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Circles and Analogies in Public Health Reasoning Louise Cummings

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Circles and Analogies in Public Health Reasoning Louise Cummings SUMMER 2014, VOL. 29, NO. 2 35 Circles and Analogies in Public Health Reasoning Louise Cummings School of Arts and Humanities Nottingham Trent University, UK Abstract 7KHVWXG\RIWKHIDOODFLHVKDVFKDQJHGDOPRVWEH\RQGUHFRJQLWLRQVLQFH&KDUOHV+DPEOLQFDOOHG IRUDUDGLFDOUHDSSUDLVDORIWKLVDUHDRIORJLFDOLQTXLU\LQKLVERRN)DOODFLHV7KH³ZLWOHVV H[DPSOHVRIKLVIRUEHDUV´WRZKLFK+DPEOLQUHIHUUHGKDYHODUJHO\EHHQUHSODFHGE\PRUH authentic cases of the fallacies in actual use. It is now not unusual for fallacy and argumentation theorists to draw on actual sources for examples of how the fallacies are used in our everyday UHDVRQLQJ+RZHYHUDQDVSHFWRIWKLVPRYHWRZDUGVJUHDWHUDXWKHQWLFLW\LQWKHVWXG\RIWKH fallacies, an aspect which has been almost universally neglected, is the attempt to subject the fallacies to empirical testing of the type which is more commonly associated with psychological experiments on reasoning. This paper addresses this omission in research on the fallacies by examining how subjects use two fallacies – circular argument and analogical argument – during a reasoning task in which subjects are required to consider a number of public health scenarios. Results are discussed in relation to a view of the fallacies as cognitive heuristics that facilitate reasoning in a context of uncertainty. Keywords: analogical argument, circular argument, heuristic, informal fallacy, public health, reasoning, uncertainty I. Introduction puns, anecdotes, and witless examples of his forbears. The study of the fallacies has changed :KHUHSKLORVRSKLFDOUHÀHFWLRQRQWKH considerably in the forty years since Charles IDOODFLHVEHIRUH+DPEOLQ¶VSRZHUIXOFULWLTXH +DPEOLQUDLOHGDJDLQVWWKHVKRUWFRPLQJVRI ZDVEDVHGXSRQDUWL¿FLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHG the so-called Standard Treatment of these examples which bore little or no resemblance DUJXPHQWVLQORJLFWH[WERRNV7KXV+DPEOLQ to the types of arguments that are found in S ZULWHV HYHU\GD\UHDVRQLQJWKHSRVW+DPEOLQHUDLQ $QGZKDWZH¿QGLQPRVWFDVHV,WKLQN fallacy analysis has witnessed an increase in it should be admitted, is as debased, research which places emphasis on the types worn-out and dogmatic a treatment of arguments that people actually employ. as could be imagined – incredibly Examples of fallacious arguments are now tradition-bound, yet lacking in logic much more likely to come from sources and historical sense alike, and almost such as newspapers, magazines, and other without connection to anything else in media outlets than they are to originate in modern logic at all. This is the part of the misguided attempts of fallacy theorists to his book in which a writer throws away FRQVWUXFWSODXVLEOH EXWDUWL¿FLDO DUJXPHQWV logic and keeps his reader’s attention, To see that this is the case, one need only if at all, only by retailing traditional ORRNDW:DOWRQ ZKHUHH[DPSOHVRI 36 INQUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES fallacious arguments from actual sources are be regarded as an incorrect discussion move. in abundance. Examples include a discussion In the pragma-dialectic approach, fallacies are of ad hominem argument based on an article in analyzed as such incorrect discussion moves the National Post DSSHDOVWRDXWKRULW\ in which a discussion rule has been violated” using an article featured in Newsweek YDQ(HPHUHQDQG*URRWHQGRUVWS and the argument from popularity based on a )RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQRISUDJPDGLDOHFWLFV televised interview with a politician during the VHH&XPPLQJV D Canadian Broadcasting Company programme But appearances can be deceptive. This Week in Parliament Notwithstanding the emphasis on the role The move to more naturalistic data of the arguer in reasoning and on examining for examination by fallacy theorists has DFWXDODUJXPHQWVDVRSSRVHGWRDUWL¿FLDOO\ XQGRXEWHGO\KDGEHQH¿WVIRUWKHWKHRUHWLFDO constructed arguments, there is a very real frameworks of the fallacies that have sense in which fallacy theorists are still failing emerged. The increased authenticity of these to engage with actual reasoners. Almost frameworks is a direct consequence of efforts nothing is known about the cognitive and to engage with people’s actual reasoning. One other psychological processes that people use aspect of this improved authenticity is the to assess that group of fallacious arguments development of new criteria for the evaluation DERXWZKLFK+DPEOLQKDGPRVWWRVD\WKH of arguments. Arguments are now as likely to informal fallacies. This should be compared be characterised as fallacious if they violate to the extensive psychological literature that discussion rules in a dialogue or conversation exists on deductive reasoning and fallacies as they are if they fall short of some deductive and the equally large literature that exists on standard of validity or