LIONS LED BY DONKEYS?
BRIGADE COMMANDERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN
IMPERIAL FORCE, 1914-1918.
ASHLEIGH BROWN
A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Philosophy
University of New South Wales, Canberra
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
March 2017 PLEASE TYPE THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet
Surname or Family name: Brown
First name: Ashleigh Other name/s: Rebecca
Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: MPhil
School: Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty: UNSW Canberra, AD FA
Title: Lions led by donkeys? Brigade commanders of the Australian Imperial Force, 1914-1918.
Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)
Australian First World War historiography tends to focus on the ordinary soldier: his background, character and involvement in the war. This is a legacy left by Charles Bean who, following the history from below approach, believed in the need for soldiers’ stories to be told. On the other end of the spectrum, attention is given to political leaders and the British high command. British commanders and, by extension, other Allied commanders are too often portrayed as poor leaders who were reluctant to adapt to modern warfare, and did not demonstrate a sense of responsibility for the men under their command. The evidence shows that this perception is not accurate. A comprehensive understanding of the progression of Australian forces on the Western Front cannot be gained without investigating the progression of those in command.
This thesis examines the brigade commanders of the Australian Imperial Force who held that level of command for a substantial period while on the Western Front. These commanders challenge preconceived notions of First World War commanders, as they continually developed tactics and adapted to modern warfare as it evolved. They embraced new technology and ensured that their formations were able to effectively work with it. As the war progressed, they gained an appreciation of the importance of collaborating with other formations and ensuring effective communication, and demonstrated an understanding of the challenges of war on the Western Front. By 1918, the brigade commanders were effective leaders who undoubtedly played a significant role in the success of the Australian forces.
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Date ABSTRACT
Australian First World War historiography tends to focus on the ordinary soldier: his background, character and involvement in the war. This is a legacy left by
Charles Bean who, following the history from below approach, believed in the need for soldiers’ stories to be told. On the other end of the spectrum, attention is given to political leaders and the British high command. British commanders and, by extension, other Allied commanders are too often portrayed as poor leaders who were reluctant to adapt to modern warfare, and did not demonstrate a sense of responsibility for the men under their command. The evidence shows that this perception is not accurate. A comprehensive understanding of the progression of Australian forces on the Western
Front cannot be gained without investigating the progression of those in command.
This thesis examines the brigade commanders of the Australian Imperial Force who held that level of command for a substantial period while on the Western Front.
These commanders challenge preconceived notions of First World War commanders, as they continually developed tactics and adapted to modern warfare as it evolved. They embraced new technology and ensured that their formations were able to effectively work with it. As the war progressed, they gained an appreciation of the importance of collaborating with other formations and ensuring effective communication, and demonstrated an understanding of the challenges of war on the Western Front. By 1918, the brigade commanders were effective leaders who undoubtedly played a significant role in the success of the Australian forces. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I had the good fortune to complete the first year of this thesis under the supervision of Professor Jeffrey Grey. It was a privilege to have the guidance of a historian who I have respected and admired for so long. The first time I met Jeff was when I went to speak to him about the possibility of doing a research project, which he encouraged me to pursue as a thesis instead. In that first meeting, Jeff asked me what my postgraduate coursework grades were like. I told him that overall they were good, but the lowest was in his course on Vietnam which I had taken the previous year. In what I came to know as his typical way, he gave me a small smile, somewhat satisfied, and responded with “that sounds about right”. When I left his office I was terrified.
Throughout the next year, Jeff was always supportive, understanding and encouraging of me. He was direct with his opinions and feedback, and very certain about the right way to do things. Any compliment from Jeff had to be well deserved!
My final meeting with him was the day before he passed away. After talking about my progress, I stayed a bit longer for a chat. I will always be thankful that I saw him that day, and that I spent that extra bit of time there.
Jeff played a huge part in my formative experience in academic history. This thesis is principally a result of his guidance, constructive criticism, patience, and his time. It is a reflection of everything he has taught me, and I hope it’s a reflection he would be happy with.
I am indebted to Emeritus Professor Peter Dennis, who kindly offered to take over the supervision of my thesis from July 2016. Peter’s approach had a comforting similarity to Jeff’s, and I have no doubt that I am a better researcher and writer for the assistance he has given me. I can’t thank you enough for the time and effort you have put into my work. I have been lucky to have the support of my colleagues and friends at the
Australian War Memorial in the Commemoration & Visitor Engagement section, and more recently from Craig Stockings and the Official History Project team. Thank you for your support, encouragement and friendship, and a special thank you to Emily who has given me an incredible amount of greatly appreciated support over the last year.
I have had fantastic opportunities to be taught by exceptional historians at both the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Before this, though, I was very lucky to have some wonderful history teachers during high school. I want to thank Graeme Hosken, who I first met in 2009 through the Dubbo School of Distance Education. Thank you for all of your help over the last nine years, and thank you for sharing and inspiring my passion for history.
The most important thanks go to my parents, Jackie and Jeff. Thank you for encouraging me to find and pursue what I love, and for making it so much easier by supporting me. Mum has proof-read everything I’ve written from year 11 onwards, including multiple drafts of this thesis. Thank you for your patience and commitment, and for giving up so much of your time for me. I’ve been asked countless times how I became so interested in military history, and I always tell people it’s because of Dad – though his version of the story is slightly different to mine! Thank you for sparking and sharing my love of military history. Thank you both for spending so much time listening to my research and ideas, reading my drafts, visiting museums, travelling to battlefields and crawling through old trenches with me. I can’t thank you enough for helping me get to this point.
Ashleigh Brown
For Professor Jeffrey Grey
CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 1914-15: Fit for Africa and nowhere else? The origins of 18 Australia’s Western Front brigade commanders.
Chapter 2 1915-16: ‘I don’t know what is to be done – this isn’t 40 war’. From Gallipoli to the Western Front.
Chapter 3 1916-17: Adapting to trench warfare. 62
Chapter 4 A new fighting ability: Final Australian actions on the 90 Western Front, 1917-18.
Conclusion 111
Appendix 125
Bibliography 129
1
INTRODUCTION
LIONS LED BY DONKEYS? THE DEBATE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO AUSTRALIAN
HISTORY.
‘At the age of four with paper hats and wooden swords we’re all Generals. Only some of us never grow out of it’.
- Peter Ustinov1
Origins of the debate
General Erich Friedrich Ludendorff and military strategist Carl Adolf
Maximilian Hoffman are credited as having labelled the British forces of the First
World War as lions led by donkeys, noting that they had immense respect for the soldiers who were sent into battle, but not for those who sent them.
Ludendorff: ‘The English soldiers fight like lions’. Hoffman: ‘True. But don’t we know that they are lions led by donkeys’.2
The notion of lions led by donkeys and the ensuing debate surrounding this popular image is an enduring aspect of First World War historiography, perhaps nowhere more so than in Britain and its former empire.3 Robert Foley attributes the
British acceptance of lions led by donkeys to the immediate shock of the war, but accepts its remarkable resilience, having been perpetuated through multiple generations despite research indicating that the image is unlikely to be a fair representation of Allied
1 Susan Ratcliffe (ed.), Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 2 Alan Clark, The Donkeys: The Unforgettable Story of the British Army’s Struggle Throughout 1915 (London: Mayflower-Dell Books, 1964), [page unnumbered]. 3 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 4-5. 2
commanders.4 As Dan Todman and Gary Sheffield note, this view has taken such a strong hold that it seems difficult to look past it:
Myths of military incompetence and brutality are so deeply ingrained in British culture that it can still seem difficult for some to grasp that First World War commanders were not actively attempting to massacre their men.5
When things in battle fail to go according to plan, the blame is generally placed exclusively on those who were responsible for planning, organising and commanding, often overlooking factors such as inexperience or exhaustion among troops, tactical disadvantages and other external variables.6 Although this view is clearly limited, it is perhaps unavoidable. One would inevitably find it difficult to centre the blame for the loss of a battle on men who had lost their lives. Commanders, who are often seen to control the fate of war, become the scapegoat for all other factors. ‘Indeed, if one were to compile a list of military forces that have failed in war, a connecting thread would be failures of command’.7 Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke noted that ‘the military commander is the fate of the nation’.8 Marshal Ferdinand Foch was of a similar mindset:
Great results in war are due to the commander. History is therefore right in making generals responsible for victories – in which case they are glorified; and for defeats – in which case they are disgraced.9
4 Robert Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies during the Great War’, International Affairs, No. 90, 2014, p. 279; Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2005), pp. 119-120. 5 Dan Todman and Gary Sheffield, ‘Command and Control in the British Army on the Western Front’, in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2007), p. 10. 6 Douglas Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-1945 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), p. 296; Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, p. 5. 7 Gary Sheffield, ‘The Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Century’, in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (eds.), The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 7. 8 David Horner (ed.), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 2. 9 Ibid., p. 2. 3
This is an interesting notion reflecting First World War historiography and popular history. The most well-known military leaders, almost without exception, fall at either end of the spectrum; the celebrated such as General Sir John Monash at one end, and the condemned such as Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig at the other. It is therefore an unfortunate by-product of this that those who fall in the barely discussed middle- ground tend to be missing from historiography. Instead, the focus tends to reflect the notion of First World War allied soldiers being commanded by men who were incompetent, unsympathetic and purely target-driven; the donkeys.
David Horner explains how the notion of lions led by donkeys was able to take such a strong hold in popular history: ‘As the memory of war fades … so too does the remembrance of a nation’s great commanders’.10 The mentality of the general public differs greatly between wartime and times of peace. Throughout the First World War, it is fair to assume that the public in Britain and its dominions were delighted to hear of success stories from the front lines. Commanders who led their troops to great victories were praised and many became household names. After wartime, however, the attitude of the public experienced a dramatic shift. Regardless of the overall outcome of the war, all combatant nations experienced unprecedented levels of loss. Eventually the public, and history alike, would seek to place blame for those losses. At this point, leaders – military and political – became the obvious target for the blame.
Dan Todman argues that the myths of poor leadership in the First World War were further strengthened by Britain’s Second World War experiences. The criticisms which already existed were further emphasised. Through this, the First World War leaders could be placed into the ‘model of an outdated officer class whose modes of behaviour would have to be abandoned if victory was to be achieved’ in the later stages
10 Ibid. 4
of the Second World War.11 This rejection of First World War leadership was doubly attractive as it not only offered an easy explanation of Britain’s failures in the opening years of the Second World War, as the leadership of the First World War was arguably still the norm, but ‘also held out the promise that the grinding battles of 1916-18 would not be repeated.’12 The further the British public sought to move away from the type of leadership which was prominent during the First World War, the more commanders of that period came to be seen as ‘donkeys’.
Two pieces of work produced in the 1960s presented the lions led by donkeys debate in popular culture. Alan Clark, the author of The Donkeys (1961), presented a revisionist history of British involvement in the First World War.13 This is arguably the quintessential work from Britain which reinforces the notion of lions led by donkeys.
Walter Reid, in his biographical work on Haig, asserts that Clark used Haig as his principal target to present a ‘damaging picture of leonine ordinary soldiers led by donkeys – stupid, stubborn generals, blinkered from the realities of war and comfortably billeted in luxurious chateaux, remote from the fighting’.14 Todman notes that while The
Donkeys was undoubtedly written in haste, it was also written in genuine anger at
Clark’s perception of the way the war had been fought; with ‘venality and stupidity’.15
The quality and intentions of First World War commanders were also questioned in
Joan Littlewood’s 1963 musical production, Oh! What a Lovely War, which further ingrained in British society the tendency to view the First World War from the perspective of the common soldier, rather than by reading the memoirs of officers.16
11 Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, p. 98. 12 Ibid. 13 Clark, The Donkeys. 14 Walter Reid, Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig (Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2006), pp. 9-10. 15 Todman, The Great War, p. 101. 16 Michael Billington, ‘Oh What a Lovely War: the show that shook Britain’, The Guardian, 17 February 2014, cited 14 October 2017,
Todman addresses the question of why the ‘donkeys’ version of First World
War leadership became, in just twenty years, widely accepted. He offers the explanation that, in the absence of widespread military experience at that point in time, the British public may have been more willing to accept ‘caricatures of officers’ incompetence uncritically’.17 Veterans of the First World War had debated the relative strengths and weaknesses of former commanders, which may have precluded the simplistic ‘donkeys’ view from arising immediately after the war. However, as they grew older and died, ‘the networks in which they had sustained debates about the generals went with them’.18
This, Todman believes, led to a loss of the context which had encouraged the ‘rehearsal and reinforcement of alternative views’, meaning surviving veterans were increasingly vulnerable to the myths of incompetence which had already been established amongst their descendants.19
Australia: Anzacs & Donkeys
There are gaps in Australian First World War historiography in relation to brigade commanders.20 Relatively little is written about the commanders, with the obvious exception of General Sir John Monash.21 Charles Bean’s vision for telling
Australia’s First World War history was to focus on the ordinary soldiers rather than commanders. Many contemporary historians have remained true to this. Commanders and their roles and decisions are discussed, but the great emphasis remains on the
17 Todman, The Great War, p. 115. 18 Ibid., pp. 115-16. 19 Ibid. 20 Comprehensive work has been done on Australian battalion commanders in the First and Second World Wars. See for example: William Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Garth Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 21 See for example: Peter Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1985); Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982); Roland Perry, Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War (Sydney: Random House Australia, 2014). 6
ordinary soldier, and how the decisions made by leaders affected him.22 This has undoubtedly contributed to a unique gap in Australian historiography which remains to be filled by research focusing on military commanders. Few nations are as ill-informed as Australia about their historical military leaders.
Building on this focus on ordinary soldiers, Anthony Cooper notes that the
Anzac legend came about as a direct result of the perceived futility of war, claiming that it:
[P]erfectly complemented the disillusionist view of the conflict … If the war itself was senseless and meaningless, then ‘the mettle of the men themselves’ was a convenient focus for the national memory.23
However, Australian historiography tends to condemn British commanders while simultaneously by-passing any significant mention of their Australian counterparts, with the exception of those who were generally well-known and celebrated. Robert Stevenson notes that in addition to the generally negative opinion about British commanders, there was a ‘strong consensus that Australian leadership was better’; a ‘superficial assessment [which] ignores reality’.24 It is commonly claimed that
Australian soldiers were sent in as cannon-fodder by uncaring, elitist British commanders.25 John Connor argues that this approach aligns with contemporary British attitudes:
The senior British generals who had overseen the war were seen as ‘butchers and bunglers’, but, recalling Bean’s ‘democratic’ official history, the Canadian, New Zealand and Australian
22 Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, p. 13. 23 Anthony Cooper, ‘The Australian Historiography of the First World War: Who is Deluded?’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1994, p. 24. 24 Robert Stevenson, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Vol. 3: The War With Germany (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 172; William Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 10. 25 Robert Stevenson, ‘The Battalion: The AIF Infantry Battalion and its Evolution’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), p. 39. 7
troops were acclaimed as successful soldiers who had displayed the unique national characteristics of their respective countries.26
At times, however, many Australian soldiers had a disdainful attitude towards their own, Australian, commanders. Charles Brand, for example, initially struggled to gain the respect of his men. Bean recorded that upon taking command of 4 Brigade,
Brand ‘delivered an extraordinarily inept and egoistic oration’, becoming widely unpopular amongst his men.27 Despite this, his reputation recovered as his genuine care for the men under his command became apparent.28 Certainly, not all Australian officers were, by default, better at relating to the men under their command than their counterparts, but Brand’s example highlights salient features of Australian brigade command: that the approach to leadership of Australians could be unique, and that some
(though not all) commanders improved their performance and approach over time. Due to their nature, ‘commanding Australians was notoriously hard. They rarely accepted that an officer’s authority derived from the pips and crowns on his shoulders, instead obliging officers to earn their respect’.29 This approach in part demonstrates the tendency of the Australian soldiers to accept Australian commanders over their British counterparts. Australian commanders may have been more likely to endeavour to earn the respect of their men, maintaining an awareness that these were not regular, professional soldiers accustomed to military discipline.
26 John Connor, ‘The Empire’s War Recalled: Recent Writing on the Western Front Experiences of Britain, Ireland, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa and the West Indies’, History Compass, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1123-45. 27 A.J. Sweeting, ‘Charles Henry Brand (1873-1961)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 April 2016,
Learning Curve
Proponents of the learning curve theory of progression on the Western Front believe that Britain and her allies improved markedly and were ultimately able to defeat the Germans in 1918 by gradually adapting to a new form of warfare.30 However, as
Todman argues, this implies a steady learning process carried out consistently throughout all forces at the same time, which ‘can obscure the degree to which mistakes were made as a result of inability or incompetence, rather than lack of experience’.31 Jay
Winter and Antoine Prost argue that while the commanders did make major mistakes, these were actually steps on the way to ‘mastering a battlefield that no one had ever seen before’.32 Winter and Prost point out weaknesses in the learning curve theory identified by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson who believe that if a learning curve existed on the Western Front, it was an incredibly uneven one.33 Giving the example of the use of artillery, they note that on 1 July 1916, the targeted area was both too wide and too deep, making the barrage ineffective. Two weeks later, the objectives were limited and the success was greater. Despite this, the older approach which had originally failed was used again, and it ‘was as if there was progress in mastering the battlefield – and the enemy defences – but then it was nullified, by a return to older and inadequate operational ideas’.34
A major problem with the learning curve theory is the implication that the learning process was steady, with no margin for repeating past mistakes. Once a mistake had been made and rectified once, this lesson and its results would be visible throughout
30 See for example: Paul Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2016); J.M. Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’, in Gary Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 1997), pp. 93-116; Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front. 31 Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2005), p. 82. 32 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 75. 33 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The First World War (London: Cassell, 1999), pp. 75-79. 34 Winter and Prost, The Great War in History, p. 75. 9
the British forces at the one time if a linear learning curve is to be followed. The learning curve theory holds much more merit if the expectation of it being linear and steady is removed. Robert Stevenson argues that all of the British contingents did indeed undergo a learning process, but emphasises that it was not linear:
Despite recent criticism of the concept, the BEF did endure a ‘learning curve’, or perhaps it might be better to call it an ‘expandable-learning curve’ because it was not steady, consistent or linear. It rose and fell with the growth of the force, battles, casualties and senior leadership ‘churn’.35
Aimée Fox-Godden places the learning progression of brigade staff within the overall learning curve theory, emphasising that neither was a smooth process. Instead,
‘much like the wider learning process of the Army, the development and performance of the brigade staff was, at times, erratic’.36 Despite this, however, there is a line of progression. Fox-Godden draws on the example of operations transitioning from static to ‘semi-mobile’, noting that in the later stages of the war it became necessary for command decisions to be made on the spot. This led to verbal orders or very concise operation orders being common, with brigade commanders relying on the judgement and initiative of their staff officers to a far greater extent than in the earlier years.37 The improvement of Australia’s brigade commanders can also be seen in terms of a learning curve, in so much as it can be viewed as an at times erratic progression of learning and adapting to modern warfare. However, it must be noted that this learning progression was far-reaching. By no means was it localised to one level of command, nor to one
35 Robert Stevenson, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Vol. 3: The War With Germany (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 211; Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 36 Aimée Fox-Godden, ‘“Hopeless Inefficiency”? The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, in Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell (eds.), A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014), p. 155; Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’, p. 111. 37 Ibid. 10
force. It was a progression undertaken by the British forces as a whole, with the AIF largely following the pattern of the BEF.38
Applying and investigating the debate
The lions led by donkeys debate was founded upon the performance and reputation of British commanders, and remains primarily concerned with them. It is, however, applicable to the common perception of commanders in the Australian
Imperial Force (AIF) of the First World War. Without any moulding, it can be directly imposed on Australia’s own definition of talented, hard-working soldiers and blundering commanders – the Anzac legend. A consideration of this debate seemingly justifies the tendency of the soldiers to have a blatant disregard and dislike for authority figures; if the leaders were ‘donkeys’, why ought they be respected?
This thesis will endeavour to begin filling the gap in Australian historiography by focusing on the role commanders played in the First World War, to allow for a greater understanding of them as a group and as individuals. The notion of lions led by donkeys will be investigated in terms of how it can be applied to the Australian experience in the First World War. This will be done through examining the backgrounds, approaches, successes, failures and ongoing learning progress of
Australia’s commanders. Throughout this work, a small number of commanders will be used as case studies in order to investigate the progression and learning curve they underwent during their time on the Western Front, and indeed the conflict as a whole.
Due to the limited scope of this thesis, it is not feasible to investigate the backgrounds
38 For discussions regarding the learning progression of other contingents within the wider BEF, see: Douglas Delaney, ‘Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918’, Journal of Military History, Vol. 77, No. 3, July 2013, pp. 946-7; Stevenson, ‘The Battalion: The AIF Infantry Battalion and its Evolution’, pp. 64-5; Christopher Pugsley, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2004). 11
and experiences of each individual. However, this is not to say that the experience of one individual accurately reflects the experiences of his counterparts. As such, the conclusions drawn about each individual commander should not be interpreted as an attempt to definitively draw conclusions about their level of command or all men who held that position. However, while a small sample size, the cohort of officers was chosen as broadly representative while encompassing a fair cross-section of the group.
Individuals with various backgrounds have been selected as case studies. Through this group, trends and similarities will be highlighted regarding their experiences and professional progression during the war.
The focus will be on infantry commanders at the brigade level on the Western
Front. The Western Front has been selected as the theatre of focus as it was the major theatre of war for Australia, and therefore provides the largest possible spectrum for investigation. A brief account of the brigade commanders’ experiences at Gallipoli will be included, but the focus is not on this early campaign. Being only eight months in duration and the first time the majority of those involved had encountered modern warfare, it is not appropriate to use Gallipoli as a measure of the effectiveness of commanders. To judge a commander based on their first experience of the conflict would be erroneous and would provide an incomprehensive view of the commander, as they would inevitably develop with experience over time. A brief consideration this early experience has been included as it is important to understand the formative experiences of the men who would go on to command at the brigade level on the
Western Front in order to appreciate their initial approaches to command and gain a comprehensive understanding of their learning, growth and evolution throughout the war. 12
The infantry will be discussed without inclusion of the Light Horse or Flying
Corps. This is not a reflection of their significance, but rather due to the necessity to narrow the focus in order to illuminate discernible trends. These branches of the AIF had a different command structure to that implemented in the infantry, and were considerably smaller contingents. Hence, it is most appropriate to confine the focus to the infantry for the purpose of this work.
The brigade level has been selected as the focus due to the nature of command at this level. The brigade was the smallest formation to include a formal staff structure, with the brigade headquarters consisting of the brigade commander, a brigade major and a staff captain.39 The brigade commander, the role which forms the basis of this thesis, had a significant amount of authority and influence, while remaining directly in touch with the men serving at all levels beneath him.40 According to General Sir Cyril
Brudenell White, the brigade ‘is really the last command in which an officer comes into intimate contact with his men’.41
The first chapter will provide biographical details and statistics pertaining to the men who would go on to command an Australian brigade on the Western Front for a significant period of time. The statistics presented in the first chapter, and in the conclusion, are the author’s original work. Those who were in temporary command for short intervals have not been included in this assessment, with the focus being on those who were appointed permanent brigade command. The second chapter will provide a brief overview of the position of these men between the end of 1915 and early 1916,
39 Aimée Fox-Godden, ‘“Hopeless Inefficiency”? The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, in Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell (eds.), A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014), p. 140. 40 Due to the limited scope, an analysis of the positions of brigade major and staff captain is not included in this work. See: Paul Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2016); Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, pp. 85-88. 41 Horner (ed.), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century, p. 16. 13
focusing on the conclusion of the Gallipoli campaign and the subsequent movement to the Western Front. The third chapter will consider the mid-point of the war, discussing the progression of learning on the Western Front, and the final chapter will discuss how
Australia’s brigade commanders had progressed by the final stages of war in 1917 and
1918. Through this investigation of Australian brigade commanders, an even and comprehensive view will be formed, challenging the notion that Australian ‘leonine’ soldiers were led by donkeys. The intention of this is to give commanders their rightful place in Australian historiography, alongside the soldiers they commanded.
