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Zusammenfassung Zusammenfassung Auf den folgenden beiden Seiten werden die zuvor detailliert darge- stellten 100 Fehler nochmals übersichtlich gruppiert und klassifiziert. Der kompakte Überblick soll Sie dabei unterstützen, die systemati- schen Fehler durch geeignete Maßnahmen möglichst zu verhindern beziehungsweise so zu reduzieren, dass sich keine allzu negativen Auswirkungen auf Ihr operatives Geschäft ergeben! Eine gezielte und strukturierte Auseinandersetzung mit den Fehler(kategorie)n kann Sie ganz allgemein dabei unterstützen, Ihr Unternehmen „resilienter“ und „antifragiler“ aufzustellen, das heißt, dass Sie von negativen Entwicklungen nicht sofort umgeworfen werden (können). Außerdem kann eine strukturierte Auseinander- setzung auch dabei helfen, sich für weitere, hier nicht explizit genannte – aber ähnliche – Fehler zu wappnen. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019 402 C. Glaser, Risiko im Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25835-1 403 Zusammenfassung Zu viele Zu wenig Nicht ausreichend Informationen Informationsgehalt Zeit zur Verfügung Deshalb beachten wir Deshalb füllen wir die Deshalb nehmen wir häufig typischerweise nur… Lücken mit… an, dass… Veränderungen Mustern und bekannten wir Recht haben Außergewöhnliches Geschichten wir das schaffen können Wiederholungen Allgemeinheiten und das Naheliegendste auch Bekanntes/Anekdoten Stereotypen das Beste ist Bestätigungen vereinfachten wir beenden sollten, was Wahrscheinlichkeiten und wir angefangen haben Zahlen unsere Optionen einfacheren Problemen offenhalten sollten unserer aktuellen einfacher auch besser ist Denkweise Beispiele: Beispiele: Beispiele: Z Zu viele historische Z Halo-Effekt Z Selbstüberschätzung Daten Z Mitläufereffekt/ Z Zielscheibenfehler Z Zu viele Durch- Gruppendenken Z Barnum-Effekt schnittswerte Z Spielerfehlschluss Z Nullrisiko-Verzerrung Z Bestätigungsfehler Z Millersche Zahl Z Zurückfeuer-Effekt Z Asymmetrische Z Murphys Gesetz Z Risiken überversichern Aufmerksamkeit Z Überlebensirrtum Z Fehlschluss der Z Einrahmungseffekt Z Stereotypisierung irreversiblen Kosten Z Auffälligkeitsverzerrung Z Anekdotischer Z Status-quo-Verzerrung Z Verfügbarkeitsheuristik Fehlschluss Z Dispositionseffekt Z Beobachter- Z Mentale Buchführung Z Konjunktionsfehler Erwartungseffekt Z Argumentum ad logicam Z Verschieben der Z Verlustaversion Z Clusterillusion Torpfosten Z Auswahlüberlastung Z Tautologien und inhalt- Z Egozentrische Verzerrung Z Fluch des Wissens liche Wiederholungen Z Verwechseln von Ursache Z Prävalenzfehler Z Sicherheits- und und Wirkung Z Heuristiken in einer Möglichkeitseffekt Z Beeinflussungen durch komplexen Welt Z Blind-Validierungen Leit- und Fangfragen Z Kontrollillusion Z Einfluss der Reziprozität Z Lernen aus Erfolgs- und Misserfolgsgeschichten Zusammenfassung 404 Schlechtes Handwerkliche Kulturelle Erinnerungsvermögen Fehler Unzulänglichkeiten Wir merken uns Dinge Handwerkliche und Grundlegende Mängel energiesparend durch… Umsetzungsfehler bei… beim/bei der… das Herunterkürzen von risikorelevanten und offenen und konstrukti- Gedächtnissequenzen strategischen Modellen ven Umgang mit Fehlern Verallgemeinerungen Interpretation und Ermitt- Unternehmenskultur und nur ein Beispiel/ lung der Kennzahlen Tone from the Top Anekdote, das/die wir risikorelevanten Entscheidungsfreude im uns merken Prozessen Management und auf das Zurückgreifen auf Geschäfts- und Risiko- den operativen Ebenen externe Erfahrungswerte strategien Fokussierung auf die Wahrnehmung von notwendigen Ressourcen strategische Ziele nur einem Teil der des Integration aller Realität (Risiko-)Managements Mitarbeiter Beispiele: Beispiele: Beispiele: Z Narrative Täuschung Z Problem der Induktion Z Angst vor Unbekanntem/ Z Inflation der „schwarzen Z Zukunft als „Blackbox" Unkontrollierbarem Schwäne" Z Mathematisierung der Z Rationalitätsillusion Z Selektive Wahrnehmung Zukunft Z Hierarchie-Gläubigkeit Z Selbsterfüllende Z Die Welt als Casino Z Sonnenblumeneffekt Prophezeiung Z Blinde Modellgläubigkeit Z Wissensriesen/ Z Kognitive Dissonanz Z Alpha- und Beta-Fehler Realisierungszwerge Z Negativitätsverzerrung Z Diversifikations-Mythos Z Isoliertes Parallel- Z Argumentum ad Z Fat Tails/Normal- universum hominem verteilungsillusion Z Entscheidungsverstop- Z Strohmann-Argument Z Fehlsteuerung fung beim Management Z Appell an die Ignoranz erkennbarer Risiken Z Intransparenz Z Falsches Dilemma Z Langsame, Z Autoritätsargument Z Dammbruchargument unkoordinierte Reaktion Z Gefangen im Hamsterrad Z Tu quoque Z Kausaler Fehlschluss Z Kurzfristorientierung Z Faktor Mensch Z Keine Verbindung mit der Z Veraltete, leblose Z Vergleich von Äpfeln Planung Risikostrategie und Birnen Z Mangelhafte Risiko- Z Fehlende Anreiz- Z Zu wenig Erfahrung kommunikation steuerung Z Unterschätzen