A Nuclear Deal with Iran

A Nuclear Deal With Iran

Managing the Consequences

Report of the American Foreign Policy Council Task Force

October 2015 C About AFPC

For over three decades, AFPC has played an essential role in the U.S. foreign policy debate. Founded in 1982, AFPC is a 501(c)(3) non-proft organization dedicated to bringing information to those who make or infuence the foreign policy of the United States and to assisting world leaders with building democracies and market economies. AFPC is widely recognized as a source of timely, insightful analysis on issues of foreign policy, and works closely with members of Congress, the Executive Branch and the policymaking community. It is stafed by noted specialists in foreign and defense policy, and serves as a valuable resource to ofcials in the highest levels of government.

STate of the Debate 3

Anticipating the Consequences AFPC Task Force 5 _ Ilan Berman Samantha Ravich Vice President, American Former Deputy National Foreign Policy Council Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney Managing the Jack David Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Michael Rubin Fallout Former Deputy Assistant Resident Fellow, American Secretary of Defense Enterprise Institute 9

Michael Doran Jonathan Schanzer _ Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Vice President for Research, Former Senior Director, Foundation for Defense of National Security Council Democracies Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Wurmser The Road Ahead Founder, Delphi Global Matthew Kroenig Analysis Group 14 Associate Professor, Georgetown Former senior Middle East University advisor to Vice President Cheney Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council of the United States

2 Te announcement of a nuclear persistent drive toward a nuclear deal with Iran by the P5+1 pow- weapons capability. It is our view State of ers (the U.S., UK, France, Russia, that the Joint Comprehensive Plan China and Germany) on July 14th of Action (JCPOA), as the agree- brought to a close nearly two years ment is formally known, not only the Debate of intensive negotiations, begun in fails to achieve this objective, but secret in 2012 and pursued public- also expands Iran’s ability to pur- ly since November 2013, that were sue its geopolitical objectives in the intended to fully address Iran’s greater Middle East, thereby imper-

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1 Obama’s contention of broad public “Support for Iran Nuclear Agree- ment Falls,” Pew Research Center, support for the agreement, the Amer- September 8, 2015, http://www.peo- ican people appear generally opposed ple-press.org/2015/09/08/support- to the deal in its current form. In its for-iran-nuclear-agreement-falls/.

September 2015 poll of American pub- 2 lic opinion, the Pew Research Center See, for example, Mark Dubow- itz and Annie Fixler, Improving the found just 21 percent of respondents Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, polled support the current agreement Foundation for Defense of Democ- – a 12-point drop in approval for the racies Center for Sanctions and Illicit deal since it was unveiled in July.1 Finance, August 2015, http://www.de- Nevertheless, because Congress fenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/ documents/Improving_the_JCPOA. was not able to bring the JCPOA to a pdf. vote in the Senate, much less muster the two-thirds majority in both cham- bers necessary to defeat the agreement pursuant to the terms of the Iran Nu- clear Agreement Review Act of 2015, the White House views the JCPOA as binding upon the United States. More- over, although experts have profered a number of constructive proposals for improving the agreement (including tying sanctions relief to Iranian perfor- mance of its obligations under the deal, as well as a more robust inspections regime that includes short-notice visits),2 the Administration has expressed no interest in altering the parameters of the existing deal prior to its implementation. Given the foregoing, we believe that it is necessary for policymakers in Congress to begin thinking about the vulnerabilities that are likely to result from a nuclear agreement with Iran, as well as taking steps to mitigate the various threats to national security that implementation of the JCPOA will gener- ate. iling longstanding U.S. strategic interests in that part of the world. We hope that this report will help in identifying those elevated risks, and propose steps by which the United States can mitigate them. In the United States, the unveil- ing of the JCPOA touched of a heated national debate. Contrary to President

