DOCSLIB.ORG

The Role of Reasoning in Constructing a Persuasive Argument

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Role of Reasoning in Constructing a Persuasive Argument THE ROLE OF REASONING IN CONSTRUCTING A PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT RICHARD R. ORSINGER [email protected] http://www.orsinger.com McCurley, Orsinger, McCurley, Nelson & Downing, L.L.P. San Antonio Office: 1717 Tower Life Building San Antonio, Texas 78205 (210) 225-5567 http://www.orsinger.com and Dallas Office: 5950 Sherry Lane, Suite 800 Dallas, Texas 75225 (214) 273-2400 http://www.momnd.com State Bar of Texas 37TH ANNUAL ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE August 1-4, 2011 San Antonio CHAPTER 11 The Role of Reasoning in Constructing a Persuasive Argument Chapter 11 Table of Contents I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSUASION.. 1 II. PERSUASION IN ARGUMENTATION.. 1 III. BACKGROUND.. 2 IV. USER’S GUIDE FOR THIS ARTICLE.. 2 V. ARISTOTLE’S THREE COMPONENTS OF A PERSUASIVE SPEECH.. 3 A. ETHOS.. 3 B. PATHOS.. 4 C. LOGOS.. 4 1. Syllogism.. 4 2. Implication.. 4 3. Enthymeme.. 4 (a) Advantages and Disadvantages of Commonplaces... 5 (b) Selection of Commonplaces.. 5 VI. ARGUMENT MODELS (OVERVIEW)... 5 A. LOGIC-BASED ARGUMENTS. 5 1. Deductive Logic.. 5 2. Inductive Logic.. 6 3. Reasoning by Analogy.. 7 B. DEFEASIBLE ARGUMENTS... 7 C. THE TOULMIN ARGUMENTATION MODEL... 7 D. FALLACIOUS ARGUMENTS.. 8 E. ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES.. 8 VII. LOGICAL REASONING (DETAILED ANALYSIS).. 8 A. DEDUCTIVE REASONING.. 8 1. The Categorical Syllogism... 8 a. Graphically Depicting the Simple Categorical Syllogism... 9 b. A Legal Dispute as a Simple Syllogism.. 9 c. Disputed Facts; Disputed Law.. 9 2. The Hypothetical Syllogism... 10 a. The Conditional Syllogism.. 10 b. The Conjunctive Syllogism... 10 c. The Disjunctive Syllogism.. 10 3. The Dilemma.. 10 4. Implication.. 10 a. Antecedent/Consequent... 11 b. Two Rules of Implication and Three Points to Remember... 11 c. Affirming the Antecedent (Modus Ponens).. 12 d. Denying the Consequent (Modus Tollens).. 12 e. Chaining Conditional Propositions.. 12 f. Enthymemes.. 13 g. Proof by Contradiction.. 13 h. Proof by Contrapositive.. 14 i. Disproof by Counterexample.. 14 -i- The Role of Reasoning in Constructing a Persuasive Argument Chapter 11 j. Attacking a Conditional Proposition... 14 k. Refuting a Deductive Argument.. 14 l. Refuting an Argument for Change.. 15 m. Refuting an Argument Over Trust Income.. 15 B. INDUCTIVE REASONING... 15 1. Generalization.. 15 2. Simple Induction.. 15 3. Correlation and Causation.. 15 4. Statistical Syllogism... 15 5. Statistical Prediction.. 16 6. The Counting Marbles Example.. 16 7. Counterexamples in Inductive Reasoning.. 16 8. Cognitive Studies of Inductive Reasoning... 16 9. Generating Rules to Resolve Legal Cases.. 16 C. REASONING BY ANALOGY.. 17 1. Terms of Analogical Reasoning... 18 2. Comparing Deductive, Inductive and Analogical Reasoning.. 19 3. The Process of Analogical Reasoning.. 20 a. Retrieval.. 20 b. Mapping.. 20 c. Projection.. 21 d. Evaluating the Analogy... 21 4. The Use of Examples.. 21 5. Arguments by Analogy.. 21 6. Judging the Validity of an Analogy.. 22 7. Using Analogical Reasoning With Case Law.. 23 8. Analogies are More Than Just Words.. 23 9. The Power of Metaphors In the Law.. 24 VIII. DEFEASIBLE ARGUMENTS (DETAILED ANALYSIS).. 25 A. NOT TRUTH, BUT PRIMA FACIE ACCEPTABILITY.. 26 B. DEFEASIBLE ARGUMENTS IN LAW.. 26 IX. THE TOULMIN ARGUMENTATION MODEL (DETAILED ANALYSIS).. 28 A. THE MAN AND THE TIMES.. 28 B. OVERVIEW OF TOULMIN’S MODEL.. 29 C. THE COMPONENTS OF THE TOULMIN MODEL.. 30 1. Claims.. ..
