AWKWARD ALLIES:

THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND

THE RISE OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in Social and Political Thought

University of Regina

By

Paul William Gaudette

Regina, Saskatchewan

July 2010

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

SUPERVISORY AND EXAMINING COMMITTEE

Paul William Gaudette, candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in Social and Political Thought, has presented a thesis titled, Awkward Allies: The Religious Right and the Rise of the Neo-Conservatives, in an oral examination held on May 10, 2010. The following committee members have found the thesis acceptable in form and content, and that the candidate demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of the subject material.

External Examiner: "Dr. Allan MacLeod, St. Thomas More Colllege, Saskatoon

Supervisor: Dr. Shadia Drury, Department of Philosophy and Classics

Committee Member: Dr. David Elliott, Department of Philosophy and Classics

Committee Member: Dr. Phillip Hansen, Department of Philosophy and Classics

Chair of Defense: Dr. Troni Grande, Department of English

'Participated via teleconference Abstract

Despite the volumes of research being done about the neo-conservatives, very few studies explore in detail the relationship between the neo-cons and the Religious Right.

Even fewer argue that this alliance is potentially damaging to religious rights and jGreedoms as enshrined in the American Constitution; this paper attempts to fill that void.

While tracing the history and rise to political prominence of the neo-conservatives and its relationship with traditional conservatism, this study explores the role that the

Religious Right has played in neo-conservatism and the conflicting political objectives of each group. Further, it argues that the goals of both have been combined and popularized in a way that is disingenuous, utilitarian, and, often, misleading.

This paper closely explores the writings of Irving Kristol, one of the founding fathers of neo-conservatism, and demonstrates the widely different approach to religion and religious thought between these two groups. It further stresses the inherent danger in these two ideologies combining to create an American foreign policy that is both aggressive and crusading.

This study concludes that this alliance of ideals and objectives undermines the value of religion in civil society in the short term and potentially has disastrous consequences for the future. It suggests that religious people need to look past the immediate political gratification of the alliance to more deeply understand the consequences of providing political support behind neo-conservative goals.

ii Acknowledgements

I greatly appreciate the financial support of The Faculty of Graduate Studies and

Research that made this journey possible. This accomplishment would not have been possible without the support of many people. I would first like the thank Dr. Shadia

Drury for her patience and persistence. I am indebted to her for staying with me through this whole process, for her probing questions and her commitment to having me "speak" with a personal voice.

To those members of the Committee for Social and Political Thought whom I had the privilege of studying and working with, Dr. Phillip Hansen, Dr. David Elliott, and Dr.

Joyce Green, thank you for guiding me and for introducing me to ideas that both inspired and challenged.

Most importantly, the deepest thank you to my wife and three little girls, who gave up the most to make this dream a reality. After giving up many, many weekends and summer vacations with dad, we have finally made it. Thank you for your consistent support and encouragement in what seemed like an endless process.

iii Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES

IN AMERICAN POLITICS 6

CHAPTER TWO: WHAT'S IN A NAME? 19

CHAPTER THREE: THE RELIGION OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES 38

CHAPTER FOUR: NEO-CONSERVATISM ABROAD 60

CONCLUSION 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY 89

iv Introduction

It is as little justifiable to force our ideas on other people, as to compel them to submit to our will in any other respect.1 - John Stuart Mill

For a lot of people, politics has become trivial and irrelevant. Significant declines in voter turnout and decreases in other key indicators of political engagement exemplify the disenfranchisement and cynicism that so many evidently feel. Politics has become synonymous with politicians. And the distaste and mistrust that many people feel towards politicians has led not only to disinterest, but also to a loss of hope that politics can be an effective tool for change and good governance.

Part of what I would like to highlight is the importance, not only of politics, but of political ideas. I believe that politics and philosophy are not only important, but vital because they are the fundamental means of impacting and changing the world in which we live. Ideas have power, power enough to motivate and change people. Furthermore, politics is the means by which decisions are made everyday and those decisions impact our lives and the lives of others, sometimes significantly. More broadly, politics touches every aspect of our lives—our family relations, our work place, the films we see, and the books we read; it is the lens through which we view our neighbors and the world around us.

This thesis will examine a considerable political force that has dominated political thinking and political office in the United States for more than two decades. It has led to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; it has greatly impacted civil rights; it has gained great power and influence on the world stage. This force, or more accurately, this

1 John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-intervention," Fraser's Magazine (December, 1859).

1 "persuasion," is neo-conservatism. But the ideas that surround this political movement are not restricted to the Republicans in the United States or the Conservatives in Canada.

The ideology of the neo-conservatives literally swirls around us like something fast moving that is difficult to explain, define, or understand, since it has also penetrated the opposition parties in both countries. So much so, that the difference between liberals and conservatives is difficult to detect. Just as conservatives have become neo-conservatives, so liberals have become neo-liberals.

Much has been written about neo-conservatism over the last decade. Some of what has been written is complimentary, some of it suspicious and critical, and some of it is downright hostile. Commentators familiar with neo-conservatism may associate it with the George W. Bush administration and they would not be wrong. But neo-conservatism goes beyond the Bush Administration; it has existed in one form or another for over five decades, and is still the dominant force in the Republican Party in the United States and the Conservative Party in Canada.

Some academics have attempted to expose the neo-conservatives as some form of conspiratorial group with hidden intentions and a malicious agenda. It is easy to see why many might believe this and even espouse it. However, my research has led me to a more benign conclusion. I have found that the views and objectives of the neo-conservatives are more often than not published for all to see in academic journals, littered throughout the print and electronic news media and more recently spoken from podiums by many representatives of the last several presidential administrations.

In my thesis, I hope to answer one key question. That question is: what has been the source of the great political success of neo-conservatism? Or put another way, why

2 does its message seem to resonate so strongly with so many people? It seems that its appeal is connected to a general discontent with liberalism, especially among the

Religious Right. In a time when liberalism is sometimes associated with rising rates of crime, increasing drug use, decline of the traditional family, and the break down of other important institutions, to many the neo-conservatives seem to offer viable solutions.

Further, I will argue that the allure of neo-conservatism is based on three basic elements: a claim of recapturing the wisdom of a lost conservatism, a perceived alignment of political objectives with the Religious Right and, a more aggressive,

"America-first" foreign policy. Any (or all) of these may appeal to those who are seeking new solutions to complex political questions both domestic and foreign.

In what follows, I will explore these three elements of neo-conservatism and attempt to determine whether these statements are accurate and consistent. In searching for the answers to these questions, I hope to shed light on the power and charm of neo- conservatism. I will show that the details are not as simple and straightforward as they may at first appear. Indeed, much of the appeal of neo-conservatism rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of who they are and what they represent. To prove this, I will examine the claims of neo-conservatives using some of the theorists who have laid the intellectual foundations for this powerful political movement—Irving Kristol, Allan

Bloom, and Francis Fukuyama.

The first chapter outlines the rise of the neo-conservatives from a small, obscure group to a powerful and significant force in American politics. It briefly explores the history, transformation over time, and the noteworthy practical and philosophical

3 influences that have helped shape neo-conservative ideas into what they are today. This provides a backdrop and context for the theoretical chapters.

The second chapter sets out to answer the following question: Are neo- conservatives a genuine conservative voice in politics or something else entirely? This chapter deals with one of the core claims of the movement, namely that they are ideologically conservative. As this assertion seems to be one of the movement's greatest sources of appeal, I will examine to what extent this claim is true. I will argue that while their views and approach to politics occasionally coincide with what is understood to be conservatism, that in fact the goals and objectives of the neo-conservatives make them significantly different from classical conservatives. I will provide an analysis of some key aspects of traditional conservatism as understood by Edmund Burke and show how they have been abandoned by neo-conservatism as represented by the grandfather of neo- conservatism—Irving Kristol. In particular, I will examine the role played by prejudice, prescription, prudence, and presumption, all of which are key elements in traditional conservatism. I will briefly explore the role played by God's Providence in history, as understood by Burke, which will link the second chapter with the third and with the rest of the thesis.

The third chapter explores the relationship between American neo-conservatives and the Religious Right. Are the political goals of neo-conservatives naturally aligned and in harmony with those of the Religious Right and if so (or if not), what does that mean for the average voter? I will examine how religion fits into neo-conservative thought and attempt to understand the foundations of this "alliance." I hope to show that while both have similar interests and in many ways speak a familiar language, each group

4 has vastly different goals. Through a careful analysis of the work of Irving Kristol, I will show that neo-conservatives and the Religious Right have different objectives, including some that are at great odds with each other.

The fourth and final chapter explores neo-conservative foreign policy. Is their foreign policy agenda consistent with their claims of being a conservative voice in contemporary politics? I will examine the outcomes of their foreign policy from 2000-

2008 and will pay particular attention to why their approach held mass appeal to a public reeling in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy. I will focus on a number of significant and public

"defections" from the core of the intellectual group and specifically what those defections say about the neo-conservative foreign policy. Relying primarily on the work of Francis

Fukuyama, I will explore whether the neo-conservative foreign policy is consistent with its claim to being conservative and also the extent to which its appeal, especially to the

Religious Right, is connected to a strong religious zeal present in U.S. military actions in the Middle East. I conclude the chapter with some speculation about the future prospects of the movement.

5 CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

It can be difficult to understand a political group without at least a rudimentary understanding of its beginnings. So, while this chapter will be necessarily brief, I anticipate it will serve as an introduction to the chapters that are to follow. This chapter does not provide a comprehensive history, as the neo-conservatives have their beginnings as far back as the 1930s and other scholars have dealt with the topic exhaustively.2 I merely hope to touch on the key contributors, both practically and philosophically to the evolution of this important group of political players and to demonstrate their rise to power and prominence from relative obscurity.

The term neo-conservative "was first used by Michael Harrington and the editors of Dissent as a derogatory term for former comrades."3 The founding intellectual members of neo-conservatism started on the political left as Trotskyites in the 1930s at

City College of New York. It is here that many of the early and influential founders such as Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, Melvin Lasky, Norman Podhoretz,

Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Philip Selznick gained their early intellectual development. Stories about the lively debates on campus litter many historical

2 See John W. Dean, Conservatives Without Conscience (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006); John Ehrman, The Rise ofNeoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995); Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008). 3 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, p. 44.

6 accounts and the memoirs of those involved with the early development of neo- conservatism.4

While there is some disagreement about the influence of the Trotsky ist roots on current neo-conservative thought, it is clear that this group developed as aggressive debaters and "learned to use the sophisticated application of theory as a form of political combat and the conception of politics as something that should be instructed by theory."5

Another author explains the Trotskyist influence saying that it, "endow(ed) them with a temperament" and a "set of intellectual roots," namely "a combative temper and a penchant for sweeping assertions and grandiose ideas."6 This approach to political theory has not changed.

As noted by Irving Kristol, two writers during the 1940s had a significant impact on the foundational ideas of the neo-cons and their move away from Trotsky's brand of communism. These were namely, Reinhold Niebuhr and Arthur Schlesinger.7 The ideas introduced to Kristol by these two men fed a growing disillusionment and fear among the early neo-cons about communism's ability to move beyond the horrors of totalitarianism.

It started the group on their move away from Marxism. And having decided that it is impossible to have Marx without Stalin, they became a strong voice against communism and the Soviet Union.

4 See Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 3-40; Joseph Dorman's film, "Arguing the World," (A Riverside Film Productions, 1997). 5 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, p. 45. 6 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons, p. 26. 7 Ehrman, The Rise ofNeoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994, pp. 11-16,48; Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, pp. 5,21, 484.

7 Reinhold Niebuhr's article in the October 1946 edition of Life after his visit to

Europe and Germany, planted the seed. Niebuhr warned of the militaristic and ideological offensive that he had witnessed, being launched by the Soviets in Europe saying that, "this new tyranny.. .possesses the guile to exploit our moral and political weaknesses." For Niebuhr, American liberalism needed to be more honest in facing and addressing what he calls, "the tragic aspects of human existence" such as the consequences of war and good versus evil in human experience. His solution to this was to, "make our [American] political and economic life more worthy of our faith and therefore more impregnable" to Soviet propaganda.8 Niebuhr understood that there was some appeal in communism to the Germans who were still reeling in the aftermath of

World War II. He recognized that communist answers were just behind the door waiting to fill a political and economic void, by force if necessary. He suggested that Americans needed to be prepared to support Germany economically and militarily, if necessary, to combat the slide towards communism.

This cautionary message, that communism potentially held great appeal in Europe and beyond, was further emphasized in Arthur Schlesinger's book in 1949, The Vital

Center. Schlesinger was what I would call a liberal realist. He did not believe that conflict could be expelled from society and that in fact freedom and even liberty itself created an ongoing tension, even a contradiction.9 At the centre of this tension in

American democracy was what he calls the "equalitarianism of the Declaration of

Independence." On the one hand this defining American document claims that "all men are created equal" while the realities of a free and democratic society are fraught with

8 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Fight for Germany," Life (October 21,1946). 9 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Vital Center (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1988), p. 255.

8 questions of class conflict (which inherently seem to undermine the claim of equality) and just what role the state should play in establishing fairer (more equal) conditions.10

Schlesinger adeptly warns of the character of the totalitarian Soviet threat and suggests "strategy and tactics for a democratic counter-offensive." He stresses that defending and maintaining a free society will "involve all dimensions of activity- political, economic, moral and military."11 In Schlesinger's opinion, part of the appeal of

Soviet totalitarianism was that it appears to better address this tension created by freedom. He writes, "Communism has been the greatest threat, because Communism draped itself so carefully in the cast-off clothes of a liberalism grown fat and complacent, and because the disguise took in so many intellectuals."12 Yet Schlesinger rightly understands that true freedom cannot exist without some class conflict and that the role of the state is to, "define the ground rules of the game." For when it comes to the state, we can never guarantee "benevolence" or "wisdom."13

So while these two writers influenced Kristol and the early neo-cons in their move away from Marxism, I would suggest that there was something subtler in what Kristol took from these two liberal writers. Both seemed to suggest to Kristol that there were flaws in the way liberalism deals with the fundamental questions of the human condition.

Speaking of Niebuhr, Kristol explains that for the first time he was exposed to the idea that "the human condition placed inherent limitations on human possibility" and that

Niebuhr had "pointed me beyond liberalism."14 He would continue along this path away

10 Ibid., p. 157. 11 Ibid., p. 10. 12 Ibid., p. 163. 13 Ibid., p. 183. 14 Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, pp. 5, 484.

9 from liberalism when he later discovered Leo Strauss in the 1950's. In Kristol's words,

"the 'neo' worm was already eating away"15 at his ideas and understanding of politics.

