Halvorsen loader pulls away from C-130J Super Hercules at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, where Airmen from aerial port and airlift squadrons support operations 24/7 at DOD’s busiest single runway airfield (U.S. Air Force/Brian Wagner)
Theater Airlift Modernization Options for Closing the Gap
By Robert C. Owen
merica’s renewed strategic the Nation has and what it expects to whether the POR airlift fleet will be ade- emphasis on state-on-state con- acquire) presents serious shortfalls in quate to the demands likely to be placed A flict highlights significant gaps the ability to maneuver land forces on on it. The discussion then turns to the in the country’s theater airlift capa- the scale, to the destinations, or in the question of whether affordable opportu- bilities, particularly in the Asia-Pacific timeframes desired by Army planners. nities exist to mitigate the gaps identified. region. Quantitatively, there likely will Air commanders also have reason for not be enough airlift capacity available concern since the core aircraft of the Requirements to cover major conflict requirements. theater fleet, the C-17 and C-130, pose Many organizations articulate versions Qualitatively, the current program- capacity and operational risks in their of airlift requirements based on sub- of-record (POR) airlift fleet (what abilities to support high-volume combat jective guesses about future scenarios. operations at forward bases when Moreover, the details of the more threatened or damaged by attack. authoritative Department of Defense Given these gaps between capabilities (DOD) studies are classified. Therefore, Dr. Robert C. Owen is a Professor in the Department of Aeronautical Science at Embry- and requirements, this article considers this article asserts only that the steady Riddle Aeronautical University. two questions. First, it begins by asking reduction of airlift planning goals over
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Owen 13 Thirty-sixth Airlift Squadron co-pilot flies C-130 Hercules during training mission as part of Readiness Week at Yokota Air Base, Japan, providing rapid tactical airlift support throughout Pacific theater (U.S. Air Force/Raymond Geoffroy) the past four decades makes shortages ernment Accountability Office.5 Thus, from strategic distance,” and supporting practically certain. In 1981, for example, if baseline airlift studies have a theme, it “forces that may be in multiple locations defense planners accepted a fleet capac- is that their force structure goals reflect with multiple objectives.”7 Joint forcible ity of 66 million ton/miles per day budgetary concerns as much as they do entry operations doctrine calls for forces (MTMD) as a “fiscally responsible” actual requirements. to “seize and hold lodgments against target, even though their planning As in the case of quantitative assess- armed opposition . . . [making] the con- scenarios required as much as 124 ments of airlift shortfalls, qualitative tinuous landing of troops and materiel MTMD.1 Ten years later, DOD reduced assessments must be parsed from a collec- possible and . . . [gaining] maneuver space its airlift capacity to 54.5 MTMD, which tion of formal requirements documents, for subsequent operations.”8 Thus, the conveniently matched the force struc- strategies, and Service visions. At the weight of defense policy implies a need for ture actually on hand at the time.2 This highest level, President Barack Obama’s airlift forces able to support air and land number raised high-level concerns over Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: combat operations at almost any location the methodology of the study and the Priorities for 21st Century Defense calls and in the face of substantive threats. adequacy of its findings.3 Most recently, for the “ability to project power in areas The mounted vertical maneuver the DOD Mobility Capabilities and in which our access and freedom to op- (MVM) vision further articulates the Requirements Study 2016 tacitly lowered erate are challenged.”6 The DOD Joint Army’s maximal airlift requirements. the planning baseline to 30.7 MTMD Operational Access Concept expands on MVM has passed through several concep- and declared that the C-130 fleet was this guideline, calling for forces capable tual stages since the mid-1990s, but at its larger than needed.4 These findings and of “deploying and operating on multiple heart calls for “the maneuver and vertical the methodologies that produced them . . . lines of operations,” “maneuver[ing] insertion of medium weight armored drew immediate criticism from the Gov- directly against key operational objectives forces into areas in close proximity to their
