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General Nasution Brig.Jen Sarwo Edhie Let.Gen Kemal Idris Gen

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30 General Nasution Brig.Jen Sarwo Edhie Let.Gen Kemal Idris Gen Simatupang Lt Gen Mokoginta Brig Jen Sukendro Let.Gen Mokoginta Ruslan Abdulgani Mhd Roem Hairi Hadi, Laksamana Poegoeh, Agus Sudono Harry Tjan Hardi SH Letjen Djatikusumo Maj.Gen Sutjipto KH Musto'in Ramly Maj Gen Muskita Maj Gen Alamsyah Let Gen Sarbini TD Hafas Sajuti Melik Haji Princen Hugeng Imam Santoso Hairi Hadi, Laksamana Poegoeh Subchan Liem Bian Kie Suripto Mhd Roem Maj.Gen Wijono Yassien Ron Hatley 30 General Nasution (24-7-73) Nasution (N) first suggested a return to the 1945 constitution in 1955 during the Pemilu. When Subandrio went to China in 1965, Nasution suggested that if China really wanted to help Indonesia, she should cut off supplies to Hongkong. According to Nasution, BK was serious about Maphilindo but Aidit convinced him that he was a world leader, not just a regional leader. In 1960 BK became head of Peperti which made him very influential in the AD with authority over the regional commanders. In 1962 N was replaced by Yani. According to the original concept, N would become Menteri Hankam/Panglima ABRI. However Omar Dhani wrote a letter to BK (probably proposed by Subandrio or BK himself). Sukarno (chief of police) supported Omar Dhani secara besar). Only Martadinata defended to original plan while Yani was 'plin-plan'. Meanwhile Nasution had proposed Gatot Subroto as the new Kasad but BK rejected this because he felt that he could not menguasai Gatot. Nas then proposed the two Let.Gens. - Djatikusuma and Hidayat but they were rejected by BK. Nas then proposed three Maj-Gen - Yani, Suharto and Sudirman. BK chose Yani. The serah-terima was on Hari Senen. Nasution and Djuanda were only informed of the change on the Sabtu. The next major step to the left was the appointment of Subandrio as ist Deputy after the death of Djuanda in November 1963. On the basis of the testimony of Bambang Widjanarko and Leimena to Kopkamtib, Nas believes that BK was involved in the Gestapu. He asked Untung and others whether they were willing to take action and he received a letter from Untung on 30 September while giving a speech. However, Nasution had doubts whether he knew of the Lubang Buaya plan. When Sarwo Edhie (who was very close to Yani) went to Bogar on 2nd October he was dismayed to hear BK treat Yani's death so lightly. 'Revolusi bisa makan anak', said BK. Sarwo hurried back to report to Suharto and told him of BK's attitude. Nas and Suharto did not suspect BK of involvement at this time. Possibly BK refused to openly support G30S because he heard that Nas lolos. He was informed of this on his way to the palace from Dewi' s house. When he heard he decided to go to Grogol and then to Halim. Nasution had not regarded Pranoto as pro-PKI until October. However Suharto already distrusted Pranoto on 1'1 October. When Latief was captured he was found with a letter addressed to Pranoto which he had just written. He had requested further instructions from Pranoto. Before the discovery of this letter, Nas and Suharto had decided to berjalan terus on the basis of the arrangements made on 2nd October. However on the lOth Nasution sent his letter to BK with five points including the appointment of Suharto as Pangab. On 2nd, before the Bogar meeting, Nasution asked Pranoto not to carry out BK's order to become caretake Pangab but Pranoto said nothing at Bogar. (While Panglima in Jateng, Pranoto had obstructed Nasution's policy of forming Badan Kerja-sama). Operasi Budi was obstructed by Yani who protected men like lbnu Sutowo and Suhardiman. Yani himself was also corrupt. The secretary of Operasi Budi was Kol Muktis who received encouragement from Pranoto. After the coup Mu was arrested because of this but was quietly released. Nasution arrived at Kostrad at 7-7.30 on 1/10. He then moved with Suharto to Senayan. In December 1966 Nasution told a KOTI meeting that the way to stop the killings was to appoint a court to try those responsible for the killings of the generals. Nasution did not meet BK until 6 weeks after the coup when Nasution was called by BK to express his sympathy at the loss of Nas's daughter. On 2nd October BK did not invite Nas to the meeting in Bogar. BK was angry at proposals that Nas be appointed as Wakil President (proposals from West Java, East Java etc). Eventually Suharto and Nas decided to call a meeting of pang!imas which announced that it was not necessary to fill the post. Why was BK confident