Who were the donkeys?
In order to gain an understanding of an effective commander, it is important to also understand what made an ineffective commander. Although it would be a fundamental mistake to cast judgement upon all military commanders of the period through consideration of a well-known minority, it would also be a mistake to dismiss the notion under the belief that it was completely unsubstantiated.
When thinking of a ‘donkey’ commander, Haig is one of the most commonly accused. His reputation has been perpetuated throughout modern popular culture, such as the television series Blackadder Goes Forth, which is considered the most influential representation of the ‘donkeys’ myth of the 1980s.42 .This is a continuation of the negative representation of First World War military leaders in popular culture, with extensive similarities being found between the generals of Oh! What a Lovely War and those in Blackadder Goes Forth.43 Despite this, it is also a good measure of how much attitudes had changed by the 1980s. Todman notes that sixty years beforehand, ‘such a savage attack on the generals would have inspired outraged objection’, and even in the
42 Finlo Rohrer, ‘How accurately does Blackadder reflect history?’, BBC News, 15 June 2016, cited 4 September 2017,
1950s and 1960s the kind of representation in Blackadder Goes Forth would have been disputed to an extent.44 In 1989, however, they were unchallenged; ‘any unease the audience felt was at the incongruity of laughing at doomed men … not at mocking the leaders who had won the war’.45
The condemnation and ridicule of Haig that is apparent in popular culture was not immediate. In fact, when he died in 1928, he lay in state for two days in St
Columba’s Church with an estimated 25,000 people visiting to pay their respects.
Significantly, this figure includes First World War servicemen, many of whom had been permanently incapacitated by their service. A First World War servicemen wrote to
Lady Haig after her husband’s death, telling her that he felt Haig’s passing as though it were his own father, and that he had been a friend to them, and ‘treated the private soldier like a human being, and made one proud to serve him in all matters’.46 In 1998, a campaign was held calling for Haig’s statue to be melted down and made into medals for the families of First World War servicemen who had been executed as deserters and mutineers. The Sunday Telegraph later published a scathing article by A.N. Wilson claiming that Haig should never have had a statue in the first place.47
David Lloyd George, British prime minister during the war, was among those who criticised Haig. Despite acknowledging that Haig was a ‘painstakingly professional soldier with a sound intelligence’, he did not believe that he had the ability to successfully carry out the duties he had been entrusted with.
He did not possess the necessary breadth of vision or imagination to plan a great campaign against some of the ablest generals of the war. I never met a man in a high position who seemed to me so utterly devoid of imagination.48
44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., p. 73. 47 Reid, Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig, pp. 2-5; A.N. Wilson, The Sunday Telegraph, 7 May 2000. 48 Anon., ‘War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 1928’, cited 10 September 2017,
Gary Sheffield notes that, despite his reputation, Haig held many of the assets necessary to be an effective military leader: ‘a sharp, if not outstanding, mind; capacity for hard work; willingness to learn; and an excellent grasp of the essentials of soldiering’.49 Haig’s place in popular memory of the First World War is indicative of the power of the ‘donkeys’ view of British officers, while his more complex place in the historiography suggests the degree to which such popular perceptions should be more closely examined.
Considering the anti-donkey
Peter Simkins argues that soldiers at the time, and historians since, have followed a tendency to emphasise the limitations of the role played by brigade commanders, rather than to focus on the individuals’ positive attributes and the opportunities they had in terms of commanding formations.50 John Gellibrand, a brigadier himself, even chose to focus on the constraints rather than the opportunities of brigade command. A decade after the armistice, he recorded that as a brigadier, one had
‘little scope beyond oiling the works and using his eyes’.51 In order to look beyond the limitations to put them in perspective, it is important to understand the qualities which contributed to someone being an effective commander.
General Sir Alexander Godley commented following the battle of Fromelles that
‘few people realise what a terrific strain is put upon a man in high command in these
49 Gary Sheffield, ‘The Making of a Corps Commander: Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig’, in Spencer Jones (ed.), Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2013), p. 111. 50 Peter Simkins, ‘Building Blocks: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade Level in the B.E.F.’s Offensive Operations, 1916-1918’, in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2007), p. 145. 51 Ibid. 16
desperate actions of modern warfare’.52 There must be an acceptance of the significance of the military leader’s role in order to gain an understanding of Australia’s overall First
World War experience. This should not seek to minimise or detract from the ordinary soldier’s role, but instead to level the playing field. Peter Stanley notes the importance of leadership amongst Australia’s focus on the individual initiative and feats of soldiers.
It was leadership, Stanley asserts, which earned the nation’s reputation in the First
World War. It was:
[L]eadership that got them to go forward, to dig and to stay put under the incessant bombardment … A man had to justify his rank and exercise it. He had to get frightened men to act, instilling in them a confidence in his power of command.53
Various qualities contribute to effectiveness of a military commander. Major
General Herman Landon, who commanded a British brigade and division during the
First World War, noted that the brigade commander ought to display ‘quick, practical methods of command, and a cheerful outlook’.54 Simkins describes an effective brigade commander as having been schooled to ‘accept discomfort and personal danger’, with bravery and a devotion to the needs of their men.55 Martin van Creveld notes that command is a function that must be exercised continuously if the army is to exist and operate effectively.56 In order to do so at the brigade level, one should be proficient across many different areas including administration, planning and tactics, and military knowledge.57 One should also display certain qualities, such as an approachable nature and a genuine sense of responsibility to the men under his command. Despite these desirable qualities, as Todman argues, the true test of any commander should not be his
52 Ibid. 53 Stanley, Bad Characters: Sex, Crime, Mutiny, Murder and the Australian Imperial Force, p. 40. 54 Simkins, ‘Building Blocks: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade Level in the B.E.F.’s Offensive Operations, 1916-1918’, pp. 159-60. 55 Ibid., p. 155. 56 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 5. 57 Delaney, Corps Commanders, p. 2. 17
personality or morals, or the boldness of his military manoeuvres; it ‘should surely be whether he wins or loses with the minimum possible losses to his own side’.58
Throughout this work, a number of Australians who displayed these characteristics will be discussed in an effort to analyse the quality of men commanding
Australian brigades during the war. Instead of immediately condemning military leaders for errors in judgement, losses and failures, it is important to remember the role of hindsight. As Liddell Hart reflected, ‘it matters little what the situation was at any particular point or moment; all that matters is what the commander thought it was’.59
58 Todman, The Great War, p. 83; Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 7. 59 B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber, 1943), p. 218. 18
CHAPTER ONE
1914-15: FIT FOR AFRICA AND NOWHERE ELSE? THE ORIGINS OF AUSTRALIA’S
WESTERN FRONT BRIGADE COMMANDERS.
‘The officers … represent the cream of our professional and educated classes, young engineers, architects, medicals, accountants, pastoralists, public-school boys, and so on’.
- General Sir John Monash1
Charles Bean believed that the selection of Australian officers ‘stood in marked contrast to the British preferment to social position and education’.2 Dale Blair concurs, noting that there is an acceptance of a British ‘officer-type’ which is depicted in the
Anzac legend as being a ‘public-schooled, class-conscious, textbook authoritarian incapable of understanding the character and requirements of the front line soldier’.3
Australian commanders, on the other hand, are typically seen as ‘being more informal, generally having risen from the ranks, and more attuned to the wants and needs of their men’.4 Blair indicates, in agreement with Bean, that this can be interpreted as being a result of a selection process for officers that differed greatly between Britain and
Australia.
In order to gain a thorough understanding of Australia’s Western Front brigade commanders, it is important to investigate their backgrounds, as many factors contributed to their rise through the ranks and their style of command during the war.
Significant attention tends to be devoted to the background of Australia’s First World
1 Dale Blair, ‘An Australian “Officer-Type”? A Demographic Study of the Composition of Officers in the 1st Battalion, First A.I.F.’, Sabretache, Vol. 39, 1998, p. 22. 2 Ibid., p. 21. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 19
War soldiers, while far less is written about the origins of the majority of their commanders. This chapter will address this gap in historiography through a discussion of the commanders’ backgrounds. An indication of trends and outliers among the commanders as a cohort will be presented, in order to describe what the typical origins of a First World War Australian brigade commander were, as well as illustrate the level of diversity among them as a group. Through understanding their background, it is possible to gain a greater understanding of their approach and style of command, which in turn will be valuable in terms of investigating their experiences on the Western Front.
Rural versus urban: the enduring debate
The typical Australian soldier, as romanticised in accounts of Australians at
Gallipoli, had his background as a bushman; tall, stocky and skilled with a rifle without the need for military training, bred for unfavourable landscapes, and with physical prowess far superior to that of his urban British counterparts. This view forms an integral part of the Anzac legend with its foundation in the Gallipoli campaign. Charles
Bean, Australian war correspondent and later Official Historian, undoubtedly chronicled the feats of the Anzacs and their suitability to the rough terrain. As Brian Dwyer notes, however, it was certainly not only Australian writers who claimed the bushman nature of Australian soldiers. Bean and his British counterpart, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, both wrote of the typical Australian soldier during the campaign. Bean believed that rural
Australia bred a high standard of soldier as ‘the wild, pastoral life of Australia, if it makes rather wild men, makes superb soldiers’, while Englishmen ‘lacked the resourcefulness required for any activity in open country’.5
5 Brian Dwyer, ‘Place and Masculinity in the Anzac Legend’, Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature, Vol. 4, 1997, p. 226. 20
Bean’s personal opinion regarding the differences between urban and rural soldiers was perhaps influenced by his own pre-war experiences. He had a tendency to revert to his rural background and experiences. Bean was born in Bathurst and spent a portion of his life in western New South Wales writing a series of articles on the wool industry, later compiling them into a book, On the Wool Track which was published in
1910.6 Bean’s personal background was evident in his work during the First World War.
Dwyer notes that in the Official History, soldiers are ‘likened to farm hands, their officers to station managers’.7 In Bean’s eyes, L.L. Robson contends, the AIF reflected
‘values which Australians drew from their contact with the countryside, and it happens that these values and strengths are the very ones which are called upon in a war’.8
However, Ashmead-Bartlett tended to romanticise the Australian soldier to a far greater extent than Bean, noting their spirit in his commentary on the landing:
I have never seen anything like these wounded Colonials in war before. Though many were shot to bits, and without any hope of recovery, their cheers resounded through the night … They were happy because they knew they had been tried for the first time, and had not been found wanting.9
Regardless of whether or not a man with a rural background made a better soldier than his urban counterpart, their predisposition to soldiering is an area which receives significant attention. Nathan Wise notes that working-class men, many of whom had rural backgrounds, were adept at soldiering due to their pre-war experiences.
He argues that they had a practical knowledge of their work which ‘often surpassed that
6 Anon., ‘Charles Bean’, Australian War Memorial, cited 2 October 2015,
of their superiors’, perhaps indicating he considers the majority of commanders to have urban backgrounds.10
Wise argues that while a man from an urban area may have found himself in completely unfamiliar territory during war, a rural man would have found the transition somewhat easier. ‘The links with civilian work … provided a sense of continuity and
“comfort”’.11 In their work on Germany during the Second World War, Walter Rinderle and Bernard Norling noted that during the period between the First and Second World
Wars, some European governments endeavoured to ensure many people stayed on the land filling agricultural professions. It was believed this would be advantageous if war were to break out in Europe again, as rural men were considered to make better soldiers than those from cities.12 Evidently, this view and focus on rural backgrounds is not isolated to Australia, nor to any one conflict, but instead can be interpreted as being a considerably widespread twentieth-century view.
While much is written about the origins of Australian soldiers, particularly with regards to rural Australia, far less attention is devoted to the origins of the commanders.
Bean indicates that, rather than every Australian who embarked overseas being a bronzed bushman, the AIF actually comprised a fair cross-section of Australian society;
‘the company commander was a young lawyer and his second in command a most trusted mate … a young engine driver and so on’.13 This illustrates a departure from the rhetoric found in the Anzac legend, and provides a far more balanced view of the diversity of backgrounds of Australians involved in the First World War.
10 Nathan Wise, ‘The Lost Labour Force: Working-Class Approaches to Military Service During the Great War’, Labour History, No. 93, 2007, p. 171. 11 Ibid. 12 Walter Rinderle and Bernard Norling, The Nazi Impact on a German Village (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), pp. 1-2. 13 B. Nairn and G. Serle, (eds.), Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 7 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1979), p. 228. 22
Charles Brand, at times an unpopular, but nonetheless efficient and successful brigade commander, was from a rural background. He was born in Ipswich,
Queensland, to a farmer. His personality and approach clashes with that generally expected of the typical bushman soldier. Brand was labelled as egoistic upon assuming command of 4 Brigade and Edgar John Rule, who compiled the 14th Battalion’s unit history, notes that he was often quite abrasive, drawing on the following example:
Some of our wild boys had been playing up in the village … After he [Brand] had them marched out in front of the crowd (some of them were in handcuffs), he started to tell us of his own exploits … One part of it we all remember well: “I won my DSO before any of you were on Gallipoli”, … When the parade was over, the old Brig. was just about the most unpopular man in France as far as our brigade was concerned. But it did not last long; his care for the men’s wants soon brought him to their confidence, and he became generally popular.14
Brand and his men had a positive relationship for the most part. During the failed attack on Bullecourt of 11 April 1917, Brand’s brigade suffered 2,500 casualties but his men retained their respect for him, instead blaming the British higher command for the failure and their losses.15 This attack, and Brand’s involvement in it, will be discussed in a later chapter.
Table 1.1: Rural/regional & urban demographics of brigade commanders
Background Number Percentage Rural/regional 11 34.38% Urban 14 43.75% Non-Australian 7 21.88%
14 Carl Johnson and Andrew Barnes (eds.), Jacka’s Mob: A Narrative of the Great War by Edgar John Rule (Melbourne: Military Melbourne, 1999), p. 24. 15 Ibid. 23
The above table presents evidence differing from commonly accepted popular history. There is a relatively even split between rural and urban backgrounds for brigade commanders, with urban backgrounds actually being more prominent. Additionally, there were considerably fewer brigade commanders from non-Australian backgrounds than one might expect, with only seven of the thirty-two having been born outside of
Australia. Of them, three (Nevill Smyth, William Lesslie and Ewen Sinclair-MacLagan) were seconded to the AIF during the war.16 Duncan Glasfurd had been seconded from the British Army to the Australian Military Forces in June 1912. At the outbreak of war, he sought to return to his own regiment, but was instead appointed by General William
Bridges to the 1st Division, AIF, as a general staff officer.17 Clarence Hobkirk initially served in the British Army during the First World War, but was transferred to command
14 Australian Infantry Brigade upon promotion, presumably owing to a lack of suitable positions available in the British Army, or a lack of suitable Australians to command the brigade. The remaining three – Colin Rankin, Henry Goddard and Evan Wisdom – had migrated to Australia in 1884, 1890 and 1891 respectively.18
It is reasonable to expect far more of Australia’s brigade commanders to have been of a non-Australian background, given the youth of Australia as a nation at the time. In fact, very few non-Australians were in command of Australian brigades on the
Western Front. Even so, it took the AIF three and a half years before it was able to take
16 NAA: B2455, SMYTH Nevill Maskelyne; Robert Likeman, Doctors on the Western Front, France and Belgium 1916-1918: The Australian Doctors at War Series, Vol. 3 (Kenthurst: Rosenburg Publishing, 2014), p. 28; NAA: B2455, SINCLAIR-MACLAGAN Ewen George. 17 Chris Clark, ‘Duncan John Glasfurd (1873-1916), Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 January 2016,
command of the majority of its formations and provide the bulk of its senior staff’.19
Even with Australians in command of brigades, they were generally dependent on the expertise of British staff, and throughout the war the AIF benefited from the secondment and attachment of British staff and specialists, even in instances when
Australians were in command of the formations and units.20 This is reflective of experiences in the wider BEF, with the CEF also dependent on the assistance of British officers, 214 of whom served in various CEF formation headquarters to fill command and staff appointments.21
The issue of class in the military
Prior to and during the First World War, class distinctions were a central element of British society, and this extended to the military.22 As previously mentioned,
Bean believed that the AIF approached the appointment of commanders better than
Britain. While the latter appeared to focus on class, education and social status, Bean saw the Australian approach as more egalitarian, providing ordinary soldiers with opportunities for advancement. ‘Anyone watching an Australian battalion on parade felt that in this year’s corporals he saw the next year’s sergeants and the following year’s subalterns’.23 Furthermore, Bean believed that ‘the absence of social distinction encouraged the initiative which was the outstanding quality of Australian troops’.24
19 Robert Stevenson, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Vol. 3: The War With Germany (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 173. 20 Ibid., p. 172; David Horner, ‘The AIF’s Commanders: Learning on the Job’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Army Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), pp. 108-109. 21 Douglas Delaney, ‘Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918’, Journal of Military History, Vol. 77, No. 3, July 2013, p. 935. 22 Anon., ‘Britain and the War: The War and the Changing Face of British Society’, National Archives UK, cited 25 January 2016,
Differing from Bean’s notion of an egalitarian AIF, Blair believes that Australia’s officers actually resembled Britain’s to a high degree:
The Australian ‘officer-type’ embodied the very characteristics of class and education synonymous with the stereotypical British officer. This similarity is little considered in descriptions of the AIF officer corps which, in the main, are based around the premise that most AIF officers rose through the ranks and were therefore more egalitarian.25
John Monash noted that while many Australian officers did indeed come from within the ranks, his experience with the 3rd Division illustrated that there was a clear trend among officers.
The officers (the great majority of whom I have promoted from the ranks) represent the cream of our professional and educated classes, young engineers, architects, medicals, accountants, pastoralists, public-school boys, and so on.26
Monash’s statement appears to reflect command appointments across the AIF.
While there does indeed appear to have been opportunities for advancement by rising through the ranks, those given the opportunity were from specific professional backgrounds and generally had a high level of education. The pre-war occupations and education of Australia’s brigade commanders will be discussed later in this chapter.
Indeed, at face value, the selection of officers appears as democratic and egalitarian as Bean believes. As Robson notes, apart from RMC graduates, no candidate was to be commissioned unless he had already enlisted, hence qualifying in a way that was fair and equal to all others. However, there were various loop-holes to this general rule. Firstly, men who had served as officers in the militia or the cadets prior to January
1915 were able to be given direct appointments as officers. Additionally, even when the only option was via enlistment as a private soldier, a select proportion of the recruits
25 Blair, ‘An Australian “Officer-Type”? A Demographic Study of the Composition of Officers in the 1st Battalion, First A.I.F.’, p. 27. 26 Ibid., p. 22 26
were deemed suitable to serve as officers and, as such, were immediately sent to officer training schools.27 It appears that Australia’s brigade commanders, for the most part, did work their way up through the ranks. However, with Monash’s statement in mind, as would logically be expected, those who were exceptional were chosen for promotion.
Education, previous occupations, skills and experience were all quite rightly taken into serious consideration.
Education
Prior to the outbreak of war, education was considered a very important element in the selection of British officers. In 1902, a representative of Woolwich, the officers’ academy for prospective engineers and artillerymen, commented on the importance of a certain type of scholarly background:
We would rather have a classically educated boy than one who has given his mind very much up … [to] physics and those kinds of subjects. We want them to be leaders in the field first … Power of command and habits of leadership are not learned in the laboratory. Our great point is character; we care more about that than subjects.28
Table 1.2: Education of brigade commanders
Education Number Percentage High school only 20 62.5% University 6 18.75% Military College 5 15.63% * Note: one commander did not complete a high school level of education and as such is not represented in the above statistics (hence the percentages do not equal 100 in this group).
27 Robson, ‘The Origin and Character of the First A.I.F., 1914-1918: Some Statistical Evidence’, p. 747. 28 Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-18 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003), p. 41. 27
Similarly, Australian brigade commanders of the First World War tended to be of an above average scholarly background. As illustrated in the above table, all but one of the commanders had completed their high school education. Raymond Leane was the only one of the cohort not to have completed high school. Leane left school at the age of
12 to work for a retail and wholesale business, a far more common trend during this period than completing high school and gaining a university level of education. During this time, many children, primarily from working class families, had to leave school at an early age to take up a trade.29 The fact that all but one of those who would go on to command Australian brigades on the Western Front completed high school is testament to the nature of officer selection. Evidently, Australia’s officers during the First World
War were well educated for their time.
Employment
Nathan Wise notes that of all Australians who served overseas during the First
World War, ordinary soldiers and officers, over two-thirds were of working class backgrounds.30 However, it must be noted that ordinary soldiers make up the bulk of this statistic as they inevitably form the largest portion of those who served overseas.
Australia’s brigade commanders had a range of employment backgrounds prior to the outbreak of war, indicating their diversity as a group and the range of experiences and skills they would bring to their roles during the conflict.
29 Anon., ‘World War I: Snapshot of Australia at the time of the outbreak’, ABC News, 19 August 2014, cited 2 October 2017,
Table 1.3: Pre-war professions of brigade commanders
Employment Number Percentage Regular/professional soldier 7 21.88% Teacher/professor 5 15.63% Businessman 10 31.25% Accountant 3 9.38% Clerk 4 12.5% * Note: these statistics are based only on predominant professions, rather than incorporating the pre-war professions of all brigade commanders (hence the percentages do not equal 100 in this group).
The above table illustrates statistics of the predominant pre-war professions of brigade commanders. Other professions included farming, engineering, surveying and legal soliciting. Australia’s brigade commanders undoubtedly came from all walks of life, bringing with them an array of skills and individual expertise which would be invaluable to their time in command on the Western Front.
Only seven of Australia’s brigade commanders were regular or professional soldiers prior to the First World War, adding weight to Bean’s interpretation of
Australian officers as having risen through the ranks. Service in the militia is not included in the statistics presented above, as this service was undertaken in addition to their civilian professions.31 Militia experience was different from that of professional soldiers, who had made the military their career.32 However, the vast majority of the men who would lead Australian brigades had militia experience (some in positions of command) and many had served in South Africa, in addition to their various professional backgrounds outside the military. Thus, by the time they reached brigade
31 Statistics concerning militia service are presented in Table 1.4. 32 For a discussion of the contribution of the militia to the AIF, see: Jean Bou (ed.), [Introduction] The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), pp. 1-5; Horner, ‘The AIF’s Commanders: Learning on the Job’, pp. 110-117; Delaney, ‘Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918’, p. 938. 29
command, despite the fact that they had not been regular soldiers, their pre-war militia experience ensured that they had a strong foundation of knowledge and experience, military and otherwise, with which to proceed.
Prior military service
Inevitably, prior military experiences shaped approaches to command. In terms of the First World War, the question arises as to the value of prior military service, as the type of warfare on the Western Front was remarkably different from any pre-1914 conflict and, as will be discussed further, it also shared very few similarities with the
Gallipoli campaign of 1915.33 Although a man who had combat and command experience could be considered more educated in terms of the military and battle planning processes, upon reaching the Western Front, he would still need to adjust his approach to deal with the problems raised by static trench warfare. While any prior experience should be considered valuable, it did not in itself prepare the individual for the challenges unique to the Western Front.
Table 1.4: Prior military service of brigade commanders
Type of service Number Percentage Militia 25 78.13% South Africa 11 34.38% Service for a country other 5 15.63% than Australia * Note: some commanders fit into more than one of the above categories, and therefore have been represented more than once (hence the percentages do not equal 100 in this group).
33 Robert Stevenson, ‘The Battalion: The AIF Infantry Battalion and Its Evolution’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), p. 48. 30
Of the eleven men who had served in South Africa, three did so as part of the
British Army: Smyth, Sinclair-MacLagan and Hobkirk.34 Despite this, given the role
Australian colonies played in supporting Britain during the Boer War, it is unlikely that they would have had a significantly different experience from the remaining nine who served as part of the colonial forces.
Spencer Jones notes that the critics of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) tend to dismiss prior wartime experience of commanders based on the grounds that an involvement in colonial warfare provided no valuable preparation for modern warfare.