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Conjunction Fallacy' Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors
    Journal of Behavioral Decision Making J. Behav. Dec. Making, 12: 275±305 (1999) The `Conjunction Fallacy' Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors RALPH HERTWIG* and GERD GIGERENZER Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany ABSTRACT Findings in recent research on the `conjunction fallacy' have been taken as evid- ence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content-blind Ð in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the con- junction rule of probability theory. But content-blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we ®rst show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term `probability' in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term `frequency' narrows the spectrum of possible interpreta- tions of `probability' down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact Ð rather than the presence or absence of `extensional cues' Ð accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassi®ed as fallacies. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. KEY WORDS conjunction fallacy; probabalistic thinking; frequentistic thinking; probability People's apparent failures to reason probabilistically in experimental contexts have raised serious concerns about our ability to reason rationally in real-world environments.
    [Show full text]
  • Logical Fallacies Moorpark College Writing Center
    Logical Fallacies Moorpark College Writing Center Ad hominem (Argument to the person): Attacking the person making the argument rather than the argument itself. We would take her position on child abuse more seriously if she weren’t so rude to the press. Ad populum appeal (appeal to the public): Draws on whatever people value such as nationality, religion, family. A vote for Joe Smith is a vote for the flag. Alleged certainty: Presents something as certain that is open to debate. Everyone knows that… Obviously, It is obvious that… Clearly, It is common knowledge that… Certainly, Ambiguity and equivocation: Statements that can be interpreted in more than one way. Q: Is she doing a good job? A: She is performing as expected. Appeal to fear: Uses scare tactics instead of legitimate evidence. Anyone who stages a protest against the government must be a terrorist; therefore, we must outlaw protests. Appeal to ignorance: Tries to make an incorrect argument based on the claim never having been proven false. Because no one has proven that food X does not cause cancer, we can assume that it is safe. Appeal to pity: Attempts to arouse sympathy rather than persuade with substantial evidence. He embezzled a million dollars, but his wife had just died and his child needed surgery. Begging the question/Circular Logic: Proof simply offers another version of the question itself. Wrestling is dangerous because it is unsafe. Card stacking: Ignores evidence from the one side while mounting evidence in favor of the other side. Users of hearty glue say that it works great! (What is missing: How many users? Great compared to what?) I should be allowed to go to the party because I did my math homework, I have a ride there and back, and it’s at my friend Jim’s house.
    [Show full text]
  • Thinking About the Ultimate Argument for Realism∗
    Thinking About the Ultimate Argument for Realism∗ Stathis Psillos Department of Philosophy and History of Science University of Athens Panepistimioupolis (University Campus) Athens 15771 Greece [email protected] 1. Introduction Alan Musgrave has been one of the most passionate defenders of scientific realism. Most of his papers in this area are, by now, classics. The title of my paper alludes to Musgrave’s piece “The Ultimate Argument for Realism”, though the expression is Bas van Fraassen’s (1980, 39), and the argument is Hilary Putnam’s (1975, 73): realism “is the only philosophy of science that does not make the success of science a miracle”. Hence, the code-name ‘no-miracles’ argument (henceforth, NMA). In fact, NMA has quite a history and a variety of formulations. I have documented all this in my (1999, chapter 4). But, no matter how exactly the argument is formulated, its thrust is that the success of scientific theories lends credence to the following two theses: a) that scientific theories should be interpreted realistically and b) that, so interpreted, these theories are approximately true. The original authors of the argument, however, did not put an extra stress on novel predictions, which, as Musgrave (1988) makes plain, is the litmus test for the ability of any approach to science to explain the success of science. Here is why reference to novel predictions is crucial. Realistically understood, theories entail too many novel claims, most of them about unobservables (e.g., that ∗ I want to dedicate this paper to Alan Musgrave. His exceptional combination of clear-headed and profound philosophical thinking has been a model for me.
