they were forced to vote a certain party. On election day business were open as 38.It was reported that one polling station was burned in the Kebayoran area of Jakarta. Slnar Haraoan. 3 July, 1971. 150 polling stations in their respective offices and each polling station accommodated between 100 to 200 voters so that the government would be able to trace voters whether they casted their ballots for the non-government parties. Several days before casting their ballot, letters of nitification were issued for every registered voter. On voting day, they reported to their Voter Registration Committee and had to wait for their turn. After receiving a ballot then the voter would go into the polling booth and pierce the picture of one of the ten political parties. Then the ballot must be folded properly and dropped into the ballot boxes. After finishing this procedure, some people went home while others were inclined to stay around and watch the ritual. High voter turn out is not unusual in a political system that requires every citizen to vote. 94.02 per cent of the eligible voters (58,179,245) cast their ballots. This is slightly higher than the previous election (87.6%). The so called golonqan putih or white group failed to discourage people from voting even though this urban phenomenon had made its case loudly. In rural areas, eligible voters were chased by village officials and the local authorities in order to assure they were present at polling stations at the right time. 151 Although the official outcome of the 1971 election was not made public until August 7, 1971, the Golkar victory was generally recognized shortly after the election day. It won a landslide victory with 62.8 per cent of the vote and a guranteed 227 seats in the parliament.39 The Nahdlatul Ulama was second with 18.67 percent. The biggest loser was the PNI (6.94%) the party that gained the most votes in 1955 election (22.3%)., The Islamic party Parmusi came out with 5.36 percent, and the PSII was fifth with only 2.39%; then followed the Christian and Catholic parties with 1.34 and 1.10 per cent, respectively. The other three parties were under one per cent, Perti (0.7%), the IPKI (0.62), and the Murba with only 0.09 of the popular votes. Golkar won in virtually every province. In Aceh, Maluku, Greater Jakarta, and Central Java, Golkar won by 50 per cent or less but still controlled the majority, while in other provinces the government sponsored party won by a great landslide. In eight provinces it controlled more than 75% of the popular votes ranging from 76.12 in West Java to 92.48 per cent in Southeast Sulawesi. In ten provinces, Golkar won less than the party leaders expected, ranging from 54.77% in East Kalimantan to 69.8% in West Nusatenggara. 39.In addition to this, Golkar would add 100 more seats through appointment procedures both from the military and civilians. And an additional nine seats more for West Irian were allotted to Golkar. 152 Other political parties did not perform as well as Golkar. The Nahdlatul Ulama gained substantial support from its traditional stronghold in East, Central and West Java. These three provinces contributed 79.07 per cent of its total votes (10,213,650). It gained quite a number of supporters in the provinces of North Sumatra (136,035), South Sumatra (153,440), Yogyakarta (126,315), South Sulawesi (230,127), West Nusatenggara (150,119), and South Kalimantan (210.941). The other Islamic parties were less successful. The Parmusi gained a total of 2,930,746 votes (5.36%). Fifty per cent of its voters were from Java, while the other 50 per cent were well distributed troughout the country. It seemed that Parmusi followed the pattern of Masyumi in the 1955 election in which the latter drew 49.0% of its followers from Java. The PSII drew the majority of its voters from West and East Java, and South Sulawesi. These provinces contributed 43.3% of PSII votes. The Perti was able only to gain a substantial support in West Java, Aceh, and West Sumatra. 70 per cent of its votes came from these areas. As indicated earlier, the most surprising loser was the PNI. If in 1955 it ranked first in the popular vote, in 1971 it ranked third with only 6.94 of the popular votes (3,793.266). The majority of its members were absorbed in Golkar due to the "monoloyalty" process as well as intimidation and harassment. 82.9 per cent of its voters came from Java, a slightly higher percentage than in 1955 153 (80.7%), while Central Java contributed 52.0 per cent of its popular votes. Observing the decline of PNI's popularity, * Liddle noted why it occured, explaining that "Former and potential PNI voters, bereft of leadership, fearful of reprisals despite a secret ballot, inclined in any event to conform to what seemed to be the prevaling mood and to follow the stated wishes of villages officials and their bureaucratic superiors, failed to come to the party's aid," (1973, p.300). The PNI was not able to create a rallying symbol such as it had in the past. The Christian and Catholic parties relied on their traditional supporters from East Nusatenggara, Maluku, and North Sumatra. About half of the Parkindo popular votes were from these areas, while the majority of Catholic party support came from East Nusatenggara. There are some explanations why Golkar was able to win the election with a landslide victory. Golkar claimed that its victory was due to the combination of several factors, including the ability of the government to implement development policies, the negative perception of the mass population toward parties, the persuasive arguments addressed by Golkar, the ability of Golkar to draw on enormous funds and forces, and the role of Golkar's intellectuals (Samsudin, et.al., 1972,p. 139). They never mentioned the impact of coercive measures, such as intimidation, harassment, physical punishment, and the like to force people to vote for Golkar. 154 A more sound argument, even if it is only partially acceptable, was presented by Harry Tjan Silalahi, who argued that "the parties were no longer considered capable of carrying out their proper functions as an integral part of the political infrastructure. They had contributed to the compartmentalization and polarization of the society on the basis of ideology and manipulated the masses to their own ends," (1977, p.5). Still Silalahi, however, represented the official/government argument as well as perceptions on parties. Donald Hindley also gives a more plausible explanation to the defeat of the parties, especially the PNI. He argues that the PNI has lost its raison de'etre to be able to attract the voters (1972). Liddle saw it 'as result of combination of the ability of Golkar and military people to penetrate village bureaucracy, and the failure of party leaders themselves. He observes that party leaders were more interested in securing their own personal interests and "became less and less concerned with the maintenance of their village support bases," (1973, p.302). While, like Liddle, * he does not discount the role of intimidation, James Mackie believes that "many simple peasants and becak drivers and the like simply looked upon Golkar as the Partai Pemerintah (Government Party,sic) and felt it to be unwise not to vote for it," as reasons why people support Golkar (in Oey Hong Lee, 1974,p.71). 155 The ritual and the result of the 1977 and 1982 elections are a repetition of the previous election, since the procedures and the atmosphere are the same. Nevertheless some important phenomena should be discussed here. First of all, there was a decline in voter turn out in the 1977 election. Although the proportion of total registered voters increased by almost four per cent, voter turn out decreased by almost the same amount, that is, from 94.02% to 90.57%. Three possible factors explain this problem. The first is that the impact of the restructuring of political parties had left the masses without much choice. Second, internal conflicts within the PPP and PDI turned the voters off, while they did not want to vote for Golkar. This is especially the case for the independent "middle class" urban voters. And third, as Silalahi argued, the heated and partisan campaigns during elections turned voters away. Even though in 1982 voter turn out slightly increased by 0.90%, it was still lower than the first election in the New Order era as shown in Table 4.1. 156 Table 4.1 Voters Turn Out in New Order General Elections 1971 1977 (+/“) 1982 (+/") Total Pop. 114,190,218 129,842,848(13.7%) 146,531,733(11.3) Registered Voters 58,179,245 70,662,155(21.5%) 82,133,639(16.2) Total Valid Votes 54,699,549 63,998,344(17.0%) 75,126,306(17.3) % of Toral Registered Voters 50.95 54.42 56.65 % of Total Pop.Casting Valid Votes 47.90 49.29 51.27 % of registered Voters casting Note : Adapted from Harry Tjan Silalahi, "The 1977 General Elections: The Results and The Role of Traditional Authority Relations in Modern Indonesia Society," The Indonesian Quarterly. Vol. V,. No. 3, July 1977? and Soeroso, "The Outcome of the 1982 General Elections," The Indonesian Ouaterlv. Vol. X, No.3, 1982. A second major factor that must be considered is the improved performance of the Islamic party (PPP) in 1977. As Table 4.2 indicates, the Islamic party increased its popular votes by 2.18% from 27.11% in 1971 to 29.29% in 1977. Furthermore, for the first time the PPP outvoted the govern ment party, Golkar, in Jakarta and improved its performance in twelve other provinces as shown in Table 4. In provinces such as Bengkulu, Riau, South Sumatra, Lampung, West and South Kalimantan, the PPP increased its popular votes by more than ten percent. According to Harry Tjan Silalahi (1977), 157 this phenomenon can be explained in terms of traditional authority relationships. The PPP has been able to effectively use its traditional authority (religious leaders) in attracting voters. Liddle (1978), on the other hand, gave an additional dimension when he argued that the unfication of all Islamic parties in one front was a blessing for the Muslim community because their focus was narrowed and drawn to one front, the ka1abah front, even though the government tried to recruit a more accommodative group from GUPPI. By using one front, the Muslim community could draw a more clear line between the parties and its competitors. The government party regained its strength in the 1982 elections by convincingly defeating its opponents in all provinces except Aceh. Its popular vote increased by 2.23 per cent, while the Islamic party declined by 1.51 per cent. This is due to Golkar's ability to apply more sophisticated strategies in campaigns, the proven ability of the government in promoting the quality of life (in economic terms), the changing image of the armed forces by their voluntary work in villages throughout the country prior to the election (Sigit Kusumowidagdo, in Leo Suryadinata, 1982). Finally, the internal rivalries among party leaders of both the PPP and PDI turned away many of their sympathizers. 158 Electoral Laws an(L_The__ Hegemony of Golkar It is important, in the final part of this chapter, to discuss the political consequences of electoral laws under the New Order government, that is, their effect on the establishment of Golkar's hegemony. To what extent has the electoral system, in this case proportional representation, contributed to the creation of the hegemonic party system? This is an important question to be explored. As discussed in this chapter, Indonesian electoral laws apply the system of proportional representation. Even though the 1969 law and its amendments were intended to use the "list" system40, in reality when allocating seats to parties in each district, the General Election Institute (LPU) applies the system of The.Largest Remainder Formula. This procedure begins with the calculation of a "quota" (q), that is, the total number of votes (v) cast in the district divided by the number of seats (m) allocated for that district or q *= v/m. The quota will be used as the price of each seat. The second step is to determine the initial allocation (s), that is, the number of votes each party receives (t) divided by the quota (s=t/q). Since it will be unlikely to award all seats at once, particularly in 4°.The reason was that each party proposed the list of its candidates in the districts. But in reality the system did not really apply the "list" system as applied in the Western democracy. In the "list" system the whole country becomes the single district. 159 the large districts, the left over seats will be awarded to the parties with the largest remainder of votes by applying * the formula: Remainder (r) «= t - f (s> (q)).41 Several scholars have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the type of electoral system or formula applied in particular countries, its consequences, as well as the degree of representativeness of the electoral formula being applied (Rae, 1971; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984, 1986; Duverger, 1984, 1986; Rose, 1984; and Riker, 1984, 1986). Douglas Rae offered a powerful proposition. He argued that "electoral system generally tend to: (1) advantage strong parties, especially those holding majorities or near majorities, (2) disadvantage the weakest parties, and (3) withhold seats from weak parties, thereby reducing the total number of legislative parties" (1971, p. 79). When we observe the outcomes of the general election and the allocation of seats in the Indonesian case, using for convenience the 1982 data, it is clear that the proportional representation electoral system adopted created a dis advantage for the weakest party (PDI). Of 27 electoral districts PDI obtained one or more seats in only nine. PDI was denied seats in several districts even though it gained a substantial number of votes. In the province of North Sulawesi, for example, the PDI was denied seat even though 41 .Douglas W. Rae, The Political Conseounces of Electoral Laws (1971, p.79). 160 the party was able to collect almost the same amount of votes with the Islamic party, that is, 6.11% and 6.77%, respective ly. The PPP was awarded a seat (table 4.2). This in part due to the small number of seats allocated to the district. In the district in which the total allocation of seats was small the largest party (Golkar) swept an average of about 70% of the seats. Hence the contribution of the electoral system toward the hegemony of Golkar is very clear, and the small parties, especially the PDI has difficulty to gain more influence. 161 Table 4.2 Distribution of Votes and The Number of seats Allocated: The 1982 Data % of Votes and % of Seats Allocated Province PDI Golkar PPP Aceh (10) 3.75 - ) 36.97(40.0) 59.08(60.0) N . Sumatra (19) 7.01 5.3) 72.54(73.7) 20.44(21.1) W.Sumatra (14) .83 - ) 60.41(64.3) 38.77(35.7) Riau ( 6) 2.52 - ) 71.69(66.7) 25.79(33.3) Jambi ( 6) 1.39 " ) 84.80(83.3) 13.81(16.7) S. Sumatra (11) 5.92 9.1) 56.03(54.6) 38.05(36.4) Bengkulu ( 4) 3.24 “ ) 70.62(75.0) 26.15(25.0) Lampung ( 8) 10.62 12.5) 59.36(62.5) 30.02(25.0) Jakarta (13) 15.82 51.4) 44.99(46.2) 39.20(38.5) West Java (50) 9.49 10.0) 63.34(64.0) 27.17(26.0) Central Java (51) 11.80 11.8) 60.47(60.8) 27.73(27.5) Yogyakarta ( 6) 16.10 16.7) 60.55(66.7) 33.34(16.6) East Java (57) 6.59 7.0) 56.78(56.1) 36.64(36.8) W.Kalimantan ( 7) 8.28 14.3) 70.97(71.4) 20.75(14.3) C.Kalimantan ( 6) 1.23 - ) 84.22(83.3) 14.55(16.7) S.Kalimantan (10) 1.10 - ) 59.25(60.0) 39.65(40.0) E.Kalimantan ( 6) 6.85 - ) 61.30(66.7) 31.85(33.3) N. Sulawesi ( 6) 6.11 - ) 87.13(83.3) 6.77(16.7) C. Sulawesi ( 4) 3.18 - ) 81.32(75.0) 15.51(25.0) SE.Sulawesi ( 4) .49 - ) 96.95(100.0) 2.56 ( - ) S. Sulawesi (23) .58 - ) 89.18(91.3) 10.23( 8.7) Bali ( 8) 9.71 12.5) 87.71(87.5) 1*75( - ) NTB ( 6) 3.24 - ) 68.61(66.7) 28.16(33.3) NTT (12) 2.35 - ) 96.35(100.0) 1.30( - ) Maluku ( 4) 5.79 “ ) 75.24(75.0) 18.96(25.0) Irian Jaya ( 9) 4.35 11.1) 92.48(88.9) 3•17 ( - ) Note: The number in paretheses are the % of allocation of seats. Source: KOMPAS, 25 April, 1987. The principal problem of small party, especially the PDI, has to confront is to surpass the threshold of the PLEASE NOTE: These pages not included with original material. Filmed as received. University Microfilms International 164 designated ••quota” in a certain district.42 The above table (4.3) indicates that there are fifteen electoral districts in which the PDI failed to gain a seat. The characteristics of these electoral districts are (1) all of them are in the outer islands, (2) the size of the population is small, and (3) most of their administrative districts are also small. Moreover, the degree of competitiveness between parties in the outer islands is much lower than in Java. The local bureaucrats and military officers are usually more willing to take all out measures to guarantee that Golkar will come out with a very strong performance. As indicated in table 4.3, the difference between the designated quota and the votes gained by the PDI is extremely large in almost all of these districts. It is therefore very difficult for the PDI to surpass the threshold in order to gain a seat in these electoral districts. The situation becomes even worse for the small party such as the PDI because the seats allocated to these provinces are very few, and the government party (Golkar) swept the popular votes with an absolute majority. 42.The Islamic party (PPP) failed to gain a seat only in four electoral districts such as Bali, East Nusatenggara, Maluku, and Irian Jaya. This is not a suprising phenomemon, since the majority of the population in these electoral districts are Christians and Catholics. 165 Table 4.3 The Comparison Between The Threshold of One Seat and The Votes Gained by the PDI SSSS8S8BSSSSBSSSSSSSSeseSSSfiSSSBSBBBSSGS8BBSSBSSSBSSSS8S8SS The Number of The Price of The Number Electoral Seats Alloca- One Seat or of Votes District cated Quota PDI Gained Aceh 10 141.117 51.700 West Sumatra 14 129.109 13.129 Riau 6 209.966 27.072 Jambi 6 131.055 10.589 C. Kalimantan 6 88.333 6.435 S. Kalimantan 10 115.300 11.833 E. Kalimantan 6 111.985 39.418 N. Sulawesi 6 192.336 68.666 C. Sulawesi 4 171.718 21.368 S.E. Sulawesi 4 122.999 2.464 S. Sulawesi 23 140.922 18.109 W.Nusatenggara 6 242.160 42.713 E .Nusatenggara 12 120.780 34.656 Maluku 4 187.043 41.115 Irian Jaya 9 72.411 27.990 Note: The price of one seat is derived from the number of registered voters in the district divided by the number of seats allocated to the district (Q=v/m). Source: KOMPAS. 25 April, 1987 Nevertheless, the electoral system adopted in Indonesia is very unique. The country consists of thousands of islands but the population is concenrated in Java (60%). The govern ment is fully aware the sensitivity of the problem of balancing Java and the Outer Islands. In so doing, the electoral laws stipulate that rather than the district (the administrative unit below the province) the province is designated as the electoral district, and each administrative 166 district will be guaranteed at least one seat, even though the price of one seat is 400 thousand votes and many administrative districts have fewer inhabitants than that. The intention was to help the less populated areas in the outer Islands. The principal consequences of this arrangement is that certain electoral districts, mostly outside Java, are over represented because they have quite a large number of administrative districts regardless of the size of the population. On the other hand, certain electoral districts, such as North Sumatra and Jakarta, were under represented because they have fever administrative districts although the size of the population is larger than certain districts. As shown in table 4.4 the provinces such as South Sulawesi, NTT, Irian Jaya, Central Kalimantan, and Aceh are over represented, while other districts such as Jakarta with more than seven million inhabitants, and other are under represented. In the extreme case, the electoral district of Yogyakarta that has more population than East Nusatenggara (NTT) was allocated only six seats while NTT twelve seats. PLEASE NOTE: Duplicate page numbers. Text follows. Filmed as received. University Microfilms International 167 Table 4.4 Representativeness in Selected Electoral Districts: The 1982 Data SSSSSSSSeSS8SSSSSSSSSStt&fiSBB«8Si8Sre8SBSBBBSSSB8SSBSSSBBese:SSS:5 % of Registered # of Seats % of Golkar Province Voters Allocated Seats S.Sulawesi 3,241,168 23* 93.30 NTT 1,229,363 12* 100.00 Irian Jaya 651,701 9* 88.89 C. Kalimantan 530,000 6* 83.33 Aceh 1,411,168 10* 40.00 North Sumatra 4,199,103 19** 73.68 Jakarta 3,570,939 13** 46.15 Yogyakarta 1.636,100 6** 66.67 NTB 1,455,662 6** 66.67 W.Kalimantan 1,364,687 71.43 Bali 1,441,769 8** 87.50 Note: *Over Represented Districts **Under Represented Districts Source: KOMPAS, 25 April, 1987 Combined with several other factors as revealed in Chapter III, the contribution of the electoral system adopted in general elections in Indonesia toward the establishement of the hegemonic party system is quite clear. Conclusion Throughout the analysis I have demonstrated how elections were held under the New Order regime. The military and the government attempted all out efforts to assure the victory of their own sponsored party, Golkar. Democratic principles have been abandoned and certain groups in the society, the civil servants and people who work in state 167 related agencies, have no choice but to support the government party. Consequently Golkar won a landslide in every election by collecting more than 60 per cent of the popular vote. It eventually became the hegemonic party in the country while other parties play a peripheral role. The immediate result of elections under the New Order was the perpetuation of a strong executive with a full grip on political control. The government has gotten the chance to implement its policies, and therefore it has gained a more legitimate image among the voters. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy becomes very strong and uncontrollable. Almost all of its policies are unaccountable because of its intolerance of adopting different perspectives ideas. The government however at. one time saw its performance decline, losing in several areas to the Islamic party. The latter seems to be the principal rival of the government in every election so that the issue between Pancasila and Islam continues. Several districts (kabupaten) in East and Central Java are still consistent ly controlled by the Islamic party. This is an interesting phenomenon in a country in which the military and the bureaucracy are predominantly strong. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) still has not been able to perform as strong as the other two parties. Internal conflict among its party elites, the inability to find out a new rallying symbol, and so on, made it difficult for the PDI to compete against the other two parties. CHAPTER V VILLAGE OF YOGYAKARTA: THE SOCIO- ECOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTS Yogyakarta In Indonesia, Yogyakarta is unique. The region consists of almost three thousand square miles and was given the status of special autonomous region from the birth of the nation. The Sultanate of Yogyakarta has been allowed to sustain its throne while at the same time the Sultan, Hamengkubuwono IX, is the governor of the Special Province of Yogyakarta. During the revolutionary period (1945 - 1949), he played a prominent role in helping the creation of the independence state of the Republic of Indonesia. He continued to show strong leadership in national politics until he relinquished the Vice-Presidency in 1978. As a political entity, Yogyakarta was founded in the middle of the eighteenth century. With the support of a group of noblemen, Prince Mangkubumi rebelled against the Kingdom of Mataram in May 1746. The rebellion ended with a peace treaty, the Gyanti treaty, signed in February 1755, that divided Mataram into two political entities, Surakarta and 168 169 Yogyakarta. The latter was to be headed by Prince Mangkubumi who received the royal name of Hamengkubuwono. The new sultanate then built its capitol in Yogyakarta, then called originally from Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat (Selosoemardjan, 1962, pp. 10-13). Yogyakarta then became a center of Javanese culture. It is rich with cultural activities that revolve throughout the year. During the revolutionary period Yogyakarta became the Capital of the New Republic until the transfer of authority in 1949. Since Yogyakarta is part of Java, the people of Yogyakarta are Javanese who certainly share the same Javanese culture. The people, for instance, speak Javanese language but with a subtle difference compared with the rest of the Javanese. They are very proud of speaking in a particularly refined and gentle manner. It is therefore plausible, according to Selosoemardjan, to say that the people of Yogyakarta have a sub-culture that is distinct from other Javanese since "Yogyakarta has remained a self-ruling principality, retaining much of its old feudal structure which has existed since the advent of Dutch colonial power. The rest of Java has been ruled by alien powers without the intermediacy of indigeneous kinglike traditional heads," Selosoemardjan argued (p. xx). Yogyakarta is surrounded by the province of Central Java. The western part of its region is shared with the district of Purworedjo that was under the former residency of Kedu, while its northeast and east is also shared with its archrival, the residency of Surakarta. The Indian ocean is on the Southern edge of the region. In the most northern part of the province stands one of the most active volcanoes in the world, Mount Merapi, reaching about 3500 meters above sea level. This mountain provides a fertile soil for Yogyakarta, especially the districts of Sleman and Bantul. Two big rivers run parallel from north to south, the Progo and Opak. Hence it is believed that among the Yogyakartans that "No water runs north," Selosoemardjan said (p. 4), and the people in Yogyakarta will live in full prosperity if the two rivers can be connected with a waterworks that can be used for irrigation. The "Selokan Mataram" or Mataram waterworks, that connected the two rivers is in the final stages of completion when this study is conducted. The Special Province of Yogyakarta consists of five administrative semi-autonomous districts. The capital city is also Yogyakarta, bearing the same name as the Special Region. This is the only city in the province of Yogyakarta. Its administrative unit is called Kotamadya Yogyakarta. The rest of the region is divided into four Kabupateiis or Districts, that is, Bantul in the southcentral region, Gunungkidul in the southeast, Kulonprogo in the west, and Sleman in the north. 171 Each kabupaten Is divided into kecamatan or subdistricts, which then further divided into kalurahan or desa (village). Finally, the kalurahan is divided into padukuhan or hamlets. PppulaUpn Yogyakarta is perhaps one of the most densely populated regions in the world. According to the 1981 population census, 2,750,128 people reside on 2997.42 square kilometers of the province, or an average of 917 individuals per square kilometer. The City of Yogyakarta is the most densely populated with about 10.791 people per square kilometer (Table 5.1). Table 5.1 Distribution of Population in Yogyakarta aBBBSBBBBBSBBBBBBBBeBBSSBBtStSSBBBBBBBCBBBBSBBSBBBBBBSBBBBBSBBa Districts/City Areas in Sq.Km Tot.Pop.1980 Dens./Sqkm Yogyakarta 36.90 398.192 10.791 Bantul 419.04 634.442 1.514 Gunungkidul 1.428.61 659.486 462 Kulonprogo 558.22 580.442 682 Sleman 554.65 677.323 1.221 Province (DIY) 2.979.42 2.750.128 868 Source ; Biro Pusat Statistik, “Hasil Pencacahan Lenakap Sensus Penduduk Tahun 1980. Seri L Mo. 5, Jakarta, Mei, 1981, pp. 130 - 131 172 Because of the difference In natural resources more than half of the region's total population lives on one-third of the area, Yogyakarta, Bantul, and Sleman, while half of the population is scattered over the other two thirds of the area, Kulonprogo and Gunungkidul. Bantul and Sleman are more fortunate than the other two districts, because the former are located between the two rich irrigated valleys from the Progo to the Opak rivers that will be connected by the newly completed Mataram waterworks, or Selokan Mataram, while the majority of land in Gunungkidul and Kulonprogo is not well irrigated. The majority of the people in Yogyakarta are Muslims. The latest census indicates that 2,543,288 or 93 percent are Muslims, five percent (132.529) are Catholics, and about two percent (54.134) are members of the Protestant church. There are numbers of Hindu and Buddhist followers but their percentage is insignificant. The majority of the Catholics live in the city of Yogyakarta and the District of Sleman, while the followers of Hindu and Buddhism resides in the city of Yogyakarta and the district of Gunungkidul. The Villages Selosoemardjan defines village as "a territorial cluster of five or six hamlets (each hamlet includes 60 to 90 families) administered by an elected village headman with his 173 assistants, who functions as the head of one or sometimes two hamlets," (1962, p. 87). This study follows much of what has been illuminated by Selosoemardjan*s work. The National Statistical Bureau (BPS) reports that there are 556 villages or administrative units that are similar to villages in the province of Yogyakarta.1 However Selosoemardjan reported that in the early 1950s there were only 375 villages in the area (1962, p. 94). I believe that his account is more accurate than the official report of the BPS since the latter includes all administrative units that have similar administrative level with village in accordance with the Village Ordinance of 1979 concerning the lowest administrative unit in the country.2 Villages in The Colonial Period The village itself did not exist in Yogyakarta until 1918 when the land reform ordinance was implemented.3 Prior to 1918 the rural population was not organized in villages as administrative or political unit. The society was under the 1 . Buku Saku Statistik Indonesia (Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia), 1983, Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS), Jakarta, Indonesia, p. 3. 2 . This refers to the village ordinance No. 4, 1979, namely Undano-Undano No. 4/1979 Tentang Pemerintahan Desa dan Kalurahan. 3 . It was called Inlandsche Gemeente Ordonantie or IGO that regulated village administration in Java. In the Outer Islands was called Inlandsche Gemeente Ordonantie Bu itenoewesten (IGOB). 174 authority of the bekel, an appointed official who represented the prince who controlled certain lands under the appanage system. The bekel was in charge of collection taxes either in "natura" (rice) or in currency (money). Concerning the atmosphere of rural life in that period, Selosoemardjan noted that "The rural community at that time is here referred to as 'natural' since it was the natural gregariousness of the Javanese farmers which made them live in proximity to each other. They formed the community in the sociological sense, but they were not considered village communities in effect among its members; and there was no formal leader..." (1962, pp. 32-33). When the land reform law became effective in 1918 the kebekelan was abolished. Three or four of the kebekelans were formed a into village or desa. The desa was legally recognized as indigenous public authority at the lowest administrative unit and with elected officials of its own. Nevertheless, not all members of the community were given the franchise. Only the land proprietors had political rights, that is, the right to discuss political matters of the village in the village council. All landowners were members of the village council. The council itself was chaired by the lurah or village headman. The landless peasants and the women did not have political rights. The women was viewed as "kanca wingking" or companions in the 175 kitchen since their main duty was to prepare meals for men when discussion was conducted at the front porch or pendopo of the village headman's house. From Independence to Guided Democracy The revolutionary or independence period and its aftermath brought about great political change in rural areas. The newly independent republic was committed to democratic principles, including the administration of the Special Region of Yogyakarta, especially the young Sultan, Hamengkubuwono IX. In April 1946, the government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta issued a decree that abolished the old village council of landholders.4 The decree introduced a new legislative council in every village. Members of the council were male or female, 20 years of age or older, and were to have resided in the respective village at least six months. One member of the council would represent 100 residents, with a minimum of ten and a maximum of 30 representatives for each council. It is important to note that only heads of the households were granted the right to vote provided that they met the general requirements as mentioned above. Moreover, 4. Ordinance of the government of DIY of 11 April 1946, No. 16, article 2(2), as quoted by Selosoemardjan (1962, p. 91). only males were allowed to compete for executive positions in the village administration because of the certain perceptions of males on women in Java. The executive council consisted of the lurah as the village headman who is supported by five assistants. They were in charge of social, religious, welfare, and security affairs, plus a village clerk or carik who was in charge of daily administrative affairs of the village. In addition, the lurah was also assisted by several kepala dukuhs or heads of the hamlets. The kepala dukuh actually played an intermediary role between the lurah and the community. Another noteworthy institution was the Majelis Desa or Village Assembly. Members of this assembly were all eligible voters in the village. It had its own chairman and secretary that were independent of both the village council and the village executive council. The village assembly had the right of final decision if there was a conflict between the executive and legislative branch. Concerning the relation ship between these institutions Selosoemardjan wrote: The village legislative council had the right to demand an account from the village executive council of the performance of its duties. And if the executive council could not satisfy the legislature, the latter could decide to pass a vote of nonconfidence which, if accepted by the executive council, must lead to the latter's resignation. If the executive council did not accept the legislature's vote of nonconfidence, either of the two parties could submit the conflict to a higher authority, the Maielis Desa or Village Assembly, which had the power to pass the final verdict. (1962, p. 91-92). Ill The structure of village administration can be shown as follow: Panewu . _ 7 L_ Village Assembly Village LURAH Council Assistants Kepala Dukuh Ficiure 3: The Structure of village Government in The Post-Independent Period. Source : Adapted from Selosoemardjan, Social Chance In Yocrvakarta. 1962, Cornel University Press, p. 419 178 The pattern of political and administrative arrangements did not undergo radical changes at any time during the period of Guided Democracy. It is important to note that under the Soekarno regime, the central government did not penetrate the village bureaucracy. It was indeed during this period that the villages enjoyed great autonomous capacity. The new local government laws5 even gave far greater autonomy to every local government throughout the country. Nevertheless, the village administration was highly politicized because of the ability of political parties to penetrate rural areas. The communist party (PKI), for example, gained much support at the village level because it exploited important issues concerning peasant's life such as land reform. The other parties had less success than the PKI but were able also to counter some movement of the PKI to protect their masses. Village officials then became affiliated with certain political parties. So did the village councils or DPR desa (Selosoemardjan, 1962, pp. 202-212). Consequently, both the government apparatus and the community became highly divisible because of the animosity between the competing parties, especially between the PNI, PKI, and the Islamic parties of Masyumi and NU. 5 . The law No. 1, 1957 bearing the name of Undang Undanq No. 1. tahun 1957 Tentana Otonomi Daerah. or The Laws on Regional Autonomy No.l, 1957. President Soekarno then modified the laws with the passage of Presidential Decree No. 6, 1959. 