DOCSLIB.ORG

THE IRAQ WAR -- PART I: the U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE IRAQ WAR -- PART I: the U.S 1 THE IRAQ WAR -- PART I: The U.S. Prepares for Conflict, 2001 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 326 Timeline By Joyce Battle 1985 – Academic Albert Wohlstetter supporter, neoconservative Richard Perle, introduces Iraqi expatriate Ahmad Chalabi reportedly raises most of the group’s to Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, funding from defense contractors and a neoconservatives later influential in the right-wing foundation. Bandar attracts George W. Bush administration. 1 support from several Jewish organizations by telling them that if Saddam Hussein 1989 -- Petra Bank of Amman, founded were eliminated other governments in the by Ahmad Chalabi and influential through region would deal with the Arab-Israeli its strategic lending to prominent conflict on more “pragmatic terms."5 Jordanians, including the king of Jordan’s brother, is seized by the government for October 10, 1990 -- An informal alleged irregularities. Chalabi flees the association called the Congressional country in the trunk of a car. Two years Human Rights Caucus holds a hearing on later he is convicted in absentia for reported Iraqi atrocities. The association embezzlement and fraud and sentenced to is chaired by Tom Lantos (D-CA) and John 22 years in prison.2 Porter (R-IL) who also head the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, 1990 – Prominent neoconservative which is headquartered in free office space academic Bernard Lewis meets Ahmad at Hill & Knowlton's Washington, D.C. Chalabi and becomes one of his leading office. At the hearing a 15-year-old advocates.3 Kuwaiti girl says she witnessed Iraqi soldiers leaving babies on the floor to die August 2, 1990 -- Iraq invades Kuwait, in order to steal incubators; the story is accusing it of conspiring with the U.S. to widely repeated as fact. In reality the girl both steal its oil and drive down oil prices. is the Kuwaiti ambassador’s daughter and was coached by Hill & Knowlton in what August 2, 1990 -- Kuwait’s ruling family was later shown to be false testimony.6 hires Hill & Knowlton to lobby for a U.S. war against Iraq; the company Late 1990 -- President George H.W. Bush coordinates the work of a number of decides to drive Iraq out of Kuwait with public relations firms including the Rendon military force. As the heads of the Joint Group. Polls to identify themes most Chiefs of Staff and the Central Command, likely to win public support for war find Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf are that depicting Iraqi leader Saddam in charge of war planning, but Defense Hussein as a dangerous madman who Secretary Dick Cheney is displeased with commits atrocities against his own people their work. He has DOD official Paul is most effective.4 Wolfowitz work with his aide Scooter Libby and Henry Rowen, also of DOD, to September 1990 -- Rep. Stephen Solarz secretly draw up an alternative plan. (D-N.Y) sets up the Committee for Peace While Powell is traveling abroad Cheney and Security in the Gulf to lobby for war presents the alternative to Bush, who against Iraq with support from rejects it.7 conservatives and some hawkish Democratic activists, along with Saudi February 2, 1991 – At the end of the ambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar. A Persian Gulf War U.S. propaganda outlets 2 in the region encourage Kurdish and York Times and causes the Bush Shi’ite insurrections in Iraq that are administration major embarrassment.12 quickly suppressed. The Bush administration is criticized for not invading March 4, 1992 – Future George W. Bush Iraq but its defenders, like Dick Cheney, administration official Douglas Feith and say this would have left the U.S. his fellow neoconservative Frank Gaffney entangled in a long-term occupation. The write a Washington Times commentary U.S. sets up no-fly zones over northern excoriating the George H.W. Bush and southern Iraq and many in the administration for criticizing the right-wing administration expect, wrongly, that a Likud Party for expanding illegal Israeli coup will soon overthrow Saddam settlements in the occupied West Bank.13 Hussein.8 1993 – When George H.W. Bush is April 3, 1991 -- U.N. Security Council defeated by Bill Clinton, Dick Cheney joins resolutions impose sanctions on Iraq to the American Enterprise Institute where force it to destroy its nonconventional he is increasingly influenced by neocon 14 weapons programs. The sanctions last AEI members, including Richard Perle. until 2003 and devastate Iraq’s economy, infrastructure, and