Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of
Discrete Resources⇤
Marek Pycia† M. Utku Ünver‡ UCLA Boston College
This Draft: February 2014
Abstract Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand is conducted via di- rect mechanisms without monetary transfers. Incentive compatibility and efficiency are primary concerns in designing such mechanisms. We show that a mechanism is indi- vidually strategy-proof and always selects the efficient outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function if and only if the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. We construct the full class of these mechanisms and show that each of them can be implemented by endowing agents with control rights over resources. This new class, which we call trading cycles, contains new mechanisms as well as known mechanisms such as top trading cycles, serial dictatorships, and hierarchical exchange. We illustrate how one can use our construction to show what can and what cannot be achieved in a variety of allocation and exchange problems, and we provide an example in which the new trading-cycles mechanisms strictly Lorenz dominate all previously known mechanisms. Keywords: Individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto effi- ciency, Arrovian preference aggregation, matching, no-transfer allocation and exchange, single-unit demand. JEL classification: C78, D78
⇤We thank numerous seminar and conference participants as well as Andrew Atkeson, Sophie Bade, Salvador Barbera, Haluk Ergin, Manolis Galenianos, Ed Green, Matthew Jackson, Philippe Jehiel, Onur Kesten, Fuhito Kojima, Sang-Mok Lee, Vikram Manjunath, Szilvia Pápai, Martine Quinzii, Al Roth, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Tayfun Sönmez, William Thomson, Özgür Yılmaz, William Zame, and three anonymous referees for comments. Kenny Mirkin, Kyle Woodward, and Simpson Zhang provided excellent research assistance. Ünver gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Microsoft Research Lab in New England. †UCLA, Department of Economics, 8283 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095. ‡Boston College, Department of Economics, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02467.
1 1Introduction
Microeconomic theory has informed the design of many markets and other institutions. Re- cently, many new mechanisms have been proposed to allocate resources in environments in which agents have single-unit demands and transfers are not used, or are prohibited. These environments include: allocation and exchange of transplant organs, such as kid- neys (cf. Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2004); allocation of school seats in Boston, New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco (cf. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003); and allocation of dormitory rooms at US colleges (cf. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999). The central concerns in the development of allocation mechanisms are incentives and ef- ficiency.1 We study two incentive compatibility requirements, individual strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness, and two efficiency requirements, Pareto efficiency and effi- ciency with respect to an Arrovian social welfare function (Arrovian efficiency). We show that three among four possible combinations of these requirements are equivalent: a direct mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient if and only if it it is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient, and also, if and only if it is group strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient. We construct the full class of these mechanisms and analyze the implica- tions of our characterization, as well as the usefulness of the newly constructed mechanisms. The restriction to direct mechanisms is justified by the revelation principle.2 Before describing our results and their implications, let us highlight the common features of the standard model we are studying and of the above-mentioned market design problems. There is a finite group of agents, each of whom would like to consume a single indivisible object to which we sometimes refer to as a “house,” using the terminology coined by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We allow objects that are the agents’ common endowment as well as objects that are privately owned. Agents have strict preferences over the objects, and are indifferent about what objects are allocated to other agents. The outcome of the problem is amatchingofagentsandobjects. We study two incentive-compatibility concepts, and two efficiency criteria. A mechanism is individually strategy-proof if no agent can benefit by reporting a non-truthful preference ranking. A mechanism is group strategy-proof if no group of agents can jointly manipulate
1Incentives and efficiency are also central to the theory of allocation mechanisms. For instance, Bogolo- mania and Moulin (2004) discuss “a recent flurry of papers on the deterministic assignment of indivisible goods” and state that “the central question of that literature is to characterize the set of efficient and incentive compatible (strategy-proof) assignment mechanisms.” The prior theoretical literature on single- unit-demand allocation without transfers has focused on characterizing mechanisms that are strategy-proof and efficient alongside other properties (see below for examples of such characterizations). In contrast, our characterization of strategy-proofness and efficiency does not rely on additional assumptions. 2See Appendix A for a discussion of the revelation principle in our context.
