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2006 Book Reviews The .SU Naval War College

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SINS OF OMISSION

Dallaire, Roméo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2004. 562pp. $16.95

Interventions by the United Nations for experience in the peacekeeping field, the purpose of establishing and main- offered to provide a commander, some taining peace have a mixed record. of the staff, and logistic support. Some have been reasonably successful, Dallaire, who had recently been pro- such as in East Timor, while others, moted to the rank of general and whose such as Rwanda, have not. Roméo tour in Canada had come to an end, Dallaire, the author, a retired lieutenant leaped at the opportunity to go to general in the Canadian army, suggests Rwanda when the command was of- that efforts by the United Nations Secu- fered. Upon reporting to UN headquar- rity Council largely depend upon the ters in New York, Dallaire was told that location of the problem area. East his resources were limited and that the Timor, just to the north of Australia mission had to be small. He was or- and on the flank of major shipping dered to design the mission to fit those routes, met the requirements. Rwanda, parameters and not the demands of the in his opinion, did not. actual situation. A devout Catholic, he Under the Charter of the United Na- was particularly interested in protecting tions, interventions may be governed by human life. Such commitment, not un- Chapter 6, which stipulates that the common among military personnel, can peacekeeping contingent is not to use turn conventional wisdom on its head. force but to separate the warring sides, Belgium had acquired Rwanda from all the while maintaining a neutral Germany in the 1920 League of Nations stance. However, under Chapter 7, UN Mandate and in 1925 united it adminis- troops are authorized to use force to tratively with the Belgian Congo, which keep the antagonists apart. Dallaire lay to the west. Like most European speaks of a Chapter 6½, a hybrid of powers with colonial dependencies, Bel- the two without official UN sanction. gium staffed much of its governing ap- When the decision was made to send a paratus with native civil servants—the Chapter 6 mission to Rwanda, the Cana- Tutsis—who for the most part were dians, whose army had had considerable better educated than other Rwandans

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and in many ways resembled Euro- “perks” of the office, Booh-Booh was to peans. The Tutsis also captured the top prove useless. Further, the forces pro- jobs in commercial enterprises. The vided for the mission (known as other principal tribe, the Hutus, were UNAMIR, for United Nations Assis- not happy with this development. tance Mission to Rwanda) were grossly When Rwanda achieved its indepen- inadequate. Its troops, Ghanaian and dence from Belgium in 1962 and Tunisian, were brave, well trained, and promptly installed a Hutu-dominated professionally led, but they arrived government, they were in a position to without equipment. Pleas by Dallaire to exact revenge on the formerly elite UN headquarters for equipment and lo- Tutsi population. gistic support from the major powers Many Tutsis fled to neighboring fell on deaf ears. The United States, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire. The Tutsis Britain, and France had no interest in slowly gathered strength in those ha- the mission, although France did send vens and developed (by African stan- aircraft to evacuate Europeans caught dards) a first-class army. By the early in Rwanda by the hostilities; requests by 1990s the Tutsi army was prepared to Africans for rescue were denied. invade Rwanda and install a Tutsi gov- Not long after Dallaire arrived, an in- ernment. Threatened by the imminent formant in the Rwandan government return of their enemies, the Hutus qui- told him of weapon caches hidden by etly encouraged the formation of vigi- the extremist militias. The general im- lante groups to drive out or murder mediately requested permission to find remaining Tutsis, as well as moderate and destroy them but was refused on Hutus. Matters had reached this stage the grounds that such action would vio- when Dallaire arrived in the Rwandan late the neutrality of the mission under capital, Kigali, in August 1993. Chapter 6; nor was Dallaire permitted In addition to being the military repre- to engage in intelligence operations. In- sentative of the UN, Dallaire was also stead, he was directed to identify the temporarily assigned the position of informer to the Rwandan government. political representative. When no one Dallaire honored the order not to de- was immediately assigned to replace stroy the arms, but he refused to betray him in the latter post, the Canadians the informant. In any event, the should have sensed the general lack of source’s information soon dried up interest on the part of UN authorities. when the futility of the situation be- Naive in the ways of the UN bureau- came unmistakable. cracy, however, Dallaire was optimistic The corruption of the extremist govern- that he could perform his mission to ment authorities, the elimination of the the fullest extent. Eventually, in late Oc- moderates, and the subsequent mass tober 1993, the United Nations sent a murder, amounting to genocide, is too political representative with the some- involved to discuss adequately in this what improbable name Jacques-Roger review. Suffice it to say that approxi- Booh-Booh, former Cameroonian for- mately eight hundred thousand Afri- eign minister and a friend of the UN cans—men, women, and children, secretary-general, Boutros Boutros- nearly all of them innocent civilians— Ghali. Interested primarily in the were killed, some after severe torture.

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Dallaire is especially hard on France, which arguably prevented Dallaire from Britain, and the United States for their taking measures to block the genocide. refusal to provide assistance or autho- In the book’s preface, Dallaire recounts rize the UN to take timely measures to how a retired army chaplain asked him block the massacre. He attributes their if he still believed in God after his Afri- inaction in part to France’s other inter- can experience. His reply was “yes, be- ests in the region (the president’s son is cause he had shaken hands with the said to have had business interests in Devil.” The work has had wide success Rwanda) and to fear in the Clinton ad- in Canada but not as yet in the United ministration of another Somalia debacle. States. (The American reader should (Although Dallaire does not mention it, note that morning or evening “prayers” the Clinton administration’s lack of re- refers to staff consultations, not reli- sponse was to have severe consequences gious observances.) Shake Hands with for the United States when Osama Bin the Devil is an important book and Laden interpreted its unwillingness to should be read by every military officer act as American weakness.) Dallaire is and senior noncommissioned officer. not easy on Canada either. He refuses in his book to place blame on anyone ROBERT C. WHITTEN Commander, USNR (Retired) within the UN leadership; however, in a Cupertino, Calif. later interview with a San Francisco ra- dio talk-show host, Dallaire thoroughly castigated Boutros-Ghali as having been more responsible than anyone else for the genocide. Record, Jeffrey. Dark Victory: America’s Second Command of UNAMIR had profound ef- War against Iraq. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute fects on the Canadian general, among Press, 2005. 205pp. $49.90 them post-traumatic stress disorder. Jeffrey Record is one of the nation’s When he was relieved and returned to most experienced and respected defense Canada, he was offered, and he accepted, analysts. His latest critique of the 2003 the number-two post in the Canadian Iraq war, Dark Victory, provides many army. Haunted by his experience in important insights into the reasons for Rwanda, he retired before his term ended. the war and for its successes and fail- This is an excellent example of a good ures. More generally, this work is a case and highly competent man deeply dis- study of the challenges of transforming turbed by international failures and the military victory into a victory with Machiavellian tactics of world powers. meaningful and lasting strategic impact. His experience with the United Nations In many ways this book focuses on the raises the question of how far a military critical difference between “war fighter” commander should go in honoring or- and “war winner,” and on the fact that ders from civilian authority. The prece- conflict termination and its aftermath dent of the Nuremburg trials provides are at least as critical as any phase of military officers with sanction to refuse battle proper. orders that would produce sins of com- Record, however, writes as a critic of a mission. But what about the “sins of war he does not believe in, and of a omission”? There are no precedents, nation-building process he sees as a

