Halvorsen loader pulls away from C-130J Super Hercules at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, where Airmen from aerial port and airlift squadrons support operations 24/7 at DOD’s busiest single runway airfield (U.S. Air Force/Brian Wagner) Theater Airlift Modernization Options for Closing the Gap By Robert C. Owen merica’s renewed strategic the Nation has and what it expects to whether the POR airlift fleet will be ade- emphasis on state-on-state con- acquire) presents serious shortfalls in quate to the demands likely to be placed A flict highlights significant gaps the ability to maneuver land forces on on it. The discussion then turns to the in the country’s theater airlift capa- the scale, to the destinations, or in the question of whether affordable opportu- bilities, particularly in the Asia-Pacific timeframes desired by Army planners. nities exist to mitigate the gaps identified. region. Quantitatively, there likely will Air commanders also have reason for not be enough airlift capacity available concern since the core aircraft of the Requirements to cover major conflict requirements. theater fleet, the C-17 and C-130, pose Many organizations articulate versions Qualitatively, the current program- capacity and operational risks in their of airlift requirements based on sub- of-record (POR) airlift fleet (what abilities to support high-volume combat jective guesses about future scenarios. operations at forward bases when Moreover, the details of the more threatened or damaged by attack. authoritative Department of Defense Given these gaps between capabilities (DOD) studies are classified. Therefore, Dr. Robert C. Owen is a Professor in the Department of Aeronautical Science at Embry- and requirements, this article considers this article asserts only that the steady Riddle Aeronautical University. two questions. First, it begins by asking reduction of airlift planning goals over JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Owen 13 Thirty-sixth Airlift Squadron co-pilot flies C-130 Hercules during training mission as part of Readiness Week at Yokota Air Base, Japan, providing rapid tactical airlift support throughout Pacific theater (U.S. Air Force/Raymond Geoffroy) the past four decades makes shortages ernment Accountability Office.5 Thus, from strategic distance,” and supporting practically certain. In 1981, for example, if baseline airlift studies have a theme, it “forces that may be in multiple locations defense planners accepted a fleet capac- is that their force structure goals reflect with multiple objectives.”7 Joint forcible ity of 66 million ton/miles per day budgetary concerns as much as they do entry operations doctrine calls for forces (MTMD) as a “fiscally responsible” actual requirements. to “seize and hold lodgments against target, even though their planning As in the case of quantitative assess- armed opposition . [making] the con- scenarios required as much as 124 ments of airlift shortfalls, qualitative tinuous landing of troops and materiel MTMD.1 Ten years later, DOD reduced assessments must be parsed from a collec- possible and . [gaining] maneuver space its airlift capacity to 54.5 MTMD, which tion of formal requirements documents, for subsequent operations.”8 Thus, the conveniently matched the force struc- strategies, and Service visions. At the weight of defense policy implies a need for ture actually on hand at the time.2 This highest level, President Barack Obama’s airlift forces able to support air and land number raised high-level concerns over Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: combat operations at almost any location the methodology of the study and the Priorities for 21st Century Defense calls and in the face of substantive threats. adequacy of its findings.3 Most recently, for the “ability to project power in areas The mounted vertical maneuver the DOD Mobility Capabilities and in which our access and freedom to op- (MVM) vision further articulates the Requirements Study 2016 tacitly lowered erate are challenged.”6 The DOD Joint Army’s maximal airlift requirements. the planning baseline to 30.7 MTMD Operational Access Concept expands on MVM has passed through several concep- and declared that the C-130 fleet was this guideline, calling for forces capable tual stages since the mid-1990s, but at its larger than needed.4 These findings and of “deploying and operating on multiple heart calls for “the maneuver and vertical the methodologies that produced them . lines of operations,” “maneuver[ing] insertion of medium weight armored drew immediate criticism from the Gov- directly against key operational objectives forces into areas in close proximity to their 14 Forum / Theater Airlift Modernization JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 battlefield objectives without the need minimize the chance of collateral losses of limited in their throughput. The impact for fixed airports, airfields, or prepared personnel