In the early 1950's, while in London, Kristol continues what he describes as an

"evolving discontent with social democracy and liberalism." He meets several true conservative thinkers and journalists, the kind of which had "no counterparts in

America." Among these was Michael Oakeshott who was "fast becoming one of the most distinguished conservative thinkers of this century."16 These encounters seem to create for Kristol a kind of legitimacy to conservative thought. He writes, "I hadn't known any conservatives.. .and I was fascinated by the fact that they felt perfectly at ease with themselves as conservative, neither apologetic nor unduly contentious. They were, after all, heirs to a long tradition of conservative politics and conservative thought in

Britain."17

It was also during the 1950's that Kristol encounters the writings of Leo Strauss, which moves him even further away from liberal ideals and towards a "new" conservatism. Kristol states that Strauss was one of the thinkers who "had the greatest.. .impact on my thinking." He writes that Strauss "was from a different planet," was the "quintessential philosopher," and that "encountering Strauss's work produced the kind of intellectual shock that is a once-in-a-lifetime experience."18 Several other prominent neo-conservative thinkers openly acknowledge Strauss's "profound influence;" among these are Francis Fukuyama, Gertrude Himmelfarb, and Paul

Wolfowitz. In a 1951 issue of Commentary, Gertrude Himmelfarb wrote that Strauss was

15 Ibid., p. 5. 16 Ibid., p. 24. 17 Ibid., p. 25. 18 Ibid., p. 7.

10 "perhaps the wisest and most penetrating among contemporary political philosophers."19

William Kristol (son of Irving) later wrote that, "Strauss., .is in large part responsible for

making the thought and principles of America's founders a source of political knowledge

and appeal, and for making political excellence more broadly a subject of appreciation and appeal."20 Furthermore, the influence of Strauss and Straussian thought becomes clearly evident in the numbers of modern neo-conservatives who either studied with

Strauss or with a student of Strauss. "The networks of political associations that emanate

from the University of Chicago during the 1970s present a framework of interrelated

biographies for many of those considered to be among the rank and file of today's neo- conservatives."21

A short time later, neo-conservatives start to inject themselves and their thinking

into public and political life through significant involvement in publishing and writing for

several intellectual journals.22 In 1959 Norman Podhoretz became the editor in chief of

Commentary and "had a profound effect on the journal's intellectual direction."23 Kristol

describes Podhoretz and the other major contributors to Commentary as "disenchanted

liberals" who "now became our allies."24 Six years later, Kristol and Bell founded Public

Interest. Both these magazines created a forum for neo-conservative thought and gave

voice to up and coming neo-conservative intellectuals such as Midge Decter, Edward

19 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons, p. 92. 20 Ibid., pp. 106-113. 4 * I Halper *and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, p. 67. 22 For an excellent account of the neo-conservative rise in publishing influence see Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 2 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, pp. 46-47. 24 Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, p. 31.

11 Shils, Michael Novak, Gertrude Himmelfarb, and Seymour Martin Lipset. "Alongside

Commentary and Public Interest, neo-conservative thinkers and writers established ties with Encounter, The New Leader, American Scholar, and Foreign Policy. By the end of the 1970s, neo-conservative articles were appearing in TV Guide, Reader's Digest,

Fortune, Business Weekend and U.S. News & World Report.''''25 Neo-conservative thought was beginning to enter the American mainstream.

In the 1970s the neo-conservatives, who had for more than a decade been moving in a more conservative political direction, stopped supporting the Democrats. The most important contributing factor was the Democratic Party's presidential nomination of

George McGovern in 1972. McGovem's opposition to the Vietnam War led them to conclude that the Party was naive in matters of foreign policy and hopelessly soft on

Communism. Another contributing factor was the changing attitudes of the Democratic

Party (as led by Jimmy Carter from 1976 to 1980) toward Israel. These trends could only be addressed by a change in party devotions. The neo-conservatives officially broke from the Democratic Party in the early 1970s. The neo-cons wanted a foreign policy that would take a strong stance against the Soviet Union, while backing Israel-morally, economically and politically. At the same time, the neo-cons took a conservative stance against the radical politics of the 1960s. "In the neo-conservative view, its [the

Democratic Party] foreign policies were firmly in the hands of the left and the party no longer opposed anti-Semitism or totalitarian thinking."26 Thus neo-conservatives felt they had no choice but to abandon support for the party of Roosevelt and Kennedy.

25 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, pp. 46-47. 26 Ibid., p. 136.

12 The 1970s also saw the neo-conservatives vocally opposing any "passive" form of foreign policy in favor of a more hawkish posture. They were particularly critical of any withdrawal from the conflict with Communism and viewed this approach as conceding a silent (and unwise) victory. They increasingly criticized and undermined the legitimacy of the United Nations and were vocally skeptical of the UN's ability to be an effective and valid political influence. Furthermore they believed that a "commitment to Israel's security and right to exist and a patriotic support of American values were inextricably linked."27 The neo-cons believed that Israel was a solitary bastion of American political values in the Middle East, and that the plight of Soviet Jews gave them the moral legitimacy to take a more aggressive stance in foreign policy against the Soviet Union.

Sympathy for the cause of Israel and Jews in the Soviet Union came easily to a group in which American Jews were heavily in evidence, but the ideological goals of the movement were also consistent with such a position. This made their support of the presidential agenda of Ronald Reagan in 1980 an easy transition.28 However, this change in devotions was not without some reluctance:

They had been Democrats all their lives and still hoped to save the party.

Moreover, they hesitated to become Republicans. Their devotions had not, in

Elliott Abram's words, been 'replaced by any real sympathy for the Republicans.'

Despite their discontent, through January 1980 they still sought a sign that the

(Democratic) party would listen to them and that their influence would be

restored. By February this ambivalent stance had changed, however, for it had

27 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, pp. 55-58. 28 Ehrman, The Rise ofNeoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994, pp. 122-24,136.

13 become clear that the neo-conservative position within the Democratic Party was

hopeless.29

Notwithstanding these sentiments, there was a general shift toward and rise in the prominent involvement of neo-conservatives in the Republican Party in the 1970's and

1980's. This new generation of neo-cons moved their primary focus away from the academy and toward engagement in more practical politics and secured prominent positions in various Republican administrations. They made modest strides during the

Reagan administration but were optimistic about the "coming conservative century."30

Kristol believed that liberalism was "at the end of its intellectual tether" and that there would ultimately be a move towards "modern conservatism" as Americans "are witnessing and living through a prolonged spasm of liberal fanaticism." This "spasm" manifested itself in failing social programs and increases in crime, sexuality, and welfare dependency. In the wake of these issues Kristol believed that Americans would turn to the "three pillars of modern conservatism" namely, "religion, nationalism and economic growth."31

Two scholars emerged around this time (the late 1970s and early 80s) to have significant influence on modern neo-conservative thought. Albert Wohlstetter and Allan

Bloom (a student of Leo Strauss) planted the seeds for what would become the mainstay neo-conservative doctrines until the present day: Wohlstetter with his ideas on foreign policy and Bloom for insights on social issues.

29 Ibid., p. 131. Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, p. 364. 31 Ibid., pp. 365-66.

14 Albert Wohlstetter argued to significantly boost the American nuclear umbrella, in number and in its capacity to resist a first strike. As for nuclear deterrence, he went on to recommend a large conventional force capable of fighting a general war against the

USSR alongside a full blown nuclear conflict. He also emphasized the necessity of having the capacity to fight in a number of limited theater conflicts. He was a firm believer in a global order, underwritten by America's might and secured through the export of American values to the rest of the world. In his view, America could not be a great power without a worldwide web of interests. And this web of interests could not be secured through military means alone.32 In short, Wohlstetter encouraged the build up of an extensive military machine but also the export of American ideals and values as a way of maintaining power and influence in the world. He was a notable mentor to both Paul

Wolfowitz and Richard Perle.

Allan Bloom popularized the ideas of Leo Strauss through his national best- selling book, The Closing of the American Mind. In this extremely popular book, Bloom successfully demonizes liberalism saying that reason has been replaced by relativism and that societal values will quickly slide towards nihilism if it is not properly checked.

Bloom speaks about the important role of culture in shaping the hearts and minds (and prejudices) of members of a society. He laments the loss of those forces that have traditionally shaped opinion and the minds of the American people. He claims that,

"openness has driven out the local deities." For Bloom relativism and value-based

32 Albert Wolhstetter, "Strength, Interest, and New Technologies," in Robert Zarate and Henry Sokolski, editors, Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009)

15 judgments have taken the place of traditional sources of truth and wisdom like religion, the Bible, the family and even reason.33

The ideas of both Wohlstetter and Bloom continue to hold a dominant place in neo-conservative thinking to this day. And their students (and their students' students) would go on to occupy positions of great importance within the administrations of

Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush.34 The neo-conservatives were growing in significance and power within Washington.

Towards the end of the 1980s, a crisis emerged. Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union and ultimately orchestrated the end of Soviet-style communism. The neo-conservatives were left in something resembling intellectual turmoil as they had largely defined themselves in terms of their anti-communism and the importance of taking a strong stance against the Soviets. During the early 1990s, there was considerable debate around the next steps for the movement. What should be their direction in foreign and domestic policy? Without a clear enemy to unite against, what significance would the neo-cons play at home or abroad? Had the mission been accomplished, or was this just a new opportunity to promote liberal democracy and

American values worldwide in this "uni-polar" reality?

One of the early founders of the movement, Norman Podhoretz, feeling that their primary goal to defeat Soviet communism had been achieved wrote that, "Neo- conservatism no longer exists as a distinctive phenomenon." Podhoretz went on to explain that neo-conservatism had also lost its "ideological distinctiveness" and that the

33 Allan Bloom. The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon &Schuster Inc., 1987), pp. 56-59. 34 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, p. 62.

16 ideas that were once novel to the group had either been abandoned, adopted by other

conservatives or were no longer relevant. Podhoretz saw neo-conservatism as having

been the lone voice in favour of capitalism, the only group that stood up against radical

social policy like affirmative action, and the strongest opponent of the "dangerous lies" of

the 1960's radicalism. Now these ideas permeated many other groups both liberal and

conservative and thus "what killed neo-conservatism was not defeat but victory."35 But

in many ways, it was just the beginning of true power and influence for the neo-cons.

The mid to late 1990s became an opportunity to define a new foreign policy

agenda for the neo-conservatives. "Even though they did not join the administration,

neo-conservatives such as Perle, Wolfowitz, and William Kristol sided with Clinton on

the issue of stopping Serbian aggression against Bosnia."36 What was perceived as a

failure in multi-lateral, UN sponsored conflict resolution seemed to strengthen the resolve

of neo-conservatives who argued that America should go it alone. This idea is perfectly

outlined in Robert Kagan's Of Paradise and Power, published in 2003. The post-cold

war neo-conservative movement, led by a younger generation, established two ideas that

would dominate American foreign policy to the current day: "U.S. interventionism against the weapon state and the export of democracy as a central purpose of foreign

policy."37 This placed the United States at the forefront of actively discouraging (by

preemptive military means if necessary) countries from seeking to develop or acquire

weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear weapons) through its foreign policy.

35 Norman Podhoretz, "Neoconservatism: A Eulogy," Commentary (March, 1996). 36 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons, pp. 206-208. 37 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, p. 80.

17 The U.S. would also seek to export the values and practices of Western-style democracy and free market capitalism wherever it could reasonably exert its influence.

Through the 1990's, "Washington's neo-conservative establishment grew into a far-reaching, well-funded and powerful intellectual-political matrix...Groups such as the

PNAC [Project for the New American Century].. .forged links with social conservatives.. .(and the) Christian Right."38 They promoted this new nationalism that demonized the left and liberals as un-American and championed militarism toward the

Third World as I will discuss further in the fourth chapter.

Finally, the tragedy of 9/11 positioned the neo-cons as would-be prophets.

Suddenly, their views were not only popular but they had been proven right. That we live in "an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depends on the possession and use of military might."39 The neo-cons could once again see the world around them as dangerous and as posing a constant and imminent threat to order and prosperity. And with George W. Bush in power they had the political clout to do something about it. They could now move towards their goals of spreading democracy and free market values in a way and in countries not previously open to them. They were now able to do so under the auspices of a "war on terror," to ensure the maintenance of their own security and to promote American interests and "universal" values.

In the chapters that follow, I will explore what I see as the key reasons for the impressive rise in the popularity and the influence of the neo-conservatives. Firstly, to what extent does their alleged conservatism explain their popularity?

38 Ibid., p. 109. 39 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power (New York: Random House, Inc., 2003), p. 4.

18 CHAPTER TWO: WHAT'S IN A NAME?

This chapter will explore to what extent neo-conservatives are a conservative voice in politics, as they seem to claim. This is important as the idea that neo-cons are tapping into a lost conservative wisdom greatly appeals to an electorate fearful of the excesses of liberalism. I will explore what the primary differences are between the traditional conservatives and neo-conservatives and what makes the neo-conservative approach to politics and philosophy much more dangerous than that of traditional conservatives.

I will begin by outlining the traditional conservative approach to politics and change. I will explore the traditional conservative values as described by Edmund Burke and compare those with neo-conservatives who seem to have a more radical approach to politics and change. It should become clear that neo-conservatives in no way want to preserve the world as it is, but rather are determined to "turn back the clock" on traditional American ideals and politics.

Traditional conservative values are not easily summed up in a few ideas or concepts. In fact, many conservative thinkers (past and present) argue that conservatism is a disposition rather than a fixed set of political ideas or goals. This flies in the face of our contemporary understanding of conservative politics that seems over-wrought with social policy and religious extremism. Nevertheless, the formalized concept of conservatism harkens back to Edmund Burke in his 1790 book, Reflections on the

Revolution in France. From his important book we can begin to position conservatism in its rightful place in political thought and history as a reaction to liberalism as opposed to the more modern conception of conservatism as a political ideology in its own right.

19 After witnessing (what he called) the "horrors" of the French Revolution, Burke almost anticipates the Reign of Terror that takes place in 1793-94, in his compelling treatise espousing the virtues of clinging to and maintaining certain traditional values and taking a slow approach to change. Burke maintained that a society and its customs and institutions are built on long-standing traditions and proven methods of addressing political issues.

Burke believed strongly in an organic, ordered society. He was a champion of class structures and tradition, which he saw as the backbone of civil society. He maintained a strong distrust of egalitarianism, fearing it as unnatural and unobtainable.

He also had serious misgivings about using theological arguments to try to legitimize the rights of man. In other words, he saw liberty as a noble social and political inheritance and rejected the connecting of religion with rights. In his view, it was dangerous to imagine a close alliance between rights and religion as it ran the risk of empowering rights with an overly dogmatic character.