179 Villages Under The_New_Order Government The New Order regime's attitude toward village administration has been completely different from its predecessor. Proponents of the New Order believe that the system of highly politicized villages needed to be abandoned since it did not help to provide a good environment for economic development. Hence, the process of depolitization of rural life was an inevitable policy objective for a development minded government. It is done through, first, the concept of "floating mass," in which no political parties are allowed to actively recruit members in rural areas. Second, even though they are elected, all village officials in Yogyakarta were required to join the Association of Home Affairs Employees, or Kokarmendagri, which then became the core unit of the Civil Service Association or KORPRI (Ken Ward, 1974). Moreover, the process of government centralization at all levels is quite apparent. The old laws regulating the relationship between the central and local government were replaced with new laws. The local government completely lost most of its autonomy, and for the first time since independence a new village ordinance was enacted, Law No. 4, 1979 on the Structure of Administration of the Desa and its equivalents. The penetration of the national bureaucracy into village life has become highly visible. The implementation of central 180 government development policies demands a cohesive and efficient village administration. The "Green Revolution," rural credit, family planning, and other centrally designed, funded and administered programs required a full control of the village apparatus to mobilize the mass population to accomplish program goals but at the same time required that no other groups penetrate the village to insure tranquality. In political terms, the central government made massive efforts to ensure the support of the rural population for GOLKAR. The Sub-District army commands, KORAMIL, the police officers were to ensure the allegiance of village heads or lurahs as Ken Ward (1974) revealed in his study of the 1971 Elections in East Java.6 Another noted change in village administration was the demise of its representative body, the Village Assembly. The Lembaga Musyawarah Desa or village assembly was replaced with The Resilience Body of the Village Community, popularly known as Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa or LKMD. This body is expected to give advice to the lurah but the latter does not bear any responsibility to the LKMD. He is directly responsible to the bupati or district officer through the sub-district office. Finally, it is important to note that all village officials in Yogyakarta are still directly elected by the people. All villagers, male or female, 17 years of age or 6 . Even though Ward's field study was in East Java, his assertions in especially page 91 was parallel with the case of other villages in Java. 181 already married and a resident of the village for at least one year, have the right to vote. To be elected to a village position, a person must be at least 21 years of age and have finished primary school. Those officials are not given a regular salary but have the right to control land (lungguh), that is, the land set aside for use by officials during their term of office. The lurah can remain in his office for eight years and can be reappointed for another eight years. The structure of village administration under the New Order is shown in Figure 4. Conclusion Throughout this analysis one can discern significant changes in the village, especially village administration, in Yogyakarta, from an isolated social and political unit to a highly politicized community under Guided Democracy, and then to highly bureaucratized community under the New Order regime. Unlike villages in other parts of the country, or even in Java, villages in Yogyakarta are unique in the sense that the government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta is still committed to the implementation of democratic values in village politics. This is especially the case when all village officials are directly elected by the village community. 182 Sub-District Officer LKMD LURAH Kepala Dukuh Ficrure 4 ; The Structure of Village Government During The New Order Period. Notes : 1. Assistant for Social Affairs 2. Assistant for Welfare 3. Village Clerk 4. Assistant for security Affairs 5. Assistant for Religious Affairs. PLEASE NOTE: Duplicate page numbers. Text follows. Filmed as received. University Microfilms International 183 conclusion Throughout this analysis one can discern significant changes in the village, especially village administration, in Yogyakarta, from an isolated social and political unit to a highly politicized community under Guided Democracy, and then to highly bureaucratized community under the New Order regime. Unlike villages in other parts of the country, or even in Java, villages in Yogyakarta are unique in the sense that the government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta is still commited to the implementation of democratic values in village politics. this is. especially the case when all village officials are directly elected by the village community. CHAPTER VI RESEARCH SITE: THE VILLAGES OF BROBANTI Introduction This chapter is devoted to the description of individual villages in which field research was actually conducted. Those villages are located in the sub-district of Brobanti, and are denoted as the villages of Sukaramai, Sukadamai, and Sukamulya. The analysis is mostly based on aggregate data that were collected during field research in those areas and at the sub-district office. It is interesting to note that each village makes a yearly report to the province on a standardized form provided by the Office of Rural Development of the Department of Home Affairs. The form provides good data on a wide range of characteristics of the village.2 1. Since the subject of this study is political behavior the real name of the sub-district and those villages are concealed for the purpose of protecting villages and individuals from further scrutiny by higher offices. 2. One should be cautious with the use of this kind of information since there is an inclination among village officials to provide good reports to make a better impression. The calcula-tion of Income Percapita, for example! seems to be very arbit- rary, and it is very difficult for those officials to provide accurate and reliable information since their level of training is relatively low. 183 184 Brobanti is located in the district of Kulonprogo about 25 kilometers southwest of the city of Yogyakarta. To reach * the villages, the visitor has to cross the Progo river over the newly built longest bridge in Java. The bridge also connects the districts of Bantul and Kulonprogo. The "spirit" of development seems to have touched those villages since communication is not a problem. A smooth asphalt road from the city of Yogyakarta through Bantul district is well maintained. Public transportation such as small pick up trucks and minibuses are available during the day to the district's capitol, Wates, the city of Bantul, and Yogyakarta. All three villages lie within five miles of each other in the lowland area. The southernmost of those villages directly faces the waves of Indian ocean. From Sukadamai village, for example, people can hear the thundering ocean waves, especially during the monsoon period. Every unit of land is cultivated. Irrigated paddy fields are planted two or three times a year, and in designated areas the peasants grow sugarcane for the sugar industry about fifteen miles away. The sugarcane factory belongs to the Sultan of Yogyakarta. Sukaramai village This village is the "capital" of Brobanti sub-district. Compared to other villages in the sub-district, Sukaramai has 185 an "urban" flavor since one can observe shops,a market, schools, and offices for both the civilian and military services, as well as the police. Sukaramai is a village of about 223 hectares of land. About 94 hectares are fully cultivated, especially for rice production, using a semiirrigated system. With average of 3000 milimeters rainfall each year, and combined with selected seeds, it is possible to cultivate the land for three crops a year. It is understandable that the majority of the population make a living as farmers and farm laborers. The 1984 village statistics indicate that there are 4445 people living in Sukaramai of which 47.7 percent are male and 52.3 percent are female. 695 (15.6%) are registered as children up to five years of age, 26.2 percent are in the age of 6 to 15 years, 17.5 percent between 16 to 25 years of age, 30.6 percent between 25 to 55 years, and about ten percent are 56 years old or older. Among those children, 14.5 percent are of school age. In terms of religious orientation, 96 percent of the people of Sukaramai are registered Muslims. The reformist Muhammadiyah social organization seems to have very strong adherence in this village, since the organization is active in providing social services, especially in education. There are quite a few Catholics with two percent of the population (106) belonging to the denomination. A small church can be seen when one passes along the village main road. 186 The village statistics indicate that 31.4 percent of the adults are fanners, 21 percent are farm laborers, and only 9.2 percent are tenant farmers. Landownership seems to vary. Although the majority of households claim landowner status, 611 of them control between 0 - .25 hectare of land, 29 households own an average of .50 hectare, 16 households control up to one hectare, 9 households claim to have more than one hectare, and only 5 families own two hectares or more. Since the village has an urban flavor, occupations also are quite varied. 126 of the people are engaged in retailing activities. There are also 388 civil servants (school teachers, office clerks, etc.), eight barbers, nineteen tailors, and seventeen people engaged in "service" activities, such as bicycle and motorcycle repair. Development activities that have been launched by the New Order regime seem to have had a positive impact on Sukaramai. In almost all indicators, the village has shown signs of improving. If the village statistics are accurate and reliable, income percapita in 1980, for example was 108 thousands rupiah. It went up to 288 thousands rupiah in 1984.3 Housing stock has strikingly improved. In 1980 only 574 houses were made of brick, the figure had risen to 827 by 1984. Furthermore, there are 14 small pick up trucks and 9 3 . In 1980 one US dollar was equal to 645 rupiahs, and in 1984 was rupiahs. 187 trucks, one sedan, 97 motorcycles not in use in Sukaramai. The figures become more impressive when considering 135 radios and 53 television sets are included. Education has also improved. In addition to the existence of primary (6) and secondary schools, the village also has two high schools. In 1980, 295 people have a high school diploma or equivalent, and 23 people have graduated from college. These figures increased to 335, and 34, respectively, by 1984, and 32 of the people graduated from a university. In the past, Sukaramai was a village with a mix of several contending political parties, especially Masyumi, PNI, and the PKI. However since the 1970s the process of bureaucratization and depoliticization has proceeded in Sukaramai, so that the government sponsored party, Golkar, now dominates the entire political arena. Only the Islamic party has been able to challenge Golkar, but never with great success. In the 1977 national election, for example, Golkar received 53.5 percent of the vote, the Islamic party gained only 25.6 percent, and the Democratic party 20.9 percent of 2037 popular votes. In 1982, Both Golkar and PPP improved their standings, to 55.1 and 26.3 percent, respectively, while the PDI fell to 18.6 percent. It is very difficult for the two parties to challenge Golkar since quite a number of both active and retired civil servants live in this village. The high visibility of the 188 army and police officers, as well as the district officers seem to play an important role in boosting Golkar's influence. Sukadamai village Compared to the other two villages under study, Sukadamai is relatively more isolated. Visitors must travel a crude and muddy road about two miles from Sukaramai. Entering the village the road and village path is very narrow. Nevertheless cars and motorcycles can reach the village. The latest statistics indicate that 4777 people reside in Sukadamai. Among them, 51.6 percent are female and 49.4 are males that occupied 1156 households. Only 9.0 percent of the population are children under five years, 26.0 percent are between 6 to 15 years old, and 52.0 percent are between 16 to 55 years old, while 13.0 percent are 56 years old or older. Sukadamai is a village of 603.5 hectares. Approximately 238 hectares of land are fully cultivated under rice production, and about 45.8 hectares are unirrigated land. According to village statistics, less than half of the households (43.5%) own irrigated land. Among the household landowners, 302 have less than .50 hectares, 138 own between .60 to 1.00 hectare, 63 families have more than one hectare, and only one family is reported to have more than two hectares of irrigated land. ,189 There was no report on the level of literacy of the village, but education seems to be a priority among the people. 1244 of the villagers finished secondary school, 319 * graduated from high school, and 59 individuals graduated from a four-year college. To continue school beyond the primary level, the people from Sukadamai have to send their children to the neighboring areas, such as Sukadamai, the district of Bantul, and the city of Yogyakarta. As in other villages, the people of Sukadamai depend upon farming; therefore, farming is the major occupation of the village, with 1525 farmers, 340 tenant farmers, and 242 farm laborers. Nevertheless, there are 240 villagers registered as civil servants (school teachers and office clerks), 112 of them involved in poultry, and 45 people are small retailers. In Sukadamai one can also find two blacksmiths, 25 carpenters, eight barbers, and thirteen tailors. Even though this southernmost village of the study is near the Indian ocean, no one wants to be a fisherman because the ocean is too dangerous to be easily exploited. Almost all of the people are Muslims(99.8%). However, there are nine members of other denominations, five Catholics and four Christians. There were no reports that people of Sukadamai hold any other religious beliefs. It is difficult to assess the "stage" of development of Sukadamai. Physical appearance seems, except village roads, to indicate that the village is very well developed; 85 190 percent of the house are brickhouses, and only 12 percent are with bamboo roofs. It Is reported that there were 128 # motorcycles in 1984, 130 radios, and 26 television sets. These figures had increased from 102, 112, and 15, respectively, in 1982.4 In terms of political affairs, bureaucratic officials label Sukadamai as "stubborn" village, since it was very hard for the bureaucracy to penetrate and "Golkarize" the village.5 In the 1977 general elections, the Islamic party, PPP, won popular support with 45.8 percent of the votes, followed by Golkar with 36.2 percent, and the PDI with 18.0 percent of the votes. In the 1982 elections, however, Golkar won the contest with 49.0 percent of the votes, the Islamic party with 39.7 percent, and the PDI with only 11.3 percent of the votes. Several bureaucrats complained that there are quite a number of Islamic leaders who are highly respected in the village.5 4.The lurah and other village officials informed me that Sukadamai was nominated by the district officer to represent the district in an annual competition (lomba desa) for the award as the village with the best development record in 1986. Unfortunately I did not follow information on what village won the award. 5 .Personnal discussion with Brobanti Sub-District officer, January 16, 1986. 5 . This account is based on personal interviews with local bureaucrats. 191 Sukamulva Village It is not difficult to reach Sukamulya. A smooth asphalt road connects the village with the outside world. It is only twenty kilometers from the city of Wates, and about 30 kilometers from Yogyakarta. Sukamulya is smaller than Sukadamai but still larger than Sukaramai. It is a village of 565 hectares, but more than half, 300 hectares, is cultivated irrigated land. The rest of the land is consumed for housing, village roads, and cemetery. There are 6960 people living in Sukamulya. Like the other two villages, women outnumber men, with almost 52 percent of the population being female. Among those individuals, 12.8 percent are children up to five years of age, 12 percent are of school age, 11.9 percent between the age of 13 to 18, and 63.2 percent are adults. Village statistics indicate that only 54 adults are illiterate. More than half of the population (51 %) finished primary school, 12 percent finished secondary school, about seven percent graduated from high school, and almost one percent (67) graduated from college. These figures reveal that the people ' of Sukamulya are quite aware of the importance of education. There are 1166 farmers tending their own land in Sukamulya. In addition, there are also 196 tenant farmers and 689 farm laborers. Furthermore, it is reported that 249 192 people are Involved in retail businesses, 296 people are civil servants (school teachers and office clerks), and several other people work as artisans, tailors, barbers, and motorcycle as well as bicycle repair. Land ownership seems to be quite varied. The village statistics indicate that 1237 households have irrigated land of less than .25 hectare, 26 households have land of about .50 hectare, only three households have land of about one hectare, and another three families have more than one hectare but still less than three hectares. In 1981, the Minister of Home Affairs recognized Sukamulya as one of the best villages in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, since the village had been able to exceed other villages in the region in terms of development activities. It is apparent that the rhythm of development has indeed touched Sukamulya. Almost all houses, for example, are built of brick, except 30 that are still traditional bamboo houses. Electricity is spreading in Sukamulya, and there are 55 houses that have electricity. Further statistics indicate that in the village there are 11 pickups, 4 trucks, 190 motorcycles, 383 radios, and 110 television sets. Sukamulya is a stronghold of the Islamic party. The government party, Golkar, has never won an election in this village. In the 1977 general elections, 69.2 percent of the voters supported the Islamic party, PPP, while Golkar received only 22.9 percent of the votes, and the PDI gained 193 only 7.9 percent out of 3126 registered voters. In the 1982 elections, Golkar increased its support to 31.3 percent of the votes, while the PPP still prevailed with 62.1 percent, and the PDI gained only 6.5 percent of the popular votes in the village. This is another "stubborn" village as the bureaucrats say. The spirit of Islamic fundamentalism can be found in this village particularly among younger people. It was reported that some of them joined the fundamentalist movement "Komando Jihad," and government security officials have to watch the situation in this village closely. The village headman recognized that it is very difficult for Golkar to gain more votes in the village because quite a number of the people are fanatic Muslims. "I told the bupati (district officer) that my target is only 30 percent of the vote. There is nothing I can do. I have to campaign against Kyai Ahmad and Mr. Astari. Both of them are very powerful and members of the DPRD Kulonprogo," the headman said on one occasion.7 7 . Personal interview with the lurah of Sukamulya on December 6, 1986. He stressed this point on several other encounters with him at his office. 194 Conclusion Throughout the analysis I have described the characteristics of the primary villages of study. From the analysis one can see that each village has its own character, although all of them are rural and agricultural in orientation. The village of Sukaramai has an urban flavor and is mostly dominated by the government party Golkar. Sukadamai is relatively isolated and less "developed," while Sukamulya is well developed and solely dominated by the Islamic party, PPP. Further analysis will uncover the principal differences in characteristics of these villages as related to electoral behavior which is the main focus of this study. CHAPTER VII THE SOCIO-RELIGIOUS PROFILE, THE GROWTH OF PARTISAN SUPPORT AND VOTING IN THE VILLAGE OF BROBANTI SUB-DISTRICT Introduction This chapter attempts to apply Geertz's conception of Javanese social structure— that is, the distinction between santri and abangan— in the villages of Brobanti. The priyayi variant will not be included since this group is not so distinct in rural Java, especially in the areas of my research. The chapter attempts to identify the profile of socio-religious orientation by looking at the behavior of the respondents. It will be followed by the analysis of the growth of religious orientation by looking at the pattern of socialization and the development of partisan support. Political socialization focuses on the question of how groups and individuals develop and maintain their identity as well as how that identity is related to party support or voting. 195 196 The Santri-Abancan_ in Brobanti The Scale of Religious Orientation What are the principal differences between the abangan and santri? What behavior makes them distinct from one another? The answer to these questions is their relationship with Islam. Geertz observed that the abangan and santri are principally distinct in two areas. First, the abangan do not take Islam seriously but are "fascinated with ritual detail," while the santri are concerned solely with Islam as a guiding light in every day life. The doctrine, for the santri, overshadows the ritualistic aspects of Islam. Second, the two groups are different in their basic social unit. For the abangan, their basic social unit is the household and it is the ritual "slametan" that holds together the abangan community. "It is food from separate kitchens brought together, rather than food from a common kitchen divided up," (p.128). For the santri, the ummat, or Islamic community is the basic social unit.1 1.From his observation Geertz wrote that "Islam is seen as a set of concentric circles, wider and wider communities-- Hojokuto Java, Indonesia, the whole Islamic world spreading away from the individual santri where he stands, a great society of equal believers. Constantly repeating the name of the Prophet, going through the prayers, chanting the Koran"(1960, p.126). This doctrine, I believe, is drived from the pronouncement fHadits) of the Prophet Muhammad saying that "All Muslims are brothers, and it is not indeed Muslim if they do not love each other." 197 Like Geertz, a leading Indonesian cultural anthropologist, Koentjaraningrat, divides the Javanese Muslims into two groups, syncretics and puritans. In explaining the difference between these two groups Koentjaraningrat writes that: "Many of these Javanese, however, do not follow the principles or 'cornerstones' of Islam, the rukun (pillars) Islam seriously. They do not, for example, perform the five daily shalat or incantations, nor the weekly shalatul Jum'at. Neither do they consider ously the strong Moslem taboo against eating pork, and many do not have desire to perform the hajji, or pilgrimage to Mecca. Many Javanese, however, do fast during the month of Pasa or Ramadhan...... They firmly believe in God (Allah), and like Moslems in General, they believe that Muhammad is Allah's Prophet. They also believe that if they lead a good life their soul will go to heaven (Munggah Swarai), but leading a bad life will bring them to hell (Neraka). They are aware that Islam has a sacred book which contains Allah's words. Most of them even now the name Koran f and each of them has at least once in his life pronounced the Moslem confession of faith, the A1 Fatihah. that is, at his circumcision ceremony. However...these Javanese Moslems also believe in a great many other religious concepts, supernatural beings, and powers, and they also perform many religious ceremonies, which have little connection with the official religious doctrine of Islam" (1985, p.317). By looking at both the Geertz and Kuntjaraningrat explanations, a scale of socio-religious orientation for the respondents in this study, the villagers of Brobanti, was developed. Following the procedures of calculation of individual score described in Chapter II the respondents were divided into six categories as follows: 198 - Those with the score of between 0.00 - 1.50 were Included in weak abangan and santri. - Those with the score of between 1.60 - 2.50 were the moderate abangan and santri. - Those with the score of between 2.60 - 4.00 were the abangan and santri. The Religious Profile From the outset it should be recognized that it was very difficult to get information from a complex society in rural Java. Most Javanese are reluctant to reveal much about themselves because it is against their tradition. An individual who talks about him/herself is considered as "umuk" or snobby. Hence a low profile is much preferred than any revealing social behavior. The Javanese political culture, in Giacomo Sani's terms (1983), is a reticent culture. The task becomes more difficult when the respondents are suspicious of being contacted by people from outside of their environment, especially from the priyayi of the urban class.2 Moreover, discussing politics is part of the social taboo in most rural areas since the 2 .My student assistants who did most of the interviews told me that the villagers thought that they were officials from either the loeda fthe local land tax office) or from thr sub-district office. Usually after a long personal introductory session combined with a letter from the lurah they would feel secure and became cordial. 199 people have come to believe that politics has always been negative or "anti-development" which eventually means anti government, subversion, or the like. It is not surprising that all of the respondents claimed that they are Muslims.3 Among the 570 respondents, 33.7% (186) can be identified as abangan, and 66.3% (364) belong to the santri group. Among the abangan, 26.34% (49) can be categorized as strong abangan, 27.42% (51) are the moderate abangan, and 46.24% (86) are the weak abangan. Among the santri, 25.96% can be categorized as weak santri, 33.06% as moderate santri, and 40.98% are the strong santri identifiers. It is interesting to note that it is not difficult to determine whether a respondent is abangan or santri. Very often they so consider themselves. On one occasion I met a middle aged villager from Sukamulya. After a long personal introduction I noted the following discussion: - Agaminipun manopo pak? (What is your religion sir?) + Nggih Islam den (Yeah, Islam sir) - Mestinipun sholat nggih (Do you practice sholat?) + Mboten, aras-arasan. Kulo puniko mboten ngertos Islam (No sir, I am just lazy, I do not know about Islam) - Tanggi tanggi nipun pripun pak? (How about your neighbour?) + Manawi puniko santri sadaya. Nek kulo niki abangan kemawon (They are all santri. I am just only an abangan).4 3 .Originally 600 respondents were randomly selected. Thirty of them were Christians, and they were dropped from the sample since only Muslims are included in the sample. The concept of abangan and santri only dealt with the Muslims. 4 .Personal interview with a villager from Sukamulya on the way back to the city of Yogyakarta, Thursday December 22,1986. 200 The same phenomenon can be discerned among the santri in those villages. An encounter with another middle aged peasant, a father of three, from the village of Sukadamai revealed the followings: - Panjenengan agaminipun Islam, nggih (Sir, is your religion Islam?) + Ya, Inggih (Yes, Sir) - Sholatipun ajeg mboten (Do you pray regularly or not? + Ya, inggih, kudu ajeg (Yes sir, must be regular) - Mestinipun santri nggih (Are you a santri?) + Mboten ngertos kulo. Manawi Islam nggih Islam. Sholat kudu sholat. Pasa ya kudu pasa. Tiyang Islam puniko kudu sholat, puniko perintahipun agama (I do not know. Yes I am a Muslim. I should sholat. I should do the fasting. The Muslim people have to pray (sholat), because our religion asks us to do so) - Kepingin munggah kaji mboten (Do you want to go to Mecca?) + Manawi gadah arto, nggih kepingin banget (If I have the money, yes, I really want to)5 . From the above encounters one can observe the pattern of religious orientation between abangan and santri in those villages. The question is what is the primary cause of those differences in religious orientation? One possible explanation is found in the differences in the process of socialization which I will develop in the following analysis. 5 .Meeting a respondent (with one of my student assistants) on December 24, 1986. at Sukadamai village. The student carried out most of the discussion since my Javanese is not as good as theirs. All of my students reported that the interviews were mostly done in a combination of ngoko(low level) and kromo madya (middle level), with some initial politteness in kromo inggil(high level) Javanese language. 201 Political Socialization and The Growth of Partisan Choice and Loyalty The study of socialization in rural Java is very challenging since it is a neglected field. Neither Indonesians nor foreign specialists have given significant attention to how the Javanese acquired political norms and values such as, for example, Almond and Verba (1965) have done. As a frontrunner in studying Javanese culture, Geertz in his monumental work, The Religion of Java, shed some light on socialization processes by explaining the slametan proceedings, for example. Hildred Geertz (1961) then provided a more detailed analysis in her work on The Javanese Family. This was followed by Donald Emmerson's (1976) attempt to explain the pattern of political socialization and political behavior among the Javanese elites. A more thorough analysis, based mostly on personal experience, has been conducted by Supomo (1984), and Kuntjaraningrat developed a more contemporary account of socialization in rural Java (1985). Except in Emmerson's work, none of these studies discussed the pattern of political socialization among Javanese families, and therefore, they lack empirical data.6 6 .Stephen A. Douglas, however, did conduct a survey research study of political socialization in Indonesia. But this work was designed for urban political activists. It also did not clearly reveal the pattern of political socialization. For further analysis please see his work Political Socialization inlndonesia.(Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970). 202 In this study, the influence of family on individual behavior and partisan choice in the villages of Brobanti is carefully studied. It is designed to discover the pattern of authority relationships within the Javanese family by looking at the paths individuals follow in acquiring values and norms, especially concerning religion. This analysis reveals different, patterns of authority relationships between the abangan and the santri communities. In doing so, three principal questions were asked of the respondents. Do their parents teach them about religion? Do the parents ask them to go to the mosque or prayer house (langgar) regularly? And, do the parents ask them to always follow religious teachings in every day life?. The pattern of response among the respondents are quite different. The santri people are inclined to respond positively to the above questions, while the abangan respond negatively as shown in Table 7.1. 203 Table 7.1 Percentage of Parents Influence in Inducing Religious Values Abangan Santri Items (N-186) (N=384) Yes No Yes No l.Do your parents always teach you on religious matter facama Islam)? 28.00% 72.00% 93.70% 6.30% 2.Do your parents ask you to go to mosque/langgar or to pray regularly? 27.40 72.60 97.30 2.70 3.Do your parents ask you to always follow religious teachings in every day 32.80 62.70 98.60 1.40 The above table clearly indicates the strong influence of the santri parents toward their offsprings for inducing religious (Islamic) values, while the abangan parents do not perform as the santri do. A question then arises concerning the strength of the influence of the parents. In answering this question, the respondents were asked about the strength of their parents' influence. The division of opinion between the abangan and the santri seems to be very clear. In the first item, the majority of the abangan (69.3%) said their parents occasionally or seldom taught them about Islamic/ religious teachings, while a great majority (85.1%) of the santri said their parents often or very often taught them 204 about religious principles.7 The average score of parent's influence for the abangan is 2.10 while for the santri is 3.15. "Do your parents always ask you to go to mosque/langgar or to pray regularly?" Among the abangan respondents, 58.8% said that their parents seldom/occasionally asked them to pray or to go to mosques/langgar regularly, while only 16.9% of the santri belongs to the similar category, and 83.1% of the santri revealed that their parents urged them to do so. The average score of the santri is 3.12 while for the abangan is 2.39. The same pattern of response was shown in the last item, when they were asked "Do your parents always ask you to follow religious teachings?" About 50.8% of the abangan said that parents occasionally or seldom urged them to follow religious lines, while 49.2% revealed that their parents were always concerned whether their children followed religious lines. And for the santri people 84.7% gave a positive answer, while only 15.2% said that their parents only occasionally urged them to follow religious lines (table 7.2). The above 7.What I mean by religious principles in this analysis concerns the main pillars of Islam (Rukun Islam), such as the Confession of faith (fiyahadat), Regular Prayer Five Times a Day (Shalat), Fasting During the Month of Ramadhan (Puasa), Paying Alms (Membavar Zakat Fitrah), and Making the Pilgrimage to Mecca for the able (Hajji). The first item is intent to reveal whether the parents teach their children, for example, how to do the Shalat. how to conduct the fast, and how to correctly make the Confession of Faith (Svahadat). 205 information indicates that both the abangan and the santri parents are concerned with their offsprings' religious behavior. Table 7.2 Percentage of The Degree of Parents Influence !BSeSBBSSBSBBBBaBBBBBBBSBBBaBSSSSSSS&&fiBeS8BSSe Abangan Santri Items VO Of Oc Sid Nv VO Oft Occ Sid Nv (4) (3) (2) (1) (1) (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) #1 7.3 13.4 30.8 38.5 _ 37 .3 47.8 7. 9 7. 0 - (N“52) (N=343) #2 18.0 31.1 24.6 26.2 — 40. 7 44.0 7.2 8.0 - (N=51) (N=361) #3 23..5 17.6 33. 3 25. 5 - 39 .0 44.1 6. 5 10 .4 - (N=61) (N=379) Note: For item #1, the Mean(X) score for the abangan is 2 . 1 , while for the santri is 3.25 For item #2, the Hean(X) score for the abangan is 2.09, for the santri is 3.17. For item #3, the Mean(X) score for the abangan is 2.39, for the santri is 3.12. Concerning specifically political socialization previous studies conducted by Hildred Geertz (1961) and Douglas (1970) indicated that children in Javanese families were unsocialized to the political world because most parents do not include their children in the decision making process at home. The same phenomenon can also be found in Brobanti.8 B .What Hildred Geertz and Stephen Douglas meant was that in rural Java children are not exposed to the inculcation of democ ratic values such as discussion on family affairs and involvement in family's decision making process. 206 In this study there were four indicators for the patterns of political socialization. The respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the four following statements: 1. Hy parents always decided the type of school I was going to enter, when I was young. 2. When I got married my parents chose my husband/ wife to be. 3. Hy parents never discussed with me our problems at home, when I was young. 