THE CASE of the C–5A by Marcelle Size Knaack Air Force Hist
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RESEARCH STUDIES SERIES MILITARY AIRLIFT AND AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF THE C–5A By Marcelle Size Knaack Air Force History & Museums Program WASHINGTON, D.C. 1998 ii PREFACE This is the third in a series of research studies—historical works that were not published for various reasons. Yet, the material contained therein was deemed to be of enduring value to Air Force members and scholars. These were minimally edited and printed in a limited edition to reach a small audience that may find them useful. We invite readers to provide feedback to the Air Force History and Museums Program. The author, Marcelle S. Knaack, a member of the Office of Air Force History, undertook the research and writing of this book as a consultant, after she retired. Tragically, she passed away in November 1996, before she completed the manuscript. Her colleague, Bernard C. Nalty, also retired by that time, undertook to complete Ms. Knaack's work. At first glance, the history of the C–5A Galaxy seems to be nothing more than a compilation of contradictions. Ordered under a totally new procurement concept specifically designed to control costs, the C–5A aircraft ended up costing a small fortune. Its purchase in 1965 depended on achieving an initial operational capability no later than 1969, but the transport did not appear in South Vietnam in a truly operational capacity until August 1971. Although built by the Lockheed-Georgia Company, celebrated for its success with military transports like the C–130 Hercules and C–141 Starlifter, the C–5A program from the very start encountered serious technical problems, delays, and exorbitant cost overruns, which combined to trigger several congressional investigations. Although the program contracted in size under the pressure of these failings, it survived congressional opposition and began to demonstrate its unique value during the last year of the Vietnam War, even though operating under weight restrictions. In October 1973, moreover, the C–5A helped provide Israel with a constant flow of supplies to ensure victory over the attacking Egyptian and Syrian armies. Into the 1980s the C–5A operated under increasingly stringent flying restrictions because the flawed wing structure deteriorated until it had to be replaced. While under these restrictions, the C–5A could carry just 174,000 pounds of cargo, roughly 100,000 pounds more than the C–141, but 46,000 pounds less than the Galaxy's design objective. Although installation of the heavier new wing would probably prevent the airplane from ever attaining the design capacity of 220,000 pounds, the Military Airlift Command was determined to extend the service life of the C–5A because its performance remained so impressive even with a reduced load. The improvements that strengthened the structure of the C–5A were incorporated in a new version of the Galaxy, the C–5B, for which Lockheed-Georgia reopened its production line. The modified A-model and the new C–5B did everything expected of a heavy-logistics transport during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. Jacob Neufeld, General Editor August 1998 iii iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book was suggested by Gen. Duane H. Cassidy, Commander in Chief of the Military Airlift Command from 1985 to 1987, and by the late Lt. Gen. Ralph E. Havens, Commander of the Air University, when both were members of the Air Force Historical Advisory Committee during the years 1988 and 1989. Generals Cassidy and Havens believed that the Air Force needed an impartial account of the C–5A program. Dr. Richard H. Kohn, the Chief of Air Force History, launched the book, which came to fruition under his successor, Dr. Richard P. Hallion. In pursuing the objectives of accuracy and candor, I received advice and other assistance from several of my colleagues in the Air Force history program: Herman Wolk, Bernard C. Nalty, Jacob Neufeld, Wayne W. Thompson, Michael H. Gorn, R. Frank Futrell, and Michael Levy. Another Air Force historian, R. Cargill Hall, not only arranged the contract for completing the book but also offered comments and information that helped ensure the kind of product that Generals Cassidy and Havens wanted. Historians Richard K. Smith and Rene J. Francillon, also shared their extensive knowledge of the C–5A in particular and aerodynamics in general. v vi CONTENTS Preface ............................................................iii Acknowledgments ................................................... v Introduction ........................................................ ix I. Military Airlift and the Evolution of Aircraft Procurement ............ 1 Early Procurement Practice ........................................ 1 The Post-World War I Promotion of Aircraft Development ................. 3 The World War II Production Boom .................................. 6 Airlift for Berlin and Korea ......................................... 8 Continuing Wartime Aircraft Procurement Practices .................... 12 Reorganizing to Manage Technology ................................. 13 Contract Changes Add Costs ...................................... 15 Airlift at the Close of the Eisenhower Era ............................ 16 Notes ........................................................ 17 II. Flexible Response and the Beginning of the C–5A .................. 21 The Effects of Flexible Response on Airlift Requirements and Doctrine ....... 21 The Imprint of Project Forecast .................................... 27 The Total Package Procurement Concept ............................. 31 The C–5A Program Approved ...................................... 36 The Study of March 1965: Weight and Engines ......................... 38 Weight: A Frustrating Start ....................................... 40 Notes ........................................................ 43 III. Building the C–5A: Problems and Controversy ..................... 47 Source Selection Board Proceedings ................................. 49 Selection: The Low-Cost Bidder Prevails .............................. 53 Engine Development: Difficult at Best ............................... 57 An Old, Familiar Pattern ......................................... 59 A Tortuous, Downhill Road ........................................ 61 Playing Hard Ball ............................................... 63 Catching the Public Eye .......................................... 65 Notes ........................................................ 69 IV. Settlement of the C–5A Program and Another Procurement Reform .. 73 Money, A Continuous First Priority ................................. 74 The Unsolved Financial Dilemma ................................... 75 Cutting Losses ................................................. 76 Another Crisis ................................................. 81 Damage Control ................................................ 84 The C–5A Problems that Remained in 1972 ........................... 88 Notes ........................................................ 91 V. The End of the C–5A Program and the Beginning of the C–5B ........ 93 Overseas Deployment ............................................ 93 A Mixed Victory ................................................ 96 Rewinging the Fleet ............................................. 98 Facing New Challenges .......................................... 102 Notes ....................................................... 107 VI. An Assessment ............................................... 109 Notes ....................................................... 119 Appendices 1. Estimated Mission Performance Based on Contractor Revised Proposals of September 4, 1965 ...................................................... 123 2. C–5A Program Funding ......................................... 125 3. Lockheed Supplemental Agreement 1000, and General Electric's Restructured Contract ..................................................... 127 4. C–5A Yearly Production and Status ................................ 129 5. DOD Directives 5160.2 and 5160.22 ................................ 131 6. MAC Airlift Missions and Flying Hours ............................. 133 7. The Cost and Repricing Formulae .................................. 135 8. Serial Numbers, Acceptances, and Attrition .......................... 137 Bibliographic Note ................................................. 139 Abbreviations ..................................................... 141 INTRODUCTION Acquisition of the C–5A and C–5B transports manufactured by the Lockheed-Georgia Company between 1969 and 1989 embodied both the struggle to control the cost of weapon systems and the emergence of military airlift as a key element of national strategy. Even though the improved C–5B incorporated changes in engines and airframe typical of a second production model of the basic C–5A, the two versions symbolized different eras and the development of new procurement concepts. Both, however, reflected the growing importance of long-range air transport. The C–5A experienced a multitude of technical problems. Critical weakness in the wing, production slippage, and cost overruns nearly caused the program's cancellation in 1970. Yet, the new aircraft made a reality of the concept of flexible response by providing truly global reach for Air Force and the Army. The C–5A also signaled the beginning of drastic procurement reforms that sought to curb the cost of new weapon systems, though unsuccessfully since the new and highly publicized concept of total-package procurement was never pushed to its logical