Jones argues against this criticism, noting that leadership and decision-making skills are valuable in any type of warfare:
[T]he skills of leadership developed in these imperial actions, namely the ability to make quick decisions, lead men in dangerous situations and endure the experience of being under fire, were of universal value.35
John Keegan makes a comparison between British officers and their German counterparts, noting that the British had a far wider range of experience, both military and non-military, which he considered an ‘advantage which went far to compensate for the defects in their formal training’.36 Keegan agrees with Jones’ assertion that experience in colonial wars was of value, as it ‘gave them frequent practice in command of troops in action … [and] an excellent practical training in logistics’.37 Despite the
34 Ivan Chapman, ‘Sir Nevill Maskelyne Smyth (1868-1941)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 18 September 2017,
stark differences between colonial wars and the First World War, military experience of any kind was advantageous to assuming a position of command.
At the outbreak of the First World War, John Gellibrand already had a significant amount of military experience to his name. Deciding on a military career at a young age, his goal was to rise through the ranks of the British army.38 At the age of 17 he passed the Royal Indian Engineering College entrance exam, but due to bank failures in Australia he was unable to take the course. Not disheartened, Gellibrand entered the
Royal Military College at Sandhurst in September 1892, graduating at the top of his class the following year.39 He received the General Proficiency Sword for achieving the highest aggregate marks in the final exams, and a revolver for the best marks in drill, leaving the college in good stead for a future in the military.40 The following year,
Gellibrand was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the South Lancashire
Regiment.41 In early May 1898 he furthered his military education, sitting his captain’s promotion examinations. He earned distinctions in tactics, topography, law and organisation, achieving 90.15% overall.42
Gellibrand was involved in the South African war, commanding a company in operations during February 1900. He was a highly competent leader in terms of his administrative and tactical skills, as well as his ability to lead and inspire his men. He was dedicated to his soldiers and made an effort to hold conversations with them and assist them when necessary. Further to this, he was a good soldier in his own right, regarded as a marksman with the rifle.43 These skills, and the approach he took towards the men serving beneath him, evolved him as a military leader and gave him a good
38 Peter Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 9-12. 39 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., p. 18. 42 Ibid., p. 22. 43 Ibid., p. 24. 32
foundation from which to rise through the ranks to brigade command and, indeed, beyond.
In 1906, Gellibrand was selected to attend the staff college at Camberley.
During his time there, he recorded many criticisms of the manner of instruction he was receiving. Just six weeks in, he referred to the college as the ‘Fool Factory’. He noted that the majority of the students displayed little idea of how to learn, and the weaker ones had no chance of developing character. Others, he believed, were already too set in their ways and had a one-sided mind, never able to build a complete picture of any given situation. Gellibrand firmly believed and articulated that they would end up ‘still more one sided and convinced of the merits of their own views – fit for … Africa & nowhere else’.44 Brian Bond, while certainly not going as far as Gellibrand to condemn the staff college, concluded that the course provided was ‘far inferior’ to that provided at the Prussian Kriegsakademie (Prussian Staff College).45 Future staff officers were
‘moulded in the image of the scientific specialists’ with ‘little scope for studying the practical problems of military operations’.46 Also drawing on a comparison with the
Kriegsakademie, Keegan notes that Camberley and Quetta taught far less and ‘taught what they did teach less well’.47 The primary value, rather than being education, was actually social. ‘They brought together the most promising officers of their generation, ensuring that they knew each other well thereafter’.48
While posted to Ceylon as deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster general on a four-year term, Gellibrand became increasingly disillusioned with the British
44 Ibid., p. 39. 45 Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), pp. 42-43. 46 Ibid., p. 76. 47 Keegan (ed.), [Introduction], Churchill’s Generals, p. 9. 48 Ibid. 33
Army. He requested a transfer and expressed a desire to leave the service entirely.49 He appears to have been impatient for promotion and believed, perhaps beyond reasonable justification, that he was entitled to one above his colleagues. Illustrating his impatience, he wrote:
You think I should stay in the Army, so I would if I saw a reasonable prospect for advancement. I have held my present rank for 10 years and can’t expect promotion in the Regiment for another 7 or 8 years!50
Gellibrand resigned his commission and was gazetted out of the army on 27
April 1912.51 Charles Bean noted that it was a ‘constant wonder … how a man with his qualities and with staff college training could have been allowed – much less compelled
– to slip out of the British Army’.52 Peter Sadler argues that Gellibrand’s principal problem was that he clashed with the values held in the British army toward the end of the Victorian era.
He scorned the unprofessional behaviour of some senior officers, despised unreasonable instructions that showed a lack of appreciation of their outcome, disliked the archaic rituals of mess life, deprecated the role that class played in determining who should be favoured with desirable appointments, and condemned the general lack of understanding about the direction modern warfare might take.53
Arguably, Gellibrand’s negative experience placed him in good stead for a leadership role in the First World War. He had already formed opinions about the right and wrong way for an officer to relate to, inspire and lead men. His opinion about the
British army would follow him into the AIF, as would the many lessons he had learned throughout his already substantial military career. This is not to suggest that all, or even
49 Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand, p. 44. 50 Ibid., p. 46. 51 Ibid., p. 47. 52 A.W. Bazley, ‘Sir John Gellibrand (1872-1945)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 19 January 2016,
the majority, of those who would lead Australian brigades on the Western Front had experiences and opinions similar to those of Gellibrand. In fact, he was certainly among the minority in terms of his high level of experience prior to the First World War. In most cases, Australian brigade commanders were to learn and form opinions about leadership and command style as they went, whereas Gellibrand was by no means representative of this trend.
Table 1.5: Branch of service
Service Branch Number Percentage Infantry Only 26 76.47% Light Horse/Mounted 5 14.71% Rifles ANMEF 2 5.88% Artillery 1 2.94%
The above table details the branches of service the AIF’s brigade commanders were involved in. An overwhelming majority had only served in the infantry, although there were five who moved from the Light Horse to the infantry. Two had also served as part of the Australian Naval & Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF) in German- occupied New Guinea in 1914 prior to joining the AIF; William Holmes commanded the ANMEF, and Edward Fowell Martin remained in New Guinea as District
Administrator after the German surrender until February 1915, at which time he returned home and immediately enlisted in the AIF.54
54 Stevenson, The War with Germany, p. 31; NAA: B2455, HOLMES William; NAA: B2455, MARTIN Edward Fowell. 35
Gallipoli
The vast majority of the men who commanded at brigade level on the Western
Front had some involvement in the Gallipoli campaign, 29 of the 32 having been on the peninsula for a period of time. A considerable number of them were in command of companies or battalions during the campaign, gaining their formative leadership experience and skills before moving on to higher levels of command in France and
Belgium. This will be discussed further in the following chapter.
Table 1.6: Service at Gallipoli
Nature of Service Number Percentage Brigade commander 9 28.13% Battalion commander 13 40.63% Company commander 1 3.13% Staff officer (inc. junior 6 18.75% staff officers) Second-in-command 1 3.13% No involvement at 3 9.38% Gallipoli * Note: John Keatly Forsyth has been included in the above statistics twice, as a brigade commander and a staff officer (hence the percentages do not total 100 in this group).
Many Western Front commanders forged their reputations at Gallipoli. Thomas
William Glasgow served during 1915 as part of the Light Horse, which was deployed to fight as infantry for the duration of the campaign, and established himself throughout the campaign as a man who was keen to be involved and deeply resented leaving his men. Glasgow gained a very positive reputation at Gallipoli. George Hubert Bourne, who served with Glasgow in the 2nd Light Horse Regiment, recalled that he had a great energy and zeal which lent itself well to leadership. ‘In those early days, what chiefly 36
impressed us were his strict discipline, forceful personality and knowledge of his job’.55
While awaiting orders for embarkation to Gallipoli, Bourne recalled Glasgow ‘straining at the leash – the most impatient man at Heliopolis’.56
Glasgow distinguished himself at Gallipoli as acting commander of Pope’s Hill.
From this position, on 7 August, he led 200 men in an attack on Dead Man’s Ridge.
One hundred and fifty-four of them became casualties. Glasgow was among the last to fall back during this operation and when he did so, he carried one of his wounded men with him. The following day he was placed in command of the 2nd Light Horse and, as lieutenant colonel, held that appointment until the evacuation in December. When the orders to evacuate were received, Glasgow was on leave at Lemnos. He immediately applied for permission to return to his troops and supervise the evacuation, but this was denied. ‘On this being refused, he took “French leave” & simply went’.57 Glasgow’s determined nature and care for the men under his command followed him from
Gallipoli on to the Western Front and was instrumental in his later involvements, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Comparisons with the wider British Expeditionary Force
A thorough investigation of the backgrounds and experiences of those commanding brigades in the wider BEF is out of the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to acknowledge that the AIF was a part of this wider force and, as such, had some traits and experiences in common with other elements of the British forces, namely the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) and New Zealand Expeditionary Force
55 AWM38: Official History, 1914-18 War: Records of C.E.W. Bean, Official Historian [correspondence with George Herbert Bourne, 28-10-1936]. 56 Ibid. 57 Ralph Harry, ‘Sir Thomas William Glasgow (1876-1955)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 January 2016,
(NZEF).58 As Robert Stevenson notes, all contingents of the BEF were organised on
British models, their commanders and staff were trained similarly, and they were equipped with the same weapons.59 In fact, the dominion troops ‘represented the very best of the BEF’s tactical combined-arms system’.60
The background of the CEF and NZEF were also similar to the AIF. Stevenson notes that the CEF was ‘composed of similar material’ to the AIF, ‘especially its regimental officers, who were mostly militiamen’.61 In the early stages of the conflict, however, the Canadian commanders were superior to their Australian counterparts, with much of the senior leadership of the CEF being made up of British regulars.62 The
NZEF, on the other hand, initially had very few differences to the AIF. However, New
Zealanders eventually occupied most of the positions, which is something that it took the majority of the war for the AIF to achieve.63 The AIF did not have the benefit of the same solid foundation as the CEF and NZEF, of having experienced regular commanders in important positions.64 Despite some differences, Stevenson believes that the AIF was not overly unique and its relationship with and connection to the wider
BEF is closer than is often acknowledged.
Even those factors that might be regarded as Australian (manpower and command and management) were not inherently dissimilar. There was a strong crossover and sharing of personnel, training facilities and doctrine, which suggests that those things that were common outweigh the singular … the AIF embodied the best of the British military system.65
58 See for example: Christopher Pugsley, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2004), pp. 51-165; Delaney, ‘Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918’. 59 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 208. 60 Stevenson, ‘The Battalion: The AIF Infantry Battalion and its Evolution’, p. 65. 61 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 177. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.; This is similar to the experience of the CEF, in which British officers filled various command and staff appointments: Delaney, ‘Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918’, p. 935. 64 Ibid., p. 210. 65 Ibid., p. 183. 38
Conclusion
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, Australia’s Western Front brigade commanders came from all walks of life. There was no ideal background, which allowed for various effective individual approaches. Clear trends are visible, however.
Based on the statistics provided in this chapter, the typical man in command of an
Australian brigade on the Western Front had completed a high school level of education, had a professional background as a businessman combined with militia service, had served at Gallipoli (most likely in command of a company, battalion or brigade) and generally had not served in any branch other than the infantry.
In terms of the selection of Australian commanders during the First World War, it does appear that there was an egalitarian element to this process as Charles Bean believed. However, it cannot be seen as entirely egalitarian due to the scholarly, professional and military qualifications and experiences of those promoted to command.
These were such that it is clear that Monash’s view of them representing the ‘cream of our professional and educated classes’ also holds merit.66 There was certainly an opportunity for advancement through the ranks, as Bean believed, but these opportunities were presented to men of high professional and military value, as noted by
Monash.
With the backgrounds and prior military experiences of the brigade commanders in mind, their arrival on the Western Front and subsequent involvement can be assessed.
It is important to maintain a consideration of the backgrounds and experiences of these men when investigating their approach to their first engagements on the Western Front, and the evolution of their approach throughout the conflict. As has been argued
66 Blair, ‘An Australian “Officer-Type”? A Demographic Study of the Composition of Officers in the 1st Battalion, First A.I.F.’, p. 22. 39
throughout this chapter, all elements of a commander’s background shaped their attitude towards and approach to command and leadership. 40
CHAPTER TWO
1915-16: ‘I DON’T KNOW WHAT IS TO BE DONE – THIS ISN’T WAR’. FROM GALLIPOLI
TO THE WESTERN FRONT.
‘Monash seemed to have temporarily lost his head, he was running about saying ‘I thought I could command men’ … those were his exact words’.
- Major C.J.L. Allanson1
Australian involvement in the Gallipoli campaign ended with the evacuation of the last remaining AIF troops on 20 December 1915. Over an eight-month period at
Gallipoli, 26,111 Australians became casualties, including 8,141 deaths.2 The AIF had built a strong reputation for itself, and would further this on the Western Front. This theatre would present a different set of conditions, a new type of static trench warfare, a new enemy in the German soldiers and, for the most part, new higher level commanders. This chapter will address the position of Australia’s Western Front brigade commanders at the end of 1915 and in the early stages of 1916, including an evaluation of the prior experience of commanders and the value of this to their arrival in the main theatre of the First World War.
Western Front challenges
Prior to Australians reaching the Western Front, a stalemate had already firmly taken hold. Their first months in this theatre would see a considerable period of adjustment, clearly demonstrating the differences between the trench warfare many of
1 Peter Pederson, ‘I thought I could command men: Monash and the assault on Hill 971’, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), Gallipoli: A Ridge Too Far (Wollombi: Exisle Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 130. 2 Anon., ‘Gallipoli’, Australian War Memorial, cited 27 April 2016,
them had experienced at Gallipoli, and the type of trench warfare they would be exposed to over the next three years.3 The Western Front required a different approach from previous conflicts and other theatres of the First World War. For commanders who saw active service in South Africa, and to a lesser extent even those at Gallipoli, the fact that firepower equalled success went against everything they believed about warfare.
Paddy Griffith argues that the high command was not prepared to fight, or even accept, trench warfare or the problems it presented.4 The issue of communication, in particular, posed problems on the battlefields of the Western Front:
The First World War was fought in a technological hiatus; armies were too big and too dispersed for commanders to exercise voice control in person, yet radio communications were in the most rudimentary of states. Once the infantry went over the top, commanders could have little influence over what happened next.5
In order to assess the performance of commanders, it is necessary to take into account four fundamental points: the realities of the strategic position, the technological context of war, the totality of the First World War (particularly on the Western Front), and the means Britain and her allies had with which to fight.6 With these points in mind, any analysis of commanders must allow for a period of adjustment due to the vastly different conditions and the system of trench warfare that had been established on the
Western Front, which nobody could have been immediately and adequately prepared for at the time.
With the array of new technology and the necessity for updated and evolving tactics, many commanders were confused and alarmed by modern warfare. As the
3 Robert Stevenson, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Vol. 3: The War With Germany (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 74-79; Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 156. 4 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 5. 5 Gary Sheffield, The Somme (London: Cassell, 2003), p. 10. 6 Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2005), p. 74. 42
Western Front settled into stalemate towards the end of 1914, Lord Kitchener admitted,
‘I don’t know what is to be done – this isn’t war’.7 By 1916, the damage which could be done by new weapons, primarily high-powered machine guns and artillery, had become painfully evident, but some maintain the view that commanders were reluctant to abandon their preconceived ideas of war and adapt to the requirements of static trench warfare, including embracing new technology.8 Winston Churchill commented on the reluctance of commanders to alter their approach according to the nature of the warfare they faced. ‘If only the Generals had not been content to fight machine gun bullets with the breasts of gallant men, and think that was waging war’.9 Andy Simpson, however, disagrees with the claim that commanders were reluctant to adapt:
Given the interest Haig displayed in tanks, gas and even, at one point, a death ray, it seems unfair to say that his belief in the psychological battlefield led him to ignore new weapons.10
Undoubtedly, the First World War was a conflict centred on adapting to the challenges of modern warfare, innovating and developing new technologies. Any consideration of this conflict must take these challenges into account. This made the conflict, particularly in the main theatre, challenging for soldiers and commanders at all levels. With an understanding of the difficulties which commanders would face upon reaching the Western Front, and allowing for a period of adjustment, the Australian arrival on the Western Front in 1916 and their early involvements can be discussed.
7 J.F.C. Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History, Vol. 3: From the American Civil War to the End of the Second World War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956), p. 233. 8 Van Creveld, Command in War, p. 10. 9 David Horner (ed.), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 85. 10 Andy Simpson, ‘British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-1918’, in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2007), p. 100. 43
Staff officers
William Lesslie was attached to Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood’s staff during the Gallipoli campaign. He retained a staff position throughout 1916, and in
January 1917 he was promoted to temporary brigadier-general in command of 1
Brigade.11 Lesslie’s position as a staff officer during 1915 provided him with a valuable opportunity to learn from senior commanding officers around him. In this position he would have gained an insight into the approach of commanders, without having the first-hand experience himself. Despite receiving criticisms such as being labelled arrogant and out of touch with the realities of the front line, staff officers played a
‘critical role in the military leadership team’.12 Having staff officer experience, Lesslie arrived on the Western Front with experience in administration, and an understanding of the role of high level commanders.13 At this point, he was lacking field experience, which he would gain while leading 1 Brigade.
Light Horse
John Antill took part in the Gallipoli campaign as part of the Light
Horse. His involvement is principally remembered by his role at the Nek, during 3 Light
Horse Brigade’s assault on the area. Attacking over a small area, with the Turks having been warned of the attack by artillery shelling and subsequently having time to reorganise and prepare, the four waves of Australians stood little to no chance of success from the outset.14 The 10th Regiment’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Noel Brazier, urged Antill who was the brigade major in charge at headquarters, to
11 Robert Likeman, ‘Doctors on the Western Front, France and Belgium 1916-1918’, The Australian Doctors at War Series, Vol. 3 (Kenthurst: Rosenburg Publishing, 2014), p. 28. 12 Paul Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2016), pp. 1-2; Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, p. 85; William Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 78-81. 13 Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, pp. 78-81. 14 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, p. 145. 44
cease the attack. Peter Burness notes that ‘Antill was furious at the impertinence of
Brazier who had left his post to query orders that had been firmly given’.15 Brazier later claimed that Antill’s response had been to shout ‘push on!’ and the third wave was sent over the top. He again tried to halt the attack but, in the confusion, part of the final wave also went over the top, the attack achieving no objective and resulting in 372 casualties.16
Despite his controversial performance at Gallipoli, Antill rose to command a regiment shortly afterwards. In September 1916, he was transferred to command 2
Infantry Brigade, which was the formation he took to the Western Front.17 William
Glasgow was in command of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment during the evacuation of
Gallipoli. In March 1916, he was promoted to temporary brigadier and tasked with raising 13 Infantry Brigade, which he commanded on the Western Front.18 Later in the war, some soldiers condemned Glasgow’s movement from the Light Horse to the infantry, specifically his choice to take fellow light horsemen with him to his new command, placing them in staff positions.
I have no doubt he was a very competent officer. With a staff of trained and experienced infantry officers to aid him in his new posting, he would have been a very successful brigade commander … [But] he was allowed to bring junior officers and non-commissioned officers and install them as brigade major, staff captain, [and] brigade bombing officer … What else could be expected but a debacle …19
Peter Edgar rightly dismisses this somewhat as reflecting a mixture of bitterness, pride and independent judgement on the part of the individual soldier. Edgar attests to
15 Peter Burness, ‘By bomb and bayonet: the attacks from Lone Pine to the Nek’, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), Gallipoli: A Ridge Too Far (Wollombi: Exisle Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 119. 16 Ibid.; Anon., ‘Charge at the Nek’, Australian War Memorial, cited 2 March 2017,
the vindication of Glasgow’s decision to take light horsemen with him to infantry command, as he continuously received excellent service from these men.20
Given that the Light Horse fought as infantry during the Gallipoli campaign, the experience of Antill and Glasgow was very similar to that of men who led infantry units or formations during the campaign. Their approaches were similar, and these men were as well prepared for the Western Front as any of their counterparts.
Company and battalion command
James Heane, Edgar Herring and James Stewart were each in command of companies during the Gallipoli campaign. Heane reached battalion command in January
1916, with Herring and Stewart following suit the next month.21
Charles Brand, Robert Smith, Evan Wisdom, Carl Jess, James Robertson, Henry
Goddard, Edmund Drake-Brockman, Iven Mackay, James Cannan and Gordon Bennett were all in command of battalions during the Gallipoli campaign, and retained this command during the move to the Western Front.22 Raymond Leane took command of a battalion while in Egypt during early 1916.23 Similarly, Edward Fowell Martin had been the second-in-command of the 17th Battalion, and in April 1916 rose to command the unit.24 John Gellibrand was appointed to command the 12th Battalion on 4 December
1915. As this unit was resting on Lemnos at the time, Gellibrand joined them there. On
20 Ibid., p. 138. 21 NAA: B2455, HEANE James; NAA: B2455, HERRING Sydney Charles Edgar; NAA: B2455, STEWART James Campbell. 22 NAA: B2455, BRAND Charles Henry; NAA: B2455, SMITH Robert; NAA: B2455, WISDOM Evan Alexander; NAA: B2455, JESS Carl Herman; NAA: B2455, ROBERTSON James Campbell; NAA: B2455, GODDARD Arthur Henry; NAA: B2455, DRAKE-BROCKMAN Edmund Alfred; NAA: B2455, MACKAY Iven; NAA: B2455, CANNAN James Harold; NAA: B2455, BENNETT Henry Gordon. 23 NAA: B2455, LEANE Raymond Lionel. 24 NAA: B2455, MARTIN Edward Fowell. 46
1 March, having only been a battalion commander for a number of months, he was appointed to command 6 Brigade.25
Those who commanded companies and battalions at Gallipoli gained their formative experience of leadership in these positions, and in this respect the campaign played a significant role in their First World War experience and approach. Through their experience at Gallipoli, they gained an invaluable understanding of the responsibilities and limitations, and the frustrations associated with these limitations, involved in the role of lower level commanders. Company and battalion commanders are likely to have had experience leading their unit at the front line, giving them a first- hand perspective of the importance of information being passed down, and indeed up, the chain of command. Having been in a position where receiving, interpreting and applying orders was a common task, these men would have gained an understanding that orders flowing down from the brigade level needed to be concise, take into account the possibility of changing situations, and allow for initiative at the lower levels of command. When they reached brigade command, their previous experience was likely to prevent them from erroneously writing orders which attempted to comprehensively cover every possible eventuality rather than allowing for this adaptation and initiative at the battalion, company and platoon level. Giving subordinates the scope to act on their own initiative was essential for maintaining flexibility on an unpredictable battlefield.26
Additionally, their time in command of a company or battalion gave them a heightened understanding of the experiences and approaches common at the front line, assisting them to avoid the commonly accepted ‘donkeys’ trait of being entirely disconnected
25 NAA: B2455, GELLIBRAND John. 26 Garth Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 25-6; Aimée Fox-Godden, ‘“Hopeless Inefficiency”? The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, in Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell (eds.), A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792- 1945 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014), p. 145. 47
from and unfamiliar with the real situation on the front line.27 ‘Although it was an imperfect learning environment, those who command battalions [at Gallipoli] … were in a much better position to command on the Western Front’, having experienced modern warfare, battlefield leadership and unit administration on active service.28
Brigade command
Ewen Sinclair-MacLagan, Nevill Smyth, John Forsyth, John Paton and Duncan
Glasfurd were in command of brigades during the Gallipoli campaign, and would take their formations on to the Western Front in 1916.29 William Holmes was also a brigade commander during the campaign, although he was in temporary command of the 2nd
Division at the time of the evacuation. Shortly afterwards, he returned to his 5 Brigade, taking it on to the Western Front in April 1916.30
John Monash was in command of 4 Brigade at Gallipoli, and has received criticism for his performance there. During his brigade’s involvement at Baby 700, it was observed by both his superiors and subordinates that Monash was struggling. Major
Thomas Blamey indicated that reports received from Monash had given Birdwood and
Godley the impression that he was shaken by the events at Baby 700, which is not a trait that is associated with his leadership later in the war.31 Major C.J.L. Allanson, who was in command of the 6th Gurkhas, later reflected on Monash’s lack of composure during this operation:
27 For further discussion on Australian battalion commanders of the First World War, see: Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen. 28 Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 39. 29 NAA: B2455, MONASH John; NAA: B2455, SINCLAIR-MACLAGAN Ewen George; NAA: B2455, SMYTH Nevill Maskelyne; NAA: B2455, FORSYTH John Keatly; NAA: B2455, PATON John; NAA: B2455, GLASFURD Duncan John. 30 NAA: B2455, HOLMES William. 31 (Later Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey); Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982), p. 220. 48
What upset me most was that Monash seemed to have temporarily lost his head, he was running about saying ‘I thought I could command men’ … those were his exact words.32
Geoffrey Serle argues that much of the criticism Monash has received for his performance at Gallipoli, including that at Baby 700, was prompted by Charles Bean.