2 their reports so that all of them weakly benefit from this manipulation, while at least one in the group strictly benefits. Importantly, strategy-proof mechanisms are immune to ma- nipulation regardless of the information the agents’ possess. As importantly, in our setting group strategy-proofness is equivalent to the lack of manipulation opportunities for groups of two agents. This makes group strategy-proofness a desirable property of mechanisms in our setting, particularly because in applications we see attempts at strategic coordination. Co- ordinated reporting to a mechanism has been, for instance, documented in kidney allocation and exchange (cf. Sönmez and Ünver, 2010; Ashlagi and Roth, 2011) and in school choice (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008).3 Furthermore, coordinated reporting is effectively the only way agroupofagentscanmanipulateallocationsinmanyoftheseenvironments;forinstance, without an approval from the school district, two parents cannot trade school admission decisions ex post.4 The first efficiency criterion we study is Pareto efficiency. A mechanism is Pareto efficient if, for all preference profiles, the resulting matching is not Pareto dominated by any other matching; a matching Pareto dominates another if all agents weakly prefer the former to the latter, and some agent’s preference is strict. The second efficiency criterion we study requires the efficient matching to be the maximum of a social ranking of matchings, in line with Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), and Arrow’s (1963) reformulation of welfare economics.5 To formulate this more demanding efficiency criterion, we define a social welfare function (SWF) to be a mapping from profiles of agents’ preferences over matchings to partial strict orderings of matchings. We allow partial orderings—such as Pareto dominance—and derive results for complete orderings as corollaries.6 We require that each SWF satisfies the Pareto
3In kidney exchange, transplant centers occasionally try to first conduct kidney exchanges using their internal patient-donor pool, and list their patients and donors in outside exchange programs only if they fail to find a suitable match, thus hindering the efficiency of regional exchange systems (cf. Sönmez and Ünver, 2010; Ashlagi and Roth, 2011). Also, a doctor acting on behalf of several patients can coordinate their reports if it benefits his or her patients. There are known cases of doctors gaming medical systems for the benefit of their patients. For instance, in 2003 two Chicago hospitals settled a Federal lawsuit alleging that some patients had been fraudulently certified as sicker than they were to move them up on the liver transplant queue (Warmbir, 2003). In school choice, Pathak and Sönmez (2008) describe strategic cooperation among parents, e.g. among the members of the West Side Parent Group in Boston. 4Non-manipulability is not the only benefit of using strategy-proof mechanisms. Such mechanisms also impose minimal costs of searching for and processing strategic information, and they do not discriminate among agents based on their access to information and ability to strategize (cf. Vickrey, 1961; Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin, 1979; Pathak and Sönmez, 2008). 5Pareto efficiency is, on one hand, the baseline efficiency requirement, and on the other hand, it does not indicate which of the possibly many Pareto-efficient matchings to choose. For instance, Arrow (1963), pp. 36-37, discusses the partial ordering of outcomes given by Pareto dominance, and observes: “But though the study of maximal alternatives is possibly a useful preliminary to the analysis of particular social welfare functions, it is hard to see how any policy recommendations can be based merely on a knowledge of maximal alternatives. There is no way of deciding which maximal alternative to decide on.” 6See e.g. Sen (1970,1999) for analysis of welfare with partial orderings.