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nearly disastrous failure. His book is a severe limits do not exist on what it can policy argument, not a dispassionate and cannot do; the broader question that analysis, and needs to be read as such. surrounds the current nation-building ef- There are also times when his focus on fort in Iraq is whether any such effort on the argument gets in the way of his this scale can work. analysis. This same issue pervades Record’s criti- Chapter 1, for example, contrasts the cism of neoconservative ideology, the- invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the 1990– ory, and practice in chapter 2 and 91 Gulf war. It raises a number of valid thereafter. It simply is not clear that arguments about the difference between “realists,” pragmatists, or “neoliberals” the consensus building in the first war would ultimately be able to achieve last- and the somewhat unilateral nature of ing strategic success. Certainly, remem- the second, but it also implies that the bering the arrogance and failures of the United States could have toppled Rostow brothers (Walt and Eugene), Saddam’s regime by extending the war McGeorge Bundy, and Robert long enough to destroy the Republican McNamara, this reviewer had a horrible Guards or by some undefined actions to feeling of déjà vu when reading through support the Kurdish and Shi’ite upris- Record’s discussion of the failures of ings. It does not really address the fact the policy makers of the George W. that the U.S. and coalition forces were Bush administration. The impact was even less prepared for stability opera- strikingly similar to that of the conclu- tions and nation building in 1991 than sion of George Orwell’s Animal Farm was the Bush administration for the in- (originally published in 1945): The lead- vasion of Iraq in 2003. ers of the Bush administration’s war on More importantly, chapter 1 raises Iraq became difficult to distinguish from problems that as yet no analyst of war the leaders of the Kennedy-Johnson ad- and its aftermath has convincingly ad- ministrations’ war in Vietnam. It also dressed for either Iraq wars or other became painfully clear that the aptness modern conflicts. Like the chapters that of the phrase “lions led by donkeys” has follow, it does not discuss the practical long outlived World War I. challenges in moving from limited war Record’s analysis of the practical prob- to total war or the problems inherent in lems in how the administration has the unpredictable nature of stability op- handled conflict termination, stability erations and nation building. operations, and nation building is ex- Record’s analysis of the failures of both tremely useful. To know what needs to Bush administrations to deal with the be done right you have to know what aftermath of military victory is remark- has been done wrong, and Record does ably insightful, but it is far from clear an excellent job of addressing the weak- that the postwar situation in Iraq was in nesses in the “Bush doctrine,” the dif- fact controllable or that a successful pro- ferences between Saddam Hussein and cess of conflict termination and nation Osama Bin Laden, the problems with building could have been put in place. U.S. war aims, the rationale for the war, As Record points out in many other areas and the failure to size or shape the inva- of his discussion, the fact that the United sion force for nation building. Record’s States is a superpower does not mean that critique may not be balanced or objective,

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but it is all the more useful for this. captures inescapable fundamental Record presents a clearly defined thesis truths. First, defining terrorism is that is to be rejected or accepted, and fraught with politics, emotion, and legal that makes the reader focus on the ma- quandaries; however, the world must jor strategic issues of the war. reach a consensus in order to move to- The last two chapters deal with the ward solutions. Second, democracies “peace” that followed Saddam’s fall and are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism, its broader implications for the future and they are struggling with the ques- exercise of American power. Anyone tion of whether to treat terrorism as a interested in the transformation of the crime or as a method of war. Third, ef- U.S. military, future grand strategy, and forts to counter terrorism must be dealings with conflict termination multigenerational. Finally, decision should read these chapters. One way or makers can and must take steps to inoc- another, the United States is going to ulate society against the effects of ter- have to deal with such issues again and rorism, through a comprehensive again, as long as it is the world’s preem- education campaign. inent military power. Even if the United This book is based on Ganor’s doctoral States can eventually meet some defini- dissertation, Israel’s Counter-Terrorism tion of “success” in Iraq, it will still Strategy, written for the Hebrew Univer- have to deal with the lingering impact sity. Israel is the only liberal democracy in of political and strategic mistakes that the Middle East. Using the Israeli model, Record describes so well at the end of Ganor observes that democracies are Dark Victory. uniquely vulnerable to terrorism where In short, this is a remarkably insightful government must defend itself yet main- book, one that raises precisely the issues tain principles of transparency, rule of that need to be resolved when assessing law, and representative governance while the Iraq war and shaping an American remaining mindful of world opinion. strategic posture for the future. Ganor explores ten explicit dilemmas that face democratic nations: defining the ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN threat; defining counterterrorism; em- Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies ploying intelligence; deterrence policy; choosing offensive and defensive actions; public opinion and ethics; legislative and punitive policies; media coverage; damage to societal morale; and finally, dilemmas concerning international cooperation. Ganor, Boaz. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. New Brunswick, N.J.: Ganor warns that if terrorism remains a Transaction, 2005. 334pp. $39.95 subjective concept influenced by one’s Among a cacophony of authors on ter- point of view, solutions will be simi- rorism writing since September 2001 is larly amorphous. Without consensus a small but refreshing group who offer on the definition of what constitutes specific, pragmatic, and tested solu- terrorism, global efforts to defeat it tions. Boaz Ganor joins this select few will fail. Ganor begins with a well con- with a book aptly subtitled A Guide for sidered definition of terrorism, includ- Decision Makers. Ganor splendidly ing a rigorous analysis of why