He claims that Bean had a prejudice against Monash as a result of his origins, and notes that the two men did not have a good relationship during the war.33 A more useful way of interpreting criticisms of Monash at Gallipoli is to recognise that they inevitably have some validity. Monash, like all commanders at Gallipoli, was facing a steep learning curve in terms of modern warfare and was undoubtedly under pressure to have his formation perform in their first involvement of the war. As Peter Pedersen notes,
Monash had no experience in this type of operation and, as such, cannot be expected to have perfected it in his first involvement.34 Monash would eventually progress to command the Australian Corps in 1918.
Inevitably, those who had commanded brigades prior to arriving on the Western
Front had the advantage of increased experience. They were accustomed to the level of command itself and may, understandably, have been more comfortable to make decisions and stand by their convictions than those who had only experienced lower levels of command. The next challenge for them was to adjust to the style of warfare, the conditions on the Western Front, and the necessity to develop new tactics.
A different baptism of fire
As stated in the previous chapter, a small number of Australia’s Western Front brigade commanders had no involvement in the Gallipoli campaign. Alexander Jobson
32 Ibid., p. 236. 33 Ibid., p. 251. 34 Pedersen, ‘I thought I could command men: Monash and the assault on Hill 971’, p. 130. 49
was appointed to the AIF on 10 February 1916 with the rank of colonel and placed in command of 9 Brigade. He was promoted to temporary brigadier-general on 1 May
1916, prior to departing Australia. Jobson arrived in London in July 1916 and his brigade trained on Salisbury Plain before moving to France in November. Upon arrival, they entered the Nursery Sector on 26 November 1916.35
Clarence Hobkirk took over command of 14 Brigade on 22 July 1916 while it was stationed at Fleurbaix. Hobkirk was originally part of the Essex Regiment before being seconded to the AIF. Little is known about his early involvement with the AIF, but he does not appear to have served at Gallipoli.36
Edwin Tivey was appointed brigadier-general on 3 February 1916, commanding
8 Brigade. At this time he was awaiting orders to move his formation to Tel-el-Kebir, and during March he was temporarily in command of the 1st Division. This appointment only lasted a number of days, and Tivey noted in his diary that it was revoked as a result of Brigadier General Godfrey Irving who approached Headquarters with a complaint based on the fact that he was senior to Tivey.37 Tivey’s diary entries do not indicate that he was upset by Irving’s actions or the subsequent decision, and he appears satisfied with brigade command. In June, Tivey and his brigade left for France. On 11 July, he recorded in his diary that three men of the 30th Battalion had been wounded in action, the first casualties of his brigade. The following day he noted that the first men of his brigade had been killed in action.38 A week later, Tivey would face great difficulty in keeping track of this, with his brigade participating in the ill-fated attack on Fromelles.
This action and Tivey’s role within it will be discussed later in this chapter.
35 NAA: B2455, JOBSON Alexander. 36 National Archives UK: WO 374/33800, HOBKIRK Clarence John. 37 AWM 3DRL/3058: Private Record, Major-General Edwin Tivey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 1866-1947 [1915-1919 diary, undated entry]. 38 Ibid., [1915-1919 diary, entries dated 11 and 12 July 1916]. 50
Those who had no involvement in the Gallipoli campaign gained important experience elsewhere during the First World War and beforehand. The conditions, style of warfare and tactics at Gallipoli were not consistent with what was experienced on the
Western Front. Thus their lack of involvement in this early campaign was not detrimental to their ability to command at brigade level on the Western Front. Any experience gained prior to reaching this theatre was valuable primarily because of the skills and development of tactics gained from it. In any case, it was necessary to continuously adapt to changing tactics, new technology, and a war of attrition after reaching the Western Front, regardless of prior experience.39
Introduction to the Western Front: The Nursery Sector
Following the regrouping and expansion of the AIF in Egypt during early 1916,
Australian forces began arriving on the Western Front. As previously discussed, warfare in this theatre was vastly different from anything the Australian soldiers and commanders had experienced before. In order to introduce them to the theatre, many spent time in what was known as the Nursery Sector. This sector was a quiet area near
Armentières where the men were to take the opportunity to adapt to trench warfare, a war of attrition, and the new enemy they would soon be exposed to.40 Charles Bean noted that the ‘part of the Anzac infantry which had served in Gallipoli at once observed many differences between the trench-warfare on the Armentières front and that to which they were accustomed’.41 These differences included attacks which took place primarily at night or during the dark hours of the early morning, the increasing importance of
39 Jean Bou (ed.), [Introduction], The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914- 1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1916), pp. 4-5; Robert Stevenson, ‘The Battalion: The AIF Infantry Battalion and its Evolution’, in Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle, p. 50. 40 Peter Burness, ‘1916: Australians in France’, Australian War Memorial, cited 29 April 2016,
artillery and fire-power, a larger no-man’s-land area, and the size of the front line itself.42
At Anzac the opposing trenches had at certain points run so close that hand-grenades were continually thrown by both sides: at Quinn’s Post for seven and a half months bombing had never ceased. At Armentières the German lines were nowhere nearly (sic) within bomb throw.43
The Nursery Sector proved effective in introducing the troops to the Western
Front without immediately throwing them into the middle of intense fighting.
According to Bean, despite rare interludes of heavy firing, this sector saw little action.
Bean noted the commanders situated themselves ‘half-a-mile in rear, and the other higher staffs, miles farther back’.44 This perhaps demonstrates a clearer view of their role on the Western Front than one might initially realise. In modern warfare, it is not wise for commanders to place themselves in a forward position which would unnecessarily put them in danger. In earlier conflicts, commanders saw it as their role to lead from the front, but in Europe during the First World War the implementation of this method would be deeply flawed. It was necessary for brigade commanders to situate themselves in a position close enough to see and communicate, but not so close that they were in immediate danger.45 As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, this was a balance many brigade commanders struggled to maintain throughout their time on the Western Front.
The sector remained quiet until June, giving many of the troops who reached the
Western Front in the first half of 1916 a valuable period of adjustment before becoming involved in fierce major offensives at Pozières and on the Somme. Bean notes that at
42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., p. 121. 44 Ibid., p. 124. 45 Van Creveld, Command in War, pp. 161-167. 52
this time, the casualties of I Anzac Corps were far lower than those of any other corps in the Second Army.
These tranquil months fortunately gave the commander and staff of the A.I.F. time not only for some training of the troops, but also for the very important task of establishing the system of organisation and control which was to endure until the force eventually returned to Australia, and upon which its efficiency both directly and indirectly depended.46
The worst 24 hours in Australian military history
The first major action with Australian involvement on the Western Front took place at Fromelles on the night of 19-20 July 1916. This action, which was a collaboration between the British 61st and Australian 5th Divisions, was organised as a feint, its objective being to draw German attention away from the Somme, encouraging troops to be diverted to Fromelles.47
The Battle of Fromelles48
Map has been removed due to copyright restrictions.
46 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 3, p. 144. 47 Ashley Ekins, ‘The Battle of Fromelles’, Wartime, Vol. 44, 2008, pp. 18-23. 48 Mike Senior, ‘Fromelles, 19/20 July 1916 – a success after all?’, Stand To: The Journal of the Western Front Association, No. 83, August-September 2008. 53
Edwin Tivey and Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott, commanded 8 and 15 Brigades respectively during this action. Elliott was pessimistic about the operation planned for Fromelles, but nonetheless believed his formation was prepared.49 In the days prior to the offensive,
Elliott demonstrated a quality which would become synonymous with his leadership style throughout the war - an unwillingness to proceed without questioning plans.
According to Elliott’s biographer, Ross McMullin, he acknowledged that he had only been on the Western Front for a number of days, but nonetheless had noticed problems with the preparations which concerned him enough to believe that ‘the attack had no hope of success’.50 His concerns were primarily that his men had too much ground to cover when crossing no-man’s-land, the guns had been rushed into position, and there was a lack of communication trenches.51
Charles Bean noted that the 32nd Battalion of Tivey’s 8 Brigade ‘occupied the most difficult position’, on the left of the attack, with the 31st battalion directly adjacent.52 The brigade’s position meant that their advance would be conducted with no cover for their left flank. This was identified as a problem by higher command and, as such, a British unit was diverted to cover this section and assist Tivey’s brigade. Roger
Lee draws attention to Tivey’s major advantage: at a distance of 200 yards, his was the closest formation to the enemy trenches, placing them in far closer proximity than any other attacking force.53 Although this was tactically a significant advantage, it must be acknowledged that it also meant they were placed in even greater danger with a heightened risk of being hit by their own artillery. Elliott’s brigade faced a similar issue, being in the rear position with the greatest distance to cross no-man’s-land. As a result, they were the first to commence the advance, leaving their jumping-off point prior to
49 Ross McMullin, Pompey Elliott (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2002), pp. 209-210. 50 Ibid., p. 210. 51 Ibid., p. 211. 52 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 3, p. 353. 53 Roger Lee, The Battle of Fromelles 1916 (Canberra: Australian History Unit, 2010), p. 211-212. 54
the end of the preliminary artillery bombardment and, as a result, risking being hit by friendly artillery.54 Bean confirms the difficulties the Australians faced with friendly artillery:
[W]here No-Man’s-Land was narrow, the Australians were now suffering severely through the falling among them of an increasing number of their own shells. Even during the morning the 8th Brigade had been hit by such astray shots.55
As Tivey’s brigade was in a vulnerable position, they would require support and protection. Lee contends that Tivey’s highest priority should have been to ensure continuous communication with the supporting formation, ideally with the appointment of a liaison officer. ‘That neither of these initiatives occurred arguably demonstrates the brigade planners’ lack of experience in attack planning on a scale of this magnitude.’56
Aimée Fox-Godden also notes that liaison with neighbouring formations was a vital responsibility of each brigade, particularly for the staff captain.57 That Tivey neglected to ensure his staff maintained effective liaison reflects his lack of experience, a lack of understanding of successful cooperation, and a lack of staff knowledge. Undoubtedly, the majority of brigade commanders and their staff were lacking experience not only in organising large-scale attacks, but also in dealing with problems raised by trench warfare. They were experiencing their introduction to modern warfare and, as such, it would be unreasonable to expect them to succeed with no errors of judgement in their first major action in this theatre. The overarching plan to which the British and
Australian formations were committed was the brainchild of Lieutenant-General (Sir)
Richard Haking, commander of the British XI Corps. Despite the fact that Haking’s objective was arguably misguided, Australian commanders at all levels had an input in
54 McMullin, Pompey Elliott, pp. 211-13. 55 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 3, p. 357. 56 Lee, The Battle of Fromelles 1916, p. 178. 57 Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, pp. 139-156. 55
the planning process, and therefore share the responsibility for the failure. As Lee argues, a lack of experience by all planners and commanders involved was detrimental:
[L]ack of experience in both the planners and the assault commanders … saw basic mistakes made: leaving the machine guns in the rear wave and not having prearranged localised artillery support were errors that would not reappear in later years.58
In fact, ‘there was even less room in brigade planning for generalities or imprecise detail. It was the brigade plan … that precisely determined the direction, shape and intensity of the attack’.59 As the attack at Fromelles had originally been planned for 17 July, commanders and planners at both the brigade and battalion levels had very little time to make sense of the plan handed to them, and to turn it into orders.
Tivey’s brigade order 23 was issued at 8:30pm on 16 July.60 The attack was then postponed by 48 hours owing to inclement weather, which allowed additional time for preparation, although the plan and orders were not significantly changed before the attack was eventually launched on 19 July.
Lee argues that there is very little information found in the Australian formations’ diaries regarding their involvement at Fromelles. In fact, he notes that of all the Australian formations involved, the only indication that the attack had commenced was a single-line entry in 15 Brigade’s diary.
Neither brigade nor battalion war diaries for the 8th Brigade attack include written orders, either for the original attack planned for 17 July nor for the final attack, which set down the final forward deployment time.61
However, both Tivey and Elliott’s brigade diaries contain considerable details covering their movements to the front line, subsequent battalion movements, an
58 Lee, The Battle of Fromelles 1916, p. 197. 59 Ibid., p. 167. 60 Ibid., p. 173. 61 Ibid., p. 177. 56
overview of the battle, and the aftermath. Tivey noted that his formation billeted at
Fleurbaix on 15 July, with the brigade headquarters moving there the following day as his battalions moved to the front line. On 19 July, he noted that the artillery bombardment commenced at 11:00am, with his troops moving to their allocated position. A brief overview of the battle is included, followed by a note on 20 July indicating their return to the original front line, and an additional note the following day indicating that his brigade had sustained an estimated 1,750 casualties.62
Elliott’s diary for 15 Brigade is slightly more detailed than Tivey’s in terms of the assault on Fromelles. On 17 July, Elliott recorded that the start-time for the attack was postponed twice before ‘finally the attack was abandoned for the day’.63 On 19
July, Elliott described the morning as ‘very misty’, noting that the weather prevented the artillery from firing until 9:00am, with the infantry’s start-time being two hours later. A brief outline of the attack was included and, additionally, appendix twelve of
Elliott’s brigade diary gives a more detailed description.64 Therefore, it is evident that the diaries of both brigades involved actually contained a satisfactory amount of information about their roles at Fromelles. Given the nature of these diaries and their role to track movements, involvements and casualties of formations, both of the brigade diaries provide considerably comprehensive information.
Tivey and Elliott both ignored an explicit divisional directive which stipulated that it was the brigadier’s responsibility to calculate and issue the forward deployment time for their own brigades. Instead, Tivey and Elliott both appear to have delegated this duty to their battalion commanders.
Consequently, while a movement time clearly was decided and made known to all the participants, there is no evidence in the
62 AWM4 23/8/8: Official Record, 8 Infantry Brigade war diary, July 1916 [entries dated 15, 19 and 20 July 1916]. 63 AWM4 23/15/5: Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, July 1916 [entry dated 17 July 1916]. 64 Ibid., [entry dated 19 July 1916]. 57
war diaries to show how this was done or how the calculations used to identify the correct time to move was derived.65
In addition to this, rather than following divisional orders by calculating and fixing the jumping-off time for the first wave of his brigade, Tivey copied the order verbatim into his brigade order, which may be an indication that neither he nor his staff had read the divisional orders or, at the very least, they had not read them thoroughly.
Lee draws on these examples as evidence of a lack of attention to detail by Tivey and his staff, offering the suggestion that it may have been due to the pressure of the impending attack, an interpretation which is particularly pertinent given that it was their first major involvement on the Western Front.66
The orders provided by 8 Brigade to its battalions were ‘vague and inadequate’.67 This was not unique to Tivey’s brigade. No Australian orders preceding the operation provided information regarding the ground itself, the enemy, or their fortifications. This is despite the fact that the relevant information was readily available at corps level and higher headquarters.68 This information should have been considered vital as the majority of Australians involved had not yet fought against German soldiers, or in this theatre.
Given the inexperience of both the local tactical commanders and of the troops themselves, such information would have been invaluable to developing the local tactical assault plans. Certainly, the brigade commanders understood the need for timely information concerning the enemy.69
65 Lee, The Battle of Fromelles 1916, pp. 177-85. 66 Ibid., p. 177. 67 Ibid., p. 194. 68 Ibid., p. 195. 69 Ibid. 58
Martin van Creveld argues that ‘orders should be clear and unambiguous; they must tell subordinates everything they should know, but nothing more’.70 Additionally, the execution of these orders must be monitored closely enough to ensure it is done reliably, but ‘not so close as to undermine the authority and choke the initiative … of subordinate commanders at all levels’.71 Fox-Godden notes that brigade staff of the First
World War actually tended to produce extremely and unnecessarily detailed operational and administrative orders, in an effort to compensate for a lack of experience. ‘This tendency to account for every eventuality often inhibited initiative and self-reliance on the battlefield’.72 This forms part of a top-down command system, which Raymond
Callahan agrees subordinate commanders acting on initiative.73
Excessively detailed orders were certainly not given at Fromelles, with extremely important information being neglected in the Australian orders, as has already been discussed. With Fromelles being the first major Australian involvement on the
Western Front, it is likely that early failures such as this shaped the way brigade commanders and staff approached drafting orders for subsequent operations. It may have been a case of over-compensation in the future while attempting to avoid a lack of information being provided to the battalions at all costs.
Despite obvious failures and errors in judgement, it would be erroneous to attribute the blame solely to Tivey and Elliott. They were inexperienced, particularly in this theatre of the war, and they understandably did not play the leading role in the planning process ahead of the assault on Fromelles. However, Tivey and Elliott should not escape blame entirely either. It is clear that both made mistakes ahead of, and during the fighting at Fromelles. Additionally, although the main planning was conducted by
70 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 8. 71 Ibid. 72 Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 145. 73 Raymond Callahan, Churchill and His Generals (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), p. 15. 59
the British, the Australian commanders had the opportunity to formulate elements of their own brigades’ plan after interpreting the orders handed down to them. While the
Australian brigade commanders are certainly not solely responsible for the failures at
Fromelles, nor could they have avoided the disaster due to the fundamental tactical errors of attacking this fortified line, they certainly hold a degree of responsibility for the actions and failures of their formations. This responsibility cannot be overlooked due to their inexperience on the Western Front, but their failure at Fromelles should not be used to pass judgement on their overall ability either. There must be an understanding of the period of adjustment and learning process that all commanders, and indeed their troops, would undergo throughout their time in this theatre.
A valuable insight into the approach of Australian brigade commanders can be gained by investigating early actions such as Fromelles. Tivey and Elliott both involved themselves heavily in the battle. Elliott in particular ensured he was close to the front- line and visible to the men under his command. McMullin comments on the benefit of
Elliott’s presence to his men: ‘boosting their morale was the presence of their brigadier, braving the front-line danger alongside them with a willingness shared by few equivalent commanders’.74 Although McMullin is undoubtedly right in the sense that
Elliott’s presence would have been received favourably by his troops, his actions also demonstrate a lack of awareness of modern warfare.75 By being so visible on the front line, Elliott was placing himself in an unnecessarily dangerous position. This is reminiscent of typical British approaches to command prior to the First World War.
Indeed, it was not uncommon for this approach to have been carried through to the First
World War, with the attrition rate of junior officers drawing higher level commanders
74 McMullin, Pompey Elliott, p. 216. 75 Van Creveld, Command in War, p. 167; J.M. Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’, in Gary Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 101. 60
closer to the front.76 Major-General William Bridges, for example, neglected personal safety and spent an excessive amount of time close to the front line at Gallipoli, which ultimately resulted in his death.
After the battle of Fromelles, both Elliott and Tivey were shocked by the losses their formations had sustained. Elliott decided to inspect his brigade for himself. Two decades later, Lieutenant Neil Freeman of the 58th Battalion recalled this: ‘I … will always have before my eyes the picture of Pompey … the morning after Fromelles, tears streaming down his face, shaking hands with the pitiful remnant of his brigade’.77
Charles Bean visited both brigades after the battle, also noticing the impact the experience had on the commanders.
Poor old Tivey looked quite over done – with eyes like boiled gooseberries … Elliott was dead asleep when I called … [When he] came out I felt almost as if I were in the presence of a man who had just lost his wife. He looked down and could hardly speak – he was clearly terribly depressed and overwrought.78
Conclusion
By the end of 1916, the majority of those who would lead Australian brigades had arrived on the Western Front and had witnessed the ferocity of the fighting which they were to experience for the next two years. Through an analysis of early operations such as Fromelles, it is possible to identify the early stages of the learning progressions of Australia’s brigade commanders during their time on the Western Front. Early involvements in this theatre provided the AIF’s brigade commanders with an understanding of trench warfare and attrition. From these involvements they became
76 Spencer Jones, ‘The Demon: Brigadier-General Charles Fitzclarence V.C.’, in Spencer Jones (ed.), Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2013), p. 252. 77 McMullin, Pompey Elliott, p. 224. 78 Ibid., p. 226. 61
more aware of the importance of effective communication, experience in interpreting and composing orders, and an understanding of the conditions on the Western Front.
Though early actions were plagued by inexperience and, to an extent, poor decisions at all levels of command, these experiences were the foundation for commanders to build upon in the future. Mistakes, successes and failures were all important in building knowledge and experience which would assist the brigade commanders as they progressed through the conflict. The following chapter will demonstrate the application of the lessons learned in early 1916. 62
CHAPTER THREE
1916-17: ADAPTING TO TRENCH WARFARE
‘Unfortunately we have to make war as we must and not as we should like to’.
- Lord Kitchener, Dardanelles Committee, 20 August 1915.1
The lessons learned by Australian brigade commanders in the early stages of
1916 would be applied later that year and the next, with Australian formations gradually adapting to trench warfare. This period encompassed an increasing ability of Australian soldiers and commanders to adapt to modern warfare and to implement new technology, weapons and tactics in order to do so. This chapter will address the changes in the approach of brigade commanders in the period of 1916 and 1917, as their learning progressed. This will be done through investigating the innovations made on the
Western Front during this period, and discussing the role of brigade commanders in significant battles in which Australians took part: Pozières, Mouquet Farm, and attacks on Bullecourt. By this means, trends in the growth and development of brigade commanders and their tactics will be highlighted.