4 to an infusion into the American economy (currently estimated at $16.7 trillion) of roughly $4.2 trillion, approximately fve times the economic stimulus that stabi- Anticipating the lized the U.S. fnancial sector following the 2008 global economic crisis. Moreover, these funds will invariably be augmented by the benefts of post-sanctions trade Consequences between Iran and potential trading partners in Europe and Asia, which now appear eager to expand their eco- Proponents of the agreement negotiated between Iran nomic ties to the Islamic Republic.5 and the P5+1 powers claim a number of positive aspects White House ofcials have expressed their hope if Iran abides by the terms of the JCPOA, including that its unprecedented windfall will be used by the Ira- short-term constraints on Iranian uranium enrichment, nian regime overwhelmingly to improve domestic con- a reduction in the number of centrifuges operated by ditions and strengthen its economy.6 Even if Iran does the Islamic Republic, and a delay of the “plutonium 3 spend the lion’s share of sanctions relief in this fashion, track” of the regime’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, a however, the sheer volume of funds to be unblocked broad spectrum of national security practitioners, mili- means that the Iranian regime will nonetheless be able tary experts, scientists and analysts concur that the deal to signifcantly augment its expenditures on several is woefully defcient in several respects. fronts of concern to U.S. strategic interests. Te list of these defciencies is long. Some, like signifcant shortfalls in verifcation and monitoring, Terrorism fnancing. Te Islamic Republic, which was preclude confdence that Iran will abide by the terms frst formally designated as a state sponsor of terrorism of the agreement in the future, or that the internation- by the Reagan administration in 1984, still maintains al community will know promptly if it does not. Like- its status as the world’s most active backer of terrorist wise of concern is that the JCPOA weakens the global groups. Te scope of this material support is extensive, nonproliferation regime by setting a precedent for what estimated by the U.S. Treasury Department several counts as a “peaceful” nuclear program that will have ef- years ago to be in the billions of dollars annually.7 More fects well beyond the Middle East. Arguably graver still recently, a study by the Congressional Research Ser- is that the JCPOA, upon implementation, will empower vice found Iranian spending on these activities to range a range of Iranian activities deeply inimical to the stra- from $3.5 billion to $16 billion annually.8 Tese expens- tegic interests and security of the United States and its es include, inter alia, between $100 and $200 million per allies and international partners. Tese strategic, politi- annum to Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia; tens of million cal and economic problems will include: of dollars annually to the Palestinian Hamas movement and; the entire annual operating budget of the smaller

Expanded Iranian resources Palestinian Islamic Jihad (estimated at some $2 million). Under the parameters of the JCPOA, Iran is poised to Tat these expenditures have continued unabated, de- receive massive sanctions relief and unfrozen assets in spite the growing adverse impact of U.S. and interna- the near term: an estimated $100 billion or more afer tional sanctions on the Iranian economy in recent years, a perfunctory six-month verifcation period. Te scale illustrate that terrorism support – euphemistically of this economic assistance is staggering. It represents termed “export of the revolution” by the Iranian regime a quarter or more of Iran’s total annual GDP, which – represents a cardinal regime priority. With extensive amounted to $415 billion in 2014.4 It likewise matches or sanctions relief now on the horizon, it would be prudent exceeds the entirety of the European Recovery Program for policymakers to expect this support to grow signif- (colloquially known as the Marshall Plan) launched by cantly. Indeed, should Iran allocate a mere 10 percent the Truman administration in 1948 in the afermath of of the sanctions relief it receives under the JCPOA to World War II, an efort that disbursed $13 billion ($120 such activities, it would double or even treble its current billion in today’s dollars) to seventeen countries in Eu- expenditures in this arena. rope over the span of four years. Te proportional impact of such relief to the Islamic Republic is comparable

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3 Greater regional activism. Over the sive, would doubtless have been For a short summary of these and other stipulations, see Blaise Misztal, past several years, even as it has en- even more so without the economic “Iran Deal: Section-by-Section Anal- gaged in nuclear diplomacy with the constraints imposed on Iran by West- ysis,” Bipartisan Policy Center, July P5+1 powers, the Islamic Republic ern sanctions. Now that sanctions will 14, 2015, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/ has assumed an increasingly asser- be lifed pursuant to the provisions of blog/iran-deal-analysis/. tive foreign policy line throughout the the JCPOA, greater Iranian involve- 4 “Iran GDP,” Trading Economics, greater Middle East. Tis has included ment in the theaters mentioned above, n.d.,http://www.tradingeconomics. massive, sustained aid to the regime of as well as others (including Bahrain com/iran/gdp. Bashar al-Assad in Syria since the start and the Palestinian Territories), should 5 See, for example, “Iran to Host Trade of the civil war there some four-and-a- be expected. Teams from 10 EU States,” Press half years ago, encompassing the de- TV (Tehran), September 15, 2015, ployment of Iranian military forces, the Stronger Iranian military capabilities. http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/0- provision of signifcant arms and war In anticipation of the sanctions relief 9/15/429296/Iran-to-host-trade- teams-from-10-EU-states. materiel, and the provision of massive fowing from the JCPOA, Iran’s leaders amounts of fnancial assistance (es- are preparing for a period of sustained 6 Nadia Bilbassy-Charters, “Ben timated at $6 billion or more annual- strategic expansion. In the Islamic Re- Rhodes: Iran’s New Money Post Deal 9 will Go to Uplif ‘Terrible Econo- ly). Iranian aid, supplies and training public’s Sixth Development Plan, for- my,’” Al Arabiya (Riyadh), July 16, likewise were instrumental to the suc- mally unveiled on June 30th, Supreme 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/ cessful overthrow of the pro-Western Leader Ali Khamenei outlined plans News/middle-east/2015/07/16/Ben- government of Yemeni President Abed for a number of martial measures. Rhodes-Iran-s-extra-revenue-after- Rabbo al-Hadi earlier this year by the Tese include an expansion of the na- nuke-deal-will-help-uplift-terrible- economy-.html. country’s Shi’ite Houthi rebels.10 And tional defense budget to fve percent in Iraq, ongoing political disarray and of GDP, as well as an upgrade of de- 7 Under Secretary of the Treasury for the fght against the Islamic State ter- fense capabilities as a hedge against “all Terrorism and Financial Intelligence rorist group have provided Iran with forms of external threats,” with a par- Stuart Levey, Remarks before the 5th Annual Conference on Trade, Trea- the opportunity to further expand its ticular emphasis on the strengthening sury and Cash Management in the already-extensive infuence, both di- of the Iranian regime’s ballistic missile Middle East, Abu Dhabi, United Arab rectly and via assorted Shi’a militias. arsenal. Te increase means that Iran’s Emirates, March 7, 2007, http://uae. Tese activities, while exten- defense spending, currently pegged at usembassy.gov/remarks_of_stuart_ levey_.html.