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definitions matter. “Terrorism,” he for dealing with terrorism. Israel swirls writes, “is a form of violent struggle in dizzyingly in a historical, emotional, which violence is deliberately used and political whirlpool that shapes the against civilians in order to achieve po- opinion of those who live outside its litical goals (nationalistic, socioeco- borders. Putting politics aside, the dis- nomic, ideological, religious).” Ganor cerning reader is offered a practical offers three elements upon which his analysis of how a liberal democracy is definition relies. Violence is a key factor; seeking a win-win-win scenario against it eliminates nonviolent protests, terrorism by maintaining a domestic strikes, and tax revolts from discourse moral conscience based on rule of law, on terrorism. The goal is always politi- response to a critical international audi- cal (e.g., to change the form of gover- ence, and insistence on keeping terrorism nance, to revise economic or social from “affecting the public’s day-to-day policies). Finally, if an act is to be called affairs and the essence of life in Israel.” terrorism, its targets must be civilians. Another fascinating discussion con- Terrorism does not include random in- cerns the power of education as a tool jury inflicted on civilians who happen of counterterrorism. According to to find themselves in areas of conflict; it Ganor, Netanyahu advocated strength- is, rather, violence intentionally and ening public resistance to the corrosive specifically directed at civilians. effects of terrorism through education One of the many unique strengths of designed to inoculate the population this book is its personal interviews with against the impulse to give in to pro- pivotal Israeli authorities. These include tracted terrorist pressure. In 1997 the Prime Minister Ariel Sharon; former Herzilya-based International Policy In- prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir, Shimon stitute for Counter-Terrorism started Peres, and Benjamin Netanyahu; a for- an aggressive program of lectures and mer adviser, Rafi Etan; former members educational activities aimed at strength- of Mossad Meir Degan and Shabtai ening the Israeli public’s ability to cope Shavit; a former member of Shin Bet, with terrorism. Ganor asserts that pub- Yaakov Perry; and former defense min- lic education contributes to solutions ister Moshe Arens. These sources and by reducing the fear and paralysis that others of equal prestige give Ganor un- terrorism can cause. Furthermore, pub- precedented insights into the heart of lic information, particularly in a liberal Israeli decision making. This book is an democracy, reinforces trust and disarms authoritative accounting of Israel’s terrorists, who seek to undermine soci- struggle against terrorism. However, ety’s stability. Ganor’s exclusive analysis of the Israeli Perhaps the most stunning revelation in experience is also a weakness. the book comes in the final chapter, as Without question, the Israeli govern- Ganor says, as did most Israeli policy ment and citizens have endured a level makers whom he interviewed, “Israel of deadly terror unprecedented in mod- does not have—nor did it ever have—a ern times. Israelis are sought worldwide written, structured and unambiguous as experts on airline security, physical counter terrorism policy.” What then, security, and intelligence. Yet often were the underlying principles by which there is global criticism of Israeli methods decisions were made across numerous

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political administrations? Why does the The book’s main challenge is to develop Israeli experience offer solutions for a some consensus as to what constitutes a way ahead? The Counter-Terrorism Puz- security issue. If considered broadly, zle provides the answers. anything that affects the well-being of To paraphrase the author, the book is humans might be included, but so inclu- intended to serve as a guide to the per- sive a discourse might be meaningless. plexed, a tool for decision makers at all Sheehan sides with those who propose to levels of government, industry, military, limit the debate to the human-inspired police, academics, and the public at dangers of a life-threatening nature to large. Ganor succeeds in this intention. collectives. Thus all traditional military The book is highly recommended for all threats are counted, along with global readers in his intended audience. warming (but not earthquakes) and the Kosovo genocide of 1999 (but not the JEFFREY H. NORWITZ disappearance of the Gaelic tongue). Naval War College This system works. After a clear and understandable discus- sion of security as initially set forth by the realist school of international relations,

Sheehan, Michael. International Security: An Ana- Sheehan devotes a chapter to each of the lytical Survey. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, elements of what he calls today’s “broader 2005. 199pp. $49.95 agenda” of security: security communi- ties, economic, societal, environmental, National security students and practi- gender, postmodern, and critical security. tioners commonly dive into esoteric de- In each case, he draws on the seminal ar- bates on the merits of various grand ticles and arguments for each element strategies and foreign policies, having and then offers his personal critique of spent little or no time pondering the what each adds to the debate. contemporary meaning of the term that drives the discussion—“security.” Sheehan makes it clear that all of these Michael Sheehan, professor of interna- schools are reactions to realism and tional relations at Swansea University in that each new element of the “broader the United Kingdom, and author of a agenda” offers its antidote to the tradi- number of authoritative texts on related tional perspective of viewing states, subjects, was driven to write this book rather than individuals, as the consum- by a felt need to shed more light on this ers of the benefits of security. However, “contested concept.” International Secu- he insightfully shows that each element rity does an admirable job of illustrat- itself has an element of realist thinking. ing the myriad ways in which scholars That is, ameliorating the tensions have used the term since the advent of caused by intrasocietal (tribal) rivalries the discipline. More significantly, not only reduces danger to the people Sheehan offers thoughtful commentary but also advances the relative power of on how contemporary scholars should the state by showcasing its stability. The take into account new forces in interna- case is equally well made for economic tional relations that demand broader and environmental policies. Sheehan is thinking on “security.” at his best, however, when he illustrates in each chapter how these new topics go

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beyond this obsession with the state service academies—as well as to serve as and military power and contribute to a handy desk reference for professionals the development of what is now com- and practitioners.” monly called human security. Since the publication of that first edi- Unfortunately, many of his observa- tion the U.S. national security landscape tions and conclusions are both obvious has undergone a radical transforma- and repetitive. He chides the realist tion. Over the last fifteen years the (and neorealist) school in nearly every United States has been to war in the chapter of the survey for being mesmer- Persian Gulf, Europe, and Afghanistan. ized by the military, statist, and power Moreover, the world has witnessed correlates of security. The first of his mass executions in the name of ethnic several suggestions that the world had strife in Africa and Europe, the onset of changed markedly since the end of the the “information age,” the rise of China Cold War should have sufficed. His the- as a military and economic power, an sis that individuals as well as states increased proliferation of weapons of must be the referents of security can be mass destruction, and a tremendous found in every chapter. surge in non-state-sponsored terrorism. While the book has an academic tone Perhaps the most critical turning point and is well footnoted, it remains readily relevant to U.S. national security law was digestible for the layman. It is particu- 11 September 2001, when the radical larly well suited for midcareer national Islamist terrorist group al-Qa‘ida killed security professionals embarking on the thousands of American civilians. The re- study of national security issues, since it sulting U.S.-led Global War on Terror- will induce them to develop personal ism has redefined how Washington and interpretations of the meaning of inter- Americans view national security. national security. Our national security Not surprisingly, the turbulent nature of establishment needs more of this. the post–Cold War and post-9/11 eras led to a significant evolution in the now es- TOM FEDYSZYN Naval War College tablished field of national security law. Moore and Turner have gone to great lengths to create in the second edition of National Security Law an up-to-date case- book that covers not only the fundamen-

Moore, John Norton, and Robert F. Turner. Na- tals of national security law but also new tional Security Law, Second Edition. Durham, N.C.: areas in the law that are burgeoning as we Carolina Academic, 2005. 1,424pp. $110 enter the twenty-first century. The au- thors have assembled some of the world’s In 1990 John Norton Moore and Robert leading experts in their respective fields of F. Turner, along with Frederick S. law and policy. Most notably, they place a Tipson, published a National Security clear emphasis on national security issues Law casebook covering a “new field in that have arisen in the post–Cold War American law and legal education,” a era. In addition to adding several new work designed for “use in law schools, chapters, such as “Domestic Terrorism,” advanced degree programs in interna- “Information Warfare,” “Homeland Se- tional relations and national security, curity,” “Outer Space Law,” “Drugs as a and the nation’s war colleges and