society; this includes May 1993 -- Laurie Mylroie, an Iraq doubling its child mortality rate.9 policy advisor for the Clinton-for-president campaign, no longer in favor with the Around May 1991 -- George H.W. Bush administration, meets with FBI agents to signs a top secret directive authorizing a explain her theory that Iraq was behind CIA covert operation to overthrow the February 1993 World Trade Center Saddam Hussein, using any means bombing. Afterwards they do not return 15 necessary including lethal force. The her calls. agency concludes at the outset that there is no chance of success since it has no November 1993 -- Ahmad Chalabi reliable assets in Iraq.10 promotes a plan he calls “The End Game” for overthrowing Saddam Hussein, Around May 11, 1991 -- The CIA hires envisioning a revolt by INC-led Shi’ites in the Rendon Group for propaganda southern Iraq and Kurds in the north that operations against Iraq. Rendon would inspire a military uprising and lead assembles anti-government Iraqis under to the installation of an INC-dominated the rubric Iraqi National Congress, and regime friendly to the U.S. and Israel. helps install Ahmad Chalabi, recently Chalabi uses some of his substantial CIA convicted in Jordan for fraud and funding to start building an armed 16 embezzlement, as INC chief.11 militia. February 1992 – Defense Department 1994 – A CIA case officer accompanied policy under secretary Paul Wolfowitz has by Ahmad Chalabi visits “a forgery shop” his deputy Zalmay Khalilzad secretly draft run by the INC in Kurdistan, where people a paper, “Defense Planning Guidance“, scan Iraqi intelligence documents into 17 outlining military planning for the next computers to create disinformation. century. It calls for the Pentagon to “establish and protect a new order” to 1994 -- Republican electoral gains in deter any possible rivals from even trying Congress lead to increasing to compete with a hegemonic U.S. and neoconservative influence on Middle East 18 contemplates preemptive use of nuclear, policy debates. biological, and chemical weapons, “even in conflicts that do not directly engage U.S. October 29, 1994 – President Clinton interests.” The draft is leaked to the New signs a Memorandum of Amplification replacing Bush’s 1991 finding authorizing 3 covert action to overthrow Saddam Israel has the right to expropriate the Hussein.19 occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. They also advise Israel to privatize its economy, March 5, 1995 -- An attempt by Ahmad to indirectly undermine Syria by Chalabi and the CIA to execute what is overthrowing Iraqi president Saddam essentially Chalabi’s “End Game” plan fails Hussein, and to work with the king of dismally. Over State Department Jordan to restore a monarchy to Iraq. objections NSC official Martin Indyk had (Britain installed generally amenable authorized a clandestine CIA operation monarchs in both Jordan and Iraq after under which Chalabi’s militia in alliance World War I; Ahmad Chalabi’s family was with tribal leaders won over by bribes part of a wealthy elite during that era, would provoke urban disturbances in Iraq which was ended by a 1958 revolution.)23 and sabotage government facilities. Shi’ite groups were to attack in the south Spring-Summer 1996 -- A CIA and the Iraqi army was to then join the undercover operation attempting to uprising. The scheme was discovered by organize an officers’ coup against Saddam Saddam Hussein’s government but Hussein is discovered and routed by Iraq. Chalabi refused to abort the operation; it Meanwhile, one faction among highly failed, no Iraqi military officers rebelled, divided Iraqi Kurds invites forces loyal to many INC members were executed. The Saddam Hussein into Kurdistan to crush CIA and DIA turned against Chalabi as its rivals; the Iraqi military captures and ineffectual but the Defense Department kills hundreds of Ahmad Chalabi’s continued funding the INC. Chalabi supporters and many others flee to the retreated to London and relied U.S.24 increasingly on neoconservative pundits and the U.S. Congress for support.20 September 27, 1996 – Paul Wolfowitz attributes Iraq’s crushing of the recent August 8, 1995 – Saddam Hussein’s CIA coup attempt to Clinton son-in-law, Gen. Hussein Kamel, defects. administration ineptitude and writes that He tells U.N. inspectors they have been Saddam Hussein still has “a loaded gun -- highly effective in Iraq and that all and it’s pointed at us.”25 chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear related weapons have been destroyed. June 1997 – Ahmad Chalabi tells the After this high-level defection the Iraqi Jewish Institute for National Security government gives huge volumes of Affairs that overthrowing Saddam Hussein documentation on its former weapons and replacing him with a regime “at peace programs to the U.N.21 with its neighbors” would be easy if the U.S. supported an INC-led insurgency. 