30

General Nasution

Brig.Jen Sarwo Edhie

Let.Gen Kemal Idris

Gen Simatupang

Lt Gen Mokoginta

Brig Jen Sukendro

Let.Gen Mokoginta

Ruslan Abdulgani

Mhd Roem

Hairi Hadi, Laksamana Poegoeh, Agus Sudono

Harry Tjan

Hardi SH

Letjen Djatikusumo

Maj.Gen Sutjipto

KH Musto'in Ramly

Maj Gen Muskita

Maj Gen Alamsyah Let Gen Sarbini

TD Hafas

Sajuti Melik

Haji Princen

Hugeng Imam Santoso

Hairi Hadi, Laksamana Poegoeh

Subchan

Liem Bian Kie

Suripto

Mhd Roem

Maj.Gen Wijono

Yassien

Ron Hatley

30 General Nasution

(24-7-73)

Nasution (N) first suggested a return to the 1945 constitution in 1955 during the Pemilu.

When Subandrio went to China in 1965, Nasution suggested that if China really wanted to help Indonesia, she should cut off supplies to Hongkong. According to Nasution, BK was serious about Maphilindo but Aidit convinced him that he was a world leader, not just a regional leader.

In 1960 BK became head of Peperti which made him very influential in the AD with authority over the regional commanders.

In 1962 N was replaced by Yani. According to the original concept, N would become Menteri Hankam/Panglima ABRI. However Omar Dhani wrote a letter to BK (probably proposed by Subandrio or BK himself). Sukarno (chief of police) supported Omar Dhani secara besar). Only Martadinata defended to original plan while Yani was 'plin-plan'.

Meanwhile Nasution had proposed Gatot Subroto as the new Kasad but BK rejected this because he felt that he could not menguasai Gatot. Nas then proposed the two Let.Gens. - Djatikusuma and Hidayat but they were rejected by BK. Nas then proposed three Maj-Gen - Yani, Suharto and Sudirman. BK chose Yani. The serah-terima was on Hari Senen. Nasution and Djuanda were only informed of the change on the Sabtu.

The next major step to the left was the appointment of Subandrio as ist Deputy after the death of Djuanda in November 1963.

On the basis of the testimony of Bambang Widjanarko and Leimena to Kopkamtib, Nas believes that BK was involved in the Gestapu. He asked Untung and others whether they were willing to take action and he received a letter from Untung on 30 September while giving a speech. However, Nasution had doubts whether he knew of the Lubang Buaya plan.

When Sarwo Edhie (who was very close to Yani) went to Bogar on 2nd October he was dismayed to hear BK treat Yani's death so lightly. 'Revolusi bisa makan anak', said BK. Sarwo hurried back to report to Suharto and told him of BK's attitude. Nas and Suharto did not suspect BK of involvement at this time.

Possibly BK refused to openly support G30S because he heard that Nas lolos. He was informed of this on his way to the palace from Dewi' s house. When he heard he decided to go to Grogol and then to Halim.

Nasution had not regarded Pranoto as pro-PKI until October. However Suharto already distrusted Pranoto on 1'1 October. When Latief was captured he was found with a letter addressed to Pranoto which he had just written. He had requested further instructions from Pranoto.

Before the discovery of this letter, Nas and Suharto had decided to berjalan terus on the basis of the arrangements made on 2nd October. However on the lOth Nasution sent his letter to BK with five points including the appointment of Suharto as Pangab.

On 2nd, before the Bogar meeting, Nasution asked Pranoto not to carry out BK's order to become caretake Pangab but Pranoto said nothing at Bogar. (While Panglima in Jateng, Pranoto had obstructed Nasution's policy of forming Badan Kerja-sama). Operasi Budi was obstructed by Yani who protected men like lbnu Sutowo and Suhardiman. Yani himself was also corrupt. The secretary of Operasi Budi was Kol Muktis who received encouragement from Pranoto. After the coup Mu was arrested because of this but was quietly released.

Nasution arrived at Kostrad at 7-7.30 on 1/10. He then moved with Suharto to Senayan.

In December 1966 Nasution told a KOTI meeting that the way to stop the killings was to appoint a court to try those responsible for the killings of the generals.

Nasution did not meet BK until 6 weeks after the coup when Nasution was called by BK to express his sympathy at the loss of Nas's daughter. On 2nd October BK did not invite Nas to the meeting in Bogar.

BK was angry at proposals that Nas be appointed as Wakil President (proposals from West Java, East Java etc). Eventually Suharto and Nas decided to call a meeting of pang!imas which announced that it was not necessary to fill the post.

Why was BK confident that's he could get away with the dismissal of Nasution in February 1966? In June a Koti meeting heard BK complain that KOTI was interfering too much in domestic affairs. BK ordered Suharto to change the structure of KOTI. Meanwhile Nas as Men Hankam had to go to Jateng for a few days. While Nas was away, Suharto presented his proposals to BK who said they did not go far enough. BK demanded the dissolution of SAB and the abolition of the post of Menhankam.

In the discussions BK offered the post of Menkom to Suharto who rejected it. BK thought he could outwit Suharto.

Eventually Suharto proposed Nat as Wakil Panglima Besar of KOGAM. Nasution refused to attend such .... ? and was diam sadja dirumah.

The AD planned to mentjulik Suhandrio and other leftist ministers such as Ast (?). For about a week before 11/3, they surrounded the palace waiting for an opportunity. Some generals complained that Sarwo Edhi was too slow. Amir Machmud and Adjie were left out of these plans because they were loyal to BK. (There was no plan to capture Chairul Saleh at this stage).

After BK's flight to Bogar the three generals flew after him. Their plans were not very clear. Suharto only told them to assure BK that they would rely on BK. Eventually the Supersemar was prepared. Subandrio insisted on the inclusion of 'angkatan lain' as well as AD. BK did not sign it until he had consulted Adjie.

On his way to Bogar, BK called at Tjilandak KKO base.

BK did not realise that Suharto would use the Supersemar to announce the ban on the PKI. Immediately he called the other three panglima to Bogar on Hari Minggu (probably 13th). That night meetings were held in Jakarta at Mulyadi's house and then at Leimeina's. They discussed how they could menginsyafkan Suharto to withdraw the ban on the PKI. {?)

Meanwhile Kostrad men at the Halim base (dalam rangka KOGAM) came across an instruction issued by Sri Mulyono Herlambang which made preparation for an expected Kostrad attack on Halim and the lstana. It envisaged the possibility of returning to Tjilandak. Kostrad leaders met immediately and decided to mandahalui by placing troops at all strategic points in the city. At the same time Kol. Wahono of Kostrad approached Nas and asked him to call a meeting of the Pang!ima. Nas called Sutjipto, Muljadi, and Hartono, as well as Rusmin representing AURI (He refused to meet Sri Muljono). Kemal ldrus and some Kostrad leaders also attended Kemal refused. Kemal refused to shake hands with the other commanders. Kemal sat on one side and the others on the other with Nas in the middle. The meeting took place at about 2 am on te Monday morning.

Eventually it was all sorted out and everyone was very relieved. Kemal shook hands with the others.

In early 1965 a number of attempts were made to bring Nas back into line with Yani. Suharto also made an attempt along those lines at Lebaran 1965. At that stage Yani, Suharto cs could not imagine a stuation without Suharto.

Sumitro supported BK in 1966 and 1967 together with other Brawidjaja officers.

There had be a plan to take BK to Surabaya in 1966.

Adjie was close to Adjie personally but anti-PKI - ie. like Yani.Yani and Sukarno 'had the same hobby'. If BK did not have a woman each day he felt bad.

Nas thinks that Suharto did not want to depose BK until at least the MPRS session in 1966. Even in 1967 he did not want to take the oath of office. It was partly due to circumstances but also because of his attitude to Sukarno.

Yani was always confident that he could get closer to BK's ear than the PKI could. Nasution doubted this.

General Nasution,

20 August 1973

The basic difference between Nas and Yani was that Yani was in the 'istana' while Nas was not. They agree in their attitude to the PKI but differed in their attitude to BK. Their tactics in their attitudes in approaching BK was very different.

On the issue of dissolution of BPS and Murba they were considered relatively insignificant by the army leaders. However Nasakomisasi and the 5th Force threatened the existence of the TNI 'secara langsung'

On the basic issues Nas and Yani were united but not on 'sehari-2' matters.

The Ad's strong defence of HMI must be seen in the conext of the general situation. Although the HMI was a minor matter, it came under attack at the same time as contact with Nas .. the Peltu Sudjono incident.

Martadinata was the one leader of ABRI who had regular contact with Nas. Nas never met Yani informally. Nas 'cannot remember' a meeting with Yani at the beginning of 1965. However he remembers a meeting with Yani at the beginning of 1965. However he remembers Basuki Rach mat and then Suharto coming to try to convince him to revise his attitude to BK.

Nas had contact with Azahari before the December 1962 affair. When Azhari came to Jakarta in 1962 Magenda met him at the airport to prevent the BPI people getting him. Shortly after the revolt, Nas discussed the issue with Hasan Basri, the Pangkomdah Kalimantan. Nasution's role was limited to encouraging Azahari through Hasan Basri and Magenda. It seems that material assistance was not given.

Makin lama, Azahari had more contact with the BPI. If at first he had 90% contact with us and 10% with them, in the end he was 100% in control with BPI. Nas does not know Yani's attitude at that stage because they only met at formal meetings.

Nas regarded Konfrontasi as a matter of principle while YLani looked at it more in terms of the advantages it offered to the TNI both politically and in terms of armaments.

Nas did not take part in decisions to drop troops in Malaysia. AD was not very happy about it.

Nas proposed buying missiles with a 40km range to 'mengunci' Singapore. This seems to have been accepted by KOTI. Later Kol Muskita was given the task by Yani of drawing up a request to Moscow. Influenced by Yani and Sukendro (?) he asked for 2000 km range rockets which could be not only lsed against Butterworth but also the Clark airfield in the Philippines. Subandrio and Yani went on an arms-buying mission to Moscow but were rejected. Then in October, BK sent Nas to Moscow.

Yani and Suharto were not enthusiastic about dropping troops in Malaysia. They preferred to try to first build up 'pockets' of resistance in Malaysia. Ali Murtopo's visit to Malaysia were for this purpose. He used smugglers. The aim at that stage was not to seek peace.

According to the AD plan, Kostrad forces in North Sumatra could be used to invade Malaysia if necessary once pockets of resistance had been developed. (However Nas agreed with my suggestion that these may have been an element of 'permainan' in this ie. a tactic for impressing BK.

BK was often angry with Suharto in late 1965 but was not always able to influence Suharto eg bans on PKI.

Nas does not know whether Adjie consulted any leaders in Jakarta before banning the PKI. He did not consult Nas.

Nas thinks that BK may have offered Adjie the post of Menteri Dalam Negeri but Adjie did not accept it. Adjie would not have been likely to accept the post of Menteri Hankam against Suharto's wishes for fear of being rejected by Suharto. Nas had not heard that Adjie had been offered the post by BK in Feb 1966.

After Sarbini's appointment as Menkohankam he came two times to Nas's house to arrange the serah-terima but Nas refused to co-operate. Sarbini was 'malu' because he could not start work.

Mokoginta was like Yani. Possibly he deliberately issued pro-BK statements in late '66.

The Pengumuman 20 Februari was a compromise between Suharto and the other Panglima. However Nas and the MPRS leaders refused to accept it. It was then called an "upaya resistan' (?)so that the feelings of the AC and AK were bit badly hurt.

Suharto was looking for a way out that would avoid the dismissal of BK. Also Suharto was pre-occupied with other issues like rice etc. Suharto did not speak of postponing the MPRS after 20 February. It was hard to know exactly what Suharto's view were. Brig.jen Sarwo Edhie

Magelang, 5-9-1970

Sarwo was previously Wa Dan and became Dan RPKAD in January 1965 (or 1968?}. RPKAD was directly under the Pangad until the coup, when it was placed below Suharto as Panglima of Kostrad. When Umar replaced Suharto at Kostrad, RPKAD remained under Kostrad. The RPKAD consisted of 3 battlions, one of which was at the front under confrontation.