However, Burke believed that religion was essential to maintaining the social and moral fabric of society. He wrote, "It is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal; that atheism is against not only our reason but our instincts."40 More than that, Burke believed that God's providence should be acknowledged in society for the very existence of the laws, the sovereign, the state, and for all the good that came of these things. Burke maintained that all virtue and "perfection" came only because of

"His will."41

40 Edmund Burke, Conor Cruise O'Brien, editor, Reflections on the Revolution in France (London: Penguin Books Limited, 1968), p. 187. 41 Ibid., pp. 195-96.

20 Despite this Burke argued that politics and religion belonged in separate spheres.

This can be seen in the following quote,

Politics and the pulpit are terms that have little agreement. No sound ought to be

heard in church but the healing voice of Christian charity. The cause of civil

liberty and civil government gains as little as that of religion by this confusion of

duties. Those who quit their proper character, to assume what does not belong to

them, are, for the greater part, ignorant of both the character they leave and of the

character they assume. Wholly unacquainted with the world in which they are so

fond of meddling, and inexperienced in all its affairs, on which they pronounce

with so much confidence, they have nothing of politics but the passions they

excite. Surely the church is a place where one day's truce ought to be allowed to

the dissensions and animosities of mankind.42

For Burke, religion was one of several proven pillars that upheld society on the back of a noble heritage. He speaks of an "established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree it exists."43 For

Burke each one was vital to the maintenance of a successful society and state. One was not more important than any other but each was an essential element (that had been proven over time) in English society. These elements contributed to stability and justice for society's members.

Burke speaks with trepidation of "fanaticism" and "superstition" in religious belief and practices, and warns that these will lead to a loss of "wisdom" and "errors and

42 Ibid., p. 94. 43 Ibid., p. 188.

21 excesses of enthusiasm" that can "deform a country" or "stimulate real injustice."44 For

Burke, religion was meant to be a vehicle for mankind to achieve something higher than himself, to develop charity, and to seek virtuous examples worthy of imitation.45

Burke understood that the true source of political knowledge was much more than theories (like those concerning natural rights) but rather he saw political knowledge as derived from practice and proven experience within a long-standing social system. For

Burke, the wisdom, experience, and ability to rule were socially invested in the aristocracy and the nobility. In essence, Burke's classic conservative disposition is built upon four pillars: prejudice, prescription, prudence, and presumption. Each of these four elements deserves some further exploration and an explanation of how they contradict the neo-conservative approach to politics and society. What is consistent between them is that they are all an approach to politics and change rather than a set ideology of their own. This will become significant as we move to compare these concepts and this approach to politics with that of neo-conservatism.

Burke claims that prejudice is part of man's nature. He calls it, "wisdom without reflection."46 It is "a motive to give action to.. .reason."47 The beauty of Burke's language is worth exploring,

Prejudice is of ready application in an emergency; it previously engages the mind

in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in

the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice renders a

44 Ibid., pp. 262-270. 45 Ibid., p. 263. 46 Ibid., p. 119. 47 Ibid., p. 183.

22 man's virtue his habit; and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just

prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature.48

One author described prejudice as, "an opinion that has stood the test of time and is far preferable to abstract thought."49 Burke would argue that we should cling to those ideas and the prejudices that have stood the test of time and be reluctant to exchange them for conceptions of a hypothetical "good" that may or may not be obtainable as it exists only in abstract or rational thought. This caution will help men to avoid being tossed to and fro by every wind of theory that may be presented before them.

This is of particular importance in the political realm where decisions and choices have far-reaching impacts. Burke cautions us that we can be "so taken up with.. .theories about the rights of man, that (we) have totally forgot his nature."50 Burke explains the role that prejudice should play in the political machinations of government as follows:

I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught

feelings; that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish

them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves,

we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have

lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish

them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private

stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small...

Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices,

employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them.

48 Ibid., p. 183. 49 Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1977), p. 62. 50 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 156.

23 If they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to

continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of

prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice,

with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection

which will give it permanence.51

Clearly, Burke praises prejudice. He suggests that our deepest moral commitments cannot be projects in rational thought. This means that we do not always need to reexamine our first principles.

The second element of Burke's classical conservatism is prescription.

Prescription recognizes the value of continuity and seeks to ensure it. Burke explains,

By this means our liberty becomes a noble freedom. It carries an imposing and

majestic aspect. It has a pedigree and illustrating ancestors. It has its bearings

and its ensigns armorial. It has its gallery of portraits; its monumental

inscriptions; its records, evidences, and titles. We procure reverence to our civil

institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere individual

men; on account of their age; and on account of those from whom they are

descended.52

Burke promotes the virtues of looking to the familiar, of finding the strength and benefit in what is now and what has been. "Under a pious predilection for those ancestors, your imaginations would have realized in them a standard of virtue and wisdom, beyond the vulgar practice of the hour: and you would have risen with the example to whose

51 Ibid., p. 183. 52 Ibid., p. 121.

24 imitation you aspired. Respecting your forefathers, you would have been taught to respect yourselves."53

Further, the principle of prescription means that "politics should be based on what we know" and not on what we think might happen.54 This idea flows naturally from prejudice. If we are cautious in what we think, recognizing the value in the familiar, this is then extended into the realm of action and politics through prescription. It is consistent with what we normally associate with a conservative disposition, namely maintaining a slow, rather than rapid pace, preferring stability and predictability to chaos and uncertainty.55 Prescription proposes that our societies are built on a noble and difficult past and that that foundation is only reliable because of years of experience and sacrifice by those who have gone before us to make it so. True legitimacy is only derived from history and custom.

Burke also suggests that we should be cautious when contemplating significant change to age-old concepts of morality or long-held practices in politics. A classical conservative believes it unlikely that any new moral principles will be discovered.

Further, they argue it is unlikely that better ways of doing things will be unearthed and as such we should treasure practices of the past that have given our society such vitality and stability.

This idea leads naturally into the third element of conservatism, the principle of prudence. For Burke (like Plato) prudence is one of the chief virtues; he calls it "the first

53 Ibid., pp. 122-23. 54 Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism, p. 62. 55 Michael Oakeshott, "On Being Conservative," in Russell Kirk, editor, The Portable Conservative Reader (New York: The Viking Press, 1982), pp. 567-599.

25 of all virtues."56 Prudence proposes that any large, significant change that will result in long-term consequences for man or society should be measured using teleological methods and not just considered worthwhile for its short-term outcomes.

I cannot stand forward, and give my praise or blame to any thing which relates to

human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object.. .1 should

therefore suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France, until I was

informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with

discipline and obedience. ..with morality and religion.. .property; with peace and

order; with civil and social manners.57

Sudden and/or vast changes run the risk of replacing a perceived difficulty or problem with an even larger, more disastrous outcome. Thus lengthy reflection, appropriate apprehension and cautiousness should be undertaken prior to any significant political change. In Burke's view, there can be no simple or universal blueprint for governments or human nature.

By a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is watched;

the good or ill success of the first, gives light to us in the second; and so,

from light to light, we are conducted with safety through the whole series.

We see, that the parts of the system do not clash. The evils latent in the

most promising contrivances are provided for as they arise. One advantage

is as little as possible sacrificed to another. We compensate, we reconcile,

we balance. We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole that various

anomalies and contending principles that are found in the minds and affairs

56 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 153. 57 Ibid., pp. 89-91.

26 of men. From hence arises, not an excellence in simplicity, but one far

superior, an excellence in composition.58

A second facet of prudence pertains to controls placed on power and passions. "It

is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which

has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society."59

Therefore a conservative recognizes the danger inherent in political power and endeavors

to place limits on power and temper that with checks and balances. In so doing, he ensures the essential (albeit limited) freedoms are protected while order is maintained.

Radicals will see unlimited political power as good and necessary to implement

significant, progressive change, but the conservative is ever aware that tyrannical power

is the same (and often times, worse) in the hands of the new "saviour" than it was in those

of the "old guard." "Considerate people, before they declare themselves, will observe the

use which is made of power, and particularly of so trying a thing as new power in new

persons, of whose principles, tempers, and dispositions, they have little or no

experience."60 By this Burke suggests a general distrust of individuals in whom we may

recklessly place our trust through the granting of power and authority. This attitude is

again consistent with the conservative disposition and its understanding of human nature

as well as the importance of putting limits on the use of power.

Presumption is the fourth quality that Burke maintains as essential to a "good" and stable society. Presumption assumes that the current way of doing things is good if it

works. However Burke was not oblivious to the fact that a state needs a mechanism for

58 Ibid., pp. 281-82. 59 Ibid., p. 152. 60 Ibid., p. 91.

27 healthy, thoughtful change. "A state without the means of some change is without the means of conservation."61 However, change is something to be controlled through extremely careful deliberation as several of the quotes above have demonstrated. Change must be justified in terms of some demonstrable injustice or conversely, in some self- evident benefit. "I shall only say here, injustice to that old-fashioned constitution, under which we have long prospered, that our representation has been found perfectly adequate to all the purposes for which a representation of a people can be desired or devised. I defy the enemies of our constitution to shew the contrary."62 He goes on to explain that,

"Old establishments are tried by their effects. If the people are happy, united, wealthy, and powerful, we presume the rest. We conclude that to be good from whence good is derived."63 The conservative is not against change in all forms and at all times but advises extreme caution when approaching political change as it potentially has far reaching and unintended consequences. One author explained it this way,

Conservative presumption.. .says...that one requires a reason for any change but

not its absence. This.. .presumption.. .is based on the belief that there is generally

a cost to any change. Therefore, the presumption allows one to believe that

change is undesirable unless it is established either that in the case under

consideration the change involves no cost, or that its benefits at least match its

drawbacks. The conservative presumption entails that a proposal which restricts

61 Ibid., p. 106. 62 Ibid., p. 146. 63 Ibid., p. 285.

28 liberty shall not be accepted unless supported by good reasons. But it entails the

same regarding a proposal to repeal a law which restricts freedom.64

Traditional conservatives recognize that there is a constant conflict that goes on between the temptations of government power versus the conservative disposition to inject moderation and restraint etc.65 Traditional conservative values further reject ideology as unnecessarily fractious.66 Viewing the maintenance of an orderly society as paramount, ideology is rejected and avoided wherever possible. Conservatives, as we have seen, value principles like skepticism and prudence and are not easily reconciled with a vested ideological stance.

These four pillars in Burke's thought, as I have expanded on above, outline an approach to politics, a disposition that will underscore the thought and political action of the classical conservative. The conservative often sees liberalism as Utopian and unrealistic in its approach to politics and its more radical approach to change. Not to mention its talk and theorizing about rights and freedoms not tempered with prudence, prejudice, prescription, and presumption.

The guiding principles of the neo-conservative movement in America stand in stark contrast to traditional conservatism. Their attitude to change is greatly affected by their understanding of American liberalism and further impacts their fundamental views of important political questions in all areas from domestic to foreign policy. There are distinctive differences between the two so-called "conservative" groups.

64 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 12. 65 Oakeshott, "On Being Conservative," The Portable Conservative Reader, pp. 595-96. 66 Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism, p. 132.

29 Irving Kristol, the father of neo-conservatism in America makes no apology for his belief that traditional conservatism is not well equipped to deal with the nuances of a modern democratic society. Responding to John Stuart Mill who once called the British

Tories "the stupid party," Kristol writes an article of the same name. In "The Stupid

Party," Kristol clearly outlines the core elements of traditional conservatism as "loyalty to a traditional way of life," "aversion to innovation based on mere theoretical speculation" and, "a fiduciary relation to the whole nation-past, present and future."67 He is obviously no stranger to traditional conservative principles.

Yet Kristol goes on to argue that times come in the "life of a nation" when conservatism is not enough, that political philosophy and visionary ideas must emerge in the public forum of debate. Kristol's type of conservative party, "has to 'stand for' a perceived vision of a decent society; it has to be able to articulate the elements and rationale of this vision."68 For Kristol political success in a modern democracy can only be founded on a forward looking "vision" and not "stupidity" or conservative backwardness, which he claims, is simply "not enough."69

Kristol continues by saying that, "habit and custom are weak before the forces of communication" that we live in "a world where ideas and their articulation are indispensible to effective conservative government."70 Kristol recognizes that ideas motivate people to action and that in order to obtain political success in a modern, technological age those ideas must be packaged and presented to people in a motivating,

67 Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. 349. 68 Ibid., p. 351. 69 Ibid., p. 349. 70 Ibid., p. 353.

30 but also a palatable way. For neo-conservatives this becomes the staple of their political activities but it also throws traditional conservative values out the window.

Kristol insists on the "newness" of his conservative ideas and sees neo- conservatism as well positioned to fill a conservative/Republican vacuum that is void of real ideas and vision. He states, "American neo-conservatism is very different from...ideal English conservatism...I think it fair to say that it is different from whatever passes for conservatism in all...democracies...the neo-conservative critique went deeper, and was more radical, than conservative critiques."71 Elsewhere he writes that, "One can say that the historical and political purpose of neo-conservatism would seem to be this: to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy."72 Kristol and his fellow neo-conservative writers seem to have a view of traditional conservatism as being no longer capable of addressing the complexities of modern society or of being able to provide answers to current political problems. They make few apologies for the neo-conservative conviction that things on the American political landscape must radically change and see their movement as the vehicle for that change.

The reason for this kind of radical thinking has to do with the neo-conservative understanding of modern liberalism. Kristol says that "conservatism in America is a movement" and that the catalyst for this movement is to rise as an "enemy (of)

71 Ibid., pp. 374, 379. 72 Irving Kristol, "The Neoconservative Persuasion," The Weekly Standard (25 August 2003) p. 1.

31 contemporary liberalism."73 He explains this somewhat reactionary approach by appealing to the writings of Leo Strauss. "The writings of Leo Strauss have been extraordinarily influential. Strauss's analysis of the destructive elements within modern liberalism, an analysis that was popularized by his students and his students' students, has altered the very tone of public discourse in the United States.. .To bring contemporary liberalism into disrepute... is no small achievement."74 This quote foreshadows just what

Kristol and the neo-conservatives intended as they move forward to create an enemy out of liberalism in the eyes of the American public using the various media vehicles I have outlined in my first chapter.