4. When I was young, we never discussed politics at home. The pattern of response of both the abangan and santri were similar, the very strong influence of parents in the decision process and the low level of political experience of individuals (Table 7.3). As the table indicates, the respondents almost overwhelmingly approved the above statements which means that it is the elder's who dominate completely the decision process. In the most extreme case, almost three-fourths (73.1%) of the respondents strongly agreed that their marriage had been arranged by their parents. It seems to confirm that tradition is still to be maintained in determining whom an individual will marry. It is also important to note that the average score of respondent's index of support is 3.0 which means that it is very high. 207 Table 7.3 Percentage of Respondent's Perception on Parents Influence Items Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Do Not Agree Disagree Know #1 (N=552)* 41.7% 35.3 15.4 7.6 _ #2 (N=379) 73.1 12.9 8.4 5.5 - #3 (N=570) 40.4 38.4 12.9 8.3 - #4 (N=570) 43.7 32.6 14.5 9.2 — Note : The average scores of the above items are 3.11, 3.5, 3.11, and 3.11, respectively. For the items see page 206 *The missing data are not included Only for the respondents who are married Table 7.4 Percentage of Respondent's Perception on Parents Influence by Socio-religious Orientation Abangan Santri Items SA A DA SDA DK 1 SA A DA SDA DK #1 48.9 25.3 17.3 8.6 _ I 38.0 40.4 14.8 7.1 ** #2 46.8 28.5 15.6 9.1 - I 37.2 43.4 9.5 7.9 - #3 72.7 9.3 11.7 6.3 - 1 73.3 14.7 4.8 5.2 - #4 51.1 22.6 16.7 9.7 — ! 39.9 37.7 13.4 9.0 - Note : The abangan's average scores on the above items are 3.15, 3.13, 3,48, and 3.15, respectively; while the santri's average scores are 3.09, 3.10, 3.56, and 3.08, respectively. For the items see page 206. It is indeed true in Java, as elsewhere in Indonesia, that children are well protected by their parents. Children are also expected to conform to the Javanese value system(ni awani). They must behave accordingly, respecting 208 older people, and are not supposed to directly confront their parents or the elders whenever they have disagreement. "Never did I dare to discuss It with the family. I always thought that, as a child, I had no right to do that; my mother had forbidden me to speak to grown-ups. Children must listen quietly. When there were guests, I had to stay in my room or play outside and not be included in things," one notable Indonesian writer said reflecting his childhood experience (Ayip Rosyidi, 1968, p.86). In Javanese homes, the terms such as ora elok (not good), ora wanaun (not proper), and other oras (nots) are inculcated over time in the offspring. This does not mean that children are not allowed to have or to acquire experiences of their own. Parents in Java as Koentjaraningrat(1985) pointed out, do indeed encourage their children to interact with the social environment outside of the house. This is what Kuntjaraningrat called "diounumbar.1,9 especially after school hours. They play with their favorite friends, enjoy kite fighting (layanaan), and engage in other social interactive and learning situations. Nevertheless quite a number of children in rural areas are valuable for the family in strict economic terms. They help their parents by herding family's cattle, look after younger brothers and 9.Literally dipunumbar means to set free. In the context of socialization children in rural Java are allowed to play outside of their home (such as fishing, hunting birds, making toys, and so on) and are free to choose friends. 209 sisters, or collect dry wood for cooking. Through the process of dlpunumbar. the abangan and santri follow different paths of socialization experiences. Among Muslims, religious institutions such as the langgar or prayer house, and mosque play a dominant role in shaping individual personality and behavior. Next to the home experience, this institution is the basic unit of education. At the mosque or langgar children learn the Arabic alphabet and recite verses of the Koran. The Islamic teacher (kyai) tells them religious stories about the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate followers, the story of heaven and hell, as well other religious stories of the glorious Islamic past. Moreover, the langgar/mosque plays a unique social function, because the children gathering together everyday eventually come to realize that they are part of the Islamic community or ummat. The spirit of comraderie grows in this kind of environment especially when the kyais inculcate this kind of spirit among members of the ummat.10 The Javanese abangan community, however, do not have such an institution. By and large they are hesitant to join gatherings at their langgar/mosque because of the long 10.My personal experiences in the very strong Islamic community in Bima, West Nusatenggara, indeed reflects the process of inculcating Islamic values from the prayer house. The children were required to fill up the mosque's water basin, take care of the mosque's bedug (large drum) during Ramadhan (the fasting month), clean the yard, and so on. These experiences and duties had very important values in the socialization process. accepted beliefs that the langgar belongs to the santri. This does not mean that they are totally alienated from the langgar/mosque. Among the 570 respondents, 76.6% said that they go to langgar regularly, while 23.4% revealed they do not go regularly. Among those who go to langgar/mosque regularly, 13.5% of them are included in the abangan category. There nonetheless seems to be a close association between religious orientation and the frequency of going to langgar/mosque, as shown in Table 7.5. Table 7.5 The Degree of Going to the Mosque/Langgar Frequency of Socio-religious Orientation Going to Langgar ------or Mosque Abangan Santri Very Often 1.61% 28.39% Often 11.29 29.95 Occasional 9.68 18.49 Seldom 8.06 23.18 Never 69.35 00.00 Total 100.00% 100.00% (N=186) (N=364) Note t Chi Square significant at .001 (X2 c.001), Tau^ = .171 211 The above table clearly Indicates that santri people are more devoted in undertaking religious activity than the abangan. A very high proportion of the santri revealed that they go to langgar/mosque regularly compared to the low proportion of the abangan people.11 Socialization and Politleal/Voting Preference The question then becomes how is this religious orientation translated to individual political preference? Does it really shape individual political choices when it comes to making decisions in voting? Do parents still have a strong influence on their children when they decide to join a political organization?. Studies in the Western world demonstrated that parents quite often have an influence on their children in the development of party identification. According to this theory, party ID is acquired prior to adolescence (Hess and Torney,1967, p.90; Greenstein, 1965, p.73), then it becomes stable and to some extent reinforced. The proportion of parental influence, however, declines when the children pass adolescece, and they become more independent of their parents' influence(Jenning and Niemy, 1974; Glenn, 1972). One also should bear in mind that the degree of agent's (parent, 11.0ne should bear in mind that praying regularly five times a day (Shalat) is a key indicator for the practicing Moslem, according to Islam. That is why this item is very important because it clearly distinguishes between the abangan and the santri in Java. 212 siblings, peer group, mass media, etc.) influence is a function of the extensivity and intensivity of exposure, interaction, and receptivity between the agents and the individuals(Paul Allen Back, in Renshon, 1977,p.118). In the case of the villagers of Brobanti there is a clear indication that parents play a very significant role in shaping the individual's political values. The data reveal that there is a strong relationship between the parent's and the children's party identification (Table 7.6). The parent and offspring will likely have similar patterns of political behavior. The parents who strongly identify with the Islamic parties will likely influence their children similarly, and those who have ties with non-Islamic parties have children who adopt similar views. Table 7.6 The Congruency of Parent and Respondent's Party ID in Brobanti Villages BqB68SBSSBBBBBBSBBBBBSSBBSSBBSB8SBBBBBBBBBBBS6BQBSS&BB8B&B6CBB Respondent's Party Identification Parent's Party ______Identification Islamic Party | Non-islamic Parties Islamic Party 71.80% | 25.91% Non-islamic Parties 28.20 | 74.09 Total 100.00 100.00 (N=305) (N=265) Note: Chi Square is significant at pc.001, Tau^, = .2085 source: From The questions : "In general, what political party do you feel you are very close to?, How close are you to the party? Are you and your parents close to the same party?". 213 The above table answers the question then of does parent/ child socialization translate into voting preference? The answer seems to be affirmative, in that parents seem to have a strong influence on their children's voting behavior. In the 1971 elections, there was a strong indication that parents and their offspring had the same voting preference in almost all parties. The parents with PNI or Golkar backgrounds, for example, who voted for these parties would likely to be followed by their children. The same phenomenon could also be found among families with strong Islamic background as shown in table 7.7 Table 7.7 The Relationship Between Parents' and Respondents' Voting Preference in Brobanti Villages: The 1971 Elections e&BBBSBSqeSRBSBBBBBSBSSfiBBBBBSSStSS&BBBSSeBBSBBSSSSSBBSBBBBe&fiSS Respondent's Vote for Parents vote-— For PNI 1 Golkar I NU ! Parmusi ! Other PNI 85.71% 20.93% _ 33.33% Golkar 12.24 65.12 13.51 6.67 44.44 NU - 6.98 81.08 4.44 Parmusi - 2.32 5.41 86.67 - Other 2.04 4.65 — 2.22 22.22 Total 100.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00% 100.00% (N=49) (N=43) (N=37) (N=45) (N=9) Note : -Chi Square significant at pc.001, -Other parties were Parkindo, Partai Katolik, IPKI, and Murba 214 The Brobanti village data nonetheless also reveal that there is a tendency toward declining parental influence in voting preference. In the 1977 elections, compared to the 1077, more children of PDI and PPP tended to vote differently from their parents. In the case of the PDI, 62% of the respondent also voted for PDI reported that their parent voted for PDI, compared to a figure of 86% for 1971. PPP is even worse: that is, only 47% of PPP voters said that their parents also voted for the same party (Table 7.8). The 1982 sample data reveal a continuing trend for PDI but a return to the earlier pattern for PPP. That is, two-third of PDI voters in 1982 reported that their parents voted for Golkar, which two- third of PPP voters said that their parents voted for PPP too. Nevertheless, the data still support the notion that parents play major role in shaping their children's voting preference. Table 7.8 The Relationship Between Parent and Respondent's Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1977 Elections BSBBBB&B&BBBeBBBSBnBSBBBBSSBBBBBBBtS&BBSBBBSSeeiBBBBSBSBSBBBSBSS Respondent's Vote For For PDI 1 Golkar 1 PPP PDI 61.54% 30.85% Golkar 34.62 48.94 53.26 PPP 3.85 22.34 46.74 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=26) (N=94) (N=92) Note : Chi Square is significant at pc.001 215 Table 7.9 The Relationship Between Parent and Respondent's Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1982 Elections Respondent Vote for Parent V o t e ------For PDI ! Golkar 1 PPP PDI 34.04% 5.83% Golkar 65.96 80.83 35.34 PPP — 13.34 64.66 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=47) (N=120) (N=116) Note : Chi Square is significant at p<.001 After glancing at the above tables, two interesting points should be discussed here briefly. First, it is not surprising that parents still play a dominant role in shaping individual behavior, especially electoral behavior among Javanese villagers since parents are the most dominant agent of political socialization. The general notion of political socialization asserts that the degree of interaction between agents and individual depends upon the level of exposure, communication, and receptivity (Allen Beck, in Renshon, 1977,pp. 117-8). In the case of the Javanese villagers, it is generally known that the level of mobility as well as the exposure to other agents (mass media) remains very low. The primary institution, therefore, they are exposed to is the family and the immediate members of their neighborhood. 216 Why, then, and this is the second point, is there also a tendency for children to act differently in elections? One plausible explanation is that parents are more vulnerable to pressure from village officials and the bureaucracy, while the children are inclined to demonstrate some kind of protest by voting for a non-government party in elections.12 One young local legislator, Mr. Astari (not his real name), told me one day that his, only hope was from the youngsters in Brobanti. He said: "We from the PPP indeed rely on young people from our district. They are persistent. Even though they had been intimidated, and harassed by Golkar people they still persist. The more they are intimidated the more they support the PPP. They just don't like the way village and bureaucratic officials act in winning elections."13 Another possible explanation is 1ife-cycle: the boldness of the young who tend to protest. If this is not a cyclical but a long term trend, it suggets that Golkar might anticipate trouble in future elections, that is, Golkar does not have a grass-root mass bases, especially among the santri community. 12.This point will also be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VIII. 13.Personal interview with Mr. Astari on January 9, 1986 in the City of Yogyakarta. 217 Socio-Religious Orientation and Voting After looking at the patterns of political socialization and their relationship to partisan choice, the analysis now comes to further stage, testing the major hypothesis on the relationship between socio-religious orientation and voting preference. The basic assumption in this study is that in Javanese villages the inclination of people to act in electoral activity is shaped by their socio-religious background, i.e., the abangan and santri denomination. Zf this assumption is correct then the people in Brobanti will exhibit political behavior accordingly, that is, all abangan people would vote for non-islamic parties (PDI and Golkar), and all santris would vote for the Islamic party (PPP). As discussed earlier, among the 570 respondents who voted in the 1982 elections, 32.63% are abangans, and 67.37% are santris. The pattern of their voting preference is not surprisingly different, the majority of the abangans voted for both Golkar and PDI, while the majority of the santris voted for the Islamic party.Among the strong abangans (N=58), 64% voted for Golkar, 36% for PDI, and none of them supported PPP (Table 7.10). Golkar drew 78% of the moderate abangan, and PDI was only able to collect 19%, and PPP gained 3%. The percentage of PPP voters from the weak abangan increased to 6%, while PDI declined to 15%, and Golkar gained almost 79% (N=62). Among the weak santri (N=108), about 4% voted for 218 PDI, 64% for Golkar, and 32% for the PPP. The moderate santri voters were splitted between PPP and Golkar, that is 54% and46%, respectively. A strong majority of the strong santri voters (N=143) supported PPP (73%), while 27% of them voted Golkar, and none for the PDI. These sample data clearly support the notion that people voted along religious orientation (the X2 is significant at .001). We can also find similar phenomenon among the respondents who asnwered that they voted in the 1977 elections (N*=329), except that the majority of the strong abangan (N36) voted PDI, that is about 53%, and 47% voted Golkar (Table 7.11). One-third of the moderate abangan voted for PDI, and 70% of them voted for Golkar. Among the weak abangan, almost 12% of them voted for PPP, only 8% for PDI. None of the santri, however, cast their ballots for PDI in 1977, and the Islamic party drew the majority of the santris. Among the respondents who said that they voted in the 1971 elections (N«251), Golkar gained strong support from the abangans and weak santri (Table 7.12). The sample data from Brobanti villages seem to support the hypothesis that over time in general elections people tend to vote in accordance with their socio-religious orientation. There is a significant relationship between the socio religious background and voting for a certain party in Brobanti villages. The simple statistics test seems to 219 support the hypothesis with the value of Chi Square is very significant at .001, and the values Tau^ .295, .294, and .271 in the three elections sample data. Table 7.10 The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation And Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1982 Elections Vote For Socio-Religious -- Total Orientation PDI Golkar PPP Strong Abangan 36.21% 63.79 — 100.00(N°58) Moderate Abg. 19.45 77.42 3.23 100.00(N=62) Weak Abangan 15.15 78.79 6.06 100.00(N=66) Weak Santri 3.70 63.89 32.41 100.00(N=108) Moderate Santri - 45.86 54.14 100.00(N*133) Strong Santri 27.27 72.73 100.00(N=143) Note : Chi Square is significant at p<.001, and Tau^ = .295 Table 7.11 The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation And Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1977 Elections Vote for Socio-Religious — Total % Orientation PDI Golkar PPP Strong Abangan 52.78% 47.22 - 100.00(Ns36) Moderate Abg. 29.62 70.37 - 100.00(N=54) Weak Abangan 7.84 80.39 11.76 100.00(N=51) Weak Santri _ 44.87 55.13 100.00(N<=78) Moderate Santri - 36.84 63.16 100.00(N=57) Strong Santri — 26.42 73.58 100.00(N=53) Note : Chi Square is significant at p < .001, Tauj, - .294 220 Table 7.12 The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation And Voting Preference in Brobanti: 1971 Elections S8S&&&SSCB8tSSSBSS8B8BSSSSS888StttSS&&SBSSSSnSBSBS8&SBSi Vote for Socio-Religious “_ m/hf l O u a a i l a t Orientation PDI Golkar PPP Strong Abangan 48.65% 51.85 - 100.00(N=27) Moderate Abangan 43.24 56.76 - 100.00(N=37) Weak Abangan 6.67 86.67 6.67 100.00(N=45) Weak Santri 52.08 37.92 100.00(NK48) Moderate Santri - 28.00 72.00 100.00 (N*=50) Strong Santri - 36.36 63.64 100.00(N=44) Note : Chi Square is significant at p < .001, Tau^ = .271 At the individual village level there seems to be no striking deviation from the Brobanti-wide sample data. In the village of Sukaramai an overwhelming majority of the abangan supported Golkar. Only among the weak abangan Golkar gained less than 70% of the votes, while among the moderate and strong abangans Golkar got about 78% and 84%, respectively. About 7% of the moderate abangan supported the PPP, while none among the strong and weak. There is no clear information why this occured. Golkar also got a strong support from the santris, especially among the weak and moderate santris, that is, 64.58 and 57.78%, respectively. While among the strong santri Golkar gained almost 39% (Table 7.13). It is not surprising because Sukaramai is the stronghold of Golkar. In the village of Sukadamai (N=155), the PPP gained strong 221 support from the moderate and stong santri voters, that is, 68 and 72%, respectively; while Golkar was strongly supported by the abangans and weak santri (60%), and PDI only received substantive support from the strong santri voters, that is, about 44% (Table 7.14). Sukadamai is considered one of the toughest and most stubborn villages by the local bureaucrats. Sukamulya village presents an interesting different phenomenon. Golkar has never been able to defeat the Islamic party in this village. Among the sample data (N=165) the santri voters overhelmingly supported the PPP, and Golkar gained less than 30% of the vote from the santri (Table 7.15). The abangan voters, on the other hand, strongly supported Golkar. This is the village of the Islamic party because the non-Islamic party has never been able to penetrate the santri community. Table 7.13 The Relationship Between Religious Orientation And Voting Preference in Sukaramai Village: 1982 Elections Vote For Socio-religious — ----- Total % Orientation PDI Golkar PPP Strong Abangan 34.62% 65.38 — 100.00(N=26) Moderate Abangan 14.81 77.78 7.41 100.00(N=27) Weak Abangan 15.56 84.44 — 100.00(N=45) Weak Santri 4.17 64.58 31.25 100.00 (Nbs48) Moderate Santri - 57.78 42.22 100.00(N=45) Strong Santri - 38.98 61.02 100.00(N=59) Note : Chi Square is significant at p < .001, Tauj, = .179 222 Table 7.14 The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation And Voting Preference in Sukadamai Village: 1982 Elections BSBBCBSSStSSSSSStSS&SSBSBBSSSSSSBBBSSSBSSSSSSSSSSSSaSfiCSSSSS Vote For Socio-Religious — Total % Orientation PDI Golkar PPP Strong Abangan 43.75% 56.25 100.00(Nb 16) Moderate Abangan 25.00 75.00 100.00(N=20) Weak Abangan 14.81 81.48 3.70 100.00(N=27) Weak Santri 6.67 60.00 33.33 100.00(N=30) Moderate Santri 31.57 68.42 100.00 (N*=19) Strong Santri 27.91 72.09 100.00(N=43) Note : Chi Square is significant at p <.001, Taujj, » .278 Table 7.15 The Relationship Between Socio-Religious Orientation And Voting Preference in Sukamulya Village: 1982 Elections Vote For Socio-Religious — ----— — ------Total % Orientation PDI Golkar PPP Strong Abangan 40.00% 60.00 — 100.00(N=10) Moderate Abangan 11.76 88.24 - 100.00(N=17) Weak Abangan 4.55 81.82 13. 64 100.00(N=22) Weak Santri — 26.87 73 .13 100.00(N=45) Moderate Santri - 22.73 72. 27 100.00(N=44) Strong Santri — 25.93 74. 07 100.00(N=27) Note : Chi Square is significant at pc.001, Tau^ » .109 223 Party Identification and Voting Do voters in Brobanti cast thei ballots in accordance with their party identification?. From the available data it seems to be that the answer is affirmative. Almost one-third of the respodents who said that they feel close to the Islamic party voted for the Islamic party in the 1982 elections, and the other one-third voted for the non-islamic parties. Among those who stated that they feel close to the non-islamic parties voted for the non-islamic parties, and only 2% voted for the Islamic party. Table 7.16 indicates a strong relationship between party identification and voting. The Chi Square valuee is significant at .001, and the value of Pearson contingency coefficient (C) is .566. Table 7.16 The Relationship Between Party Identification and Voting: The 1982 Elections Vote for Party ID Islamic Party Non-islamic P. Islamic Party (N=395) 69.18% 30.82 100.00 Non-Is. P. (N=265) 2.26 97.74 100.00 Note: Chi Square (296.33) is significant at .001, and C coefficient is .566 224 The relationship between party identification and voting becomes even clearer when we observe the strength of the degree of identification. As shown in table 7.17, the respondents who have a strong idenfication with an Islamic party would be likely to vote for an Islamic party, and those who revealed that they have strong identification witn a non- Islamic party would be likely to vote for that non-islamic party. The weak identifiers had the tendency to change their party. allegiance. Almost two-thirds of the respondents who have a weak identification with an Islamic party voted for Golkar in the 1982 general elections. Table 7.17 The Relationship Between The Strength of Party ID and Voting in Brobanti: The 1982 Elections &SSBSSSa&BBBBS&BBBSBBB&t&&&SBBBBaSSBSBSBBBBBBBSBSeSBSBSBB?SC;BB Party Identification Ialsmic Party Non-islamic Party Vote for Party Strong Weak Strong Weak Islamic Party 83.04% 30.86 - 26.09 Non-islamic P. 16.96 69.14 100.00 73.91 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N«224) (N=81) (N«242) (N=23) From the above analysis one may observe that the voters in Brobanti have the tendency to vote accroding to their party identification which is based on the socio-religious 225 cleavage, that Is, the abancran and santrl denominations. It means that the stronger the voters in rural Java idenntify ♦ themselves with a certain party, the more likely they would vote for that party. In order to have a more clear picture on the relation ship between party identification and voting, it would be more interesting to take a closer look at the relationship between the individual's attachment to a certain party and his or her voting preference. As revealed in table 7.18, no santri respondents identified themselves with the PDI. Among the 384 santri identifiers about 21% of them identified themselves with Golkak, and 79% identified with the Islamic party. All of those who identified with Golkar voted for Golkar, while among those who identified with the PPP. 1.3% foted for the PDI, one third for the government party (Golkar), and about 70% voted for the PPP. The reasons why quite a . number of the santris voted for Golkar is that the formal leaders (village officials) who were also santri supported Golkar. 226 Table 7.18 The Relationship Between Party Identification and Voting: The santri Identifier BBeBeSBtttSStt&SSSSQSSBBBBBBBSBaBBBBttSBBBSSSBBBBBBBBaBBaSttS&BnBB Identification With Party Vote for PDI Golkar PPP PDI — 1.31% Golkar - 100.00 29.51 PPP — — 69.18 Total — 100.00 100.00 (N-79) (N«305) Note: The Chi Square is significant at .001, and the C coefficient is .498 Among the abanaan identifiers, none of them identified with the Islamic party. In identifying with the secular parties, they were divided almost evenly. Among the 88 respondents who identified with the PDI, only 37.5% voted for the PDI while the majority of them voted for Golkar (55.68%), and almost 7% voted for the PPP.14 For those who identified themselves with Golkar, 90% voted for Golkar and 10% for the PDI (Table 7.19). The lower degree of allegiance among the PDI identifiers can perhaps be explained by the intense pressure from officials on abanaan voters to choose Golkar. 14. The reason seems to be that of peer groups pressure and voting "against," that is, they did not like both the PDI and Golkar but they had cast they ballots. 227 Table 7.19 The Relationship Between Party Identification and Voting: The Abanaan Identifier SSS=S=ESSCBSS8S8:888SBBSeBStSB8SSBeBSBS8& SBnsS88StS8SBBBBSBeSBSSS Identification With Party Vote For PDI Golkar PPP PDI 37.50% 10.20 Golkar 55.68 89.80 PPP 6.82 Note: The Chi Square is significant at .001, and the C coefficient is .348 From the above analysis, the Brobanti data seem to support the general hypothesis that there is a relationship between party identification and votig, and that relation ship is very strong. It means that the Brobanti respondents have the tendency to support and vote according to their party identification and the identification is based on the socio-religious cleavage, that is. santri and abanaan. Reasons to Vote For a certain Party After looking at the patterns of voting behavior in the villages of Brobanti, the analysis now attempts to uncover the reasons why those individuals in the sample vote for a certain party in general elections. There are numerous reasons why people vote for Golkar, for example, and why some villagers stick with the Islamic PPP. 228 The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) There seems to be among the PDI voters in the sample (N=47) a tendency toward opposition or "voting against" behavior since their reason to vote for the PDI is not based on ideology in accord with what the party advocates, but because they just do not like either the PPP or Golkar. No less than 31.91% of the PDI voters expressed this reasoning. One young PDI voter stated that "I do not like the PPP because they are very fanatical, the santri always condemn other people for not being good Muslims. I do not like Golkar either because Golkar people overact when they campaign."15 The second predominant reason that people vote for a particular party is because of peer-group pressure. They cast their ballots because their friends and their neighbors vote for the PDI. About 27.66% of the voters are within this category. "My husband said that it is okay to vote for the PDI, and my neighbors also do the same. If I vote differently I will be subjected to neighbour's daily gossips."16 The image of Soekarno still seems to influence some PDI supporters. About 19.15 per cent of the PDI voters said that they voted for the PDI because it is the party of Soekarno. 15.Personal interview with Mr. Soegiman (not his real name) on January 14, 1986. He is about 27 years old, married with one child, he lives at Sukadamai, make a living as a farm laborer. 16.It was expressed in Javanese as the following. "Kulo dikandani bapakke bocah bocah ora apa apa nyoblos banteng. Tangggi tanggi ya pada nyoblos banteng. Nek kulo nyoblos liyane menkgo dirasani." (Student Assistant Notes). 229 '•PDI is the party of Banteng, isn't it? I like it because it is President Soekarno's party," one old nan told the interviewer.17 Ideology does not seem to play a significant role in shaping the thinking of PDI voters. To some of them, The PDI represents the poor. It is quite understandable since in the past the PNI always claim that it was the party of the marhaen, the poor and destitute people as Sukarno said. About 12.77% of the respondents said they vote for the PDI because it represents the party of the poor. And finally 8.51% of the PDI supporters said that they cast their ballots without any specific reason. The_Golongan Karva The "negative vote" contributes only a small amount (6.40%) of the Golkar voters in this sample. This is quite strange despite the fact that Golkar has conducted massive negative campaigns against political parties by labeling parties as anti-development and too political. Furthermore, 5.79% of the Golkar voters voted without any specific reasons. The question then becomes why did they vote for the government party, Golkar?. The biggest proportion of Golkar voters held the image that Golkar is the government party (38.41%) as the principal 17.In Javanese it was expressed as "PDI puniko partai Banteng, nggih. Kulo cocok, puniko partaine pak Karno, nggih," (Student Notes). 230 reason for voting for Golkar. It seems that following the path of the village leaders (lurah, kepala dukuh) and the local bureaucrats, for the Javanese villagers, makes life "easy" because they are the prominent leaders(wong gedhe) while the villagers are the common people (wong cilik). The wong gedhe are the role model in which every body in the village will look up at. "Golkar is the party of our.lurah, and pak Dukuh, and they said that all wong gedes belong to Golkar. I just follow him, I trust him, he is a good Moslem," one santri voter from Sukamulya argued.18 It is the chief of the hamlet (kepala dukuh) who seems to play the dominant role in influencing individual voting for Golkar in Brobanti. Among Golkar supporters in the sample many said that they voted for Golkar because their kepala dukuh asked them to and they do not dare challenge this (21.65). The kepala dukuh also prevailed when he told his people that Golkar is the party of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, and it is important to vote for the party of the Sultan. Among them, 17.68% said that they voted for Golkar because kepala dukuh told them that the sultan belongs to Golkar. It is important to note that the people in Yogyakarta, especially in rural areas, still pay very high deference to their sultan. 18.It is stated in Javanese as "Golkar puniko partaine pak Lurah lan pak Dukuh, jarene sedaya wong gede puniko melu Golkar. Kulo manut pak Dukuh kemawon, kulo percaya kaliyan pak Dukuh, panjenengan puniko tiyang Islam nggih," (Personal interview with Soeharno of Sukamulya, January, 21, 1986). 231 Furthermore, the sultan was very active in campaigning for Golkar during the elections, and his eldest son is also the chairman of Golkar in Yogyakarta province. But why they do listen to their kepala dukuh? It is quite understandable that the kepala dukuh is the most proximate formal leader in the village and consequently he is able to exert influence. When there is conflict among villagers, the kepala dukuh is the one who resolves it. When they need a travel permit or to sell property (land, cattle, etc.), they have to see the kepala dukuh for a permit. He is also able to harass and intimidate people in the village.19 Some Golkar voters in the sample (10.70%) also accepted the fact that the New Order regime has been able to prove its ability in developing the country. Golkar people always stressed during campaigns that it is the government that built roads, bridges, dams, new markets, health centers, new school buildings,and not the parties. "I like Golkar because it is not a political party. Golkar does not like politics, the people do not like politics too. Golkar likes development. We have a beautiful bridge, a smooth asphalt road because of development, not politics," one civil servant from Sukaramai enthusiastically told one student interviewer. It seems that 19.Quite a number of stories are told about a kepala dukuh or lurah who intimidated people in the elections. Those stories are very difficult to confirm because they mostly came from the non government parties. 232 Golkar has been able to convince people by telling then that politics only belongs to parties, such as the PPP and PDI.20 The_Partai^Persatuan Pembancrunan fPPPl Anong the respondents, the followers of the Islanic party of PPP seem to be the most Ideological In contrast to the PDI and Golkar voters. Almost 33% of them (N*»217) said that they voted for the PPP because of Ideological reasons. They argued that as a Muslim It Is Imperative to vote for an Islamic party, since It Is the defender of Islamic causes and the party advocates Implementing Islamic teachings. Here are examples of their reasoning: "I am a Muslim and I want to be a good Muslim. A good Muslim must embrace Islam completely, that Is, not only active in daily worship but also support for an Islamic organization. I believe that God (Allah) will reward me if I vote for an Islamic organization, since it is part of worship(ibadah)."21 20.I encountered the same phenomenon _when a group of students and my colleagues and I on" a study tour visited a village in a mountainous area of Probolinggo, East Java, in 1981. One local bureaucrat proudly said "Here, in our sub district, there is no politics because we do not have political parties. We only have Golkar." The students looked at each other and smiled. 21.Personal interview with Mr.Supangat. He is about 29 years of age, single, and very active in hisvillage (Sukadamai), former student of an Islamic school in a nearby village. 233 "I do not care that there is conflict between Mr. Naro and Mr. Sudarji. I am a Muslim so that I have to vote for an Islamic -party fPokoke oartai Islam). I want to see Islamic values implemented in this village."22 The second biggest proportion (32.31%) of the PPP voters reason is that their leader, the kyai, told them that voting for an Islamic party is part of worship, and therefore it is imperative for Muslims to support an Islamic party. Here one can see that the role of local Islamic leaders is very important in shaping up individual behavior in the village. One of the leader that comes from this area is Kyai Hajji Ahmad; he is from Sukamulya. He is a politician and member of the local legislature (DPRD). Every villager respects him, even the village head and village officials. The lurah of Sukamulya told me that he already told the bupati that his target in the village is only 30% because the village belongs to Kyai Ahmad. To follow their family and tradition is another reason the villagers voted for the PPP (21.54%). Their parents came from a very devoted Islamic tradition that usually supported the .Islamic parties, from Masyumi to Parmusi then to the PPP, or from HU to NU again then to the PPP. They are usually reluctant to deviate from the tradition. A young activist like 22.My student encountered Mrs. Mardyah, a divorced woman 43 years of age. She told the student that she once worked in Jakarta as a housemaid (servant) for a former cabinet minister in the early 1970s. She wants to go to Saudi Arabia to work as a housemaid. She has been told that the PPP is in disarray because of the conflict between Mr. Naro and Mr.Sudarji. 