On 1October1965 Sarwo called together his officers and decided to wait at his camp. He sent some officers out to critical areas to gather information. Meanwhile another officer came from Kostrad with a note from Suharto saying the situation was gawat and calling Sarwo to him. However Sarwo thought that Suharto may have written the letter under duress so he stayed there till further information came in. He then went to Suharto.

Suharto ordered him to take over the Telecommunications and RRI buildings. He put Sarwo directly in control of this operation to do it in his own way. Later Sarwo was ordered to take Halim.

On 2nd, Sarwo went to Bogor to meet BK. BK said that Yani's death was something natural in a revolution. From that moment Sarwo could not accept Sukarno.

Apart from Sarwo's troops, the Kujang battalion from Siliwangi was active in Jakarta on that day.

In the middle of that month Sarwo said that he was ready to lead his troops to Djateng. Suharto considered this and a few days later accepted Sarwo's offer. The RPKAD went by road to Semarang.

There were already a few companies (a small battalion) in Djateng at Semarang, Magelang and Kartasura near Solo. Another one-and-a bit troops were not from Jakarta, thus making 2 full battalions.

There was no resistance in Semarang but the situation was very tense. They then moved on to Magelang and then quickly to Solo at night arriving at about 3.30am. Sarwo had received an emergency call from Surjosumpeno [Regional commander in Central Java]to go quickly to Solo. There was no resistance on the road to Solo but the road was blocked by PKI afterwards.

Sarwo did not have enough troops to take command of the situation. He called for more troops from Jakarta but they could not send them. He then asked for permission to arm and train the Nasa elements (Nas). Eventually permission was given. He gave various youth organisations 2-3 days training and then sent them out against the PKI. They were more or less under the control of RPKAD men. 'Then I could sleep at night' said Sarwo. (Nas was as vicious as A(?) in the killing).

After some time the killing got out of hand and Sarwo appealed to the people to stop killing each other.

In some areas snipers from Diponegoro fired on RPKAD.

The RPKAD stayed in Djateng until 31 December.

RPKAD men were sent setjara diam2 to Djatim mainly as an intelligence operation to see how the situation was there. They did not go openly to Djatim.

In December they went to Bali but the purpose was to stop the killing which was already out of hand. Sarwo says that the heaviest killing proportionately took place in Bali. On his return to Djakarta Sarwo had close contact with student leaders. But they often came to him after they had taken some action and had already run into trouble.

From early in March discussions were taking place on what to do after Sukarno's February cabinet. Sarwo decided along with Kemal Idris (who appears to be in charge of Kostrad at that time) to put troops in front of the palace without any signs. The purpose was to frighten the President. They would wait to see what happened. They hoped to separate the President from his closest advisors.

Q-What would have happened if Tjakrabirawa opened fire? This would have given an opportunity to clean them up and settle the situation.

Only about 3 companies of RPKAD were involved. At that time about% of Kostrad's troops were RPKAD. There were also a couple of Siliwangi divisions. Sarwo says that as a prajurit he should not have take this action but he did so as a 'pedjuang'. (It appears that Suharto did not know exactly what was happening but knew that something of this sort was likely to happen.) Sarwo and Kemal had been calling for 'pressure' on BK for some time. If Suharto knew, it was through Kemal, not Sarwo.

As soon at BK had fled, Suharto was very happy to exploit the situation by sending three officers to Boger.

On 12th Sarwo ordered the show of force. Shortly before it began, Umar orderd him to call it off, but Sarwo went ahead against orders.

On 13th BK called the Panglima of AC, AK and AU and told the RPKAD them that this time Suharto had gone too far.

On l6th7 the RPKAD was again ordered to surround the palace and get 9 ministers.

There was a danger of civil war in 1966 and 1967 but Sarwo believed in pushing ahead and taking the risk.

Sarwo, Kemal and Dharsono were the vanguard in this respect pushing ahead of the others and dragging them on. They often held meetings together.

In Medan, Sarwo found that the PNI was under ASU control (they still believed in Marhaenism). Sarwo membekukan PNI because he saw that anti-PK! groups were going to take violent actions against the PNI. Sarwo hoped that the Osa -Usep elements would re-organise the party, but he did not intervene directly in the parties' affairs as in Djatim.

However eventually Sarwo's policy was reversed by the central government which was opposed to Sarwo's line.

After Aidit's death, this was not announced because it was thought it would make a bad impression abroad.

Sarwo has been a Brigjen for 5 years. 'Dimata rakyat dinilai tinggi tetapi penilaian rakyat lain daripada penilaian atasan.'

Sarwo says that you can't have democracy without political parties but the present parties in Indonesia are no good. However later more modern party leaders might arise. let Jen Kemal Idris

9 December 1970

Kemal Idris had been opposed to Sukarno for a very long period before G-30-S.

He had been involved in the 17 October affair as a Let.Col. In 1955 when the regional trouble was beginning. Ke ma I was relieved of his position. He did not get a new job until 1963. Meanwhile he was promoted to Col in 1959 although Sukarno would not give him a job. In this period he did much studying and talking to people such as Sudjatmoko. Yani once planned to make him a military attache but BK vetoed it. In 1963 he spent eight months in the Congo. Then in 1964 Suharto pushed and tricked BK into permitting Kemal to be appointed to lead the troops to invade Malaysia. At that time he became Brig-Jen. Kemal says that BK knew that 75% of the troops in an invasion would be killed.

In Sumatra Kemal headed troops that had to be prepared to invade Malaysia if the order came. In fact they had no adequate means for making an invasion. In the army at that time many generals were doubting the prospects of confrontation.

In North Sumatra Kemal's troops were the strongest and best. Thus he was the dominant panglima at the time of the coup.

On 1 st October Kemal did not hear the radio report at 7 but was told of it in his office. He did not understand what had happened. He tried to make contact with the HQ of the Pangkoanda in Medan but was unsuccessful. At 1 he heard the broadcast of the Dewan Revolusi. He a assumed the PKI was involved. He also feared that Medan was in PKI hands. As contact could not be made with Medan, he decided to go there himself. He found that the Pangkoanda HQ was trying to contact Jakarta but was unsuccessful. They were confused about the situation.

Kemal ordered his troops to patrol and arrest communists, especially in the plantation areas. After going to Jakarta on the 7th, he returned with the full story and large-scale pembunuhan took place. The local people helped.

It appears that there was no actual pro-coup activity in Medan. However, Kemal says they would have moved if Kemal had not moved.

In November Kemal moved to Jakarta as Kepala Staf Kostrad. Unofficially Kemal and Sarwo supported the student actions. Suharto told them to protect the students. At that time many generals were still very subservient to BK. Increasingly the student movement took on anti-BK overtones.

In Kostrad Usman was the Panglima but he had delegated much authority to Kemal. Since January there had been an informal arrangement whereby Kemal had authority over .ill! troops in Djakarta including Kodam V. Amir was in charge of territorial work while Kemal was in charge of operations.

By February and March Suharto was feeling that the army was losing the initiative. He called Kemal and Sarwo and told them that they must win back the initiative for the army from Sukarno. He did not order troops to be placed in front of the palace. This was done by Ke ma I as a concrete implementation of Suharto's more general instruction.

The purpose of the placing of the RPKAD troops there was to frighten Sukarno - and also to protect the demonstrating students. If possible they were to arrest Subandrio, Chaerul and certain other ministers. Siliwanti troops in Djakarta were also under Kemal's control. They were used for patrolling etc.

Kemal saw the Supersemar as a step only.

Kemal saw the March 11 incident as the crucial turning point. The people saw that when the pressure was on, BK would give in. Although the true story did not appear in the newspapers, it would have been quickly carried to the regions by the party leaders.

Kemal does not think there was any real danger of civil war. The people were not ready to rise up on Sukarno's behalf.

Kemal, Dharson and Sarwo wanted to create a new political system. In general they favoured a new two party system. Soeharto had the power as the time (Tap IX) to dissolve the existing parties. However he was very concerned to work through constitutional means. He wanted the parties to voluntarily dissolve themselves but natural whey would not do this. Kemal and Dharsono favoured the disbanding of the existing parties. Dharsono took steps to implement his ideas but in Kemal's case he did not control an area. Nevertheless he supported Dharsono's efforts.

The independent group also supported the two-party idea. However it quickly faded away, partly because of internal conflict and also because of the intervention of certain military people.

In 1967, action was taken in certain areas against the PNI although the aim was not always to ban the PNI but to crystalise it and let new leaders replace the old Sukarnoist leaders.

Suharto is still sympathetic to a simplification of the parties (pengkotakan). But the present plan is not strong enough. The old parties remain much as they were.

Suharto tricked Sukarno into agreeing Kemal's promotion as Maj.Djen. Suharto told BK that he planned to send Kemal overseas but Kemal had to become a Maj.Djen first. After the promotion Kemal was not posted abroad. General Simatupang, November 1969

Kapita Selekta at UI

During the revolusi, panglima TNI was elected by the other panglima, not appointed by the government. Sudirman was therefore rather independent of the government.

When Sukarno-Hatta were arrested, the real government was the TNI. The Pemerintah Darurat at Bukittinggi had no real authority.

Simatupang committed the TNI to support the Roem - ? agreement in 1949 although many military men disagreed. Nevertheless they remained loyal to the agreement.

Hamid - ? says that Simatupang agreed to incorporate KNIL in the TNI as a unit. What Simatupang agreed to was to incorporate some of the KNIL according to the needs of the TNI. Later Hamid tried to have Simatupang killed.

It was decided to draw up a set of obligations for soldiers. Simatupang was the Kas at the time. The proposed 'Pedoman Pradjurit Angkatan Perang' but he was over-ruled by those who supported the magical Sanskritized 'Sapta Marga'. Simatupang sees the value of such terms now although he is little attracted personally.

The party system lost its authority when the PNl-Masjumi coalition broke up in 1952. No longer was a stable system possible. The Masjumi then split (NU) and a group in the PNI looked to the PKI as its ally.

The 'peristiwa 17 Oktober' was not a coup. If Simatupang had wanted to stage a coup, he could have by ringing his telephone. But he did not want to because the TNI had no idea of what to do once they had power. What everyone realised that the old system had to go, the trouble with BK's new system was the role it gave to the PKI. Probably BK thought that the PKI was essentially nationalistic, with internationalistic trimmings (?)

The coup. The PKI were 'takut konyol mati'. If BK died, the AD would eliminate the PKI. Therefore they had to act. Syam said that there were enough supporters in the AD and Aidit had no way of checking them for himself. Brig Ojen Sukendro 14 and 23 December 1970

Sukendro was exiled by Sukarno in August 1962 but was re-called to Indonesia toward the end of 1963 and put under house arrest. But after six weeks he was called by BK at about the end of December 1963. BK asked him to become head of Intelligence (BPI). However Sukendro refused. Some weeks later BK asked him to become Menteri Negara in the field of the economy.

At that time everyone was trying to be close to BK. BK was not really on the PKl's side against the AD. He wanted friends on all sides

In April 1965 Sukendro was sent by Yani and BK to meet Tungku and Tun in KL (Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak). Sukarno had expressed willingness to meet them. Sukendro had to explore the chances of a meeting. However, when he returned a meeting of leaders was held. Ali and Aidit opposed negotiations while Chaerul said negotiations must be held with Britain. The others eg NU Pete agreed to let BK decide.

After this there was a separate Mandala attempt (ie not KOTI) to contact Malaysia. This was Suharto's initiative. Possibly Yani and probably BK were unaware of it. It was done through the Chinese and through ships engaged in trade with Malaysia. This was Ali Murtopo's job.