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National Security Issue,” and “Opera- tional Law,” Moore and Turner have de- leted material that was more relevant to Hook, Steven W. U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox the Cold War. Additionally, many other of World Power. Washington, D.C.: Congressio- chapters have been revised and updated nal Quarterly, 2005. 487pp. $54.95 to reflect important advances in national Steven Hook’s textbook of American security law and policy. foreign policy offers a sweeping array of Perhaps what sets this casebook apart issues that put contemporary American from others in the genre is its extensive politics in clearer perspective. The pref- scope. Its thirty-two chapters cover not ace lays out this paradox: the very only “some of the central public preoccu- sources of American strength have in- pations of our time—military force, arms creasingly become sources of vulnerabil- control, free speech, and terrorism— ity, among them a sclerotic bureaucracy but also a number of more esoteric cor- that cannot “effectively manage the dy- ners of the law,” which at times have namic world order that, to a consider- gained wide attention and scrutiny. In- able extent, is of its own making.” For deed, every conceivable aspect of na- Hook, the United States is threatened tional security law and policy, from by forces such as globalization, which it “The Use of Force in International Re- so vigorously promoted and which gave lations: Norms Concerning the Initia- it strength. This work explores the im- tion of Coercion” to “War Crimes and pact of this paradox on the process of Tribunals” to “The Control of Interna- making U.S. foreign policy. tional Terrorism” and “Immigration The book examines the setting of U.S. Law and National Security,” is included. foreign policy, touching on the rise of The second edition of National Security American power and on various views Law sets the standard in its field and and theories of how decisions are made. will no doubt facilitate “an interdisci- It then explores the governmental plinary understanding” of what Moore sources of foreign policy, including the and Turner “believe to be one of the various branches of government and most important public policy develop- the bureaucracy, and nongovernmental ments now facing the nation.” Without sources of foreign policy, such as public question, Moore and Turner have suc- opinion, interest groups, and intergov- ceeded in producing a comprehensive, ernmental organizations. Finally, it ex- well organized, extremely well written amines policy, including defense and casebook filled with seminal cases, in- economic statecraft, and transnational sightful commentary, and stimulating problems such as population growth, questions for discussion. National Secu- global warming, and the proliferation rity Law is likely to rapidly become a of weapons of mass destruction. The re- staple at law schools and advanced de- sult for the reader is a good under- gree programs across America and will no standing of contemporary American doubt be relied on by scholars, students, foreign policy. and practitioners for years to come. Hook offers interesting point-counter- SEAN P. HENSELER point debates on subjects ranging from Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy the realist-liberal debate on war to nu- Naval War College clear deterrence versus just war. There

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are also sections in which such figures as students, scholars, and policy makers Fidel Castro, Ted Koppel, and Theodore will be grappling in the coming years. Roosevelt speak in their own words, as STEPHEN YETIV well as many useful graphs and tables Old Dominion University that clearly illustrate important devel- Norfolk, Va. opments in world politics. The exten- sive glossary should prove very helpful. No book, alas, is without its shortfalls, and I offer two. First, Hook works with a theme; he puts forth an argument Carpenter, William M., and David G. Wiencek, eds. Asian Security Handbook: Terrorism and the about the current state of American af- New Security Environment. 3rd edition. New York: fairs and shapes his textbook around M. E. Sharpe, 2005. 365pp. $84.95 it. It is an interesting theme and a good tool for learning, but because In March 2005 Secretary of Defense textbooks are often devoid of editorial Donald Rumsfeld released The National comment, in this one argument may Defense Strategy of the United States of pass as fact. Overall, the approach is America. In the foreword Rumsfeld effective, but teachers will need to em- sends a clear message about America’s phasize to their students that the book security concerns: “We live in a time of is thematic. unconventional challenges and strategic uncertainty. We are confronting funda- Second, the scholarship needs updating mentally different challenges from in certain sections—for instance, in the those faced by the American defense es- discussion of cognitive psychology and tablishment in the Cold War and previ- decision making. It is true that much of ous eras. The war on terrorism has the important literature in this area is exposed new challenges, but also un- dated, and that a book of this kind precedented strategic opportunities to should not overwhelm the student. work at home and with allies and part- However, more could have been done ners abroad to create conditions favor- to incorporate new work. able to a secure international order.” Overall, this is one of the best texts on Indeed, as witnessed by the summer American foreign policy. Hook, an as- terrorist bombings in London and ear- sociate professor of political science at lier attacks in Madrid and Bali, coun- Kent State University, has a strong rec- tering these deadly “unconventional ord of publication on this subject and is challenges” requires imaginative think- a veteran textbook author. This work ing and expert geopolitical knowledge. will be of interest not only to college The Asian Security Handbook: Terrorism students but also to members of the and the New Security Environment aims Naval War College community. While to assist in meeting these challenges in it is not yet clear that the United States the Asian setting. is caught in a grand paradox the likes of The Asian Security Handbook, strongly which Hook addresses, it is certainly a reflecting the post-9/11 environment, vital, even defining, theme to consider, presents a series of political and security and one that he frames effectively. Cer- assessments of twenty-three Asian coun- tainly, it is an issue with which tries. True to its subtitle, the editors

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begin with an excellent chapter on ter- authors, while most welcome for their rorism, which includes thought- diverse viewpoints, represent a wide provoking photos, maps, and a figure range of writing and research abilities. depicting the “Southeast Asia terror The coverage on China, for example, is network.” Noting that today’s threats divided into brief, mostly unsupported come in a myriad of identities, Carpenter statements of questionable consideration and Wiencek include insightful discus- and depth. Subtitles range from “Spies” sions on “security issues and trends in- to “Farmers, Rural Areas.” (The intro- dependent of the events of September ductory chapter’s discussion on China, 11.” This section includes well crafted although brief, is much more useful.) assessments on piracy, U.S.-Chinese The style is similar to that of a U.S. strategic competition, and weapons of Army area handbook, and there are but mass destruction (WMD). The detailed three endnotes; two are official U.S. tables on piracy and WMD develop- government publications, the other a ments in Asia are also very helpful. Chinese government website. Other Our electronic media, the latest infor- country profiles, such as that on India, mation erupting fast and furious from are more polished, scholarly, and computers, radio, and television, create thorough. relevance and timeliness issues for any Is the Asian Security Handbook a useful traditionally published reference mate- reference? The U.S. national defense rial. Lengthy publication time lines and strategy sets forth a plan to defeat the ever-changing international situa- America’s adversaries by “countering tion exacerbate the problem. Here, the ideological support for terrorism,” or Asian Security Handbook shows both CIST. CIST—and how it can be used— value and weakness. The chapter on ter- has quickly become a hot topic within rorism addresses events well into 2004. Department of Defense professional The authors ask the right questions and military education circles. Clearly, aca- present thoughtful arguments that demic courses that provide students should stand the test of time. The infor- with a greater knowledge of our incred- mation in many of the country-profile ibly diverse world, including relevant chapters, written by a wide range of languages, culture, economic, and politi- government, academic, and private- cal factors, are key components in the sector specialists, is more dated. Indeed, building of sorely needed understanding a quick review discloses that most of and expertise. Unquestionably, Asia is a these articles are supported by sources critical area for study and assessment, written no later than 2003. The section and the Asian Security Handbook pro- on Japan has a mere two endnotes, cit- vides the nonspecialist with a single ref- ing publications of 2001 and 2002. Per- erence for most of it. While the writing haps more alarming is the coverage on and timeliness are uneven, the Asian Se- Singapore, which consists of only five curity Handbook presents a starting point pages of text (Brunei is allotted thirteen for those interested in studying this criti- pages), no endnotes, and just three cally important region. dated suggested readings. Surely Singa- TIMOTHY N. CASTLE pore deserves much more attention. Naval War College Also, the seventeen contributing