234 Mr Astari is an excellent example. His grandfather was an active member of the Masyumi in the 1955 election, and so was his father. From each generation in Brobanti, this family has remained the core of the Muhammadyah movement, an organization that was closely related to Masyumi during the heyday of the party in the 1950s.Finally, about 13.33% of the PPP voters cast their ballots without any specific reasons. They do not know why they voted for the PPP. Conclusion In this analysis I have tried to uncover the religious profiles of the respondents in Brobanti by looking at the process of socialization. Then I attempted to develop an analysis of the relationship between the growth of religious experience with the growth of party identification /partisan choiceby observing the pattern of political socialization in the villages. In the final part of this endeavour, the analysis of the relationship between the socio-religious orientation, the abangan-santri form and voting behavior, has been examined to find reasons why people cast ballots for a certain party in general elections. From the analysis, one can see that there is a close relationship between individual socio-religious orientation and voting preference. The data from Brobanti indeed support the notion that people are inclined to vote according to their socio-religious orientation. Thus, santri will be inclined to vote for the Islamic party, while abangan will tend to support a secular party in the elections. The stability of the pattern of voting preference is clear in the analysis. The santri voters seem to be more ideological in making the voting decision than the abangan. What is interesting is that quite a number of them also voted for Golkar. Nevertheless, other variables have also to be taken into account, such as the pattern of leadership and class. The following chapters will explore those variables in relation to voting in Javanese villages such as in Brobanti. CHAPTER VIII LEADERSHIP AND VOTING IN BROBANTI Introduction This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of leadership in influencing individual behavior in the electoral process. The analysis focuses on the respondents' perceptions of the type and node of leadership in Brobanti. The principal questions being explored in this analysis are who the people of Brobanti consider as leaders, what qualities are necessary to be regarded as a leader, what are the nodes of interaction between leader and followers, and finally does the leader play a doninant role in shaping individual behavior, especially in voting, in the villages under study? The najor contention of this chapter is that, in Brobanti, village leadership, both formal and non-fomal, is one of the najor ingredients in looking at village politics, especially electoral politics. Individual decisions to support a certain political party are shaped by his/her interaction with the existing leadership in the village. One should keep in nind, however,' that the concordance of 236 237 behavior between the leader and followers in a village depends upon the concordance of their socio-religious background. Leadership and Political Behavior in Javanese Villages Who are the leaders in the Javanese village community? Hofsteede(1971) distinguished two types of Javanese village leaders, that is, the formal and the informal leaders. The former are those "who are holding an official position in the village administration," by virtue of election and appointment by the upper level of bureaucracy, while the latter are those who do not hold an official position but are "recognized as leader either by a particular group or by the entire village community" (p.25). It should be noted here that the formal leaders do not necessarily have the qualities of leadership as the informal ones, but, because of their position, which is perhaps acquired by appointment, they are recognized as leaders. Hence the magnitude of an official leader's influence can be less than that of the recognized and respected informal leaders. In rural Java, particularly in Yogyakarta, formal leaders consist of the lurah (village head) and all of his assistants and hamlet heads (kepala dukuh) that function as intermediaries between village officials and the community. 238 The number of kepala dukuh depends upon the size of the village. All of the officials are directly elected by the eligible voters in the village (see chapter V). The lurah is usually the most respected among village officials. He is elected for an eight-year term and can be automatically renewed for another term by the bupati (district head). His influence stems from his "officialdom" as well as his wealth. He and his assistants receive no salaries from the government but are supported by his control over the best quality land in his village (tanah benakokl. The amount of land allocated to him and his assistants depends upon the tradition in the village.1 The lurah is also powerful because he represents the .upper level of the government. On this role Koentjaraningrat observes that: "The lurah occupies the position of intermediary between the village community and the higher echelons of government. All communications of the government and the outside world for the villagers in general or for individual villagers invariably pass through the office of the village administration, and even communication through the mail often remains within the control of the headman" (1985, p.195). In most cases, the lurah occupies his position by virtue of inheritance, in the sense that he is elected as lurah because his father and grandfather were also lurahs or at least held positions in village administration before. 1.In Brobanti, for example, the lurah receive two hectares of irrigated land, while his assistants receive an average of one hectare, as does the kepala dukuh. 239 The second most powerful official is the kepala dukuh, who draws power from his proximity to his people and his intermediary position between village officials and the community. He is in charge of daily affairs in his hamlet. Whenever there is a dispute among people in his hamlet, his main responsibility is to reconcile the dispute so that tranquility and order in the village are protected. He also plays a fatherly role for his constituents. Ho policy will be carried out without his support. In Yogyakarta he is elected directly by the people in his hamlet (padukuhan). The lurah's assistants are also powerful, but the strategic position of the kepala dukuh's office makes a difference in their relative contribution on the daily affairs in the village. The head of security affairs (pak aman) is considered the most influential among the assistants, since he is considered tougher because he has to deal with individuals who disrupt village order, such as criminals and bandits. The non-formal leaders vary widely in positions, back ground, and influence. They gain influence by virtue of commanding certain knowledge and "attributes" in the village. One group of non-formal leaders are those who are the descendants of the original settlers (tiyang baku) or cikal bakal of the village. "Their relationship with the venerated village ancestors is often supported by their possession of an ancient house or of heirlooms, or by their attachment to 240 the sacred graves of the founding ancestor," Koentjaraningrat argued (1985, p.189). Even though most of the tiyang baku at the present time have lost their land and become poor, they are still respected by the people in the village because "Descent is...more important as a criterion for prestige than possession of the main source of village economy, that is, land," Koentjaraningrat reiterated (1985, p.189). Another type of informal leaders are those who command the understanding of religion, i.e., Islam. They are the kyais or the ulamas, and the hajji who are very influential. These leaders are respected by virtue of their mastery of the syari'ah (Islamic Law) as well as other Islamic teachings. They are usually the "imam" at the Muslim prayer houses and mosque when conducting daily prayers and giving sermons (chotbah) on Friday. In some areas, they have built their own school (madrasvah) and establish a pesantren, or boarding school. Their followers usually obey their orders with unquestioned loyalty. In addition to the understanding of Islam, most of the kyais/ulamas gain respect through wealth by the means of land ownership. Many of them are able to generate income so that they can travel to Mecca for the pilgrimage and return home to become haii. "The term hail is synonymous with rich man," Geertz said (p.134). Finally, there are individuals who are considered guru. The guru is able to function as spiritual teacher, as curer, and sorcerer or dukun. The dukun can claim to cure all kinds 241 of diseases, even cancer in this modern world. "To be a dukun is thought to be dangerous to the individual, for the * extraordinary power with which he traffics can destroy him if he is not spiritually strong," Geertz observed (1960, p.87). The dukun learns his practices either from his parents or from another dukun, "who is thus his guru; and whatever he learns he and others call his ilmu (science). Ilmu is generally considered a kind of abstract knowledge or supernormal skill, but to the more concrete-minded and 'old- fashioned* it is sometimes viewed as a kind of substantive magical power, in which case its transmission may be more direct than through teaching," according to Geertz (1960, p.88). Individuals such as school teachers, members of village civil defense units as well as functionaries of the village council and other organizations are also influential but their authority cannot match the power of the above mentioned leaders. As mentioned earlier, these traditional leaders are able to exert influence upon fellow villagers. They mobilize people for their own interests. Communication is always a one-way communication because in traditional society, such as in the villages of Yogyakarta, the leader who transmits the message is more important than the message itself. In short, 242 it is not the content of the message that is important rather it is the source of the message. Hence their role in influencing individual decision is undoubtedly important. Since Javanese villagers are basically divided into two religious outlooks, that is, the abangan and the santri, the principal type of relationship between the leaders and followers ought to follow these lines. it is difficult to comprehend, for example, that santri people will follow the directives of an abangan leader in making a decision. The abangan, on the other hand, will by no means follow the decision made by the santri leaders. Their ideological stance and their basic socio-religious values are fundament ally different. Clifford Geertz depicted those differences in the following figure: 243 | Javanese Abangan | | Javanese Santri | Abangan Village | | Santri Village | Abangan Village Santri Village Leaders Leaders | Abangan Villagers | | Santri Villagers | Figure 5: The Pattern of Relationship Between Village and The Type of Leadership Adapted from; Clifford Geertz, The Social History of An Indonesian Town (Cambridge, Massachussets, MIT Press, 1965). How are we going to translate the above mode of relationship into electoral behavior in Yogyakarta, especially in the villages of Brobanti? My purpose is to compare the role played by formal leader, that is, village officials, and informal leaders, especially religious leaders, within the two social groups. In particular I hypothesize that (1) when informal leaders are influential, they will be able to challenge with some success the formal leader(s) who usually support the government party. 244 Conversely, if (2) the dominant role of formal leaders is j unchallenged, the government party (Golkar) will prevail in general elections. The Perception of The Oualitv_of Leadership in Brobanti j The first question being asked of the respondents in | Brobanti villages is that beside the lurah2 who do they i consider as leaders in their community? Then, what are the reasons to consider him/her as the leader? Do the villagers see or visit him/her regularly? What are the reasons to visit the leader? These types of question will help to identify the leaders in the village community as well as the necessary requirements to be regarded as leader. In the villages of Brobanti, it seems to be that the popularity of village officials is only challenged by religious leaders. When the respondents were asked whom they i considered as the most influential figure in the villages almost half of them revealed that the kepala dukuh is the most influential person. The religious leaders such as kyais and religious teachers almost evenly matched the popularity of the kepala dukuh. Other leaders are not able to match the popularity of those two types of leaders (Table 8.1). I Surprisingly, in Brobanti one would not be able to find any 2 |.The lurah is not included in the question because he is undoubtedly the most popular person. The villagers will, we assume, automatically choose him if he is included the question. 245 kind of spiritual leaders such as the dukun and guru. The reason perhaps has to do with the fact that most of the people in Brobanti sub-district are members of the Muhammadyah social movement that always advocates purifying Islamic teachings. For the Muhammadiyah people, belief in the spiritual things is against Islamic beliefs. Table 8.1 Ranking of Leaders in Brobanti Leader % of Leader's Popularity Village Officials 46.42% Kyais/Rel.Leaders 43.51 School Teacher 5.86 Party Officials 3.16 Other 1.05 Total (N=570) 100.00% Nevertheless the perception of leadership is different when we take into consideration religious orientation, i.e., abangan-santri denomination. As shown in Table 8.2, half of the abangan believe that the kepala dukuh is the most influential person. Surprisingly the kyai/religious leader is ranked second by one-third of the abangan respondents, followed by school teacher, and local party activist. Among 384 santri respondents, the kyai is the most influential with more than half, the kepala dukuh with 35, followed by the school teacher, and local party activist. 246 Table 8.2 Rankin? of The Leaders: By Religious Orientation SSS8SSBBBBSSStSKfi&SBtttSfittfi&fitt&ttS888rSBSB8BBBSSBBSSBBa»S Respondents Religious Orientation Abangan Santri Vill.Officials 52.09% 35.42% Kyais/Rel.Leaders 34.41 55.73 School Teacher 8.06 4.95 Party Officials 3.23 3.13 Other 1.61 .01 Total 100.00(Nb 186) 100.00(N“384) Note : This table is drawn from the question "Besides lurah (Village Head) whom do you think is the most influential person in the village?." Across the village data the perception of leadership is quite different. In Sukadamai village, the kepala dukuh is considered the most influential person since about 54% of the respondents in the village believe in him, followed by religious leader with 35%, the school teacher and party activist. The same phenomena are also found in Sukaramai. A strong majority of the respondents revealed that village officials are the most respected leader, followed by religious leaders. Other leaders were not as popular as the two leaders. It was the religious leaders that gained the most respect from the respondents in Sukamulya. Almost 65% of the 165 respondents believe in their kyai, while village officials are only popular among 22% of the respondents (Table 8.3). As mentioned earlier, Sukamulya belongs to the santri community, while Sukaramai is a mixture of both abangan and santri people. Table 8.3 Ranking of The Leaders in Individual Villages Villages Leaders ------Sukadamai Sukaramai Sukamulya Vil. Officials 53.55% 57.60 22.42 Kyai/Rel.Leaders 35.48 35.20 64.85 School Teacher 9.03 3.60 6.67 Party Official 3.23 2.40 4.29 Other — 1.20 1.82 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N“155) (N**250) (N“165) When we examine the perception of leadership across the socio-religious orientation in each village, the difference between the abangan and santri is very clear. Village officials are very popular among the abangan respondents in the three villages. About 81% of the abangan in Sukadamai said that they believe in their kepala dukuh, about 75% in Sukamulya revealed similar perception, and 69% in Sukaramai (Table 8.4). The santri respondents also gave favorable opinion to village officials in Sukadamai and Sukaramai, while in Sukamulya the school teacher and party officials are more popular than village officials. Kyai/religious leaders get the strongest (85%) favourable opinion among the santri in Sukamulya, but their popularity is lower than village officials in Sukaramai. Only 45% of the santri respondents in Sukaramai said that kyai/religious leaders are their most respected leaders compared to 50% the santri gave to village officials. The only possible explanation why village officials are more popular and religious leaders among the santri respondents in Sukaramai is that no strong religious leaders live in this village. In Sukamulya, on the other hand, the strong influence of Kyai Ahmad is unchallenged by the formal leaders. As indicated earlier (Chapter V) the government party (Golkar) has never been able to penetrate the santri part of society so that it fails in every election. Even the lurah himself recognized the fact that his party will never be able to prevail in election as long as Kyai Haji Ahmad still lives in this village. In addition to Haji Ahmad, a dynamic young leader (Astari) is also from Sukamulya. He is very well accepted by young people not only from Sukamulya but also by other villagers in Brobanti. Sukamulya is known as the "stubborn" village among the local bureaucrats.3 3.The District officials who are in charge of elections already drawn a special picture on the position of Sukamulya in the 1987 elections. He put the "Green" sign for the villages that are difficult to be penetrated by Golkar, "Red" for villages that controlled by the PDI, and "Yellow" is the sign for Golkar. 249 Table 8.4 Ranking of Leaders in the Villages of Brobanti By Religious Orientation SeSBSSSSSBSBSSSSB8SSBBSB8SSBSSBSeS88tSeSSSS&BBSBSBBBBSBSSS= Villages Leaders Sukadamai | Sukamulya I Sukaramai Abg Str Abg str Abg str Vil.Offs. 81.40% 42.86% .75.56% 2.50% 69.39% 50.00 Kyai/Rel. 6.98 44.64 11.11 85.00 19.39 45.39 School T. 4.65 10.71 4.44 7.50 5.10 2.63 Party Ldr. 6.98 1.79 6.67 3.33 4.08 1.32 Othe — 2.22 1.67 2.09 — Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N«43) (N=112) (N=45) (N«120) (N=98) (N=152; The above table indicates that each village has its own type of leader. The formal leader is very strong in both Sukadamai and Sukaramai and is accepted by both santri and abangan people. The informal leader, on the other hand, is very strong in Sukamulya and relatively strong in Sukadamai. In Sukaramai there is no informal leader, but the santri people there still have a high regard for Islamic leadership. It is also interesting to note that the religious leader receives some respect from the abangan people. In Sukaramai, for example, about 19 per cent of the abangan said that they accepted kyai/religious leaders as their leader, while in Sukamulya and Sukadamai about 11.0 and 7.0 per cent, respectively. The following table shows the relative importance of both types (formal-informal) of leadership among the villages. 250 Table 8.5 The Strength of Leadership in Brobanti Sukadamai Sukamulya Sukaramai Types of Leader Strong Strong Strong Formal Yes No Yes (++) (---) (+++) Informal Yes/No Yes No (+/») (+++) (---) The question then arises concerning the impact of the types of leadership on political behavior, especially electoral behavior. Prior to discussing political implications of leadership characteristics, it is important, however, to discuss factors that connect the behavior of leader and followers. In his analysis of the relationship between traditional authority and participation in rebellions, Jackson argued that ideology does not play any significant role in connecting between the leader and his followers. "In traditional authority, obedience is not based on agreement with the leader's ideological stance; the followers adhere to the leader's position regardless of the ideological contradictory turns that he may take," Jackson said (1980, p.186). The data of this study suggest a completely different picture. 251 Brobanti villagers fit more closely Geertz's conclusions about the importance of the santri-abangan cleavage than they do Jackson's opposing argument. The santri leader is connected with the santri community because of Islam, the abangan leader is connected by his beliefs to the abangan community. It is therefore inconceivable that the santri people accept the orders of the abangan leader, and vice versa. Each resents being dominated by the other. Table 8.6 clearly reveals the strong concordance between the leaders' and the followers' religious orientation. From the table we can see that only those with a rather weak religious orientation have the tendency to move their allegiance. Among the weak abangans, almost 47% said that their leaders are from the weak santri group, while among the weak santri group, about 25% said that their leaders are from the abangan. Table 8.6 The Concordance of Leadership and Its Followers Types of Leadership Followers ------— Total % Abg./Secular | Str/Religious Str.Abg(N=58) 72.41% 27.59% 100.00 Mod.Abg(N=62) 79.03 20.96 100.00 Weak Abg(N=66) 53.03 46.97 100.00 Weak Str(N=08) 24.07 75.93 100.00 Mod.Str(N=133) 3.00 97.00 100.00 str.str (N=143) 100.00 100.00 Note : Chi Square is significant at p<.001, Taujj = .177 252 The question then arises concerning the prerequisite that an individual is regarded as an influential person or a leader in village of Brobanti. In attempting to answer this question the study tries to investigate the respondent's perception. They were asked "What are the reasons that a person (s) you regard as a leader is very influential?." Among various reasons this study has been able to record five reasons why an individual is regarded as leader and the reasons are different across religious orientations, that is, the abangan-santri. It seems to be that villagers have a general conception of leadership. Among the 570 respondents, 35% gave that type of reasoning, even though they expressed it in different ways, such as a middle age peasant who said "We in this village believe that our Pak Dukuh is our leader. We like him, when he talks we listen; I think everybody listens to him."4 Or a santri young man from Sukamulya who said "I believe in our kyai. Kyai Ahmad is very interesting when he gives khotbah (sermon) on Friday. When he talks he recites things from the Koran. I believe people in our village like it very much."5 Or a woman, our host from Sukaramai, who did not hesitate to say, "I just believe in our lurah and our 4 .Personal interview, January 16, 1986, Sukadamai village. 5 .Personal interview on January 9, 1986. 253 kepala dukuh. They are our leaders. They never have intention to harm people. That is why people always follow his order."6 The second important leadership ingredient in Brobanti is "deep knowledge in religious affairs." About 28% of the respondents asserted that they considered their leader a very influential person because of his knowledge of Islamic teachings. It nonetheless should be noted that the abangan disputed such quality since only 8% of them believed that this type of ingredient is necessary compared to 38% of the santri. As Astari said, "No one can challenge our kyai on religious matters. He is blessed with his knowledge, that is why we like him and follow his footsteps."7 It is clear that for the santri no other qualities have higher priority than deep knowledge in religious affairs for their leaders. Being "honest" is another important quality since 20% of the respondents claimed it, especially among the abangan people. For the latter, honesty is only second to individual quality as a leader; 26% of the abangans believed in that quality. For the santri people this quality ranked third because honesty is inherent in the knowledge of religious 6 .We stayed in her house at Sukaramai. She provided good accommodations for the students and myself. She is married to a village official, her second marriage. She tends a small shop and a restaurant on the main street. She seems to be well educated. 7 .Personal discussion with Mr. Astari 254 natters. "Of course such a quality as honesty is very important, but it is inherent within Islam," Astari argued when I talked to him. The fourth ingredient is the "availability" of the leader. For the people in Brobanti the leader is always ready to help them when they are needed. What it means here is that the leader is always accessible for the followers when the latter have problems. It does not always have to do with material or economic needs because the presence of the leader in a difficult situation (such as the death or illness of an immediate family member and the like) is extremely important since it means caring and showing responsibility. Some of the respondents revealed it in the following statements. "When my father died three years ago, it was Pak Dukuh and Pak Kaum (religious affairs assistant to the lurah) who gave me a lot of supports. They told me that it was Allah's will so that I had to accept it. I felt very relieved afterward."8 "We have a very good neighborhood here. If there is any disagreement or dispute among us, our leaders are always ready to help ub in solving the problem. If we suspect someone we will report to our kepala dukuh and Pak Aman. They always ready to deal with the criminals."9 8 .Personal interview with Sudrajat of Sukamulya on January 30, 1986. 9 .Personal notes from interviewing a cigaret vendor at Sukaramai, January 9, 1986. Pak Aman is an acronym for the Kepala Bagian Keamanan or Chief of Security Affairs in the village. 255 "I have no problem seeing our kepala dukuh, nor do the other people in this padukuhan (hamlet). When we try to see him, he is always available.1,10 "Kyai Ahmad is like our father. He is always willing to help people. I take his advice seriously and I feel secure when I talk to him."11 Table 8.7 Reasons Why A Person is Very Influential Reasons Percentage Strong Leadership Quality 35.26% Deep knowledge of Islam 28.25 Being honest 20.00 Availability 12.98 Possessing special character 3.51 Total 100.00% (N=570) 10.Personal interview on January 9, 1986. 11.Personal interview with a young santri from Sukamulya, January 8, 1986. 256 Table 8.8 Reasons Why A Person is Very Influential' By Religious Orientation Religious Orientation Reasons Abangan | Santri Leadership quality 40.86% 32.55% Being honest 26.34 16.93 Deep knowledge of Islam 8.06 38.02 Availability 18.82 10.16 Possessing special character 5.91 2.34 Total 100.00 100.00 (N=186) (N«384) Scholars like James Scott (1972 and 1977) and Karl Jackson (1978 and 1980) have attempted to apply the concept of patron-client relationship in examining the relationship between leader and followers in Southeast Asia. The problem with clientilism is that, first, it is not a relationship peculiar to any traditional society per se. Clientilism can be found in any society, modern or traditional, as well as in rural and urban communities. Second, clientilism involves an exchange motivation between leader and followers. That is not necessarily the case in Javanese villages because people who are involved in a certain type of interaction are not 257 always motivated by material reward. The concept of ichlas (a kind of unpretentious straightforwardness or sincerity) fits well in Javanese villagers1 interactions.12 In pure economic terms it is difficult to become a patron since there is no single individual in the village who can fully command economic resources, especially in controlling land ownership. Land distribution in Brobanti makes it less possible for an individual to command economic control. Those who control more than one hectare of land are usually village officials through the tanah bengkok system. The land will be returned to the village when they die or retire from their official position. The traditional arrangement makes it also difficult for the land owner to abuse the relationship with the tenant farmer and the farm laborers. Finally, a small minority of respondents (3.5%) believe that the reason that a certain individual is influential is because he/she has a certain character or quality that ordinary people do not have. Perhaps we can say that such quality is "charisma." It should be noted, however, that it is very difficult to find a leader who really has very strong charisma. Perhaps the kyai or the lurah belong in 12.What I mean by ichlas is that if a common person follows the order of the leader, it does not mean that he/she is expecting something in return. This also true for the leader. The religious leader does something for his people because it is part of his worship or amal-ibadah. He is ichlas to do so because God (Allah) will reward him, not his people. 258 this category, but there is no individual that has what Sartono Kartodirdjo (in Claire Holt, 1972) called ilmu kadigdayan or other kind of ilmus.13 The reason why no person emerges with such kind of ilmu is that perhaps because Grobanti is very strongly influenced by the Muhammadyah social movement that does not believe in any kind of un- Islamic practice. Interaction and Obedience/Lovaltv The Degree of Interaction It is normally assumed that in order to establish a strong tie between leader and followers both parties attempt to establish a mode of interaction, such as visiting each other. The question then concerns the degree, purpose, as well as the result of interaction between leader and followers. From the available data, a near majority of respondents revealed that they occasionally visit their leader, 14 one- fifth said that they often visit their leader, and about the 13.In rural Java, like in other part of the Indonesia, there is a common belief that certain individuals are able to master an ilmu, that is, "an abstract knowledge or supernormal skill, but by the more concrete-minded and 'old fashion* it is sometimes viewed as a kind of substantive magical power," (Geertz, 1960, p.88). To acquire such knowledge and skill some people conduct certain activities such as fasting, meditating, and so on. 14.The frequency of interaction or visit is measured in ordinal terms as Very Often(Every Week), Often(Every Month), Occasionally(Every Six-Month), SeldomfOnce a year), and Never. 259 same proportion have a very high interaction with their leader. In addition, 15% said that they seldom meet the leader, while only 2% reveal that they never visit their leader (Table 8.9). It should be added that among the leaders, only the kepala dukuh and kyai have a very strong interaction with the community. No respondents reveal that they never meet their kepala dukuh, but only 3% stated they 4 did not see or visit the kyai. Table 8.9 The Degree of Interaction Between Leaders and Followers Frequency of visits Percentage Very Often 19.12% Often 20.70 Occasional 43.16 Seldom 15.26 Never 1.75 Total 100.00 (N°570) Note: Very often (every week), Often (every month), Occasional (every three months), Seldom (once a year). 260 Table 8.10 The Degree of Interactions Between The Leaders and Their Followers In Brobanti Leaders * 1 1 1 14C1 N t 1 l ■ 1 1 i i i 1 i Frequency - H H 1 of Visits * I | #3 | #4 | #5 i i i i Very Oft. 21.65% 20.85% — _ Often 24.80 20.08 8.33 - - Occass. 46.06 42.08 41.67 26.67 16.67 Seldom 7.48 13.90 44.44 73.33 83.33 Never — 3.08 5.55 —— Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N*»254) (N-257) (N“36) (N-15) (N=6) Note: The leaders are Village Officials (#1), Religious Leaders (#2), School Teachers (#3), Party Officials (#4), and Other (#5). The purpose of the visit varied. Nevertheless, almost half of the respondents revealed that they visited their leaders because they seek personal advice for their problems, such as marital problems, conflicts with neighbors, and so on. Both abangan and santri respondents said that seeking advice is the major reason to see the leader (Table 8.11 and 8 .12). What is surprising is that only 10% of the respondents who answer the question said that the reason for a visit was to seek financial or economic help. This figure is much lower than that for other purposes, such as just paying respect to the leader. The concept of "sowan" or visiting to pay respect is very important in the Javanese community. It 261 t clearly Indicates that the interaction is not merely based on exchange motivation such as in a "rational" economic community. The follower comes from far away places just to show deference to the leader. This is especially the case among the santri people. "The relationship between kyai and his santri (pupil) is very unique because it is more emotionally based. In public or secular school once you graduate the relation is terminated. That is not the case in our community. We, the kyai and the santri, try to find ways and means (merloaken) to visit each other (silaturrahmi), one well-known kyai told me once.15 It is silaturrahmi that is important in Javanese village, not clientilism. The other reason for visiting the leader was to find a "spiritual" support. It only constitute 7% of the respondents. This relationship indicates that the leader was considered to have special quality in which he was able to transfer his ability to other people. As mentioned earlier, however, very few people believe in this type of quality due to the fact that the influence of Muhammadiyah in the community is very strong. Finally, the interaction between leader and followers is also based on other purposes, that is, merely an official business matter. About 14% of the respondent gave the reason that they visit the kepala dukuh or other village officials 15.Personal note when visiting one of the famous Pesantren in Central Java in 1982. 262 because they just want to pay taxes (radio, land, etc.), register the newly born baby, seek permits (travel, meeting, selling property), and the like. Hence it was a pure business matter. Table 8.11 Purpose of Visiting Leaders in Brobanti Reasons for visit Percentage Seeking advice on personnal problems 48.23% Just visit to pay respect 20.48 Official business 14.33 Seeking financial help 9.87 Seeking "spiritual" support 6.89 Total (N=570) 100.00% Source: Question "What are the reasons for visiting your leaders?." Table 12 Purpose of Visiting The Leader in Brobanti, By Religious Orientation Religious Orientation Reasons for ------Visit Abangan Santri Seeking Advice on Personal Problems 36.47% 53.68% Just visit to pay respect 22.94 14.62 Official/Business 24.12 9.81 Seeking financial help 8.82 10.35 Seeking "spiritual" help 7.65 6.54 Total 100.00 100.00 (N=186) (N=384) 263 The Degree of Obedience Jackson argued that the followers did not contribute any significant role in making decision (i.e., political decision) since it was already decided by the leader. If that is the case it means that all people in traditional society such as in Javanese villages will always blindly follow the order, advice, suggestion, and instruction that comes from the leader. In fact, my Brobanti data do not support Jackson's contention. When the Brobanti respondents were asked "Do you always follow your leader's advice or suggestion?," no respondent reveals that he "never" disobeys his leader. The majority of the 391 respondents who answered the question said that they always or often obey their leader's order or suggestion, and nearly half said that they occasionally or seldom follow orders (Table 8.13). When we observe at across religious orientation f abanoan-santri), the data indicate that the santri are more loyal or obedient to their leaders than the abangan with 61% and 42%, respectively, in the strong affirmative answer (always plus often). About 58% of the abangan said that they occasionally or seldom obey the order/suggestion compared to 39% of the santri (Table 8.14). 264 Table 8.13 The Degree of Obedience Among Followers in Brobanti Following advise Percentage Always 18.25% Often 19.82 Occassional 18.42 Seldom 12.11 Never - No Response 31.40 Total 100.00(N=570) Source: Question "Do you always follow your leader’s advice or suggestion?." Table 8.14 The Degree of Obedience Among The Followers, By Religious Orientation Religious Orientation Following ------— Advise Abangan j Santri Always 23.21% 27.96% Often 18.75 32.97 Occasional 34.82 23.66 Seldom 23.21 15.41 Never —— Total 100.00 100.00 (N=112) (N=279) Note: The missing data are not included. 