Innovation on the Western Front
Following a non-linear learning curve, the AIF’s brigade commanders learned from their experiences, and applied those lessons in subsequent operations.2 Innovation is a key element of a commander’s role in warfare, and was particularly relevant given
1 Paul Guinn, British Strategy and Politics 1914 to 1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). 2 Robert Stevenson, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Vol. 3: The War With Germany (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 211. 63
the nature of the technology being developed and trialled during this conflict.3 Effective command in modern warfare required an acceptance and understanding of technology, with senior commanders and staff ‘pushing forward new weapons which they hoped would push them to victory’.4 First World War commanders are generally thought to have resisted innovation and new technology, as Any Simpson notes:
One myth of the Great War is that all senior commanders were resistant to innovation. Given their ready acceptance of … trench mortars, gas, and new and technically sophisticated artillery techniques, this view would seem to be inaccurate.5
Of course, this is not to say that all commanders were necessarily open to innovation, but some Australian brigade commanders certainly did focus on the development of tactics and the ability of their troops. Edwin Tivey, commander of 8
Brigade, expressed ideals of what he expected from his troops. He recorded in his diary that ‘a man without initiative, if not quite useless, is certainly not nearly as useful as he might be, and could hardly be depended on in [an] emergency’.6 A lack of initiative,
Tivey believed, could be traced from one of three sources: over-repression during childhood, natural indecision, or a lack of training; particularly in moral and mental discipline.7 It was the latter which he believed a commander should attempt to correct in his troops. Tivey was a firm believer in the importance of training and development, particularly encompassing tactics and technology, and he was extremely focussed on the military discipline and readiness of his troops. As he commented, ‘when you take your
3 David Horner, ‘The AIF’s Commanders: Learning on the Job’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), p. 108; Rhys Crawley, ‘Backs to the Wall: Australians on the Western Front, January – June 1918’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), pp. 269-270. 4 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 109. 5 Andy Simpson, The Evolution of Victory (London: Tom Donovan Publishing, 1995), p. 66. 6 AWM 3DRL/3058: Private Record, Major-General Edwin Tivey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 1866-1947 [1915-1919 diary, undated entry]. 7 Ibid. 64
men into action, all this discipline will repay you & your men, a thousand fold’.8 This view was not isolated to Tivey. Harold Elliott and William Glasgow also believed in the importance of continuous training to ensure the ability of their troops to adapt to the evolving requirements of war on the Western Front.9 Robert Stevenson notes that the 1st
Division, the longest serving Australian formation, spent approximately a quarter of its service engaged in training.10
Tivey had very firm views on what would and would not work in modern warfare, which were opinions he formed at a very early stage of his career. He noted that decisive success in battle could only be achieved through a narrow offensive, that half-hearted measures never lead to success, and that superior artillery fire should always be the first objective.11 This view of the importance of artillery is indicative of a commander who understood modern warfare. As Albert Palazzo notes, effective use of artillery was imperative as it could destroy the enemy’s equipment and personnel, and enable the infantry to take and hold objectives more quickly and safely.12 Tivey also commented that decisive frontal attacks historically offered a chance to break the enemy’s force in two, but that modern weapons reduced the chance of success in this manner.13 He evidently entered the war with an understanding of, and ideas about warfare, training and how to lead formations. As has been discussed in previous chapters, the brigade commanders on the Western Front were well-educated for their
8 AWM 3DRL/3058: Private Record, Major-General Edwin Tivey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 1866-1947 [1915-1919 diary, undated entry]. 9 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 162; William Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 29. 10 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 162. 11AWM 3DRL/3058: Private Record, Major-General Edwin Tivey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 1866-1947 [1915-1919 diary, undated entry]; Albert P. Palazzo, ‘The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, January 1999, pp. 56-57. 12 Ibid., pp. 57-59. 13 AWM 3DRL/3058: Private Record, Major-General Edwin Tivey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 1866-1947 [1915-1919 diary, undated entry]. 65
time, and brought an array of experiences with them to command. Their backgrounds, along with their understanding of the importance of continuous training and innovation, and their willingness to apply it, was an element of their effectiveness in brigade command. This would become evident when their troops became involved in major actions during 1916 and 1917.
Pozières & Mouquet Farm (The Somme Offensive): July – September 1916
The Somme offensive presented a major learning curve for the Allies. Gary
Sheffield notes that Haig and his Army commanders were united by one factor during this offensive: ‘that they had no previous experience of command at the level they were called upon to perform on the Somme’.14 This also reflects the early engagements of
Australian commanders on the Western Front, including the Somme offensive.
Although the offensive was extensive, the major Australian commitment was at
Pozières, encompassing Mouquet Farm, as part of the Reserve Army, commanded by
Lieutenant-General Sir Hubert Gough.15
Gough had begun preparations to take his principal target, Thiepval. To this end, the I ANZAC Corps was to take the village of Pozières, with the intention being to continue on to capture the high ground along Pozières Ridge.16 This landmark was strategically important, principally because it would provide an advantage in terms of artillery observation as well as a view into the German second and third lines of defence.17
14 Gary Sheffield, The Somme (London: Cassell, 2003), p. 25. 15 Meleah Hampton, Attack on the Somme: 1st Anzac Corps and the Battle of Pozières Ridge, 1916 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2016, pp. 31-32. 16 Meleah Hampton, ‘Hubert Gough, the Anzacs and the Somme: Descent into Pointlessness’, British Journal for Military History, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 2016, p. 47. 17 Ibid., p. 48. 66
Pozieres and Mouquet Farm18
Map has been removed due to copyright restrictions.
On 23 July 1916, 1 and 3 Brigades of the 1st Australian Division attacked
Pozières. All three objective lines were captured and, from there, the fortifications inside the village itself were assaulted.19 On the night of 28-29 July, an operation was carried out with William Holmes’ 5 Brigade attacking on the right, John Paton’s 7
Brigade in the centre, and John Gellibrand’s 6 Brigade on the left.20 Gellibrand’s brigade diary notes that the first objective was achieved ‘without difficulty’, and the second was taken just fifteen minutes later.21 However, soon afterwards, the 23rd
Battalion (6 Brigade) received word that 7 Brigade had failed to reach its objectives, and that its 26th Battalion to the right of Gellibrand’s formation was falling back.
However, no formal indication of this had been received by Gellibrand’s headquarters,
18 Anon., ‘Battle of Pozières’, Australians on the Western Front, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, cited 10 September 2017,
so no 6 Brigade units withdrew, instead continuing to consolidate their positions. A reserve unit of their own brigade was sent to protect the flank which had been left exposed by 7 Brigade, before continuing on to achieve the objective. Gellibrand’s brigade diary records that:
After it was definitely ascertained that the 7th Brigade were not making another attempt to carry the position it was not considered advisable to maintain our new line with such an exposed flank and orders were given to fall back along the line.22
In addition to the regular report which was submitted by 7 Brigade immediately after the failed attack, a supplementary note was included in an appendix of the brigade’s war diary in an attempt to explain the actions of the 26th Battalion. The report notes that it was ‘quite clear that isolated groups penetrated both lines of trenches’, prior to orders being received from an ‘unknown source’ for the battalion to retire.23
According to Paton’s report, ‘it is possible this order may have been given by one of the
Bn. Officers who did not return’.24 Paton then confirms that they connected with 6
Brigade following the failure, but this is not expanded on. The report emphasises that careful reconnaissance was undertaken, but it was a ‘difficult and complicated task’ to assemble the three battalions.25 In this respect, there appears to be a stark difference between Paton and Gellibrand. The battalions of Gellibrand’s brigade undoubtedly functioned very well together in this attack, even to the point of a reserve unit being brought forward to cover the flank left vulnerable by Paton’s brigade. Many factors may have contributed to this, but is difficult to overlook the influence of the commanders themselves. Gellibrand was far more experienced in commanding front-line formations
22 Ibid. 23 AWM4 23/7/11: Official Record, 7 Infantry Brigade war diary, July 1916 [Appendix 9: Attack on German trenches on the ridge north of Pozières by the 7 Australian Infantry Brigade on the night of the 28th/29th July]. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 68
than Paton, and appears to have had a brigade which was considerably more prepared for this attack.
In the three days which followed, the village was cleared of German troops, and the Australians occupied a ‘much-sought-after position’.26 Having sustained the loss of
5,000 men, the exhausted 1st Division was replaced in the line by the 2nd. This division then occupied the area for ten days, launching two attacks which pushed their line beyond the village.27 Throughout this period, several German counter-attacks had to be repelled.28 On 4 August, the three brigades of the 2nd Division (5, 6 and 7) went forward following a three-minute intense artillery barrage.29 6 Brigade’s diary notes that its battalions experienced a ‘considerable delay’ during their move from Sausage Valley caused by the 26th Battalion, part of Paton’s brigade, ‘fouling the trench’.30 It is significant that this problem was caused by the same battalion which had caused problems in the attack of 28-29 July. Paton and, indeed, his battalion commander, should have identified this as a significant problem to be worked on immediately. With a very short period of time between the two engagements, it would be unreasonable to expect major changes. However, there is no indication in the brigade’s diary that any training was undertaken to target the 26th Battalion’s directional problems after moving out of the front line following the 28-29 July attack.31 This should have been a priority for Paton, particularly considering that the same unit would be involved in an assault within the next week.
26 Hampton, ‘Hubert Gough, the Anzacs and the Somme: Descent into Pointlessness’, p. 50. 27 Mat McLachlan, Walking with the Anzacs: A Guide to Australian Battlefields on the Western Front (Sydney: Hachette Australia, 2009), p. 138. 28 Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought: The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 117. 29 Ibid., p. 118; AWM4 23/7/12: Official Record, 7 Infantry Brigade war diary, August 1916 [Appendix 4: 7 Australian Infantry Brigade order no. 50, 4 August 1916]. 30 AWM4 23/6/12: Official Record, 6 Infantry Brigade war diary, August 1916 [Appendix 19: Brief report on operations carried out on August 4th/5th 1916]. 31 AWM4 23/7/11: Official Record, 7 Infantry Brigade war diary, July 1916; AWM4 23/7/12: Official Record, 7 Infantry Brigade war diary, August 1916. 69
As part of the assault on the area surrounding Pozières Ridge, Mouquet Farm – located approximately 1.7 kilometres north-west of the ridge – was attacked on numerous occasions.32 The farm was approached by the ANZAC Corps in two movements before being attacked on 14-15 August, with the objective being to extend
British control of the area from Pozières Ridge to Thiepval in order to drive a wedge behind the German-held salient.33 Bean noted that the Germans quickly discovered that
Mouquet Farm was consistently being targeted and, as such, allied troops advancing through the narrow salient faced heavy, prepared machine gun fire.34 After the initial stage of the attack, the 14th and 16th Battalions of Charles Brand’s 4 Brigade were ordered to make as much progress as possible while the German lines were unsettled.
The formal advancement to Mouquet Farm would take place as part of the second stage in the following days. This was the final engagement of Australian troops in the
Pozières region, with Gellibrand’s 6 Brigade tasked with leading the pursuit of the
Germans to the Hindenburg Line. The second column of this pursuit was provided by
Harold Elliott’s 5 Brigade. Only small gains were achieved during the Australian operations around Mouquet Farm, and it remained in German hands at the time of the I
ANZAC Corps’ withdrawal from the Somme on 5 September. It was finally captured by
British troops three weeks later.35
There was no significant Australian involvement in the planning of the assault on Pozières Ridge, with Gough being primarily responsible. Meleah Hampton argues, the plan ‘showed an Army commander who had some education in recent techniques in
32 Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought: The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 119. 33 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 3: The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1916 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1940), p. 727; Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought: The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 119. 34 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 3, p. 731. 35 Ibid. 70
set-piece operations’.36 Having learned from previous experiences on the Western Front,
Gough constructed his plan around a lifting barrage, to provide protection for the infantry as they advanced.37 During a lifting barrage, the infantry moved forward immediately after the bombardment commenced, moving as close to the enemy trenches as possible. Then, as the bombardment lifted, the trenches would be rushed. Through this method, the time between the lifting of the fire and the infantry’s arrival on the objective was reduced.38 The winter of 1916-17 is considered the turning point in the artillery war, as commands began to draw upon the lessons of the Somme. At this point, counter-battery artillery became the ‘most essential’, and a corps-level Counter-Battery
Staff Office was established.39 From this point, the BEF gradually gained the upper hand in the artillery war. Successful counter-battery fire would prevent the enemy from undertaking defensive barrages, increasing the infantry’s chances of successfully crossing no-man’s-land.40 The evolution of artillery tactics is an element of the learning curve which was experienced on the Western Front. In addition to the successful implementation of counter-battery fire, the lifting barrage would eventually progress further as well, becoming the more effective creeping barrage.41
Gellibrand has been criticised for establishing his headquarters in Sausage
Valley, approximately three kilometres behind the front line at Pozières. As previously mentioned, brigade commanders faced difficulty in striking the right balance when choosing the placement of their headquarters.42 Peter Sadler notes that following the erroneous placement of his headquarters ahead of this action, Gellibrand ‘rarely afforded himself such safe luxury again, for it was almost completely out of touch with
36 Hampton, ‘Hubert Gough, the Anzacs and the Somme: Descent into Pointlessness’, p. 49. 37 Ibid. 38 Robert Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 168. 39 Palazzo, ‘The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I’, pp. 56-57. 40 Ibid., pp. 57-59. 41 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 168. 42 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 156. 71
events’.43 As Spencer Jones notes, the placement of headquarters was one of the initial problems facing commanders in this theatre:
The brigade headquarters needed to be close enough to the front line to enable control of the battalions, but if placed too close it was in danger of being overrun by German breakthroughs … [or] hit by German artillery.44
It was essentially a process of trial-and-error to find the right balance between being close enough to facilitate effective communication and to maintain a sound understanding of the situation as it unfolded, while also being far enough behind the line to ensure the commander was not in a position of unnecessary danger. Unfortunately, unreliable methods of communication and the heavy attrition suffered by junior officers at the front line created a ‘leadership vacuum’, inevitably drawing higher level commanders closer to the front.45
An analysis of the involvement of Gellibrand and Elliott at Mouquet Farm reveals some striking similarities between the pair. Both were considered to be ‘of marked character and courage, but each required holding’.46 As a result, General
Brudenell White tried to limit their independence in this operation by placing daily limits on each of their advancements.47 This was common in the First World War, as it was feared that battlefield confusion would make effective command from above impossible. To prevent this kind of situation, each unit and formation was ‘assigned a patch of front of standard length across which it was to advance’, which would be done slowly and deliberately towards the assigned objectives. Upon reaching the objectives,
43 Peter Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 95. 44 Spencer Jones, ‘The Demon: Brigadier-General Charles Fitzclarence V.C.’, in Spencer Jones (ed.), Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2013), p. 252. 45 Ibid., p. 253. 46 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 4: The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1940), p. 154. 47 Ibid. 72
‘regardless of the strength of the opposition facing them, [troops] were to halt, consolidate, re-establish communications, and wait’.48 This restriction on advances is an example of the constraints of the brigade level of command which, as has been discussed in previous chapters, Gellibrand struggled with. Although brigade commanders were able to act with their own initiative and experience, their divisional commander was ultimately responsible for making the decisions and, as was the case at
Mouquet Farm, brigade commanders could find themselves overruled. J.M. Bourne argues that leadership at the brigade level was not fundamentally different from battalion leadership. The responsibilities of battalion and brigade commanders alike were to display personal courage, to set an example and to uphold the welfare of their men.49 The similarities also extend in part to the constraints of command. Bourne notes that a brigade commander’s ability to influence operational and tactical planning was
‘strictly limited’, and they were often frustrated by a lack of scope for initiative, supporting Gellibrand’s belief that a brigadier could do little beyond ‘oiling the works and using his eyes’.50
The six weeks of fighting for Pozières Ridge, encompassing the attacks on
Mouquet Farm, ultimately did not achieve any material gains. Hampton argues that there was very little post-operation analysis following the capture of the village.51
Aimée Fox-Godden, however, notes that during and after the Somme campaign as a whole there was an ‘intense analysis’ of performance.52 ‘Lessons learned were
48 Creveld, Command in War, p. 161. 49 J.M. Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’, in Gary Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 99. 50 Ibid., pp. 99-101; Peter Simkins, ‘Building Blocks: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade Level in the B.E.F.’s Offensive Operations, 1916-1918’, in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2007), p. 145. 51 Hampton, ‘Hubert Gough, the Anzacs and the Somme: Descent into Pointlessness’, p. 47. 52 Aimée Fox-Godden, ‘“Hopeless Inefficiency”? The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, in Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell (eds.), A Military 73
circulated through memoranda and notes before codification in formal training manuals’, allowing for problems to be addressed.53 This suggests that problems were able to be identified as operations on the Somme continued, with the lessons being extrapolated and applied during the planning of subsequent operations. This does not mean that vast improvements were immediately obvious. It continued to be a process of trial and error, within a learning progression which inevitably took time. In fact, Gary
Sheffield argues that the pay-off of the lessons learned during the Somme offensive was not apparent until spring the following year, during the next major offensive undertaken by the British.54 The Somme represented a turning point in terms of the learning curve and progression of commanders on the Western Front. According to Paddy Griffith, by the end of the Somme campaign, the ‘truly effective individual commanders within the
BEF’ can be identified.55 By this stage, the ‘weak’ had been ‘weeded out by the higher authority’, and valuable experience had been gained in fighting a war of attrition.56
The First Battle of Bullecourt: 11 April 1917
With German troops beginning to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line, Australians were among the allied forces tasked with pursuing them. During this pursuit, several villages were taken and Australians faced fierce fighting against the Germans before reaching the Hindenburg Line on 9 April.57
Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014), p. 150. 53 Ibid. 54 Sheffield, The Somme, p. 158. 55 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, p. 83. 56 Ibid. 57 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 4, p. 283. 74
First Battle of Bullecourt58
Map has been removed due to copyright restrictions.
In support of the British offensive at Arras, General Hubert Gough
(commanding the Fifth Army, to which the four Australian divisions belonged) proposed an attack on the narrow section of the front between two strong points of the
Hindenburg Line, Bullecourt and Queant. Gellibrand’s 6 Brigade was to pass north of
Bapaume, while Elliott’s 15 Brigade would pass south. Bean notes that of the two,
Elliott’s brigade found itself in the most difficult position due to a limited access to supplies. ‘Elliott’s column … had seven miles of Somme mud behind it – Gellibrand’s was fed by the crowded Albert-Bapaume road’.59
General White’s view of Elliott as a man who required limitations once again came into play at Bullecourt. Elliott’s column of the advance ended up three miles ahead of the Fourth Army which was advancing to its south, creating a dangerous gap in the attack.60 Although this demonstrates Elliott’s ability to achieve results, it also
58 Anon., ‘The First Battle of Bullecourt’, Australians on the Western Front, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, cited 10 September 2017,
illuminates a flaw in his approach to command. Elliott should have placed an emphasis on maintaining an appropriate level of communication with the formations he was working alongside, in order to ensure no such gap was created in the advance.61 Despite his ability to have his own brigade move forward, this movement should have been slowed in order to avoid the vulnerability created by becoming isolated from the remaining formations. As a result of the gap which had been created, Major General Sir
Joseph (Talbot) Hobbs, commanding the 5th Division, forbade Elliott to advance any further until he was ordered to do so. ‘Despite orders, Elliott was with difficulty restrained from pressing further’.62 To an extent, it is understandable that Elliott wanted to continue his advance. As a commander watching his brigade’s success in isolation, it would be difficult, at face-value, to justify halting or slowing the progress being made, with the obvious inclination being to continue the move towards the objective.
However, it is important to note that in operations such as this, all of the formations had to work effectively together in order to achieve the principal objective; undeniably more important than the individual objectives of each segment. Hence, Elliott had a responsibility to ensure he did not isolate his brigade from the others, and his attempts to continue pushing forward demonstrate a flaw in his understanding of conducting complex operations.
Attacks on the village were planned to occur simultaneously but, due to delays of other formations, the Australians made their next attack alone. This was driven principally by Evan Wisdom’s 7 Brigade, which was now the advance brigade of the 2nd
Division, capturing Lagnicourt while the 15 Brigade supported its flank.63 Meanwhile,
14 Brigade took Doignies and Louveral, and 1 Brigade took Hermies and Demicourt.64
61 Creveld, Command in War, p. 161. 62 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 323. 63 Ibid., p. 324. 64 Ibid., p. 325. 76
With the need to maintain pressure on Bullecourt and the surrounding villages, the 4 and 12 Brigades led by Charles Brand and James Robertson, marched into position on 10 April. However, the attack was delayed and the troops were withdrawn, before re- occupying their positions the following day.65 4 Brigade commenced its attack at
4:45am on 11 April, achieving the first and second objectives, but it was unable to continue on to the third. After seven and a half hours of fighting, facing the pressure of repeated counter-attacks and the failure of the two brigades to join at the inner flanks, the Australians were forced to fall back.66 The withdrawal was effectively supported by a light artillery barrage.67
Despite the failure at Bullecourt, the 4th Australian Division had achieved something which had been believed impossible. For a period of time, it had seized part of the supposedly impenetrable Hindenburg Line.68 However, this was not done without any complications. Australians were supported by tanks during the first attack on
Bullecourt, and both brigade commanders were underwhelmed by their value and usefulness.69 4 Brigade’s diary noted that ‘no assistance was derived from the tanks as our infantry reached the enemy wire some time before them and were forced to push on’.70 A report compiled by the commanders of the 14th and 16th Battalions (4 Brigade) described the tank involvement as ‘useless, or – worse than useless’.71 The tanks were late to arrive and as a result, were also late getting to the jumping-off point. In fact, only
65 Ibid., p. 329. 66 AWM4 23/4/19: Official Record, 4 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [entry dated 11 April 1917]; Bean, Anzac to Amiens, pp. 331-332. 67 AWM4 23/4/19: Official Record, 4 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 4: Intelligence Summary – attack, 11 April 2017]. 68 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, pp. 333-334. 69 AWM4 23/4/19: Official Record, 4 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 5: Special report on “tank” co-operation in attack night of 10th/11th April 1917]; AWM4 23/12/14: Official Record, 12 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 11: Report on operations of tanks, 11 April 1917]. 70 AWM4 23/4/19: Official Record, 4 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 4: Intelligence Summary – attack, 11 April 1917]. 71 Ibid., [Appendix 5: Special report on “tank” co-operation in attack night of 10th/11th April 1917]. 77
three of the six tanks which had been allocated to 4 Brigade made it to that point at all.72
The report also draws attention to the fact that the tank crews were unprepared to attack alongside infantry, and appeared to know ‘nothing whatever about the particular operation they were to participate in’.73
The two leading battalions quickly reached the tanks that had moved forward, still some distance from the wire. The wire had not been broken by an artillery bombardment or by the tanks prior to the infantry advance, leaving them extremely vulnerable. Bean noted that, in this difficult situation, ‘hesitation would have been fatal, and their officers led magnificently’.74 This comment was made specifically regarding lower-level officers, but the plan and orders passed down by Brand to his battalions, and his efforts in training and preparing them should be acknowledged. The importance of allowing initiative among subordinate commanders is also significant in this instance.
Giving subordinates the scope for this, as Brand did, is ‘essential for the management of complex tasks and the maintenance of flexibility’ on the battlefield.75
The battalion commanders’ report concedes that the single tank which reached the objective did good work, although it was almost immediately put out of action by direct hits. The other crews, however, made ‘no effort’ to reach their objectives, with some halting despite their tanks being completely serviceable, and with others moving along the original jumping-off point without making any effort to go forward.76 One
72 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, p. 110. 73 Ibid.; Robert Stevenson, ‘The Battalion: The AIF Infantry Battalion and its Evolution’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), p. 54. 74 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 331. 75 Garth Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 25-26; Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 145.
76 AWM4 23/4/19: Official Record, 4 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 5: Special report on “tank” co-operation in attack night of 10th/11th April 1917]. 78
crew claimed that their tank ‘had caught fire, but gave no reason … personal safety and comfort seemed their sole ambition’.77
The failure of the two brigades to join their inner flanks was also attributed to the failure of tank support. Robertson’s brigade diary indicated that every attempt was made to join up with 4 Brigade, but there was a gap of 400 yards to cover which was the result of the tanks failing to reach their objective.78 12 Brigade also struggled as the two tanks assigned to deal with the centre and left of their attack were put out of action merely 20 yards into their advance. The remaining two were hardly more effective, stopping after 100 yards, at which time the infantry moved ahead, and the tanks ‘were not seen again on our front by the attackers’, and the brigade staff was certain that the tanks had not reached the Hindenburg Line.79 Raymond Leane, in battalion command at the time, noted that ‘[the] stakes were still standing and the wire strong. In fact my opinion is that they never tried to do so’.80
Given that tanks were a relatively new technology, still being trialled at the time of the attack on Bullecourt, it is not surprising that their implementation was not flawless. No new technology can be expected to be perfected immediately. The problem in terms of the tanks employed at Bullecourt, however, is centred on the fact that little planning or preparation appears to have been undertaken prior to the attack. The tank crews and infantry were unsure of how to support one another in a major attack and, as such, merely got in the way of one another rather than presenting as a unified force.
Cooperation between infantry and tanks would be developed and improved upon in subsequent operations, as the BEF continued its learning progression.
77 Ibid. 78 AWM4 23/12/14: Official Record, 12 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 7: Report on operations in the left brigade (Bullecourt) sector 4th Australian Divisional front, 15 April 1917]. 79 Ibid., [Appendix 11: Report on operations of tanks, 11 April 1917]. 80 Ibid. 79
Brand’s 4 Brigade suffered 2,339 casualties out of 3,000 men engaged in the attack, and Robertson’s 12 Brigade lost 950.81 The following month, Bullecourt would once again be attacked by Australian troops. In the early minutes of the attack, ‘disaster struck’.82 The lessons which should have been learned and applied from the first battle of Bullecourt failed to have a significant influence on the planning and execution of the second.