By this time the AD had decided not to send any army troops to Malaysia. The troops sent there were mainly from AURI.

At that time (1964-65} Sukendro AD was not really expecting a military coup. They expected it would be at least a year before a coup attempt. Sukendro thought that the PKI would emphasize large-scale strikes etc to weaken the govt before attempting any coup. Sukendro wanted to put army people into vital positions in the economy.

Sukendro also proposed that the AD take complete control 'step by step' of KOTI so that any 'kemungkin' could be met. Especially Sri Muljono Herlambang and possibly Ahmadi should be removed.

Thus the AD was not really expecting a military coup. They expected that it would be at least a year before a coup attempt.

In February 1965 Sukendro's plan to take over KOTI was leaked out, possibly by Muhono. This made the PKI nervous. Then in June, at a meeting of panglima from the daerah, Yani praised Sukendro's work in contacting Malaysia. (In fact this contact should have been top secret.)

In mid-September Sukendro was planning to go to Peking but delayed his departure when he heard a report of a plan to kidnap 7 generals including himself and Sudirman, apart from the generals killed during the coup. He warned Sutojo about this. This was about 13th September.

Shortly before he left, Aidit met Subandrio. Then Subandrio ordered Sukendro to come back to Indonesia on 28th September after completing economic negotiations.

The generals killed were those known to be strongly anti-PKI. Others like Suharto were not so 'gigih'.

If BK had died, most likely Nasution would have taken over as the army candidate.

From as early as 1958-9 after Seskoad courses, Soeharto was suspicious of Rukman and Supardjo. However Pranoto was quite different. He was not a PKI type. In about June or July, Chaerul called a meeting between the PNI (Ruslan, Ali and Surachrnan) and the AD (Yani, Sukendro etc) to discuss ways of meeting the PK!. However they only quarrelled).

Sukendro was present when BK collapsed in August 1965. This was a major factor in PKI calculations. Let. Gen. Mokoginta\

9-8-73

Mokoginta was appointed as Pangkoandah in November 1964.

In the atmosphere of 1964-5 it was not possible for the army to take direct action against the PKI because the army did not want to memberontak against the line of the government. Neverthless the regional commanders took action within the letter of the law. E.g. Mokginta suspended the PKI naewspaper 'Harian Hara pan'.

When the PKI proposed that the peasants and buruh be armed, Mokoginta decided to arm the Hansip. However he was careful to make sure that the PKI element was in a minority. Further their arms were inferior.

After Bandar Betsy, the hakim ketua was threatened by the PKI. He was afraid to announce the decision. Mokoginta called him and issued a counter-threat that he would be arrested if he failed to make the announcement. At that time the regional commander could take many decisions independently of the President.

The army leaders calculated that they would have a dominant influence on Sukarno. At the same time Sukarno knew that there were a range of types in the army. While some like Mursyid and Suadi followed him without reserve, others followed Nasution. Thus BK could not risk taking action against Yan i. BK knew that Yani was under mining his policies but they were still on good terms personally. 'We are all murid2 of Bung Karno'.

In Atjeh the army was too slow in taking action to prevent the killings. In fact many of the army were Atjehnese and shared the failings of the people. The PKI was largely non-Atjehnese.

From March 1966 the TNI had broken BK's power. His personality was such that he could not accept the 'constitutional' position that was offered to him. Rather than have only limited powers, BK preferred to have none.

Mokoginta did not have good ties with the Kesatuan Aksi which supported ABRI against the PKI but also took advantage of the situation to to attack the Chinese. Mokoginta issued an instruction to prevent people pulling down pictures of BK who was still the President. Mokoginta believed that whatever his faults, BK was still President and should be treated as such.

On Konfrontasi, the aim was never to invade Malaysia but only to drop troops there in the expectation that's the Malalysians would rise in revolt. This was a serious miscalculation.

The army did not support the campaign enthusiastically but they were happy to receive modern arms as a result of the campaign.

Hen Mokoginta started Operasi Harapan, Suharto told him not to push it too quietly as some groups were concerned about the benefits only going to Sumatra. Ruslan Abdulgani

5July1972

Ruslan is not a priyayi but his wife is. He comes from a commercial family

Bung Karno (BK) began to talk about 'guided democracy' after 17 October. Later Chaeral Saleh and Achmadi tried to influence him in the direction of a one-party system.

In 1959 a Panitiya Tiga of Nasution, lpik and Ruslan devised the qualifications for the new party laws. They proposed not to recognise 'partai yang memberontak'. BK proposed not to recognise 'partai yang memberontak'. BK insisted on adding 'sekarang'.

Apparently Sukendro and Maginda supported the Liga Demokrasi despite Nasution's interest in reducing the role of the parties. There were many groups within the army.

The 1960 move against the PKI was more to frighten than to crush. Ruslan was at a meeting of the DPA on the day that the army moved. Aidit, Njono, Munir etc attended when troops appeared outside. They did not want to leave. asked Nasution who said that apparently the local garrison was taking more action. Munir left in Ruslan's car.

By 1962 Yani had become cynical about Nasution. Yani and Nas are completely different personalities. He was less interested in she replacemnsonalities. Nas never jokes while Yani was like Sukarno - esp fond of women. Thus they could work together. Yani was more inclined to give concessions to BK but the difference was not so great. Yani was more flexible. Sukarno had been interested in pushing Nasution out. He was less interest in the replacement. Nasution felt forsaken by Yani.

At a KOT! meeting in 1965 the question of clashes between TNI and PNI in Djogjakarta arose. Chaerul took the initiative to settle it without PKI participation. A meeting was held at his home between Yani, Ali and the supporters. It was Yani rather than Ali who invited Ruslan. Yani wanted not only to settle the incident but to lay the basis for further PNl-TNI co-operation. He offered aid to the coming PNI HUT. Ruslan did not want to accept obvious aid eg army? transport. Eventually some aid was given. However Ali was not very enthusiastic about further co-operation.

Nasution was a major figure supporting the idea of operations against the Malay Peninsula. He once suggested using missiles against Singapore. At the KOTI meeting even BK was kaget to hear this proposal. It was not adopted. Ruslan himself does not know how the decision to land troops in West Malaysia was reached.

Yani was not really opposed to confrontation. He could see benefits for the army but he was always conscious of the need to avoid provoking the British too far.

13July 1972

Murba

The Murba approached BK to rehabilitate Tan Malaka. Tan Malaka was made a Pahlawan Kemerdekaan Nasional in March 1963. Chaerul Saleh got on well with Aidit despite his strong opposition to the PKI. Chaerul wanted to 'domesticate' the PKI and turn it into something like Murba. The army was a sympathetic observer when Murba put forward its one-party proposal. Murba knew that TNI would support them but it was certain that PNI and NU would be opposed.

Ruslan thinks that the Murba role in BPA has been exaggerated. There were Masjumi-PSI people in the background. Also D... and Achmadi supported BPS. Once Achmadi was shouted down at a rally when he tried to defend BPS.

Not all Murba leaders supported BPS. Chaerul, Adam? and Suharni did but Maruto was apparently no involved. Prijono was much closer to the PKI which supported his educational policies. Murba seems to be as much a 'state of mind' as an organisation. Astrawinata? was also a Murba man of the Prijono type.

Some Murba people say that the USSR was seeking to contact with urba in 1964 but there is no evidence of this.

As Minister of Trade, Adam Malik concluded many contracts through Dewi and Slipi (?) Slipi is where Dewi lived.

PNI

'Deklarasi Marhaenisme' was partly a clever move to get close to BK at the expense of PKI and BPS. Surachman's policy in Petani (?)was wise. He tried to keep up with BTI rather than side with the landlords.

Hadisubeno came from a raden type of family. He was feudal in outlook. He is like the kind of bupati who can go down into the rice-field and was thus immensely popular He was devoted to BK but BK hated him.

20July 1972

BK wanted to set up a re-tooling body so Nasution prepared PARAN in order to prevent it falling into other hands. Nasution also conducted Operasi Budhi which caught a number of military figures including Gen. Surjo. (Later when Surjo was appointed as an advisor to Suharto in 1966, Nasution called him and requested that he refused the appointment).

Soeharto had been moved from Semarang in 1960 by Nasution partly because of Nasution's anti­ corruption campaign. Suharto's Kas, Pranoto, had also been agitating for Soeharto's removal. Pranoto, a very simple and quiet man, was close to the ordinary pradjurit. He was unhappy with Suharto's economic activities as well as his strong anti-communism.

Subandrio wanted to ban HMI but GS (especially Sutjipto, Sunarso) called HM! tokoh including Sulastomo, Marie (?) and Dahlan and told them to declare that they had no connection with Masjumi and accepted Manipol. When they had done this, BK decided not to ban them. Thus it was not Subandrio who protected them.

Njoto was a very intelligent and amicable man. Lukman was more blunt. Sudisman was pleasant but not as intelligent as Njoto.

1 At the Cabinet meeting on 6 h November 1965, Njoto praised BK as much as possible. However Chaerul then spoke and warned BK against being 'dikentutkan'. 'Ada jg kentut dgn diam tetapi baunya terasa'. Applause broke out after Chaerul's speech. Chaerul and Achmadi had been behind the idea of Barisan Sukarno. Subandrio then also took over the question. Tumahate (?)also prepared a National Front Gaya Baru. Chaerul and Subandrio remained strong rivals.

On about 15th or 161h March a meeting was held at the palace. BK asked Chaerul to read a speech saying he was still President. It was also proposed ('I forgot who') that Ruslan give an explanation. (Presumably it wasn't BK who made this proposal).

A 6-member presidium was appointed and presented to BK for approval. He changed the order by putting Leimena on top. Thus in effect he gave his approval.

Later when A. .. wanted to re-enter the UN Suharto told R... to tell BK. BK said he did not want to go back to the UN but would if they were asked by some other countries. Ruslan asked how many. BK said 5 or 6. Ruslan said that was alright. BK then said 10-12. They eventually agreed on about 8. Diah (who was acting Menlu) called a meeting of ambassadors from neighbouring like Thailand and asked what their reaction would be to Indonesia's return to the UN. They all said it was good. Then Ruslan went back to BK and said that since then 8 countries asked Indonesia to return to the UN.

Suharto wanted to continue the relationship when BK remained as President but BK would not accept it. BK's character was such that he had to play the leading role and he stood to his principles like Nasakom.

If BK had died in 1965 he would have been succeeded most likely by Chaerul. Subandrio was disliked by the army. Once Yani asked Ruslan whether he would be interested. Whoever was President, the government would be based on the army supported by PNI and NU.

Ruslan had only met Suharto 2 or 3 times before the coup. At the time of the coup he had to stop and think which one was Suharto.

30 August 1972

BK made a big mistake in dismissing Nasution. He was probably misled by Subandrio and the BPI on the likely reaction from the army.

Suharto and Nasution were working together at that time. Ruslan met Suharto and Sutjipto at Nasution's place after Suharto had been told. Suharto asked Ruslan to go and see but Ruslan was unwilling because there were rumours that he too might be dropped.

Suharto did not react immediately because he was concerned to act 'legally'. Martadinata was fairly close to Nasution while Mudjadi (?}was much influenced by BK.

Ruslan does not think Suharto sent a list of ministers to be arrested by BK but he may have requested the dismissal of Subandrio. Many people had been doing that.

Ruslan does not know of an army team headed by Basuki to keep contact with BK. Suharto often used Ruslan. Sukarno was often very angry in the months after March.

Muljadi Djag ..... and Marzuki Jatim (?)approached BK about the formation of a new .... Party, probably before 11-3-66.

Ruslan did not attend the PNI Congress because he knew what was going to happen. When it was about to open, Adjie met Ruslan and Sukarno, and requested that Ruslan attend but Ruslan refused unless he got a guarantee from Adjie that there would be no interference. Adjie could not give such a guarantee. Adjie's group or his own troops were weak.