1996 -- Chalabi and a dedicated Later he tells the Jerusalem Post that he supporter, Francis Brooke, set up shop in would facilitate export of Iraqi oil to Georgetown to lobby for the INC. They Israel.26 study the methods of the African National Congress and various pro-Israel groups in October 1997 -- The International order to refine their technique.22 Atomic Energy Agency issues a definitive report declaring Iraq to be free of nuclear July 1996 – Future Bush administration weapons; its main author later says it was officials Douglas Feith and David Wurmser "highly unlikely" that Iraq could conceal a (later an advisor to Dick Cheney) are nuclear weapons program from modern among the authors of an advisory paper detection systems.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Husain Haqqani 154 Bay State Road Department of International Relations Email: Haqqani@Bu.Edu CAS IR 586 Islam in South Asian P
    Husain Haqqani 154 Bay State Road Department of International Relations Email: haqqani@bu.edu CAS IR 586 Islam in South Asian Politics Fall 2013 Tuesday 12:30- 3:30 pm Course Guide This course will examine the relations between the State, Politics, and Islam in South Asia and their impact on international relations. Islam became the defining element of a Pakistani identity after the partition of British India in 1947. It continues to have a strong influence on South Asian politics, especially in relation to unresolved regional conflicts over Kashmir and to some extent in Afghanistan. Pakistanis consider the dispute concerning Kashmir an unsolved question of the partition of British India in 1947 and lay claim to the territory because the vast majority of the population is Muslim. India, a secular state, views the Kashmir question as legally settled, and it too claims the whole territory, which is at present divided along a cease fire line. Pakistan has backed Islamist insurgents in Indian-controlled Kashmir in an effort to force India’s hand. India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons, which make war and peace between them a global concern. In Afghanistan, U.S. backed Mujahideen fought the Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s, fell into civil war once the Soviets left and were replaced by the Taliban, who claimed they were uniting the country under the banner of Islam’s prophet. The Taliban were ousted from power through U.S. military force after 9/11 and the U.S. is playing a critical role with the intention of rebuilding Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • The Leftist Case for War in Iraq •fi William Shawcross, Allies
    Fordham International Law Journal Volume 27, Issue 6 2003 Article 6 Vengeance And Empire: The Leftist Case for War in Iraq – William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe, and the War in Iraq Hal Blanchard∗ ∗ Copyright c 2003 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke- ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj Vengeance And Empire: The Leftist Case for War in Iraq – William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe, and the War in Iraq Hal Blanchard Abstract Shawcross is superbly equipped to assess the impact of rogue States and terrorist organizations on global security. He is also well placed to comment on the risks of preemptive invasion for existing alliances and the future prospects for the international rule of law. An analysis of the ways in which the international community has “confronted evil,” Shawcross’ brief polemic argues that U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were right to go to war without UN clearance, and that the hypocrisy of Jacques Chirac was largely responsible for the collapse of international consensus over the war. His curious identification with Bush and his neoconservative allies as the most qualified to implement this humanitarian agenda, however, fails to recognize essential differences between the leftist case for war and the hard-line justification for regime change in Iraq. BOOK REVIEW VENGEANCE AND EMPIRE: THE LEFTIST CASE FOR WAR IN IRAQ WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, ALLIES: THE U.S., BRITAIN, EUROPE, AND THE WAR IN IRAQ* Hal Blanchard** INTRODUCTION In early 2002, as the war in Afghanistan came to an end and a new interim government took power in Kabul,1 Vice President Richard Cheney was discussing with President George W.