265 Table 8.15 Respondents Degree of Obedience by Religious and Age t s ss fis es a t s t s & & n s a 8 8 B 8 8 SBBBSB 8 S 8 B B S S e 8 &&: Abangan Santri Following Order/Advice Older Young | Older Young Always 26.78% 19.64% 28.00% 27.48% Often 28.57 8.93 43.33 20.61 Occasional 32.14 37.50 16.67 31.30 Seldom 12.50 33.92 10.81 20.61 Never — —— - Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=»56) (N=56) (N=148) (N=131) Note: The missing data are not included. When we apply "age" as a controlling variable one will discern that the younger generation are more disobedient than the older people. As Table 8.15 indicates, older people of both the abangan and santri were very likely to obey order of the leader. Among the abangans, 55% of the older people will always or often follow order of their leader's. The figure is much lower for the younger people. The same phenomenon can be found among the santris. The data on Table 8.15 clearly indicate that younger people do not blindly follow their leader's behavior as suggested by Jackson in his study. That is the reason why one young Islamic party activist from Sukamulya said: 266 "We have been harassed and intimidated from every angle. The district officials makes us their main target, especially in this sub-district. We can and will rely upon our young people because they just do not like Golkar's overacting. They do not listen to our lurah or village officials. I am very convinced that we will prevail."16 As discussed earlier that there are two possible explanation about the above phenomenon. First, the life cycle phenomenon, that is, the boldness of the young to disobey their parents; or, second, broad trend of a changing values in rural society concerning the relationship between parents and children. And certainly it will have an impact on the decision to vote in the future elections. In attempt to comprehend this phenomenon, it is inters'eting to observe whether education has an impact on changing of social values in Brobanti. The reason is because of the popular belief that education is one of the variables that can bring about social change. In the case of Brobanti, the question then are the more educated persons relatively more active in interacting with leaders than the less educated one? Furthermore, does education affect the degree of loyalty and obedience toward leaders?. The available data seem to answer affirmatively that the more educated respondents are relatively more active in interacting with their leader. As shown in Table 8.16 those who have a high level of education are more active than the 16.Personal discussion with Astari. 267 respondents in other categories, such as junior high school, primary school, and no education. The relationship between education and interaction is quite strong as indicated by the value of Chi Square which is significant at .001, and other statistics, such as Pearson contingency coefficient (C), and Taufc, .217 and .153, respectively. Table 8.16 The Relationship Between Education and Interaction Degree of Interaction Education High Low High (N»98) 63.27% 36.73 100.00 Medium (N“137) 36.50 63.50 100.00 Low (N“174) 38.51 61.49 100.00 No Educ. (N161) 29.81 70.19 100.00 Note: The Chi square (28.06) value is significant at .001, C coefficient is .217, and Tauj;, is .153 The relationship between education and interaction becomes even stronger when we control for the socio-religious orientation variable (Table 8.17). The value of Chi Square increased to 53.552 and is significant at .001. Othe statistics also indicate the strength of the relationahip with the C coefficient of .293, Tauj, of .262, as revealed in the following table. 268 Table 8.17 The Relationship Between Education and Interaction By Socio-Relirious Orientation Degree of Education High Low Degree of ------Interaction Abangan Santri Abangan Santri High 78.79% 66.15 39.22 31.06 Low 21.21 33.85 60.78 68.94 Total 100.00% 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=33) (N°62) (N=153) (N=322) Note: The value of Chi Square (53.552) is significant at .001, the C coefficient is .293, and Tau^ is .262 The Brobanti data also indicate a quite significant negative relationship between education and the degree of obedience and loyalty toward leaders, which is measured by the degree of respondents follow their leaders advice. As shown in Table 8.18 the less educated people are more loyal and obedient than the better educated ones. The percentage of those who have a high or medium degree of education who follow the advice from their leaders is much lower than those from other categories. 269 Table 8.18 The Relationship Between Education and Obedience The Degree of Following Advice Total Education High Low High (N=98) 36.73% 63.27 100.00 Medium (N=98) 34.69 65.31 100.00 Low (N=102) 62.74 37.62 100.00 Ho Educ. (N=93) 89.25 10.75 100.00 Note: The Chi Square (75.603) is significant at .001, the C coefficient is .403, and the Tau^ is .195 The relationship between the two variables becomes stronger when we enter the third variable, that is, the socio-religious orientation as a controlling variable. Table 8.19 reveals that both the abanoan and Bantri respondents with low level of education have higher degree of obedience than those who have high degree education. The statistical indicators show a strong negative relationship between the variables. 270 Table 8.19 The Relationship Between Education and Obedience, By Socio-Religious Orientation • Degree of Education High Low Following Advice Abangan Santri Abangan Santri High 41.67% 32.00 73.91 53.93 Low 58.33 68.00 26.09 46.07 I I 1 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N“33) (N“62) (N=322) I 1 * H 1 1 1 H t 1 O i 1 * Z 1 O 1 D 1 1 i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 H • • 1 1 H 1 WO O 1 u 1 I • Note: The Chi Square value is significant at .001, C coefficient is .523, and the Tau^ ia .322 The question then arises concerning the implication of the above findings. What does it tell us concerning the role of education in social interaction in rural Java? Does it also indicate that the process of economic development in the last two decades has brought about social transformation in Rural Java? And is education not an indication of social class but an independent variable itself as has been depicted by the Western development literature?. Early paradigm on the theory of modernization and social change, for example Daniel Lerner (1958) and Karl W. Deutch (1961) argued that socio-economic development, measured by the increasing of income, lteracy, etc., will bring about political development, measured in part by the degree of 271 political participation. The classical work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture clearly revealed a strong relationship between education and participation, that is, those who have a higher degree of education will more likely be active in the political and social affairs within the community. In the Indonesian case, Dwight King (1983) has conducted a similar study which also revealed that those who had undergone social mobilization will be more likely to be involved in social and political affairs in their community than the people with a lower degree of social mobilization. The Brobanti data support King's findings. In the last ten years Brobanti has undergone a significant change in terms of the level of education. In the village of Sukaramai, for example, there are six primary schools, six junior high schoolsm, two secular high schools, and one Islamic high school.17 The young people from Brobanti do not have to travel to the nearest town (Bantul and Wates) or to the city of Yogyakarta to enter high school as their parents used to do. The impact of increasing the level of education is that, as shown in the case of Brobanti, the people become more critical when they receive messages from their leaders which 17.Sukadamai village only has six primary schools, while Sukamulya has four primary schools and two primary Islamic schools (madrasvah). Source: The village Annual Report. 1981 and 1982. The Directorate of Rural Development, Office of the Governor of Special Province of Yogyakarta. 272 eventually change the degree of loyalty and obedience to their leaders. In other words, respondents with a high degree of education will be more likely to disobey the advice, suggestion, and order from their leaders. Leadership and Voting Usually one year prior to election time, local leaders are confronted with a delicate problem. Village officials and their spouses are busy with meetings at both the district and sub-district offices. They are summoned to listen to speeches delivered by the bureaucrats and local military officers of the strategy on how to prevail In elections.18 They are also assigned certain figures as targets to be pursued to win in their respective villages. The ability to gain more than the assigned target is an indication of "good" behavior and loyalty to the government. Otherwise they will be embarrassed and suspect in the eyes of higher officials and fellows from other village.19 The non-formal leaders on 18.The official name of the activity is "Pekan Santiaji Pemilihan Umum, or General Elections Preparation Week," conducted at both the district and sub-district level. 19.When I told one of the village headmen in the district that I want to do field research in Sukamulya, the village headman laughed and said "Sukamulya lurah is not really a Golkar supporter. Our bupati (head of the kabupaten) doubted his loyalty to Golkar and to government because the PPP always prevails in elections in Sukamulya." Personal meeting with a young lurah from Kulonprogo District, January 27, 1986, when he visited my office in Yogyakarta. 273 the other hand do not have that kind of pressure because they are more in a defensive situation. Certainly they are not assigned with a certain figure to be accomplished. Nevertheless it is safe to say that the election is a contest of political popularity between the lurah and other village officials against the non-formal leaders, especially in a situation where which the latter is difficult to coopt because of a sharp contrast in ideology, interest, and religious orientation. The principal interest of village officials is to convincingly prevail while the interest of non-formal leaders is to maintain respect from fellow villagers. Zt is therefore possible to draw the following hypothesis in this analysis. First, "People vote in an election on the basis of their attachment to a certain leader in the village." It means that there is an association between the way people vote and the pattern of leadership in a village. Second, "In a situation in which the formal leader does not have a strong rival in the village, the government party (Golkar) will win, otherwise, the opposing party will prevail." Do the data from Brobanti support the above hypothesis?. Before answering this question it is interesting to note the typical political atmosphere in the villages prior to election time. 274 A highly political activity comes to rural Java just about six months before an election. Although the official campaigns begins one month before casting the ballot, local political leaders already engage in building and maintaining relationship with their respective constituents.20 They actively visit people even without a clear election purpose but they at least give "hints" to people. An articulate young man from Sukadamai described the process as follows: "When election time comes every pamong and other prominent figure seem to be very nice. Our lurah and kepala dukuh tell us to remember number 2, while our kyai asks us to stick with number 3. Sometimes they do not directly ask to vote for a certain number, but we know what they mean. But they also threaten us, especially the pamong. Actually I do not like election time because people becomes suspicious of other people."21 When the respondents were asked whether they Beek advice from their leader when they make a decision on voting, the answer seems to vary. Among the 570 respondents, only 14% answer positively and follow their leader's advice, and 20% gave a positive answer but did not follow the advice to vote for a certain party. About 15% of the respondents gave a 20,The new elections law only give one month to campaign prior to and one respite week before casting the ballot. 21.Personal interview (February 3,1986) with Mr. Kusnen (not his real name) from Sukadamai when I asked him to describe his perceptions of the political atmosphere during the election. He is about 27 years old, a high school graduate, and very active in his village. 275 negative answer because they already knew the position of their leader so that seeking their advice was unnecessary. About 36% gave negative answer because it was the leader that visited them and suggested to vote for a certain party, and 14% said they made their own decision (Table 8.20). Table 8.20 Respondent's Relation With Leader When They Vote in the Election Seeking Advise When Vote in Election Percentage Yes, and I vote according to his suggestion 13.86% Yes, but I did not follow his suggestion 20.18 No, because X already knew what party he was going to vote 15.09 No, he visited me and suggested me to vote for party X 36.14 No, X made my own decion 14.73 Total (N=570) 100.00% Source: From the question "When you vote in the election, do you seek advice from your leader?." When we attempt to look accross the socio-religious orientation, there seems to be a difference between the abangan and the santri. About one-fifth of the abangan said that they made their own decision compared to only 11% of the santri, but about 23% of the santri said that they did not follow the leader's suggestion. Furthermore, almost half of 276 the abangan respondents said that their leader visited them and suggested to vote for a certain party, compared to only 32% of the santri (Table 8.21). Table 8.21 Respondents Relations With Leader When They Vote in Election, by Religious Orientation Respondent's Religious Orientation Seeking Advise -----— ------In Election Abangan | Santri Yes,and I vote according to his suggestion 19.35% 11.20% Yes,but I did not follow his suggestion 15.05 22.65 No, because I already knew what party he was going to vote 11.29 16.92 No,He visited me and suggested to vote for party X 45.16 31.77 No, I made my own decision 9.14 17.45 Total 100.00(Nb 186) 100.00(NB384) The overall data from Brobanti seem to support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between attachment to a certain leader and voting for a certain party. As shown in Table 8.22, the relationship is quite strong (the X2 value is significant at .001, and the Contingency Coefficient score is .375). Nevertheless, not all people who have an attachment to religious leaders vote for an Islamic party because 43% of Golkar votersare attached to religious leaders, as are 4% of 277 PDI voters. The similar notion can be applied to the PPP because 25% of the respondents who are attched to village officials voted for PPP. It is important to note that in the three villages, all lurahs are santri and returned pilgrims (haji) as well. The respondents who have attachment to village officials therefore do not necessarily cast their ballots for Golkar. The religious linkage between officials and the voters was an important factor why santri people voted for Golkar. Table 8.22 The Relationship Between Attachment to Leaders and Voting for a Party Attachment to Leaders vil.Offs. Rel.Ldrs Others PDI 6.82% 4.03% 32.76% Golkar 67.80 42.74 36.21 PPP 25.38 53.23 31.03 Total 100.00% 100.00 100.00 (N™264) (N°248) (N°58) Note : Chi Square is significant at pc.OOl, and Contingency Coefficient(C) is .375 When we control the socio-religious orientation, the pattern of relationship becomes stronger and the value of Contingency Coefficient(C) increased to .542 as shown in Table 8.23. The santri respondents who are attached to village officials were evenly divided between Golkar and the PPP, but among the santri respondents who are attached to religious leaders 59% voted for PPP, and 40% for Golkar, while among the abangans 62% of them voted for Golkar, 24% for PDI, and 15% for PPP. Table 8.23 Attachment to Leaders and Voting, By Socio-religious Orientation Vil. Offs 1 Rel. Ldrs Others Vote for Abg Str 1 Abg Str Abg Str PDI 46.06% _ 23.53 .01 70.83 5.88 Golkar 85.94 50.74 61.76 39.72 35.00 44.12 PPP — 49.26 14.71 59.36 4.17 50.00 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=128) (N“136) (N=34) (N°214) (N=24) (N°34) Note : The value of is significant at .001, and the Contingency Coefficient(C) is .542 The individual village data seem to reveal a clearer relationship between informal leaders, santri voters, and the PPP. As stated in the second hypothesis, in a situation in which the formal leaders do not have strong competitors from the non-formal leaders, the probability of the government party (Golkar) to fully control the electoral process in the village is much greater than in the village with strong non- formal leaders that have different vision, interest, and ideology. In the village of Sukamulya, 71% of the 107 respondents who are attached to religious leader voted for the PPP, and 82% of those who are attached to village officials cast their ballots for Golkar (Table 8.24). This is the village that the bureaucrats like to label as the "most stubborn" village in the whole district of Kulonprogo. Golkar has never been able to prevail in an election in this village. The village headman himself was a staunch supporter of the Islamic party but he had to change his party to save his office because of the "monoloyalty" process. Their constituents did not follow their footsteps to support Golkar. Table 8.24 Attachment to Leaders and Voting: Sukamulya Village Vil.Offs I Rel. Ldrs I Other Vote For Abg str |I Abg Str | Abg Str PDI 8.82% 20.00 50.00 _ Golkar 82.36 100.00 80.00 29.41 50. 00 - PPP 8.82 —— 70.58 100 .00 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 .00 (N=34) (N“3) (N=5) (N=102) (N=6) (N=15) Note: The value of X2 is significant at .001, and the Contingency Coefficient(C) is .600 The most important factor that makes the PPP prevail in this village is the presence of two prominent figures. The first one is Kyai Haji Ahmad who emerged as the most influential person who no other individual, even the village 280 headman, is able to challenge. From the 1950s Kiyai Ahmad was a member of the traditional Islamic party, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). When the regrouping of parties occurred in 1973, Kyai Ahmad emerged as the principal activist of the PPP, widening his constituency beyond the NU community. One village official told me that "Kyai Ahmad is very powerful in this village. He is not rich even though he has some pieces of land, but everybody respects him, even village officials. His knowledge of Islamic teachings is unmatched.1,22 The second influential figure is a young man, Astari. He has great influence among young people in the village. Golkar does not have a young person as influential as Astari. He is an active member of Muhammadyah, an organization that has very strong influence in Brobanti and Yogyakarta. In 1982 he was elected to the local legislature. The combination of these two prominent figures, especially since they represent the two mainstreams(NU and Muhammadiyah) of Javanese Islam makes the PPP a formidable opponent of the government party in the general elections. The Sukadamai village gives another picture of rivalry between the two types of leadership. In earlier elections the Islamic party showed a strong performance by defeating both the government party and PDI. Its influence, however, 22.Personal interview with Mr. Achda (February 4, 1986), a village official in Sukamulya. He joined the police force until the early 1980s, when he left and competed in election for village office. His father was also a pamong. He is about 38 years old. 281 weakened when village officials joined Golkar because of the "monoloyalty" process. Their constituents followed them. The Islamic party, however, was still a formidable opponent of Golkar and PDI because the PPP prevailed ‘in the 1977 elections, and gained a substantial number of votes in 1982 (Table 8.25). The reason was that in Sukadamai there were two hajis who gained respect from people in the village. But village officials were still the most influential figures in Sukadamai. A large majority of the respondents, both abangans and santri, in this village who are attached to village officials vote for Golkar, while about 38% of the santri voted for the PPP, and 26% of the abangan for the PDI. Among those who are attached to religious leaders 72% voted for the Islamic party, and 26% for Golkar (Table 8.25). In this village the influence of the kepala dukuh and lurah is very strong. The lurah himself is a very devoted Muslim, a member of the Muhammadiyah. According to people from Sukadamai, the Muhammadiyah leader was a Sukadamai village official and still visits the village regularly. In the 1982 elections, Muhammadyah did not have clear position on what party should be supported. The people in this village therefore followed % 282 their lurah and kepala dukuh.23 There are several hajis (returned pilgrims) but their political inclination was not clear. Table 8.25 Attachment to Leaders and Voting: Sukadamai Village Vill.Offs Rel . Ldrs Other Vote for Abg str | Abg Str I Abg Str PDI 25.64% — 100.00 8.00 100.00 _ Golkar 74.36 62.50 - 26.00 - 64.29 PPP — 37.50 - 72.00 — 35.71 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 ( N=35) (N=48) (N-3) (N=50) (N“5) (N14) Note: Chi Square(X2) value is significant at .001, and the C score is .599 The Sukaramai village presents a different picture since the government party has been able to consistently control village politics. Of the respondents who have attachment to village apparatus, 81% of the abangan and 47% of the santri voted for Golkar. Among the respondents who are attached to religious leaders, 61% of the santri and 58% of the abangan voted for Golkar and only 39% of the santri voted for PPP. One interesting point should be noted is that about 54% of the santri who are attached to village officials voted for PPP (Table 8.26). In this village there is no strong 23.In the 1971 and 1977 general elections Muhammadyah had a clear position on what party to support, that is, the Islamic party. 283 informal leader, but the Muslims in this village are mostly influenced by religious leaders from nearby villages either from Sukamulya or a village that has a pesantren. The village officials, on the other hand, are very popular, and quite a number of civil servants reside in this village. Table 8.26 Attachment to Leaders and Voting: By Socio- Religious Orientation, Sukaramai &SSS==SSSSSBBB8BnSBnSSBBSSBSS8SBSSS&BSeBeB8BBBS8BSSStS8B Vill. Offs. Rel.Ldrs Other Vote for Abg str | Abg Str | Abg Str PDI 19.12% 26.32 36.36 - Golkar 80.88 47.42 57.89 60.87 63.64 85.71 PPP 53.95 15.79 39.13 14.29 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N°68) (N-76) (N»19) (N=69) (N=ll) (N=7) Note: The Chi Square is significant at .001, and the coefficient is .512 Finally, it is important to look at the performance of each party in the elections from 1971 to 1982. The Brobanti data indicate the strong persistence of the voters in Sukamulya to vote for the Islamic party, and the voters in Sukaramai to vote for the government party. 284 Table 8.27 The Election Results In The Three Villages: 1971 - 1982 Sukadamai Sukaramai Sukamulya Party '71 *77 '82 '71 '77 '82 '71 '77 82 PDI 17.2% 18.03 11.18 21.1 20.9 18.37 7.12 7.9 6.37 61k 44.32 36.16 48.25 52.8 53.46 54.49 26.37 22.9 31.31 PPP 38.52 45.81 40.57 26.3 25.63 26.78 66.51 69.2 62.32 Note: The 1971 election result of the PDI is a combinat ion of five parties, while the PPP is from the four Islamic parties, Source: PemerintahDaerah Tinckat II, Kulonprogo, Pemilihan Umum 1977. 1982. What we can conclude from the above is that in Sukamulya where the informal Islamic leader was very strong and able to challenge the formal leader, the non-government party (PPP) prevailed over Golkar. Since in Sukaramai no informal leaders existed, the government party was very strong. In Sukadamai, on the other hand, the formal leaders were very strong while at the same time the informal gained some respect. The strength of the PPP in this village rested on the fact that the Muhammadiyah social organization has a number of followers. 285 Conclusion Throughout the analysis I have attempted to uncover the relationship between the pattern of leadership and voting behavior in Brobanti. One important contribution of the finding in this chapter, I believe, is the empirical analysis that supports Geertz'searlier notion that leadership has its own political and social constituency based on socio-religious orientation. The followers will be inclined to engage in political affairs based on the concordance of their attitudes with the leader. This study thus rejects Karl Jackson's contention that ideology does not play any significant role in linking the behavior of political leaders and their constituents. My data clearly indicate that religion, as ideology, is the most critical linkage between the leader and its followers. Jackson is clearly mistaken, at least in the case of Brobanti, when he argues that "obedient behavior is not based on agreement with the leader's position regardless of the ideological contradictory turns that he may take" (1980, p.186). This study also indicates that villagers do not blindly follow their leader's instruction, order, advice, or suggest ion. In Sukaramai village, for example, the majority of respondents who have a strong attachment to a religious leader vote for Golkar, the government party. "In a fundamental sense, the opinions of the follower were 286 determined long time ago, perhaps twenty years earlier when he entered a dependency relationship with particular leaders," Jackson argued (1980, p.187). This is clearly untrue, the Brobanti data reject this argument. * Finally, this study does not advocate the application of the clientilistic model of political behavior. The reason is that in rural Java people have a . tendency to respect authority, but not on the base of an exchange motivation. The relationship is sincere because it is based on the unmaterialistic motivation, or on the basis of "ichlas." The rationale for this behavior is clearly non-economic. i CHAPTER IX CLASS: DOES IT HATTER? Introduction This chapter is devoted to analyzing the role of class in affecting electoral behavior. What I mean by class is a position of an individual voter in Brobanti measured by occupation, land ownership, and so on. Income is not included because it is very difficult to measure since most of the respondents in the village, except for civil servants, do not have fixed income. The purpose of writing this chapter is to discuss whether class has an impact on political behavior, especially electoral behavior in rural Jawa. The reason for conducting the Analysis is that there is an ongoing debate among scholars whether class is germane in observing Indonesian politics. I will argue that because there is no political institution that is willing to articulate class interest in rural Java, the role of class as an explanatory variable is less distinct than other variables such as socio-religious orientation, party identification, and leadership. 287 288 Class and Voting In studies of voting and party support In Western political systems there is a clear indication that political parties establish their base of support along class lines. The source of partisan political behavior is also connected with the socio-economic status of an individual who supports a certain party that advocates his/her economic interest. Labor, the poor, the landless peasants, and so on, are well, connected with the party of the left or parties with a socialist outlook. The rich or the well to do, the employer, the better educated, the landowner, on the other hand, are the principal supporters of the right wing or conservative political party. The study of party support and voting in the United States clearly reveals the general pattern of support of both the Democratic and Republican parties. In earlier studies of voting, Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates (1944, 1954) found that socio-economic status or class is one important variable in explaining vote in addition to religion, race, ethnic, regional, and rural-urban cleavages (1954, pp.54-87). They found out also that the majority of business, professional, and white-collar groups were supporters of the Republican Party, while workers voted for the Democratic party1. ^-.This study also revealed that solidarity among the upper strata was higher than the lower one, and there was a tendency among the latter to split their allegiance. 289 A series of studies conducted by Angus Campbell and his colleague (1954, I960, and 1966) also indicated that class and voting were intercorrelated. In the American study, therefore, it is possible to see a continuous pattern, of party support based on socio economic status or class. Class plays a significant role in explaining electoral behavior in other countries as well. "Class is the basis of British party politics,” Pulzer argues (quoted in Rose, ed, 1974, p.700). Butler and Stokes (1969) have also demonstrated the way class affected party support and electoral behavior. According to Richard Rose (in Rose, ed, 1974, pp. 500-517) the majority of upper-middle class voters were inclined to support the Conservative Party, while the vast majority of the working class voted for the Labor Party. The same phenomena can be discerned in the Netherlands. "Of the various socio-cultural variables, religion (church affiliation and church attendance) and social-class should be the best predictors of party preferences," Arend Lijphart argued concerning electoral support in the Netherlands (in Rose, ed, 1974, p. 243). This is clearly the case for the major secular parties such as the W D (The Liberal Party) and the PvdA (The Labor Party).2 The lower-class strongly 2 .The W D stands for VolksnartH voor Vriiheid en Democratie. or People'Party For Freedom and Democracy; whire the PvdA stands for Partii van de Arbeid, or the Labor Party. For a complete analysis of party system in the Netherlands please see Arend Lijphart, the Politics Of Accommodation 290 supports the Labor Party, while the middle-upper class tends to vote for the Liberal Party. Hence, socio-economic status or class is still the stronger predictor of party support in the Netherlands, especially for the secular parties. Similar trends can be seen in almost all industrialized countries such as Italy (Samuel Barnes, 1974; Giacomo Sani, 1974), Belgium (Keith Hill, 1974), Australia (Autkin and Kahan, 1974), and so on. The reason, according to Lijphart, is that "social class is a universal feature of industrialized nations," (in Rose, ed, 1974, p. 262). Class_and Political Behavior in Indonesia: A_Continuing Debate If class or socio-economic status, measured by occupat ion, income, and so on, is the best predictor in industrialized countries, does it help to explain Indonesian political behavior, especially in shedding the light on individual behavior such as voting in rural Java? There seems to be an ongoing debate on the significance of class in politics in Indonesia (Anderson and Kahin, 1982). The debate usually concerns whether class or culture has the better role as an explanatory variable of political behavior in Indonesia. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968). 291 Among others, it was Mortimer (1969) who started to doubt the usefulness of class. The reason, according to Mortimer, was that class cleavages were superseded by other cleavages such as religions and ethnic, that have penetrated the Indonesian polity for a long time. "From Marxian premises themselves," Mortimer argued, "we would expect to find class cleavages at the time of Indonesian independence occupying a rather low rating in comparison with other, older and more deeply-entrenched social divisions, a number of which, for various reasons, were intensified in the late colonial and early independence years," (1969, p.5).3 Social mobilization in rural Java, according to Mortimer, can not be channeled through class appeal simply because the poor peasants are tightly bound by "the traditional patronage." The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), for example, had access to the people in rural Java through "channels of patronage, kinship and traditional influence," Mortimer argued (1969, p. 6).4 Consequently, mass mobilization was based not along class lines but through the socio-religious cleavages, i.e., the santri-abanaan (in 3 .In his later work on giving an account of the Communist Party in Indonesia, Mortimer gave a more comprehensive analysis of why the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) applied other strategies rather than class. For a further analysis please see Rex Mortimer, (1974), Indonesian Communist Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics. 1959-1965. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press. 4.The same account was also given by Selosumardjan in social Change in Yocrvakarta (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 166-173. 292 Java), Islam versus non-Islam (the Outer Islands), and therefore, "a class-based alternative had proved unworkable," Mortimer ended his arguments.5 Another scholar seems to support the significance of class as an explanatory variable of political behavior. W.F. Wertheim (1969) argued that Javanese society is well structured between the prlvavi aristocracy and the common people (wong gedhe versus wona cllikl. The similar pattern can be discerned in the village between the nuclear villagers, that is, those who are the original settlers of the village, and the newcomer families who can not control the land but work as share croppers.5 What is interesting in Javanese villages, according to Wertheim, is that village leaders, who are rich and control a larger portion of the land, had different political orientation which eventually led to the polarization of politics in rural Java, i.e., the aliran in the Geertzian sense. Those leaders added another dimension of rural politics, that is, the politics of 5 .There was a time the PKI attempted to rally the masses through the channel of class consciousness, that is, when it sponsored the aksi seoihak (Unilateral Action) in 1964-65 against the landowner, especially in East Jaya and North Sumatra. It ended up, however, with failure because of the strong opposition from the Muslim leaders and the army. e .This distinction, I would argue, is no longer valid since the newcomers can own the land so long as they have the purchasing power. Unfortunately I was not able to find data on landlord absenteeism in Yogyakarta. 293 patronage. It was those leaders who commanded the poor peasantry to take revenge against the communist failure of aksi seoihak (unilateral action). Parties in Javanese villages, according to Wertheim, in the early and mid 1960s had shifted from the aliran to class struggle, however. Again he took into serious consideration the case of aksi seoihak in Java that was sponsored by the communists to confiscate land from the santri landowners to make landreform law into reality. For Wertheim the dimension of class in rural politics of Java is inevitable. He insisted on the importance of a more thorough analysis of the relationship between socio-economic class and political orientation. "Even in the absence of more concrete data, however, it is possible to elaborate its sociological implications at greater depths," he argued (1965, p.5). A more recent plea for the significance of class analysis came from an Australian scholar, Kichard Robison (in Anderson and Kahin, 1982, pp. 131-148). He faulted the cultural mode of analysis because its proponents "fail to comprehend the dynamics of politics; and, more important in terms of New Order Indonesia, they fail to provide a means for explaining why power and conflict exist there in their present form," (p.131), and after all the cultural approach focuses its attention upon the style of the regime and not the substance, "and it ignores the very real socio-economic dimension of the New Order," Robison argued. According to Robison, the New Order regime consists of Ma complex alliance," of bourgeois classes such as the politico-bureaucratic class, the Chinese business community, and the domestic urban middle-class.7 These classes are integrated in such a way through the provision of legal and politico-economic infrastructures in order to form a capitalist mode of production. Furthermore, this alliance has the power to transform rural villages class structures by implementing policies such as Bimas fBlmbinaan Massal. or Mass Guidance for self-suffiency in food), and a number of m o r e s (Instruksi Presiden, or Presidential Instruction) credit programs. Consequently, class divisions were deepened. The end product of the above politico-economic arrangements, according to Robison, is that "Rural society in Java appears quite clearly to be moving in the direction of concentration of land ownership and the attendant polarization of landed and landless," and, "That such a process is of crucial significance for the form of political relationship and the nature of power and conflict in Indonesia," he argued (1982, p. 138). Robison did not dismiss the significance of the cultural approach, i.e., the Javanese cultural perspective. The cultural approach is important but there are other 7.This phenomenon reminds me of the similar alliance in Brazil on the existence of what Peter Evans calls as "Triple Alliance" between the Multi National Corporation, Domestic Bourgeoisie, and the military-bureaucrats (Peter Evans, Dependent Development. 