8 Carla Humud, Christopher Blanch- ard, Jeremy Sharp and Jim Zanotti, “Iranian Assistance to Groups in Ye- men, Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories,” Congressional Research Service Memorandum, July 31, 2015, http://www.kirk.senate.gov/imag- es/PDF/Iran%20Financial%20Sup- port%20to%20Terrorists%20and%20 Militants.pdf. 9 Eli Lake, “Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad,” BloombergView, June 9, 2015, http://www.bloombergview. com/articles/2015-06-09/iran- spends-billions-to-prop-up-assad. 10 Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian Support Seen Cru- cial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, December 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN- 0JT17A20141215. 6 some $14 billion annually, will grow by roughly a Stepped up Iranian proliferation 11 third. President Obama has publicly asserted that the JCPOA Tere are indications that the Islamic Repub- closes of “all pathways” by which the Iranian regime lic has already begun to ramp up its defense expendi- can acquire a nuclear capability. Tis, however, is not tures. In recent weeks, it has initiated major new pro- accurate. Te agreement concerns itself overwhelming- curement talks with arms suppliers such as Russia and ly with the overt means by which Iran might develop a China, and is now poised to acquire new aircraf, air nuclear capability: by building one. A parallel, covert 12 defenses and components. Such acquisitions will lead, “pathway” – involving procurement of nuclear-relat- over time, to a signifcant strengthening of Iran’s ability ed components and materiel from foreign suppliers to project power into its immediate periphery, as well – remains open. As such, the practical efect of the as its capacity to threaten and/or challenge its strate- JCPOA, once implemented, will be to facilitate covert gic rivals. Even before then, however, the perception procurement by the Islamic Republic. Moreover, given of growing Iranian military power will begin the expanded resources soon to be at Iran’s disposal, its to have pronounced efects on the geopo- purchasing power for such activities will expand expo- [T]here is litical balance of power in the greater nentially. Middle East. Willing foreign suppliers exist at both the state considerable and non-state level. At the state level, Iran’s ongoing – risk that Tehran A new rogue state patron. Al- and extensive – strategic alliance with the North Ko- could covertly though it has received com- rean regime poses considerable future risks, insofar paratively little attention to as nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation between procure nuclear date, one of the most signif- the two countries has a long history and is ongoing.13 materials from icant consequences of the Similarly, multiple private entities involved in Iran’s Chinese brokers economic windfall inher- nuclear and ballistic missile programs continue to op- ent in the JCPOA will be its erate within the People’s Republic of China, and have and circumvent a impact on the foreign allies been estimated to provide as much as 90 percent of the nuclear deal by and strategic partners of the necessary “goods and technology” for both.14 As such, secretly Islamic Republic. Tis list in- nonproliferation experts have warned that “[t]here is cludes the “Bolivarian” nations considerable risk that Tehran could covertly procure creating a new of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecua- nuclear materials from Chinese brokers and circum- parallel nu- dor in Latin America, the Stalin- vent a nuclear deal by secretly creating a new parallel clear pro- ist regime of Kim Jong-un in North nuclear program.”15 Korea, and the dictatorship of Omar At the same time, Iran will have both greater el-Bashir in the Sudan, among others – all incentive and greater capability to engage in “ofshore” of which currently maintain signifcant politi- development of a nuclear capability, relying on its ex- cal, economic and military ties to the Iranian regime. isting strategic partnerships abroad to continue nuclear To date, Iran’s contacts with those countries development outside of territorial Iran. Here, too, Iran’s have been impeded, at least in part, by the econom- contacts with North Korea represent a source of serious ic isolation of the Iranian regime itself, as well as the concern, with one or more of the nuclear tests carried fnancial weakness of these rogue state partners. But, out by the DPRK over the past decade believed to have given the scope of the sanctions relief contained in the been carried out at least in part to test Iranian capabili- JCPOA, Iran will shortly have the ability to strength- ties.16 en those alliances signifcantly, with major adverse ef- fects on international security. An associated danger is A regional proliferation cascade the potential provision by Iran of strategic assistance to other aspiring nuclear weapons states; by allowing In the late 2000s, worries over Iran’s burgeoning nucle- Iran to keep a large enrichment program, the JCPOA ar capability had prompted the beginnings of a region- increases the risk that Iran could transfer enrichment al proliferation “cascade,” as vulnerable regional states technology and materials to other states or even non- moved ahead with the acquisition of strategic coun- state actors. terweights to Iran’s emerging nuclear capability. As of