3 and independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives postulates (Arrow, 1963): (i) a SWF is Pareto if it ranks any matching strictly below any other matching that Pareto dominates it, and (ii) a SWF satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives if, given any two profiles of preferences and any two matchings that are socially comparable under both profiles, if all agents rank the two matchings in the same way under both profiles, then the social ranking of the two matchings is the same under both profiles. We call a mechanism Arrovian efficient with respect to a SWF if, for all preference profiles, the resulting matching is the unique maximum of the SWF.7 For shortness we say that a mechanism is Arrovian efficient if it is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF. Our first main result (Theorem 1) establishes that a mechanism is individually strategy- proof and Arrovian efficient if and only if the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Both directions of the equivalence are noteworthy. First, the equivalence tells us that requiring individual strategy-proofness and Arrovian efficiency guarantees group strategy-proofness. As discussed above, group strategy-proofness is a very desirable property of an allocation mechanism. Second, mechanisms such as Serial Dictatorships or Top Trading Cycles (defined below) were known to be group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient; our equivalence allows us to conclude that they are also Arrovian efficient—there are Arrovian SWF that rationalize them. As far as we know, the present paper is the first to connect the literature on allocation and exchange and the literature on Arrovian preference aggregation. In particular, we seem to be the first to recognize the equivalence of Theorem 1. However, stronger equivalence results—which do not hold true in our setting—are familiar from studies of voting. In voting—unlike in our problem—all agents have strict preferences among all outcomes. In the class of Pareto efficient mechanisms, individual strategy-proofness is then equivalent to group strategy-proofness (Gibbard, 1973, and Satterthwaite, 1975).8 This stronger equivalence fails in our setting as it admits individually strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanisms that fail group strategy-proofness.
7There is a rich social choice literature on the correspondence between choice and the maximum of the SWF ranking in the context of social choice (see below). This literature is interested in rationalizing social choice rather than efficiency of allocation mechanisms, and hence it says that a mechanism, or social choice, is “rationalized by a SWF” rather than “efficient with respect to a SWF.” 8The equivalence of Theorem 1 also has counterparts in the social choice literature on restricted preference domains—such as single-peaked preferences—in which there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Arrow efficient rules. For instance, Moulin (1988) extends a result by Blair and Muller (1983) and shows that in environments such as single-peaked voting, if an Arrovian SWF is monotonic, then the mechanism picking its unique maximal element is group strategy-proof. In particular, this implies that in single-peaked voting individual strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent with no need to restrict attention to efficient mechanisms. In contrast, in allocation environments the equivalence results from the conjunction of incentive and efficiency assumptions, and the equivalence of incentive assumptions alone is not true.
4 The equivalence of Theorem 1 leads to a question: what mechanisms are individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient? Our second main result, Theorem 2, answers this question and constructs the full class of individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient mechanisms, or, equivalently, the full class of group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms. This new class of mechanisms—which we call trading-cycles mechanisms, or trading cy- cles for shortness—is closely related to David Gale’s top-trading-cycle mechanism (reported by Shapley and Scarf, 1974), and especially its generalization by Pápai (2000) (known as hierarchical exchange, or simply top trading cycles). Let us describe trading cycles in the special case of our environment in which there are as many objects as agents and each agent initially controls an object. First consider Gale’s top trading cycles. The top-trading-cycle algorithm resembles decentralized trading and matches agents and objects in a sequence of rounds. In each round, each object points to the agent who controls it and each agent points to his most preferred unmatched object. Since there are a finite number of agents, there exists at least one pointing cycle in which an agent, say agent 1, points to an object, say object A; the agent who controls object A points to object B, etc.; and finally the last agent in the cycle points to the object controlled by agent 1. The pointing cycles might be short (agent 1 points to object A, which points back to agent 1) or might involve many agents. The procedure then matches each agent in each pointing cycle with the object to which he points. The pointing cycles thus become cycles of trading. Rounds are repeated until no agents and objects are left unmatched. Gale’s top-trading-cycle mechanism is a special case of trading cycles; Roth (1982) showed that it is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Other examples of trading cycles obtain when we take one of the agents—let us call him a broker—and change the way he can trade the object he controls—which we call the brokered object, or the brokered house. We do so by running the same algorithm as above except that we make the broker point to his most preferred unmatched object that is different from the brokered object. Surprisingly, we prove that this modification of top trading cycles remains group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient (and hence, by Theorem 1, also Arrovian efficient).9 Even more surprisingly, this slight modification of top trading cycles gives us the full class of group strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms. While we described top trading cycles and trading cycles for a particular environment, the same algorithms can be used in more general environments, for instance when all objects
9It is natural to ask whether we can run an analogue of trading cycles with more than one broker in a given round. The answer is negative; such a mechanism would not be strategy-proof and efficient. As we explain in the paper, at-most-one-broker-per-round is an inherent feature of group strategy-proofness and efficiency, and not merely a convenient simplification.