der Z Überschätzen der Z Gelernte Sorg- und adversen Selektion Portfoliobetrachtung Hilflosigkeit Z Nicht-Beachtung von Z Keine übergreifende Folgerisiken Risikosicht Z Detail- statt Zusammen- Z Falscher Umgang mit hangorientierung Innovationen Z Keine Sicherung gegen Z Überwälzen der Dominoeffekt Verantwortung Z Mittelweg vs. fauler Z Zu viele Ja-Sager Kompromiss Z Angst und Gier Z Die Lean Risk Z Umgang mit unange- Management-Illusion nehmen Wahrheiten Z Quantifikations-Irrglaube Schlussbetrachtung Herzlichen Glückwunsch! Sie haben sich durch 100 ausgewählte „Fehler des (Risiko-)Managements“ durchgearbeitet und ich möchte nun noch ein paar abschließende Gedanken mit Ihnen teilen. Risiken sind etwas völlig Normales und so ist es auch mit deren Management. Nicht umsonst setzt sich das chinesische Wort für Krise, nämlich „weiji 危机“, aus „wei 危“, was Gefahr, und ji 机“, was Gelegenheit bedeutet, zusammen. Auch im Griechischen beschreibt das Wort „krisis“ keinesfalls nur eine hoffnungslose Situation, sondern vielmehr den Höhe- oder Wendepunkt einer gefährlichen Lage. Der 1998 verstorbene Bielefelder Soziologe Niklas Luhmann hat dies so ausgedrückt: „Die Tür zum Paradies bleibt versiegelt – durch das Wort Risiko" (vgl. Luhmann 2003, S.26). Um im Diesseits die Chancen zu wahren, musste man schon immer Risiken eingehen. Letzten Endes unterscheidet es den Guten vom sehr Guten und den Schlechten vom sehr Schlechten, wie gut oder wie schlecht er oder sie mit Risiken umgeht. Modellieren Sie Ihre Risiken mit Augenmaß und balancieren Sie empi- rische Fakten, Intuition und State-of-the-Art-Modelle vorsichtig aus. Dann ist Risikomanagement auch keine „Rocket Science“, sondern vielmehr solides Handwerk. Dies zeigte sich auch im Jahr 1998 beziehungsweise 2000, als der von Richard Merton, seines Zeichens Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträger, mitgegründete Fonds „Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)“ zuerst gerettet und anschließend endgültig aufgelöst werden musste. Merton konnte in der Spitze zwar Kontrakte © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019 406 C. Glaser, Risiko im Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25835-1 407 Schlussbetrachtung in Höhe von einer Billion US-Dollar abschließen, gleichzeitig gerieten seine Geschäfte aber durch die schlechteren makroökonomischen Bedingungen in den Emerging Markets, die Russlandkrise sowie Fehlspekulationen mit italienischen Staatsanleihen in schwere Turbulenzen. Faktoren wie Flexibilität, Intuition und auch Anti- fragilität wurden von Merton unterschätzt. Er hat schlichtweg nicht die richtige „Balance“ zwischen Hard und Soft Facts gefunden. Sie haben sicherlich bemerkt, dass ein Großteil der dargestellten Risiken und Beispiele eine große Verknüpfung mit dem Themengebiet der Psychologie haben. Dies ist auch wenig verwunderlich. Schließlich lässt sich „Risiko“ nicht greifen, nicht sehen, nicht berühren und auch nicht wiegen. Es ist vielmehr eine subjektive Empfindung, bei der unsere geistigen beziehungsweise kognitiven Fähigkeiten eine zentrale Rolle einnehmen. Unser Gehirn hat über die Jahrhunderte und Jahrtausende hinweg gewisse Strategien entwickelt, um mit Risiken und Ungewissheit schnell und unkompliziert umzugehen. Viele dieser Techniken und Strategien sind hocherfolgreich, gleichzeitig gibt es aber auch Unschärfen oder Anfälligkeiten für Verzerrungen und Fehlschlüsse. Denken Sie nur an die Verarbeitung bei zu vielen Informationen, etwa mithilfe von Stereotypen, Anekdoten, des Bestätigungsfehlers oder des Beobachter-Erwartungswerts. Oder Fehler, wenn wir besonders schnell handeln müssen, wie beispielsweise die Status-quo- Verzerrung, den Fehlschluss der irreversiblen Kosten, die Selbstüber- schätzung oder den Barnum-Effekt. Ähnlich ist es auch bei der Frage, was wir uns wie lange merken (können) sollen oder wenn uns nur unvollständige Informationen vorliegen und wir diese in Bezug auf Schlussbetrachtung 408 Ähnlichkeiten mit unseren Erfahrungen aus der Vergangenheit abglei- chen. Wohlgemerkt: dies erfolgt in Bruchteilen von Sekunden und größtenteils unterbewusst! Denkfehler führen speziell im Umgang mit Statistiken zu Verzerrungen und Irrwegen. Es gibt allerdings auch Auswege, wie die zahlreichen Tipps und praktischen Tricks zu den einzelnen Fehlern des Risikoma- nagements gezeigt haben. Dies ist auch sehr wichtig, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Bedeutung der Interpretation und Wahrnehmung der Daten und Informationen durch Big Data noch deutlich zunehmen wird. Jetzt, da Sie einen guten Überblick über unterschiedliche Bereiche und mögliche Problemfelder im operativen und strategischen (Risiko-) Management erhalten haben, steht Ihrem langfristigen Erfolg nichts mehr im Wege. – Zumindest nicht aus Sicht des Risikomanagements!
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