Second Battle of Bullecourt: 3-17 May 1917
The Second Battle of Bullecourt83
Map has been removed due to copyright restrictions.
Three weeks after the first failed attack on Bullecourt, the 2nd Australian
Division assaulted the same ground which 4 and 12 Brigades had attacked on 11 April.
At 3:45am on 3 May, 5 and 6 Brigades, led by Robert Smith and John Gellibrand
81 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 334. 82 Eric Andrews and B.G. Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited: The Australians in France, 3 May 1917’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, Vol. 15, 1989, p. 34. 83 Anon., ‘The Second Battle of Bullecourt’, Australians on the Western Front, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, cited 10 September 2017
respectively, began their advance.84 Gellibrand’s brigade order no. 88 indicated that his formation was to attack the Hindenburg Line using the leapfrog principle in cooperation with Smith’s brigade on their right, and the British 185 and 186 Brigades on their left.
This principle was new tactic being implemented throughout the BEF, which ensured the units involved would not become overstretched and could retain enough strength to consolidate a position once it was captured.85
With its flank passing by the village, Gellibrand’s brigade was fired on from the flank and the front. As a result, part of the formation was pinned on the wire, but its right and centre columns were able to continue their advance.86 Being partly sheltered by a sunken road which ran between the two brigades, they were able to seize part of the trenches of the Hindenburg Line. 5 Brigade’s diary notes that at 4:01am, the 18th
Battalion reported seeing a success signal from 6 Brigade and, at 6:20am, Gellibrand called to confirm that his brigade had reached their second objective.87 After receiving this call, Smith spoke to their divisional commander about Gellibrand’s belief that the next objective could only be gained if there was a reorganisation prior to an attack on
Reincourt.88 Throughout the attack, both brigade commanders appear to have been in relatively consistent contact with their divisional commander, as well as the battalion commanders serving under them.89 Despite this, Gellibrand noted that ‘a marked improvement is required in the telephone work between Brigade and Divisional H.Q.’90
Smith’s 5 Brigade was struggling early on in the attack. It had been unable to take its first objective, having been met by cross machine-gun fire after being halted at
84 AWM4 23/6/21: Official Record, 6 Infantry Brigade war diary, May 1917 [entry dated 3 May 1917]. 85 Ibid., [Appendix 1: 6 Australian Infantry Brigade Order No. 88, 1 May 1917]; Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 93. 86 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, pp. 338-339. 87 Ibid.; AWM4 23/5/23: Official Record, 5 Infantry Brigade war diary, May 1917 [entry dated 3 May 1917]. 88 AWM4 23/5/23: Official Record, 5 Infantry Brigade war diary, May 1917 [entry dated 3 May 1917]. 89 Ibid; AWM4 23/6/21: Official Record, 6 Infantry Brigade war diary, May 1917. 90 AWM4 23/6/21: Official Record, 6 Infantry Brigade war diary, May 1917 [Appendix 4: Report on the assault on the Hindenburg Line of Bullecourt, 3rd May 1917, p. 21.] 81
the wire entanglement.91 The British 62nd Division, attacking on 6 Brigade’s other flank, had failed to take the village itself but it had successfully seized part of the Hindenburg
Line. Some troops had then continued and reached the second objective. Bean notes that
Gellibrand, having established his headquarters at the railway embankment with an excellent vantage point (a clear improvement on this element of his command at
Poziéres) could see the trouble the British unit was having. However, ‘reports from the
62nd Division’s headquarters that it had taken Bullecourt were believed as against
[Gellibrand’s]’.92 As a result, Gellibrand was ordered to attack Bullecourt with one of his reserve battalions, the 25th. He obliged but, when the first platoons were unsuccessful, made the decision to call it off immediately.93 This action shows his competency and initiative, while also reflecting the constraints of his level of command.
Gellibrand followed the orders which had been given to him, but he certainly did not do so blindly. His common-sense, instinct and initiative were carefully balanced with his conformity to the chain of command.94
Eric Andrews and B.G. Jordan argue that, in the case of the Second Battle of
Bullecourt, British commanders were primarily responsible for the difficulties faced by
Australian troops, but that this was undoubtedly compounded by ‘serious weaknesses’ and errors in judgement of Australian staff workers.95 Their criticism is mainly directed towards the staff and soldiers of Smith’s 5 Brigade, contrasting with Gellibrand’s 6
Brigade who performed well during this operation. Andrews and Jordan draw attention to the confusion within 5 Brigade regarding orders, giving the example of the 17th
Battalion’s commanding officer who was concerned about the moonlight and incoming
91 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, pp. 338-339. 92 Ibid., p. 339. 93 Ibid. 94 Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2005), p. 83 95 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited: The Australians in France, 3 May 1917’, p. 34. Criticisms of staff officers of this period are common. For examples, see: Todman, The Great War, pp. 85-88; Paul Harris, The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2016), p. 1. 82
artillery fire, and decided to hold up his unit’s advance to the jumping-off point. As a result of this decision, the 18th Battalion, behind his unit, was blocked from moving forward.96 This inadvertently risked delaying the entire operation. However, Andrews and Jordan note that the jumping-off tapes presented an additional problem as they gave an incorrect line of approach meaning that the right flank risked separation from the main body. Realising this, the commanders altered the direction of their approach, but this in turn led to bunching at the wire.
When the barrage finally lifted, and the few surviving leaders tried to get the troops to rush the trenches despite the continuing heavy German machine-gun fire, the Australians hesitated, and somebody remembered the word ‘retire’.97
The execution of orders ‘by the men of 5 Brigade, compared with those of 6
Brigade on their left, was not altogether impressive’.98 However, Andrews and Jordan note that the blame should not be placed solely on the troops. They continue by focusing on the two brigade commanders: their experience, ability and approach. Again, the issue of the placement of headquarters came into play. While noting that Gellibrand placed his headquarters ‘very near the line’, Smith is criticised for establishing his in the village of Noreuil, which was approximately two kilometres from the front. ‘When disaster struck, he could not react as quickly as Gellibrand, and seems to have lost control of events’.99 Evidently, Gellibrand had learned from his previous error at
Pozières, and from that point ensured he was closer to the line to avoid becoming out of touch with events. However, despite belonging to the same division, Smith did not have the same approach to the establishment of headquarters by this stage of the war. In this
96 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited’, p. 35. 97 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 98 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 4, p. 542; Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited: The Australians in France, 3 May 1917’, p. 36. 99 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited: The Australians in France, 3 May 1917’, p. 36. 83
case, Smith had not benefited from the lessons learned by Gellibrand in previous experiences, making the same error which had previously been addressed by his counterpart. This supports the notion of a non-linear learning process on the Western
Front. The process was not steady or consistent and, the development and performance of individual brigade commanders could at times be erratic.100
There were failures in the planning and issuing of orders ahead of this operation, specifically in terms of the plans drawn up by Smith for 5 Brigade, which were ‘vague on crucial points and lacking in focus’.101 For instance, in his plans the position of the start line, as decided by Smith, meant that the battalions on the right-hand side were obliged to line up across a sunken road. Smith could, and indeed should, have
‘anticipated that in the dark the men would shunt to the right, using that road as their left boundary’, perhaps accounting for reports that the 19th Battalion began too close to the German lines.102 Smith’s error regarding the jumping-off point for his battalions could be attributed, in part, to his lack of understanding of the ground itself. Given that he was not involved in the initial attack on Bullecourt, he should have familiarised himself with the ground his men would be crossing. Gellibrand situated himself close enough to understand the ground and conditions, in addition to the situation as it progressed, allowing him to make a more informed decision, whereas Smith, through his own error in judgement, was lacking this advantage. As previously noted, Smith was approximately two kilometres away from his troops, placing him at a distance which essentially put him out of touch with the situation.
Gellibrand recorded that the organisation of the attack appeared to be over- specialised in duties due to the number of objectives and tasks. He believed that
100 Stevenson, The War With Germany), p. 211; Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 155. 101 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited: The Australians in France, 3 May 1917, p. 38. 102 Ibid. 84
‘thorough explanation’ of what was required to be done would suffice for most tasks with regards to officers, with the execution itself being left to the responsible leader on the spot, drawing on the importance of allowing initiative from subordinate commanders.103 It is likely that this contributed to Gellibrand’s decision to request a reorganisation before continuing on to the subsequent objective, as previously discussed, and demonstrates the level of experience he had to this point. Gellibrand had developed a clear ability to read situations, and highly effective leadership skills in terms of planning, organisation and critical thinking.
Smith, on the other hand, appears to have lacked vital information during the planning stage, which is attributable to a lack of communication between Smith,
Gellibrand and their divisional commander, Major General Nevill Smyth prior to the operation. According to Andrews and Jordan, Smith made considerable errors of judgement when organising fire power to support 5 Brigade. His orders mentioned four machine gun companies covering their advance in addition to supplying guns for the protection of the right flank. However, one of those companies (the 22nd) was not available to him as it had been given specific targets in Gellibrand’s orders.104 This is a significant error as it had the potential to leave a section of Smith’s advance unprotected and vulnerable. It could have been easily avoided through communication between the two brigade commanders and the divisional commander while planning and preparing for the offensive. By this stage of the war, it had become very clear that joint headquarters and joint planning was paramount to success in multifaceted operations such as the second attack on Bullecourt. It ensured momentum of the operation as all
103 AWM4 23/6/21: Official Record, 6 Infantry Brigade war diary, May 1917 [Appendix 4: Report on the assault on the Hindenburg Line of Bullecourt, 3rd May 1917, p. 21.]; Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, pp. 25-26; Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 145. 104 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited: The Australians in France, 3 May 1917’, p. 38. 85
commanders involved were aware of the intent and objectives, and could continuously share information regarding the progress of the operation as a whole.105 Two brigades and the additional supporting machine gun companies could not work together effectively without a clear and shared understanding of the objectives and plans of all formations involved.
Unlike Smith, Gellibrand’s ‘control of the fire-power available to him is impressive’.106 Demonstrating a thorough understanding of the difficulties his brigade faced in terms of the terrain and enemy positions, Gellibrand planned precise points for the machine-guns on his left flank to target until the artillery would take over.107 In order to identify precise targets and to understand where support needed to be concentrated, Gellibrand had a comprehensive understanding of the battleground and prepared his troops and their supporting artillery well. However, it must be noted that he was allocated more machine guns than Smith. In addition to this disparity in allocation, two additional machine gun companies were kept in reserve, rather than being allocated to Smith.108 This may be a result of the 2nd Division’s staff underestimating the danger which would be coming from the right. Although it was an error in judgement by staff at the divisional level, given Smith’s experience, he should have identified this as a problem and raised it with Smyth. The difference in the ability of Smith and Gellibrand to effectively plan and control fire-power indicates that this was something learned and developed by brigade commanders through individual experiences rather than being a division-wide lesson; further evidence of a non-linear, at times erratic, learning curve.109
105 Geoffrey Till, ‘The Gallipoli Campaign: Command Performances’, in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (eds.), The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 36. 106 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited’, p. 38. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Stevenson, The War With Germany), p. 211; Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 155. 86
On 17 May, upon deciding that Bullecourt was not worth holding, the German high command withdrew their forces from the village.110 Thus, the Australian objective was achieved, though at a huge cost and subsequent loss of confidence among the troops.111 Although the objective had been achieved, errors and failures in tactics were apparent. Bean’s view is that the blame for failures in judgement and planning should be placed with Gough and the British High Command, and Andrews and Jordan support this view. ‘They created a situation in which the cards were stacked heavily against the
Australian troops’.112 Pointing to a lack of learning from errors following the first attack on Bullecourt, they argue that the ‘primary error in the second battle of Bullecourt was exactly the same as in the first: to attack in a re-entrant … the late change of zero hour made matters worse’.113 This supports Robert Stevenson’s view of an ‘expandable learning curve’ which was discussed in the previous chapter.114 Although considerable learning, progression and adaptation had taken place by this stage in the conflict, errors were still made. The process was clearly not a linear or consistent learning curve, with mistakes continually being made even towards the later stages. Although the wider BEF was experiencing a learning progression, individual commanders at all levels still experienced an individual learning process, often at different rates.
In terms of failures in Australian command, Smith’s plan was ‘unimaginative’, and the orders handed down by Smyth’s 2nd Division ‘reveal slipshod thinking’.115
Further to this, the Australian corps command did not effectively defend the interests of their men against Gough, with Andrews and Jordan particularly noting that their ‘grasp
110 Ibid., p. 34. 111 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 4, pp. 542-544. 112 Ibid.; Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Bullecourt Revisited’, p. 43. 113 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Bullecourt Revisited’, p. 43. 114 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 211. 115 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Bullecourt Revisited’, p. 43. 87
of battle tactics was inadequate’.116 However, as previously discussed, the brigade commanders involved, particularly Gellibrand, did have a well-developed understanding of tactics. Despite this, their lack of communication with the divisional commander,
Smyth, during the planning stage prevented their opinions from being passed on. By this stage, commanders at the brigade level should have had the confidence to raise opinions with higher command when necessary, and for the benefit of the men under their command.
It appears that, although Gellibrand and his men performed satisfactorily and the objective was achieved, the Australians overall had not sufficiently planned or prepared for this operation, nor had they familiarised themselves with the dangers involved, or the terrain itself. In many cases by 1917, previous errors of judgement were being taken into consideration when planning operations. However, this is not to suggest that there were no lessons left to be learned. Mistakes in warfare are inevitable. Given that there was only a matter of weeks between the two attacks on Bullecourt, it is possible that a greater amount of time was required for mistakes to be correctly identified and strategies to be put in place to adapt future plans accordingly, than what the British and
Australian staff and commanders were afforded in this case. Additionally, the two attacks were carried out by different divisions. The 4th Division conducted the first attack, and the second was conducted by the 2nd Division. It is extremely likely that the problems faced by the 4th in April were not communicated to the 2nd prior to their involvement. As such, they were to conduct a very similar operation without the benefit of hindsight which the 4th Division would have had the second time around. This further strengthens the notion of an ‘expandable learning curve’ in which there were different
116 Ibid. 88
rates of learning and progression, as opposed to a clear, linear indisputable curve across the British forces.117
Conclusion
Andrews and Jordan note that between 1917 and 1918, a change took place in the Australian troops and command. By 1918, the Australians were regarded as ‘crack troops’, having gradually improved during their time on the Western Front.118 The operations of 1917 had revealed a growing confidence at the tactical level, with
‘commanders and staff demonstrating outstanding leadership and initiative’.119 With a focus on training and the evolution of tactics taking place during this period, Australians at all levels, including brigade command, were improving significantly. In the final year of the war, Australians would demonstrate a ‘new fighting ability’, partially attributable to the learning curve they had experienced thus far on the Western Front, and the evolution of tactics being implemented as a result.120 This reflects the overall position of the wider British forces by this stage. The Canadian Corps was developing during the same period, and being ‘well-schooled in British Army methods and staff procedures, easily kept pace with the increased tempo of operations’.121 Roger Lee notes that the
AIF did not fight in isolation, and its ‘development as a fighting force owed a great deal to developments and adaptations within the wider BEF and indeed beyond’.122 The BEF as a whole had harnessed new ideas, techniques and technologies, becoming more adept
117 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 211. 118 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Bullecourt Revisited’, p. 43; Jean Bou (ed.), [Introduction], The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), p. 5. 119 Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 151. 120 Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Bullecourt Revisited’, p. 43. 121 Douglas Delaney, ‘Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918’, Journal of Military History, Vol. 77, No. 3, July 2013, pp. 946-947. 122 Roger Lee, ‘The AIF and the Hundred Days: ‘Orchestration’ for Tactical Success in 1918’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), p. 277. 89
at conducting modern warfare.123 Improvements in ‘administration and infrastructure were vital elements in the learning curve that transformed the BEF from the clumsy organisation of July 1916 to the formidable army of August 1918’.124
123 Ibid, p. 278. 124 Sheffield, The Somme, pp. 163-164. 90
CHAPTER FOUR
A NEW FIGHTING ABILITY: FINAL AUSTRALIAN ACTIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT,
1917-18.
‘Tell us what you want us to do Sir … but you must let us do it our own way.’
- William Glasgow1
As discussed in the previous chapter, Australian forces were among those in pursuit of the Germans as they retreated to the Hindenburg Line from 1917. This chapter will discuss the final stages of Australian involvement on the Western Front from late 1917 to the armistice in 1918. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the evolution of tactics developed and employed by Australian brigade commanders throughout their time on the Western Front, and to gain an understanding of the progression of learning and development during this period. Through a consideration of the late actions on the Western Front, a greater and more holistic understanding of this progression will be gained.
As discussed in the previous chapter, innovation and training were at the forefront of thinking for brigade commanders on the Western Front. The focus on training and development continued through to late 1917 and 1918. During the winter of
1917-18, in between periodical stints in the front line, William Glasgow’s 13 Brigade undertook a considerable amount of training as per his orders. Glasgow requested that all battalions practise open warfare tactics, demonstrating an understanding that the style of warfare he had become accustomed to was going to change and evolve throughout the final stages of pushing the Germans beyond the Hindenburg Line.
1 William Glasgow to General Heneker ahead of the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux, cited from: C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 5: The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Main German Offensive, 1918 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1940), p. 574. 91
Training was collaborative, with the brigade staff in particular supporting the battalion commanders and staff.2 Glasgow found and subsequently sought to improve upon faults in his troops. The main issues he identified were: a level of inexperience among officers and non-commissioned officers; a failure to take advantage of ground, which was likely a result of the static trench warfare they had become accustomed to by this stage; a lack of covering fire; and the failure of officers and non-commissioned officers to direct and control fire, which was inevitably directly connected to their inexperience.3
Continuously training soldiers well was a challenge commonly faced by commanders.4
Robert Stevenson notes that it is often claimed that training was not an important task but, if this was indeed the case, ‘then experienced men such as Glasgow squandered a considerable amount of time’.5 The 1st Division, Australia’s longest-serving formation, spent approximately a quarter of its total service time engaged in training. Of this, about a quarter of the time was dedicated to the individual, with the other three-quarters to collective training.6 With such an extensive amount of time being dedicated to training in the midst of conflict, it was clearly an important element of service, and a focus of commanders. Glasgow’s persistent focus on training greatly paid off in the final year, as will be discussed throughout this chapter.
First and Second Battles of Villers-Bretonneux: March – April 1918
Australian involvement at Villers-Bretonneux encapsulates the lessons which had been learned and subsequently applied by commanders within the 4th Division by
2 William Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 27. 3 Peter Edgar, To Villers-Bretonneux: Brigadier-General William Glasgow, DSO and 13th Australian Infantry Brigade (Sydney: Australian Military History Publications, 2008), p. 186. 4 Garth Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 3. 5 Robert Stevenson, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Vol. 3: The War With Germany (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 162; Harold Elliott was considered one of the most effective commanders in terms of training. See: Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 29. 6 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 162 92
the later stages of the conflict. The actions of William Glasgow and Harold Elliott, in command of 13 and 15 Brigades respectively, demonstrate the new approaches which had been trialled and shaped by their earlier experiences and learning progression on the
Western Front.
Villers-Bretonneux7
Map has been removed due to copyright restrictions.
The village of Villers-Bretonneux and the surrounding area was strategically important to both sides. On 21 March 1918, General Erich Ludendorff launched the massive Michael Offensive and, in just two weeks, had driven the British line back 66 kilometres. This brought the Germans within striking distance of the village, which would in turn open them up to Amiens.8 Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg reflected upon the importance of taking the village:
7 Anon., ‘Map of Villers-Bretonneux’, ABC, cited 10 September 2017,
If it fell into our hands … the enemy’s field of operations would be cleft in twain and the tactical breakthrough would be converted into a strategical (sic) wedge, with England on one side and France on the other. It was possible that the strategic and political interests of the two countries might drift apart as a result of such a success.9
On 24 April 1918, the German push against the British 8th Division at Villers-
Bretonneux was successful. The British and Australian formations present attempted to counter-attack and hold as much of their line as possible, but struggled and were ultimately pushed back.10 The Germans continued their advance west towards Amiens, and the British High Command immediately ordered that this vital position be retaken as a matter of priority. Glasgow’s 13th Brigade, which was in Fourth Army Reserve at the time, marched from Querrieu to join III Corps, at which time it was attached to the
8th British Division for the duration of the operation.11 Elliott’s 15 Brigade was also to be involved in the counter-attack. Elliott had been on the sideline for the initial German offensive in the area and during the activity of the preceding fortnight, he had kept a battalion in the Aubigny line, a mile behind the village, with orders to be ‘continuously prepared to capture Villers-Bretonneux if lost’.12 As such, he had the advantage of an increased familiarity with the area and he and his brigade were prepared for an attack.
On the afternoon of 24 April, Glasgow and Major T.G. Clark, brigade major of
13 Brigade, were called to meet with General William Heneker of the British 8th
Division to discuss plans for the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux. Clark later reflected on what took place, noting that Glasgow vehemently disagreed with the plan
9 Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (translated by F.A. Holt), Out of My Life (Sydney: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1933), p. 256. 10 For a comprehensive examination of the involvement of the British 8th Division, to which the Australian brigades were attached for this operation, see: Alun Miles Thomas, ‘British 8th Infantry Division on the Western Front, 1914-18’, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, 2010, pp. 285-326. 11 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13th Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918]. 12 Edgar, To Villers-Bretonneux, p. 225; Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 5, pp. 540-541. 94
devised by the British commanders, and proposed his own plan instead. Clark’s recollection notes that Elliott agreed with Glasgow’s proposal and ‘that was the way the plan of the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux originated’.13 However, Charles Bean found no evidence to support Clark’s claim that Elliott was present during Glasgow’s initial meeting with Heneker, noting that Elliott himself made no reference to it in his records, and that Glasgow openly denied that Elliott had been there.14 Regardless,
Glasgow certainly was involved in the planning process ahead of the counter-attack on
Villers-Bretonneux. After his initial meeting with Heneker, Glasgow was disappointed with the lack of up-to-date information he was provided with and decided to travel to
Blangy Wood to ascertain the current situation for himself. After being informed that troops were holding Cachy Switch, he returned to attend a conference at the 8th
Division’s headquarters, which Elliott also attended, where the final plan was formulated. The 13 Brigade diary notes that no direct attack on Villers-Bretonneux was to take place. Instead, it would be enveloped by two simultaneous attacks which would come together east of the village with the ultimate objective of the original front line.