For Kristol, the "enemy" is modern liberalism. He argues that the time for the conservative disposition has past and that a more radical approach is needed. In speaking of the evils of modern liberal society, Kristol says the traditional conservative and, "his conservative disposition offers us no guidance in coping with all those necessary evils, which can tear our lives apart.. ,"75 He believes this because he sees liberalism as dangerously fraught with relativism and nihilism.76 In his opinion, these tear at the fabric of modern society and undermine the traditional ways in which individuals are bound together, namely through family, church, nationalism, etc. The arguments perpetuated throughout neo-conservative writings by Kristol, Bloom, and others, attack a straw man

73 Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, pp. 377-79. 74 Ibid., p. 380. 75 Ibid., p. 375. 76 See the section on Values (p. 194) in Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1987)

32 since they fail to understand the most fundamental tenets of liberalism and underestimate its importance for the American founding.77

Kristol also speaks of a "conservative frustration" that, in his opinion, desires change and creative new ideas. More than that though, Kristol hopes for a modern conservative who is demanding and expectant of radical change. Kristol clearly understands the power and the potential of ideas, placing an inordinate amount of trust in their ability to bring about positive change. "What rules the world is ideas, because ideas define the way reality is perceived."78 This is in complete opposition to the conservatism of Burke who expressed skepticism at the possibility of ideas and theories alone finding us political solutions or stability without an appeal to the tried and tested methods of the past. Yet Kristol persists,

There is a.. .conservative majority out there.. .but it has to be welded together out

of disparate parts; it has to be created, not just assumed. And it can only be

created through the unifying power of political ideas. It is a world.. .where ideas

and their articulation are indispensible to effective conservative government,

because it is only such ideas that can provide definition and coherence to the

conservative constituency.79

Where traditional conservatives would be leery of change based on unproven ideas, the neo-cons embrace the hope of a better future and radical change through unproven ideas.

While traditional conservatives would facilitate slow change through principles and practices inherent in skepticism, prejudice, and prudence, this new breed of conservative

77 See Shadia B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). See especially the chapter titled, "Neoconservatism: A Straussian Legacy." 78 Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, p. 233. 79 Ibid., pp. 351-53.

33 imagines and creates an urgency to inspire radical change. Burke's understanding of the traditional conservative disposition and their approach to politics never assumes that conceptual possibilities are necessarily better than what exists.

In my opinion, the neo-conservatives have positioned themselves in the political void between liberalism and conservatism, appealing to liberals through their supposed commitment to freedom and free market economics, while at the same time tapping into the fears of the Religious Right regarding moral decay and decline in contemporary

America. They speak the language of both sides extremely well and exploit the growing political discontent and cynicism that has developed towards politics and government at the end of the twentieth century. This in part accounts for their significant political success over the last 20 years. But more importantly, it outlines that the neo- conservatives have a radical agenda. As I have shown above, the neo-conservatives have managed to situate liberalism as the explanation for all that is wrong with America. In doing so they cleverly tap into a growing discontent felt by many religious and under- represented groups in the U.S. But it comes with a cost.

Part of that cost is that this approach has "trafficked in polarization - the creation of division for its own sake - and in that process has diminished the balance and civility of our democratic systems, eroding public faith in government overall."80 This polarization has further exploited a public that is swayed by "sound-bytes," catch phrases and simplified notions of complex political problems. No other politician used this more to his advantage than George W. Bush and the Republican Party. This is a sharp contrast to a traditional conservatism that acknowledges and recognizes the ever-present existence

80 Hugh Segal, Beyond Greed (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1997), p. 4.

34 of uncertainty, which creates a general distrust of reason, and an ongoing suspicion and even rejection of systems designed as a quick political fix.81 But it also creates public confusion over important political ideas and terms. There is no longer a clear distinction between liberals and conservatives.

In this chapter, I have suggested that neo-conservatism is not at all like traditional conservatism and in fact promotes significant change built on unproven ideas. As I mentioned, this is a powerful message because it resonates with people who are looking for an alternative to perceived liberal excesses but also because it appeals to basic, "good principles." That is to say, neo-cons appear to protect and defend the family and "family values." They appear to stand for God, church, country and the good, old fashioned, hard-working American. In fact, many people are not fully aware of what they have

"signed up for" when supporting this new breed of American conservatism. It seems they have signed up for a radical program that has little connection to true conservative values and in fact imagines an America very different from the one today.

Neo-conservatism is not a throw back to some lost era of conservative wisdom but in fact is largely in conflict with the core principles of classic conservatism. Perhaps the distinction between the two approaches to politics is best framed by the modern conservative philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, who wrote, "Government, then, as the conservative in this matter understands it, does not begin with a vision of another, different, and better world. ..the intimations of government are to be found in ritual, not in religion or philosophy; in the enjoyment of orderly and peaceable behavior, not in the

81 Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism, p. 112.

35 search for truth or perfection."82 Burke and Oakeshott's more traditional conservatism seems more at peace with the present. Oakeshott as a modern thinker is able to accept the achievements and contributions of liberalism as a modern reality. In stark contrast, neo- conservatives struggle to escape their raison d'etre, which is their disdain for and distrust and fear of liberalism. They cannot accept it as essential to the foundations of American government and society. They continue to strive for a "different and better world" ignoring the political realities of the American founding and history.

But so what? What does the difference between these two conservative groups really matter? I believe that this is important for two reasons. Firstly, I believe that vagueness around this distinction is an intentional attempt to mislead the American voter.

If truth and knowledge are power, then the American public needs to be keenly aware of what they are voting for and the principles behind neo-conservative politics. This new brand of American conservatism does not represent slow and thoughtful change but in fact holds a radical view of society, culture, and the American way of life. That view impacts all aspects of American political life both domestic and foreign. The purpose for this deception will become clearer in my fourth chapter as we discuss the foreign policy goals and failures of the neo-conservatives.

And secondly, I believe (or at least I am hopeful) that if the electorate better recognizes what neo-conservatism actually stands for and how these ideas represent a danger to long held rights and freedoms, that they will seek political alternatives in the form of ideas and leaders that more accurately reflect the desires of the "common man."

In a sense I hope that a more clear view of what neo-conservatism represents will

82 Michael Oakeshott, "On Being Conservative," Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1962), pp. 168-196.

36 empower the American public to seek greater understanding of complex political problems and ultimately find creative solutions to those problems instead of perpetuating a "hate movement" that blindly attacks every vestige of liberalism. This can only occur through a full recognition of how the issues are currently being manipulated and what that means for the current political landscape. In the next two chapters, the goals of the neo-conservatives will become clearer as we explore the relationship between the

Religious Right and the neo-cons as well as their approach to foreign policy and so-called democracy promotion abroad.

Interestingly, Burke speaks of the "true spirit of toleration" when it comes to the intersection of different faiths. He explains, "They tolerate.. .because they respect justice." He emphasizes this point by going on to write, "They would reverently and affectionately protect all religions, because they love and venerate the great principle upon which they all agree, and the great object to which they are all directed."83 In these statements Burke is outlining one of his core propositions. He understands that maintaining and protecting the fundamental institutions of society like the church, the monarch, the aristocracy, the law, etc. is to ensure that an environment is created and nurtured wherein individuals have stability to seek the virtues of charity and justice.

Burke's understanding of the role of religion will become more important as we explore the relationship between the Religious Right and the neo-conservatives in the next chapter.

83 Ibid., p. 259.

37 CHAPTER THREE: THE RELIGION OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES

In this chapter I explore the relationship between the neo-conservatives and the

Religious Right. This alliance is important to correctly understand as it has significantly contributed to neo-conservative political success over the last three decades. To some it would appear to be an association that just "makes sense" and a coalition between two groups with the same (or at least similar) political goals. I start by exploring why (on the surface) these two groups appear to pair naturally as an alliance. I examine the apparent similarities in social policy and values. I will compare the purpose and role that religion plays in the lives of the true believer versus the neo-conservative thinker.

In particular, I explore the writings of Allan Bloom and Irving Kristol in order to understand the purpose of culture and religion in civil society and just why these are important to the neo-conservative world-view. The work of Allan Bloom becomes significant here in that he is one "popularizer" of Leo Strauss's work and Strauss was a major influence on Kristol and neo-conservative thought, as I have shown in chapter one.

It will become clear why the views of the neo-conservatives and the Religious Right are seemingly so compatible in that the means by which both seek to accomplish their goals are almost identical.

I also explore the ways in which the neo-conservatives have endeared themselves to the Religious Right through the use of important American symbols and stories. I examine the way the neo-conservatives have positioned themselves in relation to these symbols particularly related to the Founding and religious liberty in a way that has made their claims both convincing and compelling.

38 In his extremely successful and widely read book, The Closing of the American

Mind, Allan Bloom, a guru of the neo-conservatives and a student of Leo Strauss, provides a significant clue to the purpose and usefulness of religion in society as viewed by the neo-cons. Bloom begins with assumptions that are familiar to Christians. For

Bloom and neo-conservatives in general, natural man is savage, self-centered, wild, brutish, untamed, and over-sexed. These "untamed desires are always there. It is natural."84 This resonates well with fundamentalist Christians who believe man is inherently wicked and fallen. Bloom's prescription for resolving this unfortunate state in which man finds himself may also sound familiar. The remedy is a mixture of "culture" and quasi-religious virtues.

Bloom's idea of 'culture' is broader and more utilitarian than what we might commonly understand. Bloom explains that "culture is a cave" meaning that it is artificial and mythical in nature.85 He describes culture as the "link between inclination and duty" and as the "unity of man's brutish nature and all the arts and sciences he acquired in his movement from the state of nature to civil society." Through culture the purposes of "both the world of nature and that of society are fulfilled." Bloom continues to explain that because of man's brutish nature and society's need to control it, "myths are created that haunt him, make him feel guilty and persuade him that he is sinful because of his natural desire."86 These are principles with which many Christians might in fact agree whole-heartedly. The problem lies in the fact that the neo-conservative

Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1987), p. 186. 85 Ibid., p. 38. 86 Ibid., pp. 185-86.

39 politician, philosopher, or pragmatist, does not believe these things; they are simply a

'means to an end.'

In Bloom's view, culture, while not identical to religion, encompasses and is superior to it. "Culture is what makes possible, on a high level, the rich social life that constitutes a people, their customs, styles, tastes, festivals, rituals, gods—all that binds individuals into a group with roots, a community in which they think and will generally, with the people a moral unity, and the individual united within himself."87 (Italics added)

It is clear from Bloom's explanation of culture that it is man-made and necessary to move men from the state of nature to civil society. That it is bigger and superior to religion is clear in the following statement: "Culture itself generates its own way of life and principles, particularly its highest ones, with no authority above it. If there were such an authority, the unique way of life born of its principle would be undermined."88 (Italics added) It seems that according to Bloom, mankind needs societal myths to create a deep sense of identification with God and country. Yet for the truly devout, religion is more than myth or a tool to control man's natural desires, it is a important vehicle used to return to an estranged God and a means to living a good life.

But Bloom does not stop there, he has plenty to say about religion and society and the challenge that it poses for the philosopher saying, "the political problem for the philosopher is the gods."89 He continues:

The problem for the philosopher is primarily religion. The philosophers must

come to terms with its authoritative presence.. .He must deny he is an atheist,

87 Ibid., p. 187. 88 Ibid., p. 192. 89 Ibid., p. 265.

40 although he remains ambiguous as to the character of his belief... Socrates never

says he believes in the gods of the city. But he does try to make himself appear to

be a sign sent from the gods.90

This quote is significant because it shows that Bloom believes religion has to be

"handled" or "controlled" as it cannot be ignored. The philosopher must correctly position himself in relation to religion in order to gain its full societal benefits. Those benefits being control and power. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that despite the antagonism between religion and philosophy, the neo-conservative philosopher has no intention of doing away with religion, even if he has political power. As Bloom writes:

Socrates never suggests that, even in the unlikely event that philosophers should

be kings and possess absolute wisdom, the nature of the cave could be altered or

that a civil society.. .could do without false opinions.91

True leaders, in Bloom's approach, have every intention of using religion for their own purposes. For Bloom and the neo-cons, religion becomes a tool to be used for the purpose of controlling the masses. They do not try to imagine a political society without the existence of false opinions or myths. Those myths simply include the ideas embedded in religious thought.

While it is clear from the context of these quotes that Bloom is exploring classical political thought (particularly around the time of Socrates) and is not explicitly stating these ideas as his own, he makes no secret of his partiality to Socrates. He is also tracing an evolution of practices and beliefs in a political society from what he sees as the higher assumptions of the ancients to the inferior beliefs of the moderns. Later, in The Closing

90 Ibid., p. 276. 91 Ibid., p. 265.

41 of the American Mind, Bloom goes on to lament our modern condition wherein reason has replaced superstition and arbitrary, relative values have replaced true virtue among the common man.92 Therefore it becomes necessary for "philosophers [to] engage in the gentle art of deception" to ensure that false (but politically useful) opinions are perpetuated among the populace.93 However Bloom never fails to remind us that the philosopher is always alone with this wisdom: "Philosophy and philosophers always see through such hopes for individual salvation and are hence isolated."94 Among these

"false opinions" and "hopes for salvation" Bloom firmly places religion and spirituality.

The views of Irving Kristol are not that different when it comes to the role that religion is to take in society and its usefulness to the neo-conservative agenda. Kristol writes:

In the great mass of men.. .happiness in untruth is preferred to truth. If God does

not exist, and if religion is an illusion that the majority of men cannot live

without, then psychoanalysis and religion can be reconciled.. .by the simple

expedient of a double standard of truth. Let men believe in the lies of religion

since they cannot do without them, and let the handful of sages, who know the

truth and can live with it, keep it amongst themselves. Men are then divided into

the wise and the foolish, the philosophers and the common men, and atheism

becomes a guarded, esoteric doctrine~for if the illusions of religion were to be

discredited, there is no telling with what madness men would be seized, with what

uncontrollable anguish. It would indeed become the duty of the wise publicly to

92 Ibid., pp. 266-67. 93 Ibid., p. 279. 94 Ibid., p. 290.

42 defend and support religion, even to call the police power to its aid, while

reserving the truth for themselves and their chosen disciples.95 (Italics added)

This quote speaks of the neo-conservative philosopher and his approach to religion and politics. But Kristol was a practical man and saw himself more as a pragmatic political activist. What becomes particularly telling, as we explore his essays, are the many references to the utility of the Religious Right in helping conservatives to gain political power. As the Religious Right became increasingly active in politics through the 1970s,

1980s and 1990s, Kristol saw it as an opportunity that could not be ignored and he suggested the establishment of a meaningful coalition:

The religious conservatives are already too numerous to be shunted aside, and

their numbers are growing, as is their influence.. .Today, it is the religious who

have a sense that the tide has turned and that the wave of the future is moving in

their direction.. .Religion is easily the most important because it is the power that,

in the longer term, can shape people's characters and regulate their motivation.96

This quote shows that Kristol recognizes that the Religious Right has become a group that must be acknowledged and that there is utility in bringing them "into the fold." In

Kristol, there is no natural affinity or affection for the religious beyond the recognition that they may help the neo-conservatives reach their goal of coming to power. He goes on to make an emphatic argument for the usefulness of keeping close ties with this group when he states, "The reason is simple: It is not possible to motivate people to do the right thing, and avoid doing the wrong thing, unless people are told, from childhood on, what

95 Irving Kristol, Neo-Conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. 404. 96 Ibid., p. 365.

43 the right things and the wrong things are."97 Religion, for Kristol is one tool for educating and instructing the people from an early age and nothing more.