    [Show full text]
  • CJR - Iraqgate, by Russ W
    CJR - Iraqgate, by Russ W. Baker March/April 1993 | Contents IRAQGATE The Big One That (Almost) Got Away Who Chased it -- and Who Didn't by Russ W. Baker Baker, a member of the adjunct faculty at Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, is a free-lance writer who regularly contributes to The Village Voice. Research assistance was provided by Julie Asher in Washington and Daniel Eisenberg in New York. ABC News Nightline opened last June 9 with words to make the heart stop. "It is becoming increasingly clear," said a grave Ted Koppel, "that George Bush, operating largely behind the scenes throughout the 1980s, initiated and supported much of the financing, intelligence, and military help that built Saddam's Iraq into the aggressive power that the United States ultimately had to destroy." Is this accurate? Just about every reporter following the story thinks so. Most say that the so-called Iraqgate scandal is far more significant then either Watergate or Iran-contra, both in its scope and its consequences. And all believe that, with investigations continuing, it is bound to get bigger. Why, then, have some of our top papers provided so little coverage? Certainly, if you watched Nightline or read the London Financial Times or the Los Angeles Times, you saw this monster grow. But if you studied the news columns of The Washington Post or, especially, The New York Times, you practically missed the whole thing. Those two papers were very slow to come to the story and, when they finally did get to it, their pieces all too frequently were boring, complicated,and short of the analysis readers required to fathom just what was going on.
    [Show full text]
  • The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003
    THE REGIME CHANGE CONSENSUS: IRAQ IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1990-2003 Joseph Stieb A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2019 Approved by: Wayne Lee Michael Morgan Benjamin Waterhouse Daniel Bolger Hal Brands ©2019 Joseph David Stieb ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Joseph David Stieb: The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003 (Under the direction of Wayne Lee) This study examines the containment policy that the United States and its allies imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and argues for a new understanding of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. At the core of this story is a political puzzle: Why did a largely successful policy that mostly stripped Iraq of its unconventional weapons lose support in American politics to the point that the policy itself became less effective? I argue that, within intellectual and policymaking circles, a claim steadily emerged that the only solution to the Iraqi threat was regime change and democratization. While this “regime change consensus” was not part of the original containment policy, a cohort of intellectuals and policymakers assembled political support for the idea that Saddam’s personality and the totalitarian nature of the Baathist regime made Iraq uniquely immune to “management” strategies like containment. The entrenchment of this consensus before 9/11 helps explain why so many politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals rejected containment after 9/11 and embraced regime change and invasion.
    [Show full text]
  • Record of the Communications Policy & Research Forum 2009 in Its 2006 National Security Statement, George W
    TWITTER FREE IRAN: AN EVALUATION OF TWITTER’S ROLE IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN IRAN’S 2009 ELECTION CRISIS ALEX BURNS Faculty of Business and Law Victoria University alex@alexburns.net BEN ELTHAM Centre for Cultural Research University of Western Sydney and Fellow, Centre for Policy Development ben.eltham@gmail.com) Abstract Social media platforms such as Twitter pose new challenges for decision-makers in an international crisis. We examine Twitter’s role during Iran’s 2009 election crisis using a comparative analysis of Twitter investors, US State Department diplomats, citizen activists and Iranian protestors and paramilitary forces. We code for key events during the election’s aftermath from 12 June to 5 August 2009, and evaluate Twitter. Foreign policy, international political economy and historical sociology frameworks provide a deeper context of how Twitter was used by different users for defensive information operations and public diplomacy. Those who believe Twitter and other social network technologies will enable ordinary people to seize power from repressive regimes should consider the fate of Iran’s protestors, some of whom paid for their enthusiastic adoption of Twitter with their lives. Keywords Twitter, foreign policy, international relations, United States, Iran, social networks 1. Research problem, study context and methods The next U.S. administration may well face an Iran again in turmoil. If so, we will be fortunate in not having an embassy in Tehran to worry about. From a safe distance, we can watch the Iranian people, again, fight for their freedom. We can pray that the clerical Gotterdamerung isn’t too bloody, and that the mullahs quickly retreat to their mosques and content themselves primarily with the joys of scholarly disputation.