Elliott’s brigade would attack from the north in a south-easterly direction, and Glasgow decided to commence his brigade’s attack from a north-south line, which was believed to be clear of the enemy at the time. He would then attack eastwards, moving south of
Villers-Bretonneux.15 Heneker argued, claiming that this plan was impossible; not because of practicality, but because the corps commander had ordered the attack to be launched from Cachy itself. Glasgow protested and stood firm, noting that attacking across the enemy’s front was decidedly against the army’s teachings. Bean argues that
13 AWM38 3DRL 606/276/1: Records of C.E.W. Bean, Official Historian, 1928-1937 [extract from letter from Captain T.G. Clark, M.C.]. 14 Ibid. 15 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918]; Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 5, pp. 572-573; Edgar, To Villers-Bretonneux, p. 255. 95
by continuing with his own plan, Glasgow would ensure his right flank was protected and he would be able to protect the left by dropping troops in position throughout the advance.16 Glasgow’s insistence on being involved in the planning process, and in particular on presenting the merits of his own plan, clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of his leadership and understanding of modern warfare gained throughout the learning progression on the Western Front. His comments on the army’s teachings, and the undeniable practicality of his own plan, are testament to this learning curve in consistently developing new effective tactics.17 His willingness to put his opinion forward suggests a changing dynamic between brigade commanders and their superiors on the Western Front. J.M. Bourne notes that British brigade commanders had a limited ability to influence operational and tactical planning, but some individual officers
(notably H.W. Higginson, GOC 54 Brigade) ‘were capable of registering outspoken objections to what they considered ill-conceived plans’.18 While this was not necessarily a widespread trend throughout the BEF, the example of Higginson indicates that this should not be seen as a trait of Australian commanders specifically. It is possible that by this stage of the war, brigade commanders across the BEF had a greater tendency to involve themselves and voice opinions in the initial planning processes alongside higher level commanders.19
The information on which Glasgow had based his plans proved to be out-dated as the Germans had moved several hundred yards further forward. Aimée Fox-Godden argues that this was common, and generally due to poor communications and a centralised approach to command. A brigade major later recalled ‘the extraordinary
16 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 5, pp. 572-573. 17 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 211; Aimée Fox-Godden, ‘“Hopeless Inefficiency”? The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, in Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell (eds.), A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014), p. 155. 18 J.M. Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’, in Gary Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 101. 19 Ibid. 96
difficulty of obtaining information and finding out what was really happening’.20
However, brigade commanders and their staff had little option but to rely on the most up-to-date information available to them and, on this occasion, Glasgow’s choice proved wise despite the fact that the German positions had moved. If nothing else, it allowed for a simple approach which would be valuable considering the inherent difficulty of the attack associated with moving across unfamiliar ground at night.21 The risk of this kind of attack at night was considered, particularly pertinent given the lack of any previous reconnaissance, but it was noted that it was ‘absolutely necessary’ to rectify the situation and regain the village and surrounding area as soon as possible, before the German troops had the opportunity to reorganise and settle into their newly- gained lines.22
During the planning of the counter-attack, Glasgow also voiced his concerns regarding preliminary bombardments. He believed they served little purpose and argued against having one implemented ahead of the counter-attack.23 Glasgow’s concerns about preliminary bombardments were well-founded. In the previous years on the
Western Front this kind of bombardment had been used as a staple ahead of many infantry advances, and rarely had they had an overwhelmingly positive effect. In some instances, such as ahead of the attack on Fromelles when the Germans were in well- fortified positions, these preliminary bombardments did not disturb the line, but actually indicated to the enemy than an infantry attack was imminent. Indeed, ‘surprise might be enhanced by avoiding an obvious build-up to a crescendo’ in the preliminary
20 Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 148. 21 Edgar, To Villers-Bretonneux, p. 255. 22 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, p. 1]. 23 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 5, p. 574. 97
bombardments.24 Further to this, in many cases including at Bullecourt in 1917, these artillery bombardments also failed to break the enemy’s wire entanglements, thus providing very little, if any, assistance to the infantry advance.25 Glasgow’s awareness of the shortcomings of preliminary bombardments had undoubtedly been formed by observing failures such as these, and his insistence against implementing one at Villers-
Bretonneux demonstrates sound knowledge of the need to amend tactics accordingly.
His argument was successful and instead, artillery would assist during the advance by bombing the village, the railway and the Monument for an hour after the commencement of the offensive, before lifting its fire to a line well beyond that of the
British front.26
As has been discussed in previous chapters, the importance of maintaining effective and consistent communication with all formations involved in major operations had long since been realised by 1918.27 This was carried out exceptionally well during the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux. The initial conference held at the
8th Division’s headquarters on the afternoon prior to the attack meant that the British and Australian commanders who would be involved had the opportunity to discuss ideas and formulate their plans and orders together. 28 Although Elliott had most likely not been at the meeting between Glasgow and Heneker earlier that day, he did attend
24 Mark David Sheftall, Altered Memories of the Great War: Divergent Narratives of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p. 70; Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 145. 25 C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens: A Shorter History of the Australian Fighting Services in the First World War (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1946), p. 331. 26 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, pp. 1-2]. 27 Geoffrey Till, ‘The Gallipoli Campaign: Command Performances’, in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (eds.), The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 36. 28 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, pp. 1-2]. 98
this conference, and the two Australian brigadiers effectively represented the interests of their formations.29
Ahead of launching the counter-attack, Glasgow and his staff moved to share headquarters with Elliott’s 15 Brigade at the Blangy Tronville Chateau.30 This establishment of joint headquarters had proven to be an effective method of maintaining communication in previous actions, and it would allow Glasgow and Elliott to have access to and to discuss information coming in from the battalions within both of their brigades as the battle progressed.31 This was a vital advantage, and it was particularly important as the two brigades were expected to join their flanks as they moved towards their objectives.32
It was intended that 15 Brigade would take the first objective, putting it close enough to be in touch with the front line held by James Campbell Stewart’s 14 Brigade.
It was believed that this would act as a favourable launching point for the final assault on the village itself.33 Despite not being directly involved in the attack itself, Stewart’s
14 Brigade provided assistance to Elliott. At 11:45pm, Elliott’s staff contacted Stewart’s brigade to notify them that the 60th Battalion (15 Brigade) were unsure of their position.
As this battalion was meant to be moving towards their objective, 14 Brigade was asked to provide any assistance possible to find and redirect the battalion.34 At 12:15am,
Stewart received further word from 15 Brigade noting that the forward movement had
29 AWM38 3DRL 606/276/1: Records of C.E.W. Bean, Official Historian, 1928-1937 [extract from letter from Captain T.G. Clark, M.C.]. 30AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, pp. 1-2]; AWM4 23/15/26- 02: Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [General Staff Operation Diary, entry no. 67]. 31 Geoffrey Till, ‘The Gallipoli Campaign: Command Performances’, in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (eds.), The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 36. 32 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, pp. 1-2]. 33 AWM4 23/15/26-01: Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [entry dated 24 April 1918]. 34 AWM4 23/15/26-01: Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [entry dated 24 April 1918]. 99
not begun at 11:00pm as planned and expected due to the 60th Battalion’s loss of direction.35 This was rectified soon after, as around the same time his staff contacted
Stewart, Elliott confirmed in his own brigade’s diary that all battalions had since reported moving in close co-operation, and he believed they were nearing their first objective.36
At 3:20am, Elliott recorded that ‘our attack is reported to have been very successful and practically all objectives [have been] achieved. Enemy reported in great strength but fighting poorly. Our men killing him in hundreds.’37 Glasgow confirmed this, also recording that the village of Villers-Bretonneux had been cleared at this time, with the exception of a small pocket near the railway bridge. Three tanks were tasked to go forward to deal with this but failed to do so, with the mopping up instead being completed around 8:30 that morning by troops of the Durham Light Infantry.38 As several areas were mopped up, the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux was considered a success, with the area back in the hands of the Allies.39
An appendix in Glasgow’s brigade diary contains a report he compiled after the counter-attack was complete. In this report, he reflected on the usefulness of trench mortars and tanks. He noted that the nature of the fighting during this period meant that there was little to no scope for the use of light trench mortars. Despite this, a battery was sent to Cachy Switch to be on hand for the battalion commanders to use as required, and on the night of 25 April, two mortars were mounted near the railway station to defend it from any potential German attempt to regain the position. However, the only targets
35 AWM4 23/14/25: Official Record, 14th Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [entry dated 25 April 1918]. 36 AWM4 23/15/26-01: Official Record, 15th Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [entry dated 24 April 1918]. 37 AWM4 25/15/26-02: Official Record, 15th Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [General Staff Operation Diary, entry no. 98]. 38 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13th Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, p. 3]. 39 Ibid. 100
which presented themselves were out of range.40 The availability of trench mortars during the counter-attack shows an interesting balance between warfare as it had existed on the Western Front for the previous three years, and the semi-mobile warfare which was evolving at this point in 1918 as the Allies pushed the Germans beyond their final point of defence.41 Glasgow’s remark that the nature of fighting during this period lacked scope for trench mortars indicates that he was certainly aware of the limits of certain technologies which, despite having been very useful in previous years, were not practical for extensive use in the final stages of the war. Making the trench mortars available for use in the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux was a positive move because with the situation changing minute to minute, there was certainly the potential that they may have been useful at some point. Not forcing the use of these trench mortars when it was clear that they would not be useful was equally as positive, and shows the willingness to accept the need for progression of tactics and understanding of new technology on the part of all commanders involved.42
By this stage of the war, the British forces were becoming more adept at working with tank support, and the potential of tanks was being realised. However,
Glasgow noted that the usefulness of tanks in this instance was uneven. Their involvement was valuable, but it appeared to be contingent on specific circumstances.43
This observation is strikingly similar to that made by Charles Brand the previous year after his brigade’s involvement at Bullecourt.44 Glasgow praised the tanks which had been detailed to mop up the Bois D’Aquenne area on the morning of 25 April, but also
40 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, p.5.] 41 Garth Pratten, ‘The AIF’s Artillery and Mortars on the Western Front’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), pp. 99-101. 42 Ibid. 43 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, p.5]. 44 AWM4 23/4/19: Official Record, 4 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 5: Special report on “tank” co-operation in attack night of 10th/11th April 1917]. 101
noted that the three tanks which had been tasked with mopping up Railway Arch and
Monument Wood ‘failed to put in any appearance at all’.45 Glasgow was certainly not as critical of the tanks and their crews as Gellibrand had been the previous year, but nonetheless recorded that ‘the value of tanks seems to depend largely on the courage and resource of the crew’.46 It appears that the tanks themselves were useful by the final year of the war, but the extent of their usefulness still relied heavily on the quality of men who crewed them, in addition to the mechanical reliability of the tanks themselves.
This adds further weight to the notion of an expandable learning curve, and Fox-
Godden’s assertion that both the wider learning process and the development and performance of individuals was, at times, ‘erratic’.47 When considering a learning curve taking place throughout the BEF during the First World War, the human factor must be remembered. Despite the improvements of technology and the theory of tactics, the possibility of human error is inherent to war.
Although the final objective as set out in the original order was not achieved, the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux by the 13th and 15th Brigades should be considered to have been successful. The German troops were pushed out of the village, and the
Allies regained the strategic advantage that this area offered. Glasgow noted that ‘there seems little doubt that [the enemy] did not expect the counter-attack, and … was still somewhat disorganised’, justifying the decision to attack over unfamiliar ground at night in order to capitalise on the disorganisation of German troops.48 The success of this attack highlights major improvements in the Australian troops, commanders and tactics. Glasgow and Elliott worked very well together, particularly in terms of
45 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, p.5]. 46 Ibid. 47 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 211; Fox-Godden, ‘The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918’, p. 155. 48 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, p.6]. 102
collaboration of plans and communication, demonstrating a shared evolution of brigade commanders within the 4th Division. Their significant level of involvement from the outset and throughout is indicative of their progression in terms of initiative, competence and understanding of their role.
Breaking the Hindenburg Line: 29 September – 5 October 1918
Hindenburg Line49
Map has been removed due to copyright restrictions.
By September 1918, the German troops had successfully retreated to their final point of defence, the Hindenburg Line, with Australian troops among those in pursuit.
This period of fighting allowed for more mobile operations than had previously been possible due to static trench warfare. The ability of the commanders involved to adapt to
49 Anon., ‘The Hindenburg Line’, Australians on the Western Front, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, cited 10 September 2017,
this evolving warfare is a continuation of the learning curve on the Western Front.
Having become accustomed to and adept at fighting static trench warfare, the situation was now evolving to more open warfare which presented a new set of challenges.50 The next step for the Allies was to break the German point of defence, which they had successfully penetrated late in the previous year. A preliminary attack took place on 18
September 1918, resulting in troops of General John Monash’s Australian Corps reaching the first part of the Hindenburg Line. On 29 September it was finally definitively broken, with fighting and consolidation taking place up until 5 October.51
In planning the main offensive, Monash proposed an attack over the bridge which would be conducted in two stages. The first stage, which he saw as straightforward, would be conducted by the American 27th and 30th Divisions under the support of a creeping barrage, which by this stage was considered a very effective use of artillery support.52 The Americans were to make an advance of approximately 4,400 yards to seize the Hindenburg Line, the tunnel mound and the support line. In addition to the creeping barrage, the Americans would also have the support of sixty tanks.53 The second stage was to take place without the support of an artillery barrage and Bean noted that as a result of this, it would require ‘more experienced troops’.54 For this stage, the brigades of the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions were selected. These divisions were both commanded by men who had formerly commanded Australian brigades, John
Gellibrand and Talbot Hobbs respectively. They would be supported by thirty tanks to
50 David Horner, ‘The AIF’s Commanders: Learning on the Job’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), pp. 120-121. 51 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6: The Australian Imperial Force during the Allied Offensive, 1918 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1942), p. 945. 52 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 168. 53 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6, p. 945. 54 Ibid. 104
make an advance past that of the Americans, engaging in open warfare to seize the
Beaurevoir Line and village.55
The American attack was launched first, followed soon after by the second stage conducted by the Australian formations. The battalions of Edwin Tivey’s 8 Brigade passed through Bellicourt, finding that the Americans had not reached their objective, although it had been believed that they had.56 Tivey’s men were unable to assist the
Americans who appeared to be struggling. Although they were to pass through the
American objective, the Australians were under strict orders as per Monash’s plan not to ‘become entangled’ in that task, but rather to continue moving straight through to their own objective.57 If the Australians were able to avoid being caught up in the fighting being conducted by the Americans, which they did, there was no problem with the two stages of the attack taking place simultaneously. In fact, it was likely to be advantageous for the Australians, with fewer German troops available to be diverted to the final Australian objective.
The conditions of the battlefield on 29-30 September posed difficulties for the troops. Bean described the area as a ‘wet battlefield, cratered and crossed by belts of thick wire and wide muddy trenches’, as the tanks and infantry attempted to move forward.58At 9:25pm Henry Goddard warned the battalions of his 9 Brigade of the conditions, but also appealed to divisional headquarters, claiming that in difficult conditions such as these, the necessary preparations would require seven hours of clear weather. Goddard’s concerns were that moving to the jumping-off point would necessitate a 12,500 yard march, the night was dark with rain and wind, enemy artillery
55 Ibid. 56 AWM4 23/8/34: Official Record, 8 Infantry Brigade war diary, September 1918 [Appendix 14: Report on operations 29 September to 2 October, 5 October 1918]. 57 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6, p. 961. 58 Ibid., pp. 999-1000. 105
was very active, and the troops would be crossing unfamiliar ground.59 His concerns were well-founded and show a high understanding of modern warfare and the role of command. Martin van Creveld argues that an important element of command is a focus on external factors, including the weather and terrain.60 Goddard’s trepidation regarding his troops crossing unfamiliar ground at night was similar to Glasgow’s concern at
Villers-Bretonneux. However, once again it was important that the attack go ahead.
Given that the Americans had already launched their attack and were on the way to their objective, it would have been negligent and inadvisable to alter or postpone the
Australian advance behind them.
8 and 15 Brigades, commanded by Edwin Tivey and Harold Elliott respectively, were also hindered by the poor conditions, with their advance taking them through very dense fog. Bean noted that as Tivey’s brigade descended towards Bellicourt at approximately 8:45am on 30 April, they ran into fog that was so dense that leadership among his battalions became ‘very anxious indeed’.61 Similar to Goddard’s brigade, both 8 and 15 Brigades were facing the difficulty of crossing unfamiliar ground with inhibited visibility. In conditions such as this, effective communication between the battalions and brigades involved became even more important. The fact that the formations did not become cut off from one another is testament to the effective communication which was maintained throughout the attack.62
The Australians ran into further difficulties during their advance, aside from the delay of the Americans reaching their objective. Reconnaissance conducted by
Goddard’s 9 Brigade indicated that 10 and 11 Brigades, commanded by Walter Ramsay
McNicoll and James Cannan, were not advancing according to plan. During their
59 Ibid.; AWM4 23/9/23: Official Record, 9 Infantry Brigade war diary, September 1918 [entry dated 29 September 1918]. 60 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 6-7. 61 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6, p. 970. 62 Till, ‘The Gallipoli Campaign: Command Performances’, p. 36. 106
advance they had been subjected to heavy machine gun and artillery fire at close range, halting their movement. The 41st Battalion, acting as the left battalion of Cannan’s 11
Brigade, had been halted at the old American front line close to Benjamin Post.63 As a result, Goddard ordered his 33rd, 34th and 35th Battalions not to continue their advance until they were certain that McNicoll’s and Cannan’s formations were also doing so.64
At 4:45pm the 34th Battalion’s headquarters was in touch with 10 Brigade, confirming that they had only been able to move forward 100 yards and were still held up as a result of machine gun fire.65 Meanwhile, 11 Brigade was struggling to the point where
Cannan believed they required assistance. He was informed by the commander of the
American 105th that a reserve battalion would be sent to assist his brigade, but this unit did not arrive in time.66
10 and 11 Brigades were not the only ones among the Australian formation to struggle with German machine gun and artillery fire. In fact, the majority of the
Australian formations encountered heavy fire during the move forward, ‘clearly denoting that the enemy had not been driven from positions in the Hindenburg Line’.67
As a result, they were under continuous fire during the preliminary approach march, and this did not lessen for many of the formations as they progressed closer to their objective.68 Tivey’s 8 Brigade was held up due to the brigade immediately to its left being unable to cross the canal. As a result, the left flank of his formation was exposed and ‘suffered severely’ from machine gun and artillery fire.69 This attack on the
Hindenburg Line was on such a large scale that all of the involved formations were
63 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6, p. 963. 64 AWM4 23/9/23: Official Record, 9 Infantry Brigade war diary, September 1918 [entry dated 29 September 1918]. 65 Ibid. 66 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6, p. 979. 67 AWM4 23/9/23: Official Record, 9 Infantry Brigade war diary, September 1918 [entry dated 29 September 1918]. 68 Ibid. 69 AWM4 23/8/34: Official Record, 8 Infantry Brigade war diary, September 1918 [entry dated 29 September 1918]. 107
inevitably very reliant on one another to move forward at the rate expected. Difficulties such as weather, being held up at landmarks, and being subjected to enemy fire must be taken into consideration during the planning stage, and it is obvious that this happened prior to attacking the Hindenburg Line. It is evident that none of the commanders involved panicked or acted irrationally when faced with problems caused by the difficulties encountered by other formations, as they worked effectively together to ensure none were cut off. The effectiveness with which this was carried out in such a large scale attack is in stark contrast to Harold Elliott’s involvement the previous year during the first battle of Bullecourt. As discussed in the previous chapter, Elliott continued his brigade’s advance despite those around him having been held up, creating a significant gap in the overall advance.70
On the morning of 30 September, Elliott moved his brigade headquarters further east to a more suitable position.71 As has been discussed in previous chapters, the placement of headquarters was an ongoing issue for Australian brigade commanders on the Western Front. That Elliott recognised that where he had initially established his headquarters ahead of the attack on the Hindenburg Line was no longer providing him with an effective vantage point, and chose to act on this, demonstrates the evolution of his thinking regarding this issue throughout his time on the Western Front.
At 12:00pm, it was noted in 15 Brigade’s diary that the Americans appeared to be disorganised. It was reported that American stragglers were returning to the line and a senior officer was required to check on the situation. Elliott had ‘personally turned at least three parties back’.72 Bean notes that many Australians, including Monash, criticised the Americans for their role that day, though he considered their judgement to
70 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 323. 71 AWM4 23/15/31-01, Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, September 1918 [entry dated 30 September 1918]. 72 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 323. 108
be ‘based on ignorance of the facts; never, indeed was criticism more unjust’.73
American General Headquarters was aware that its troops were insufficiently trained and lacked the experience required for a large scale attack, but also realised that even though it was not ideal, their troops would have to be involved.74 It is unsurprising that
Elliott found stragglers among the American troops. They had insufficient training, insufficient experience, and were advancing through fog and smoke which many of them believed to be gas, and as a result some troops inevitably found themselves cut off from their formation.75 At 12:35pm Monash ordered Elliott’s brigade to ‘push on at once’, using all available tanks, and to carry any American troops they came across with them, solving the problem of cut-off troops.76
The Australian 3rd and 5th Divisions, with American support, eventually broke through the third and final section of the Hindenburg Line, forcing the Germans to fall back. Monash’s overall objective had been achieved. This attack on the Germans’ final point of defence, despite the difficulties encountered, is indicative of the progression of competency and effectiveness of the Australian troops and commanders, and an application of lessons learned throughout their time on the Western Front. As has been discussed, this was a large-scale attack, made more difficult by the involvement of inexperienced American troops, unfavourable conditions, and significant levels of machine gun and artillery fire from the enemy. Despite all of the difficulties faced by the Australian troops, the commanders at all levels performed admirably and collegiately to ensure their success. Successful Australian involvement (let alone leadership) in a large-scale attack such as this would have been unthinkable in the early
73 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6, p. 993. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid., p. 994. 76 AWM4 23/15/31-04, Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, September 1918 [Appendix 41: Narrative of operations carried out by 58th Battalion AIF from September 29th to October 1st 1918, p. 1]. 109
stages of fighting on the Western Front, but by 1918 the Australian Corps had become an effective part of the British forces.77
Conclusion
On 5 October 1918, following the breaking of the Hindenburg Line, James
Robertson’s 6 Brigade attacked Montbrehain in an attempt to breach the final system of
German defences within the Beaurevoir trench system. Despite strong German resistance, within hours the Australians had taken their objective at the cost of 430 casualties.78 This was the final engagement of the Australian infantry on the Western
Front.
Undoubtedly, a major reason behind the effectiveness of Australian command by the end of the war was the commanders’ familiarity with each other. ‘By 1918, the divisions and brigades in the Australian Corps had developed a sophisticated set of methods for fighting in battles’, as evidenced by Australian involvement at Villers-
Bretonneux and in breaking the Hindenburg Line.79 Monash had risen through the levels of command, including commanding 1 Brigade for a period during 1916, to command the Australian Corps. Men such as Gellibrand and Hobbs had risen from brigade command to command divisions, and battalion commanders had taken their place in command of brigades. There is little to criticise in terms of the involvement of
Australian brigade commanders in 1918. They were involving themselves in the planning processes ahead of attacks, ensuring they maintained effective communication with each other, their superiors and subordinates alike during offensives, adapting to the
77 Roger Lee, ‘The AIF and the Hundred Days: ‘Orchestration’ for Tactical Success in 1918’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), p. 299. 78 Adam Rankin, ‘Montbrehain, 5 October 1918: A case study in tactical operations and battlefield integration’, Australian War Memorial Summer Vacation Scholarship Scheme (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 2014). 79 Ibid. 110
changing nature of warfare in this theatre, implementing new tactics and technologies effectively, and using a high level of initiative to rectify difficult situations. By 1918, the troops and commanders were experienced and well-learned in modern warfare, resulting in a very effective fighting force.
111
CONCLUSION
The AIF’s brigade commanders vastly improved in aspects of their leadership over the course of their time on the Western Front. ‘There can be no denying that the
AIF was, at the end of the First World War, a tactically competent, battle-hardened force’, by comparison with its own performances earlier in the war, and with its peers in
1918.1 The AIF, like all other components of the wider BEF, had effectively adapted to the changing demands of warfare on the Western Front.2 The progression of the AIF’s brigade commanders can be measured through various means, including the evolution of the tactics they implemented, their willingness and ability to embrace and develop new technology, and their increasing ability to work effectively with other commanders at all levels.
Evolution of tactics
The First World War was a conflict centred on adapting to the challenges of modern warfare and innovating, developing, trialling and adjusting new technologies and tactics. Developing tactics and identifying when existing tactics were no longer effective or practical was a fundamental part of the brigade commander’s role, and one which Australia’s Western Front commanders excelled at, particularly in the later stages of the war. When Australian forces arrived in Europe in 1916, static trench warfare had firmly taken hold and they initially had to adapt to the challenges this posed. The stalemate they experienced for the first year and a half was immensely different from
1 Roger Lee, ‘The AIF and the Hundred Days: ‘Orchestration’ for Tactical Success in 1918’, in Jean Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle: How the Australian Imperial Force Fought 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1916, p, 299. 2 Christopher Pugsley describes the Canadian Corps as the ‘most effective fighting formation among the British armies’ on the Western Front in 1918, having also experienced a learning progression on the Western Front. See: Christopher Pugsley, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War (Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2004), p. 165. 112
the trench warfare that many had become accustomed to at Gallipoli, as has been discussed.
In 1918, as the Allies pursued the Germans to the Hindenburg Line, the stalemate was essentially broken with open, flowing warfare becoming more common.
