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- Lecture 4 1 Examples of Mechanism Design Problems
- The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path
- Parkes Chapter on Mechanism Design
- Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in Random Assignment Model
- Tacit Collusion in the Presence of Cyclical Demand and Endogenous Capacity Levels
- Communication with Language Barriers"
- Some Unpleasant General Equilibrium Implications of Executive Incentive Compensation Contracts
- A Note on Competing Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle
- Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources
- Incentive Compatibility, Scalability and Privacy in Real Time Demand Response
- Testing Dynamic Incentive Compatibility in Display Ad Auctions
- Evaluating Incentives for Collusion in Differentiated Product Markets: Measuring the 'Coordinated Effects' of Mergers
- One-To-Many Matching Auctions in Platforms
- Machine Learning, Game Theory, and Mechanism Design for a Networked World A
- Lecture Notes Microeconomic Theory
- Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration
- Empirical Strategy-Proofness∗
- Robust Clearing Price Mechanisms for Reserve Price Optimization
- Incentive Compatible Regression Learning ✩ ∗ Ofer Dekel A,1, Felix Fischer B, ,2, Ariel D
- Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing
- Incentives for Social Information Transmission: Theory and Behavior
- Testing the Quantal Response Hypothesis∗
- One Man, One Vote Bid
- Notes on Mechanism Design+
- Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core*
- A General Impossibility Theorem and Its Application to Individual Rights
- Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions*
- Roger B. Myerson1
- Lecture Notes
- Collusion-Resistant, Incentive-Compatible Feedback Payments
- An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design by Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
- COLLUSION by ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED DUOPOLISTS Richard E. KIHLSTROM* Xavier VIVES* 1. Introduction We Investigate the Possibili
- Mechanism Theory
- Mechanism Design with Partial Revelation
- The Sample Complexity of Up-To-Epsilon Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
- On Identification in Infinitely Repeated Games
- 6.896: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture 18
- Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
- Lecture 12: Bayesian Incentive-Compatibility
- Stochastic Choice and Noisy Beliefs in Games: an Experiment∗
- Multilateral Bargaining Over the Division of Losses*
- A Data-Driven Metric of Incentive Compatibility
- When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
- Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Mechanisms ∗
- Level-K Mechanism Design∗
- Incentive Compatibility Implies Signed Covariance*
- Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem
- No Externalities: a Characterization of Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility with Public Goods
- Strictly Strategy-Proof Auctions∗
- A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection
- Mechanism Design and Self-Selection Contracts (PDF)
- Extensive Form Games "…Nest Description"
- Ecosystem Services Auctions: the Last Decade of Research
- Strategyproofness in the Large
- Information Economics
- Uncertainty, Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility
- Some Notes on the Revelation Principle
- Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application
- • Tips When You Practice Memorizing Them, If You End up Saying Something That Sounds More Natural Than What You Wrote, Go Back and Revise What You Wrote
- Mechanism Design Theory
- Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive*
- Essays in Game Theory