As we read further, he writes, "Coping with a religious revival, however, is something that conservatives and the Republican Party are not yet prepared to do.

Religious people always create problems since their ardor tends to outrun the limits of politics in a constitutional democracy. But if the Republican Party is to survive, it must work at accommodating these people."98 He continues, "Wouldn't it be better if both our parties remained secular? It probably would be..In other words, if the Republicans wish to win, then they had better mobilize and befriend the Religious Right. But these comments clearly see Kristol distancing himself from any real or genuine affection with the religious who he is seeking to court. It is strictly a marriage of convenience.

Kristol makes no apology for not being a true believer. On the contrary, he emphasizes again and again the practical value in this coalition. He writes in 1995,

Because religious conservatism is not only antistatist but antiliberal on

philosophical grounds (however "unsophisticated" those philosophical grounds

are), the role of the neoconservative intellectuals become especially

important.. .Many of these neoconservatives are not themselves religiously

observant in their private lives.. .This leads to accusations...of hypocrisy or cold­

blooded political instrumentalism. But such accusations miss the point. All

political philosophers prior to the twentieth century.. .understood the importance

of religion in the life of the political community. Neoconservatives.. .share this

97 Ibid., p. 365. 98 Ibid., p. 368. "ibid.,p. 372.

44 understanding. Just as there is a difference between being pious and being

observant, so there is a difference between being observant and being

religious...Modern secularism has such affinities to moral nihilism that even

those who wish simply to affirm or reaffirm moral values have little choice but to

seek grounding for such values in a religious tradition.100

This quote clearly states the neo-conservative view of religion and its usefulness as outlined by both Bloom and Kristol. It also shows the disregard that Kristol feels toward the "unsophisticated" religious believer. For Kristol it is not about being a true believer; it is about utility and usefulness.

Kristol makes an interesting distinction within religion itself. He distinguishes between "orthodox" and "gnostic" religion or between the "rabbinic" and "prophetic" traditions. Kristol is suspicious and cautious when it comes to the prophetic tradition in that it leaves too much room for interpretation and a view of the world as needing to be transformed and changed. He views prophetic Christianity as a "counter-culture" and sees it as creating "enormous problems" in the "practical world."101 He explains that the relationship between religion and the "real world of politics" must lean towards the orthodox or rabbinic tradition as it calls upon stability, predictability and caution.

Further, there is no room in it for revelation or personal interpretation of scripture and man's "fullest human potential [is obtained] through virtuous practice in our daily life."102 Orthodoxy itself is adverse to any radical change to those norms that have

100 Ibid., pp. 380-81. 101 Ibid., p. 430. 102 Ibid., p. 431.

45 shaped peoples' behaviours and activities.103 The neo-conservative encourages orthodox religion to create followers but not thinkers or questioners. This proper grounding in religious values ensures that the masses will avoid their natural dispositions and thus become politically manageable.

Both neo-conservatives and the furthest extremes of the Religious Right suggest that a wholly Christian nation was the original plan for the United States of America.

The idea of this type of state is problematic in that it would require a singular religious context in order for it to work. So in order to get the majority of Americans to support this radicalized view requires skillful manipulation, the intentional hijacking and the gratuitous misuse of important American symbols.

Donald Heinz, professor of Religious Studies at California State University, asks the important question, "What is it about symbols which give them such political power?

Symbols are signs which humans generate and discover as they create meaning and interpret the world." We begin "relating to symbols by drawing meaning from them and attempting to disseminate such meaning is a significant form of expressive social action."

Symbols like "the family and school can function as consciousness-raisers that mobilize a sense of participation in larger meaning and may effectively invite entry into the political process.»>104

Herein we find the most significant similarity and overlap in the methods used by the neo-conservatives and the politically active Religious Right: symbol production and manipulation. There is great power in this approach because "seizing access to or control

103 Ibid., pp. 429-441. 104 Donald Heinz, "The Struggle to Define America," in Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow, editors, The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 143-44.

46 of symbol production gives a social movement the opportunity to create an alternative world through the power of symbols."105 The Religious Right, like the neo- conservatives, sees itself as "engaged in a contest over the meaning of America's story" and "public symbols are the key instruments through which overarching systems of meaning are discovered and constructed." Therefore, "gaining access to symbol production (generation, selection, definition, dissemination, and control) is indispensible."106

One of the most powerful symbols seized by the neo-conservatives and the

Religious Right is the American Founding. This is not an easy line of attack as the

United States is founded on solidly liberal principles. Freedom of religion and the natural equality of men were two of the primary principles most strongly safe-guarded by those key contributors to the American Founding and yet these two seem to be among those first values undermined by the neo-conservative approach to politics and their view of just what society should look like.

Several recent authors have identified this serious attempt to defraud the

American people. Alan Dershowitz, a self-professed liberal and Harvard law professor details the many falsehoods implicit in these claims. In his book Blasphemy, he writes,

The intensity with which the Religious Right attempts to conscript the Founders

into their cause indicates the importance the movement ascribes to historical

benediction by association with the origins of the Republic. If [they] convince

105 Ibid., pp. 146-47. 106 Ibid., p. 137.

47 enough people that America was a Christian nation that has lost its way, the more

legitimate their efforts in the political arena seem.107

Dershowitz understands how anxious the Religious Right is to legitimize its view of

America. Its attempts to validate its political and historical views are fierce and troubling.

Daniel C. Maguire, a professor of Moral Theological Ethics at Marquette

University, has written hundreds of articles and many books outlining the dangers in the

Religious Right's approach to politics. "Such radical tinkering with the system is not conservative. It represents an attempted subversion of the method of checks and balances that was so central to the vision of the Founding Fathers and to that of true conservatives."108 Both the neo-conservatives and the Christian Right have strong motives for attempting this subversion. Both understand that this is a key element of gaining legitimacy with the public, and they have been surprisingly successful in their attempts. For any group to claim that defending one specific type of religion or belief as a national religion or belief system was in any way a part of the original intent of the

Founding Fathers, is quite simply false and nearly impossible to defend without intentional deceit. The first amendment clearly outlines that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."

The intent of this passage seems clear in that there should be no preference of one religion over another, non-religion over religion, or religion over non-religion.

107 Alan Dershowitz, Blasphemy: How the Religious Right is Hijacking Our Declaration of Independence (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), p. 2. 1 8 Daniel C. Maguire, The New Subversives (New York: Continuum, 1982), p. 12.

48 Maguire explains the two primary advantages "seen by the Founding Fathers of the United States in the non-establishment of religion: government could not intrude on the privacy and integrity of religious bodies, and no religious persuasion could be imposed by law on citizens who enjoyed other beliefs."109 These are implicit in both the

Constitution and the Declaration of Independence; there can be no mistaking the intention of the framers in these two foundational documents. Thomas Jefferson himself warned against leaders who "being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others..

Jefferson goes on to say that:

Our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions.. .Therefore the

proscribing of any citizen as unworthy of the public confidence by laying upon

him an incapacity of being called to offices of trust or emolument, unless he

profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injudiciously

of those privileges and advantages to which, in common with his fellow-citizens,

he has a natural right.. .It tends also to corrupt the principles of that very religion

it is meant to encourage, by bribing with monopoly of worldly honours and

emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to it.110

From these brief quotes it is clear to see that Thomas Jefferson not only discourages the use of any religious test when it comes to determining an individual's right to stand for office or lay claim on his basic rights, but he believes it to be contrary and "corrupting" to

109 Ibid., p. 12. 1,0 Quoted in Ibid., p. 12.

49 the very religious principles that are being unjustly forced on someone. This simply lends support to the belief that the United States was not founded as a Christian nation any more than it was founded as an Islamic state or a deist empire.

Paul Weyrich, founder of the Free Congress Foundation, an evangelical think tank, expressed the goal of the Christian Right bluntly when he said, "We are talking about Christianizing America. We are talking about simply spreading the gospel in a political context."'11 This should be a terrifying prospect for anyone who is not religious but it should be equally upsetting for those whose beliefs (including Christian beliefs) fall outside of the narrow scope of evangelical Christianity. A state that espouses such a shallow definition of what it means to be an American (or a Christian, for that matter) runs the very real risk of disenfranchising those who believe differently. From there it is a very short distance to persecution for one's beliefs, the elimination of real religious freedoms and the exclusion of those individuals from the political process. Maguire rightly says that:

The New Right never tires of telling us that this nation was founded by Christian

men explicitly relying on the Bible. The myth then continues saying that we have

fallen away from our Christian origins and are being called and legislated back

into them by the New Right. In historical fact, the churches were never weaker

than at the founding of the nation. Historians estimate that somewhere between 4

and 7 percent of the first American citizens were formally church

members...Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, George Washington, Benjamin

Franklin, and most of their colleagues and peers were quite discontented with

111 Quoted in Dershowitz, Blasphemy: How the Religious Right is Hijacking Our Declaration of Independence, p. 110.

50 orthodox Protestant teaching and practices. Their flirtation with deism and other

European imports was not seen as any kind of political limitation, though they

would all have been written off as "secular humanists" by today's Religious

Right.112

So how does this agenda of the Religious Right coincide with that of the neo- conservatives? To understand the answer to that question we only need to go back and recognize the role that neo-conservatives have for religion (and more broadly, culture) to play in politics and society. For the neo-cons, religion, as an integral part of culture, is a tool or a means of shaping and molding men and women into their specific roles in society, the family, and (most importantly) their relevant political spheres. Religion is used as a tool to ensure obedience. The strong presence of Christian religion in a predominantly religious state would allow neo-conservatives to ensure the undeviating devotion of its citizens while they pursue their political objectives.

These realities should be troubling to true religious believers and encourage them to do a close examination of their alliance with neo-conservative ideologues. While the means to achieving their goals may be very similar, and in some cases their goals may even appear to be the same, this chapter shows that the motivations and the ultimate outcomes for these two groups are extremely different. Neo-conservatives have strictly political and (as we will see in the next chapter) imperialistic goals. Their objective is to control men and ensure obedience and order. They are not looking forward to an impending glorious return of Christ nor do they believe in a trouble-free world beyond

112 Maguire, The New Subversives, p. 12.

51 the grave that exists for the righteous and devout. They simply support religion as a means to controlling and ensuring the continuance of order and power.

I find myself agreeing wholeheartedly with one author who stated, "You are implying a lot if you claim to speak for Christianity and for Christians. What troubles many people is that certain planks of conservative ideology are made to seem synonymous with being Christian or being religious." He continues: "We are politicizing too many moral questions. These questions need to be fought publically, yes, but not necessarily through the state." He then accurately points out that, "To say that the public square should be more hospitable to religious people is quite different from believing that the government itself needs to get enmeshed in religious squabbles. That is as bad for the religious as it is bad for religious freedom. Civil society exists as a forum independent of government."113 It seems very convenient for neo-conservatives to narrowly define what it means to be Christian as it allows politicians to artificially claim to understand the needs of this politically active group. It is, however, not doing any service to Christians who are a very diverse and varied group.

George Armstrong Kelly, distinguished political theorist, wrote the following,

"The only way we can preserve our liberties in private religion is to forego some liberties in community religion."114 This idea should remind us that we live in a society that is pluralistic in nature. Further, it should encourage us to remember that decisions made in government and law impact all members of society and those impacts may be long lasting and even negative.

113 E.J. Dionne Jr., "Responses," in Michael Cromartie, editor, Disciples and Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1994), pp. 17-19. 114 Kelly, Politics & Religious Consciousness in America, p. 228.

52 Kenneth Heineman noted early in the 1980s that an unhealthy tension was growing between the Religious Right and the neo-conservatives. Heineman, as a member of the Religious Right expresses frustration over the fact that the neo-conservatives and

Republicans have failed to deliver on their promises. The "elitist group that controlled the Republican Party - felt threatened by religious idealists...Republicans regarded religious conservatives. ..as a block of reliable voters to be trotted out every four years and then ignored until the next election."115 This utilitarian approach to politics is not new and still exists. Neo-conservatives want to control and predict the vote of the

Religious Right while rarely delivering on their promises of changes to the social landscape. "Reagan had promised fundamentalists and Pentecostals that he would save the American legal system from the forces of social liberalism."116 Yet, "after a decade of conservative governance, Americans had an economic system that hurt families and a political culture that appeared unwilling to prevent the dissolution of the social order."117

For Heineman, neo-conservative lip service to family values and promises of economic policies that would strengthen the family instead resulted in tax breaks for the rich and increased support for large corporate interests. In other words, the Republicans of the

1980s learned that they could utilize the Religious Right as a reliable group of voters that did not need to be appeased with fulfillment of campaign promises.

As we have seen, generally neo-conservatives are not 'true believers' but they see the practical advantage to using religious ideas to control a society. They popularize a nebulous mix of religion, patriotism, and protectionist sentiments and call this idea,

115 Kenneth J. Heineman, God is a Conservative (New York: New York University Press, 1998), p. 157. 116 Ibid., p. 160. 117 Ibid., p. 186.

53 'culture'. It then becomes a tool that is used to control the masses and keep them politically manageable and willing to fight, kill, and die for their country when asked.

Some might argue that the faithfully religious lend themselves to this project and they would not be wrong. While people of faith may be willing to fight and die for their religious freedoms, the reasons for their sacrifice matter! It is one thing to die for the freedom to live and worship in whatever manner you choose, but it is entirely different to fight in wars that are staged or manufactured for political or financial gain.

Further, the neo-conservative strategist sets up a scenario in which the devout

Christian follower will be at odds with traditional American political principles. As

Dionne rightly suggests, "Liberal, democratic society asserts that its functioning depends upon a contest of ideas. It refuses to establish in its own practices and in its government certain things that religious people take for granted. This is a continuing source of friction."118 Through their association with the neo-conservatives, the Religious Right undermines the religious freedoms that were wisely established by the American founders. A friction is created between what is truly in the best interest of the religious

(that being liberty and freedom—thus enabling them to protect their diversity of beliefs and ideas), and the idea of a mindless mass of people who are simply spoon-fed religion as a means of social control.

As we have seen in this chapter, the United States was never meant to be a state supporting a single type of culture, religion, or viewpoint. The Founding Fathers recognized that people of varying faiths and backgrounds would gather in a country dedicated to freedom, prosperity and a multiplicity of ideas. In fact, safeguards, checks

1,8 Dionne, "Responses," p. 42.