In late April BK was thinking in terms of dissolving the MPRS.

Naution was quite happy to be appointed as Ketua MPRS.

BK seemed to hope that his 17 August speech would rally the people behind him but he did not understand the real situation.

Bambang Supono was holding mystical meetings at his house in 1967 attended by various people including Sutjipto of the Police. He was hoping to find a way of putting BK back in power. Sudarman and Sarbini decided to 'arrest' him in and put him in a nice place at Pasar Minggu because they knew that Suharto also planned to arrest him. Ruslan does not know what Bambang Supeno's committee was with Petir.

Hartono of KKO was entirely pro-BK. There was a danger that fighting could break out in early 1967.

Ruslan does not know of any plan by BK to try to bring in PNI Osa-Usep in March 66. There was not much pressure either to ?? PNI Ali.

In about November 1965, BK, Subandrio and Sutardho (?)discussed a possible formation of what BK called a 'baby PNI'. Sutardhio came and asked for Ruslan's opinion. Ruslan opposed the idea. It seems that Subandrio had made the proposal.

Sukendro was arrested in mid-67 after he said that he had been a member of the Dewan Jenderal. A 'smoke screen' was set up about a dozen Sukarnoists being arrested. Mhd Roem

10 November 1970

When the PMI was founded they were forced to accept Naro and lmron Kadir, both of whom are Ops us.

Alamsyah is a Muslim who is closer to PMI than other generals but he is also a general and when the pressure is on he is a general more than a Muslim.

At present Roem is head of KAPU (Komite .... Pemilihan Umum) of Parmusi). This committee consists largely of ex-Masjumi leaders who are doing Parmusi's campaigning. Djanarwi's fault was that he is relying too much on the ex-Masjumi leaders, but he has to do this to get votes.

In the outer islands the Panglima are prepared to work with Parmusi because it is so strong. They have to work with Parmusi.

Sukarno had 6 years of real power (1959-65). Then he fell. Suharto has already had four. The people will not stand more than 6 years.

There is evidence that elements in ABRI itself regard the activities of Opsus as being too much. Hariri Hadi

3 October 1973

Of the original non-military members of SPRI, Sia met Danudirjo and Abdulhadir were from SESKOAD where they already had close contact with Widjaja cs. They were different in outlook to the other members of SPRI. Abdulkhadir was Sudanese and Slamet may perhaps be from the Siliwangi.

The civilian members of the were able to contact the party leaders informally eg Saliman Sumadi and PNI. Hariri Hadi himself was close to the Masjumi a Ii ran but he was able contact the party leaders informally eg Suliman Sumati and PNI. Hariri Hadi himself was closer to the Masjumi aliran but he was also able to contact the NU (especially the Subchan group)

The politics team's ineffectiveness was partly due to Sarbini's personality and also the distrust of his political background (ie PSI). The politics team was also less effective because Suharto took advice from the generals

Widjaja had no great difficulty in getting his economic measures accepted eg 3 October.

Frans Seda was not really an economics expert. In effect the economics team made economics policy. To that extent SPRI was a 'cabinet bajangan'.

Laksamana (pen) Poegoeh

18-7-73

Why was AURI more leftist-inclined than the other services?

The army and navy had their origins in the revolution while AURI was formed later. Most of its officers were very young. Suryadarma was strongly opposed to Nasution. Omar Dhani was 'tolol' and had no understanding of politics. The PKI was clever in influencing him.

The GPPR was led by 7 young officers who had PKI ties. It was directed against the ALRI leadership, especially Martadinata who was close to Nasution. They planned a naval strike followed by penangkapan2. However the strike in Surabaya was not accompanied by similar action in Jakarta. As a result 175 young officers (Capt and below) were dismissed and placed in the Department Maritime under Ali Sadikin.

In October 1965 BK wanted to replace Yani with Adjie but Adjie refused to accept.

In late 1966 there was a plan for BK to mengungsi to Surabaya. ALRI were ready to take him there while elements in the Brawidjaya division and the East Java police (Sumarsono) were prepared to protect him. However BK was unwilling to go as it could have set off civil conflict.

(reports of arrest in Nov. 66?)

The Sesepuh Brawidjaja signed a statement prepared by Col Suharto {former commander of Surabaya KODIM and secretary of Keluarga Besar Brawidjaya). The statement was sent to (the newspaper) El Bahar but Pangad considered it too keras. He modified it and then published it. As a result El Bahar was suspended.

BK was reluctant to sign the Pengumunan 20 Febrary until given djaminan2 by Muljadi and Sutjipto J. that nothing would happen to

Agus Sudono (Ketua Parmusi}

21-8-70

Kap-Gestapu

On the evening of pt October 1965 AS went to Subchan's house where he ate. Two others were there. Then they went out to see what was happening. Subchan went to a general's house while Agus went to gedung Postel. On their return they heard that Suharto had restored order. At midnight they met Suharto who promised arms to the Muslim masses if this were necessary the next day.

On 2nd Agus signed a statement prepared by Sutjipto SH at KOT! condemning Gestapu. Only PNI, Partindo and Perti refused to sign. However Perti's leadership was quickly replaced.

On 3rd a meeting was held attended by Subchan, Harry Tjan, Agus, Lukman Harun, and other Muslims at the Muhamadijah University. They planned a meeting the following day.

That night they met General Umar who advised them against it as he could not guarantee their safety. Any way they went ahead and Umar provided 15 or so soldiers to guard them.

The rally on 4th was held at Taman Sunda Kelapa. About 2000 attended. The only NU representative was Subchan. There were probably about 20 from PMKRI led by Harry Tjan while the rest were probably about 20 from PMKRI led by Harry Tjan while the rest were of the PMI a Ii ran like Pemuda Mluhammadijah, Pll Gasbindo etc.

On the gth a big rally was held at Taman Surapati. About 50,000 attended. All parties except PNI and Partindo joined in. After the rally, the plan was that they would go to the Front Nasional via Jin Thamrin to demonstrate. However, some of them ie Pemuda Muhamadiyah, HMI and Pll, led by Siregar Pau (?)went to the PKI building while Agus led Gasbindo to the SOBS! building in Kramat. Both were burnt down. Siregar got a list of PK! addresses which were used in further attacks over the next few days.

Ali Murtopo was the man they usually approached if they had dealings with Suharto. (He got funds from Chaerul Saleh).

KAP-Gestapu became Fron Pantjasila because the aim of crushing the PKI was achieved. However it was beginning to break up. The division was particularly between the older party leaders and the non-party young men. The old men did not want to take too hard action against BK.

BK tried to cause dissension in the FP by setting up the FN Galya Baru (which never came into being) and by appointing some of the young FP men, incl Agus, to the new DPA. However they rejected their appointment.

The FP finally broke up when Suharto appointed the Ampera cabinet. They finally split over the struggle for seats. Sarwo Edhie gave this account to Agus about 11 March. Sarwo informed Suharto that the students might demonstrate at the Cabinet meeting. Therefore he should supply troops to protect the students. Suharto agreed. What actually happened may have been more then what Suharto had expected.

BK had plans to disband the MPRS. He had 3 battalions of KKO to support him waiting at Tanjung Priuk {May 66).

Why was Nasution not taken back into Cabinet after Supersemar. Agus thinks that Suharto ws concerned not to give offense to BK. Suharto and Nasution were still very close at that time. After the MPRS session when Suharto went to the palace, BK seemed quite happy. He said he could not with Suharto but if Nasution had been selected by the MPRS he could not accept the decision. At that time Suharto had no ambition to be President. However, Suharto and his staff became more aware of Nasution's possible ambitions when members of the MPRS proposed that Nasution should take over if BK 'berhalangan'. Some of these members did not like the idea of another Javanese taking over.

Nasution had been pleased to be appointed Ketua MPRS.

There was great tension at the Sidang lstimewa MPRS. Suhartos responding to pressure from the radicals on one side and the Panglima2 on the other. Muljadi and Sutjipto strongly supported BK while Rusmin was half-and-half. The term 'rintisan djalan' for the Pengumanan 20 Februari came from Maj Djen Andi Jusuf (an'opportunist'). At the time there were many KKO troops at Tanjung Priuk.

24-8-1970

The military was not informed of the plan to burn down the PKI and SOBSI buildings. They were afraid if the ABRI knew, they would not agree. Even Subchan was not told.

Both NU and IPKI were slightly pro-BK at MPRS ke-IV.

In his speech at MPRS, Agus pointed to Partindo and pro-Kl elements in the hall. Later he was called by Nasution and Sugih Arto to give their names. 17 were excluded.

In general, Suharto's assistants tried to make sure that BK was not too severely criticised at the MPRS. Agus was the first speaker to be critical but he had to tone it down.

After the MPRS BK tried a 'come-back'. However when he refused to condemn the PKI, Suharto finally decided he had to go.

After the MPRS, BK tried to 'come-back'. However when he refused to condemn the PKI, Suharto finally decided that he had to go.

It was planned that BK would go to Surabaya on 10 November. However Suharto heard of the plans to keep him there to lead the resistance in Djakarta. The KKO was said to be involved. Sumitro was regarded as 'pro-BK'. Agus says that Sumitro's position now in Djakarta is not very good. Panggabean has the power.

Suhardiman, as Ketua Soksi, had been a strong supporters of Bk in 1964-5. Thus BK called him in January 67.

Sarbini had no brains. He was close to both BK and Suharto. Umar also is not clever. When he was Panglima of Kostrad, Kemal was the real ruler. When Sarwo Edhie was moved to Medan, Kemal was promoted to Panglima Kostrad. But this was just a clever move by Ali Murtopo. The eventual goal was to push them all out.

Sukendro was arrested in mid-1967. Sukendro was head of military intelligence at the time of the PRRI. He quietly captured people responsible for assassination attempts (the granat attack). Thus he was close to BK. In 1967 he was considered as a rival of Ali Murtopo who had been arrested. At that time there had been meetings involving Sukendro, Jatidjan (?), Suadi, Mursjid but it seems that only Sukendro was arrested.

Once Agus discussed the Pertamina question with Suharto. Suharto said he could never forget that early in October 65 Chaerul, Subadrio, Jusuf Muda Dalam etc refused to provide funds for the RPKAD to go to Djateng. lbnu Sutowo provided these funds.

Sudjono Humardani was Ass 7 of Kostrad when Suharto moved to Kostrad (??).

PMI

Lt Gen Sudirman was just a 'cover' as Ketua Badan Amal Muslim which was really a Masjumi oriented organisation.

In May Amir Machmud called ex-Masjumi leaders. Probably he was wanting their support in the clash with BK

Muljadi Djojomartono (with lr Sanusi) wanted to set up a new party based on Muhamadiyah in May 66. BK was hoping to get ex-Masjumi support through this party.

ABRI Statement 21-12-66 was probably more directed to influencing BK than to threatening the Masjumi. The Masjumi misinterpreted this and over-reacted to it.

In the meetings of Panitiya 7 with Alamsyah etc the Panitiya was never clearly told who was not acceptable - 'This is the Indonesian way'.

In February 68 it appeared that Alamsyah did not know so much compared with Ali Murtopo ad Sudjono Humardani.

In 1967 Suharto told Agus that he was not opposed to the restoration of Masjumi but that many generals whose men were killed in PRRlk were strongly opposed.

Apart from vetoing the Masjumi element, Agus agrees that's indirectly the authorities may have pressed for the inclusion of some people in the PM! leadership (in response to question about lmron Kadir and Naro). Harry Tjan

Sekdjen Partai Katholik/Sekdjen Front Pantjasila

8.10.70

Harry Tjan was introduced to Subchan about 3 months before the coup. They found that they had similar ideas so often met.

About 27th, Harry met Nasution who told him that something seemed likely to happen. At that time Nasution was not at all close with Yani. Meanwhile Mashuri and his group had close contact with Yani and Suharto etc. However Masjuri's group had no real base.