This was anticipated and adapted to remarkably well by the commanders. Training was taken seriously and considered important by many brigade commanders, including
Harold Elliott, Edwin Tivey and William Glasgow. The extensive training which
William Glasgow’s 13 Brigade participated in during the winter of 1917-18 demonstrates his belief in the importance of continuously adapting to warfare as it evolved. 13 Brigade spent a considerable amount of time practising open warfare tactics, which was valuable for their involvement in pursuing the Germans to the
Hindenburg Line.3
The placement of headquarters required a process of trial and error for
Australia’s brigade commanders. In early involvements, it was common for the headquarters to be placed too far behind the front line, such as John Gellibrand’s at
Pozières, while he was in command of 6 Brigade. In this instance, the headquarters was established approximately three kilometres behind the front line, placing the brigade commander out of touch and therefore making it difficult to remain abreast of the operation as it unfolded, and to act accordingly. Gellibrand quickly learned from this mistake and by the time of his major involvement in the Second Battle of Bullecourt, he had adjusted his approach. In this instance, Gellibrand established his headquarters much closer and on a railway embankment with an excellent vantage point which gave him the ability to witness much of the battle and his brigade’s involvement first-hand.
3 AWM 3DRL/3058: Private Record, Major-General Edwin Tivey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 1866-1947 [1915-1919 diary, undated entry]; William Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 27; Peter Edgar, To Villers-Bretonneux: Brigadier-General William Glasgow, DSO and 13th Australian Infantry Brigade (Sydney: Australian Military History Publications, 2008), pp. 186-223. 113
Robert Smith, on the other hand, established 5 Brigade’s headquarters for the same engagement in the village of Noreuil, which placed him largely out of touch and hindered his involvement, as discussed in the third chapter.4
Throughout their time on the Western Front, brigade commanders became increasingly aware of the dangers of attacking across unfamiliar ground, particularly at night, implementing measures to reduce the inherent risk. Glasgow was involved in the planning process ahead of the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux, and found issues with the plans put forward by British command. He argued several points, principally deciding to commence 13 Brigade’s attack on a north-south line, and protested when he was informed that this would not be possible. Glasgow successfully argued his point, and his decision allowed the 13th Brigade to implement a simple approach which significantly alleviated the difficulty of crossing unfamiliar ground at night. 5
Prior to his 9 Brigade’s involvement in the attack on the Hindenburg Line,
Henry Goddard was particularly concerned about the conditions. As discussed in the fourth chapter, he was worried about rain, thick wire and muddy trenches, especially because his men had not previously been involved in that area, and their first experience of it was to be in the dark. Goddard took the correct course of action in response to his concerns. Rather than postponing, altering or cancelling the advance of his troops, which would have been negligent as the American wave had already commenced their advance, he allowed it to continue but provided a clear warning to the battalions under his command of the conditions they should expect.6 This highlights Goddard’s awareness of the difficulties caused by the conditions of the Western Front. His
4 Peter Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 95; Andrews and Jordan, ‘Second Battle of Bullecourt Revisited: The Australians in France, 3 May 1917’, p. 36. 5 Edgar, To Villers-Bretonneux, p. 255. 6 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6: The Australian Imperial Force during the Allied Offensive, 1918 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1942), pp. 999-1000. 114
understanding of the need to continue the attack despite inclement conditions and an unfamiliarity with the ground demonstrates a high level of understanding of complex operations, which is important to the role of command at all levels. The learning progression experienced by Goddard had made him increasingly aware of the effect which the actions and performance of his troops had on the other formations involved, and the operation as a whole. As discussed in the third chapter, Harold Elliott’s involvement at Bullecourt in April 1917 showed a very different level of awareness to that of Goddard in 1918. General Brudenell White was concerned about Elliott’s tendency to push forward further and more quickly than he should. At Bullecourt,
Elliott’s column of the advance moved forward at such a rate that it ended up three miles ahead of the formation advancing to its south, thereby creating a significant gap in the attack.7 At this stage, Elliott appears to have lacked the experience and depth of knowledge of complex operations to hold his advance back to remain in line with the other formations involved. In comparison to Elliott’s error in judgement, Goddard’s actions clearly demonstrate a much greater understanding of tactics, cooperation and complex operations on the Western Front, as should be expected by the final year of the war.
A war of technology
An abundance of new technology was introduced, trialled and improved over the course of the conflict on the Western Front. This factor is significant in terms of all levels of command, as the commanders were required to become accustomed to a new type of warfare implementing modern technology. This presented unique difficulties for those who had held positions of command prior to the First World War, and for those
7 C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens: A Shorter History of the Australian Fighting Services in the First World War (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1946), p. 323. 115
who had little to no previous command experience. In this respect, it was a level playing field as none of the brigade commanders had experience with the technology which was developed throughout the war. As has been discussed, a major criticism of First World
War commanders is that they were reluctant to embrace new technology. The evidence shows that this is an unfair criticism.
Preliminary artillery bombardments were used predictably throughout the initial years on the Western Front, often with no positive effects. Preliminary bombardments often proved to do nothing more than alert the opposing troops that an infantry attack was imminent, as was the case at Fromelles in July 1916. The Germans were protected by fortifications and, as such, were safe from the artillery bombardment and had ample time to prepare prior to the commencement of the infantry advance.8 By 1918, brigade commanders were well aware of the pitfalls of preliminary bombardments, and in many cases were expressing their concerns. As discussed in the fourth chapter, Glasgow successfully fought against having a preliminary bombardment implemented ahead of the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux. Instead, artillery initially bombed the village, the railway and the Monument, before lifting its fire beyond the objectives. With
Glasgow’s input, the need to alter the use of this technology was realised and executed.9
The use of trench mortars also became far less effective than it had been in the earlier stages of war on the Western Front. In 1918, the nature of open warfare removed the scope for their use as they were undoubtedly more suited to the close-quarters form of fighting that was inherent in static trench warfare. Despite this, ahead of the counter- attack on Villers-Bretonneux, trench mortars were still provided in case an opportunity
8 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 145. 9 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 5, p. 574. 116
in which they would be useful was presented.10 In this case, they were not used as the targets proved to be out of range. The continued availability of this technology, however, demonstrates a clear understanding of the complexities of modern warfare.
Trench mortars were not considered vital to the attack and their limitations were known, with Glasgow being among those to comment on the lack of scope for their use by this stage of the war. However, they remained available which was advisable given the situation could have changed at any stage and there certainly may have been the potential for their use.
The brigade commanders involved at Bullecourt, where they worked with tanks for the first time, were critical of the support, or lack thereof, which their formations received from tank crews. Charles Brand, in command of 4 Brigade, was particularly critical of them, compiling a report, with the assistance of his battalion commanders, noting that his formation received no assistance during their initial advance.11 As has been discussed, the major difficulty early on was that the infantry and tank crews were not adequately prepared to fight alongside one another, as they had not trained together and there was uncertainty about what was to be expected. By the time of the counter- attack on Villers-Bretonneux, tanks had become far more useful, and the infantry benefited more from their involvement. Glasgow, however, remained slightly critical and believed the usefulness of tank involvement was dependent on the individual crews.
Despite this, the value of the technology itself had certainly been realised.
Given the unprecedented extent of the development of technology which took place over the course of the First World War, it is significant that the AIF’s brigade commanders were able to adjust to it, and assist the men under their command to work
10 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, p. 5.]. 11 AWM4 23/4/19: Official Record, 4 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1917 [Appendix 5: Special report on “tank” co-operation in attack night of 10/11th April 1917]. 117
with various new technologies. It is clear that the brigade commanders did not shy away from new technology, and were prepared to evolve their tactics around it.
Cooperation in command
The Australian brigades began working more collaboratively with one another, including those within different divisions, as the war went on. By 1918, there was clearly a much greater ability for the formations to work as a unified force, as evidenced by the more complex and multi-faceted operations they were involved in during the later stages of war.
At Pozières, the brigade commanders involved had difficulty working effectively with one another. Gellibrand’s 6 Brigade functioned very well as a single formation, but was forced to use a reserve unit from its own brigade to cover the flank which had been left vulnerable by the failure of John Paton’s 7 Brigade to remain connected. As highlighted in the third chapter, Gellibrand had to make a judgement call regarding pulling his own troops back, which was done after he ascertained that Paton’s brigade would not be making another attempt to carry its tasked position.12 This is an early example of a failure of the AIF’s brigade commanders to work effectively with one another within an operation. When Paton made the decision that his brigade would not move forward again, he should have alerted Gellibrand. Instead, Gellibrand’s formation was left cut off and the commander had to predict what the actions of his counterpart would be.13 Fortunately, as the war progressed, so did the ability of brigade commanders to communicate consistently and effectively throughout operations.
In the later years on the Western Front, brigade commanders – and, indeed, their battalion commanders – began establishing joint headquarters ahead of complex attacks.
The first major success in this regard was the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux,
12 AWM4 23/6/12: Official Record, 6 Infantry Brigade war diary, August 1916 [Appendix 17: Brief report on operation carried out on 28th/29th July 1916]. 13 Ibid. 118
when joint planning and the establishment of joint headquarters was implemented very effectively by Glasgow and Elliott. In this instance, Glasgow took the initiative to move himself to connect with Elliott’s 15 Brigade headquarters.14 The two commanders worked very well together in terms of collaboration of plans and communication, demonstrating a shared evolution of brigade commanders within the 4th Division.
The cooperation between Australian brigades extended further than the establishment of joint headquarters. During the counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux,
James Stewart, in command of 14 Brigade, assisted Elliott’s 15 Brigade despite his formation not being directly involved in the operation. Elliott’s staff contacted Stewart’s brigade when one of the battalions within 15 Brigade was disoriented and unsure of its position. Stewart agreed to provide any assistance possible to redirect the lost battalion, as it was believed they may have been nearing 14 Brigade’s position. The situation was resolved soon after, with Elliot communicating this to Stewart.15 Stewart’s willingness to become involved if necessary, and the fact that he remained informed of the situation as it unfolded, even though his brigade was not among the attacking forces, is testament to the unified nature of brigade command by this stage of the war. While it is clear from early examples such as Pozières that the brigades did not initially work together effectively, as the war progressed, the willingness and ability of Australia’s brigade commanders to assist one another and work in large-scale operations together improved vastly.
When the Australian Corps came to its final major involvement on the Western
Front, attacking the Hindenburg Line, it had become an efficient fighting force. As
14 AWM4 23/13/27-02: Official Record, 13 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [Appendix 1: Report on Operations near Villers-Bretonneux from 24th to 26th April, 2 May 1918, pp. 1-2.]; AWM4 23/15/26- 02: Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [General Staff Operation Diary, entry no. 67]. 15 AWM4 23/15/26-01: Official Record, 15 Infantry Brigade war diary, April 1918 [entry dated 24 April 1918].
119
discussed in the fourth chapter, the Australian brigades across various divisions worked very effectively with one another in this operation. Additionally, they took on a leadership role, with the less experienced American forces attacking in the first stage and the Australians following through before pushing forward in the second stage. As this was a large-scale, complex operation, the success of the commanders involved is indicative of the progression of the Australian forces’ ability by this late stage of the war. The AIF and its commanders had experienced the same non-linear learning curve as the wider BEF and, with the lessons learned continually being applied, by 1918 the
Australian Corps had become a very effective fighting force within the BEF.16
Post-war
Two Australian brigade commanders were killed on the Western Front. On 12
November 1916, Duncan John Glasfurd, in command of 12 Brigade, was reconnoitring trenches in a sunken section near Cheese Road at Bernafay Wood. He sustained abdominal wounds from shell fire in the area, and was evacuated via a ten-hour stretcher journey. Glasfurd later died of his wounds at the 38th Casualty Clearing
Station, Heilly.17
William Holmes commanded 5 Brigade from September 1914 until January
1917, at which time he assumed command of the 4th Division. On the morning of 2 July
1917, he was escorting the New South Wales premier, William Arthur Holman, to the
Messines Ridge. While en route, they saw an anti-aircraft battery, and as they stopped to watch it in action, Holmes remarked to the premier that ‘the Boche must know you are
16 Robert Stevenson, The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War, Vol. 3: The War With Germany (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 211. 17 Chris Clark, ‘Duncan John Glasfurd (1873-1916), Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 January 2016,
visiting us’.18 They intended to proceed to the summit of Hill 63, but Holman briefly returned to their vehicle, at which time a shell from a field gun fell near Holmes, wounding him in the back and chest, and knocking him unconscious. He was taken to a
Field Ambulance, but died as he reached it.19
The remaining thirty Western Front brigade commanders included in the statistics presented in this thesis, survived the war. Nevill Smyth had transferred back to the British Army in May 1918 and the other British commander, Ewen Sinclair-
MacLagan, remained with the AIF until the end of the war, transferring back in 1919.20
Seventy-two per cent of Australia’s Western Front brigade commanders continued to serve in the military after the end of the First World War, the majority taking command of militia units. Despite commanding the 3rd Division based in Victoria for a year from 1921, John Gellibrand’s military service after 1918 was minimal.21 As detailed in the first chapter, Gellibrand had significant military experience by the time he joined the AIF. He had graduated at the top of his class from the Royal Military
College at Sandhurst, and developed his administrative and tactical skills through lower-level leadership during the conflict in South Africa. After this important experience, he had gone on to several other roles within the British Army and was a highly accomplished officer by the outbreak of war in 1914. After devoting such a significant portion of his life to the military, it seems unusual that he would not continue extensive regular military service after the end of the conflict. As previously discussed,
Gellibrand had abandoned his position in the British Army due to his frustration with a lack of advancement opportunities, and a fundamental disagreement with elements of the culture within the institution. Given he had reached the level of divisional command
18 NAA: B2455, HOMES William. 19 Ibid. 20 NAA: B2455, SMYTH Nevill Maskelyne; NAA: B2455, SINCLAIR-MACLAGAN Ewen George. 21 A.W. Bazley, ‘Sir John Gellibrand (1872-1945), Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 January 2016,
in 1918, it is unlikely that the same stresses and concerns would have led to his decision to significantly reduce his military service after the war. Instead, it is considerably more likely that he was satisfied with what he had accomplished and was ready to move on to other ventures. Gellibrand was heavily involved in the establishment of Legacy, demonstrating his continuing interest in the welfare of those who had served in the First
World War. Bean recorded that:
[T]here was a time when some of us thought that the best monument to John Gellibrand might be the story of Second Bullecourt. Now I feel there will be an even better – the record of Legacy.22
More than half (56%) of the brigade commanders returned to their pre-war occupation, either for a short period or for the remainder of their careers. Harold Elliott immediately returned to Melbourne in June 1919 and began rebuilding his law firm, which he balanced with commanding 15 Brigade within the militia. While remaining in his pre-war profession, Elliott also took on other roles in politics and became involved in the Returned Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Imperial League of Australia, with a keen interest in the welfare of ex-servicemen.23
Elliott struggled after the war, primarily due to the stress he had endured during his wartime service, and his endless work afterwards. In 1931, he was suffering from high blood pressure and was admitted to hospital. Soon after being discharged, he was found with a wound in the arm before being rushed back to hospital, where he died on
23 March. It was later confirmed that he had died as a result of suicide.24 The effect of the war on ordinary soldiers who returned is often discussed, but the fact that it also had lasting effects on those who were in command is too frequently overlooked. As has been discussed, Elliott consistently demonstrated a genuine sense of responsibility and
22 Ibid. 23 A.J. Hill, ‘Harold Edward (Pompey) Elliott (1878-1931)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 January 2016,
care for the men under his command, which was particularly evident in his reaction to the massive loss of men at Fromelles in 1916. Experiences such as this stayed with
Elliott, and he was evidently unable to move on from them after the war.
A relatively small number, 12.5%, took up an occupation in a different field from that which they worked in prior to the First World War. Glasgow, a clerk and businessman before the war, became involved in politics and served as Minister for
Defence from 1927 to 1929. During this period, the government completed its five-year defence programme involving an increase in the size of the citizen army and the modernisation and expansion of the Royal Australian Air Force. During the 1930s,
Glasgow resumed business interests, becoming the director of several companies and, in
1936, he sat on the Queensland board of advice of the National Bank of Australasia. In
1939, he was appointed as the first Australian high commissioner to Canada. This role involved negotiation on matters of policy regarding the Empire Air Training Scheme, and he visited the various schools where Australians were training. The high quality of his work in this role prompted Canadian government advisors to later recommend him for consideration as governor-general. Glasgow’s last years were spent in Brisbane, and he passed away on 4 July 1955.25 Glasgow had arguably the most diverse post-war career of all of those who had commanded Australian brigades on the Western Front.
Post-war political careers were not uncommon, with 31% of the former brigade commanders becoming involved in politics. Those who did so invariably took a particular interest in the welfare of returned servicemen, the families of those killed in the First World War, and Australian defence policy. Charles Brand won a Victorian
Senate seat for the United Australia Party in the 1934 election, and he held it until 1947.
He combined his interest in defence policy and ex-servicemen in this role, with his other
25 Peter Edgar, Sir William Glasgow: Soldier, Senator and Diplomat (Newport: Big Sky Publishing, 2011), pp. 278-317; Ralph Harry, ‘Sir Thomas William Glasgow (1876-1955)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 January 2016,
role as chairman of the Federal Parliamentary Ex-Servicemen’s Committee which he held for five years from 1942.26 A major element behind the characterisation of Allied commanders of the First World War as donkeys was their supposed lack of care and responsibility towards the ordinary soldiers under their command. As has been evidenced, Australia’s brigade commanders consistently demonstrated throughout the war that this was not the case, and their extensive efforts to focus on the needs of ex- servicemen in their involvement in politics, and ventures such as Legacy, the Federal
Parliamentary Ex-Servicemen’s Committee, and the Returned Sailors’ and Soldiers’
Imperial League of Australia further proves this.
Were the lions led by donkeys?
When examining the effectiveness of the work carried out by Australian brigade commanders on the Western Front, it is vital to take into account the nature of their role and the difficulties they faced. In addition to the evolution of tactics, the effect of new and evolving technology, and the inherent constraints of brigade command, there were other difficulties to consider. Not least, the AIF was an all-volunteer force, which resulted in it being comprised of men who had, for the most part, little to no military experience with the possible exception of militia service. The AIF’s brigade commanders, almost without exception, had a very positive approach to commanding these men, with the understanding that it was necessary to earn the respect of their subordinates.
Australia’s First World War soldiers were not lions led by donkeys. Any analysis of the effectiveness of the Australian forces should not focus only on the soldiers themselves. While they undoubtedly became more adept to fighting during their
26 A.J. Sweeting, ‘Charles Henry Brand (1873-1961), Australian Dictionary of Biography, cited 23 January 2016,
time on the Western Front, credit must also be given to those who were in command as they were responsible for developing tactics, effectively implementing technology, and ensuring the development of the soldiers through training. Australia’s brigade commanders were a diverse group of men with various backgrounds, approaches and experiences, as much so as the men under their command. Their approach, ability and understanding of modern warfare developed throughout their time on the Western
Front, and they consistently adapted to the challenges they faced. This proved to be an ideal approach to warfare on the Western Front, and more broadly in the First World
War, and one which was shared with the wider British Expeditionary Force.27 As much as the Australian soldiers had improved by 1918, their commanders had improved with them. Despite some early failures, Australian brigade commanders excelled, particularly in the final year of the war, and were a credit to the Australian Corps.
27 Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 183. 125
APPENDIX: AUSTRALIAN BRIGADE COMMANDERS, 1914-1918
1 Brigade (1st Division)
Colonel Henry Normand MacLaurin (August 1914 – April 1915)
Brigadier General Harold Bridgwood Walker (April 1915 – May 1915)
Brigadier General Nevill Maskelyne Smyth (May 1915 – January 1916)
Lieutenant Colonel Harold Edward Elliott (January 1916 – March 1916)
Brigadier General Nevill Maskelyne Smyth (March 1916 – December 1916)
Colonel Thomas Albert Blamey (December 1916 – January 1918)
Brigadier General Iven Giffard MacKay (June 1918 – March 1919)
2 Brigade (1st Division)
Colonel/Brigadier General James Whiteside McCay (August 1914 – July 1915)
Brigadier General John Keatly Forsyth (July 1915 – June 1916)
Colonel Henry Gordon Bennett (June 1916 – September 1916)
Brigadier General John Macquarie Antill (October 1916 – February 1917)
Brigadier General James Heane (February 1917 – past November 1918)
3 Brigade (1st Division)
Colonel/Brigadier General Ewen George Sinclair-MacLagan (August 1914 – December
1916)
Brigadier General Henry Gordon Bennett (December 1916 – past November 1918)
4 Brigade (4th Division)
Colonel/Brigadier General John Monash (September 1914 – July 1916) 126
Brigadier General Charles Henry Brand (July 1916 – October 1918)
Brigadier General Edmund Alfred Drake-Brockman (October 1918 – past November
1918)
5 Brigade (2nd Division)
Colonel/Brigadier General William Holmes (September 1914 – January 1917)
Brigadier General Robert Smith (January 1917 – July 1918)
Brigadier General Edward Fowell Martin (July 1918 – past November 1918)
6 Brigade (2nd Division)
Colonel Richard Linton (March 1915 – September 1915)
Brigadier General Reginald Spencer Browne (September 1915 – December 1915)
Major-General John Gellibrand (March 1916 – June 1917)
Major-General John Paton (July 1917 – August 1918)
Brigadier General James Campbell Robertson (August 1918 – past November 1918)
7 Brigade (2nd Division)
Colonel James Burston (April 1915 – October 1915)
Brigadier General John Paton (October 1915 – November 1916)
Brigadier General Evan Alexander Wisdom (December 1916 – past November 1918)
8 Brigade (5th Division)
Brigadier General Edwin Tivey (July 1915 – November 1918, past armistice)
Brigadier General Charles Stewart Davies (November 1918 – April 1919)
127
9 Brigade (3rd Division)
Colonel/Brigadier General Alexander Jobson (February 1916 – August 1917)
Brigadier General Charles Rosenthal (August 1917 – May 1918)
Brigadier General Henry Arthur Goddard (June 1918 – past November 1918)
10 Brigade (3rd Division)
Colonel/Brigadier General Walter Ramsay McNicoll (February 1916 – October 1918)
Brigadier General Carl Herman Jess (October 1918 – past November 1918)
11 Brigade (3rd Division)
Colonel/Brigadier General Colin Dunlop Wilson Rankin (February 1916 – December
1916)
Brigadier General James Harold Cannan (December 1916 – past November 1918)
12 Brigade (4th Division)
Brigadier General Duncan John Glasfurd (February 1916 – November 1916) [DIED OF
WOUNDS]
Brigadier General James Campbell Robertson (December 1916 – November 1917)
Brigadier General John Gellibrand (November 1917 – May 1917)
Brigadier General Raymond Lionel Leane (June 1918 – November 1918)
13 Brigade (4th Division)
Brigadier General Thomas William Glasgow (February 1916 – June 1918)
Brigadier General Sydney Charles Edgar Herring (June 1918 – past November 1918) 128
14 Brigade (5th Division)
Colonel Nevill Maskelyne Smyth (February 1916)
Brigadier General Godfrey George Howy Irving (March 1916 – May 1916)
Brigadier General Harold Pope (May 1916 – July 1916)
Brigadier General Clarence John Hobkirk (August 1916 – March 1918)
Brigadier General James Campbell Stewart (March 1918 – past November 1918)
15 Brigade (5th Division)
Brigadier General Godfrey George Howy Irving (February 1916)
Brigadier General Harold Edward Elliott (March 1916 – past November 1918)
16 Brigade (6th Division)
Brigadier General John Macquarie Antill (March 1917 – September 1917)
Lieutenant Colonel William Kenneth Seaforth Mackenzie (September 1917 – October
1918)
Note: As the 6th Division was not fully formed before the armistice, this unit did not see active service outside England.
17 Brigade (6th Division)
Brigadier General John Paton (April 1917 – July 1917)
Colonel William Walker Russell Watson (July 1917 – September 1917)
Note: As the 6th Division was not fully formed before the armistice, this unit did not see active service outside England. 129
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