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11 Abbas Qaidaari, “More Planes, Missiles and Warships for Iran,” Al-Monitor, July 14, 2015,http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/14/more-planes-missiles-and- warships-iran-increases-its-military-budget- by-a-third.

12 See, for example, Michael Rubin, “Iran Chooses Guns over Butter Every Time,” News- week, August 31, 2015, http://www.newsweek. com/iran-chooses-guns-over-butter-every- time-366848; see also Christopher Harress, “China and Iran Weigh $1 Billion Deal to Swap 2009, in a sign of this concern, at least ly or through the purchase of nuclear Chengdu J-10 Fighter Jets for Major Oil Field,” thirteen other countries in the greater components from foreign suppliers. International Business Times, August 6, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/china-iran-weigh-1- Middle East were in various stages of Tis represents a grave challenge to the billion-deal-swap-chengdu-j-10-fighter-jets- nuclear acquisition, with most doing so contemporary nonproliferation order, major-oil-feld-2042356.

specifcally in response to Iran’s nuclear as well as to existing models of deter- 13 Larry Niksch, Testimony before the House 17 efort. While the subsequent outbreak rence, and increases the chances for Committee on Foreign Afairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade; of the so-called “Arab Spring” succeed- catastrophic miscalculation. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacifc, and; ed in muting those stirrings, at least for Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, July 28, 2015, http://docs.house.gov/ a time, growing uncertainty over the A slower, but stronger, Iranian meetings/FA/FA18/20150728/103824/HHRG- regional strategic balance in the Mid- nuclear program 114-FA18-Wstate-NikschL-20150728.pdf. dle East – coupled with fears of Iran’s Te particulars of the JCPOA confrm 14 See Wyn Q. Bowen, Ian J. Stewart and Dan- imperial ambitions – has revived the that the initial objective of Western di- iel Salisbury, “Engaging China in Proliferation interest of regional powers in acquiring Prevention,” Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, plomacy with Iran – the “rollback” of October 29, 2013, http://thebulletin.org/engag- their own nuclear deterrent. the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infra- ing-china-proliferation-prevention. Most prominently, Saudi Ara- structure – has not been attained. To 15 Orde F. Kittrie, “Te China-Iran Nucle- bia, Iran’s long-time ideological rival the contrary, the existing terms of the ar Pipeline,” Foreign Afairs, July 13, 2015, in the Islamic world, has made clear https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/chi- agreement will actually help Iran to that, should Iran move toward the cre- na/2015-07-13/china-iran-nuclear-pipeline. develop a stronger nuclevar program ation of a nuclear weapon, “we would 16 See, for example, Claudia Rosett, “Iran Could over time. Pursuant to a number of key do that also.”18 Tere are indications Outsource Its Nuclear-Weapons Program to provisions - including Russian coop- North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, that the Saudi government has already 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-could- eration on nuclear research at the For- moved in that direction; Saudi Arabia outsource-its-nuclear-weapons-program-to- dow Fuel Enrichment Plant (Annex I, north-korea-1403303442; See also Gordon G. was an important fnancial backer of Chang, “Does Iran Have Secret Nukes in North Section H), European aid in strength- Pakistan’s nuclear program, and re- Korea?” Te Daily Beast, March 29, 2015, http:// ening Iranian nuclear security (Annex www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/29/ cent, credible reporting has suggested does-iran-have-secret-nukes-in-north-korea. III, Section D), and international assis- that worries over Iran’s nuclear capa- html. tance in aiding Iran to master the nu- 17 bility have prompted Riyadh to codify Tis list included the six nations of the Gulf clear fuel cycle through fuel fabrication Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, arrangements for the procurement of (Annex IV, Section 2) - the P5+1 pow- Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) “of the shelf” nuclear weaponry from as well as Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Al- ers have pledged to help improve the geria, and Tunisia. See “Nuclear Programmes in Islamabad.19 Other countries can be capability and sophistication of Iran’s the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran,” Inter- expected to follow suit, given both the national Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic nuclear efort over time. As a result, Dossier, May 23, 2008, https://www.iiss.org/en/ inherent faws in the JCPOA and the they will bring Iran closer to a baseline publications/strategic%20dossiers/issues/nu- inability of the Obama administration clear-programmes-in-the-middle-east--in-the- nuclear capability over the coming de- shadow-of-iran-5993. to provide adequate security guaran- cade, perhaps considerably so. In the 18 tees against the emergence of a nuclear As cited in Sohrab Ahmari, “Te Saudis Re- process, they will greatly constrain U.S. ply to Iran’s Rising Danger,” Wall Street Jour- Iran. Te end result will likely be move- options for responding to Iran’s nucle- nal, August 21, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/ ment toward a “multi-nuclear Mid- articles/the-saudis-reply-to-irans-rising-dan- ar program, either during the time the ger-1440197120. dle East,” with multiple regional states JCPOA is in force or the period that 19 seeking the acquisition of an ofensive Toby Harnden and Christina Lamb, “Sau- immediately follows. dis ‘to Get Nuclear Weapons,’” Sunday Times nuclear capability, either indigenous- (London), May 17, 2015, http://www.thesun- daytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_ East/article1557090.ece. 8 have begun to return to the Iranian market in earnest now that sanctions appear to be on the verge of being Managing the removed. Moreover, because of the terms of the JCPOA, Iran’s ability to move this money is poised to expand signifcantly. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Fallout more than a dozen Iranian banks that were previously barred by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Finance Te foregoing makes abundantly clear that passage of (SWIFT) will be reintegrated into the global fnancial the JCPOA does not signal an end to the Iranian chal- system.20 lenge confronting the United States, but rather a new Te United States and its partners therefore – and arguably even more challenging – phase in that need to focus on how to prevent post agreement Irani- contest. America’s strategy must change accordingly, an money from migrating into the cofers of Hezbollah and should do so in the following areas: and other terrorist actors or from fueling expanded nuclear procurement and proliferation. Doing so requires signifcantly expanding the resources available to rele- Tracking Iranian money Te terms of the JCPOA envision the Iranian regime vant governmental bureaus and agencies – among them receiving an economic infusion of unprecedented scope the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Terrorism and from the release of previously-frozen oil revenue. Iran’s Financial Intelligence and the Commerce Department’s economic windfall will be bolstered further by expand- Bureau of Industry and Security – to identify, track, and ing trade with various foreign trading partners, who interdict such illicit funds and activities, as well as pro- viding them with a clear political mandate to do so.