1983). 295 political cultures that must be taken into consideration, he said.8 Furthermore, the emergence of the new kulak class brings about more important consequences in village politics, and therefore "Client-patron networks will become more inadequate for securing political and economic accommodation between rural classes and structuring relationships between rural classes and the state," according to Robison (1982, p. 138). If Robison's arguments are valid, especially at the rural level, one should expect the emergence of conflict in Javanese villages that is based bn class, i.e., the poor landless peasant vis a vis the rich landowner.9 My point is that if such conflict emerges it will be articulated also in voting behavior. The poor and the landless villagers would inclined to support and to vote for the non-government party (PDI and PPP) while the rich and landed villagers would vote for the government sponsored party of Golkar provided Robison's arguments are valid. 8 .Unfortunately Robison did not elaborate further other dominant rival culture that stand up against the Javanese culture in Indonesian politics. 9 . There were some instances in the 1970s in which peasants' protest movement did exist, such as the case of Si Ria Ria villages in North Sumatra and the Jenggawah rural protest movement in East Java. Those protests, however, involved legal disputes between the tenant farmers in those areas who did not have legal right to the land they occupied. It was against the state, not the landed peasantry. 296 I have not been able to find any significant data on rural conflict based on class in Java since the New Order government assumed political domination. My observations indicate that it was the traditional allran cleavages that motivate individual voting preference. I would argue, then, that class does not indeed have explanatory power in explaining voting behavior in rural areas of Java. Rather I would be more inclined to look at the traditional allran pattern. 11 In the villages of Java, poor peasants are once again (or still) attached— and on increasingly unequal terms— to landowners or office holders. But even those who are conscious of their oppression and exploitation have no alternative leadership to which to turn and little prospect of finding any in a society deeply penetrated by military and civilian officials seemingly united in their pursuit of material self-interest," Liddle correctly put it (1977, p. 19). I would argue therefore that since the inception of the New Order government the role of political parties and mass organizations that usually articulate class interest has diminished drastically due to depoliticization. Class does not play any significant role in influencing individual voting decisions for a certain political party in elections in rural areas in Java. 297 Class and Voting In Brobanti Social stratification in rural areas, according to scholars such as Juan Linz (1976) and Arthur Stinchcombe (1961), is based on the distribution of rights to control land as well as on how to use those rights such as ownership, tenancy, cultivation, and so forth. Arthur Stinchcombe divided rural communities in several systems such as: "(1) the manorial or hacienda system; (2) family size tenancy; (3) family small holding; (4) plantation agriculture; and (5) capitalist extensive agriculture with wage labor or the rancho'1 (quoted in Linz, 1976, p. 367). The classical work of Pitirim Sorokin and his colleagues divided farm economic systems into six economic enterprises and then differentiated several strata of agricultural population into: (1) Proprietors of large, latifundi (um) -type- agricultural enterprises (2) Proprietors of smaller capitalist agricultural enterprises (3) Managers of tenants of large capitalist enterprises (4) Proprietors of farmer-capitalist agricultural enterprises (5) Proprietors of farmers agricultural enterprises (6) Tenants of capitalist agricultural enterprises (7) Tenants of farmer-capitalist agricultural enterprises (8) Tenants of farmer agricultural enterprises (9) Higher employees of capitalist and farmer- capitalist enterprises (10) Proprietors of peasant consumptive agricultural enterprises (11) Tenants peasant consumptive agricultural enterprises (12) Proprietors of proletarianizing or small decaying agricultural enterprises (13) Hired laborers of various types (Quoted in Juan Linz, 1976, p. 370). 298 Social stratification in rural Java is not as complicated as revealed by Sorokin and his colleagues. In the beginning, however, social stratification is merely based on the right to control land which include "kuli kenceng" for the land owning peasants, "kuli setengah kenceng" for the tenant farmers, and "wong ngindung" for the villagers who do not own land but stay on the neighbor's property.10 Due to the modernization process this classification is no longer valid in looking at class structure in Javanese villages. Hence classification based on multiple factors is more plausible. As defined earlier class in Brobanti is measured by the level of education, land ownership, and occupation. Income can not be included because of the difficulty in acquiring accurate information on income among people in Javanese villages. Except for the civil servants, most people in rural areas do not have fixed income to be recorded. Transforming their production into dollar values will take special method and require help from the economists. The first indicator is education. Does it play a major role in influencing individual political preference in Brobanti? Do people with higher education vote differently 10.For further analysis please see Sutardjo Hadikusumo, Desa (Bandung: Sumur, 1953) and Koentjaraningrat, "Tjelapar: A Village in South Central Java," in Koentjaraningrat, vilages in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967). 299 than people with lower or no education? From the available data It seems to be that the relationship between education and voting Is very weak (Table 9.1). From the table we can see that among individuals who vote for the PDI, 4% of them have college education, about 11% graduated from High School, 36% attended Junior High School, 28% finished Primary school, and about 21% are without any formal education. The pattern of Golkar voters is almost the same. Among the 306 respondents who voted for Golkar in the 1982 elections, about 8% are with college degree, 13% finished High School, 22% attended Junior High School, 31% finished Primary school, and 26% without any educational background or illiterate. For the PPP supporters (217), 5% of them attended college, 8% finished High School, 24% finished Junior High School, 30% were only able to finish Primary School, and about 32% did not go to school. 300 Table 9.1 The Relationship Between Education and Voting in Brobanti Villages Vote for JjcVc X WJL — —« Education PDI | Glk | PPP College 4.26% 7.52 5.07 High School 10.64 12.75 8.29 Junior HS 36.17 22.22 23.96 Primary Sch. 27.66 31.05 30.42 No School 21.27 26.46 32.26 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=47) (N=306) (N=217) Note : Chi Square is significant at p<.30, Contingency Coefficient(C)“ .128, Taujb = .070 The majority of those who attended college (36) voted for Golkar, that is, 63.89 per cent (Table 9.2). It is understandable since after graduating from college most Indonesians (Javanese) work for the government and they have no choice but to vote the government party. Nevertheless the above figures clearly indicate that the contribution of education toward explaining voting is weak. All parties draw almost the same proportion across educational levels. The simple statistical figures indicate that there is a relation ship between education and voting but that relationship is very weak as shown in Table 9.2. 301 Table 9.2 Education and Voting in Brobanti Vote for Level of - Total Education PDI 61k PPP College (N=36) 5.56% 63.89 30.56 100.00 HS (N=62) 8.06 62.90 29.04 100.00 JHS (N=137) 12.41 49.64 37.96 100.00 Pr.Sch.(N“174) 7.46 54.60 37.96 100.00 No Sch.(N=161) 6.21 50.31 43.48 100.00 In chapter VIII it was revealed that respondents with a higher degree of education behaved differenty than those with a lower degree or no education at all. The data indicated that there is a positive relationship between the level of education and the degree of interaction, i.e., the higher the level of education the more interactive an individual with leaders. It was also revealed that there is a negative relationship education and the degree of loyalty and obedien- ce toward leaders. It means that respondents with a higher degree of education have a tendency to be disobedient or indifferent toward their leaders. Since the analysis of this chapter has revealed that education does not have a substantial impact on voting, the question then arises concerning the implication of the findings on education in Chapter VIII. The most plausible explanation of this phenomenon is that education must not be included as indicator of class but a variable itself that can 302 be treated independently from class. Hence, this is different from the conventional procedures that has been followed for a long time in the Indonesian (Javanese) context in which education is an indicator of class. This prevailing perception is derived from the fact that according to Clifford Geertz (1960, 1965) in Java social class is divided into two principal layers, that is, wonq aedhe and wono ciltk. The former is considered to be better educated, more enlightened, has higher social status, and is more likely to have bureaucratic position, while the latter is usualy perceived as less educated, ignorant, and belonging to the common people. The above perceptions perhaps should be changed because Geert1s analysis was conducted more than two decades ago while the progress in Indonesia brings about changes in attitude and behavior. Hence, since the Brobanti data indicate that education makes a difference in political behavior, that is, the better educated people act differently when they interact with their leaders, it is about time to treat education not as indicator of class but of modernity. Hence it would be worthwhile, especially for future research, for future understanding of political culture in Indonesia. The second indicator is occupation. In rural Java, as shown in previous chapters, occupation is categorized in several classes such as farmer, farm laborer, retailer, civil servant, and other (including tailor, artisans, services 303 [bicycle, motorbike, radio and television reparation], and the like). In this study there are only 420 respondents who can be included in the above categories since the rest of the respondents are dependents (spouse and children). From Table 9.3 we can observe that all respondents who work as civil servant voted for Golkar. It is not surpriding since the civil servants in Indonesia have no choice but to vote for Golkar. The relationship between occupation and voting in election is quite strong when civil servant is included in the table. When it is dropped from the calculation, however, the relationship is weak. The sample data indicate that the proportion of each occupation drawn by each party is almost the same. The PDI drew 17% of retailer, 45% are farmers, 24% farm laborers, and 14% of other occupations. Golkar drew almost the same proportion, that is, 12% retailers, 31% farmers, 26% farm laborer, and 8% from other occupation. The Islamic party (PPP) revealed the same indication. 304 Table 9.3 The Relationship Between Occupation and Voting in Brobanti Villages Vote for Types of — Occupation PDI | Glk | PPP Civil Servant 23.14% Retailer 17.24 11.57 10.74 Farmer 44.83 31.40 43.62 Farm Laborer 24.14 26.04 38.25 Other 13.79 7.85 7.38 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=29) (N=242) (N=149) Note : The value of Chi Square is significant at any level when civil servant category is included in the analysis. If it is not included, the Chi Square value drops sharply (from 43.761 to 5.003) and is not significant almost at all levels. As mentioned earlier all civil servant respondents voted for Golkar. Among the retailers, 10% voted for the PDI, 33% for PPP, and 57% supported Golkar (Table 9.4). For the farmer respondents only 8% voted for the PDI, almost half of them cast their ballots for Golkar, and 42% for the PPP. Half of the farm laborers voted for Golkar, 45% for the Islamic party, and only 6% for the PlDI. Respondents from other occupations reveal an almost similar proportion. 305 Table 9.4 Percentage of Voting From Each Occupation C=S8&8S«SSSBSSSSSeSSSS8BSBSSSfiSS&SttBB«SB8BR88BBSBBS8BB8SB Vote for Occupations ----- — Total % PDI Golkar PPP Civil Sr.(N=56) - 100.00 - 100.00 Retailer(N~49) 10.20 57.14 32.65 100.00 Farmer(N=154) 8.44 49.35 42.21 100.00 Farm Lbr.(N«127) 5.51 49.61 44.88 100.00 Other(N=34) 11.76 55.48 32.35 100.00 As shown in the table, if the civil servants are included in the analysis there seems to be a close association between occupation and voting preference. The value of Chi Square is very high and is significant at any level. When the civil servants are excluded from the analysis, however, one can find an interesting phenomenon in which occupation does not play any significant role in influencing voting behavior among the Brobanti villagers. The value of Chi Square drops sharply (from 43.761 to 5.003) and is not significant at the required levels (either at.05 or .10). It seems to be the case that all parties drew almost the same proportion of voters across occupational lines. The third indicator is land ownership. Do the rich peasants vote differently from the poor and landless?. This question is very intriguing because this phenomenon can also be found in other cases as Juan Linz has demonstrated (1976). 306 m Among the 362 households that are included in this study 7% have more than one hectare of land, 23% own between .5 to one hectare, 37 per cent have between .25 and .49 hectare, 19% have less than .25 hectare, and 15% are landless peasants (Table 9.5).11 Table 9.5 Disribution of Land Among Respondents in Brobanti BBSBBBSRBBBBBBBBBBeBBBBaBBBSBBBSBSStStS&BBSSBBBDBBBP Size of Land (in Hectare) Percentage > 1.00 6.63% .50 - 1.00 ■ 22.65 .25 - .49 36.74 < .25 18.51 Landless 15.47 Total 100.00 (N=362) For those who have more than one hectare of land, 58% voted for Golkar, 42% cast their ballots for the Islamic party (PPP), and none for the PDI. For the second category (.50-1.00 Ha), the majority of landowners (60%) voted for Golkar, 31.71 per cent voted for the PPP, and 9% supported the PDI. The similar pattern can be found among households in the third category (.25-.49 Ha), that is, 59%, 32%, and 9%, voted for Golkar, the Islamic Party, and the PDI, i:L.Land distribution in Indonesia is based not on individual ownership but on household. 307 respectively. For the poorer fanners, who own less than .25 Ha, 64% supported the government party of Golkar, 27% supported the PPP, and 9% for the PDI. Finally, among the landless peasants, 55% for Golkar, 30% supported the PPP, and finally 14% voted for the PDI. Table 9.6 Land Ownership and Voting in Brobanti Land Vote for Ownership (in Hectare) PDI | Glk | PPP > 1.00 _ 6.51% 8.77 .50 -1.00 21.21 22.79 22.81 .25 - .49 36.36 36.28 37.72 < .25 18.18 20.00 15.79 Landless 24.24 14.42 14.91 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N“39) (N°215) (N=114) Note : The value of Chi Square is 5*591 which is not significant, and the Pearson Contingency(C) is only .124, and the Tau^ is .0005. The above statistics indicate that the richest farmers are inclined to support the government party, and the not so rich farmers support the Islamic party, while the poor farmers or the landless support the weakest party. Nevertheless if we take a closer look at the above Table(9.6), we can observe that each political party is able to draw almost the same proportion of support across all the 308 categories of land ownership. What it means is that land ownership does not really affect the way the Brobanti villagers decide what political party they want to support. Except for the first category (more than 1.000 Ha), all parties drew the same amount of proportion of the voters. It is not strange that the majority of the rich people vote for Golkar since most of them are village officials foamonq desa) and their relatives. However, the data in this study indicate that, at least in Brobanti villages, land ownership does not really make any difference in explaining voting in Javanese villages. It is important therefore to look at the overall category of class in the analysis. By examining all indica tors among the respondents (570) there are 16.14% of them who can be included in the "upper-class" category, 35.61% are "middle-class," and 48.25% are included in the "lower-class" category. The statistical analysis on the relationship between class and voting indicates that class does not play any significant role in affecting voting behavior of the Brobanti villagers (Table 9.7). The PDI was able to draw 11% of the upper class villagers, Golkar gained 16% of the votes from the same category, and the Islamic party (PPP) gained 20% of support from the same group. All parties drew almost the same amount of proportion of support from the middle- class voters, that is, 38%, 34%, and 38%, for PDI, Golkar, and the Islamic party, respectively. 309 Table 9.7 The Relationship Between Class and Voting in Brobanti: The 1982 Elections Vote for Class ------Stratification PDI Glk PPP Upper 10.64% 15.69 19.79 Middle 38.30 33.66 27.79 Lower 51.06 50.65 44.24 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N=47) (N=306) (N=217) Note: The value of Chi Square (X2) is not signifi cant at any level, the Pearson C is .075, and the Tauj, is .003. If we further examine the relative contribution of each class category toward the proportion of voting in Brobanti we will be able to observe that each draws almost the same amount. Golkar, for example, draws 52%, 51%, and 56% from the upper, lower, and middle class, respectively. The same phenomena can be discerned for the other two parties. 310 Table 9.8 The Proportion of Class For Each Party Party Class Total % Stratification PDI Glk PPP Upper(N»92) 5.43 52.17 42.39 100.00 Middle(N“203) 8.87 50.74 40.39 100.00 Lower(N“275) 8.73 56.36 34.91 100.00 Does class have any relationship to socio-religious orientation, that is, the abanaan and santrl? The statistics indicate that there seems to be a significant relationship between class and socio-religious orientation even though the relationship is not very strong (Table 9.9). Among the upper-class voters, 41% of them are the abanaan. and 59% are the santri. For those who are the middle-class, however, 72% of them are the santri. and 28% are abanaanr while the lower- class respondents, 33% of them are the abanaan. and 67% belong to the santri group 311 Table 9.9 Class and Religious Orientation in Brobanti Religious Orientation Class ------— -— — Total % Stratification Abangan | Santri Upper (Ne=92) 41.30 58.70 100.00 Middle (N“203) 28.08 71.92 100.00 Lower (N=275) 33.09 66.91 100.00 Note: The value of Chi Square is sgnificant at p<.10, the Pearson Contingency Coefficient (C) is .094, and the Tau^ is .009 When we introduce the third variable, however, we will be able to observe a different perspective on the relationship between class and voting, that is, the socio religious orientation (abancan-santri). As revealed in Table 10 the relationship between class and voting is quite clear when we control religious orientation. The value of Chi Square is significant at any level, the Pearson Contingency (C) score is .510, and the Taujg is .207 which indicates a good relationship between the three variables. 312 Table 9*10 The Relationship Between Class and Voting By Controlling Socio-religious Orientation S=SSSSSSSSSSee£eBStteeStSSfi&&SBeSBBGBBeBBBSBBBBBSSBSaSS Class Stratification V o t e ------For Upper Middle Lower Abg str Abg Str Abg Str PDI 13.16 29.82 .01 23.08 1.63 Glk 86.84 27.78 66.67 44.52 72.53 48.37 PPP 72.22 3.51 54.74 4.40 50.00 Tot 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 (N*»38) (N-54) (N-57) (N“146) (N=91) (N«184) Note: The value of Chi Square is significant at any level, the Pearson Contingency (C) coefficient is .510, and Tau^ is .207 There are two important possible explanations concerning the lesser role of class in explaining voting behavior in Javanese villages. First, as Juan Linz argued, in the rural community based on subsistence agricultural production economic factors play a less important role in promoting conflict. Rather, "certain non-economic factors seem to be important determinants of political behavior. These include: religious sentiments; traditional and ideological loyalties; historical cleavages; urban cultural and ideological influences; ethnic-religious identifications; and so forth," Juan Linz argued (1976, p. 384). Why is this the case? Juan Linz then gave plausible reasons when he said that "The 313 greater independence from market situations probably contributes to this more traditional and ideological politics. The lesser sensitivity to market situations may also make members of this stratum less concerned with specific government policies, thereby leaving room for more generalized attitudes toward the 'government.'" (p. 384). The second explanation has to do with the absence of organized interest groups that are able to advocate landless farmers' or lower class people's interest. Since the New Order became the sole political power in the country the rural community in Indonesia is virtually free from competing interest groups politics. Peasants organizations such as Petani (Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia, National Association of Indonesian Farmers) of the PNI, Pertanu (Persatuan Tani of Nahdlatul Ulama, Association of the Nahdlatul Ulama Farmers) of the NU party, 6TII (Gerakan Tani Islam Indonesia or The Movement of Indonesian Muslim Farmers) of the Masyumi, and the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, The Indonesian Farmer's Front) of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), no longer exist in rural community. The Petani and BTI were the two peasant organizations that inclined, at least in rhetoric, to claim to promote the interest of the poor peasants, while the two Islamic peasant organizations reflected the interest of the landowner in rural areas. Under the New Order peasants are organized in such a way in order to protect the interest of the corporatist state, that is, all peasant organizations are incorporated into the HKTI (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia, or All-Indonesia Peasants Association). It is no coincidence that parties are no longer able to promote the interest of the poor peasants or plead for support through class consciousness. The only possible way is to rally the masses through the more emotional symbol, that is, religion. The Islamic party of PPP cleverly applied this symbol during election campaigns. The PDI once had a class flavor, but the PDI lost its raison d ’etre as Donald Hindley correctly pointed out. The third is, the traumatic experience of the aftermath of the attempted coup of G-30-S in 1965. One of the consequences of the coup was that thousands of members of the Communist Part (PKI) in rural Java were massacred. This was due to the fact that it was the communist party that willing to express class interest against the landowners, especially throughout the unilateral action or "aski sepihak." These are the reasons why class or economic interest is not a strong explanatory variable in Indonesian politics in the New Order. Conclusion Throughout the analysis I have attempted to demonstrate whether class affiliation does have an important effect on voting behavior in Brobanti villages. As indicated by the available data from the study it is clear that class is less significant in explaining electoral behavior in those 315 villages. Rather, it is the cultural variable that has a more significant role. The reason is that, first, in a small scale agricultural economy, such as in Java in which the strong landlord does not exist as well as the relative independence of the peasant from the market economy, the non-economic factors such as religion are more prominent than class. Second, the nonexistence of interest groups that promote * farmers interest along with the unification of peasant organization to protect the interest of the corporatist state make it impossible to create "class consciousness" among the peasants in Javanese villages. As Ossowsky has argued class analysis will be useful in a situation in which class consciousness exists. That is not the case in Javanese villages. What are the implications of this finding? First, this study does not seem to support earlier studies of voting behavior in Western political democracy. These studies indicated that elections are an expression of class struggle, as revealed by Lipset. That is not the case in Javanese villages, however. Second, this study has also contributted to the continuing debate among scholars (Indonesian specialists) whether class or culture has more explanatory power in giving an account for Indonesian or Javanese politics. This study clearly indicates that class has nothing to do with individual behavior in Javanese villages. CHAPTER X DISCRIMINANTS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR IN BROBANTI Introduction In this chapter I would like to wrap up the whole analysis before coning to the final conclusion of the study. It is devoted to revealing what variable or variables has relatively more contribution in explaining electoral behavior in Brobanti. As indicated earlier, in this study there are four major variables that I examined to explained voting or electoral behavior, that is, the socio-religious orientation (abangan-santrl), party identification, the pattern of leadership, and class or social stratification. The question then among those independent or explanatory variables which variable (s) has contributed more in explain ing the dependent variable (voting)?. Before answering this question, it is important to describe some methodological procedures applied in the analysis, that is, the discriminant analysis. 316 317 The_Discriminant Analysis of Voting What Is the principal reason of applying discriminant analysis In this study? The answer to this question Is It has to do with the measurement of the variables being analyzed. As revealed In Chapter II, the explained or dependent variable (voting) Is nominally measured, such as vote for the PDI, Golkar, and the PPP or a discrete variable. The independent variables are measured on the interval scale. It is logically unacceptable to employ the common and popularly known statistical analysis such as Pearson product-momment correlation, regression, and others, to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables that are being measured differently (Blalock, 1960). Discriminant analysis is a technique used to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in which one of those variables is measured on the nominal scale or discrete scale while the. rest are measured in iterval measurement. The relationship between those variables can be shown in the following figure. PLEASE NOTE: Duplicate page numbers. Text follows. Filmed as received. University Microfilms International 318 gJEaMRa Discriminating Variables Socio-Religious Beliefs Party Identification Leadership Class Extraneous Variables Figure 6: The Relationshp Between Voting For Parties With Discriminant Variables According to William R. Klecka (1980) the prinvcipal assumptions of discriminant analysis are the followings: (1) two or more groups: g > 2 (2) at least two cases per group: nl > 2 (3) any number of discriminating variables, provided that it is less than the total number of cases minus two : 0 XI Socio-Religious Beliefs PDI X2 Party Identification Golkar X3 Leadership PPP X4 Class xe Extraneous Variables Figure 6: The Relationship Between Voting For Parties With Discriminant Variables According to William R. Klecka (1980) the prinvcipal assumptions of discriminant analysis are the followings: (1) two or more groups: g > 2 (2) at least two cases per group: nl > 2 (3) any number of discriminating variables, provided that it is less than the total number of cases minus two : 0 In this study I have tried to follow the method and techniques as well as the assumptions of the principle of discriminant analysis. The,Discriminant of Voting in Brobanti What are the variables that have stronger discriminating power in this study? In answering this question the first thing to do is to calculate the discrimination coefficients of the independent variables, then the interpretation of the relative contribution of each variable in explaining the dependent variable will follow. The computer procedure was applied in calculating the discriminant coefficients of the independent variables.1 Following the procedures provided by Klecka (1980, p. 29), the standardized discriminant coefficients are able to be calculated as shown in the following table. 3-.In calculating the discriminant coefficients I used the statistical packages of Number Cruncher Statistical System or NCSS, version 4.2 and 5.0 by Jerry L. Hintze (Kaysville, Utah, 1987). 1 320 Table 10.1 Standardized Discriminant Coefficients of Votings BBSBBSsBBBSBSBBBBSBSBaBBBBSBSBBBBBssssBBBBBBSBBBBe Standardized Coefficients Variable PDI Golkar PPP Constant .4683403 1.08513 -.5534702 Socio-Relig. -.094427 -.132135 .226562 Party ID -.015067 -.095382 .210449 Leadership -.009805 .194359 .155447 Class -.004077 .079428 -.07547 From the above table we can observe that socio religious orientation is the most important discriminator for the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) voters. And the party identification/partisan choice, that is, the psychological attachment of an individual to a certain party regardless of legal recognition and party membership is also give signifi cant contribution as discriminator, followed by leaderrship. The least discriminating variable for voting the PDI is class. This is quite understandable since the conditions fpr raising class consciousness do not exist in villages revealed in previous analysis. It is possible, therefore, to believe that the abanaan voters are the strongest supporters of the PDI as revealed in the previous analysis. The socio-religious beliefs meausured by the degree of individual performance (behavior) in religious activities and committment to the religiour community fummat Islam) as revealed in Chapter VII is the most important discriminator for the Islamic party of PPP. As discussed earlier, the Muslim santris are inclined to support and to vote in accordance with socio-religious line, that is, the Islamic partry. The more they perform religious activities as well as the stronger their commitment to the spirit of ummat Islam the stronger their commitment to vote for an Isklamic party. Furthermore, due to the process of political socialization party identification seems to be the second strongest discriminator for the Islamic party voters, then followed by the pattern of leadership. From the above table we can observe that leadership has more significant role for the PPP voters than the people who support the PDI. Like the latter, however, class is the least discriminator variable for the PPP voters. It means that for those individuals who casted their ballots in general elections were not motivated by any class consciousness. The different phenomenon, however, can be discerned among the villagers who voted for the Golkar party. Leader ship variable is the strongest discriminatir for Golkar voters. The existence of formal leaders (village officials) who support the government party along with their ability to convince people to vote for Golkar seem to be very important 322 in explaining the pattern of party support for Golkar. The second discriminating variable appears to be the socio religious orientation for Golkar voters. As indicated in Chapter VII and VIII, Golkar drew strong support among the moderate of both abanaan and santri denominations. The relative contribution of each variable has more meanings when we further attempt to follow the stepwise procedures of the discriminant analysis. In the stepwise procedures each variable is entered in the analysis in the subsequent phases or step by step. From these procedures we shall be able to discerned the impact of the variable we put into the analysis and the significant of the variable entered in the procedure by looking at the F statistics. The follow ing table revealed the impact of each variable as shown in the stepwise procedures. 323 Table 10.2 Entry Statistics for Stepwise Selection, Forward Step Classification Variable: Voting Step 1 In Variable R2-Ad F-Val F-Prob R2-X's No XI .2153 77.8 . 0.0000 0.0000 No X2 .1704 58.2 0.0000 0.0000 No X3 .0492 14.7 0.0000 0.0000 No X4 .0046 1.3 0.2681 0.0000 Wilk's Lambda 1.000 Step 2 Yes XI .2153 77.8 0.0000 0.0000 No X2 .0839 25.9 0.0000 0.1552 No X3 .0259 7.5 0.0006 0.0428 No X4 .0098 2.8 0.0611 0.0114 Wilk's Lambda .7847 Step 3 Yes XI .1334 43.6 0.0000 0.1552 Yes X2 .0839 25.9 0.0000 0.1552 No X3 .0243 7.0 0.0010 0.1552 No X4 .0152 4.4 0.0131 0.0160 Wilk's Lambda .7189 Step 4 Yes XI .1235 39.8 0.0000 0.1751 Yes X2 .0824 25.4 0.0000 0.1639 Yes X3 .0243 7.0 0.0010 0.0526 No X4 .0152 4.4 0.0131 0.0160 Wilk's Lambda .7014 Step 5 Yes XI .1278 41.3 0.0000 0.1792 Yes X2 .0834 27.0 0.0000 0.1677 Yes X3 .0243 7.0 0.0010 0.0526 Yes X4 .0152 4.4 0.132 0.0160 Wilk's Lambda .6907 Note: No indicates the variable is not entered into equation. 324 The above outcomes of the stepwise procedures clearly indicate the relative contribution of each variable toward explaining the dependent variable. In the first step in which no variable was not included into the equation, three variables exhibited a strong discriminator with the signifi cant coefficient of F, that is, the socio-religious beliiefs, party identification, and leadership, while class reveals a very low level of significant (.268). When the first variable is included in the second step, that is, the variable with the highest F coefficient (XI), the Wilk's Lambda2 decreased significantly from a perfect 1.000 to .7847. When the second variable (X2) was included the Wilk's Lambda also went down to .7189. At the final step it has been reduced to .6907 which indicates a not so strong prediction. It nevertheless reveals the relative contribut ion of each variable. The above procedure is called the forward procedure in which all variables are not included at the first step. The backward procedure (all variables are included) will clearly indicate how each variable contributes in the equation. Again, it indicates that class does not exhibit a “'significant contribution as revealed in the following table. 2 .Unlike the correlation coefficient, the Wilk's Lambda has a reverse interpretation. It ranges from 1.00 to -l.oo. The perfect score of 1.00 or -1.00 indicates a very weak prediction, while if it closes to 0.00 it means a very strong prediction. 325 Table 10.3 Entry Statistics For Stepwise Selection, Backward Step Classification Variable: Voting Step 1 In Variable R2-Ad F-Val F-Prob R2-X1s Yes XI .1278 41.3 0.0000 0.1792 Yes X2 .0834 27.0 0.0000 0.1677 Yes X3 .0243 7.0 0.0010 0.0526 Yes X4 .0152 4.4 0.0123 0.0160 Wilk's Lambda .0697 Step 2 Yes X2 .1635 55.2 0.0000 0.0396 Yes X3 .0352 10.3 0.0000 0.0299 Yes X4 .0105 3.0 0.0512 0.0111 Wilk's Lambda .0797 Step 3 Yes X3 .0489 14.6 0.0000 0.0009 Yes X4 .0044 1.2 0.2883* 0.0009 Step 4 Yes X4 .0046 1.3 0.2861* 0.0000 Note: *The F coefficient is significant at only .288 and .286 levels which is very low. From the bove processes we will be able to discern that the class variable (X4) becomes more and more insiginificant in the equation. When the other three variables are not included in the equation the Wilk's Lambda coefficient went up to .9954 which indicates a very low level of prediction of class in the analysis. One task remain to be performed in this chapter. In chapter IX, in accord with the framewrok of this study, education was at first treated as an indicator of social 326 class. I have also treated It this way In the discriminant analysis above. From the analysis of chapter IX, however, one could observe that education seems to be distinct from class since those who have a higher education behave differently from those with with lower degree or no education at all in their relation with leaders. It necessary, therefore, to treat education as a separate variable distinct from class. To do so, the element of education in the class variable must be reduced before discriminant analysis can be performed. From these procedures the result of the analysis can be shown in the following table. Table 10.4 Adjusted Standardized Discriminant Coefficients of Voting CCECCCCaCSnCDQCDSBDBBBnaBBBBBIIBBBBBBBnBDBBBBBfiDnnCQOQCt;^ Discriminant Coefficients Variable PDI Golkar PPP Socio-Relig. -.091627 -.130165 .223952 Party ID -.015013 -.093621 .20846*3 Leadership -.009357 .192741 .153364 Class(minus Ed.) -.003186 .064952 -.064739 Education -.013721 .126461 .143754 Constant .3753619 1.036950 -.4976591 From the above table we will be able to discern that there is a change in the structure of variables that affect the dependent variable (voting). 