5 are socially endowed. In such environments, to run top trading cycles we need to specify for each round and each object which agent controls it (see Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999; Pápai, 2000); to run trading cycles we additionally need to specify for every round who, if anyone, is the broker. Provided we are careful how the control rights change from round to round, the resulting mechanisms are group strategy-proof and efficient, and no other mechanisms are.10 The main insight brought by our characterization is that every individually strategy- proof and Arrovian efficient mechanism can be obtained by specifying agents’ control rights, and allowing them to swap objects. In this sense, our result can be seen as a variant of the Second Fundamental Welfare theorem for the setting without transfers and with single-unit demands. Knowing the full class of individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient mechanisms, allows us to derive some further properties shared by all such mechanisms. In particular, we show that in any such mechanism, for any preference profile, there is a group of agents—the decisive group—all of whom can get one of their two top choices, and all but at most one of whom can get their top choice, irrespective of preferences submitted by agents not in the group. In the trading-cycle algorithm, the decisive group consists of agents who trade in the first round.11 We further show that all strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms have arecursivestructure:themembersofthedecisivegroupdeterminetheirallocation;given their preferences there is another group of agents who obtain one of top two choices among remaining objects, and who can determine their allocation irrespective of the preferences of others, etc. For instance, in a sequential dictatorship (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981; Svensson, 1994, 1999; Ergin, 2000), which is a special case of trading cycles, the first dictator chooses his most preferred object, then a second dictator chooses his most preferred object among the objects which were not chosen by prior dictators, and so forth (we refer to the mechanism as serial dictatorship if the sequence of dictators is exogenously given). Furthermore, knowing that all individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient mech- anisms may be represented as trading cycles allows one to determine what can and cannot
10We study environments both with and without outside options. The results are the same in both environments, but the above algorithm needs to be slightly generalized in the case of outside options by allowing agents to point to objects or their outside options. We also need to postpone matching a broker with his outside option until a round in which an agent who owns an object lists the brokered object as his most preferred one. 11AsimilarpointwasmadebySen(1970)andGibbard(1969)inthecontextofvoting:everySWF whose ranking of outcomes is a quasi-ordering is determined by the preferences of a group of agents they call oligarchs. Notice that in the context of allocation, the result is more subtle in that who belongs to the decisive group can depend on the profile of preferences, and we might have one member of the decisive group whose preference ranking co-determines the allocation and who obtains one of his top two choices but not necessarily his top choice.
6 be achieved in a strategy-proof way. The characterization radically simplifies analysis of such questions because it allows us to restrict our attention to trading cycles without loss of generality (we provide examples of such a radical simplification below). In this sense, the role trading-cycles mechanisms play in the single-unit demand no-transfers environments we study, can be compared to, for instance, the role that the mechanisms of Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) play in environments with transfers and quasi-linear utili- ties (cf. Green and Laffont, 1977, and Holmstrom, 1979). Other characterizations of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms that are non-dictatorial have been obtained by Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) for sharing a perfectly divisible good among agents with single- peaked preferences over their shares; and by Barberà, Gül, and Stacchetti (1993) for voting problems with single-peaked preferences. To illustrate how Theorems 1 and 2 simplify the analysis of many otherwise difficult questions, we use them to obtain new insights into allocation and exchange, as well as to show that some of the deepest prior results on allocation in environments with single-unit demands and no transfers are their immediate corollaries. First, we apply our results to the problem of exchange of goods without transfers and with single-unit demands. For example, in kidney exchange, patients (agents) come with a paired- donor kidneys (objects) and have to be matched with at least their paired-donor kidney. Another example is the allocation of dormitory rooms at universities that give some students, such as sophomores, the right to stay in the room they lived in the preceding year. Such exogenous control rights are straightforwardly accommodated by our mechanism class. When some objects are private endowments of agents it is natural to require that the participation in the mechanism is individually rational so that each agent likes the mechanism’s outcome at least as much as the best object from his endowment. We show that the class of individually