soundness. This new induction and errors of probabilistic reasoning. emphasis on people’s actual reasoning is For example, a prominent psychologist of part of a wider pragmatic turn in the study of GHGXFWLRQ3KLOLS-RKQVRQ/DLUGKDVSURSRVHG IDOODFLHVDWXUQLQZKLFKDVSHFWVRIFRQWH[W D a mental models theory to account for people’s QRWLRQGHVSLVHGE\HDUOLHUWKHRULVWV PXVWEH SHUIRUPDQFH LQFOXGLQJIDOODFLHV LQGHGXFWLYH considered in any assessment of an argument. UHDVRQLQJWDVNV VHH-RKQVRQ/DLUGDQG%\UQH The arguer and his or her motivations for IRUH[WHQVLYHGLVFXVVLRQ 7KHZRUNRI producing an argument is an integral part of $PRV7YHUVN\DQG'DQLHO.DKQHPDQ context. The person who produces and receives ZDVPRVWQRWDEOHDPRQJWKH¿UVWLQYHVWLJDWRUV arguments, it seems, has never before been so to study the types of errors subjects committed important to the study of the fallacies. GXULQJSUREDELOLVWLFUHDVRQLQJ 6HH One example of this pragmatic turn is Kahneman’s 2011 engaging account of their the pragma-dialectical framework of Frans van research in Thinking, Fast and Slow.) (HPHUHQDQG5RE*URRWHQGRUVW In contrast , no one has subjected 7KLVIUDPHZRUNGUDZVRQVSHHFKDFW the informal fallacies to experimental theory and other insights of Grice and Searle investigation, even though similar studies in developing an account of argumentation. of other areas of logic have yielded useful Speech acts that violate one of the rules results about the logical processes that people for a critical discussion and undermine ¿QGUDWLRQDOO\FRPSHOOLQJ7KHUHDUHYDULRXV attempts to resolve a difference of opinion are reasons for this omission. Chief amongst them FKDUDFWHUL]HGDVIDOODFLHV³$Q\LQIULQJHPHQW is an aversion to psychologism in logic. I of one or more of the rules, whichever party concur with the stance on psychologism taken commits it and at whatever stage in the E\*DEED\DQG:RRGV WRDSSHDU LQWKHLU discussion, is a possible threat to the resolution HPSLULFDOO\VHQVLWLYHORJLF³,QYHVWLJDWRUV of a difference of opinion and must therefore who make room for context and agency are SUMMER 2014, VOL. 29, NO. 2 37 drawn to a form of what used to be called the medical professionals who provide advice on Laws of Thought approach and, accordingly, risk to the public. There is evidence that on the are committed to an element of psychologism issue of BSE at least, medical professionals in logic. Psychologism is once again an ODFNHGVXI¿FLHQWNQRZOHGJHWRJLYHDGYLFHWR open question in the research programme of the public about the disease. Simpson et al. logical theory. Its re-emergence should not FRQGXFWHGDVXUYH\RINQRZOHGJHRI be prejudged. Better to wait and see how, BSE among 1,038 doctors in North Yorkshire, once it is up and running, a psychologically England. These investigators found that most real, agent-based logic fares as a theory of GRFWRUV WKRXJKWWKDWWKHLUNQRZOHGJHRI reasoning” LWDOLFVLQRULJLQDO . BSE was inadequate for them to give advice to Indeed the very fact that other branches the public. of logic have survived the approaches of Alternatively, it may be a member of SV\FKRORJ\ DQGQRWMXVWVXUYLYHGWKHVH the public who is experiencing uncertainty, DSSURDFKHVEXWSRVLWLYHO\EHQH¿WHGIURP as when a person is attempting to assess WKHP VKRXOGUHDVVXUHIDOODF\WKHRULVWVWKDW WKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIVRPHSXEOLFKHDOWKLVVXH their particular corner of logic can only be EXWODFNVWKHVFLHQWL¿FNQRZOHGJHWKDWLV enhanced by input from psychological studies required to undertake such an assessment. of the informal fallacies. At least this is my In both scenarios, a lack of knowledge can starting point for the discussion in the current be successfully bridged through circular paper. The arguments investigated in this study and analogical reasoning. To the extent that – circular argument and analogical argument – these reasoning strategies permit scientists have been extensively discussed in the fallacy and lay reasoners to move beyond gaps in and argumentation literature. But no one has their knowledge and make decisions about previously attempted to elicit responses from public health issues, these strategies can subjects concerning the conditions under be seen to serve as cognitive heuristics that which these arguments are judged to be more facilitate reasoning in contexts of uncertainty. or less warranted. This paper undertakes to do The heuristic value of these strategies for just that in the context of a task that examines scientists addressing the emergence of BSE public health reasoning. DQG+,9$,'6KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGLQYDULRXV The choice of public health reasoning SXEOLFDWLRQVWRGDWH &XPPLQJV as a context in which to examine circular 2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012a-c, 2013a-b, 2014a- and analogical arguments is motivated by HDE 7KLVLVWKH¿UVWVWXG\WRH[DPLQH the following considerations. The central how these same strategies are employed by lay claim of this paper is that many informal reasoners,
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