    [Show full text]
  • Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover Berkeley Law
    Berkeley Law Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2005 Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover Berkeley Law Hanny Megally Hania Mufti Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq, 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 830 (2005) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact jcera@law.berkeley.edu. HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Bremer's "Gordian Knot": Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover,* Hanny Megally, ** & Hania Mufti*** ABSTRACT Shortly after the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, in his capacity as the chief administrator of the Coalition Provisional Author- ity (CPA), introduced several transitional justice mechanisms that set the *Eric Stover is Director of the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley, and Adjunct Professor in the School of Public Health. In 1991, Stover led a team of forensic scientists to northern Iraq to investigate war crimes committed by Iraqi troops during the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in the late 1980s. In March and April 2003, he returned to northern Iraq where he and Hania Mufti monitored the compliance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions by all sides to the conflict. He returned to Iraq in February 2004 to assist Mufti in investigating the status of documentary and physical evidence to be used in trials against Saddam Hussein and other members of the Ba'athist Party.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    NOTES Introduction 1. Robert Kagan to George Packer. Cited in Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate: America In Iraq (Faber and Faber, London, 2006): 38. 2. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004): 9. 3. Critiques of the war on terror and its origins include Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America At the Crossroads (Profile Books, London, 2006); Ira Chernus, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO and London, 2006); and Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (Doubleday, New York, 2008). 4. A report of the PNAC, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000: 76. URL: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15 January 2009). 5. On the first generation on Cold War neoconservatives, which has been covered far more extensively than the second, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Murray Friedman ed. Commentary in American Life (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Madison Books, Lanham MD; New York; Oxford, 1997); and Maria Ryan, “Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War,” Comparative American Studies, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Princeton Memorial
    • PRINCETON Office of the Dean of the Faculty UNIVERSITY 9 Nassau Hall Princeton, New Jersey 08544 Olga Peters Hasty, Clerk of the Faculty November 13, 2018 American Oriental Soci ty 1 Secretary of the AOS O~fice Hatcher Graduate Library University of Michigan I Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Dear American Oriental Society, It is my privilege, as C erk of the Faculty, to forward to you a copy of a Memorial Resolution adopted by unanimous ising vote of the Faculty at its meeting of November 5, 2018. Please accept my condolences together with those of the entire faculty. Olga Peters Hasty Clerk of the Faculty OPH\kan Enclosure BERNARD LEWIS 1916--- 2018 This Memorial Resolution prepared by a special committee, was approved by unanimous rising vote at the meeting of the Princeton University Faculty on November 5, 2018 and ordered spread upon the records of the Faculty. Bernard Lewis 1916- 2018 Bernard Lewfs, Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Emeritus, pasfed away Saturday, May 19, 2018, in Voorhees Township, NJ, at the age of 101, ess than two weeks before his 102nd birthday. Lewis, who came to Princeton i 197 4 with a joint appointment as Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Easte......_ Studies in the Department of Near Eastern Studies and Long--­ term Member of the Institute for Advanced Studies, was the preeminent and most influentfal scholar of the Middle East during the second half of the twentieth century and into the first years of the twenty---first century. By combining formal training in the discipline of history with a thorough knowledge of fhe languages of the region, he was one of the first to break the mold of the traditional Orientalist scholar.
    [Show full text]
  • 2003 Iraq War: Intelligence Or Political Failure?