strategy-proof, Arrovian efficient, and individually rational mechanisms equals the class of individually rational trading-cycles mechanisms. A trading-cycles mechanism is individually rational if and only if (i) it may be represented by a consistent control rights structure in which each agent is given control rights over all objects from his endowment, and (ii) none of these agents is a broker. In particular, we show that when each agent has a private endowment, top-trading-cycles mechanisms are the unique mechanisms that are individually strategy-proof, Arrovian efficient, and individually rational. In the special case of our setting in which there are as many objects as agents and each agent is endowed with exactly one object, this corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 is implied by an earlier result of Ma (1994).12
12Ma shows that Top Trading Cycles is the unique strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually-rational mechanism in the discrete exchange economy with single-unit demand and single-unit endowment introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). There exists a unique core allocation in such an economy that can be reached by Gale’s TTC algorithm (cf. Shapley and Scarf, 1974 and Roth and Postlewaite, 1977). Konishi, Quint,
7 Second, we show that sequential dictatorships, defined above, are the only mechanisms that are individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient with respect to a SWF that always generates complete orderings.13 Dictatorships are the benchmark strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in many areas of economics. For instance, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown that all strategy-proof and unanimous voting rules are dictatorial.14 Still, we find it surprising that this corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 holds true in our environment because—in contrast to the environments where this question was previously studied—ours allows many individually strategy-proof (and even group strategy-proof) and Pareto efficient mechanisms that are not dictatorial. Third, we show that the some of the deep prior insights of the rich literature on allocation with no-transfers are immediately implied by Theorem 2. Pápai (2000)—the prior work closest to our paper—constructed a class of mechanisms referred to as top trading cycles or hierarchical exchange, which use the same algorithm as Gale’s top-trading-cycles mechanism with the exception that the mechanism takes as an input a structure of control rights (without brokers) over objects that—for each round of the mechanism and each unmatched object— determines the agent to whom the object points. She then showed that all group strategy- proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms that satisfy an additional technical property (that she refers to as reallocation-proofness) are in her class.15 This result is implied by Theorem 2 because trading cycles with brokers do not satisfy Papai’s reallocation-proofness property.16 and Wako (2001) considered an extension when agents have multi-unit demands and endowments. They showed that a core allocation may not exist when agents have additive preferences over multiple objects. Pápai (2007) showed that when we can rule out some of the types of trades that agents are allowed to make in this multi-unit model, then an extension of Ma’s characterization can be restored. 13We allow outside options in this result; without outside options we show that this subclass of trading cycles is slightly larger than the class of sequential dictatorships. 14Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) extended this result to more general social choice models, Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) extended it to public goods economies with production, Zhou (1991) extended it to pure public goods economies, and Hatfield (2009) to group strategy-proof quota allocations. In exchange economies, Barberà and Jackson (1995) showed that strategy-proof mechanisms are Pareto inefficient. 15A mechanism is reallocation-proof in the sense of Pápai if there is no profile of preferences with a pair of agents and a pair of preference manipulations such that (i) if both of them misrepresent their preferences, both of them weakly gain and one of them strictly gains by swapping their assignments, and (ii) if only one of them misrepresents his preferences, he cannot change his assignment. Pápai also notes that the more natural reallocation-proofness-type property obtained by dropping condition (ii) conflicts with group strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency as does allowing the swap of assignments among more than two agents. We do not use reallocation-proofness in our results. 16All allocation papers cited above, and the literature in general, shares with our paper the assumption that agents have strict preferences. This is the standard modeling assumption because—as Ehlers (2002) shows— “one cannot go much beyond strict preferences if one insists on efficiency and group strategy-proofness.” The full preference domain gives rise to an impossibility result, i.e., when agents can be indifferent among objects, there exists no mechanism that is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. For this reason, participants are frequently allowed to submit only strict preference orderings to real-life direct mechanisms in various markets, such as dormitory room allocation, school choice, and matching of interns and hospitals.
