15 March, Lwj67, Thank Yau Very Much for Your Letter 1^43/67 of 1 March
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1 2 cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins 1 1 I 2 Rei* TCo )7/2^ 856<ty Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet v ii::?T»pTC.TttJ. iALAlJi :.i-' < J, .••„*.;,•. (10516/187/67) BAHRAIN. 15 March, lwJ67, KIBE Hussein* s Impressions of flag ftiitf thank yau very much for your letter 1^43/67 of 1 March and for the copy of your note on King Hussein's impressions of the Gulf. This was interesting and in parts shrewd, but he was completely off-beam in his remarks about the— .Ab-™ u Bhab-— — — i— Defenc-—- -W«H -«"•*• MI ^*pe ^pr -m,Force -w.*, «ur V .9 HKIv tmv,-1*'.!^ writVV iik «% ^Ti utir t *f to yon about this point sine© there may be some clanger of King Hussein's attitude leading to unvelcome results. 2. The .Abu Itiabi Defence Fores, consisting at present of about 300 mm and a small aiM&er of British officers, only got otr the ground when Shaikh /said replaced Shakhfcut In August. It is at present equipped mainly with rifles, guas and Iband Sovars,, but 11 will be " " the latest kind of scout car. together with a lot of other vehicles, and also mortars, Karl Gustaf anti-tank weapons, as well as farther rifles and machine ^uns. There is not at present to be an air wing, but the purchase of the mor.t suitable kind of patrol craft for coastal patrols is under consideration. The Force will, so far as can be seen at present, expand to about 600 men. None of its squadrons is yet fully operational; its task is at present confined to patrolling- in a section of ^bu Dhabi away from the frontiers. The frontiers are looked after by the '.Crucial Csrian Scouts, who maintain two squadrons there. 5* I do not know why King Hussein got the impression of antiquated and useless equipment. Perhaps lie thought that Abu I&abi ought to have an army similar 'to that of Jordan, but of course the tasks are totally different and it would be ^iiit© inappropriate to equip the Abu Dhabi i)erenee Force with &jfei|teavy weapons needad to deal w Israel. Ohe fact of the matter is that when present orders are fulfilled, the Force will be perfectly well equipped for its tasK. 4. miTim. t is ./not the enci of the story. Becemee 'the Abu rtiabi Defence Force exists alongside of the Truci&l Oman ficouts, and because Shaikh Zaid can, if lie wislies, /devote £ . G. I). , Esq. 1 2 cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins 1 1 I 2 *«/..• rco i7/2^<? 85 6<ty Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet ,„*.. fc ' rssrs sis®}, ttore has besa and woains a risk ttout^ fOHaar would acquire iqulpaeat as well as raws ^01 ' iMoii would surpass those or tlie 'i'rucira umm -co 1 l t'-«a Si^ke i* t eXtT®(2l_ *l y GitllCUlJS Jt .f''-*!^ *- il ji*w«1 ^"El* ^i^ JO* % C0wu»il*%L»f^t'*'*S-*^* <"N *1 'V i'\ "**w-** rTl ®iSi AssatisfaoUoa of iiaiibsrs of the latter, «e nave thereffore bu0a pr®oociroii3<} with, ensuring trie uewt t)o»sible eoortiaatioa between the two Forces tx> avoid odioos ooBparisons-being Bade. So far we to^e ?* VAnr whol© succeeded, though the .risk o,t clisptirities occurrix^ in the ratiiro P«a4iB, Tftls if a powerful roo«on lor us not wliMitg to encourafle Shaikh^id to go in ior it and. wteTwe are «fc^ concer'ned to res4 t esiitioa the Htilar aa^ show for this. Yw account of Se cSSver^Uon with the Kipg leaves me with ^suspicion mat Dertiaps M is t« linking of unloidinfc/.oiae 01 his ©quipieat m c^id, pert«a» for u talr nrice. Tliis would b© ifio^t unweloone; lisacf this ietu*r. I hope ttet ¥om can take aa et^rly opportoait^ or ass'«ring Kim fiuesein that the -4bu ItiaM Befenoe Force, qven its likely tack, will be adequately eqgiimed . and tltt it would lot be conducive to peace and stability all rouu uti if Us to t^s ,':aoy action to encommge tlie ailei* or the CdMsdarit of his Force to move into a dimension of military eqLUll»ont. ., 1 f*,? moved to m^ tills becsiKe of the .ionaldabl ^ experts «te£ the Jordan Goveraamt want totsont oo -on .IQfMiM, iacliMing aa Arwy Mlgaalei* (in aoaiauu wo a Tiutolio security lirigadler), I na aot viOitw clwu- what ^ liir tarJfe would be and I iiope it would not be uie e^ie ci m surpliis military equipment. the Kii^fs interest in Abu Dhabi is 1 hope U^A Us oAa be persuaded not to allow any aiente Ha may mat to laalce 'to go off at iv i^e Uiey Ha¥8 been properly elided vatii -ou - «ulcr *111 m &Q\M, continue to vwint a nuiibop or Jordanian txparts, but if misundersUtficdngs are to DO Avoided t the Jordanians stoulc! wait until these experts are Tor before shading 'tfeea. 