327 For the PDI voters, socio-religious orientation and party identification still play a stronger discriminating role, followed by education, while leadership and class variables seem to be the weakest discriminators. Among the Golkar voters, leadership still appears to be the strongest discriminator followed by socio-religious orientation. The education variable, however, emerges as the as the third discriminating variable that is stronger than party identification and class. The latter, as in the of the PDI voters, seems to have the weakest discriminating role. There is no significant change among the Islamic party voters since socio-religious orientation is still the strongest discriminating variable, followed by party identification and leadership variables. Nevertheless, it should be mwntioned here that education relatively gives more contribution than class. Similar to the earlier analysis in this chapter, the role of individual variables can be further discerned when we perform the stepwise procedures, both forward and backward. In this procedure each variable is entered in the analysis in a subsequent spet. The result of the analysis is revealed in table 10.5. 328 Table 10.5 Entry Statistics For Stepwise Selection, Forward Step Classification Variable: Voting Step 1 In Variable R2-Ad F-Val F-Prob R2-X's No XI .2079 77.1 0.0000 0.0000 No X2 .1689 56.9 0.0000 0.0000 No X3 .0490 14.5 0.0000 0.0000 No X5 .0457 12.7 0.0000 0.0000 No X4 .0041 1.3 0.2673 0.0000 Wilk 1s Lambda 1.0000 Step 2 Yes XI .2079 77.1 0.0000 0.0000 No X2 .0839 25.9 0.0000 0.1552 No X3 .0241 11.3 0.0000 0.0428 No X5 .0176 7.8 0.0006 0.0412 No X4 .0096 2.8 0.0611 0.0114 Wilk 's Lambda .7216 Step 3 Yes XI .1306 43.1 0.0000 0.1552 Yes X2 .0817 25.9 0.0000 0.1552 No X3 .0241 13.7 0.0000 0.1552 No X5 .0176 11.3 0.0000 0.1552 No X4 .0096 4.4 0.0131 0.0160 Wilk 's Lambda .7054 Step 4 Yes XI .1331 39.8 0.0000 0.1751 Yes X2 .0834 25.9 0.0000 0.1639 Yes X3 .0243 11.3 0.0010 0.0526 No X5 .0167 7.0 0.0010 0.0526 No X4 .0152 4.4 0.0131 0.0160 i-CX £ ■s Lambda .6984 Step 5 Yes XI .1235 39.8 0.0000 0.1751 Yes X2 .0824 25.4 0.0000 0.1639 Yes X3 .0243 11.3 0.0010 0.0526 Yes X5 .0172 7.0 0.0010 0.0526 No X4 .0152 4.4 0.0131 0.0160 Wilk's Lambda .6904 329 (Table 10.5 continued) Step 6 Yes XI .1278 41.3 0.0000 0.1792 Yes X2 .0834 27.0 0.0000 0.1677 Yes X3 .0234 11.3 0.0010 0.0526 Yes X5 .0172 7.0 0.0010 0.0526 Yes X4 .0152 4.4 0.0132 0.0160 Note: XI = Socio-Religious Orientation X2 = Party Identification X3 = Leadership X4 = Social Class (minus education) X5 <= Education If we compare with the outcome of the analysis as revealed in table 10.2 we will be able to discern the different impact of education. The Wilk's Lambda, as indicator of the strength of prediction, has decreased from .6907 to .6837 which indicates the relative contribution of the variable education. A similar outcomes can be expexted when the backward procedure is performed as shown in the following table. 330 Table 10.6 Entry Statistics For Stepwise Selection, Backward Step Classification Variable: Voting Step 1 In Variable R2-Ad F-Val F-Prob R2-X's Yes XI .1278 41.3 0.0000 0.1792 Yes X2 .0834 27.0 0.0000 0.1667 Yes X3 .0243 11.3 0.0010 0.0526 Yes X5 .0172 7.0 0.0010 0.0526 Yes X4 .0152 4.4 0.0123 0.0160 Wilk 's Lambda •6837 Step 2 Yes X2 .1643 55.2 0.0000 0.0396 Yes X3 .0352 16.4 0.0010 0.0271 Yes X5 .0248 10.3 0.0010 0.0216 Yes X4 .0105 3.0 0.0512 0.0111 Wilk 's Lambda •6904 Step 3 Yes X3 .0537 18.2 0.0000 0.0009 Yes X5 .0471 10.3 0.0000 0.0009 Yes X4 .0044 3.0 0.0512 0.0009 Wilk1's Lambda •8236 Step 4 Yes X5 .0468 14.6 0.0000 0.0009 Yes X4 .0044 1.2 0.2893* 0.0009 Wilk's Lambda .8296 Step 5 Yes X4 .0046 1.3 0.2931** 0.0009 Note: The name of variables remains the same. *significant only at .289 Significant only at .293 All statistical indicators from the outcomes of the analysis indicate that the socio-religious orientation variable relatively has the strongest discriminating role, 331 especially when we look at the explained variance (R2) and the F statistics. It is followed by the variables party identification, leadership, and education, respectively. Social class remains the weakest contributor in explaining voting in Brobanti. It is important to note that from the analysis, education appears to be an important variable that is distinct from class. Does this mean that the conventional understanding of the indicators of class in Javanese society has to be reexamined? More important, does it mean that the modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s were correct after all? Scholars like Karl Deutsch (1961) and Daniel Lerner (1958) argued then that with modernization including increasing literacy and education, individual attitute toward politics changed. In particular, the higher the level of education the more independent and participatory politically an individual was likely to be. Since this is a case study (with its limitations) perhaps it is too early to refute what has been delineated by Clifford Geertz almost two decades ago. Certainly, further intensive analysis of the general pattern of electoral behavior in Java with a widerrange of data and more sophisticated instruments is necessary. 332 Conclusion Throughout the analysis I have demonstrated the relative contribution of each individual variable toward explaining voting behavior in Brobanti. By employing the discriminant analysis procedures I believe that I have been able to confirm the analysis in the previous chapters on the relationship between the dependent variable and the independ ent variables. To conclude, that among the four independent variables, it was the socio-religious orientation that exhibited a significant role, in explaining voting behavior in Brobanti, followed by the party identification variable. The relative importance of the latter, I believe, is the product of the process of political socialization. Leadership also plays a significant role in explaining voting behavior of the Javanese villagers, while class seems to be insignificant. % CHAPTER XI CONCLUSION Introduction The principal questions raised in this study are as follows: Why do the voters in Javanese villages persistently vote for the same political party in general elections? What variables that explain voting behavior in Javanese villages? Among the variables, which variables make a relatively greater contribution than others? The analysis presented in previous chapters has, I believe, successfully shed the light on these questions. Voters in Javanese villages, especially in Brobanti, were raised in certain norms and values through the process of political socialization that led to the creation of partisan choice. Among those norms and values, the aliran is still prevalent within the frame of mind of the people in rural Java, through the persistent presence of the socio-religious norms, that is, the abanaan and santrl that lead to the polarization of the society. This is the key factor in understanding political behavior .1 Java. 333 334 In this concluding chapter, I would like to recount the whole argument in explaining electoral behavior in rural * Java. Prior to that effort, it is important to present first the political environment with which voters have to cope before they make a decision to support and vote for a certain party. This environment includes an authoritarian polity that has made possible the establishment of a hegemonic party system. Authoritarian Politv_and The Hegemonic Party System Too much has been written about the nature of the present New Order government. Different scholar have presented different models and labels of the characteristics of the regime, including bureaucratic polity, bureaucratic authoritarianism, state qua state, neo-patrimonialism, and modern personal rule. All of the arguments presented by the scholars of Indonesian politics, however, shared one thing in common, that is, the political process under the New Order regime is not a democratic one. A small minority of elites (both military and civilian) dominate the political agenda by explicitly excluding the majority of the people. From the outset, the immediate concern of the elite has been legitimacy within a stable political system in order to bring about economic development that promotes the well being of 335 the people. Consequently, all the necessary measures have been applied to ensure stability including rewarding political supporters and disciplining political dissidents. The general elections are the only viable option to earn legitimacy because by winning the elections the government is able to claim recognition and set the tone of both political and economic activities. After the military sponsored party, Golkar, won a strong majority in the first general elections in 1971, the New Order regime had an extra incentive to establish of a hegemonic party system in the country. Giovanni Sartori (1976) credited Wiatr (1967) for inventing the concept of hegemonic party system, but it was Sartori, from my point of view, who gave a more comprehensive analysis of the hegemonic party system. He noted that within the hegemonic party system electoral processes are not held in an antagonistic fashion, alternation will not occur, and other parties become licensed and second class parties, and therefore the hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is liked or not "Clearly, not only alternation but the very premises of competition are ruled out," he said (p. 231). What has been elucidated by Sartori seems to fully explain the present party system in Indonesia's New Order. The government party, Golkar, is indeed a hegemonic party. Since it does not have a clear ideological platform Golkar belongs - to what Sartori categorized as the "pragmatic hegemonic party." After winning with a very strong majority 336 of the popular vote (62.8%) In 1971, Golkar became the sole political machinery that control the whole spectrum of thepolitical process in the country, while the PDI and ppp became second class or licensed parties. After showing a "poor" performance in the 1977 elections with 62.11 percent of the popular votes, Golkar regained its confidence in 1982 by collecting more than 64% of the vote.1 Its hegemony will not be unchallenged at least in the next five or seven years. What are the contributing factors that make it possible for the creation of such system? I would argue that there are four factors that have led to the formation of the hegemonic party system under the New Order regime. First, the creation of a repressive apparatus in order to secure political order and stability in the country. This apparatus includes the Kookamtib (the Operation Commands for the Restoration of Security and Order), Bakin (State Intelligence Agency), QPSUS (Special Operations Agency), and Diriensospol. a special directorate within the Department of Home Affairs as a watchdog institution within the bureaucracy. These institutions, in addition to the army and state police force, have been utilized in general elections to secure Golkar's victory. Second, the process of depolitization of the community in order to implement economic development policy. Included in this process is the application of "monoloyalty" 1.The latest general elections (1987) Golkar collected more than 70% of the popular vote. 337 for all civil servants and individuals who are employed by the state related agencies, and the implementation of the floating mass policy in rural areas. Third, the emasculation of political parties and the restructuring of political parties. And fourth, the creation of electoral laws and electoral processes that secure the government sponsored party a virtuall win in every general election. This includes the arrangement of campaigns, the determination of issues that are not allowed to be discussed, and the restriction of individual (particularly from the opposing parties) involvement in elections and campaigns. Under such circumstances, i.e., the authoritarian polity that has led to the establishment of a hegemonic party system, voters in Indonesia vote in general elections held under the New Order. Nevertheless, when we disaggregate the data on election results we are able to observe that not all electoral districts have been completely controlled by Golkar. The Islamic party prevailed in Aceh in the 1971, 1977, and 1982 elections, and in the 1977 election the PPP gained a plurality of the votes in several districts. In East Java, the opposition parties also defeated Golkar in several districts. The election results revealed the persistence of voting behavior of certain groups in the community to support non-government parties. 338 Voting From The Aliran Perspective In attempting to give an account of voting behavior in Javanese villages, I am content to propose the aliran perspective instead of relying primarily on the two general paradigms that are popularly known in Western democracy, i.e., the sociological and psychological schools of thought. It does not mean that I disapprove the general principles of the two models; instead, through the aliran perspective I intend to merge those two models so that they become a workable model in the Indonesian context. The merit of the sociological model is that it is helpful when it comes to examine some socio-economic factors, such as race, ethnicity, religion, rural-urban residence, class, and so forth, in explaining electoral behavior, while the psychological model will help to comprehend the growth of political socialization and partisan choice among voters. In giving an account of political behavior in Indonesia there are two different points of departure that can be applied, that is, the implicit mode of analysis envisaged by Clifford Geertz (I960 and 1965), and the explicit analysis performed by Karl Jackson (1978, 1980). My working hypo theses has been that Geertz1s model it is more plausible than what has been proposed by Jackson concerning the relationship between leaders and followers in traditional authority. 339 Aliran is extremely important in Indonesian politics since it is a source of political and social fragmentation in the country with rich ethnic, language, and religious cleavages. It has been proven in time and space that the political parties are structured on the aliran. Under the constitutional democratic system (1950-1959) the multi party system prevailed and political parties were organized along « aliran lines. Under the no-party system of Guided Democracy three principal pillars were structured following Sukarno's conception of NASAKOH. that is, the nationalist, religious (Islam), and the communist groups, and the role of political parties was substantially reduced. Although since 1971 Golkar became the hegemonic party, the restructuring of political parties was still based on the aliran principle. Hence, the question of aliran prevail from time to time with different magnitude. Geertz introduced and developed the concept, followed by many other scholars of Indonesian politics. Then it was Ruth McVey who gave a more clear picture of the meaning of aliran in Indonesian context. She said that: 340 "Seen from one political angle, the aliran divisions apply to an ongoing ideological argument in national politics...essentially a debate among factions of the Jakarta elite. From another, they refer to the political expression of vertical cleavages in the wider Indonesian society, based on. cultural variation. Finally, they apply as well to horizontal social divisions reflecting class differences. Sometimes these aspects connect with and reinforce each other, but they do not necessarily do so; and hence the aliran change their scope and quality according to the context in which they are being discussed." (1969, p. 12). Certain scholars, such as Mortimer and Wertheim, doubted the merit of this perspective, and others (Hindley and Liddle) reinforced it. From my own interpretation of the history of the party system in Indonesia, however, I am convinced that this perspective gives a better explanatory power than others. The Santri-Abanaran and Political Behavior The major theme of this study is that the socio religious denominator, as a source of aliran cleavages, is the primacy antecedent for explaining political behavior in rural Java, that is, the abangan and santri divisions. The analysis in chapter VII presents the profile of the abanaan- santri type of individuals. At the extreme axis there are the strong abanaan who perceive Islam as just a necessary ceremonial activity within a community. What makes this strong abangan distinct from other abangan is their perception of the Islamic community (ummat Island . For them, 341 ummat Islam and Islamic organizations that promote Islam are not an ally but an adversary, "they see militant Islam...as a danger, an aggression against their accustomed way of life; and its advance threatens to rob them of their identity," McVey argued (p. 14). At the other axis, there is the strong santri community who perceive Islam not only as a belief system but also as a necessary doctrine in coping with the modern world. The ultimate goals of this type of group are to implement Islamic values in all aspects of human life. For them "the abangan-priyayi cultural mode appears as heathen at heart, a style which, though it has been claimed to surrender to Islam, has yet persisted in dominating Indonesia politically and socially, preventing Islam and the group identified with it from finding their rightful place in the sun," again according to McVey (p. 17). This is the case in Brobanti, the site of this study. As discussed in chapter VII, there is a difference in political outlook and orientation between the abangan and santri community. This difference can be explained by looking at the process of political socialization among the villagers. From the analysis one can observe that they tended to follow different paths in inculcating political values and norms. The santri are inclined to utilize Islamic institutions, while the abangan prefer the non-Islaraic or secular means. Nevertheless, I should also point out that they shared one thing in common, that is, the prominent role 342 of parents as agent of political socialization, especially the father. A strong majority of the respondents in Brobanti revealed that their parents are the most important institut ion that shaped their attitude and behavior. Choosing the type of school, marriage, and family affairs is within the domain of parents' competence, not the children, and the latter are subordinated in the family's decision making process. Beyond the sphere of family, the role of religious institutions such as mosque and prayer house (langgar) are very strong among the santri people while almost non-existent among the abangan. After home experience, religious institutions are the basic unit of education among the santri. The abangan. on the other hand, does not have such an institution. Moreover, they are hesitant to join gatherings at the langgar and mosque because of the deep beliefs that langgar belongs only to the santri community. This is, I believe, the primary source of discrepancy between the two groups that lead to the formation of political cleavages. At mosque and prayer house Islamic beliefs are inculcated which eventually leads to the formation of the basic foundation of Islamic solidarity and comradeship among the ummat or Islamic community. Through this religious institution a close tie between religious leaders fkvai.haii) and the ummat is established. The kvai will take a commanding lead in maintaining solidarity among members of 343 the ummat because it is believed that all Muslims are brothers and therefore the spirit of brotherhood is the cornerstone of Islamic organization. The abanaan. on the other hand, does not have any kind of institution similar to the santri. The do not have the spirit of solidarity that is based on a shared value such as Islam. Keiawen or Javanese religion or mysticism as the pillar of the abanaan beliefs system does not provide a political doctrine or ideological platform which can be shared as a common goal. Another important point should be noted, that is, the role of other agents of socialization is very weak. The mass-media, for example, is not an instrument of injecting political values that is able to challenge the immediate environment such as parents and siblings. The availability of newspapers and magazine, radio, and television, is still very limited. Socio-Religious Orientation and Voting As revealed in Chapter VII, the process of socialization brings about the identification of individuals with a group and political party. Because the immediate environment of the respondents in Brobanti is similar, along with the absence of the role of other agents such as mass-media, the identification with a certain party or group leads to the development of partisan choice. The Brobanti sample data revealed that about 72% of the respondents who identify 344 themselves with an Islamic party said that their parents also identify with the same party, and 74 per cent of the non- Islamic party identifiers revealed a similar inclination. This was translated into partisan choice in general elections. The Brobanti sample data indicate that in the 1971 elections 86% of the respondents who voted for the PNI said that their parents also voted for the same party. Two-thirds of Golkar voters indicated the same phenomenon and more than 80% of the Islamic parties (NU, Parmusi) supporters. The concordance of parents-children voting preference declined in the 1977 elections sample data, hoever. About 49 per cent of the respondents who voted for Golkar reported that their parents also voted for the same party, and 47 per cent of the Islamic party supporters reported the same inclination. In the 1982 elections sample data, there was a further decline among the PDI voters but a revitalization of the PPP and Golkar parent-children connection. About two-thirds of the respondents who voted for the PPP reported that their parents also voted for PPP, and 81 per cent of Golkar voters indicated the same preference. The major contention of this study is that in rural Java, people are inclined to vote according to their socio religious beliefs, that is, santri-abangan. Hence I hypothesize that the santri people will prefer to vote for an Islamic party, while the abangan are inclined to vote for a party that does not advocate and promote Islamic beliefs. 345 The statistical analysis of the Brobanti data seem to support the above hypotheses. The 1982 elections sample data indicate that strong santri respondents strongly supported an Islamic party and strong abanaan had a tendency to support the PDI. The Chi Square (X2) value on the relationship between the two variables is significant at .001 level with the score of Tauj, of .295. The analysis of the respondents who reported voting in the 1977 and 1971 elections also showed the same propensity. The moderate elements of both santri and abanaan gave the highest proportion of Golkar voters. At the individual village level one is able to find similar data. Reasons to vote This study also reveals some reasons why the respondents chose to vote for a certain party in general elections. Among the PDI voters, they did not seem to have a clear ideological reasoning. About 32 per cent of the respondents who reported voting for the PDI said that they voted because they just did not like both the PPP and Golkar. Hence, there is a tendency among PDI voters to vote "against" the established government and the Islamic party. "I do not like the PPP because they are very fanatic. The santri always 346 condemn other people for not being good Muslims. I do not like Golkar either because Golkar people overact when they campaign," one young person stated in the interview.2 The second reason they voted for the PDI is peer pressure, that is, other people doing the same thing. Third, the legacy of Sukarno is still popular for some PDI voters. Those who recall the glory days of the Sukarno era tend to identify PDI with Sukarno. Hence, for them PDI is the legacy of Sukarno. About one-fifth of the PDI supporters showed this tendency. About 13% also said that the PDI represents the interest of the poor. The primary reason why the respondents voted for Golkar is that it bears the image of government party. The Brobanti sample data indicated that almost 40% of the respondents said they voted for Golkar because they followed the path of their leaders (lurah. keoala dukuh. etc). They wanted to be identified with their leaders. The role of kepala dukuh is very strong in mobilizing the masses because about 22% of Golkar voters said that they voted Golkar because they were asked to do so. Golkar also has an advantage of being associated with the Sultan of Yogyakarta, and his eldest son is also chairman of Golkar in Yogyakarta. During campaigns, village officials skillfully utilized this connection, and about 18% of the respondents who voted for Golkar said they like Golkar because it the party of their Sultan. This is 2 .Footnote 17, Chapter VII. 347 the second reason why they voted Golkar. The third reason is the ability of the government to convince villagers that Golkar promoted development not politics. The good performance of the government to develop facilities (bridge, roads, dams, clinics, markets, and the like) seemed to impress the voters in rural areas that made them vote for Golkar, while the "negative vote" only contributed 6% of the respondents. The followers of the Islamic party (PPP) seem to be the most ideological among the respondents. Almost 33% of the respondents who voted for the PPP revealed that as a Muslim it is imperative to vote for an Islamic party, since it is the defender of the Islamic cause. To be a good Muslim is to embrace Islam completely including to vote for an Islamic party. About one-third of the PPP voters also revealed that they voted for the party because their leaders asked them to do so. The Islamic leaders were able to convince their followers that voting for an Islamic party is part of worship or ibadah and therefore it is also imperative to support the PPP. To follow family tradition is another reason why voters of the PPP in Brobanti voted for the party. About 22% of the respondents gave this kind of reason. Their parents came from a very devoted santri Muslim group that traditionally voted for Islamic parties, from Masyumi to Parmusi to PPP, or from NU to Nu again and then to PPP. 348 Leadership and Voting Another hypothesis was also proposed in the analysis of voting in this study. I hypothesized that leadership plays a significant role in shaping individual voting behavior in rural Java. I argued that the individual's decision to support a certain party is shaped by his or her interaction with the existing leaders in the village. There are two types of influential in the village, i.e., the formal and informal leaders. The formal leaders are those who hold official positions in village administration, either by virtue of elections or by appointment. The informal leaders, on the other hand, are those who do not have official positions in the village administration but are respected as leaders by a particular segment of society or by the entire village community. Village officials (lurah) and their assistants and heads of the hamlet are formal leaders, while religious leaders, spiritual teachers, healers or sorcerers, and so on, are the informal leaders. As Geertz has argued, each leader has his/her own political and social constituency based on socio-religious orientation. The abancan leaders are linked to the abanaan community because they share common norms and values, that is, Javanism, while santri leaders are tied to the santri community because of Islam. It is important to note that leaders of both communities can become formal and formal leaders. 349 The principal hypotheses being tested in this part of the analysis were that (1) when the informal leaders are influential and able to challenge with some success the formal leader (s) who usually support the government party, the opposition party will prevail in general elections. And conversely, (2) when the dominant role of the formal leaders is unchallenged the government party will prevail in general elections. After illustrating the respondents' conception of the requirements for leadership as well as the degree of interaction and loyalty in Brobanti) I attempted to examine the relationship between variables as indicated in the hypotheses. My data seem to support the basic argument on the relationship between the pattern of leadership and voting in Brobanti. The respondents who are attached to village officials will likely vote for the government party (Golkar) and those who are attached to religious leaders will likely support the Islamic party (PPP). About 68% of the respondents who are attached to village officials voted for Golkar, and 53% of those who are attached to religious leaders voted for the Islamic party (PPP). When we control for socio-religious orientation in the analysis, the relationship between the two variables becomes clearer. About 86% of the abanaan respondents who are attached to village officials voted for Golkar, and almost half of the 350 santri in the same category voted for the PPP. Most important, 59 per cent of the santri who are attached to religious leaders voted for the PPP. At the individual village level the relationship between the two variables becomes even clearer. In Sukamulya in which the presence of influential informal leaders was very strong, 71 per cent of the santri who are attached to Islamic leaders supported for the Islamic party. The government party has never been able to penetrate the santri community in this village, and therefore Golkar has never prevailed. In the other two villages with the strong presence of the formal leaders who supported Golkar, the opposition parties were unsuccessful. In Sukaramai, for example, 61 per cent of the santri who were attached to religious leaders voted for Golkar, and in Sukadamai 72% of the santri who are attached to religious supported the Islamic party. In this village about 63% of the santri who are attached to village officials voted for Golkar. The reason is that the majority village officials in these three villages are also santri. What it means is that the common basic denomination between leaders and followers in Brobanti is the similarity of their basic values and ideology. My data, therefore, clearly reject Karl Jackson's contention that ideology does not play an important role in linking the behavior between political leaders and their constituencies. Instead, this study even reinforced what has been delineated by Geertz on « 351 the concordance of the allran between leaders and followers. The Brobantl sample data refute Jackson's argument that followers will blindly obey the orders and suggestion of their leaders. For Jackson, the decision to participate in political affairs has been determined by the leaders long before the followers were franchised. That is not the case in Brobanti. There is a tendency among the youth not to merely follow their leaders' suggestion and advice. This is perhaps due to the life cycle of an individual in which young people tend to be rebellious, or perhaps there is a social transform-ation in rural Java. Class and Voting Is class important in understanding individual behavior in Indonesia? I am intrigued by this question and that is the reason why I included this variable in the analysis. Class is an industrialized world phenomenon in which the division of labor as well as the controlling of the means of production is very clear. In countries with very high level of industrialization subjective class perception and class consciousness is very strong. This is not, I believe, the case in rural Java or even in Indonesia with the economy still at the subsistence level. Following Juan Linz, in a situation in which the economy is still at the subsistence 352 level, class conflict is virtually Inexlstent. Other factors such as religion, language, and ethnicity will play a more important role in promoting conflict. The Brobanti sample data do not indicate any linkage between class (measured by education, land ownership, and occupation) and voting. The upper class respondents do not vote differently than the lower and middle class people. Each political party drew almost the same proportion of voters across class lines. The more educated voters did not vote differently than the less educated villagers. Never theless, one important phenomenon is noteworthy. The relationship between occupation and voting is very strong when the civil servants are included in the analysis. This is due to the fact that all civil servants must vote for Golkar or they will lose their job if they choose to vote the opposition party. If the civil servants are dropped from the analysis the relationship between occupation and voting preference becomes weak and insignificant (the value of Chi Square drops from 50 to 5.05). There are several possible explanations why class is not important in explaining individual political behavior in rural Java. First, as Juan Linz argued, the nature of the economic system itself makes it impossible to create a mass- based class consciousness, that is, the subsistence level of the agrarian economy. A Second reason is the absence of institutions and parties that are able to articulate the T 353 interest of the poor people in Indonesia. Since the decimation of the communist party (PKI) and the emasculation of political parties the rural population has become depoliticized. Peasants are organized in a corporate way because all peasant organizations that belonged to political parties were dissolved and incorporated into the government controlled organization namely the All Indonesian Peasants Association (HKTI). Third is the traumatic experience of the attempted coup, the G-30-S. Following the attempted coup, thousands of members of the communist party were killed, including members of the Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant Front) in rural Java. Consequently, village organizations are discouraged or avoid voicing any issues that seem to promote class interest. Moreover, the New Order government always makes it clear that individuals as well as organizations are not allowed to create antagonism stemming from religious, ethnic, race, and class differences. Discriminating Voting Preference Among the variables being applied in the analysis, which variables have relatively more discriminating power in explaining electoral behavior in Javanese villages?. In attempting to answer the above question I tried to apply discriminant analysis so that I would be able to observe the relative contribution of each variable in 354 explaining the dependent variable (voting). By using computer procedures (NCSS), the calculation of discriminant coefficients was possible. The results of the analysis indicated that for the PDI voters, socio-religious orientation gave relatively more contribution than other variables, followed by leadership, and party identification and partisan choice. The least discriminating variable for the PDI voters is class. Among the Golkar voters, leadership is the strongest discriminant. The socio-religious orientation variable is also quite strong, especially compared to party identification/partisan choice and class. For the Islamic party voters, it is the socio-religious that is the strongest discriminant, followed by party identification and partisan choice, while class discriminates least. The relative contribution of each variable becomes clearer when both forward and backward procedures of dicriminant analysis were performed. Village Politics and The National Party System The findings in this study, by no means, claim a very high level of generalization because this is a case study in three Javanese villages. Nevertheless, the chosen villages are the mirror image of the social structure of rural Java. Politics and partisan behavior in Brobanti reflects a broader 355 political context since the polarization of society in rural Java is basically still following the principal aliran of the abanoan and santri community. The question then arises concerning the implications of this study on the broader context, that is, the national party system, especially for future development. It is important to note that the degree of competitiveness of politics in Brobanti is relatively higher than other sub districts in the region, and democratic principles were be applied by leaders at the district levels. Therefore, the seeds of democracy are well established at the grass-roots level of the community in Yogyakarta. What is interesting is that "changes" at the national level (that is, restructuring the party system, conflict among party elites) does not bring about "changes" in the orientation of the society at the rural level in Java because the basic political division at the national level is still the same, that is, following the socio-religious orientation. The present political system in Indonesia does not seem conducive toward the creation of democratic procedures in running the affairs of the state, including running elections. The presence of the military and the prevalent influence of the bureaucracy has made possible for a hegemonic party system in which Golkar is the unchallenged political machine at the national level. 