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20 ternational economy. Building on the Jonathan Schanzer and Mark Du- Blacklisting the IRGC bowitz, “It Just Got Easier for Iran With the exception of its Supreme Lead- foundation laid in Title III of the Iran to Fund Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, er, there is no more important political Treat Reduction Act of 2012, the July 17, 2015, http://foreignpolicy. actor in Iran than the regime’s clerical IRGC as a whole should be formally com/2015/07/17/it-just-got-easier- designated as a terrorist entity – and for-iran-to-fund-terrorism-swift- army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard bank/. Corps (Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e its economic interests, constituent en- 21 Eslāmi). Originally conceived by the tities and afliated companies should Edgar O’Ballance, Islamic Funda- Ayatollah Khomeini as a revolution- be comprehensively mapped and iden- mentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: Te tifed by relevant government agencies. Iranian Connection (New York: New ary vanguard capable of spreading his York University Press, 1997), 42. political model beyond Iran’s borders,21 Tereafer, Congress should consider 22 the IRGC is today far more than sim- legislating any additional authorities Mark Gregory, “Expanding Busi- ness Empire of Iran’s Revolutionary ply a national army. Within Iran, it is that may be necessary to penalize Iran’s foreign partners for trading with the Guards,” BBC, July 26, 2010, http:// nothing short of an economic power- www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle- house, in control of numerous compa- IRGC or entities owned by or related to east-10743580. nies and corporate entities that stretch it. 23 Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, “Iran Al- across broad swathes of the Islamic Re- ready Sanitizing Nuclear Site, Intel public’s economy, from transportation Ensuring Iranian compliance Warns,” BloombergView, August 5, to energy to construction. All told, the Iran’s anticipated violations of the 2015,http://www.bloombergview. IRGC is believed to command as much JCPOA in the near future are not like- com/articles/2015-08-05/iran-al- as one-third of Iran’s entire economy.22 ready-sanitizing-parchin-nucle- ly to include an obvious “sprint” to the ar-site-intel-warns. By default, it will therefore emerge as nuclear fnish line in the form of ma- a major benefciary of any sanctions jor, sustained violations of the terms of relief received by the Islamic Republic, the deal. Rather, it is far more likely to as well as becoming dispropor- “inch out,” testing the resolve of West- tionately enriched by the re- ern nations to hold it to account over sumption of trade between Iran numerous small infractions (such as and potential trading partners the illicit procurement of nuclear main Europe and Asia. teriel or a failure to adequately repro- To limit this beneft, the cess its existing uranium stocks). In- United States should move deed, such violations are believed to be resolutely to limit the occurring already. Tese include Iran’s IRGC’s ability recent eforts to “sanitize” its Parchin to access nuclear facility, which were reported the in- by the U.S. intelligence community in early August.23