14 Forum / Theater Airlift Modernization JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 battlefield objectives without the need minimize the chance of collateral losses of limited in their throughput. The impact for fixed airports, airfields, or prepared personnel and nearby aircraft in the event of runway strength becomes clearer when airheads.”9 To make the MVM vision of detonations of aircraft loaded with tons one considers that a C-17 flying an un- practical, proponents call for development of munitions or other hazardous cargo. refueled 2,800 nautical mile (nm) round of a large vertical takeoff and landing trip from the main U.S. airbase on Guam (VTOL) aircraft. As the MVM vision The Air Force POR Fleet in support of Army operations on the has matured, the expected payloads of In terms of gross capacity, the pro- Philippine island of Luzon could carry up these joint heavy lift (JHL) aircraft have gram-of-record fleet is in good shape. to 60 tons of cargo, while a C-130 would increased from 26- to 30-ton Stryker The Air Force fields about 213 C-17s deliver only 6 tons. Furthermore, C-130s or Future Combat System vehicles to and 428 C-130s, which comprise its could not deliver any of the armored Bradley fighting vehicles up to 36 or more core theater airlift capabilities. The Air combat vehicles or other outsize items tons in weight. MVM visionaries expect Mobility Command (AMC) manages required by most maneuver brigades.15 that these aircraft will enable a revolu- all of these aircraft logistically, but they The limitations of the C-17/C-130 tionary increase in the combat power and are assigned to AMC, geographic com- team trouble proponents of MVM. survivability of air maneuvered forces.10 batant commands, and the Air Reserve Illustrating the impact of these limita- The Air Force has not developed a Components (the Air Force Reserve tions, a 2008 Army study determined conceptual equivalent to mounted verti- and Air National Guard). Production that a C-5/C-17 fleet would in most cal maneuver, but it probably should. In of C-17s has ended, but a program cases be obliged to set down MVM the past, most Air Force airlift support to replace older C-130s with C-130Js units 50 kilometers (km) or more from concepts have presumed that transport is under way. Conflict tested for the their objectives or points of need/effect aircraft would operate under the umbrella past 20 years, this fleet remains the (PON/E).16 C-130s, once brought of American air dominance to reach the only force capable of moving brigades, into such a distant theater, could ease main bases used by the combat units they divisions, wings, air forces, and their the access problem, but they would supported. However, deeper thought sustainment anywhere on the planet. be incapable of delivering much of the about the possibility of major conflicts in Additionally, the Army and Marines equipment required. These limitations, the Asia-Pacific suggests that the United field hundreds of CH-47 and CH-53 therefore, render the MVM vision moot. States may not always enjoy unbroken battlefield airlift aircraft, while the Navy In summary, the POR airlift fleet air dominance and invulnerable bases in and Marines also conduct airlift oper- presents theater warfighters with three ca- future conflicts and that potential foes ations with about 50 C-130s of their pabilities/requirements gaps. Historical may plan to target American airlift forces own. experience suggests that there always at the beginning of any future conflicts.11 Importantly, the capacity of the Air will be shortfalls in capacity versus re- There is a need, therefore, to articulate Force’s theater transport fleet diminishes quirements. Also, the C-17/C-130 expeditionary strategies that presume that quickly when it is called on to operate combination is capable but restricted in the Service’s airlift forces may be called in austere or degraded airfield environ- its ability to deliver high tonnages and on to operate at bases that are damaged ments. Under sea level atmospheric mechanized ground units into degraded or under current or imminent attack. conditions and depending on their or austere airfield environments. Last, Land maneuver and air operations loaded weights, the maximum effort the fleet on the books has little to no at degraded airfields will demand high takeoff distances of the C-130 range capability to satisfy the Army’s MVM throughputs from airlift forces at austere from 1,700 to 3,200 feet.12 Under similar vision of conducting air assaults with or off-runway locations. Even in support conditions, C-17s need between 3,000 medium mechanized units near or at of JHL-based operations, fixed-wing and 7,000 feet.13 Presuming that run- their PON/Es. While this last gap does transports will be needed to move large ways of suitable length are available, the not relate to a concept endorsed for quantities of vehicles and supplies into limiting operational factor becomes the funding by DOD, it still has relevance to MVM bases or operating locations es- load-bearing strength of their surfaces. airlift planners since the Army, histori- tablished deep in contested territories A C-17, for example, will rut, gouge, cally the biggest user of airlift, favors it. or otherwise beyond land lines of com- and render unusable runways rated at a munication. Given the vulnerabilities of California bearing ratio of 10 (graded soil Options for Closing the Gaps transport aircraft at forward bases, local and gravel) in