54 and balances were put in place to create a political culture that would facilitate these differences and allow these differences to enrich the political and social experience of all

Americans. "We know that the greatness of this country depends on it being the most heterogeneous, the most diverse country in the world. We understand the experimental nature of the American dream."119 As Dershowitz points out, it is the protection of each individual's right to have her own beliefs that truly makes the United States great.

In my opinion, the neo-cons (and the Religious Right) have hijacked and manipulated the story of the American founding. Both have distorted the historical facts and original documents, particularly the Declaration of Independence and the

Constitution. By convincing the American public that the founders and framers of the

United States were Christian (a specific type of Christian to be exact), both groups attempt to claim legitimacy for their vision of a highly religious and monistic nation.

Further, these attempts to claim ownership of the American founding are the mechanism through which neo-conservatives attempt to convince the average voter that they are the sole legitimate voice in American politics.

This effort is a desperate attempt to monopolize and destroy the validity of the pluralism currently found in the United States; a pluralism of thought, religion, race and creed that has both strengthened and exemplified exactly what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they envisioned a country led by the principles of the Constitution. Indeed, it is an attempt to legitimatize and justify a very narrow view of American politics, culture, and religion.

119 Dershowitz, Blasphemy: How the Religious Right is Hijacking Our Declaration of Independence, p. 165.

55 The dangers in this approach are many. Firstly, let me state that I believe religious beliefs and practices add value to a society and that it generally allows for a healthy, happy and content citizenry. I also strongly maintain there is great value in a diversity of religious beliefs and that this diversity is core to what the Founding Fathers expected and hoped for at the humble beginnings of the American state. But the dangers arise when the political discourse is dominated by a single voice claiming to be the only valid religious voice in America. Couple that with the utilitarian approach to religion taken by the neo-conservatives and it creates a recipe for alienation, factions and hate mongering.

One might ask, what then do I see as the role for religious voices within the state and civil society? Surely this significant group should be allowed to have its voice and concerns heard. My first response to this question is, "Absolutely!" But it is the manner in which political voices of all stripes must make themselves heard in a democracy with which I am most concerned.

Jurgen Habermas captures my view of this best in a recent article entitled,

"Religion in the Public Sphere." Habermas recognizes the rise in "political importance" of religious groups and communities in many modern societies but goes on to explain that they must engage in political discourse using the same tools and methods available to all.

Remember, the content of political decisions that can be enforced by the state

must be formulated in a language that is equally accessible to all citizens and it

must be possible to justify them in this language. Therefore, majority rule turns

into repression if the majority, in the course of democratic opinion and will

formation, refuses to offer those publicly accessible justification which the losing

56 minority, be it secular or of a different faith, is able to follow and to evaluate by

its own standards.120

Habermas is suggesting that in order to avoid dangerous and even totalitarian means of imposing the desires of one group (even a majority) on another, those opinions, views, and ultimately political actions, must be justified using language, tools, and methods freely accessible to all. In this way, he effectually eliminates the relatively arbitrary nature of revelation and personal opinion if they cannot also appeal to Enlightenment tools such as reason, rational thought, and positive law.

Habermas draws on John Rawls to argue that all should have "equal access" to public arguments and the opportunity to learn from the "perspective of the other." He writes, "The liberal state has an interest of its own in unleashing religious voices in the political public sphere, for it cannot know whether society would not otherwise cut itself off from key resources for the creation of meaning and identity."121 He does, however, remind religious groups that the role of the state is to "recognize the principle that an impartial rule is exercised with neutrality toward competing world views."

Some modern conservatives may disagree with my claim that the alliance between the Christian Right and the neo-conservatives is a false and tentative one. However, I maintain that the Religious Right is undermining the foundation of freedom and religious liberties that are their political inheritance from the wise Founding Fathers, who observed the adverse effects of state-persecution of religious sects in Europe. Equally concerning is the failure to acknowledge that there is great diversity within Christianity itself.

120 Jurgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere," European Journal of Philosophy (Volume 14, Issue 1, April 2006), pp. 1-25. 121 Ibid.

57 Christians come in many shapes and sizes. What gives this vocal, politically active group the authority to act on behalf of all Christians? Wherein lies their legitimacy? There are inherent dangers in allowing a vocal and active minority to speak for all believers, and worse, to act politically on behalf of such a diverse group.

While still strong, the alliance between the neo-conservatives and Christian Right seems to be growing increasingly tentative. At the height of George W. Bush's leadership, his public support was strong, with his base solidly in the camp of devout

Christian believers. But as time has passed and the United States has found itself enmeshed in the quagmire of Iraq, with little significant change in the social landscape at home, and a serious economic recession lingering, the Religious Right seems to have become disillusioned with the empty promises of a once very popular president. His inability or unwillingness to address some of the large moral questions that are so important to the Christian Right has left many with a bad taste in their mouths. Further, as religious people (and others) come to recognize the way in which that administration, informed by staunchly neo-conservative ideals, has significantly decreased and damaged long-standing civil liberties, the discontent will only continue to grow and increase in intensity. For it is those very civil liberties that have created the opportunities and the freedoms in which religious views of all kinds may flourish and grow. In time, the

Religious Right will come to recognize that "Christianity is not...an instrument for doing this world's business. Whenever it has made itself that, it has gotten into trouble time and time again."122

122 George Weigel, "Comments," in Michael Cromartie, editor, Disciples and Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1994), p. 35.

58 In the next chapter I will explore some of the results of a flawed foreign policy that has (at least in part) been informed by religious zealousness and American

Exceptionalism. Both of which have created an extremely dangerous trend in American activities overseas.

59 CHAPTER FOUR: NEO-CONSERVATISM ABROAD

In this chapter, I begin by tracing the evolution of neo-conservative foreign policy from the Reagan era to the prominent and distinctive influence it enjoyed during the

George W. Bush administration. I focus on how the neo-cons redefined themselves after the collapse of the Soviet Union and turned their attention to a more outward looking foreign policy based on American Exceptionalism. This redirection took place (in part) through the creation of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and other think tanks. An examination of PNAC's core principles will situate the neo- conservatives at the center of the Bush doctrine and will clearly identify several key individuals who not only contributed to and supported problematic ideas both domestically and internationally, but also played key roles in devising those doctrines.

I also explore the role that religion continues to play in American foreign policy and its military conflicts. I will show how this is impacting international views of

America and impacting the "war on terror" in the Middle East and around the world.

Specifically I will explore the increased role that Christian fundamentalism is playing in the American military today. As in the preceding chapters, I try to understand the link between this increased religious sentiment and the significant popularity of neo- conservative ideas particularly during Bush's first term.

In this context, I focus on the blunders of the Bush administration in the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent collapse in his public support. As evidence of the collapse, I will briefly assess the very public battle and infighting that has occurred between very prominent neo-conservatives in the media and explore a couple of reasons for this

60 internal strife. I argue that the dissension has its source in the flawed foreign policy approach of the movement.

I spend the largest part of this chapter investigating the defection of a key intellectual from the neo-con movement, namely Francis Fukuyama. His very public defection from the group (and the subsequent book detailing his reasons) gives us a solid place to start in outlining some key defects in neo-conservative foreign policy.

Fukuyama's America at the Crossroads illustrates the neo-conservative foreign policy agenda that has plagued the United States with the tragic and dangerous fallout from the

Iraq war and the "war on terror." More importantly, as I examine his arguments, I will show that he identifies several crippling flaws in the neo-conservative doctrine.

To appreciate and understand the evolution of neo-conservative foreign policy, we need to go back about two decades. After the autumn of 1989 and the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, some neo-conservatives announced victory: their aims had been achieved, their demons conquered. But some were deeply concerned that without an "Evil Empire" they would not be able to clearly define their objectives.

On January 15,1996 Norman Podhoretz, then a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and influential neo-conservative thinker, gave a speech entitled, "Neoconservatism: A

Eulogy."123 He outlined the humble beginnings of the group and traced their history right to that moment. He stopped just short of allowing the movement to take full credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union. He wrote:

The neoconservatives, driven by their anti-Communist passions and ideas, argued

that the entire purpose of a more determined resistance to Soviet power was to

123 Norman Podhoretz, "Neoconservatism: A Eulogy," Commentary (March 1996)

61 encourage the forces of disintegration that had become visible within the Soviet

empire and even within the Soviet heartland itself...It was they themselves who

had held out the promise of precisely such a collapse as the ultimate reward of the

kind of policy they consistently urged on Ronald Reagan—military buildup, 1 combined with an ideological offensive.

Podhoretz clearly stood behind exactly the kind of tactics that were endorsed during the

Cold War but also seems to overstate the role of the neo-con influence in that process. In the next decade, neo-cons would use similar strategies and justifications in redefining their foreign policy objectives.

Podhoretz quite simply believed that neo-conservatism had accomplished what it set out to accomplish (defeat of the Soviet menace) and therefore appeared to be no longer needed. He writes, "For what killed neo-conservatism was not defeat but victory; it died not of failure but success."125 Podhoretz further emphasizes that even though there were many changes still to be made, they were cultural and domestic and could be left to other conservative forces. In Podhoretz's view, the "two ruling passions" of neo- conservatism were its anti-Communism and its rejection of the counterculture of the sixties. With the decline of Soviet power and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the neo- conservatives had accomplished one of their primary goals. He also gives neo- conservatives full credit for establishing an institutional counterrevolution to fight back against the liberal idealism of the sixties. His claims to victory in this regard seem overly extravagant. He writes,

124 Ibid. 125 Ibid.

62 I think we can say that the defense the neoconservatives mounted of American

society and its traditional values against the frontal assaults of the counterculture

ended with a victory that in its own way resembled the victory of the West over

Communism in the Cold War. Who today shies away from the word capitalism

or denies that it is superior to socialism both in producing wealth and distributing

it? Who today celebrates free and easy sex as the road to health and happiness?

Who today promotes drugs as the gateway to a higher consciousness? Today

family values are all the rage, even among feminists, and indeed even among

homosexuals, who have gone from celebrating the joys of gay sex to demanding

that they be permitted to participate in the joys of married life.126

If we were to take Podhoretz at face value, we would assume that the neo-conservative moment had passed because it had accomplished all (or most) of what it set out to do.

But I think we need to look a little closer at what he has written, for in his own way he seems to predict the future of the neo-cons over the subsequent decade. Toward the end of his speech he says it is,

Better to make of it a new beginning in the living spirit of what has passed. I

mean to say that this is not a time for mourning or for apprehension or for anxiety,

but a time for satisfaction over a just war well fought, and a time for rejoicing in a

series of great victories that cleared the way and set the stage for other great

victories in the years to come. In those victories of the future, I believe the

legacy, and the legatees, of neo-conservatism, now zestfully thriving all around

126 Ibid.

63 us, will play as indispensable a part as the neoconservatives themselves did in

achieving the victories of the past.127

Podhoretz is right, in that the mid-nineties were a "new beginning" for the neo-cons.

They would, within less than a decade, move into a position of significance and power barely dreamed of previously. Despite his claims that the ideology was dead or no longer relevant, other significant players in the movement had very different ideas and the group truly emerged in the public eye in some very noteworthy ways. Drunk on their own success and a naive belief in their own predictions, they continued to build on their legacy of the 1980s and 1990s. There was, however, a very different neo-conservative legacy with veiy frightening and damaging consequences awaiting the United States and the world.

With the fall of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, some neo­ conservatives saw the end of an era, but others saw an opportunity. That opportunity was made possible by what they viewed as a "uni-polar" moment. This moment meant that the United States was now the only world super-power and as such needed to seize the occasion to forward its own interests and spread democracy and freedom where possible.

They viewed the newly, unchallenged American empire as a virtuous leviathan that would now be free to exercise benevolent hegemony on a world stage if the situation was managed carefully and correctly. After a brief season of quiet, the neo-conservatives regrouped with a redefined vision.

One of the very public faces of this redefined vision was the Project for the New

American Century (PNAC) co-founded in early 1997 by William Kristol and Robert

127 Ibid.

64 Kagan. The founders and supporters of this group are a who's who of the neo-cons and, later, of the George W. Bush administration. Among those who signed the original

Statement of Principles we find some very familiar names. Elliott Abrams, Jeb Bush,

Dick Cheney, Francis Fukuyama, Donald Kagan, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Norman

Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz were just some of those who agreed to the core principles in an initial declaration by this newly founded group.

Several other influential supporters emerged later to sign open letters sent out to various presidents and politicians by this group. They included: Kenneth Adelman, Richard

Armitage, John Bolton and Richard Perle.

Their "Statement of Principles" included the following recommendations for government: a significant increase in defense spending to "carry out our global responsibilities," to "challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values," to "promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad," and to "accept responsibility for

America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles." These steps were "necessary if the United

States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next." This was a doctrine focused on America first with significant disregard for the known subtleties of foreign policy. It also laid, with frightening accuracy, the groundwork for what would later become the "Bush doctrine."

The neo-conservatives were positioning themselves and simply waiting for their chance. In a report titled "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Defenses, and

Resources for a New Century" written and published in 2000 by PNAC, a statement was made that has given conspiracy theorists plenty of fodder. The lengthy report states that

65 the types of changes and endorsements PNAC is suggesting, specifically endorsing significant increases in military funding and activity, will not be supported more broadly without a serious transition in both government and in public opinion. The report states,

"Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor."

Shortly after George W. Bush's controversial election in 2000, with many PNAC members and other neo-conservatives firmly in place in his administration, just such a catastrophe occurred.

The destruction of the World Trade Towers on September 9,2001 gave Bush and his neo-con advisors the public support to move forward with a foreign policy steeped in unilateral decision-making and tragic consequences. After a brief, ally-supported attack in Afghanistan meant to bring those responsible for the September 11th attacks to justice, the United States almost completely alone and with very little international support, invaded Iraq. Backed by questionable intelligence, unfounded assertions, and a glib moral superiority, Bush led the United States military into a war that, more than 8 years later, has no foreseeable end. A coup that was called a "cakewalk" and a "doable do" had turned into an embarrassing stalemate for the most technologically advanced and powerful military ever known to man.

It is not my intention here to outline the flaws and errors of the military campaign in Iraq. In my opinion, these have been clearly demonstrated, researched, and reported on in various academic and journalistic sources. It is sufficient for the purposes of this chapter to have outlined the neo-conservative influence and role in the lead up to the war.

I also hope that I have clearly (albeit briefly) documented the influence that the doctrines

66 long held by the neo-conservatives have played in the decisions made by George Bush as well as outlined the significant place held by many neo-cons in his early administration during the time these key decisions were being made.