Harry Tjan and Subchan met to discuss the situation on the 30th. They decided to call a larger meeting on 4th. However that night the coup occurred. They got into immediate contact with each other. That night Harry contacted the Kodam, Umar, and got some idea of what was happening. He also got small arms from one 'Johnny' at the Kodam (who later turned out to be PKI !)

As far as Harry knows there was no attempt to set up an exclusively Muslim KAP-Gestapu.

On 2nd, all the parpol were invited to attend a meeting called by Sutjipto to condemn Gestapu. However, PNI, Partindo and Perti, and also Parkindo refused to sign. The others signed. Parkindo was 'plin plan' at that time.

On 4th a rally was held but it was only attended by about 200 people.

Harry met Suharto on 7th. Suharto informed him of the situation and said that if the people wanted to join ABRI - terserah.

On 3th a big rally was held. Afterwards Muslim groups, on their own initiative, burnt down various PKI buildings.

At first KAP-Gestapu was aimed at the PKI. However by November, Subandrio had become a major target. Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik were interested in pushing Subandrio out. Chaerul Saleh was supplying funds to Kap-Gestapu through Kostrad. Probably Ali Murtopo had a hand in this but the money was actually handed over to Herlina.

At this time, Subchan had quite good relations with Subandrio and was not so keen on attacking Subandrio. He was saying it is better to crush the PKI first. Harry, who was very anti-Subandrio, supported Subchan to safeguard unity.

Ruslan played no active role. He was opposed to Kap-Gestapu because Hardi was involved in it.

Apart from Subchan and Dachlan (?), NU leaders at first kept out of Kap-Gestapu

Later senior party leaders became more active. On the whole they did not strongly oppose BK as most of them were ministers in daily contact with BK. In the case of Partai Katholik, Kasima was 'keras' although Seda was not. After the Harlah, NU, when everyone supported BK, and also after Chaerul had become the target of student demonstrations, BK took a new initiative with Barisan Sukarno (Also BK knew he had the support of certain Panglima).

At the end of December and early January, Chaerul also tried to form Front Nasional Gaya Baru. This was to replace the old 'Nasakom' FN. The new one would be based on support to BK. The parties' role would have been reduced.

It was about this time that Front Pantjasila replaced Kap-Gestapu.

When Nasution was dismissed the Suharto group did nothing because they had no great love of Nasution. They were not opposed to him but were also not prepared to defend him.

Some military figures were not enthusiastic about KAMI. Eg Amir. However authority in Kostrad seemed to be in the hands of Kemal and Ali Murtopo. Suharto himself was usually non-committal in public. At this time Sudjono Humardhani was Suharto's contact man. Ali Murtopo was often concerned with Malaysia.

Peristiwa 11 Maret must have taken place with the knowledge of Suharto although he may not have ordered it. Kemal and Ali took a major role. Ali was wanting to use 'snipers' against certain people.

In May certain Panglima were sent to SESKOAD. 'This was like the dentist giving a tooth an injection before pulling it out. It took some of the tension out of the situation at the time of the MPRS'.

In November there was a move on the part of the Brawidjaya to restore BK. However no action could be taken because Brawidjaya was 100% pro BK. Sumitro was newly appointed. (In addition Sumitro has very bad relations with Alamsyah).

At the MPRS session, the army 'intellectuals' helped Suharto eg Sutjipto, Alamsyah.

'Harry Tjan thinks that Sukarno could have easily saved himself by condemning the PKI even in 1967'.

'Harry Tjan, Adu I Kaderbesar (+ Masjumi?) drew up the DPR Resolusi on gth February. Ali Murtopo and Sudjono told them it had the approval of Suharto (However quite likely it didn't)'. It was then taken to Thayeb who was told that Suharto supported it. Then it was passed.

'At this time the Hardi approach to BK was bearing fruit, resulting in Pengumuman 20 Feb'. At the MPRS Suharto was hoping to make BK a kind of elder statesman whose advice could be sought when needed. He was also planning to declare BK berhalangan if need be on health grounds. He already had documents for doctors for this purpose. However in the MPRS he eventually accepted a stronger declaration.

At that time no one knew the strength of KKO and the police. Certainly they could have caused considerable blood-shed.

Some people like Sukendro were disappointed because their services had not been recognised. Sukendro was arrested for a short time in 1967. It is doubtful whether he tried to restore BK in fact.

At the time of the coup, Sudjono Humardjani was deputy Ass VII to Alamsjah. Alamsyah was 'pintar' in finding money for those who needed it before the coup. He had good relations with Suharto. 6.8.73

Mashuri was an informal advisor to Yani before the coup and was an informal advisor to Yani before the coup - and also a neighbour of Suharto. He was not all that close to Suharto who was the Ketua of the RT while Mashuri was the Secretary. After the coup he became Suharto's advisor.

Yani and Nasution were both confident that they could deal with the PKI but they disagreed over BK. Suharto was essentially a soldier who was not deeply involved in politics.

On 2nd October, a meeting was held at KOT!. Harry Tjan represented the Catholic Party and Subchan represented the NU. The other parties also attended. However the PNI, Perti, and Parkindo representatives refused to sign as did Sabam Sirait of Parkindo.

The older party leaders like ldham and Frans Seda (?) were not enthusiastic about Kap-Gestapu.

Brigjen Umar was not enthusiastic about holding the first Kap-Gestapu meeting but other officers gave encouragement

The 'inti' at the meeting on 4th was about 400. In addition other people joined in but it is doubtful if more than 1000 attended.

The Kap-Gestapu at first held a co-ordinating role. Many actions of a limited nature took place 'atas nama' Kap Gestapu which were not planned by them.

BK encouraged the FN to take over the role of the Kap-Gestapu but was unsuccessful. The Komando ABRI Sekber Golkar may have conducted demonstrations but was never a major force. (HT does not seem to remember it as a major challenge.)

The campaign against Subandrio was supported by a number of groups eg Mashuri, Adam Malik, probably Chairul Saleh, and the Muslims. Subchan was opposed to it on the grounds that the time was not yet ripe and may have led to a clash with BK.

Ali Murtopo had an important role in the 11/3 affair.

At the sedang istimewa MPRS, Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani were able to 'interpret' Suharto's thoughts to the members. Suharto often expressed himself in very vague terms. A week before the session Suharto called Harry Tjan and asked him to moderate the campaign against Suharto.

The El Bahar story about the Sesepuh could be true. Perhaps even Sumitro signed the statement. At that time it was not at all clear what Suharto wanted. The Angkatan Darat Seminar was largely influenced by PSI types - Sarwoto, Prof Sarbini etc .. Its views were not deeply accepted by AD. Thus the UU Pemilu turned out to be very different to what was planned.

Harry Tjan sees the Piagam Jakarta as a big issue in 1968. Nasution was not opposed to the indirect changes discussed at that time.

Harry Tjan has been accused of being close to ABRI. This is because ABRI defends Pantjasila (ie. secular state. However the Muslims have tried an indirect approach eg at MPRS, UU Perkawinan, Pendidikan etc. There is a danger that ABRI will give in on these issues. Therefore the secularists must back up ABRI. Issues like Democracy, Rule of Law, etc are less important in the present stage. Hardi SH

Ex Ketua I PNI

9 October 1970

People did not know that Suratman was PKI until after 18 March although they had suspected it since l51 October.

While Ruslan was anti-PK! in Cabinet, he supported Ali-Su in the PNI leadership.

In Central Java the conflict between PKI and PNI became very sharp over the aksi-sepihak issue from 1964 onwards. Clashes were occurring in South Sumatra and Bali. In May Hardi warned BK of this but BK regarded this as 'komunisto phobi'.

While on the whole Asu supporters did not like the aksi sepihak, many - probably the majority - remained loyal to the formal leaders in Asu. They were confused. Apart from the party leaders' influence, Gubernur Mochtar also supported the Asu group. Nevertheless, Hadisubeno was a strong figure. In Djatim there was no strong figure, so it remained loyal to Asu. In Central Java physical clashes took place, but on a small scale.

On 29th September Osa-Usep leaders met BK who told them to remain loyal to the party leaders (i.e Ali).

After the coup the local panglima were fairly confused about the PNI. Some were more favourable to Ali, others were more neutral.

After Supersemar, BK was still close to Ali but he does not seem to have done much to help him.

Possibly Suharto took action to ensure an Osa-Usep victory at Bandung but this action was not very evident. [answer rather evasive].

On the final day of the Congress the doors were locked to prevent the Ali group walking out. If this had happened, it may have resulted in further military intervention and maybe a third party would have been appointed to the leadership.

After Bandung, PNI leaders often met BK.

The Ali group was purged in the daerah but the extent depended greatly on the local Panglima.

In late 1966, Slamet Ginting and his colleagues tryed to form a Partai Marhaen but this attempt failed.

In 1967 Hadi tried to persuade BK to condemn the PK!. In the original draft of the Pelnawaksara he apparently took a satisfactory line but later he changed it.

On Feb 7rh Hardi had a four-hours talk with BK. He tried to persuade BK to condemn the PKI and to declare himself inactive. However by then it was probably too late. If he had done this earlier the position would have been different.

Hardi's approach had nothing to do with the Sarbini 'personal approach'.

In 1967 the Government gave concessions to the parties on the electoral system but on the other hand there was the question of appointed members. In 1966 Hardi met Sarwo Edhy who was strongly opposed to the political parties. He wanted to replace with functional groups. However, since then Sarwo has come to see the value of parties. Kemal and Dharsono probably shared Sarwo's views.

In 1967 Hardi went to Panggabean and told him either to ban the PNI or to ensure its right to live but don't let local panglima determine policy. Let Jen Djatikusumo

10.8.73

Indonesia was opposed to Malaysia because:

a. The British wanted to interfere in SE Asian affairs b. The Malays are unable to control the Chinese and 'the Chinese are always Chinese'.

The aim was to force Britain to tie down a large number of troops at great cost so that they would be forced to withdraw. At the same time only about one battalion of Indonesian forces were used. Most of them were Malayan Chinese, not Indonesians. Forces were dropped on the Malaysian peninsula in the expectation that they would get local support.

Djatikusumo was Consul(?) in Singapore up to 1956. Then he became a Minister. He became Dubes in KL in May 1963. After that he was a Special Advisor in the Deplu.

The conflict between the TNI and AURI had a long history back to 1945 when the army wanted AURI to be under the TNI while AURI wanted to be independent.

Yani was concerned to get closer to BK than the PKI was. Nasution preferred to confront BK. Djatikusumo was one of the generals who were becoming worried by Yan i's approach but only gradually. There was a wide range of opinion in the AD.

Pranoto was not obviously aligned with the PKI before Gestapu.

Djatikusumo thinks that the PKI was provoked to carry out the coup - but not by CIA. It was done 'secara halus' while the CIA is always 'kasar'. The aim was to get rid of the PKI and weaken Indonesia.

If BK had died in 1965 it is likely that Yani would have taken over. The army leaders always thought of what would happen when BK died and were confident they could deal with the situation.

Suharto played no political role before 1965. He was neither a member of Yan i's r,for Nasution's group. Maj. Gen. Sutjipto

18/5/1970

In May 1966 Sukarno was considering disbanding the MPRS and re-establishing KNIP. However his plan had not reached a concrete stage. He was wanting to fill the ex-PKI seats with his own supporters. One of the supporters of the plan to restore KNIP was Sartono of the PNI who was probably thinking that this was a way to 'menyelamatkan' PNI. Ketua Mahkamah Agung, Wirjono, was not involved with this. At this time Ruslan Abdulgani was not so close to the President. In fact since 1963 Subandrio had been much closer to the President. (When Ruslan was Menlu, Subandrio was Sekdjen Deplu; for that time Subandrio tried to by-pass Ruslan by going directly to the President. Ruslan and Subandrio had been opponents since then.