356 Nevertheless, when the political community comes to an agreement that it is time to conduct election in a more democratic way, based on the findings in this study one will expect to observe that social polarization and social fragmentation are basically still the same in which the community in rural Java is still divided along the aliran line. The findings clearly indicate that almost three decades after Clifford Geertz formulated and developed his ideas, the basic principal social structure in rural Java is still the same. The Mojokuto community in late 1950s and the Brobanti community in late 1980 are mainly still the same. Three decades do not seem to be sufficient enough to bring about change in social fragmentation in rural Java. What is The Future of Elections In Indonesia? Before answer ig this question, it is important to note that a lot of things have occured in the country after the third general elections in 1982 which have an impact on electoral politics in Indonesia. First, in 1985 the Parliament passed a new law on the regulation of political parties and mass organization to adopt Pancasila as their asas tunaaal (single fundamental principle). It means that political parties are no longer allowed to promote other ideologies than Pancasila, including Islam. In real terms, during elections parties are not allowed to use religion and other "imported" ideologies such 357 as capitalism and socialism to attract voters. The process of creating this policy har brought about the government into tense conflict with the Islamic community. Second, in the last general elections (1987), the Islamic party was not allowed to use the Ka1 abah (the black shrine in Mecca) as its ballot symbol; instead the PPP had to adopt a "star" as shown in the national symbol, while the other two parties kept their symbols. In a modern society, symbol can be meaningless, but in a modernizing country such as Indonesia it can be a unifying factor, especially the one that reflects religious values. Changing a political symbol that has been in the mind of the people for quite some time such as the Ka1abah is indeed an important issue. Third, the fourth general elections under the New order government has just been completed in April 1987. The government party overwhelmingly won by controlling the popular votes with 73%, and for the first time Golkar has been able to defeat the Islamic party in the stronghold of the Islamic community, Aceh province. The PDI imrpoved its electoral strength with the support of urban youth, particularly in Jakarta. The PPP's popularity, on the other other hand, declined in all electoral districts and lost several seats in parliament. The impact of asas tunggal still remained to be puzzled out because no empirical evidence has been examined to support the proposition. However, the party itself underwent a massive internal 358 conflict that brought about the formal departure of the NU fraction from the PPP. Moreover, some NU leaders actively campaigned for Golkar and some also put an extra effort to weaken the PPP by actively campaigning for deflating tpenggembosan) the PPP. Fourth, there were some reports that the armed forces stayed out of the elctoral process in 1987.3 Perhaps this is a new development on the changing role of the armed forces in Indonesia. If the armed forces are genuinely neutral, in the sense of not supporting Golkar, the electoral result will be different. The question then is what is the future of electoral process in Indonesia (eespecially in Java) to be drawn from this study? Does the aliran politics remain an important factor in a polarized society such as in Java? do the voters become more sophisticated, in the sense of rationally deciding what party to vote for, because of the impact of economic progress in the last two decades? First, I strongly believe that aliran politics in the electoral process remains an important element in Java. The reason is that the Javanese community itself remains divided 3 .It is very difficult to confirm this report. I believe that local military officers, such as the commandants of miltary district (Kodimi , and military rayon (lxoramil) were still actively support Golkar in many ways. The degree and the magnitude of their involvement perhaps different than in the past elections. We have to take into consideration the role of military officers in civilian bureaucracy, especially at the local level. 359 into two principal pillars, i.e., santri and abanaan. Because of the process of political socialization, their political outlook and orientation, as shown in Chapter VII, are different. For the santrif even though they accept Pancasila as asas_tunqqal. Islam is still a complete source of inspiration (in the widest sense) and their identification with a party or group that traditionally has an Islamic outlook is still strong. The abanaan. on the other hand, are able to make an adjustment with any situational change, but their profound support for non-Islamic parties is self evident. By and large, the nature of social cleavages in Indonesia is cummulative, and its impact on partisan behavior (partisan choice) is very strong. The Brobanti data indicate that a large proportion of the strong santri identifiers persistent-ly support the Islamic party and a large proportion of the abanaan consistently vote for the non- Islamic parties. One interesting point, however, should be noted, that is, the moderate of both denominations can change their allegiance. The data for this study indicate that Golkar drew the majority of its voters from the moderate abanaan and santri. Hence, the party that is able to take a position in the middle of the two pillars seems to have prevailed. 360 Second, if elections are not intentionally "arranged" to make the government party overwhelmingly prevail, that is, if the voters are free to decide which party they want to support, the outcome of the election will be different. The role of individual leaders, both formal and informal, at the village level is very strong. In as santri village, in which both formal and informal leaders support the Islamic party (assuming a free election) the other two parties will have a hard time to prevail; and in an abanaan village there is a possibility that the voters will be divided by Golkar and the PDI. Third, the Brobanti data also indicate that young people are likely to disobey their leaders. Furthermore, there is a very interesting relationship between level of education and interaction with leaders. Individuals with a higher degree of education are more active in interaction with their leaders, while the less educated are less active. At the same time, there is a negative relationship between the level of education and the degree of obedience and loyalty toward leaders. Those who have better education are more likely to disobey their leaders than those who are not well educated. The theory of modernization and social change propounded by so many social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, but now much less popular seems to be supported by data from Brobanti. Whether this phenomenon will continue and what its political effects will be worth a serious research effort. APPENDIX Questionaires/Interview Guide of The Survey on Electoral Behavior in the Villages of Brobanti, Yogyakarta, Indonesia December l._1985 - April 30, 1986 Interviewer:...... Time starts:...... Time Ends :...... Date :...... village :...... eatsesssBatt&BnasBBHBBBBBBo RESPONDENT..1 S IDENTIFICATION: 1. Age/ Date of Birth :.... 2. Status :Single( ); Married ( ) Divorced ( ) 3. Principal Occupation : - Farmer/Tenant F. ( ) - Farm Laborer ( ) - Civil Servant ( ) - Retailer ( ) - Other { ) 4. Additional Job : - Farmer/Tenant F. ( ) - Farm Laborer ( ) - Civil Servant ( ) - Retailer ( ) - Other ( ) 5. Land Ownership : - > One Hectare ( ) - .50 - 1.0 Hectare ( ) - .25 - .49 Hectare ( ) - < .25 Hectare ( ) - Landless ( ) 361 6. If Tenant Fanner : - > One Hectare ( ) - .50 - 1.0 Hectare ( ) - .25 - .49 Hectare ( ) - < .25 Hectare *( ) 7. Religion : - Islam ( ) - Christian ( ) - Catholik ( ) - Hindhu/ Budhism ( ) * Other...*.**.■* ( ) 8. If You are a Moslem do you think youself as an abanaan or as a s a n t r i ? - Abanqan ( ) - Santri ( ) 9. Level of Education : - College Degree ( ) - High School ( ) - Junior High School ( ) - Primary School ( ) - No School ( ) SOCIO-RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION 10. If you think yourself as a santri/abanaan . do you regularly practice Islamic teachings as the followings? Always Often Occs. Sid. Never 11 0] - Pray Five Times a day - Friday Prayer - Fasting during Ramadhan - Paying Alms - Other...... 363 11. If you think yourself as a santri/abanoan. do you conduct the following practices? Always Often Occs, Sid. Never (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) Making offer ( ) C ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Practicing Kelawen ( ) ( ) ( ) < ) ( ) Seek Spiritual Teacher ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Practice Special activity such as Nolakonl. Fasting and the like. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 12. Do you regularly participate in the Islamic social organizations/community? Always Often Occs Sid. Never ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - Penaalianfs) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - Muhammadyah/Nahdatul Ulama organizations ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - Other ( ) < ) ( ) ( ) ( ) SOCIALIZATION PROCESS Str Agr. Agree Disg. Str.D DK (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) 13. When I was a kid my parent always teaches me Islamic religion ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { ) 14. My parent always asks me to to mosque/langgar ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 15. My parent always suggests to fully follow Islamic teachings ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 16. My parent always decides what school I should enter ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 17. We never discussed about politics at home ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 18. My parent never asks my opinion at home ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 19. When I get married my parent decides my wife/husband to be ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 364 PARTY IDENTIFICATION 20. In general, which political party(Golkar) that you feel are very closed to? - PDI/Nat.Party ( ) - Golkar ( ) - PPP/Islamic P. ( ) - Other ( ) 22. How closed are you to the above party? Very Cls Cls Smwht Not Cl. DK (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) 23. Do you think that your parent,brothers/sisters, your neighbour also closed to one of the party you mentioned? (Note: Give number according the above scale) PDI/NP Golkar PPP/I.P. Other -Your parent ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Brother/Sister ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Relative ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Neighbor ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 24. ing, what kind of activity do you sort the party? Very Of Often Occas. Sid Never (4) (3) (2) (1) (0) -Paying fee and other contribtuion ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Participate in rally during campaigns ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Participate in party meetings ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Active member ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Asking neighbor to participate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -Other ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 25. When you voted for the Islamic party in election, could you give a special or some reasons? 1955 1971 1977 1982 -Because the IP wants to implement Islamic teachings ( -IP wants to establish an Isamic state ( -As a Moslim I have to vote for an IP { -IP promises tp build our mosque/lancrqar ( -Our Kiyais says that it is a must for a Moslim to vote for an IP ( -My neighbor vote for an Islamic party ( -Other...... ( 26. When you voted for the Nationalist party/PDI in election could you give a specific or some reasons? 1955 1971 1977 1982 -Because it's a party for the small/poor people ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) -It's President Sukarno's party ( ) -It's our lurah's party( ) -I am afraid that the IP will win the election ( ) -Our lurah asks us to vote for it ( ) -Party leaders promise to help us ( ) -Other ( ) 27. When voted for Golkar in election, could you give us specific or some reasons to do so? 1971 1977 1982 -Golkar has been very success ful in developing our village ( ) ( ) -I am very disappointed eith political parties ( ) ( ) -Our Kyai says that it's okay to vote for Golkar ( ) ( ) -Sri Sultan HB IX supports Golkar ( ) ( ) -Other...... ( ) ( ) 366 28. Do you always want to support the party you vote in elections or you want to vote other party? - yes - No, I want to vote other party THE PATTERN OF LOCAL LEADERSHIP 29. Beside lurah. whom do you think as a leader or an individual that people really respect for? (Please rank) - Guru (Spiritual) ( ) - Imam/Kyai ( ) - School teacher ( ) - Dukun(Sorcerer) ( ) - Kepala PuKuh ( ) - other.... ( ) 30. What are the reasons that you think of him/her as a leader or the most respected person.in the village? - He/She is very honest ( ) - His knowledege of Islam is very very deep ( ) - He has the special skill that other person can not match ( ) - He can communicate with the spiritual world ( ) - He/she always help when we are in need ( ) - Other ( ) 31. Do you regularly visits him/her? - Yes ( ) - No ( ) 32. If the answer is yes, how often do you visit him/her? - V. Oft.( ) Often ( ) Occas. ( ) Seldom ( ) Never ( ) 33. What are the reasons why you visit him/Her? - Seek advise so that I become rich ( ) - I want to cure my family member who get sick ( ) - Seek advise so that my daughter will get marry ( ) - Seek moral support so that I become strong ( ) - Asking some material help(borrow something) ( ) - Other ( ) 34. How oftend do you follow help his/her suggestions/advise? - V. Oft ( ) Often ( ) Occas. ( ) Seldom ( ) Never ( ) 367 35. Since your leader helps you, do you feel that you have to help him/her back in reprocical? - Yes ( ) - No ( ) 36. If yes, could you tell us what kind of activity do you need to perform for your leader? - Must help when he/she grand activity of selamatan (ceremony) ( ) - Doing something for him/her ( ) - Bringing materials(rice,etc.) when he/she ceremony ( ) - Other ( ) 37. If not, could tell us why? - He/she always refuses it ( ) - Because I think he/she helps us unpretentiously without expecting anything from me ( ) - Ge/she is rich enough so that he/she does need anything from me ( ) - Other ( ) 38. Do you feel that you always have moral debt to him/her? - Yes ) - No ) 39. Do you think that you vote a certain party in election because you have moral debt to him/her? - Yes - No ) 40. If you are an abangan or a santri, do you think it is fine to visit an abangan or a santri leader? - Yes - No 368 SOCIAL-STATUS/CLASS 42. Could you tell us about your house? - It my own house ( ) - It is my parent house ( ) - I rent this house ( ) - Other ( ) 43. The type of house. - Full brick house ( ) - Half brick house ( ) - Wood house ( ) - Bamboo house ( ) - Other ( ) 44. Do you send your children to college? If yes, where do they go? ~ Gadjah Hada ( ) - Teacher's College(IKIP) ( ) - Islamic University(UII) ( ) - Islamic Institute(IAIN) ( ) - Other...... ( ) 45. Do you have relative that has high position in a bureaucracy? and where are they? VOTING IN ELECTION 46. Do you know what party your parent vote in general election? 1955 1971 1977 1982 - Nationalist Party (PNI/PDI and other) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - Golkar — ( ) ( ) ( ) - Islamic Party(Masumi, NU, PSII, Perti,Parmusi, or PPP) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 369 47. How about yourself, what party did you vote in general elections? 1955 1971 1977 1982 - Nationalist party ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - Golkar - ( ) ( ) ( ) - Islamic Party ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 48. In general elections the Islamic party uses religion or Islam to attract people. Do you think it is appropriate? - Very Appropriate ( ) - Appropriate ( ) - Not appropriate ( ) - Not Appriate at all ( ) - Do not know ( ) Other: 49. Do you have radio or television? - Yes ( ) - No ( ) 50. If yes, what program do you like to listen/to watch? - Arts (music, dance, wavanc or puppet sho,etc.) - National and Local news - Rural development program - Religion - Other...... 52. How often do listen/watch the program? - Very Oft.( ) Often ( ) Occas. ( ) Seldom ( ) Never ( ) LIST OF REFERENCES I. Indonesian Politics and Culture Anderson, Benedict O'G. "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, Benedict Anderson and J. Siegel,eds. Culture_and Politics in Indonesia. (Ithaca, New York: Cornel University Press, 1972). "Politics and Their Study in Southeast Asia." Mimeograph, 1983. — . "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Historical Perspective." Journal Of Asian Studies. XLII, 3 (May, 1983). ------. and Audrey Kahin, eds. Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate. Interim Report Series, Cornel Modern Indonesian Project, 1982. Awad Bahasoan. "Golongan Karya Mencari Format Baru," Prisma. (December, 1981) Ayip Rosidi. "A Japanese," INDONESIA. No. 6 (October, 1968) Bachtiar, Harsya W. "The Religion of Java: A Commentary," Maialah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia. 1973. Boileu, Julian M. 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The Decline of Constitutional Democracy (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1962). ------. "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Hraff Press, 1963). ------. "Indonesia," in George McTurnan Kahin, ed., Government and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1964) 372 ------. "President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey, IV, No.18 (August, 1964). ------. "History, Theory and Indonesian Politics: A Reply to Harry J. Benda," Journal of Asian Studies. XXIV, No.2 (February, 1965). ------. "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," INDONESIA. No.6 (October, 1968). ------. "The Study of Indonesia Politics: A Survey and an Apologia," in Anderson and Kahin, eds., Interpreting Indonesian Politics (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1982). ------and Lance Castles, eds. Indonesia Political Thinking. 1945-1965 (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1970). Geertz, Clifford. "The Javanese Villagers," in G.W.Skinner, eds., Local. Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesian Project, Interim Report Series, 1959). ------. The Religion of Java (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960a). ------.• "The Javanese Kiyai: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," Comparative Study in Society and History. No.2 1960b. ------. Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963). ------. The Social History of Indonesian Town (Cambridge Massachusets: MIT Press, 1965). ------Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Geertz, Hildred. The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization (New York: The Free Press, 1961). ------"Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia (Yale University of Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven: Hraff Press, 1963). Harvey, Barbara s. "Tradition, Islam and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1955," (PhD Thesis, Cornel University, 1974). 373 Hindley, Donald. "President Sukarno and The Communists: The Politics of Domestications," American Political Science Review. Vol. LVI, 4 (December, 1962). — — — — . "Political Power and The October 1965 Coup in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 26, No.2 (February, 1967). ------. "Dilemma of Consensus and Division: Indonesia's Search of a Political Format," Government and Opposition. 1 (Winter, 1969). ------. "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order," INDONESIA. No. 9, 1970. ------. "Indonesia 1971 Pancasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections," Asian Survey. 12 (January, 1972). Hofstede, W.M.F. Decision Making Process in Four West Javanese Villages. Offsetdrkkerij Faculteit der Wiskunde en Naturwetenschapen (Nijmigen: The Netherlands, 1971). Jackson Karl D. "Traditional Authority and National Integration: Islam and Rebbelion in West Java," (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971). ------. "Participation in Rebellion: The Darul Islam in West Java," in R. William Liddle, ed. Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series, 1973). ------"Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia," in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, Political Power and CQTMnvmigfltjpn__in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). ------. Traditional Authority. Islam and Rebellion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). ------and Lucian W. Pye, eds., Political Power and Communication__in__ Indonesia (Berkely: University of California Press, 1978). Jay, Robert R. "Local Government in Rural Central Java," Far Eastern Quarterly* xv, 1956. ------. Religion and Politics in Rural central Java. Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series No. 12 (New Haven: Yale University, 1963). 374 . Javanese VillagersSocial Relations in_Rural Moi okuto (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusettes Institute of Technology Press, 1969). Kahin, George McTurnan. Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics and Nationalism (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, Secretariat Paper, No.6, 1950). . Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1952). ------ed. Government and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1964). ------ed. Maior Government of Asia (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1971). Kaisiepo, Manuel. "Dilema Partai Demokrasi Indonesia: Perjuangan Mencari Identitas," PRISMA (December, 1981) King, Dwight Y. "Social Mobilization, Associational Life, Interest Representation and Political cleavage in Indonesia," (PhD Thesis, The University of Chicago, 1978). "Indonesia’s New Order as a Bureaucratic Polity, a Neo Patrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime : What Difference Does It Make?,11 in Anderson and Kahin, eds., Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to The Debates (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, 1982). . "Associational Activity and Political Participation of Villages in West Java, Indonesia," Southeast Asia Journal of Social Science. Vo. 11, No.2 (Singapore, 1983). Koentjaraningrat, R.M. "Celapar: A Village in South Central Java," in R.M. Koentjaraningrat, ed., villages in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel Ulniversity press, 1967a). . ed., Villages in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1967b). ------. Kebudavaan Jawa (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, Seri Etnografi Indonesia, 1984). . Javanese Culture (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Oxford University Press, 1985). 375 Lande, Carl. Leaders. Factions, and_ Followers: The Philippines Politics (Yale University Southeast Asia Monograph Series, 1965). Legge, John. D. Central Authority and Regional Autonomy In Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornel University Press, 1961). Leo suryadinata. Poltical Parties and The__1982 General Elections in Indonesia (Singapore: institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982) Liddle, R. William. Ethnicity. Party and National Integration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). ------. ed. Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (Yale University Southeast Asia Monograph Series, 1973). ------. "Modernizing Indonesian Politics," in R.William Liddle, ed. 1973. Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (Yale University Southeast Asia Monograph Series, 1973b). ------. "Evolution From Above: National Development and Local Leadership," Journal of Asian Studies. 32 (February, 1973c). ------. "Power, Participation and the Political Parties in Indonesia," (Center for International Studies, MIT, 1974). ------. Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia (Singapore: Center for Southeast Asia Studies, 1977). •■The 1977 Indonesian Election and New order Legitimacy," Southeast Asian Affairs 1978 (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asia Studies, 1978a). ------. "Participation and Political Parties," in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, eds. Political Power and Communication in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978b). ------. "Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions," Pacific Affairs. 58, No.l (Spring, 1985). ------. "Contending With Scarcity," Asian Survey (Februray, 1987). 376 Lyon, Margo. Bases, of .Conflict in Rural, Java (University of California, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, Berkeley, 1970). Mackie, J.A.C. Konfrontasi. The Indonesla-Malavsia BAgfiute 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974a). ------. "The Golkar Victory and Party Aliran Alignments,11 in Oey Hong Lee, ed. Indonesia After the 1971 Elections (London: Oxford University Press, 1974b). -. "Indonesia Since 1945— Problem of Interpretation," in Anderson and Kahin, 1982, eds. Interpreting Indonesian Politics; Thirteen Contributions to The Debates (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1982). McIntyre, Angus. "Division and Power in The Indonesian National Party, 1965-1966," INDONESIA. No. 13(April, 1972). McVey, Ruth T. ed. Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Hraf Press, 1963). ------. "Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism: The Management o f Ideological Conflict in Indonesia," Introduction, in Sukarno, Nationalism. Islam, and Marxism (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesia Project. Trans, by Ruth McVey, 1969). ------. "The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia," in Anderson and Kahin, eds., Interpretin Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contribution to The Debates (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1982). Milne, Ruth. "Patrons, Clients, and Ethnicity: The Case of Serawak and Sabah, Asian Survey. 13, 1973. Mortimer, Rex. "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism," INDONESIA. No. 8 (October, 1969). Nishihara, Masashi. Golkar and The Indonesian Election of 1971 (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1972). Oey Hong Lee. ed. Indonesia After the 1971 Elections (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). "Indonesian Freedom of The Press and The 1971 Elections," in Oey Hong Lee, ed. 1974. Indonesia After The 1971 Elections (London: Oxford University Press). 377 ------. "The Emasculation of Political Parties,” in Malcolm Caldwell, ed., Ten Years Military Terror_in Indonesia (Notingham: Spokesman Book, 1975). Palmer, A. W. "The Sundanese Village,” in G. W. Skinner, ed. Local. Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia (Yale University Cultural Report Series, 1959). Village in Highland Priangan,” in R. M. Koentjaraningrat, ed. Villages in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1967). Pemberton, John. "Notes on The 1982 General Elections in Solo," INDONESIA. 1984. Robison, Richard, "Toward a Class Analysis of The Indonesian Military Bureaucratic State," INDONESIA. 25 (April, 1978). — . "Culture, Politics, and Economy in The Political History of The New Order," in Anderson and Kahin, "Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen contributions to The Debates." ( Interim Report Series, Cornel Modern Indonesia Project, Cornel University, Ithaca: New York, 1982). Rocamora, J. Elisio. "The Partai Nasional Indonesia," INDONESIA. No. 10 (October, 1970). Samson, Allan A. "Islam in Indonesian Politics," Asian Survey. No. 8 (December, 1968). ------. "Army and Islam in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs. Vol. XLIV, No. 4 (Winter 1971). . "Religious Beliefs and Political Action in Indo nesian Islamic Modernism," in R. William Liddle, ed. Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series, 1973). "Concepts of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam," in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, ed. Political Power and Communication in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). Samsuddin A., et al., Pemilihan Umum 1971 (Jakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan dan Konsultasi Pers, 1972). 378 Sartono Kartodirdjo. "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," in Claire Holt, ed. Culture and Politics,in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1972). ------. "Protest Movements in Rurak Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in The 19th and Earlv 20th .Centuries (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973). ----- . Modern Indonesia. _Tradition and Transformation: A Socio-Historical Perspective (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1984). Scott, James C. "Patron Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review Vol. 66 (March, 1972). ------. Weapons_of The Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University, 1985). Selosoemardjan. Social Change in Yogyakarta (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1962). Silalahi, Harry Tjan. "The 1977 General Elections: The Results and the Role of Traditional Autority Relations in Modern Indonesian Society," Indonesian Quarterly. Vol.V, No.3 (July, 1977). Skinner, G. W. Local. Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia (Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, Cultural Report Series, 1959). ------. «The Nature of Loyalties in Rural Indonesia", in G. W. Skinner, ed., Local. Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia (Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, Cultural Report Series, 1959). Soedjatmoko. "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," in Philip Thayer, ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free ftsia (Baltimore: The John Hopkin Press, 1956). ------. "Dyason Memorial Lectures," Australian Outlook. Vol. 21, No. 3 (December, 1967). Soekarno. Nationalism. Islam and Marxism translated by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon With an Introduction by Ruth T. McVey (Cornel University Modern Indonesia Project, Translation Series, 1969). 379 Soemarsaid Moertono. State and Statecraft in Old Java (Cornel University Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1968). Sundhaussen, Ulf. "The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society," in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, eds. Political Power and Corntnunl cat ions in Indonesia (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978). ------. The Road to Power (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1982). Suny, Ismail. Peroeseran Kekuasaan Eksekutif (Jakarta: Aksara Baru, 1963)._ Supomo Surjohudojo. Traditional Yocrva in The Chancing World. Paper presented at The Conference of the Australian- Indonesian Association of Victorya (Monash University, Center of Southeast Asian Studies, 1966). ------. Life in a Javanese Village. Paper presented at a seminar on "Peasant Farming and The Rural Economy in Village Indonesia (Monash University, Center of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973). ------Growing U p In a Javanese Village:__ Personal Remlniscenes. Paper Given to a Seminar of the Asian Society of Canberra (Monash University: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979). Soeroso. "The Outcome of the 1982 General Elections," The indonesian Quarterly. Vol. X, No. 3 (1982). Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo. Desa (Bandung: Penerbit Sumur, 1958). Utrech, Ernst. "The Military and Elections," in Oey Hong Lee, ed., Indonesia After the 1971 Elections (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). van der Kroef, Justus M. Indonesia After Sukarno (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1971). van Marie. A. "Indonesian Electoral Geography Under Orla and Orba," in Oey Hong Lee, ed., Indonesia After The 1971 Elections (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). Ward, Kenneth E. The Foundation of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesia Project, Iterim Report Series, 1970). 380 ------. The 1971 Elections? An East,Java Case Study (Monash University, Monash Papers on southeast Asia, 1974). Wertheim, W. F. "From Aliran Toward Class Struggle in The Countryside of Java," Pacific Viewpoint. Vol. 10, No. 2 (September, 1969). Yong Mung Cheong. "The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-1959," Journal_of Southeast Asian_Studles. VII, No. 1 (March, 1976). ------. "Indonesia: Questions of Stability," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1978 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978). II. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS. MAGAZINES. AND NEWSPAPERS. Biro Pusat Statistik. Buku Saku Statistik Indonesia 1983 (Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1984). Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. Paftar Pembagian Kursi. Hasll Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakvat Tahum 1971 (Jakarta, 1971). Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Kulonprogo. Paftar Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota PPR. PPRP Tonokat I dan II Kabupaten Kulonprogo (Wates, Kulonprogo, Yogyakarta, 1971). Pemerintah Paerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. nd. Paftar Isian Pertanvaan Mengenai Potensi Pesa (Yogyakarta). Republik Indonesia. Undang Undang Reoublik Indonesia No. 1 Tahun 1985 Tentang Pemilihan Umum (Semarang, Central Java: Aneka Ilmu, 1985). ------. Undang Undang Reoublik Indonesia No. 3 Tahun 1985 Tentang Partai Politik dan Golongan Karva (Semarang, Central Java: Aneka Ilmu, 1985). ANGKATAN BERSENJATA, 1971 (Jakarta) FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1977, 1982 (Hongkong). TEMPO, Weekly News Magazine, 1971, 1977, 1982 (Jakarta). KOMPAS, National Newspaper, 1971, 1977, 1982 (Jakarta). SINAR HARAPAN, National Newspaper, 1971, 1977, 1982 (Banned 1986). 381 III. THEORY OF VOTING. ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR.PARTY.SYSTEMS. AND METHODOLOGY Alford, Robert R. Partv_and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1963). Allard, Erik, and Stein Rokkan, eds. Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1970). Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press). ------. eds. The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little Brown, 1980). Apter, David E. ed. Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964). Babbie, Earl. The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, California: Wadsworth. Third Edition, 1973). Barnes, Samuel H. "Left, Right and The Italian Voter," Comparative Political Studies. No. 4 (1971). — — . "Italy: Religion and Class in Electoral Behavior," in Richard Rose, ed. Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook (New York: The Free Press, 1974). Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee. 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