The neo-conservative approach to foreign policy as outlined above is made more complicated when you add the beliefs of evangelical Christians to the mix. Their understanding of the "war on terror" and the issues in the Middle East further complicate an already difficult scenario. This group (that makes up as much as 40% of the

Republican base) tends to believe that government should be guided by religion and have no reservations about a President, namely George W. Bush, who believes that God speaks with and through him, or when he claims that God told him to attack Iraq.128

A recent survey done by the Pew Research Center, found that 46% of those who self-identified as evangelical Protestants were mostly likely to have an "unfavourable" view of Muslims, the highest percentage of any group surveyed. This same survey showed that 50% of evangelicals believed that the "Islamic religion is more likely than others to promote violence amongst its believers."129 When coupled with the evidence of a growing evangelical influence in the military, these kinds of statistics lend credence to the view that the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan may be (at least in part) religiously motivated. They might also explain why the actions in the Middle East continue to be most strongly supported by the Religious Right whose agenda seems encouraged by a biblical worldview.

128 See the stories in the July 16,2003 issue of the Lancaster New Era and the July 1, 2003 issue of Haaretz (The Israeli daily) 129 The Pew Forum On Public and Religious Life. "Prospects for Interreligious Understanding," a survey conducted on March 22,2006. www.pewforum.org

67 A recent article in Harper's magazine outlined with frightening detail the rise in influence of the Religious Right in the military. It states that the greatest concentration of evangelicals is within the officer's corps explaining that the Officer's Christian

Fellowship has over 15,000 members. The article goes on to quote several prominent, high-ranking officers who speak of "reclaiming territory for Christ in the military,"

"raising up a godly army," and another who calls the "war on terror" a "spiritual battle of the highest magnitude." These kinds of statements coupled with what can only be described as religiously motivated acts of vandalism in Iraq like spray painting crosses on mosques and personnel speaking of the war being a battle between "angels and demons," seem to provide some evidence that the actions in the Middle East are (at least in part) a modern crusade.130

But should it really be that surprising? George W. Bush himself called the "war on terror," a crusade and a holy war.131 "Soldiers are encouraged to spread the message of their Christian faith," despite General Order Number One that strictly forbids this type of proselytizing. With two-thirds of chaplains now self-identifying as evangelical and local language Bibles being shipped to the Middle East in generous supply, this trend seems unlikely to diminish.132 Another report has American rifles being inscribed (at the factory) with Biblical scripture and verse. This led the soldiers and their commanders to refer to their weapons as "spiritually transformed" and "Jesus rifles."133 As I outlined in

130 Jeff Sharlet, "Jesus killed Mohammed: The crusade for a Christian military," Harper's Magazine (May 2009) 131 Peter Ford, "Europe cringes at Bush 'crusade' against terrorists," The Christian Science Monitor (September 19,2001) 132 Kathryn Joyce, "Christian Soldiers," Newsweek (web exclusive) June 19,2009. 133 Joseph Rhee, Tahman Bradley and Brian Ross, "U.S. Military Weapons Inscribed With Secret 'Jesus' Codes," ABC News (January 18, 2010)

68 chapter three, this exemplifies the dangerous mix that the neo-conservative foreign policy agenda becomes when laced with a radical, evangelical worldview.

As the "Bush doctrine" has failed the United States both domestically and internationally over the last several years, voices of discontent have become more and more audible. Criticisms that started out in the backrooms of universities, then picked up by a few brave journalists have, reached the halls of the White House, and are now being hurled by those who once supported and espoused the very decisions and policies that they now attack. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the January 2007 edition of

Vanity Fair. An article titled "Neo Culpa," written by David Rose, explores the state of mind of three key neo-conservatives who were staunch supporters of the invasion of

Iraq—Richard Perle, David Frum, and Kenneth Adelman. These three men were not only supportive of the Iraq war at its outset, but also played key roles in publically supporting the military action as well as having noteworthy influence on the President's decision to move forward. As he began research for the article, Rose wondered what reaction he should expect to encounter from the neo-conservative proponents of the war.

"I expected to encounter disappointment. What I find instead is despair, and fury at the incompetence of the Bush administration many neo-cons once saw as their brightest hope."134

Richard Perle, a member of the Defense Policy Board until 2004, blames the Iraq failure on "devastating dysfunction within the Bush administration" and on George W.

Bush himself. Further on in Rose's article, Perle says Bush "did not make the decisions, in part because the machinery of government that he nominally ran was actually running

134 David Rose, "Neo Culpa," Vanity Fair (January 2007)

69 him." Rose observes that this is a terrible indictment, and Perle does not demur, but says bluntly, "It is." Perle also claims that given the choice to do it over again, he would not support the invasion of Iraq and yet still maintained, "I don't say that because I no longer believe that Saddam had the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, or that he was not in contact with terrorists. I believe those two premises were both correct."135

In Perle's case, at least, he seems to regret the outcome, specifically the quagmire that Iraq has turned into, as opposed to either the lies that got them there or the questionable morality of the action in the first place. Perle is not questioning the decisions that led to that cataclysmic war; rather he is calling into question the competency of the military, the government and its decisions that he helped to shape.

This seems to be a futile attempt to distance himself (and the neo-conservatives) from those destructive decisions. But he is not alone.

David Frum, former White House speechwriter and prominent neo-con author, made famous for co-writing Bush's 2002 State of the Union address wherein he coined the phrase "axis of evil," sings a similar tune. His words in the Vanity Fair article are, in some ways, even more telling than Perle's. "I always believed as a speechwriter that if you could persuade the president to commit himself to certain words, he would feel himself committed to the ideas that underlay those words. And the big shock to me has been that, although the president said the words, he just did not absorb the ideas. And that is the root of, maybe, everything."136 But here I disagree with Frum. I think it is disingenuous to say that Bush did not "absorb the ideas" as the decisions he made were in complete harmony with the ideas being set out before him. Those ideas were simply

135 Ibid. 136 Ibid.

70 flawed. Going into Iraq and the Middle East, the neo-cons held to the idea that a world governed by law and democracy, like that in the North Atlantic countries, could quite easily be exported and that the people of Iraq were simply waiting to be liberated. In fact they found that the complete opposite was true. The Americans were viewed as occupiers with military and imperialistic goals.

Frum's words strike me as terribly arrogant and presumptuous, but at their core they also speak volumes about the Bush presidency. Because Bush surrounded himself with individuals who were strongly committed to neo-conservative ideology, his decisions and worldviews were inevitably shaped by neo-conservative ideas. Bush therefore undermined his own ability to act outside of the constraints placed on him and his choices by the influential advisors he had chosen to surround himself with. Whether he was a true believer or not, Bush found himself (and subsequently the country) in a position that was impacted by decisions shaped in accordance with this ideology.

It is interesting to note that Frum is also the co-author of An End to Evil: How to

Win the War on Terror. But rather than taking any responsibility or ownership for the outcomes following the decisions in Iraq that he clearly supported in his book and inside the walls of the White House, Frum joins Perle in heaping the blame solely at the feet of the president. "People were aware in February or March of 2003 that the planning was not finished," Frum says. "There was not a coherent plan, and in the knowledge that there was not a coherent plan, there was not the decision made to wait." Ultimately,

Frum blames the situation on a "failure at the center."137 But Frum and others never

137 Ibid.

71 advised the President to wait. Indeed, everything suggests that the inner circle believed that Iraq would be a simple 'cakewalk.'

Further evidence that the neo-conservatives are backtracking in vain attempts to conceal their responsibility for the outcomes in Iraq and the damaging decisions of the

Bush administration can be found in this same article in the words of Kenneth Adelman.

Adelman is a "longtime neo-con activist and Pentagon insider who has served on the

Defense Policy Board" and famously claimed that "demolishing Hussein's military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk." Adelman's words are among the harshest. . .1 presumed that what I considered to be the most competent national- security team... was indeed going to be competent. They turned out to be among the most incompetent teams in the postwar era. Not only did each of them, individually, have enormous flaws, but together they were deadly, dysfunctional." It is difficult to overlook the irony in these statements. What Adelman fails to acknowledge (despite having intimate awareness of the fact) is that the national security team was comprised of primarily neo-conservative insiders. He is pointing the finger of blame at the very group he is a member of. With little attempt to hide the fact that he laments the impact this will have on neo-conservatism, he states, "the idea of a tough foreign policy on behalf of morality, the idea of using our power for moral good in the world-is dead, at least for a generation."138 This is a very significant quote in that it emphasizes the motivating factor behind neo-con foreign policy but also ties the idea of conservatism, religion and foreign policy together. Unlike, traditional conservatives the neo-conservative wants to force radical change through military strength if necessary. Thus the radicalism I outlined in

138 Ibid.

72 chapter two becomes apparent in the neo-conservative foreign policy. Neo-conservatives have a narrow view of what is morally correct in the world and are not opposed to acting militarily (a revolutionary means) to ensure that the world adheres to that limited paradigm. They are motivated by some oblique need to ensure the world is safe for capitalism, democracy and freedom without recognizing the incredible damage that can be inflicted in the pursuit of these goals when sought by forceful means.

In one of the most telling (and in my opinion unbelievable) statements, Adelman further claims that, "the policy can be absolutely right, and noble, beneficial, but if you can't execute it, it's useless, just useless...Bush's arguments were absolutely right."139

This statement uses a similar approach to the one mentioned above by Perle. It is an obvious attempt to try to maintain the validity of the ideas and influence that the neo- conservatives had on the decision-making process without assuming any responsibility for the outcomes of the associated actions. It seems to me like a futile attempt. Bush and the U.S. military executed the strategy exactly as planned but did not anticipate the resistance they would face. It seems they naively expected to be welcomed as liberators in Iraq and that the military efforts would be a "cakewalk." The reality was something entirely different. The greatest oversight in the neo-con approach was the foreign resistance they faced to the very values that they presumed were universal.

Rose rightly concludes that these neo-conservatives are attempting to scurry away from the administration's blunders. He argues,

The implications will be profound—not only for American conservatism but also

for the future direction and ambitions of American foreign policy. The neocons'

139 Ibid.

73 position in this debate starts with an unprovable assertion: that when the war

began, Iraq was "a doable do," to use a military planner's phrase cited by David

Frum. If not for the administration's incompetence, they say, Saddam's tyranny

could have been replaced with something not only better but also secure. "Huge

mistakes were made," Richard Perle says, "and I want to be very clear on this:

they were not made by neoconservatives, who had almost no voice in what

happened, and certainly almost no voice in what happened after the downfall of

the regime in Baghdad. I'm getting damn tired of being described as an architect

of the war. I was in favor of bringing down Saddam. Nobody said, 'Go design

the campaign to do that.' I had no responsibility for that."140

Another very public and elaborate response to the failing policies and public blunders of the neo-conservatives came from Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama studied under Allan Bloom at Cornell University, where he did his B.A. in Classics. He later went on to complete his Ph.D. at Harvard in Government where he studied with Samuel

Huntington and Harvey Mansfield. Having worked closely with these three highly influential gurus of the neo-conservatives, he was quickly gathered into the fold. Yet

Fukuyama has always distinguished himself as one of the most intriguing and interesting of the neo-con thinkers and writers.

Fukuyama worked for almost a decade at various think tanks and did two brief stints with the Reagan and the George H.W. Bush administration respectively. He was quick to make a public name for himself as an up-and-coming intellectual in 1989 with the publication of an essay in the National Interest entitled "The End of History." The

140 Ibid.

74 essay asserted that, with the spread of liberal political and economic ideas throughout the communist world and in much of the Third World, mankind had reached the end of its ideological evolutionary process; 'history,' in the Hegelian-Marxist sense had reached its culmination not in socialism but in the ideals of the French and American revolutions. It created particular interest as it came out five months prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

He solidified his place among important contemporary political scientists with the much debated and influential book, The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992, a work that fleshed out the ideas published in the earlier article.

Fukuyama was among the founders and supporters of the PNAC foreign policy initiatives, signing the initial Statement of Principles in 1997 as well as letters later arguing support for those ideas sent to both Presidents Clinton and Bush Jr. That makes his statements publicly denouncing neo-conservatism, the Bush administration, and the war in Iraq all the more intriguing. Early in 2006, Fukuyama wrote an article for the New

York Times titled "After Neoconservatism," in which he traced the errors of the actions in

Iraq and the flaws in the theoretical foundations for those decisions. In his article

(fleshed out a few months later his book, America at the Crossroads), Fukuyama makes the following statement, "Neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something I can no longer support."141

Outwardly this came as a huge blow to the neo-conservatives. Discussion and criticism of his statements continue to circulate in the media even today. An article dated as recently as May 2008 finds Fukuyama still defending and explaining his decisions.

Part of what made his declaration so damaging was his insider's knowledge of the group

141 Francis Fukuyama, "After Neoconservatism," The New York Times (19 Feb 2006)

75 and his solid theoretical understanding of the doctrines espoused by the movement.

Another element that made his defection from the movement so hard to reconcile with his previous unwavering support, was the very public nature of his declaration. Were his reasons and explanations valid and sound given what was at stake? A closer look reveals that Fukuyama's criticism of the foreign policy decisions made following 9/11 are based on what he calls two conflicting foundational principles in neo-conservative thought.

Fukuyama claims that the neo-cons shared "a belief that American power can be used for moral purposes."142 As we have seen, this belief was sustained and reinforced by the events leading up to the decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, for which many neo-conservatives are inclined to take credit (witness Norman

Podhoretz's speech "eulogizing" the movement). Fukuyama acknowledges this belief when he writes,

The way the Cold War ended shaped the thinking of supporters of the Iraq war,

including younger neoconservatives like William Kristol and Robert Kagan, in

two ways. First, it seems to have created an expectation that all totalitarian

regimes were hollow at the core and would crumble with a small push from

outside....The war's supporters seemed to think that democracy was a kind of

default condition to which societies reverted once the heavy lifting of coercive

regime change occurred, rather than a long-term process of institution-building

and reform.143

I think it is interesting to ask here, what role did Fukuyama's ideas in The End of

History and the Last Man play in influencing neo-conservatives to be overly optimistic

142 Ibid. 143 Ibid.

76 when it comes to the innate or instinctual desire men and women feel for moving towards freedom, liberalism, and democracy? In a fascinating claim, he appears to anticipate this question and attempts to distance himself from the answer while at the same time further outlining the flaws in the neo-conservative approach. He writes, "The End of

History... presented a kind of Marxist argument for the existence of a long-term process for social evolution, but one that terminates in liberal democracy rather than communism...The neoconservative position articulated by people like Kristol and Kagan was, by contrast, Leninist; they believed that history can be pushed along with the right application of power and will."144 This states clearly one of the foundational myths in neo-conservative foreign policy that events can be changed and countries influenced or redirected by the "right application of power and will."