Pernyataan ABRI S Mei indirectly opposes the KNIP plan by proposing the strengthening of the MPRS etc in pasal 4 (c).

As far as Sutjipto remembers BK only led two sessions of the Kab Ampera, one relating to the appointment of Dirdjen, Sekdjen etc and one other.

Ruslan and Leimena continued to attend Kabinet session but their influence was slight

Both Yani and Parman were 'dekat dengan Sukarno'.

Sutjipto was dismissed as Ketua G.V. Koti due to an order issued under the name of Sukarno to 'membekukan PKI dan Ormas2nya' on 14th October. When Sutjipto met BK he said he could not get BK's prior approval because BK was always moving about at that time.

On llth March Suharto was sick. Sutjipto met him at his home on that day. He did not order troops to appear in front of the Palace.

Pranoto was arrested in 1968. Djuhardi was arrested; he mentioned Pranoto. It was very difficult for Suharto to sign the order to arrest Pranoto. Twice during the Revolution, Pranoto had been Suharto's Kas.

Suharto asked Sutjipto to become Menteri Pertanian. Sutjipto said he knew nothing about pertanian. Suharto said his job was to clear up the Dep Pertanian which was under the influence of the PNl-Asu.

It was extremely difficult for Suharto to get Sukarno's signature on UUl0/1966 re the MPRS etc menjelang pemilu. KH Musto'in Ramly, Pesantran Darul Ulum, Peterongan, 24 May 1970

The Pesantren was founded by his grandfather and headed by his father. When his father died he became the kiyai.

At that time he was Sekjen Dep Veteran which was directly under the Kas AD (Nasution). He also studied Teknik for 7 months in Ko"ln in the 1950s.

The Pesantran is rather modern - half religion, half umum. There are both boys and girls.

There were not so many PKI in the immediate Djombang area but they were brought from Modjokerto and all over the place. They were taken to the nearby forest and killed by the Pesantren students. Tens of thousands were killed there.

The Kijai says that if the NU could closely work with BK in the past, it should not be too difficult to work with Suharto now.

The Kijai has been asked by 'Operasi Khusus Angkatan Darat' to find young men to be sent to Malaysia to 'membendung komunisme'. He is now sending 100 who will work in perkebunan there.

(I also met Wahab Hasbullah - the father in law of Kiyai Musto' in and father of Wahib Wahab. Unfortunately Wahad Hasbullah was in a state of advanced pikun. Maj.Gen Muskita

29-8-73

Before moving to Sumatra in Nov.65, M was Wakil ASS II (under Djamin Gintings). When Mokoginta had gone to Sumatra, he had requested that M go as his Kas but Yani insisted on him staying in Jakarta.

The PKl's advances started in about 1962 because the TN!1s role declined due to its success in restoring law and order.

Up to 1964 the TNI suffered several political setbacks. However at the beginning of 1965 several meetings were held which decided to hold the Seminar AD in an effort to restore unity. Although the language used in the Doctrine accepted in April 1965 was 'revolutionary', it in fact emphasized the TNl's determination to stand up to the PKI. Until then the TNI had always on the defensive.

Yani commanded the loyalty of the majority of the army. Nasution' s personality was such that many disliked him. He was too 'kaku' and he tended to forget the interests of his men after they had served in military functions. Further he could not get on will with BK.

After the Bandar Betsy incident in May, many officers felt 'panas' and demanded a tougher line. Yani made a speech at the commanders' call in which he stated for the first time directly that the AD would stand up to the PK!. He also said that he knew how some officers carried reports to BK. He told them to go ahead

Despite the PKl's advances the TNI felt confident in facing the future. They knew they had control of the daerah. The main goal was to prevent the PKI winning. They did not have a clear goal in regard to their role after BK's death.

Yani differed from Nasution in that Yani was flexible and not so ambitious while Nasution to be President.

In Sumatra, Mokoginta and Muskita opposed the action fronts who demanded the fall of BK. They refused to take a stand that looked as if they were giving in to the permuda.

Further, despite BK's faults, he was still the President and had contributed much to the past. They fully supported Soeharto in trying to avoid the dismissal of BK. This was not because of the danger of conflict in Sumatra because the PNI and KKO were all quite weak. Rather it was due to their personal feeling toward BK.

Mokoginta and Muskita did not altogether approve of Ishak Djuarsa's policies toward the Chinese in Atjeh. The anti-Chinese campaign was partly due to the character of the Atjehnese but also due to the character of the Panglima.

Operasi Harapan was largely draw up by Muskita. They wanted to use funds for development. The plan lasted for 3 years. At first it was regarded with suspicion by the President.

The Pusat wanted the 'crystalisation' of the PNI ie remove the Asu element. However Sarwo Edhie regarded a PNI people as Asu. He was determined to oppose the President's statement of December 1967. Umar had gone to M ... for a meeting of Panglima to explain the government's policy. Afterwards Sarwo Edhie sent out representatives to the towns of Sumut to mobilise support from the Kesatsuan Aksi behind a statement he was planning to issue in Djakarta. However, Muskita (Kusus was away) took command of all competent Kodam II troops. Eventually Sarwo Edhy failed to issue his statement in Djakarta and the ban on the PNI was lifted throughout Sumatra.

Afterward the PNI regarded Muskita as pro-PNI but he told them that he was only putting into effect his Panglima's policy

Suharto played no political role before Gestapu. He was not at all close to BK.

Pranoto was 'back' but it seems pro-PKI. However people did not xxx him he was pro-PK! until later. Suharto suspected him because he had appointed Untung to the Tjakrabirawa guard. However there had been conflict between Suharto and Pranoto for manly years.

In 1965 a proposal was put that the AKRl take over the security functions of the KODIMs. This was strongly rejected by the AD, incuding the Tri Ubaya Cakti. Maj.Gen. Alamsyah

Sekretaris Negara

12-12-70

Alamsyah is from Lampung. He was born about 1928.

He joined Peta in 1943 in South Sumatra mainly as 'djuru bitjara' because he could understand Japanese. Then he joined the army 'setjara tidak sangadja'.

He remained in South Sumara in 1958. He had supported the demands of the outer island but was opposed to the rebellion. He left Sth Sumatra because the atmosphere was unpleasant. (ie? because he opposed the PRRI?).

In 1958 he took a six months course in India and in 1959 joined KOPLAT in Bandung.

In 1960 he joined MBAD under the Deputy I at that time Djen Yani. Then Yani was succeeded by Suharto. Alamsjah's association with Suharto began then.

Yani and Suharto arranged to send him to study in USA for 15 months in 1962-63. On his return he became Wakil Ass VII and then Ass VII

As one of the clearly anti-PK! generals, he became a close political advisor to Suharto from October 1965.

Later in July or August 1966 Suharto appointed him to form the SPRI.

Before the coup, especially in Djateng, Pranoto had been 'kurang tegas' in his relations with the PKI. But it appears he was not generally known as a PKI man.

Immediately after the coup, very few generals were prepared to oppose Sukarno's line. Alamsjah was one of them.

While ministers like Chaerul were anti-PK!, they were not prepared to do anything against the PKI without Sukarno's blessing.

With the formation of SPRI, civilians were appointed to the economic and civilian sections.

The AD Seminar only made proposals about the political system. The government was not necessarily committed to its proposals. In the case of the election law, the government did not want to act in an undemocratic way. There had to be give and take with the parties. Thus agreement was reached on these laws. In fact there were generals opposed to these laws.

Alamsjah was opposed to the Dwi-Partai proposal. It was too artificial. The govt did not want to force the parties to take action. If it had forced the parties into a Dwipartai system, the government would have been branded as a military dictatorship.

The 'Independent group' never took a concrete form. There seemed to be a number of independent groups. Thus the government never refused to recognise the independent group because the group never applied for recognition. Many generals were opposed to permitting Parmusi to come into existence with Masjumi leaders. The negotiation over Parmusi took a long time because the constituents of Parmusi also had to give their approval of the leadership.

Sukarno could not be dismissed in 1966 because he was supported by the Navy, Police and part of the Air Force. Also 60% of the people of Java supported him. If he had been dismissed, there would have been civil war. Let.Gen Sarbini

2-8-73

Everyone in the army was concerned with the advance made by the PKI after 1963. Yani was as concerned as anyone else. However the PKI over-estimated its own influence. In fact the army was still stronger than the PKI.

Sarbini had a personal quarrel with Yani. This occurred some time after Sarbini's appointment as Menteri Veteran in 1964. Yani interfered with veteran affairs (possibly because communist influence had gone there.) Sarbini resented this, especially as Sarbini had been commander of Yani's regiment during the revolution and was therefore senior to Yani although Yani 'lebih pintar dari say a'.

CVP T.D.Hafas, Nusantara, November 1969

Pangab Muljadi was Orba but he lisd tn always !mar in mind the KKO and Hartnno who were Orla. Mokoginta and Sobiran were moved from Merlan !mcause they had been thern a long time. They were not Urla

Mokoginta is very religious. Sobiran was not tough enaugh to deal with PNI. Pangak Sutjipln was pm· Sukarno but ineffective Sudiryo (Ass II was really pro·PKI. He has only recently been arrested. Suharto should have moved earlier.

Sarwo Edhie was moved wway from Merlan in 1968 partly because he was tno direct with the PNI. There is a lot of smuggling in Merlan - although in Sumatara smuggling has !men reduced from $3UOm to $1DOm. The AU is invnlved but not officiallyc the money is not sent on tn Djakarta.

UB Sjaaf at the Al anti-smuggling command is a good man who has played an important role in reducing smuggling.

Sukaudm was not arrestlld in July 1987 but he was arrnsted in July 1988 for 5-8 days. He was head of intel in the early moUs (??i.lnl

Frans Seda is Orla.

Sutjipto SH switched sides. He was made a minister by Suharto in 1986 tn avoid tno sharp a break with the past

Pekuneg was not really a Judicial body. It could only investigate issues on the orrler of riie Pd Pres. Thus it was necessary to farm TPK.

Surjo has been involved in AO finanC!!S siOCE 1945. Surjo was a tnp man in lntendans AD before the coup, ie responsible for orrlering equipment etc. Surja is very corrupt. It was a mistal:E for Suharto to appoint him In Pekuneg. Surjo is from Diponegom.

Pr.main was an1's1Bd in the middle of 1967 ?

There were two Muslim groups reported In be forming a Muslim Party - Hatta and farakh (???). Hatta's was just a 'proof ballon' of the PNI? (I think he means the rumours that Hatta was to be appointed Ketua PW in 1969.)

The problem of the PM was military resistance In Masjumi. Thus all Masjumi men had ta be eliminated far the leadership before the party could be legalised.

The PSI people are all very clever and intellectual but they have no mots with the people. They claim that they control the golongan independent but this is Ulllrue. The golnngan independent was divided between those who saw it as a physical force (eg Omar Khayam) and those who saw it as a moral force (like Halas himself). Omar Khayam had recently come back from USA with a doctorate in literature and knew nothing of politics. He wanted In lead the gerakan independent but it came to nothing. Masjuri also wanmd In be a leader (of what?). The Bandung group were not interested. There was also the issue of whether or not ta go into the DPR. Hafaz was opposed.

Anumber of generals were sympathetic but the three main ones were Oharsonn, Sarwo Edhie and Kemal Idris

90% of foreign banks are owned by foreign Chinese. There are iO big Chinese businessmen. However the Chinese are protected by the generals. the two most important being SuMo and Sudjofl{] Humarrlani. Alamsyah is less involved with the Chinese. Alamsyah was of great seriice ta Suharto after the coup. Before that he does not appear In have had close crnmections with Suharto. Nearly all the other men close ta Suhsrtn had !men close In him for years. Sudjano Humardani and Suhartn have the same dukun.

Ahmad Tirtasudero was with Suhartn in Djngya (19491. Suryo was 'Suharto's paymaster also in KOTI.