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conclusions, Chain of Command is a work every serious student of U.S. na- tional security should read, because he Hersh, Seymour. Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York: Harper- raises important fundamental and Collins, 2004. 394pp. $36.95 somewhat disquieting questions: Who is ultimately accountable for the pris- Seymour Hersh continues with his lat- oner abuses that occurred at Abu est work his journey as a man with an Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay? What are agenda. Released in September 2004, it the moral and ethical obligations of is a compilation of articles published in those in uniform to adhere to interna- The New Yorker, with additional infor- tional norms of behavior when national mation intended to present a congru- guidance appears at odds with, if not in ent, as well as compelling, story about complete contradiction to, accepted the Bush administration’s efforts to global standards? wage a worldwide war on terrorism. That Hersh is a fan neither of the presi- Hersh also challenges his readers to dent and his closest aides nor of the contemplate the effects of the secretary Iraq war is made abundantly clear from of defense’s domination over the mili- the opening pages. As a consequence, tary conduct of the war on terror and Chain of Command has drawn heavy its ramifications on the future of civil- criticism from those who are either ad- military relations. Secretary Rumsfeld ministration loyalists or ideologically bent the military to his will in almost supportive of the Global War on Terror every phase of the war on Iraq, with what despite its unconventional and violent Hersh describes as disastrous results nature. Conversely, the president’s po- both in Iraq (where an insurgency rages litical opponents and others who op- on) and in the greater war on terror (in pose war on any number of grounds which the architect of 9/11 remains have heralded Hersh’s book as the latest free). The reader is left to contemplate efforts of a quixotic protagonist sworn what the obligations of senior military to bring truth into the light. The former leaders were and why they were not have assailed the book for its perceived more effective in making their voices inaccuracies and lack of credible heard on strictly military matters. Fur- sources, while the latter have lauded it ther, what salient ethical issues arise for exposing programs and decisions from jus ad bellum and jus in bello con- that appear inimical to deep-seated siderations of the Iraq war? American beliefs about decency and Hersh reserves much of his vitriol for honesty. the Bush administration’s handling of This book is clearly a polemic, intended the intelligence used to justify war on to draw attention to Hersh’s concerns Iraq. In a chapter titled “Who Lied to over what he sees as an abuse of power Whom?” he recounts much of what has at the highest levels of a government come to light about the way intelligence seemingly obsessed with a vision for was “manipulated” to build a case. For Iraq and its Muslim neighbors that may Hersh, the inability of U.S. intelligence be out of step with traditional Ameri- organizations to collect accurate intelli- can ideals. Whether you agree or dis- gence about Iraq and al-Qa‘ida is nearly agree with Hersh’s assessments and as egregious as the manner in which

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that intelligence was analyzed and in- Beyond that, nothing about this book is terpreted. He is clearly disturbed by the clear or straightforward, including the apparent usurpation of national intelli- title. The title leads one to think that gence activities by the Department of the book will examine how revolution- Defense. The reader is left with the nag- ary technologies have transformed war- ging suspicion that further such consol- fare, but the subtitle, “Disguising idation may not be in the best interests Innovation,” should serve as a warn- of the country’s leadership, since op- ing—nothing is as it first seems. This posing opinions already appear to have work is a sociological study of how the no voice. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have Hersh concludes Chain of Command by achieved what the author terms “dis- posing a troubling set of questions. “How ruptive innovations” (new ways of did eight or nine neo-conservatives who combining technologies that create new believed that a war in Iraq was the an- forms of warfighting) and sustaining swer to international terrorism get their innovations (those that improve exist- way? How did they redirect the govern- ing forms). Technology plays a distant ment and rearrange long-standing second fiddle to doctrine. Pierce’s ma- American priorities and policies with so jor thesis is that the catalysts for disrup- much ease?” Discerning readers must tive innovation are senior military look past the author’s bias and answer officers. How these officers manage the for themselves. While it is arguable disruptive innovation process is key. He whether this book will earn the stature shows that they establish small groups of My Lai 4, Hersh succeeds in con- to define the tasks that must be carried fronting us with important questions out to conduct a new form of warfare, that force us to look harder at ourselves ensure that like-minded officers are and our country. promoted, and most intriguingly, dis- guise the disruptive innovation as RON RATCLIFF merely improvements to existing Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired) Naval War College modes, in order to avert ruinous oppo- sition from entrenched interests. In support of his thesis Pierce offers a number of case studies, including am- phibious warfare, Japanese and Ameri- can carrier warfare in World War II, Pierce, Terry C. Warfighting and Disruptive Tech- nologies: Disguising Innovation. New York: Frank and Marine maneuver warfare. A nice Cass, 2004. 265pp. $115 twist is the inclusion of more recent case studies like surface-land-attack Captain Terry Pierce is a serving naval warfare and the Tactical Collaboration officer who has studied innovation at Network. the John F. Kennedy School of Govern- ment at Harvard, under the supervision After a promising first chapter in which of Stephen Rosen. This book appears to the author generally defines his terms be the author’s dissertation, written as and surveys the existing literature on part of a series on strategy and history disruptive innovation, however, comes edited by Colin Gray and Williamson a nearly disastrous attempt to establish Murray. a theoretical framework to support the