10 Te Administration’s responses to this and other “dash” for the bomb becomes more acute as we move infractions have been telling. By minimizing such in- further into the future, and Iran’s nuclear program instances as immaterial and defending Iran against crit- creases in both sophistication and maturity. Te Obama icism from the press, the White House has made clear administration has expressed its support for means of that it lacks “scalable responses” to Iranian behavior. deterring Iran “from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon,” Simply put, the U.S. does not currently possess the tools including through the use of military force if neces- to exact tactical penalties from the Islamic Republic for sary.24 Yet it so far has not undertaken concrete steps to minor infractions without torpedoing the nuclear deal communicate to the Iranian regime that it is prepared as a whole. And because it does not, the White House is to do so. incentivized to turn a blind eye to instances of Iranian As former Administration ofcials Dennis Ross cheating. and David Petraeus have outlined, one measure that Changing this state of afairs requires publicly the United States could take would be to provide Isra- articulating – and then enforcing – a series of punitive el with ordinance capable of destroying Iranian nuclear actions for tactical Iranian infractions. Such “scalable facilities: namely, the 30,000 pound Massive Ordinance responses” (ranging from asset seizures to the black- Penetrator (MOP), as well as the means to transport it.25 listing of companies to the freezing of sanc- Beyond bolstering Israel’s ability to act unilaterally to tions relief) can ratchet up the costs to prevent Iranian “breakout,” however, the United States Tehran of cheating on the terms of the also needs to articulate a clear, unambiguous deterrence JCPOA, and help ensure Iranian posture regarding its readiness to use resolute force to The Islamic compliance with the agreement. prevent Iran’s acquisition of an ofensive nuclear capa- Tese steps should be formally bility, either during the lifespan of the JCPOA or afer- Republic promulgated and articulated wards. Iran must be put on notice in concrete terms that maintains the by the Administration as a the United States is prepared to prevent the emergence capability to way of putting the Iranian of a nuclear-armed Iran by any means necessary. regime on notice regard- Intrinsic to this declaratory posture is a recap- menace its imme- ing the costs of potential italization of American defense capabilities. Te U.S. diate neighborhood infractions. But Congress military now fnds itself at its lowest force strength since – and, increasingly, should do what it can to the end of World War II. Existing budgetary constraints bring this about. have severely impacted both the readiness and power the broader By necessity, en- projection capabilities of American forces. Tis state of international suring that Iran stays within afairs calls into question the ability of the United States community. the parameters of the JCPOA to credibly assure the protection of allies in the event requires being able to accu- of hostilities with Iran, or undertake unilateral military rately track Iran’s nuclear-related action against the Islamic Republic in the event of ma- activities, both within its own bor- terial breach of the JCPOA or some other casus belli. A ders and abroad. Advanced forensic recapitalization of the U.S. military writ large, including and scientifc technologies that can help a strengthening of the nuclear triad, must become a na- accomplish this task currently exist within the tional priority at the earliest possible time. defense-industrial sector (including at the Pentagon’s Defense Treat Reduction Agency). Tey need to be Strengthening missile defense capabilities promptly deployed by the U.S. government to provide more stringent monitoring and attribution of Iran’s nu- Conspicuous in their absence from the terms of the clear processes. JCPOA are meaningful restrictions on the size and sophistication of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal. Although inclusion of Iran’s missiles were a core demand of the Enhancing deterrence against Iran P5+1 at the outset of negotiations in November 2013, Because the terms of the JCPOA do not reverse Iran’s Iran’s refusal led the Obama administration to abandon march toward nuclear status, the danger of a breakout this requirement early in the negotiating process. It has remains a real one. Moreover, the danger of an Iranian