The trouble with Suhartn is that he cannot believe that his old colleagues are corrupt without very concrete e~deru:e. It is not that they particularly sme Suhartn. (except the special case of lbnu Sutown.

Suharrliman has mad€ a mess of Berrlikari. He hss not been able ta run a huge business. Sajuti Melik

30-7-73

Sajuti was originally a Marxist and joined the underground PKI in the late 1930s. However he left the communists after they supported the Dutch after the Russian entry into the war. In 1946 he was close to Tan Malaka and was gaoled together with Tan Malaka, Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik. In the 1950s he joined the PNI.

In 1958 he wrote a book distinguishing between Marhaenism and Marxism. In 1966 he wrote a series of articles in Sul uh Indonesia which criticised Nasakom etc. Sukarno was angry and called Sajuti who was close to him at the time. After a discussion Sukarno told Sajuti who was close to him at the time. However the PNI refused to print Sajuti's articles on Marhaenism. So Sajuti offered them to Berita Indonesia -which printed them under the new title 'Belajar Memahami Sukarnoisme'. A large number of non-party newspapers then printed the articles.

A group of newspaper editors set up the BPS which was led by B.M.Diah and Adam Malik. Chaerul Saleh gave support in the background. Sajuti only wrote the articles; he was not involved in the organisation.

A few military men gave support to BPS but others remained aloof. When Berita Indonesia was banned, Yani took it over but the other papers died.

At the Lem bong meeting of the PNI Sajuti was strongly criticised. No one defended him.

Sajuti thinks that BK was caught in a PKI trap. BK could only thrive as long as there were two forces competing for power. Haji Princen

December 1969

Djotim

Sumitro had to go carefully- because of the strength of the KKO and Orla elements in Brawidjaya.

When Jassin came, he started cleaning up the Orla which meant that he had to lean on the NU while at the same time protecting the PNI (Orba). Jassin is one of the 'military intellectuals' and surrounded by PSI elements.

Djoteng

Surano cannot do away with the PNI. Hadisubeno has restored the PNI to a strong force. For a while Surano was working closely with the Catholics. He is very secular himself.

In 1965 Djateng (Diponegoro) was 60/40 Orla, Brawidjaya 40/60, Siliwangi 35/65.

Moehono was close to Sutjipto in Peperti and was a strong supporter of Orla. However he was close to Suharto in Semarang. Sudharmono was also an Orla element.

Opsus had its origin in Kostrad as the intel group under Ali Murtopo (also a strong supporter of Orla). Its first major operation was peace with Malaysia (Ali Murtopo and Benny?).

There is considerable rivalry between Ali M, Sutopo Juwono and Yoga. Yoga has been closer to Islamic groups. Sutopo has been involved in 'Mingguan Khas' (a weekly newspaper).

Yoga agrees that what Princen said about Purwadadi was true but for various reasons this cannot be admitted.

Zulkifli Lubis has been sent to Russia on intel business allegedly to discuss the Breznev Docstrine but in fact to fool the Russians into extending the discussions on their debt.

Suhardiman was from SOKSI and a trading PN. He supplied funds for the crushing of G-30-S. However he has had a number of failures at Berdikari, being involved in two bank crashes. He also failed to obtain credit from Taiwan (this was his main failure)

In Djatim, Sarbini still has his group in Brawidjaya who were very strong. This group was still fairly pro-Sukarno in 1966, 1967.

(This is on interesting example of comments which ore often true but also quite often wrong) Hugeng Imam Santoso

6-8-73

The original of the police was Gen.S.Sukanto (1945-1959). He was a true policeman who was honest etc. He therefore came into conflict with BK. In 1959 BK appointed Sukarno (nothing to do with the President) who was in fact from the pamong praja and not from the police. Hugeng had been Director of Intelligence under Sukanto and then served in North Sumatra. When Sukanto was replaced, Hugeng was also removed from office and branded as pro-PSI. He was non-active for 9 months in about 1960. Then he was appointed head of the immigration office and later Menteri luran Negara (customs, padjak etc). The he became a State Secretary. In March 1967 he became a State Secretary. In March 1967 he returned to the police as pt Deputy to Sutjipto.

Sutjipto Judo .... Took the view that while BK was President he should be served loyally. The police was called with the navy in protecting BK. The Pelopor of Brimob was headed by Anton (who is now in Malang)

The Chief of Police in Jakarta and some others were arrested after the coup. They are still in gaol awaiting trial. There seems to be a lack of evidence against them.

In the middle of 1966 the army inspired a move to depose Sutjipto. (One of those involved was the other Sutjipto, his predecessor)P. They claimed that Sutjipto was too slow in 'cleaning up'. Indeed Sutjipto was too nice a man to take firm action against his colleagues.

In 1967 the East Java chief, Sumarsono, tried to defend BK (he was a keponakan of BK). Suharto demanded that he be arrested. Sutjipto then went on tour and instructed Hugeng to arrest Sumarsono (who was a friend of Hugeng's).

In 1966 the AKRI (Angkatan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia) supported a solution that could leave BK as a President without authority.

Hugeng noted in February 1966 that Suharto made little effort to prevent the dismissal of Nasution. Subchan, Wakil Ketua MPRS, Nahdatul Ulama

16 April 1970

KAP-Gestapu arose from the anti-govt activity of the 1960s. At the time of the PRRI revolt, Muslim students were divided among those who supported the revolt and those who said it was better to work within. Subchan was a leader of the second group. Through these years he held courses to train cadres who were mostly Muslims. The Catholics (including Harry Tjan) joined in later. The PSI who later claimed to have led the opposition in fact did nothing.

The PKI were pushing Sukarno to ban HMI. Sukarno was wanting to, but he was waiting for support from NU. However, contrary to Sukarno's expectation, the NU failed to support such a ban. Thus Sukarno 1 hesitated. On 28 h Sukarno addressed CGMI celebrations but still did not announce a ban on HMI. The PKI felt very frustrated.

Leimena left Subchan's group informed of what was going on. As tension was increasing, Subchan's 1 group, including Harry Tjan (Lim Bian Kie) met on 30 h to discuss the situation. That night the coup occurred. Subchan's men quickly left Jakarta to the daerah leaving only Subchan himself in Jakarta. Thus 1 the KAP-Gestapu was formed on the 2nd and a big rally held on 4 h. Similar rallies were held about the 5th 1 and 6 h in Semarang and Surabaya.

There certainly existed a Dewan Djenderal but not in the PKl's sense. However they were all pro-BK except Nasution who as usual was undecided. Nasution disliked BK personally but could never bring himself to oppose BK openly. When Subchan offered support to Nasution on 6 October, Nasution declined. From then on the Kap-Gestapu supported Suharto. Apart from the dubious Nasution, only Parman(?) was really anti-BK. Sukendro is just a professional intelligence man -very clever but without principles (like Ali Murtopo).

On 9 November a large rally was held. (At this anti-BK overtones appeared. Ali Murtopo claimed to have obtained Rp 115 million from Chaerul Saleh for the meeting. In present times, however, this is only 3-4 million. Chaerul Saleh was trying to back two horses. The money went via Herlina and Kostrad to Harry Tjan.

On 5th December overtones declared Amir Mahmud declared his loyalty to support BK. This is the AD's (?) black spot like Maret 10 for partai politik.

How deliberate was the killing of the communists on the part of the army? Of course it was, they took quotas from the camps 'and handed them over to us'. Why were more killed in Djatim. In Djateng the PNI had been close to the PKI. Therefore they did not take part so enthusiastically. However in Djatim, Ansor and Pertanu (?) had been fighting with the PKI over land reform since 1964. Thus the crucial factor was the presence of 'our people'. While the killings may have gone on too far and may have been tragic from a humanitarian point of view, Subchan is inclined to the view that they were 'a blessing'.

1 On March 10 h BK called a meeting of party leaders to condemn KAMI. PNI and Partindo agreed. Three strongly disagreed - Subchan, Kasi (Katholik) and Ahmad Sukamidjaya (IPKI). However the two other IPKI representatives eventually gave in, first Sukendro and then Ny Hidayat. Also Arudji (?) and Harsono Tjakrominatu of PSll agreed. By then Sukarno left leaving Leimena in charge. Subchan as Ketua of the Front Pantjasila was concerned that the Front remained united. He was responsible for drafting the final compromise; that is disapproving of the 'tjara2 jang dipergunakan para pelajar, mahasiswa and pernuda itu yang akibat2nya langsung ataupun tidak langsung dapat membahayakan djalannya revolusi Indonesia dan merongrong kewibawaan PBR Bung Karno '.

After the meeting, some of the parties issued another statement declaring that they did not condemn the student's action that did not endanger the revolution. However Parkindo did not at first sign this (presumably because it contained critical references to Leimena). They then went to the Panglima2 (especially Dharsono) and said that they had done all they could. However their good name was in danger. If the panglima2 wanted a civil ally, they would have to act immediately. They acted on the 11th_

In the MPRS in 1966 a resolution was passed asking Suharto to form a government. This was passed by the Komisi. However Sukarno was angry. Eventually a compromise 'pendjalanan' was agreed on which was approved in she pleno session. Only Buyung Nasution disagreed.

Muljadi (Pangal) was not all that much a Sukarno man. However, he is an honest man of principle. He was disgusted with the way that BK former(?) supporters now killed him (???).There was a real danger of a clash with not only the KKO but the ALRI as a whole.

Sutjipto the police chief was an opportunist who supported BK.

Although the Resolusi2 DPR took a line different to Suharto, they nevertheless helped him.

All the parties now are still led by Sukarno-appointed leaders. The younger modern leaders were still fighting in each party. According to Subchan, the modernists are doing better in the NU than elsewhere. However the masses are still traditional so it is natural that all the parties are still traditional-minded.

Suharto is not clever but he has a fine political sense. However the AD is not united in regard to his attitude on corruption when he is protecting big corruptors like lbnu, Sordjuno (???), Surjo etc. There are also signs that Suharto is involved personally. Liem Bian Kie

11 February 1971

At first no one in Kap-Gestapu thought of opposing BK, including Subchan. It was only in February when BK criticised the demonstators along with Chaeral and Subandrio at a Front Nasional meeting that they became anti-BK.

Chaerul Saleh was strongly anti-PK/. But he was not strongly with the Kap-Gestapu. In November Ali Murtopo went to him for money for the big Kap-Gestapu rally. He asked Chaerul whether he was pro or anti-Suharto. Eventually Chaerul gave the money. Earlier he had refused LBK when LBK asked.

Various Partindo people such as Amunanto (and one other who was more important?) were behind the idea of the Front Nasional Gaya Baru, which was to be organised like the army with Seksi/lntell, Seksi II? Etc. It was to be the Barisan Soekarno setjara fisik. Ultimately the political parties would be greatly weakened in such a Front. This was put forward by Chaerul in the rally in Feb 66.

Ruslan was a rival of Subandrio. Unlike Chaerul, Ruslan cultivated good relations with Yan i. After the coup, Ruslan was often used by Suharto to make approaches quietly to Sukarno, especially in the field of foreign policy.

When Nasution was dismissed from Cabinet in Feb 66, Suharto told him to refuse; however Nasution was not prepared to force a showdown. Thus Suharto was forced to go slowly.

The SUAD decided on a plan to mentjulik and maybe kill Subandrio, Jusuf Muda Dai am and some other ministers. Suharto was present at the meeting. The implementation was left to Kemal, Sarwo and Ali Murtopo. Suharto did not know of the details. It was decided to move at the cabinet meeting on ll'h March. Suharto was sick at home. The ministers were to be arrested as they left.

However Suadi had already 'botjor' to Sukarno about the plan (This is why he was arrested in 1969). Thus when the troops appeared in front of the palace, BK was very startled as he did not quite know who was to be 'ditjilik'. He fled to the KKO camp at Tji. .. but they were not prepared to take action. He then went on to Bogar.