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analysis of the following case studies. recommended as a worthwhile invest- Chapter 2 is almost unreadable, appar- ment for the general reader. It is too ently due to the failure of anyone actu- bad that neither Pierce’s advisers nor ally to read or edit it. Apart from turgid his publisher extended the effort to re- and sloppy language, the chapter’s most view and edit his dissertation properly; egregious defect is the author’s nonsen- it could have had far wider appeal and sical adaptation of charts from Clay value. Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma, ROBERT C. RUBEL a standard in the innovation literature. Naval War College Pierce employs his own versions of Christensen’s charts but leaves out cer- tain key elements, with the result that the reader has no hope of making sense

of them. This will give the knowledge- Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking able reader serious doubt regarding the without Thinking. New York: Little, Brown, 2005. validity of the book. 277pp. $15.57 However, things get better as Pierce Among the many attributes desired in swings into the case studies. He con- professional military officers is the abil- trasts successful attempts to institution- ity to make extremely rapid decisions alize disruptive innovations, like the under conditions of extreme stress and Marine Corps shift to offensive am- peril, and for the highest imaginable phibious warfare doctrine in the 1930s, stakes. Decisions may even have to be with such failed efforts as Admiral made in less time than is available con- Elmo Zumwalt’s Project 60, an attempt sciously to weigh the alternatives and to refocus the Navy on sea control. select a course of action. Although not Pierce also compares the management unique—others, including doctors, law methods used to promote sustaining in- enforcement officials, and firefighters, novations, such as continuous-aim face similar situations and under equiv- gunfire, with those successful in pro- alent expectations—such demands are moting disruptive innovations, and he not a common part of most people’s finds significant differences. In the end, work experience. a degree of clarity is attained, and by In Blink Gladwell examines rapid, al- the final chapter the reader can with most instantaneous, decision making— some effort understand and even agree decisions made in the “blink of an eye.” with the author’s main arguments. In The book advances an intriguing and fact, people engaged in military innova- seductive proposition, that people can tion efforts will likely find some practi- be trained to make nearly instantaneous cal insights. decisions using minimal amounts of If, then, this book, despite its flaws, can data and yet achieve remarkable per- be useful for the knowledgeable mili- centages of successful outcomes. If tary officer, academic, or defense indus- reading Blink could produce such a re- try manager, it is most definitely not for sult, the book would represent one of the uninitiated or casual reader. Ulti- the most significant advances in the mately, it is too hard to follow and con- field of decision making in decades. tains too many editing errors to be Unfortunately, such is not the case.

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Blink is not going to transform its read- of heart attack in the emergency room ers into paragons of successful, instant than do more comprehensive diagnos- decision makers, however much the tic protocols. dust-jacket hype might imply it will. Blink identifies experience as another However, this does not mean Blink key component in the ability to make should be completely written off. There rapid and accurate decisions. Deep fa- are insights worth thinking about and les- miliarity with one’s subject, be it an- sons to be gleaned from Gladwell’s work. cient Greek statues, professional tennis, For the most part, Blink is an extremely marriage counseling, or, one may as- reader-friendly volume. Gladwell intro- sume, battle displays, is an essential duces concepts and follows up with component to making correct fast deci- deeper illumination and understanding sions. To demonstrate this point through a variety of well documented Gladwell offers the example of Vic anecdotes. During the first half of the Braden, a noted tennis coach who ap- book, the author seems about to deliver parently has a supernatural ability to on the implied promise of better deci- predict when a professional tennis sion making as he explains how some player is going to double-fault. Yet people seem to master what might be Braden cannot explain how he knows called the “art of snap decisions.” He the double fault will occur. Clearly de- does this in graduated steps, providing cades of coaching tennis have left him convincing evidence for each compo- with a predictive ability that functions nent of his argument. either so rapidly or so subconsciously Drawing on data from a study of gam- that he himself does not understand it. bling, Gladstone demonstrates that de- Gladwell also explores the negative as- cision making occurs in both the pects of thin-slice decision making. Ev- human conscious and the subconscious erybody makes lightning decisions, all mind. The gambling study found that at of us work off hunches and feelings, but least in some people subconscious deci- all too often the decisions are influ- sion making occurs more rapidly than enced by images and stereotypes that conscious decision making. Blink also have bombarded us from birth. One of provides convincing evidence that dis- the most powerful questions raised in tilling, rather than increasing, informa- Blink concerns the degree to which our tion may result in not only faster but attitudes on such fundamental ques- better decision making. The combina- tions as racial equality are answered tion of subconscious data processing through snap decision making. Accord- and the use of very limited data is ing to Gladwell the answer is “to a very known as “thin-slicing,” defined as “the large extent,” so much so that people ability of the unconscious to find pat- who sincerely believe they are not bi- terns in situations based on very narrow ased carry embedded subconscious atti- slices of experience.” A related illustra- tudes that affect their perceptions of tive anecdote comes from the medical others. Interestingly, Blink suggests community. Doctors have determined such attitudes do not have to be perma- that confining an examination to four nent, that exposure to positive images key observations results in significantly can result in measurable changes to higher percentages of correct diagnosis subconscious perceptions. If true, these

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findings would seem not only to give victorious because his team, unencum- significant ammunition to those who bered by excessive information and claim the nation’s children are exces- overanalysis, retained the power of sively influenced by what they see on rapid cognition. In other words, rather television but to have importance in ef- than relying on technology and analysis forts to counter terrorist attempts to to eliminate the fog of war, General popularize their ideologies. Van Riper’s team had been trained to Another reported pitfall to good snap work in the fog; his unexpected tactics decision making is the power of the first plunged the U.S. military and political impression. Gladwell tells the story of analysts into the very fog they had in- Warren Harding, a man whose bearing tended to dispel. Once both sides were and voice so impressed all who met him operating in conditions of reduced clarity, with their presidential quality that it Van Riper’s team was able to triumph. seemed only right he should attain the The remainder of the book examines in Oval Office. Unfortunately, Harding’s some detail the death of Amadou Diallo, capabilities did not match his image, a Guinean immigrant who was shot to and his time in the White House was death by members of a New York Police thoroughly undistinguished. In one of Department street-crime unit in 1999. the book’s more interesting anecdotes Gladwell walks the reader through the Gladwell explains the success behind shooting, presenting the police officers the so-called “Pepsi Challenge,” a blind not as slavering racists or sociopaths but taste-test designed to help the Pepsi as victims of their own physiological re- Cola Company achieve a victory over sponses to stress and a lack of training its primary competitor, Coca-Cola. Be- under high-stress conditions. According ing sweeter tasting than Coke, Pepsi to Gladwell’s research, as stress reaches was overwhelmingly favored when indi- extreme levels, such as in “shoot/don’t viduals sampled small amounts of each shoot” situations, the human body soda. The results were reversed, how- changes the way it processes and perceives ever, when the sample size was increased data. Under these conditions, signals, to an entire can. The Coca-Cola Com- perhaps especially facial expressions, no pany failed to realize this fact and di- longer carry the impact they would oth- verted significant resources into a variety erwise; humans enter a state the book of failed attempts to meet the “challenge.” identifies as “mind-blind,” a condition Much of Blink is devoted to the perfor- that might also be described as temporary mance of retired Marine general Paul autism. The odds skyrocket that the af- Van Riper as the commander of opposi- fected individual, robbed of the ability to tion forces in the MILLENNIUM CHAL- process key data rapidly, will opt to shoot LENGE war game of 2002. This game a perceived threat. However, Gladwell ex- simulated a massive U.S. military re- plains, with training these automatic re- sponse to a rogue military leader in the sponses become less severe, allowing Persian Gulf. General Van Riper report- individuals to make accurate and appro- edly scored an impressive victory priate decisions. Blink argues that an even against U.S. forces early in the game by more desirable outcome of proper train- a variety of innovative and unexpected ing is to prevent such high-stress situa- tactics. Gladwell argues Van Riper was tions from developing in the first place.