It is hard to know for certain whether Fukuyama really understands his original idea in that way or if this is just an opportunity to create distance from the foreign policy direction of the neo-conservatives now that he has the benefit of hindsight. While I agree that there are significant differences between what he was (theoretically) proposing or explaining in The End of History and the Last Man and the approach to foreign policy later endorsed by PNAC and Robert Kagan (in books like Of Paradise and Power), nevertheless it seems rather opportunistic for Fukuyama now to take such a stance.

Especially given his long support of the neo-con ideals and (even more so) his original endorsement of PNAC recommendations, I can't help but feel his claims are less than genuine.

144 Ibid.

77 Nonetheless, Fukuyama points out (correctly I believe) that claims stating the might of the United States can (and should) be used for moral or religious purposes conflicts with another core thread of neo-conservative thinking, namely "a view that ambitious social engineering often leads to unexpected consequences and thereby undermines its own ends."145 He sees democracy promotion as part of this social engineering and recognizes that attempts at democracy building, as part of American foreign policy, should be closely scrutinized and re-evaluated:

We need in the first instance to understand that promoting democracy and

modernization in the Middle East is not a solution to the problem of jihadist

terrorism.. .The overarching lesson that emerges from these cases is that the

United States does not get to decide when and where democracy comes

about.. .Demand for democracy and reform must be domestic. Democracy

promotion is therefore a long-term and opportunistic process that has to await the

gradual ripening of political and economic conditions to be effective.146

Fukuyama, in this statement, identifies another flaw in the attempts of the neo-cons to export democracy: the idea that democracy can be 'forced' on a non-democratic people.

Such a proposition goes completely against everything that a democratic society is built on. It completely disregards the role that freedom, the rule of law, economics, political judgment, history, and even religion play in establishing a truly democratic society.

These factors were all ignored in the actions taken in the Middle East.

In still other parts of his argument, Fukuyama seems most concerned with the irreparable damage the Iraq war has done to the neo-conservative movement and

78 reputation. "One of the consequences of a perceived failure in Iraq will be the discrediting of the entire neoconservative agenda."147 In this regard, he seems to agree with Perle, Frum, and Adelman in Vanity Fair. In "After Neoconservatism" he writes,

"it is the idealistic effort to use American power to promote democracy and human rights abroad that may suffer the greatest setback."148 He continues by stating, "Were the

United States to retreat from the world stage, following the drawdown in Iraq, it would in my view be a huge tragedy, because American power and influence have been critical to the maintenance of an open and increasingly democratic order around the world."149 In the closing statements of that article he makes the most telling statements:

Neoconservatism, whatever its complex roots, has become indelibly associated

with concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism and American

hegemony. What is needed now are new ideas, neither neoconservative nor

realist, for how America is to relate to the rest of the world-ideas that retain the

neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without its illusions

about the efficacy of American power and hegemony to bring these ends about.150

Statements like this, lead me to question Fukuyama's defection from the group. They are, in general, more statements of regret for the damage that has been inflicted to the reputation and doctrines of the neo-conservative agenda. He still seems to believe in the validity of the many foreign policy missteps taken by Bush under the direction of neo-con advisors. He is lamenting the outcomes rather die clear errors in judgment and direction

147 Ibid., p. 183. 148 Fukuyama, "After Neoconservatism" 149 Ibid.Ibid. 150in Ibid.

79 that took them there. He tries to argue both that democracy promotion is a violation of the core principles of the neo-con objections to social engineering while at the same time calling America's loss of power to spread democracy tragic. So which is it?

This chapter has given us a glimpse into the foreign policy priorities of the neo- conservatives. The evidence, supplied from their own writings and organizations clearly demonstrates their desires to act in ways that led the United States to the war in Iraq with all its associated blunders and dishonesty. The quagmire that Iraq has become should encourage Americans to recognize the errors in the reasoning that took them there in the first place and that those errors were deeply embedded in neo-conservative thinking.

However, I fear that the strong hold that the Religious Right has gained over the military and the associated "end of days" mentality that is associated with current activities in the

Middle East may make this a near impossible hope.

In researching for this chapter, I had anticipated finding that the neo-conservatives and their support would be declining and would be inevitably destined to fall from the political landscape for good. What I found instead surprised me. As I explored the words of Fukuyama and others more closely, I found a group that was trying to distance itself from the Bush regime and the ideas that fed into his decision-making process. I discovered, much to my surprise, that they are having some degree of success in their attempts. Perhaps this should not have surprised me as much as it did. As I have mentioned in previous chapters, this is a resilient group that has managed to redefine and reposition themselves politically several times over their short history. Their political savvy and now significant financial backing only makes this process easier and more likely to be successful.

80 What is most disturbing is that the public seems to be responding. Perhaps it is because a serious voice for a more traditional conservative approach to politics is nowhere to be found. Or perhaps it is that people find some comfort in the ideas of

American Exceptionalism, preemptive wars, and the moral obligations of a "benevolent" empire in a uni-polar moment. Those ideas feed into the fears of a public beleaguered with new realities in a 'clash of civilizations' where a foreign enemy may strike at any time. The United States is a country and a people ripe for political leadership, a leadership that will address a growing uncertainty about security both physical and economic. Perhaps a more reasonable conservative voice will emerge from the rubble left by flawed neo-conservative policies; a voice that will be prepared to take America in a new direction, drawing on the strengths and not the fears of this once great nation.

81 CONCLUSION

In this thesis I set out to understand neo-conservatism's significant rise to political prominence. I hoped to show that much of the success of the movement is based on (1) the claim of recapturing the wisdom of a lost conservatism, (2) an alignment of political objectives with the Religious Right and, (3) a more aggressive, "America-first"

« foreign policy. I believed that all of these factors have made the neo-con approach to politics extremely appealing in a time of growing political cynicism and discontent.

We have seen that the neo-conservatives are not conservative at all. Their brand of politics is firstly reactionary thus making it opposite to a truly conservative approach.

It undermines the values and principles of true conservatism and blurs the lines of political understanding for a public in desperate need of clarity. Neo-conservatism is an ideology with strong, unrealistic goals for changing the political landscape at home and abroad. The results and consequences of those ideas are clearly visible following eight years of Republican leadership under George W. Bush. The economy is in shambles, extreme partisanship is a painful political reality undermining any true dialogue between opposing camps, and the United States is engaged in military conflicts that have no apparent end in sight.

This state of affairs can be blamed in part on the fact that neo-conservatives do not embrace slow, cautious change, but rather pursue radical ideas that (in their view) must be brought to reality immediately because they believe that a classical conservative approach is no longer relevant in today's politics. Neo-conservatives are not skeptical about the ability of government to make change. Contrary to their claims, they endorse big government and big spending; they are convinced that the American experience is

82 "exceptional" and thus demands a different type of politics and a different type of conservatism to manage it properly. They have been extremely successful at capturing the ear of many through their influence in the media and have generated a campaign of propaganda that confuses the general public by distorting political terms, oversimplifying complex political problems, and flooding the airwaves with sound-bytes and catch phrases. And yet, the neo-conservatives have managed to convince the public that they are the legitimate, sole voice of conservatism in the American political arena. They have succeeded in disenfranchising truly conservative voices and removing them from the political stage.

Further, the neo-cons have managed to successfully convince the Religious Right to buy into a partnership that is built on disingenuous intentions. We have seen that neo- conservatives seek to trot out the Religious Right as a reliable voting block every four years. They understand the power and influence of the evangelicals and have managed to convince many that their goals are parallel, and that both groups are seeking the same social and political outcomes. Yet I have shown that at the heart of neo-conservative philosophy is a disdain for the truly religious. The neo-con purpose for promoting and supporting religion in society is strictly utilitarian, an opportunity to control a dark human nature (as they perceive it) and a means to achieve political ends.

Neo-conservative foreign policy goals have stretched the capacity of history's most advanced military machine and sent the U.S. budget reeling. It has undermined any moral standing that the U.S had on the world stage by "going it alone" in a war that was built on shaky intelligence and an overly ambitious, misdirected ideology. When partnered with an over zealous, overly religious military, U.S. actions in the Middle East

83 look dangerously crusade-like. Neo-conservative ideology has set back U.S. foreign affairs for at least a generation. Their belief that political ideals can be forced on other nations, that a true democracy can be created out of thin air without the help of history has proven unobtainable. Neo-cons have over-estimated the ability of ideas to overcome the age-old traditions of Islamic culture and people. In short, they have ignored the truths that are enshrined in a truly conservative understanding of politics, which relies heavily on traditions that take many generations to cultivate. Neo-conservatives have forgotten that democracy and other political and economic ideals grow and evolve slowly and only as political structures, institutions and ideas are built over time on a foundation of trial and error.

As I began this paper, I hoped that as insights about neo-conservatism came to the forefront of public awareness that the movement and its influence would begin to crumble and fall apart. While that has occurred on some level with the decline in popularity of the Republican Party (and their ideas) following the 2008 election, I failed to anticipate two key factors. Firstly, I did not fully appreciate the way that neo- conservative ideas have become so pervasive in all parts of politics on both the left and the right. The neo-conservative rhetoric has become the bedrock of the so-called conservative movement in the United States. There are no other clear, distinctive voices speaking for those who hold truly conservative views and ideas. The waters have been sufficiently muddied between what is conservative and neo-conservative so as to make any clear distinction almost impossible.

Secondly, I greatly misjudged the neo-conservative movement's resilience and propensity for redefining itself. In its history the group has successfully been able to do

84 this time and again, occasionally losing strong supporters or founding members but nevertheless each time emerging stronger with new goals and aspirations intact. This factor (on its own) seems significant enough to suggest that the neo-cons are not going away anytime soon. Despite the apparent defections of significant theorists like Francis

Fukuyama and David Frum and the more pragmatic participants like Richard Perle, the neo-conservative ideas and influence will not lie dormant for long.

The greatest surprise in my research came in my deeper understanding of the neo- conservative use of religion and the Religious Right in its politics. I found that both the neo-cons and the Religious Right are trying to utilize and seize political advantage with potentially dangerous outcomes. The Founding Fathers were wise in the Bill of Rights to enshrine the Establishment clause and the Free Exercise clause. These together guaranteed the basic religious freedoms of Americans to worship (or not) how and what they choose. It also ensured that the State would not establish or support any one religion over another. These clauses have created a framework for basic religious freedoms in the

United States ever since.

In as much as the neo-conservatives flirt with religion for political advantage, I fear they are doing so at great risk. Politics and religion do not mix so easily. While many religious peoples might disagree with what I am about to say, I firmly maintain that there is an irreconcilable tension between the Constitution of the United States and the

Bible. In the Constitution, the voice of the people is (in essence) the voice of God. Yet in the Bible, the voice of the prophets is the voice of God. These facts cannot be easily reconciled and any attempts to reconcile them are both futile and dangerous. The voice of the people cannot supplant the voice of God and his prophets without making a

85 mockery of religious faith. Replacing God with the voice of the people makes God superfluous. Far from giving religion its due respect, it destroys it. Perhaps it is too late in the paper to state my own predispositions; I have a strong religious background. It is from that perspective that I have watched carefully as religion has played an ever­ growing part in politics and in political discourse. Perhaps I am unusual in that I am a religious person who objects to the use of religion in politics at all and even more to the use of religion to justify support (whether overtly or not) for foreign policy decisions. I value the philosophy that separates church and state, which has in many ways contributed to a strong, vibrant, and diverse religious life in the United States.

One objection to my arguments and conclusion might be to ask, why worry that the neo-cons want to use religion for utilitarian means? Or put another way, can't both groups benefit from their partnership, since both see value in a strong presence for religion in public and private life? As I stated in chapter three, I believe that religion is healthy both for society and individuals. It fosters community and family, stands for high moral principles, and encourages people to be better—to change, to forgive, to strive for a good, moral life. The basis of my concern comes in the use of religion to belittle and undermine those who worship or believe differently. This is where religion and politics are not natural allies. Religion can easily lead to exclusionism, lean away from clear, rational thought and rely exclusively on faith and revelation. But modern, liberal politics requires leaders who can stand above these divisive practices and can acknowledge and recognize the needs, rights, and freedoms of a populace that is diverse and varied.

Stated differently, it is possible to argue that the increased political involvement of the Religious Right is nothing to worry about. There is no danger that the neo-

86 conservatives or the Religious Right could change the basic rights and principles of the

Establishment clause and Free Exercise of religion as enshrined in the Constitution. I believe that this objection misses the point. Democratic societies that support and uphold these important freedoms are not simply products of law; it is ultimately the public sphere that makes these freedoms possible. In other words, freedoms are not created simply through laws. They have to be legitimate, and seen to be legitimate in themselves. For that to happen there needs to be a pedagogical culture in which the values and ideology of freedom are promoted.

The value of the 'other' is quite often lost on the most extreme elements of the

Religious Right. Acknowledging the legitimacy of other ways of being and believing seems to go against their most fundamental inclinations. If others do not have a right to be, if their very existence is not legitimate in the eyes of God, there can be no dialogue. I believe that the greatest danger exists in combining the political, media, financial, and military strengths of the neo-conservatives with the over-zealous self-righteousness of the

Religious Right. Together, they pose a serious threat to an open society; they close off avenues for dialogue and create a political culture of fear and intimidation, which is so evident in the United States right now.

I am also deeply concerned and distressed by those who justify aggressive foreign policies that resemble a religious crusade. In quest for empire, they kill, maim, and oppress others in the name of God. In an age of information and technology that provides the opportunity for us to "know" our neighbours in ALL countries better than at any time in history, these activities are a terrible blight on the faith. I would urge Christians to learn important lessons from our own, less than glamorous, history of bigotry and

87 oppression during the Dark Ages. Surely, the Founding Fathers imagined something better for those who would inhabit the new world.

The constitution sets up a framework of religious freedom for all. This is to the benefit of all people, religions and creeds whose rights are protected by it. It is incumbent on the Religious Right to set aside its blind faith and to acknowledge one truth: namely, that to ensure its own basic freedom of religion, it must grant that same freedom to others. Attempts to monopolize dialogue or to suggest that America was meant to be a Christian nation infringe on religious freedoms, even its own. Even those religious practices where the method and means of worship are "offensive" must be protected. In doing so, Christians of all stripes ultimately strengthen their own freedoms.

My hope is that individuals will search for knowledge and truth about the political concepts that swirl around us today. That religious people in particular will be more critical of the political ideas that aspire to shape the world in which we live. I hope that in some small way this thesis has explained some of the reasons that neo-conservatism is more radical than conservative and why that radicalism poses potential dangers to the vaunted freedom of religion that the United States has enjoyed and exemplified.

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