Meanwhile a startled Amir Mahmud reported to Suharto who then took the steps that led to Supersemar.

At the time a number of Si/iwangi battalions were in Djakarta to assist in maintaining order. Earlier Adjie had been approached 'backing' for an action in Djakarta but he always replied 'be/um siap'. Thus the plan had to be postponed until it went ahead without a guarantee from Adjie. Adjie did nothing positive to aid BK but also did nothing to help Suharto.

The PETIR movement was headed by Kol Bambang Supeno. Those involved were arrested before the Sidang lstimewa MPRS although the announcement followed much later.

There were rumours of a plan to mentjulik BK in Surabaya but no one knows what the real plan was. Possibly it was just psywar on the part of the AD itself so that they would have a reason to prevent BK going to Surabaya.

·-~------.. ··········------.... ·-·-----·····------"-"-· -, )'here were also rumours in early 196 7 ( cg in El Bahar) about the l3rawidjaya. In fact the Brawidjaya GFormatted: Font: (Default) Times New Roman I was firmly in the hands of Sumitro who appeared to be pro PN! Asu onl.,y because of the need to balance 1·--·...... :...-=====-----=====--=="'-====--=====-===< I l'nrmatted: Font: (Default) Times New Roman j the Muslims (including KAMI which was dominated by Muslims). Thus the l3rawidjaya would not L::--~------·------·---~·------·--·------~------~------·---·-, have taken action in support of BK in 196 7), (, Forma!l~ Font: (Default) T~':"~s_New Rc_>_fT1a_'1:_lllOt Bo_lcl_,j Sukendro had been a rival of Ali Murtopo for a Jong time. BK sent him to the Thai border to meet Ghazali in order to request Malaysian accession to Indonesia's demands. Ali Murtopo confronted Subandrio in Bangkok. Then Sukcndro accused Ali Murtopo of being invoved in smuggling from Malaysia (in the early part of 1965)

Sukendm---was 'sakit hati' in 1967 and spread reports about opposition to Suharto in Dutch newspapers. He was arrested in mid-67 as a warning.

At the time of the 196 7 MPRS the danger of civil law was very real.

The navy placed the Annada in Teluk I~jakarta and trained missiles from the KKO camp at Tji ... on the RPKAD camp at '[jidjantung. The RPKAD was then evacuated. Jn addition the KKO had about 20.000 men (about two divisions) in Djakarta, "ljirebon etc. (Altogether the KKO had about 40-50,000 throughout Indonesia. ln addition in f~jakarta, the Police could have mobilised l 0,000. On the other hand, the am1y had about 50--60,000 or more troops in Djakarta.

Suharto's line at the MPRS must be seen against this background. Suharto refused to take the oath as Pd President but only as Pengcn ... Tap 33.

In the disussions before the MPRS Suharto arranged a meeting between the Panglima and the parties to show each side how he was being pushed by the other side.

BK could have hung on as President even as late as December 1966. Earlier at the time of the 1966 MPRS Suharto had suggested that BK hand over his powers but remain as President. BK refused. In the latter part of 1966 BK saw all his policies being revised so became more aggressive, especially for the August 17 speech onwards.

Kemal Idris was very close to PSI. Dharsono was also influenced by PSI. They were the most strongly anit-party. Others like Witono and Solihin were also anti-party but were not prepared to take a line in conflict with the AD. Sarwo Edhy is bodoh and follows anyone. lshak Djuarsa was influenced by Masjumi. He was not so much pro-pembaruhan but anti-PN!. Jasin is very different again.

The independent group was encouraged but it was made clear that the PSI would re-emerge. However Omar Khayyam (who knows nothing about politics but was completely influence by 'Koko) went ahead to form the Gerakan Pcbangunan without such people a5 Mochtar Lubis, Ma5huri Bt~jung, Nasution etc with the result that the Gcrakan simply became the PSI again. For this reason it was stopped.

The AD hasil9 were accepted because of the influence ofSuwato but they were not properly considered. 111 1967 they were pushed m;ide. Suharto did not want to implement the RU Pemilu by decree because this would be undemocratic and also the parties had some influence. Suharto realised that Indonesia was not Djakarta and Ban dung.

Achmad Wiraliadinata (9) was Kas Kostrad under Soeharto. He was replaces by Kemal. I le then became Ass l of KOT! Gaya Baru. However he was pushed side because he would not take a !inn line on BK.

Ali Murtopo was under Yani at Boolali from 1952-56. Then he was brought to Scmarang by Suharto where he became Wakil Assistan Y. ln 1958-59 he was sent to Bukittinggi as Kepala Stafbelow Yoga. Then in 1960 ("Suharto was digeser and Ali went with him to the newly formed {Kostrad) under its old name.

At the time of the coup, Sudjono was Kepala one of the Bogor ('')of Ass Ylll. Then he became Wakil Ass VII under Alamsyah. Then he entered SPRI.

Sudirgo was in CPM, then Ass l, then BAK!N. Aller the arrest ofRukman, it was revealed that he knew of G-30-S in advance. Thus he wa> arrested in 1968. He was not suspected before then. Similarly Rukman, as lnspektor-Jendcral AD had access to all papers in AD until 1968. Suripto

February 1971

Shortly after the student was killed went to Suhartoed in February 1971, Kemal and Yoga to press him to take action. However Suharto said that it was not yet certain that conditions in the regions were like Jakarta. Therefore it was better to let the situation develop before taking action.

Those pressing for early action were Kemal, Sarwo and Yoga.

In the elections the Sekber-Golkar should win the ex-PKI vote because there are military lurah in all these areas.

There has been a reaction to the intervention in Parmusi. The regional panglima in Parmusi areas have pressed for a softer line on the ex-Masjumi. Their views influence Hankam people like Djayatino (?) and Amir Murtono.

There was no 'pembusukan' within Siliwangi until after Adjie. Although there were pro-PKI people in Siliwangi, the Seksi 1 was strongly anti-PKI.

Siliwangi troops in Djakarta in March 1966 were called there by Kostrad, not sent by Adjie.

Sudjatmoko

13 November 1970

S thinks that the PKI could have taken over the central government. However, they would have had great difficulty enforce 'ing their rule in the daerah. But another PRRI was unlikely of the earlier experience.

It was very hard to know who wanted to get rid of BK in 1965. There must have been some.

In August 66, the army had few clear ideas of the future. At the seminar. they were greatly influenced by civilians. Later with expansion of the government, they changed their views. Suharto was sympathetic to the ideas on the election laws expressed at the seminar, but when he met the parties he was persuaded to abandon the seminar ideas. Suharto wanted to go through the democratic forms and the parliament was still dominated by the parties. Sudjatmoko's group wanted the election laws to be implemented by decree.

The independent group never really got off the ground. It quickly split. This was due to interference by the authorities.

One of the effects of a single-member system would have been to strengthen the parties by permitting younger men to move up to the leadership.

One of the difficulties in 1967 and even now, is the military men tend to see everything in security terms. Maj.Gen. Wijono

16 January 1971

Wijono was Deputy Governor of Djatim from 1960. In 1964 he was elected as Governor, defeating Dr.Satrio (kakak lbnu Sutowo) who was supported by the PKI. Satrio was then made Deputy Governor.

It is true that in 1965 the PK! slowed down their offensive in the villages because of the strong Islamic reaction.

In this period, 8 daerah were headed by PK! - Surabaya, Madiun (kota and kebupatan) Ngawi etc.

In September 1965 a women's organisation headed by the wife of the Walikota came to Wijono and demanded that action be taken to ease the rice problem. They demanded that the job of distribution of the bahan pokok be handed over to them. Wijono agreed to their demands provided that they obeyed all government regulations. He then gave them a huge pile of govt regulations to study, much to their despair.

Two days later, on 27'h, the delegation came again and et Wii.~p at his house (and office). A huge demonstration occurred outside. Wijono saw Satrio's wife among the demonstrators. They derrf!lnded 'retool Wijono' etc and called out 'Gubernur goblok'. Then they broke into the Gubernurian and smashed up furniture. Wijono estimates about 3000 demonstrators.

Wijono remained seated with the women surrounded by the mob. They prayed to God and remained 'diam'. This lasted for an hour. Then the Police Chief came. He called the PKI leader and asked him to speak to the demonstrators. After the PK! leader spoke, the masses dispersed. Wijono suspected a link between the PK! and the Police Chief.

The following day Satrio came to Wijono. Wijono handed him a pistol and said if he wanted to kill Wijono, do it yourself. Don't get other people to do it. Satrio apologised.

Then Wijono reported to Basuki Rachmat who was in Madiun at the time. Basuki then left for Jakarta where the coup took place.

No PK! action in support of the coup took place in Surabaya. Wijono broadcast that evening condemning the coup.

The killings occurred on a big scale as there were many fanatics. However, in some areas the killings stopped. For example, after several months the killings stopped suddenly in Kediri. Kijai Mahrus Ali took a sword and stood in front of the NU supporters and told them that God did not mengizinkan the killing. Thus it stopped in Kediri but not in other place.

The governors of Djateng, Djatim and Sumut were called by Sukarno. Wijono said the people were only carrying out BK's instruction- don't burn the house to kill the mouse. They were just killing the tikus. Nevertheless Wijono called for a stop to the killings but apparently without much success. He was even accused of wanting to defend the PK!. Wabah Chasbulllah had once been taken to America by BK abd remained very loyal to BK.

Some action was taken against pro-PK! leaders of PNI after the coup and durin' 1966. However not as much as in 1967. New Text Document

Yassien, Surabaya, 23-5-70

Y was in Kediri at the time of the coup. He was deputy secretary of the local NU. When the coup occurred there was much confusion. However no one did anything. During the days after the coup a few NU leaders were kidnapped and killed - but this seems to have been going on for some time.

On 13th October NU held a demonstration at the PKI building. Although Y says it was planned to be peaceful, it met with PKI resistance. Y saw his friend hack open a PKI neck at this demonstration.

After this the killings commenced. NU simp#ly rounded up com.munists each night. Sometimes they were killed in their homes; sometimes taken out of the town and killed. Then their bodies were thrown in the Brantas river. Nor only men but sometimes their wives were also killed.

The army did nothing. It was powerless. Often it sympathised with the PKI and sometimes the military men protected their own relatives in the PKI. But in general it did nothing to stop the killings.

The RPKAD never came to Kediri until August 1967.

Y himself felt sick for a month after the first killings on 13th. When invited to take part he pleaded illness. Eventually in July 66 he fled to Djakarta. He was afraid to say anything against the killings because if he had, possibly he also would have been taken. Since then he has left the NU.

The killings continued on a big scale well into 1966. After that the army arrested communists. The army continued to kill into 1967 and 1968. Even recently there have been reports in March of prisoners being killed in Kediri. Prisoners were taken out in trucks to "work'' in a plantation at 1 a.m. Y has heard chansting from a Koran in the areas at the time the prisoners begin 'work'. Many people believe they are being killed.

Before the coup, since 1962 tensions were rising with the PKI insulting religion and taking over land.

Page 1 Ron Hatley in East Java Ron Hatley

November 1972

In the villages the Muslim leaders usually waited for some indication from outside before they started killing. In most cases only 6-7 PKI leaders were killed. There was not all that much killing of rank-and-file masses. Usually the killing was spread over 3-4 days.

Sometimes outsiders came in (eg Ansor) to do the killing, but more commonly it was done in the village itself. In any case, it was the village elite which decided who was to be killed.

Occasionally marauding Ansor groups entered villages to take part in "liar'' killing but this was much more the pattern of the towns. Once the killling was done, it normally stopped completely. However the commencement of killing caried in time from village to village.

Where there was no killing, it was usually due to the influence of a local 'tokoh' - usually prijaji or army.

In the northern areas the killing seems to have stopped at the beginning of Ramadhan.

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