    [Show full text]
  • A Pragmatic Study of Fallacy in George W. Bush's Political Speeches Pjaee, 17(12) (2020)
    A PRAGMATIC STUDY OF FALLACY IN GEORGE W. BUSH'S POLITICAL SPEECHES PJAEE, 17(12) (2020) A PRAGMATIC STUDY OF FALLACY IN GEORGE W. BUSH'S POLITICAL SPEECHES Dr. Ghanim Jwaid Al-Sieedy1, Haider Rajih Wadaah Al-Jilihawi2 1,2University of Karbala - College of Education. Dr. Ghanim Jwaid Al-Sieedy , Haider Rajih Wadaah Al-Jilihawi , A Pragmatic Study Of Fallacy In George W. Bush's Political Speeches , Palarch’s Journal Of Archaeology Of Egypt/Egyptology 18(4). ISSN 1567-214x. Keywords: Political speeches, Pragmatics, Fallacy, Argument. Abstract: A fallacy can be described as the act of issuing a faulty argument to support and reinforce a previously published argument for purposes of persuasion. However, a fallacy is a broad subject that has been addressed from several viewpoints. A few experiments have tried to counter the fallacy pragmatically. However, the attempts above have suffered from shortcomings, which made them incomplete accounts in this regard. Hence, this study has set itself to provide pragmatic models for the analysis of fallacy as far as its pragmatic structure, forms, methods, and applications are concerned. These models use many models produced by several academics and the researchers themselves' observations. The validity of the established models was tested by reviewing seven speeches by George W. Bush taken before and after the war in Iraq (2002-2008). The analyses demonstrated the efficacy of the models created. Mostly because they have yielded varied results, it is clear that fallacy is a process of stages, with each round distinct for its pragmatic components and strategies. 1. Introduction: The fallacy has been regarded as a critical issue by numerous studies investigating the definition from different lenses.
    [Show full text]
  • There Is No Fallacy of Arguing from Authority
    There is no Fallacy ofArguing from Authority EDWIN COLEMAN University ofMelbourne Keywords: fallacy, argument, authority, speech act. Abstract: I argue that there is no fallacy of argument from authority. I first show the weakness of the case for there being such a fallacy: text-book presentations are confused, alleged examples are not genuinely exemplary, reasons given for its alleged fallaciousness are not convincing. Then I analyse arguing from authority as a complex speech act. R~iecting the popular but unjustified category of the "part-time fallacy", I show that bad arguments which appeal to authority are defective through breach of some felicity condition on argument as a speech act, not through employing a bad principle of inference. 1. Introduction/Summary There's never been a satisfactory theory of fallacy, as Hamblin pointed out in his book of 1970, in what is still the least unsatisfactory discussion. Things have not much improved in the last 25 years, despite fallacies getting more attention as interest in informal logic has grown. We still lack good answers to simple questions like what is a fallacy?, what fallacies are there? and how should we classifY fallacies? The idea that argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiam) is a fallacy, is well-established in logical tradition. I argue that it is no such thing. The second main part of the paper is negative: I show the weakness of the case made in the literature for there being such a fallacy as argument from authority. First, text-book presentation of the fallacy is confused, second, the examples given are not genuinely exemplary and third, reasons given for its alleged fallaciousness are not convincing.
    [Show full text]
  • From Logic to Rhetoric: a Contextualized Pedagogy for Fallacies
    Current Issue From the Editors Weblog Editorial Board Editorial Policy Submissions Archives Accessibility Search Composition Forum 32, Fall 2015 From Logic to Rhetoric: A Contextualized Pedagogy for Fallacies Anne-Marie Womack Abstract: This article reenvisions fallacies for composition classrooms by situating them within rhetorical practices. Fallacies are not formal errors in logic but rather persuasive failures in rhetoric. I argue fallacies are directly linked to successful rhetorical strategies and pose the visual organizer of the Venn diagram to demonstrate that claims can achieve both success and failure based on audience and context. For example, strong analogy overlaps false analogy and useful appeal to pathos overlaps manipulative emotional appeal. To advance this argument, I examine recent changes in fallacies theory, critique a-rhetorical textbook approaches, contextualize fallacies within the history and theory of rhetoric, and describe a methodology for rhetorically reclaiming these terms. Today, fallacy instruction in the teaching of written argument largely follows two paths: teachers elevate fallacies as almost mathematical formulas for errors or exclude them because they don’t fit into rhetorical curriculum. Both responses place fallacies outside the realm of rhetorical inquiry. Fallacies, though, are not as clear-cut as the current practice of spotting them might suggest. Instead, they rely on the rhetorical situation. Just as it is an argument to create a fallacy, it is an argument to name a fallacy. This article describes an approach in which students must justify naming claims as successful strategies and/or fallacies, a process that demands writing about contexts and audiences rather than simply linking terms to obviously weak statements.