11 Citations

24 been suggested by some that Iran’s pand production of components of “Obama’s Letter to Congressman Nadler,” New York Times, August 20, insistence on the omission of ballistic existing ones, including – most imme- 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/inter- missile capabilities from the oversight diately – interceptors for the country’s active/2015/08/20/world/middleeast/ of the JCPOA represents a conscious highly-successful Iron Dome system. document-obamas-letter-to-con- “cost imposing strategy” on the part gressman-nadler.html?_r=0. of the Islamic Republic – one intend- Preserving Iran’s democratic 25 Dennis Ross and David H. Petrae- ed to force the United States to make potential us, “How to Put Some Teeth into the additional, costly investments in the Nuclear Deal with Iran,” Washington protection of its regional allies, thereby Already ranked among the world’s Post, August 25, 2015, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/how- depleting its resources. Whatever the most repressive regimes, the past several years have seen a deepening crack- to-put-some-teeth-into-the-nuclear- case, the failure to include limitations deal-with-iran/2015/08/25/6f3db43c- on Iran’s ballistic missile program and down on human rights, freedom of ex- 4b35-11e5-bf9-9736d04fc8e4_story. arsenal as part of the JCPOA means pression and political choice within the html. Islamic Republic. Te proximate cause that the Islamic Republic maintains 26 for this crackdown was the so-called See, for example, “Iran Unveils New the capability to menace its immedi- Longer-Range Solid Fuel Missile,” ate neighborhood – and, increasingly, Green Movement that coalesced in re- Associated Press, August 22, 2015, the broader international communi- sponse to the fraudulent reelection of http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-un- ty. Iran’s ability to do so, moreover, is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Irani- veils-new-longer-range-solid-fuel- missile-1440242328. growing in light of recent advances to an presidency in the summer of 2009. the range and sophistication of its bal- But Iran’s state-directed domestic re- 27 See, for example, Awad Mustafa, listic missiles.26 pression has lasted beyond Ahmadine- “Little Progress Made on Integrat- ed GCC Missile Shield,” Defense To guard against this threat, the jad’s term in ofce, and has both deep- ened and accelerated during the tenure News, August 30, 2015, http://www. United States will need to signifcantly defensenews.com/story/defense/poli- expand and strengthen its investments of ostensibly moderate president Has- cy-budget/warfare/2015/08/30/lilttle- in Middle Eastern missile defense ca- san Rouhani. As noted by an array of progress-made--integrated-gcc-mis- pabilities. By and large, while coop- human rights watchdogs, the Rouhani sile-shield/32390269/. era has seen a signifcant spike in activ- eration with countries in the Persian 28 See, for example, “Human Rights Gulf on the creation of a consolidated ities such was public executions, media Under Rouhani,” Iran Human Rights missile defense architecture is already censorship and the arrest and persecu- Documentation Center, March 24, 28 underway, such a structure remains tion of political prisoners. 2014,http://www.iranhrdc.org/en- 27 Domestic conditions within glish/news/in-the-news/1000000448- largely conceptual. Te various mis- human-rights-under-rouhani.html. sile defense systems acquired by GCC Iran should be of signifcant concern nations to date represent stand-alone to American policymakers. Te Islam- investments, and are not properly in- ic Republic’s nearly 82 million-person teroperable and complimentary for population is overwhelmingly youth- regional defense. With Israel, by con- ful, educated and westward-looking. trast, the United States already boasts While Iran’s current clerical regime has a vibrant and ongoing missile defense made no secret of its ongoing animus partnership. To counter Iranian ca- to the United States, notwithstanding pabilities, the United States will need the passage of the JCPOA, this “other” to facilitate Gulf state procurement Iran holds out the promise of a more of advanced missile defense systems durable and harmonious relationship (such as THAAD), and expedite their with the West. But the JCPOA imperils deliveries to those countries interest- Iran’s democratic potential, because it ed in them. Additional resources also strengthens the current Iranian gov- need to be provided to Israel to accel- ernment at the expense of its captive erate the development of new missile population, even as it downgrades defense technologies, as well as to ex- Western concerns over Iran’s political

trajectory. Te agreement likewise threatens to erode scope and impact. traditional pro-American sentiment among the Iranian Yet, in the wake of the JCPOA, there is a dan- population, which has long held favorable views of the ger that America’s voice will be muted – if not silenced United States precisely because of its opposition to the outright. Te Iranian regime has made no secret of its clerical regime in Tehran. Te appearance of U.S. capit- opposition to U.S. broadcasting, which it views as un- ulation via the JCPOA puts us at risk of losing the sup- acceptable cultural penetration and subversion – a “sof port of the constituency within Iran that represents our war” of sorts against the Islamic Republic. Iranian Su- hope for the future. In response, Congress will need to preme Leader Ali Khamenei has identifed this as an exact more resolutely than ever before, through both pub- istential threat to the Iranian regime, and declared that lic statements and concrete legislation, to shine a spot- the fght against it represents the “main priority” of his light on Iran’s human rights abuses and to penalize the government.31 As such, the issue of American outreach Iranian government for its repression of democracy at could well become a point of contention in the future if home. Washington and Tehran continue to move toward dip- lomatic détente. Iranian leaders can be expected to press Protecting American outreach their American counterparts to roll back the scope and Iran, as New York Times columnist Tomas Friedman reach of U.S. media toward their citizenry. While the described a decade ago, is “the ultimate red state:” a White House has given no indication that it is prepared country with a sophisticated, urbane and youthful pop- to do so, Congress should be prepared for this to emerge ulation increasingly chafng under the ideological con- as a demand of the Iranian regime and take proactive straints of the current clerical regime.29 It is a population, steps to preserve and ultimately to strengthen the ability moreover, that is eager to meaningfully engage with the of America’s public diplomacy outlets to communicate West – even if the ruling regime in Tehran is not. with the Iranian people – even as it continues to press Over the years, public broadcasting has emerged for a robust, coherent strategy to underpin this out- as an efective and robust voice to communicate with reach. this captive constituency. According to the ofcial es- Simultaneously, the United States needs to in- timates of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, U.S. crease its investment in Internet freedom in Iran. Over international media in Farsi currently reaches nearly 30 the past several years, the Islamic Republic has dramat- percent of the Islamic Republic’s total population.30 Tis ically expanded its attempts to censor, manipulate and outreach eclipses that of its foreign counterparts (such shape the ability of its citizens to access the World Wide 32 as the BBC’s widely-respected Persian Service) in both Web. Tis digital “counter-revolution” – in the form of