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Surprisingly, Gladwell concludes his a little deeper as, at least upon the surface, book with a story that showcases the his findings would seem to have appli- negative side of first impressions, cability to such issues as officer-training thin-slicing, and stereotypes—the im- pipelines and criteria for command. pressive increase in the number of The fact that training can reduce the women in professional orchestras. This negative impacts of stress in snap deci- growth, especially in sections of the or- sion making is nothing new, especially chestra traditionally thought of as mas- for those in the military. Whether it is culine, is attributed less to a growing the Marines reacting to a convoy am- awareness of women’s rights than to the bush or a warship’s combat systems introduction of “blind auditions,” in team responding to an air attack, realis- which the applicants perform out of the tic training is a critical component of judges’ sight. Deprived of immediate success. Gladwell’s work simply rein- decision cues, the judges are forced to forces what soldiers and sailors have base their decisions solely on musical long known: You fight the way you train. merit. Artificial or nonmusical impedi- While Blink will not make its readers ments are removed, and women musi- experts at snap decisions, it remains a cians are free to rise to their level of work of interest. For one thing Gladwell competence. As examples go, this is rather conclusively demonstrates that compelling in the extreme. our individual personalities, our unique The merits of Blink are many. It is well experiences, and beliefs and values, written, lively, and engaging. Gladwell form an integral part of human deci- both explains the power of first impres- sion making. Models that fail to take sions and demonstrates that there are this aspect of decision making into con- indeed people who can make very suc- sideration are almost certain to be cessful decisions based on minimal data flawed, and leaders who fail to under- in next to no time. He also convinces stand the power of these attributes are that such talents can be acquired, or at almost certain to be disappointed. Blink least improved. Yet it is here that the may not provide all the answers, but the book loses cohesion and momentum. questions it raises are most definitely Having recognized that “blink” deci- worthy of consideration. sion making can be both positive and RICHARD NORTON negative, Gladwell offers no clear way Naval War College by which the former can be improved and the latter minimized. Furthermore, the people he identifies as good “blink” decision makers are all experts. In many

cases they have been mastering their Miller, Steven E., and Dimitri V. Trenin, eds. The fields for decades. For example, General Russian Military: Power and Purpose. Cambridge, Van Riper’s success was due at least as Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. 241pp. $25 much to his expert knowledge of U.S. The study of the Russian armed forces military procedures, strategy, and tac- has, like those armed forces themselves, tics as it was to his ability to make snap fallen upon hard times in the contempo- decisions. It is a pity Gladwell did not rary world. Therefore, this study is most pursue the question of experience welcome. The editors and authors—

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Americans, Europeans, and Russians— correctly observe that the system itself are all acknowledged experts, so it is is unreformable. not surprising that all the essays are of No one interested in tracing the evolu- uniformly high quality. The editors also tion of Russian forces and defense pol- deserve praise for including a chapter icy through 2003 can go wrong with on the defense economy; its evolution is this book. It is too bad that it was pub- a telling indicator of Russia’s defense lished when it was. Because this work is policy and overall political economy. part of a distinguished multivolume se- The editors’ purpose is to illuminate ries on Eurasian security issues, its pub- the conditions under which Russia’s lication was part of a larger program rulers have responded to the challenges and could not be delayed, but begin- for reforming their armed forces. ning in 2003 and conclusively in 2004, Thus the chapters on defense reform the logjam that had blocked reform be- (by Pavel Baev and Alexei Arbatov) and gan to give way. Defense spending and on the military’s sociopolitical condi- training, including exercises, increased tions (by Alexander Golts) paint a dev- substantially, and by 2004 the effects astating picture of an unreformed were visible. Likewise, new operational military that instead of providing secu- and doctrinal principles were intro- rity has itself become a source of inse- duced and accepted in 2003–2004. The curity for Russia. That outcome stems General Staff, which had frustrated from underinvestment, politicization, many reforms, was now firmly subordi- corruption, official neglect, and refusal nated to the Ministry of Defense, and to attack the perquisites of the military the chief of the General Staff, General establishment’s leadership. Vitaly Anatoly Kvashnin, a tenacious bureau- Shlykov’s chapter on the defense econ- cratic operator but disastrous military omy rightly points out that the regime leader, was finally sacked. Major force- has failed to break free of either the So- structure reforms began and are still viet Union’s “structural militarization” continuing today. Had the authors or the heavy hand of state control. Roy known of these trends, they could have Allison’s overview of Russian military provided first-class assessments of their involvement in regional conflicts sug- significance. gests that even after painful lessons that However, some things are already clear. military has only begun to learn what Current reforms are occurring under contemporary warfare is all about. Rose the rubric of the Russian term “reform Gottemoeller ably traces both the de- of the armed forces”—that is, changes bate over the role of nuclear forces in in force structure. These reforms, while Russia’s military structure and policy extremely consequential, do not consti- through 2003 and the implications of tute a total transformation. Indeed, the that debate as they had been revealed at defense economy remains too much of that point. Dmitri Trenin’s conclusion a Soviet-like character and is subject to reassesses the reasons why defense re- excessive state control. All the armed form had failed through 2003 and ad- forces, including those of the Ministry dresses the paradox that though many of Interior and intelligence agencies, are are calling for reforms, many others unaccountable democratically, repre- senting instead indispensable pillars of

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Putin’s neo-tsarist, authoritarian system. intelligence was smaller than its Allied In addition, the Ministry of Defense, counterparts and left a smaller trace. rather than embracing a professional Still, the influence of these German ef- army, insists upon expanding conscrip- forts on the pivotal convoy battles of tion and enserfing thousands of men as the war has remained an important un- their ancestors were enserfed over a answered question. In German Naval century ago. Thus, until and unless de- Codebreakers, Jak Showell, author of fense reforms are carried out beyond more than a dozen books on German mere reorganizations of the force struc- U-boats, has attempted to provide an ture, Russia cannot have effective account of signals intelligence in the armed forces, security, or democracy. German navy in World War II. Until then it will remain tempted by The German Naval Radio Monitoring imperialism and military adventurism, Service (or Funkbeobachtungsdienst, as in Chechnya, and fail to retrieve its commonly abbreviated B-Dienst) European vocation or achieve true inte- worked with some success against Brit- gration into Europe. Under the circum- ish and American naval codes. During stances, then, it would be a good idea if the early period of the war until 1943, the authors could be prevailed upon to the B-Dienst could read large parts of write a second edition that incorporates the Allied merchant ship and convoy the most recent trends. Then we could codes, which provided important in- derive maximum benefit from this splen- sights into convoy operations and rout- did book that was published too soon. ing. In addition to codebreaking,