8 Svensson (1999) showed that a mechanism is neutral and group strategy-proof if and only if it is a serial dictatorship; neutrality means that a mechanism is invariant to any renaming of objects. This result follows from Theorem 2 because neutral and group strategy-proof mechanisms are Pareto efficient, and because, to be neutral, a trading-cycle mechanism must be a serial dictatorship. Finally, one of the auxiliary contributions of our paper is to recognize the role of brokers in allocation and exchange problems with no transfers. In the context of our paper, the main role played by the brokers is to allow us to construct the full class of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms. The brokers can also be useful in some mechanism design settings, and we close the paper by providing an example of such a setting. In the example, the trading cycle with one broker described above is the most equitable allocation mechanism. In particular, we prove that it is strictly more equitable—in the sense of Lorenz dominance— than any top-trading-cycles mechanism.
2Model
2.1 Environment
Let I be a set of agents and H be a set of objects that we often refer to as houses following the standard terminology of the literature. We use letters i, j,k to refer to agents and h, g,e 17 to refer to houses. Each agent i has a strict preference relation over H,denotedby i. Let Pi be the set of strict preference relations for agent i,andletPJ denote the Cartesian product i J Pi for any J I.Anyprofilefrom =( i)i I from P PI is called a ⇥ 2 ✓ 2 ⌘ preference profile.Forall P and all J I,let J =( i)i J PJ be the restriction of 2 ✓ 2 2 to J. To simplify the exposition, we make two initial assumptions. Both of these assumptions are fully relaxed in subsequent sections. First, we initially restrict attention to house al- location problems. A house allocation problem is the triple I,H, (cf. Hylland and h i Zeckhauser, 1979). Throughout the paper, we fix I and H,andthus,aproblemisidentified with its preference profile. In Section 6.1, we generalize the setting and the results to house allocation and exchange by allowing agents to have initial rights over houses. The results on allocation and exchange turn out to be straightforward corollaries of the results on (pure) allocation. Second, we initially follow the tradition adopted by many papers in the literature (cf. Svensson, 1999) and assume that H I so that each agent is allocated a house. This | | | | 17 By i we denote the induced weak preference relation; that is, for any g, h H, g i h g = h or g h. ⌫ 2 ⌫ () i
9 assumption is satisfied in settings in which each agent is always allocated a house (there are no outside options), as well as in settings in which agents’ outside options are tradable, effectively being indistinguishable from houses. In Section 5.2, we allow for non-tradable outside options and show that analogues of our results remain true irrespective of whether H I or H < I . | | | | | | | | An outcome of a house allocation problem is a matching. To define a matching, let us start with a more general concept that we will use frequently. A submatching is an allocation of a subset of houses to a subset of agents, such that no two different agents get the same house. Formally, a submatching is a one-to-one function : J H; where for ! J I,usingthestandardfunctionnotation,wedenoteby (i) the assignment of agent ✓ 1 i J under ,andby (h) the agent that got house h (J) under .Let be the 2 2 S set of submatchings. For each ,letI denote the set of agents matched by and 2S H H denote the set of houses matched by .Forallh H,let h be the set of ✓ 2 S ⇢S submatchings such that h H H , i.e., the set of submatchings at which house h is 2S 2 unmatched. In virtue of the set-theoretic interpretation of functions, submatchings are sets of agent-house pairs, and are ordered by inclusion. A matching is a maximal submatching; that is, µ is a matching if Iµ = I.Let be the set of matchings. We will write 2S M⇢S I for I I ,andH for H H for short. We will also write for . M S M A mechanism is a mapping ' : P that assigns a matching for each preference ! M profile (or, equivalently, for each allocation problem).18
2.2 Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency
Amechanismisindividuallystrategy-proofiftruthfulrevelationofpreferencesisaweakly dominant strategy for any agent: a mechanism ' is individually strategy-proof if for all
P, there is no i I and 0 Pi such that 2 2 i2
'[ i0 , i](i) i '[ ](i).