1 as sending a copy of tills letter to ,,reiiie :^*b» ^eii* said ^11 lie MoiTis, and to David Roberts. cei 1 2 cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins 1 1 I 2 R*f... TCo \7/2^ 856<ty Pies se note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Brenanle. Sir D. en KING HUSSEIN Before King Hussein's recent visit to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, some anxiety was expressed lest his absence from Jordan should give an opportunity to make trouble there to those elements within Jordan and outside who wish to overturn the present regime. There was also some concern about the King's reception in the Gulf States, particularly Bahrain, and about his personal safety. In this context the two attached despatches are of interest: one dated 20 February from Sir Stewart Crawford in Bahrain about the King's visit Flag B to the Lower Gulf States and the other dated 22 February from Mr. Man about the King's visit to Saudi Arabia. 2. In the event, the expected difficulties did not occur either in Jordan or in the Gulf and it is now possible to see certain benefits arising from the visit quite apart from King Hussein's own notable success in raising funds for Jordan's arms purchases. 3. Firstly, the fact that the King was able to make this trip at all and to return to Jordan without there having been any upheaval was a witness to his success and that of his Government in re-establishing stability after the serious disturbances which followed the Israel attack on Samu. U. Secondly, King Hussein's successful projection of himself and his warm and positive personality, to which Sir Stewart Crawford draws attention, won him a good deal of sympathy (in addition to the admiration which already existed for his courage) amongst tire Rulers of the Gulf States and others not normally particularly favourably inclined towards him. King Hussein's visit may also have been something to galvanize those Rulers inclined to be faint-hearted in the face of Egyptian inspired Arab nationalist pressures to be rather more robust. 5. Admittedly in terms of Jordanian internal politics it "could be argued that it would be better for King Hussein to lie low and to avoid any prominence as a leader of those resisting Egyptian pressures, bearing in mind that his West Banker subjects look to President Nasser and his creatures, Shuqairy and the -Palestine Liberation Organisation^ the main hope for an eventual restoration of an Arab Palestinian state. King Hussein's personality and inclinations are, however, ill-fitted for such a retiring role and it would be unrealistic to expect him to fulfil it. That being so, we may as well welcome the various incidental advantages for our position in the Gulf which flow from King Hussein's willingness to be increasingly active there. 6. In the Gulf States themselves the chief consequential benefit of King Hussein's visit is that he is now likely to urge the Jordanian authorities to do all they can, short of /providing CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 cms PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE ins 1 1 I 2 Ret* TCo 17/2 <W 85£.Cty Plea se note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet CONFIDENTIAL -2- providing finance, to meet the needs of the Gulf States for technical and other help from Jordan, thus providing an alternative source of supply than Egypt, one which is much less likely to have harmful effects on our own interests in the area. 7. The visit to Saudi Arabia was perhaps the most important of all from the point of view of King Hussein's own financial hopes, but had lees importance in the contett of the general Middle Eastern political situation in that it was a public expression of an already existing common understanding and did not represent a new departure.