13 Citations 29 Tomas L. Friedman, “An Amer- widespread communications mon- ilies, rendering approximately $45 ican in Paris,” New York Times, Jan- uary 20, 2005, http://www.nytimes. itoring, onerous government regula- billion in judgments against the Islam- com/2005/01/20/opinion/an-ameri- tions, and attempts to create a second ic Republic. can-in-paris.html. (or “halal”) Internet – is already perva- To date, however, these victims 30 U.S Broadcasting Board of Gover- sive in nature. However, as a result of remain uncompensated, with Iran re- nors, “Key Media Indicators from the anticipated sanctions relief to be pro- fusing to provide payment. And now, Most Recent Available Phone Survey vided to Iran, it may soon grow signif- they are at risk of being forgotten al- of Iran,” Memo to the American For- cantly, with major adverse efects on together. In its negotiations with the eign Policy Council dated September freedom of press and expression with- Iranian regime, the Obama adminis- 10, 2015. in the Islamic Republic. Te U.S. gov- tration chose not to raise the issue of 31 “Leader Urges Measures to Counter ernment consequently needs to make remuneration for past acts of terror- Enemy’s Sof War,” Press TV (Tehran), access to the World Wide Web among ism, deeming them to be outside the November 25, 2009, http://edition. ordinary Iranians a major prong of its scope of the deal. As a result, the legal presstv.ir/detail/112163.html. much-discussed “Internet freedom judgments against Iran were not en- 32 See Timothy B. Lee, “Here’s How agenda,” and expand its investment forced as part of negotiations with the Iran Censors the Internet,” Wash- in technologies and communications Iranian regime, despite the vast scope ington Post, August 15, 2013, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the- tools that preserve and expand the free of economic relief involved. Tis, to- switch/wp/2013/08/15/heres-how- fow of ideas into the Islamic Republic. gether with the unwillingness of the iran-censors-the-internet/; see also U.S. government to enforce judgments Reporters Without Borders, “Iran,” Honoring American victims of against the Islamic Republic, now or in in “Surveillance,” special edition, Te the future, has lef victims of Iranian Enemies of Internet (March 12, 2013), terror http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/iran/. terror largely without recourse.33 Te Islamic Republic represents the Te U.S. Congress has the pow- 33 Editorial, “Debts of the Ayatollah,” world’s leading state sponsor of terror- er to alter this state of afairs. Trough Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2015, ism – a position it has occupied since legislative means, it can remove ex- http://www.wsj.com/articles/debts- formally being designated as such by of-the-ayatollah-1439507940. isting Iranian impunity and compel the Reagan administration in 1984. payment of debts owed to Americans Over the years, it has instigated or (through means such as the escrow- sponsored acts of terrorism – from the ing of Iranian monies and properties 1983 Marine Barracks bombing to the in the possession of the United States). campaign of terror waged by the Pales- By doing so, the legislative branch can tinian Islamic Jihad in the 1990s – that play an important role in ensuring that has claimed hundreds of American the Islamic Republic is not unjustly en- lives. Over the past two decades, U.S. riched at the expense of its numerous courts have worked diligently to secure victims. justice for these victims and their fam-

While a nuclear deal with Iran has now been struck, the broader strategic challenge that Iran poses to American interests and allies persists. Resolute American action is The necessary to prevent Iranian cheating during the time that the JCPOA is in force, an Iranian nuclear breakout there- afer, and adverse efects stemming from Iran’s acquisition Road of the extensive sanctions relief inherent in the agreement. Currently, the United States lacks both the capacity and credibility to respond to the potential consequences of the Ahead nuclear agreement with Iran. We believe that altering this status quo must become a priority for U.S. lawmakers in the months and years ahead. 14 509 C Street NE Washington, D.C. 20002 Telephone: 202.543.1006 Fax: 202.543.1007 www.afpc.org