Amechanismisgroupstrategy-proofifthereisnogroupofagentsthatcanmisstatetheir preferences in a way such that each one in the group gets a weakly better house, and at least one agent in the group gets a strictly better house, irrespective of the preference ranking of the agents not in the group. Formally, a mechanism ' is group strategy-proof if for all
18We study direct mechanisms. By the revelation principle, this is without loss of generality. See Appendix Aforadiscussion.
10 P,thereexistsnoJ I and 0 PJ such that 2 ✓ J 2
'[ J0 , J ](i) i '[ ](i) for all i J, ⌫ 2 and
'[ J0 , J ](j) j '[ ](j) for at least one j J. 2 AmatchingisParetoefficientifnoothermatchingwouldmakeeverybodyweaklybetter off, and at least one agent strictly better off. That is, a matching µ is Pareto efficient 2M if there exists no matching ⌫ such that for all i I, ⌫(i) i µ(i), and for some i I, 2M 2 ⌫ 2 ⌫(i) i µ(i).AmechanismisPareto efficient if it finds a Pareto-efficient matching for every problem. Pareto efficiency is a weak efficiency requirement.19 In order to define the stronger concept of Arrovian efficiency with respect to a social welfare function, denote by P M the set of strict partial orderings over matchings; we refer to elements of P M as social rankings. A social welfare function (SWF) :P P M maps agents’ preference profiles to social ! rankings. A SWF is Pareto (or unanimous) if: for every preference profile and any two matchings µ, ⌫ ,ifµ(i) i ⌫(i) for all i I, with at least one preference strict, then µ 2M ⌫ 2 is ranked above ⌫ in the social ranking, µ ( ) ⌫.ASWF satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives if: for all , 0 P and all µ, ⌫ ,ifallagentsrankµ and ⌫ in 2 2M the same way and both ( ) and ( 0) rank µ and ⌫ then µ ( 0)⌫ µ ( )⌫.We () restrict attention to SWFs that satisfy the Pareto and independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives postulates. Notice that Pareto dominance is a standard example of a SWF. Amatchingµ is Arrovian efficient with respect to a social ranking ( ) if it maximizes the social welfare, that is µ ( )⌫ for all ⌫ µ .Amechanism is Arrovian efficient 2M\{ } with respect to a SWF if for any profile of agents’ preferences ,thematching ( ) is Arrovian efficient with respect to ( ).If is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF, we simply say that it is Arrovian efficient. The next section offers two examples illustrating the concept of Arrovian efficiency.
3MainResults:Equivalence
In Theorem 1, we establish the equivalence between three of the pairs of our incentive- compatibility and efficiency concepts. In addition, Example 2 below demonstrates that the
19In particular, when imposed on group strategy-proof mechanisms, Pareto efficiency is equivalent to assuming that the mechanism maps P onto the entire set of matchings . This surjectivity property is M known as citizen sovereignty, or full range.
11 class of individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms is a strict superset of the mechanisms satisfying any of the equivalent conditions of the theorem.
Theorem 1. Amechanismisindividuallystrategy-proofandArrovianefficientifandonly if it is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient, and if and only if it is group strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient.
To illustrate this equivalence and our concepts let us look a the setting with three agents
1, 2,and3,threeobjects(houses)h1, h2,andh3, and no outside options. Consider the following two examples of mechanisms.
Example 1. The serial dictatorship in which 1 chooses first, and 2 chooses second is well- known to be group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. It is straightforward to see that this serial dictatorship is Arrovian efficient with respect to the following SWF: µ is ranked strictly above ⌫ if and only if (a) 1 strictly prefers µ to ⌫,or(b)1 is indifferent and 2 strictly prefers µ to ⌫.