    [Show full text]
  • Beardsley's Theory of Analogy
    INFORMAL LOGIC XI.3, Fall 1989 Beardsley's Theory of Analogy EVELYN M. BARKER The University of Maryland 1. Is the Argument from Analogy a consequences of an "abdication of Fallacy? statesmanship."2 Kissinger cites historical analogy as the only basis for sound judg­ In the various editions of Practical Logic ment in international diplomacy: and Thinking Straight Monroe Beardsley History is the only experience on which pioneered informal logic, the assessment of statesmen can draw. But it does not teach reasoning techniques employed in actual its lessons automatically. It demonstrates the human situations. 1 Although acknowledg­ consequences of comparable situations, but ing the prominence of analogies in reason­ each generation has to determine what situa­ ing, he contended that analogy has some tions are in fact comparable. heuristic uses, but an argument based on one Such analogical arguments, as Kissinger is inherently fallacious: points out, are directed to finding suitable Analogies illustrate, and they lead to premises for wise and prudent action. hypotheses, but thinking in terms of analogy Beardsley's intellectualist approach limits becomes fallacious when the analogy is us­ rational argumentation to asserting premises ed as a reason for a principle. This fallacy as evidence for the truth of a conclusion. is called the "argument from analogy." Consequently he overlooks or misconceives (PL 107) the character of some forms of analogical Beardsley's view implies that no serious argument prevalent in practical reasoning. reasoner will use analogies between things It is misleading to speak of "the argument in drawing conclusions, or be persuaded by from analogy," as Beardsley does, as if all another's introduction of them.
    [Show full text]
  • Physics 496 Introduction to Research Lecture 2.0: Tools for the Scientific Skeptic (Lance Cooper, Laura Greene, Tony Liss, Doug Beck)
    PHYS 496, Spring 2014 02/14/2014 D.H. Beck Physics 496 Introduction to Research Lecture 2.0: Tools for the Scientific Skeptic (Lance Cooper, Laura Greene, Tony Liss, Doug Beck) Critical Evaluation Scientific papers and research presentations, when well done, are very convincing. How do you know if they are correct? How do you know if your own research is correct? Answer: Apply logic. Critique the arguments made to arrive at the conclusions. “Science is simply common-sense at its best; that is, rigidly accurate in observation and merciless to fallacy in logic.“ (The Crayfish, 1880). “Darwin’s Bulldog” Thomas Henry Huxley, biologist 1825-1895 Copyright © 2014 Board of Directors of the University of Illinois 1 PHYS 496, Spring 2014 02/14/2014 D.H. Beck Aside: Oxford Evolution Debate Held at the Oxford University Museum seven months after the 1859 publication of The Origin of Species. Bishop Samuel Wilberforce to Huxley: “On which side do you claim your descent from a monkey, your grandmother or your grandfather?” Huxley: “I would not be ashamed to be descended from a monkey. But I would be ashamed to be descended from a man who uses his great gifts to obscure the truth!” The Scientific Method 1. Observe and describe a phenomenon or group of phenomena. 2. Formulate an hypothesis to explain the phenomena. In physics, the hypothesis often takes the form of a causal mechanism or a mathematical relation. 3. Use the hypothesis to predict the existence of other phenomena, or to predict quantitatively the results of new observations. 4. Perform experimental tests of the predictions.
    [Show full text]
  • False Dilemma Wikipedia Contents
    False dilemma Wikipedia Contents 1 False dilemma 1 1.1 Examples ............................................... 1 1.1.1 Morton's fork ......................................... 1 1.1.2 False choice .......................................... 2 1.1.3 Black-and-white thinking ................................... 2 1.2 See also ................................................ 2 1.3 References ............................................... 3 1.4 External links ............................................. 3 2 Affirmative action 4 2.1 Origins ................................................. 4 2.2 Women ................................................ 4 2.3 Quotas ................................................. 5 2.4 National approaches .......................................... 5 2.4.1 Africa ............................................ 5 2.4.2 Asia .............................................. 7 2.4.3 Europe ............................................ 8 2.4.4 North America ........................................ 10 2.4.5 Oceania ............................................ 11 2.4.6 South America ........................................ 11 2.5 International organizations ...................................... 11 2.5.1 United Nations ........................................ 12 2.6 Support ................................................ 12 2.6.1 Polls .............................................. 12 2.7 Criticism ............................................... 12 2.7.1 Mismatching ......................................... 13 2.8 See also
    [Show full text]
  • Remittance Economy Migration-Underdevelopment in Sri Lanka
    REMITTANCE ECONOMY MIGRATION-UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA Matt Withers A thesis submitted in fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Department of Political Economy The University of Sydney 2017 “Ceylon ate the fruit before growing the tree” - Joan Robinson (Wilson 1977) (Parren as 2005) (Eelens and Speckmann 1992) (Aneez 2016b) (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 1993; International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2009) (Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) 2004) (United Nations Population Division 2009) Acknowledgements Thanks are due to a great number of people who have offered support and lent guidance throughout the course of my research. I would like to extend my appreciation foremost to my wonderful supervisors, Elizabeth Hill and Stuart Rosewarne, whose encouragement and criticism have been (in equal measure) invaluable in shaping this thesis. I must similarly offer heartfelt thanks to my academic mentors, Nicola Piper and Janaka Biyanwila, both of whom have unfailingly offered their time, interest and wisdom as my work has progressed. Gratitude is also reserved for my colleagues Magdalena Cubas and Rosie Hancock, who have readily guided me through the more challenging stages of thesis writing with insights and lessons from their own research. A special mention must be made for the Centre for Poverty Analysis in Colombo, without whose assistance my research would simply not have been possible. I would like to thank Priyanthi Fernando for her willingness to accommodate me, Mohamed Munas for helping to make fieldwork arrangements, and to Vagisha Gunasekara for her friendship and willingness to answer my incessant questions about Sri Lanka.