that's he could get away with the dismissal of Nasution in February 1966? In June a Koti meeting heard BK complain that KOTI was interfering too much in domestic affairs. BK ordered Suharto to change the structure of KOTI. Meanwhile Nas as Men Hankam had to go to Jateng for a few days. While Nas was away, Suharto presented his proposals to BK who said they did not go far enough. BK demanded the dissolution of SAB and the abolition of the post of Menhankam. In the discussions BK offered the post of Menkom to Suharto who rejected it. BK thought he could outwit Suharto. Eventually Suharto proposed Nat as Wakil Panglima Besar of KOGAM. Nasution refused to attend such .... ? and was diam sadja dirumah. The AD planned to mentjulik Suhandrio and other leftist ministers such as Ast (?). For about a week before 11/3, they surrounded the palace waiting for an opportunity. Some generals complained that Sarwo Edhi was too slow. Amir Machmud and Adjie were left out of these plans because they were loyal to BK. (There was no plan to capture Chairul Saleh at this stage). After BK's flight to Bogar the three generals flew after him. Their plans were not very clear. Suharto only told them to assure BK that they would rely on BK. Eventually the Supersemar was prepared. Subandrio insisted on the inclusion of 'angkatan lain' as well as AD. BK did not sign it until he had consulted Adjie. On his way to Bogar, BK called at Tjilandak KKO base. BK did not realise that Suharto would use the Supersemar to announce the ban on the PKI. Immediately he called the other three panglima to Bogar on Hari Minggu (probably 13th). That night meetings were held in Jakarta at Mulyadi's house and then at Leimeina's. They discussed how they could menginsyafkan Suharto to withdraw the ban on the PKI. {?) Meanwhile Kostrad men at the Halim base (dalam rangka KOGAM) came across an instruction issued by Sri Mulyono Herlambang which made preparation for an expected Kostrad attack on Halim and the lstana. It envisaged the possibility of returning to Tjilandak. Kostrad leaders met immediately and decided to mandahalui by placing troops at all strategic points in the city. At the same time Kol. Wahono of Kostrad approached Nas and asked him to call a meeting of the Pang!ima. Nas called Sutjipto, Muljadi, and Hartono, as well as Rusmin representing AURI (He refused to meet Sri Muljono). Kemal ldrus and some Kostrad leaders also attended Kemal refused. Kemal refused to shake hands with the other commanders. Kemal sat on one side and the others on the other with Nas in the middle. The meeting took place at about 2 am on te Monday morning. Eventually it was all sorted out and everyone was very relieved. Kemal shook hands with the others. In early 1965 a number of attempts were made to bring Nas back into line with Yani. Suharto also made an attempt along those lines at Lebaran 1965. At that stage Yani, Suharto cs could not imagine a stuation without Suharto. Sumitro supported BK in 1966 and 1967 together with other Brawidjaja officers. There had be a plan to take BK to Surabaya in 1966. Adjie was close to Adjie personally but anti-PKI - ie. like Yani.Yani and Sukarno 'had the same hobby'. If BK did not have a woman each day he felt bad. Nas thinks that Suharto did not want to depose BK until at least the MPRS session in 1966. Even in 1967 he did not want to take the oath of office. It was partly due to circumstances but also because of his attitude to Sukarno. Yani was always confident that he could get closer to BK's ear than the PKI could. Nasution doubted this. General Nasution, 20 August 1973 The basic difference between Nas and Yani was that Yani was in the 'istana' while Nas was not. They agree in their attitude to the PKI but differed in their attitude to BK. Their tactics in their attitudes in approaching BK was very different. On the issue of dissolution of BPS and Murba they were considered relatively insignificant by the army leaders. However Nasakomisasi and the 5th Force threatened the existence of the TNI 'secara langsung' On the basic issues Nas and Yani were united but not on 'sehari-2' matters. The Ad's strong defence of HMI must be seen in the conext of the general situation. Although the HMI was a minor matter, it came under attack at the same time as contact with Nas .. the Peltu Sudjono incident. Martadinata was the one leader of ABRI who had regular contact with Nas. Nas never met Yani informally. Nas 'cannot remember' a meeting with Yani at the beginning of 1965. However he remembers a meeting with Yani at the beginning of 1965.
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