Example 2. Let us now modify the serial dictatorship of the previous example and consider mechanisms in which 1 chooses first; then 2 chooses second if 1 prefers h2 over h3,else 3 chooses second. This mechanism is an example of a sequential dictatorship, and is also individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. However, mechanism is neither Arrovian efficient nor group strategy-proof. To see the latter point let us look at the following two preference profiles:
1: h h h , 2: h h h , 3: h h h , 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1: h 0 h 0 h , 2: h 0 h 0 h , 3: h 0 h 0 h . 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 Notice that
( )= (1,h ) , (2,h ) , (3,h ) , { 1 2 3 } ( 0)= (1,h ) , (2,h ) , (3,h ) . { 1 3 2 }
The mechanism fails group strategy-proofness. For instance, when the true preference profile is ,thenagents1 and 3 have a profitable manipulation 0 1,3 . The mechanism { }{ } also fails Arrovian efficiency. Indeed, by way of contradiction assume that is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF . Then, ( ) ranks allocation ( ) strictly above ( 0),and ( 0) ranks ( 0) strictly above ( ).But,thisviolatestheindependenceof the irrelevant alternatives, a contradiction that shows that is not Arrovian efficient.
12 The proof of Theorem 1 builds on Example 2. As a preparation for the proof, let us notice three properties of group strategy-proofness. First, in the environment we study group strategy-proofness is equivalent to the conjunction of two non-cooperative properties: individual strategy-proofness and non-bossiness.20 Non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Son- nenschein, 1981) means that no agent can misreport his preferences in such a way that his allocation is not changed but the allocation of some other agent is changed: a mechanism ' is non-bossy if for all P, there is no i I and 0 Pi such that 2 2 i2
'[ i0 , i](i)='[ ](i) and '[ i0 , i] = '[ ]. 6
The following lemma is due to Pápai (2000):
Lemma 1. Pápai (2000) A mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is individually strategy-proof and non-bossy.
Second, in the environment we study group strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999). A mechanism ' is Maskin monotonic if '[ 0]='[ ] whenever 0 P is a '-monotonic transformation of P. Apreferenceprofile 0 P is a 2 2 2 '-monotonic transformation of P if 2
h H : h i '[ ](i) h H : h 0 '[ ](i) for all i I. { 2 ⌫ }◆{ 2 ⌫i } 2
Thus, for each agent, the set of houses better than the base-profile allocation weakly shrinks when we go from the base profile to its monotonic transformation. The following lemma was proven by Takamiya (2001) for a subset of the problems we study; his proof can be extended to our more general setting.
Lemma 2. Amechanismisgroupstrategy-proofifandonlyifitisMaskinmonotonic.
Finally, let us notice the following
Lemma 3. If a mechanism is group strategy-proof then no agent can change the outcome of by changing the ranking of objects worse than the object he obtains, that is if 0 differs from only in how some agent i ranks objects below ( )(i) then ( 0)= ( 0). We skip the straightforward proof of this last lemma since we later prove, without reliance on this lemma or Theorem 1, a substantially stronger result, Theorem 2.
20Both of these properties are non-cooperative in the sense that they relate a mechanism’s outcomes under two scenarios when a single agent makes unilateral preference revelation deviations.
13 Proof of Theorem 1. Notice that it is sufficient to show that individual strategy- proofness and Arrovian efficiency are equivalent to group strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency as the third equivalence then follows. First, consider an individually strategy-proof mechanism that is Arrovian efficient with respect to some SWF .InlightofLemma1,toestablishthefirstimplicationitisenough to show that is Pareto efficient and non-bossy. To show that is Pareto efficient, suppose that for some P, [ ] is not Pareto 2 efficient. Then, there exists some µ [ ] such that µ(i) i [ ](i) for all i, with a 2M\{ } ⌫ strict preference for at least one agent. Since satisfies the Pareto postulate, µ ( ) [ ], which contradicts the assumption that is Arrovian efficient with respect to .
To show that is non-bossy, let P and 0 Pi be such that 2 i2