Lebanon in the Syrian Quagmire Fault-Lines, Resilience and Possible Futures
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Lebanon in the Syrian Quagmire Fault-Lines, Resilience and Possible Futures by Youssef Chaitani Ishac Diwan Harvard, April 29, 2014 Outline What are we trying to do? I. Conceptual Framework II. Why the Syrian War will Last and impact on Lebanon III. Weaknesses of the Lebanese System IV. Lebanese Strengths and Resilience V. Comparing Future Scenarios “In a country like ours, composed of minori6es that are already approximately equal and equally jealous of their rights, where no single element can hope to cons6tute a dominant majority, where there can be no ques6on of a dictatorial regime – the only possible peace is one arrived at by consent, based on understanding and cooperaon, on a state of Charles Helou, Lebanese President equilibrium.” (1941) (1964 – 1970) 1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK What is “Sectarian, Ethnic, Communal”? • group wt shared sense of iden6ty (cultural tradi6on, language, religion, historical narraves etc.) reinforced by social relaons of kinship that tends to be stable (Geertz 1967) • Formaon of social groups and emergence Manipulaon of culture of communal iden66es as responses to (histories of oppression, Generate inequali6es economic and poli6cal condi6ons, and hence martyrdom) in a manner or are discriminatory that becomes poli6cized Social - towards certain groups as inherently dynamic (Horowitz 1985 and and exclusionary Economic Anderson 2006) • Historical events can strengthen or even create a sense of communal iden6ty. Poli6cal actors, oXen Tensions State Cultural with interests of their own, may manipulate or /Iden6ty structure even ini6ate such sen6ment (P.R. Brass, 1997) • Group iden66es determined by the ways in which membership is defined, acknowledged and denied, and how Marginalizaon External in decision- relaons to non-members are nego6ated (Taylor & Spencer making process, 2004, Massey, 1998) state •Why ethnic groups can act collec6vely to provide public goods? ins6tu6ons weak in (i) preferences – the extent to which groups have similar addressing preferences; (ii) technology -- the ease with which they work Alignment of socio-economic internaonal/ needs of together; and (iii) strategic interac6ons: the way in which non- regional power populaon or in cooperaon is more easily sanc6oned. Habyarimana et al poli6cs with local resolving ruling elites’ disputes (2009). struggles Governing mul-group sociees: What do we learn from Lebanon? • Need a raonal framework to understand how ethnicity can interact wt poli6cs • NIE (eg. North et al 2013), Limited Order Access equilibria: the result of a successful coali6on of oligarchs: – ensure peace by monopolizing use of violence – extract rents while minimizing restric6ons to economic ac6vity • Model can explain the evolu6on, adaptability, and predicament of the Lebanese state – In equilibrium, ci6zens stuck in their community – even if ideally, a majority prefers a ci6zenship model! – Horizontal and ver6cal contestaons produce transi6ons and adaptaons, even civil wars – A strong state = risk of capture by a group, leading to insecurity! Why we can have “rational” wars? (North et al 2013) • Full informaon + raonal expectaons = no war. There are beoer ways of sharing a pie than to destroy it! • Raonal wars can happen under various condi6ons, incl.: Inability of player to commit to securing a nego6ated agreement This can be applied to civil war in Syria: Virtual and Unable to Keep figh6ng to • Third player is the discontented Syrian Outbid Spoils of War Increase Spoils majority, fired up by the AS, rebels • Both the regime, and the Islamic Alawite opposi6on, have a tacit agreement to fight Rulers/ it in order to secure their future Syrian Ruling Elite Center • Move from an equilibrium wt one, (Discontented Syrian towards an equilibrium wt two oligarchs Majority) • But need for players first to Islamist Insurgents secure a border, then to unify their ranks, before being able to form a credible coali6on Interpre6ng recent changes in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq • The Lebanon seolement originate with a “naonal pact”, connected to the poli6zaon of 2 camps pre-independence. – Civil war largely due to contestaon of oligarchs from below in the context of internal and external imbalances – Taif agreements recreates the model under Syrian tutelage and a Saudi- Western umbrella – 2005 Cedar revolu6on does not change this, but the AS in Syria puts the tradi6onal model in ques6on • Syria and Iraq ini6al seolement based on praetorian minori6es – a legacy of the de-colonizaon process. – Base of regimes became narrower based over 6me as a result of economic failures – Seolement exploded wt US interven6on in Iraq and AS in Syria - in both cases, oligarchs wt their back to the wall fight back (unlike