    2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Dione Brunson, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April, 2011 DISCLAIMER THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ACADEMIC RESEARCH PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICIES OR POSITIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL INFORMATION AND SOURCES FOR THIS PAPER WERE DRAWN FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS. ii 2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? Dione Brunson, B.A. MALS Mentor: Ralph Nurnberger, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The bold U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was anchored in intelligence justifications that would later challenge U.S. credibility. Policymakers exhibited unusual bureaucratic and public dependencies on intelligence analysis, so much so that efforts were made to create supporting information. To better understand the amplification of intelligence, the use of data to justify invading Iraq will be explored alongside events leading up to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. This paper will examine the use of intelligence to invade Iraq as well as broader implications for politicization. It will not examine the justness or ethics of going to war with Iraq but, conclude with the implications of abusing intelligence. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you God for continued wisdom. Thank you Dr. Nurnberger for your patience. iv DEDICATION This work is dedicated to Mom and Dad for their continued support.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpreting the Jackson Legacy Peter Beinart
    Henry M. Jackson Foundation 1501 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1580 Seattle, Washington 98101-3225 Telephone: 206.682.8565 Fax: 206.682.8961 E-mail: foundation@hmjackson.org Website: www.hmjackson.org Henry M. Jackson Foundation TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY LECTURE nterpreting the JacksonI Legacy in a Post-9/11 Landscape By Peter Beinart About the Foundation Since its establishment in 1983, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation has been dedicated to helping nonprofit organizations and educational institutions in the United States and Russia. The Foundation’s grants provide essential support and seed funding for new initiatives that offer promising models for replication and address critical issues in four areas in which the late Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson played a key leadership role during his forty-three- year tenure in the United States Congress: Inter- national Affairs Education, Environment and Nat- ural Resources Management, Public Service, and Human Rights. About this Publication On the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation hosted a dinner and conversation at the National Press Club in Wash- ington, D.C.. Journalist Peter Beinart was invited to share his thoughts on the Jackson legacy and the Foundation’s commemorative publication, The Nature of Leadership, Lessons from an Exemplary Statesman. Foundation Executive Director Lara Iglitzin served as moderator for the discussion that followed his remarks. nterpreting the JacksonI Legacy in a Post-9/11 Landscape WASHINGTON, D.C. • SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 y y Connoll r y Har Photo b PETER BEINART Peter Beinart is a senior fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations. He is also editor-at-large of The New Republic, a Time contributor, and a monthly columnist for The Washington Post.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of the Media, Law, and National Resolve in the War on Terror
    Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 33 Number 1 Winter - 2004 Sutton Colloquium Article 10 April 2020 The Role of the Media, Law, and National Resolve in the War on Terror Robert Hardaway Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation Robert Hardaway, The Role of the Media, Law, and National Resolve in the War on Terror, 33 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 104 (2004). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, LAW, AND NATIONAL RESOLVE IN THE WAR ON TERROR ROBERT HARDAWAY* I. INTRODUCTION In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the govern- ment of the United States took unprecedented steps to protect American lives and property.' Measures imposed included tightened security at nuclear power plants,2 airports,3 and numerous other government and private installations around the United States.4 Debate over an appropriate U.S. response centered on whether there was proof of a foreign state's complicity in the attacks. On September 15, 2001, a New York Times/CBS News poll revealed that eighty-five percent of Americans would Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 1. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, After the Attacks: An Assessment, U.S. Force vs, Terrorists: From Reactive to Active, N.Y.
    [Show full text]
  • The Religious Right and the Rise of the Neo-Conservatives, in an Oral Examination Held on May 10, 2010
    AWKWARD ALLIES: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND THE RISE OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Social and Political Thought University of Regina By Paul William Gaudette Regina, Saskatchewan July 2010 Copyright 2010: P.W. Gaudette Library and Archives Bibliotheque et Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-88548-2 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-88548-2 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distrbute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation.
    [Show full text]