and nearby aircraft in the event of runway strength becomes clearer when airheads.”9 To make the MVM vision of detonations of aircraft loaded with tons one considers that a C-17 flying an un- practical, proponents call for development of munitions or other hazardous cargo. refueled 2,800 nautical mile (nm) round of a large vertical takeoff and landing trip from the main U.S. airbase on Guam (VTOL) aircraft. As the MVM vision The Air Force POR Fleet in support of Army operations on the has matured, the expected payloads of In terms of gross capacity, the pro- Philippine island of Luzon could carry up these joint heavy lift (JHL) aircraft have gram-of-record fleet is in good shape. to 60 tons of cargo, while a C-130 would increased from 26- to 30-ton Stryker The Air Force fields about 213 C-17s deliver only 6 tons. Furthermore, C-130s or Future Combat System vehicles to and 428 C-130s, which comprise its could not deliver any of the armored Bradley fighting vehicles up to 36 or more core theater airlift capabilities. The Air combat vehicles or other outsize items tons in weight. MVM visionaries expect Mobility Command (AMC) manages required by most maneuver brigades.15 that these aircraft will enable a revolu- all of these aircraft logistically, but they The limitations of the C-17/C-130 tionary increase in the combat power and are assigned to AMC, geographic com- team trouble proponents of MVM. survivability of air maneuvered forces.10 batant commands, and the Air Reserve Illustrating the impact of these limita- The Air Force has not developed a Components (the Air Force Reserve tions, a 2008 Army study determined conceptual equivalent to mounted verti- and Air National Guard). Production that a C-5/C-17 fleet would in most cal maneuver, but it probably should. In of C-17s has ended, but a program cases be obliged to set down MVM the past, most Air Force airlift support to replace older C-130s with C-130Js units 50 kilometers (km) or more from concepts have presumed that transport is under way. Conflict tested for the their objectives or points of need/effect aircraft would operate under the umbrella past 20 years, this fleet remains the (PON/E).16 C-130s, once brought of American air dominance to reach the only force capable of moving brigades, into such a distant theater, could ease main bases used by the combat units they divisions, wings, air forces, and their the access problem, but they would supported. However, deeper thought sustainment anywhere on the planet. be incapable of delivering much of the about the possibility of major conflicts in Additionally, the Army and Marines equipment required. These limitations, the Asia-Pacific suggests that the United field hundreds of CH-47 and CH-53 therefore, render the MVM vision moot. States may not always enjoy unbroken battlefield airlift aircraft, while the Navy In summary, the POR airlift fleet air dominance and invulnerable bases in and Marines also conduct airlift oper- presents theater warfighters with three ca- future conflicts and that potential foes ations with about 50 C-130s of their pabilities/requirements gaps. Historical may plan to target American airlift forces own. experience suggests that there always at the beginning of any future conflicts.11 Importantly, the capacity of the Air will be shortfalls in capacity versus re- There is a need, therefore, to articulate Force’s theater transport fleet diminishes quirements. Also, the C-17/C-130 expeditionary strategies that presume that quickly when it is called on to operate combination is capable but restricted in the Service’s airlift forces may be called in austere or degraded airfield environ- its ability to deliver high tonnages and on to operate at bases that are damaged ments. Under sea level atmospheric mechanized ground units into degraded or under current or imminent attack. conditions and depending on their or austere airfield environments. Last, Land maneuver and air operations loaded weights, the maximum effort the fleet on the books has little to no at degraded airfields will demand high takeoff distances of the C-130 range capability to satisfy the Army’s MVM throughputs from airlift forces at austere from 1,700 to 3,200 feet.12 Under similar vision of conducting air assaults with or off-runway locations. Even in support conditions, C-17s need between 3,000 medium mechanized units near or at of JHL-based operations, fixed-wing and 7,000 feet.13 Presuming that run- their PON/Es. While this last gap does transports will be needed to move large ways of suitable length are available, the not relate to a concept endorsed for quantities of vehicles and supplies into limiting operational factor becomes the funding by DOD, it still has relevance to MVM bases or operating locations es- load-bearing strength of their surfaces. airlift planners since the Army, histori- tablished deep in contested territories A C-17, for example, will rut, gouge, cally the biggest user of airlift, favors it.