Egypt, Tunisia) – Slow move towards consensual model in Iraq (federalism wt power and wealth sharing) in context of oil economy 2. WHY THE SYRIAN WAR WILL LAST – IMPLICATIONS FOR LEBANON A fragmented field internally A mulY-front war and a magnet for foreign fighters • Pro-regime: Hezbollah from Lebanon, brigades from Iraq • Insurgents : About 110,000 fighters, including 7,000 foreigners from over 50 countries Many players •Mushrooming of war entrepreneurs split about 1,600 dis6nct insurgent groups • Infigh6ng among different local opposi6on fac6ons/foreign jihadists • Violence broke the resolve of Syria’s unarmed, localized and leaderless uprising No InternaYonal/Regional Agreement on Way Out in Syria external support fires up the war External players adjust support to prevent the military defeat of clients • Iran: Syria the lifeline for Hezbollah • Regional support: discord among divides the opposion Fallout between qatar and KSA/UAE Dispute between KSA and Turkey (over Muslim Brotherhood) KSA: Numerous power centers • Israel: conflict bleeds enemies (Luowak) • West: Internaonal interven6on in Syria too costly and public disinterest as opposi6on(s) victory unarac6ve • Russia: Syria is its last outpost in the ME • Dim prospects for diplomac track: US and Russian relaons all 6me low The Dynamics of prolonged conflict E Shiing Coali6on of oligarchs borders sharing the pie Rebels fight it out among Internaonally themselves sponsored High un6l a workable agreement coali6on level of Figh6ng for the emerges border represen6ng violence Aract A border is 'Sunni' interests foreign rents established & keep center at bay Once borders stabilize, conflict moves within the border unl a unified coalion that can safeguard peace emerges Outlines of an internal border starng to appear Assad and loyalist forces: Red Hezbollah: Dark Yellow Jabhat al Nusra: Dark Gray Free Syrian army: Light Green Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: Black Israel: Blue Kurdish areas: Light Yellow Rise of War Economy leads to Emergence of New Elites & Prolongaon of the War War has decimated the Syrian economy with half of its 23 million people living in poverty Staggering unemployment levels = many (Youth) forced to join regime or opposi6on mili6as to survive (a generaon lost ) Economy led by profiteers/ mili6as: Control of land routes, border crossings and oil fields for war effort and profit power of local warlords depends on Cantons led by connuaon of the war War Lords intermioed bales within will only ease as emerging oligarchs consolidate power to secure more rents Similar to Lebanon’s civil war – the 1980s as the decade of the warlords By the late 70s, armed mili6as stopped figh6ng each other, consolidang borders and established close 6es for beoer control and coordinaon of spoils (1985-1990) • Ten mili6as controlled cantons and illegal ports: arms and foreign trade, including drug trafficking, contraband commercial goods, livestock (USD 6 billion in narco6cs produced) As illicit business grew, cooperaon between mili6as increased Mili6as came to own large (business enterprises (Post Taif) mili6as changed to poli6cal par6es and with them their welfare agencies and social networks, which serve as rents to their clients Such a process is s6ll embryonic in Syria but figh6ng for control of revenue on-going .. (eg. reports of government-Nusra deal on export of oil) Implicaon for Lebanon • Sunni and Shiia groups perceive Syrian conflict as existen6al and see themselves as an integral part of the regional struggle The refugees influx complicates security and the economy • The new regional order has also profound influence in Lebanon Emergence of a “Shia Crescent” Saudis fear an Iranian “Shiite Crescent”, threatening GCC and domes6c stability Remove Syria from Iranian orbit thereby weakening its proxies in Lebanon and Iraq US-Iranian nego6aons seems threatening and lead to more will to fight in Syrian war and in Lebanon 3. FAULT LINES IN THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM Evoluon of Sealements since 1989 Oslo Accord 1993 AssassinaYon of PM Rafik Hariri 2005 Syrian Uprising February 2011 - ? Taif Accord 1989 Israel’s War on Lebanon Kuwait War 1991 A change of the guard in Damascus: July 2006 Comes to Power 2000 - UN SCR 1559: Syria Out (Sept. 2004) Pax Syriana begins Cedar RevoluYon March 2005: Hezbollah Publicly Declares CiYzenship Model? 9/11 Military IntervenYon in Syria Syria withdraws (2013) KSA-Syria Construct of Equilibrium: Hezbollah Takes Reconstruc6on & Spoils over Beirut by (Rafik Hariri 1992 – 1998/2000 – 2004) US Invasion of Iraq 2003: force followed by Syria drawn to Iran Doha Accord May 2008 Pax Syriana (1989-2005): Syrian – 2004-11: Turbulence - aempt at reforming Secret US-Iranian Negoaons in Oman KSA alliance wt Taif: Change of the guard in Damascus & invasion November 2013 internaonal support of Iraq as SA aempts to split Syria from