    [Show full text]
  • The Argument Form “Appeal to Galileo”: a Critical Appreciation of Doury's Account
    The Argument Form “Appeal to Galileo”: A Critical Appreciation of Doury’s Account MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO Department of Philosophy University of Nevada, Las Vegas Las Vegas, NV 89154-5028 USA [email protected] Abstract: Following a linguistic- Résumé: En poursuivant une ap- descriptivist approach, Marianne proche linguistique-descriptiviste, Doury has studied debates about Marianne Doury a étudié les débats “parasciences” (e.g. astrology), dis- sur les «parasciences » (par exem- covering that “parascientists” fre- ple, l'astrologie), et a découvert que quently argue by “appeal to Galileo” les «parasavants» raisonnent souvent (i.e., defend their views by compar- en faisant un «appel à Galilée" (c.-à- ing themselves to Galileo and their d. ils défendent leurs points de vue opponents to the Inquisition); oppo- en se comparant à Galileo et en nents object by criticizing the analo- comparant leurs adversaires aux gy, charging fallacy, and appealing juges de l’Inquisition). Les adver- to counter-examples. I argue that saires des parasavant critiquent Galilean appeals are much more l'analogie en la qualifiant de soph- widely used, by creationists, global- isme, et en construisant des contre- warming skeptics, advocates of “set- exemples. Je soutiens que les appels tled science”, great scientists, and à Galilée sont beaucoup plus large- great philosophers. Moreover, sever- ment utilisés, par des créationnistes, al subtypes should be distinguished; des sceptiques du réchauffement critiques questioning the analogy are planétaire, des défenseurs de la «sci- proper; fallacy charges are problem- ence établie», des grands scien- atic; and appeals to counter- tifiques, et des grands philosophes. examples are really indirect critiques En outre, on doit distinguer plusieurs of the analogy.
    [Show full text]
  • Fallacies in Reasoning
    FALLACIES IN REASONING FALLACIES IN REASONING OR WHAT SHOULD I AVOID? The strength of your arguments is determined by the use of reliable evidence, sound reasoning and adaptation to the audience. In the process of argumentation, mistakes sometimes occur. Some are deliberate in order to deceive the audience. That brings us to fallacies. I. Definition: errors in reasoning, appeal, or language use that renders a conclusion invalid. II. Fallacies In Reasoning: A. Hasty Generalization-jumping to conclusions based on too few instances or on atypical instances of particular phenomena. This happens by trying to squeeze too much from an argument than is actually warranted. B. Transfer- extend reasoning beyond what is logically possible. There are three different types of transfer: 1.) Fallacy of composition- occur when a claim asserts that what is true of a part is true of the whole. 2.) Fallacy of division- error from arguing that what is true of the whole will be true of the parts. 3.) Fallacy of refutation- also known as the Straw Man. It occurs when an arguer attempts to direct attention to the successful refutation of an argument that was never raised or to restate a strong argument in a way that makes it appear weaker. Called a Straw Man because it focuses on an issue that is easy to overturn. A form of deception. C. Irrelevant Arguments- (Non Sequiturs) an argument that is irrelevant to the issue or in which the claim does not follow from the proof offered. It does not follow. D. Circular Reasoning- (Begging the Question) supports claims with reasons identical to the claims themselves.
    [Show full text]