just 30 passes (30 landings In broad terms, there are three commanders may want to push their and 30 takeoffs). Lighter C-130s could approaches to closing these theater operations out to unpaved areas of main make 1,500 passes on the same surface.14 airlift gaps: buy more of the same bases or even to remote fields. Such relo- Thus, in situations where airstrips or the aircraft, buy off-the-shelf aircraft offer- cations would reduce the likelihood that undamaged sections of main runways are ing desired capabilities, or develop cargo aircraft could be destroyed during short, the most capacious aircraft in the completely new aircraft. Each of these their predictable ground movements or fleet will not be able to get in, while the approaches offers its own mix of cost at their parking areas. They also would smaller aircraft could get in but would be and operational features as capability
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Owen 15 gap fillers. Consequently, this brief Study, released in February 2013, ad- Assessing the Options analysis focuses on three criteria for dressed gaps in the command’s ability We turn now to analysis of options for assessing these gap-filler approaches: the to operate into austere landing areas, closing the theater airlift gap. Option likelihood that a given option actually support the maneuver of medium-weight 1—buying more of the same aircraft will close some or all the gaps, lifecycle armored vehicles, and transport medium- already in the POR fleet—likely will costs, and general impact or opportu- weight forces and their logistics over be unattractive to theater and Service nity costs on other mission areas. strategic and operational distances di- planners. Most important, buying addi- Numerous studies have been done rectly to their PON/E.20 The technology tional C-17s and C-130s will not close on at least some elements of this issue. In options it studied included the C-17s, any of the three airlift gaps. They might 2007, DOD issued an initial capabilities C-130s, and CH-47s of the “baseline make a contribution to the shortfall document (ICD) for a JHL aircraft with fleet,” a conventional takeoff and landing in gross capacity, but they would have either super-short takeoff and landing (CTOL) turboprop-powered aircraft, a little impact on the Air Force’s ability to (SSTOL) or VTOL capabilities. By CTOL turbofan-powered aircraft, a short deliver high cargo volumes and outsize SSTOL, the ICD meant an aircraft able takeoff and landing (STOL)-capable vehicles into damaged and austere to take off from an unprepared surface turboprop, a STOL turbofan-powered airfields, and they would leave MVM and climb over a 50-foot obstacle in aircraft of planform design, a VTOL unsupported. In terms of opportunity 1,000 feet or less. The concept aircraft tiltrotor, and a VTOL hybrid airship. costs, acquisition of such aircraft could also was to be capable of carrying a In the end, AMC concluded that a new make airlift capacity available to other- 28-ton medium armored vehicle over a heavy-lift tiltrotor would be the “most wise unserved users, but its $62.1 billion 250 nm mission radius to within either operationally effective of all the options.” price tag also would siphon funds away 25–50 km of desirable points of need (if New design STOL turboprops, planform from other programs. In addition, the SSTOL capable) or less than 25 km (if turbofans, and hybrid airships also offered Air Force has stated that it has plenty of a VTOL design).17 Sensitive to its other useful, but not maximal, operational C-17s and C-130s, so making a politi- airlift support obligations, the Air Force values in the scenarios examined.21 Given cally and financially compelling case for in 2010 eased the takeoff- obstacle-clear- the characteristics of those scenarios, the more would be difficult.23 ance distance requirement to 1,500 feet JFTL found the turboprop CTOL option Option 2—acquiring an off-the-shelf to gain some trade space to increase the as “high risk.”22 aircraft—is a more complex proposition notional aircraft’s mission radius to 1,000 The JFTL also estimated the 30-year than expanding the existing fleet. The nm and thereby improve its ability “to lifecycle costs of a force of each aircraft only mid-sized airlifter on the market satisfy a wide variety of airlift mission capable of carrying a medium-armored that could address the Air Force’s airlift requirements.”18 More recently, the brigade over strategic distances into gaps would be the Airbus A400M, an U.S. Transportation Command and Air a theater, carrying a “primarily me- aircraft similar to the turboprop CTOL Mobility Command conducted studies dium weight” brigade task force in a aircraft discussed in the JFTL. With a focused on satisfying mounted vertical forcible entry operation, moving a medi- maximum payload of 40.5 tons and the maneuver needs.19 um-weight battalion within a theater, and ability to carry a Bradley fighting vehicle The Air Mobility Command’s Joint supporting the logistics of these opera- for 2,400 nm, this aircraft could con- Future Theater Lift (JFTL) Technology tions (see table). tribute to gross long-range lift capacity. Moreover, the A400M has airfield length and strength requirements close to those Table. JFTL Technology Study Lifecycle Cost Estimates of the C-130, giving it significant ability Alternative Number of Aircraft Lifecycle Cost of Budget Year 2012 (in $ billions) to sustain high throughput into airfields Baseline 63 (C-130) 62.1 not suitable for the C-17.24 The A400M 36 (C-17) also could deliver medium-weight ar- 20 (CH-47) mored units closer to their PON/E than CTOL Turboprop 49 36.4 could a C-5/C-17 fleet. Thus, if the CTOL Turbofan 84 111.1 Army and Air Force remain unable to at- STOL Turboprop 93 110.7 tain DOD authorization and funding to STOL Turbofan 93 120.8 pursue a VTOL option, an off-the-shelf turboprop CTOL could be an affordable VTOL Tiltrotor 98 128.4 second approach to at least improving VTOL Hybrid Airship 92 84.3 joint aerial maneuver capabilities. Source: Air Mobility Command, Joint Future Theater Lift: Technology Study Final Report, February 20, It is worth noting here that the 2013, 125. lifecycle costs of the medium CTOL Key: CTOL = conventional takeoff and landing; STOL = short takeoff and landing; VTOL = vertical option likely would be lower than those takeoff and landing. estimated in the JFTL. Those numbers
16 Forum / Theater Airlift Modernization JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Air Force C17 Globemaster takes off from old Israeli airstrip in Sinai Peninsula of Egypt to provide airlift support for Soldiers from Aviation Company, 1st Support Battalion, Task Force Sinai (U.S. Army/Thomas Duval)
were based on an unaugmented fleet of other options discussed in the JFTL are comparison of the current MV-22 tiltro- 49 CTOLs needed to meet the gross lift unrealistic, and their merits in relation tor and the C-130J fixed-wing transports. requirements of its chosen scenarios.25 to the theoretical capabilities of a new An MV-22, with total engine power But in reality, the Air Force likely would tiltrotor and the real capabilities of, say, of 12,300 horsepower, cruising at 240 buy only enough new CTOL aircraft to the A400M would be too marginal to knots with its maximum 8-ton payload, augment the existing C-130 fleet’s ability justify their costs. Given its inherent produces 0.12 ton-miles of useful lift per to deploy and sustain forces into airfields performance limitations, the tiltrotor hour per engine horsepower available.26 too short or soft for C-17s. For example, would make little or no contribution A C-130J, with total power of 19,364 C-130s would be capable of moving the to the general airlift shortfall over stra- horsepower, cruising at 350 knots with a personnel, supplies, and about half of the tegic distances. Over distances of a few less-than-maximum payload of 20 tons, 300 or so vehicles possessed by a mech- hundred miles, VTOL tiltrotors could will produce 0.36 ton-miles per available anized infantry battalion. Consequently, increase the flow of forces into austere horsepower.27 This comparison is inexact, the Air Force would need to field only airfields because more of them could land but in its magnitude, it offers compelling enough new medium CTOL aircraft, in a given area. But their ability to sustain and relevant insights into the operational such as the A400M, to move the other, high throughputs at those locations, in offsets of VTOL capabilities. heavier vehicles in the battalion. More comparison to what fixed-wing trans- practically, however, the Air Force ports could do, bears close examination. Recommendations might want to acquire enough medium Historically, rotary-wing aircraft have not In its examination of theater airlift gaps CTOLs to make such moves alone, since been able to generate the flight hours and mitigation options, this article has they would greatly increase movement over time or the ton-mile productivity highlighted two broad conclusions. velocities and the flow of sustainment in of fixed-wing transports. Of course, the First, gaps do exist in general long- forward airfields or at degraded air bases. attraction of a heavy-lift VTOL would be range airlift capacity, the C-17/C-130 This brings the discussion to the its maximal contribution to the aspira- team’s ability to achieve high through- final option for addressing theater airlift tions of MVM advocates. puts into austere landing areas, and the gaps—developing and acquiring a com- The assertion that tiltrotors would POR fleet’s ability to satisfy the maximal pletely new aircraft. If DOD pursued be inherently unable to generate fixed- requirements of the MVM vision. this costly option, the only reasonable wing-like throughputs bears some Second, there are numerous mitigation choice would be the VTOL tiltrotor. The expansion. Suffice it here to offer a simple options for these shortfalls. But as likely
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Owen 17 as the gross lift shortfalls will be, they Be There,” 27–28, available at
18 Forum / Theater Airlift Modernization JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014