STEPHEN BLANK B-Dienst operated a network of direc- Strategic Studies Institute tion finders that fixed the approximate U.S. Army War College locations of radio transmissions in the Carlisle Barracks, Penna. Atlantic. Whatever its success at codebreaking, the German navy in World War II failed at the critical second step of intel- Mallmann Showell, Jak P. German Naval Code- ligence analysis. Showell creates the im- breakers. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, pression that B-Dienst personnel were 2003. 160pp. $29.95 separated from key operational com- In the almost thirty years since the pub- manders and were not permitted access lic revelation that the Allies in World to information about their own forces’ War II broke substantial portions of the operations. The B-Dienst was therefore German ENIGMA cipher system, Allied reduced to passing raw messages to se- codebreaking has become a staple of nior commands, feeding the complaint our understanding of the Battle of the that radio intelligence served only to Atlantic. Less understood are the paral- provide a flood of useless information. lel efforts of the German navy to break This arrangement stands in marked Allied naval codes. The historical rec- contrast to the intimate relationship be- ord of German codebreaking is com- tween commanders and operational in- paratively fragmentary, many records telligence centers in Britain and the having been destroyed during or imme- United States. diately after the war. German naval

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From the outset, the book suffers from navy set out to provide intelligence in- an unfortunate organization. At- formation to its commanders, and how tempting to avoid a chronological his- and why it succeeded or failed in that tory of the war at sea, the author has effort. That question is never answered, arranged his material in a series of short leaving the book at best titillating but vignettes, separated by ship type and unsatisfying. area of operations. Lost in this organi- DALE C. RIELAGE zation is the common thread of the Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy B-Dienst itself. Showell, for example, Assistant Naval Attaché, Berlin touches on the question of how intelli- gence support was provided to German units at sea in several sections but never ties them together to address the critical question of information dissemination McCullough, David. 1776. New York: Simon and across the German navy. Showell at- Schuster, 2005. 386pp. $32 tempts to circumvent this problem by a David McCullough has written yet an- series of appendixes on organization, other enormously enjoyable and infor- but these are too brief to serve the need, mative narrative history. Compared to and the result is confusing and unclear. his monumental Pulitzer Prize–winning Within these sections there are histori- biographies of Harry Truman and John cal gems. For example, the author dis- Adams, 1776 is only a snapshot of a cusses a February 1943 incident in crucial moment in time, although it is which the B-Dienst intercepted a Brit- every bit as engaging. It covers the ish message containing German subma- events of the seventeen months between rine locations—potential evidence that King George III’s October 1775 an- the German code was itself being read nouncement to Parliament of unrelent- by the Allies. Ultimately, the German ing war against his American colonies navy convinced itself that its opera- and the arrival in Britain of the news of tional information had been compro- George Washington’s victory at Tren- mised through other means and that its ton in March 1777. A story of overcom- codes were secure. However, this gem, ing adversity, 1776 focuses on the early like all others mentioned, suffers from battles of the War of Independence, the second major failing of the book— which were mainly retreats for the rag- an almost complete lack of documenta- ged and often exhausted Continental tion. While the work contains a list of Army. recommended reading and mentions at Based on McCullough’s expert research the outset that it is largely based on in American and British archives, the work found in private archives in Ger- story is packed with rich descriptions many, there is no further reference to drawn from both sources. At age forty- the evidence. four, Washington is at the moral cen- The third and perhaps most important ter of the drama. Although he had failing of the book is a failure to explore never before led an army in battle and the full implications of German suc- is (as McCullough bluntly declares) cesses and failures. The fundamental “indecisive and inept” in the early New historical question is how the German York campaigns, Washington learns

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from his mistakes and somehow keeps firsthand accounts from diaries and let- his frayed army intact and unbroken. ters, and writing in a graceful style, he He also proves to be resolute as well as humanizes the stories of the lesser char- resilient, living up to his later reputa- acters of those times that did indeed tion as the “indispensable man” of the “try men’s souls.” Volunteer farmers, founding era. artisans, backwoodsmen, tradesmen, McCullough vibrantly describes other boatmen, and mere boys, all accus- indispensable characters as well. On the tomed to hardship and labor, make up American side there are Henry Knox, a the cast. There are patriot “shoemakers, “town-born” Boston bookseller turned saddlers, carpenters, wheelwrights, accomplished soldier at age twenty-five, blacksmiths, coopers, tailors and ship and Nathaniel Greene, a “fighting chandlers,” as well as their counterpart Quaker” who became the youngest bri- Loyalists—and the splendidly trained gadier general in the army at age but equally human redcoats and thirty-three. Both these men proved to Hessians. McCullough’s colorful story be outstanding military leaders and includes drunks, deserters, spies, prosti- steadfastly loyal to Washington. Leaders tutes, traitors, and no-accounts, along from the British side are also crisply with the accompanying bad teeth, portrayed. King George III, his primary smallpox scars, casts in the eyes, open military commanders General William “necessaries” (latrines), and “camp fe- Howe and Admiral Lord Richard ver” (dysentery and typhus). The story Howe, and other diligent subjects of the also describes instances of astonishing Crown are sketched, in a fresh and bal- dedication, ingenuity, energy, heroism, anced treatment. and self-sacrifice for the “glorious cause.” The Howe brothers, who were directed by King George to extend the “olive McCullough’s story ends with Wash- branch” as well as fight (perhaps ex- ington’s crossing of the Delaware and plaining some of their dawdling ma- the victory at Trenton, the battle that neuvers), are painted as courageous and gave the first great hope for the cause dedicated professionals. They com- after the British evacuation of Boston in manded an awesome force, and the 1775. It was the “brilliant stroke” that vivid descriptions of raw British Washington had sought. Fate and power—an armada of four hundred chance played a weighty role; a slight ships anchored off Staten Island, the fe- change in the wind, the arrival of fog, rocious British bombardment at Kips the amount of gunpowder, or in the Bay that began the battle for New timing of British pursuit could have York—are truly daunting. The fighting doomed the rebellion. The eventual vic- was vicious and large in scale, and tory was even then far from inevitable many readers will have to be reminded and was to be indeed a near-run thing. that forty thousand people took part in The British historian Sir George the battle for Long Island, a fight that Trevelyan once wrote of the astounding stretched over six miles through present- turnaround after Trenton, “It may be day Brooklyn. doubted whether so small a number of McCullough solidly grounds his narra- men ever employed so short a space of tive at the individual level. Utilizing time with greater and more lasting

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162 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

effects upon the history of the world.” Perhaps Washington said it best when McCullough’s superb book will con- he wrote, “perseverance and spirit have vince the reader of this view; the author done wonders in all ages.” himself concludes that the outcome WILLIAM CALHOUN seemed “little short of a miracle.” Naval War College

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