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The 1944 of & Home The Destruction of Army Group Center

By Joseph Miranda

Post-war Minsk, 1944

Background potentially threatening the ’s Allied armies got across the Rhine. westernmost lodgment in the newly lib- With all that in mind put its n April 1944 Stavka—the Soviet erated . Farther advances in the plans into motion, codenaming the high command—began planning south would be problematic as long as new offensive , I for its next major offensive that situation remained. Moreover, AGC after a Napoleonic-era Russian general against the Germans. The previous was still deep inside the western USSR’s killed in 1812. Broadly, Bagration was months had seen the successful pre-war territory, and there was there- to consist of a number of operational of them. From the sky above, the Soviet tifications to give the impression they The Soviet air force’s increasing completion of Red Army operations fore a political need to regain it. AGC’s thrusts straight across Byelorussia. Each air force would provide close support. were going to remain on the defensive. superiority over the front also aided aimed at clearing Axis forces from the defeat would also open the way to the would begin with a massive artillery To make Bagration work there would Assault and reserve units were moved those efforts by rendering German aer- Ukraine. The question then became: North European Plain, with and barrage, followed by assault units have to be surprise. Were the Germans forward only at night to avoid detection, ial reconnaissance largely ineffective. where next? After some debate then the ultimate geo-strategic breaking through the German line. to become aware an offensive was to be and were otherwise kept in assembly That was critical, because the Germans Stavka settled on Byelorussia, held by prizes. Stalin had yet other consider- Once gaps had been opened, Soviet launched against AGC, they could move areas in the rear. At the same time, had up until then relied heavily on Germany’s Army Group Center (AGC). ations: with the Anglo-American inva- tank armies and cavalry-mechanized in reserves to block it. Consequently diversionary activity was put in motion such over-flights for intelligence about There were several reasons for that sion of France in the offing, he wanted groups would drive deep, bypassing Stavka implemented an extensive in the Ukraine to make it appear the Red Army positions and movements. choice. One was that AGC’s line formed to get the Red Army as far as possible centers of resistance, encircling and deception plan (maskirovka), including Red Army was going to be launching Stavka also operationally prepared a large in the overall front, into Germany before those Western destroying fleeing enemy forces in front having units opposite AGC dig new for- its next offensive into the Balkans. its units for the coming offensive. Each

6 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 7 front (army group) and army (corps equivalent) would organize itself into assault and mobile echelons. The assault echelon was made up of rifle divisions reinforced with tank and assault gun brigades and regiments. Backing them up would be a tremen- dous concentration of artillery divi- sions. Once that echelon had broken the front, the mobile units—consisting of tank armies and cavalry-mechanized groups (corps equivalents)—would drive deep before the Germans had time to reform their line. Movement through the forests and marshes of Byelorussia, and crossing its many rivers, would require enhanced mobility. That was provided by assign- ing large numbers of American Lend Lease vehicles to the mobile echelons. Those vehicles had good cross-country capabilities, as well as being mechani- cally reliable. The Red Army also by An Infantry-Laden Soviet Tank Drives Through Minsk After the Battle then included a large engineer contin- gent that would go in with the forward units to clear minefields, while bridging The Larger Situation units would accompany breakthrough formations to facilitate river crossings. As June 1944 opened, the Third Reich still seemed to be in a good military The launch date was 22 June, the position. Germany and its Axis partners controlled virtually all of Europe from France third anniversary of the German into Byelorussia, including every belligerent continental European capital except invasion. . Yet by the end of August that entire facade had crumbled, with Allied armies sweeping to the Rhine and the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw. The German View That occurred because behind the Reich’s apparent strength was a strategic dilemma. Germany was facing a four front war: one in Russia, a second in France, a third in the The German high command Mediterranean, and a fourth in the skies over Europe against the Anglo-American strategic for their eastern front was OKH bombing campaign. All that provided the background for the destruction of AGC. (, Army High Until 1944 the Germans could use their units in France and the Low Countries as a Command), headed by Hitler himself. strategic reserve. Divisions there could be dispatched to shore up the front when gaps were As the spring of 1944 ended, OKH antic- torn in the line in the . Units that had been shot up in the fierce fighting in Russia ipated a Soviet offensive somewhere could be sent to France for refit, as well as doing double duty as garrison troops. Once the on the eastern front. The question Allies landed in , the west became a fighting front. That meant the divisions that was, where would it hit? The Germans could’ve otherwise been sent to reinforce AGC were instead engaged in combat in France. believed it would most likely come out Similarly, the Allied offensive in Italy that took Rome on 4 June turned that of the Ukraine and into the Balkans. theater into another crisis zone, though one that could mostly be managed by falling There were several reasons to back to a new defensive line farther up the peninsula. Meanwhile the Germans also believe that. One was that a Balkan had to tie down the equivalent of an army group in the Balkans to fight both Tito’s offensive would most quickly extend partisans and guard against the possibility of an Allied landing on that coast. the success of the Red Army’s previous It was, however, the fourth front that had a profound though often underappreciated offensive in the Ukraine. A drive into impact on AGC. To counter the Allied strategic bombing campaign, the Luftwaffe pulled the Balkans could take and back many of its fighters to Germany. That meant the Germans lost their earlier ability to Hungary out of the war, which would defend against the intrusions of the Soviet air force over the eastern front. When Bagration deduct those nations’ armies from began, Luftflotte Six, the formation covering AGC’s sector, had 840 aircraft, but only 40 of the overall Axis order of battle while them were fighters. The Soviets committed some 7,000 aircraft to the offensive, and they also taking the oilfields at Ploesti and reigned supreme over the Byelorussian battlefield. Meanwhile theLuftwaffe couldn’t provide Lake Balaton out of the industrial reconnaissance or close combat support to German ground units attempting counterattacks. system. Were the Red Army to seize Since airpower had been a crucial part of German mobile warfare, its loss spelled those fields, the German war economy doom for their efforts on the ground. To make things worse, the Allied campaign against the would collapse and its combat forces German petroleum industry was also starting to have effect. Growing fuel shortages meant would be largely immobilized for otherwise available aircraft were often grounded and panzers increasingly immobilized. want of fuel and lubricants. In the summer of 1944, Hitler saw defeating the D-Day landings as Germany’s top strategic priority. AGC would therefore simply have to hang on, because Germany never had the resources to fight a four front war. ★ continued on page 10 »

8 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 9 OKW & OKH Pulling back from Byelorussia would therefore only put the Red Army ’s (armed forces) was composed of the Heer (Army), irreversibly that much closer to Kriegsmarine (Navy), Luftwaffe (Air Force) and SS. The high command for the army was OKH Germany proper. Moreover, a major (Oberkommando des Heeres), headed by Hitler himself. He had taken over the job in December retrograde move would be demoral- 1941 because of his dissatisfaction with the way his generals were running the war with the izing to Germany’s already shaky allies. USSR. Technically OKH was subordinate to OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), the high AGC still held considerable parts of the command for the overall armed forces, whose chief of staff was Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. western USSR, maintaining the Reich’s The command relationship between OKH and OKW was confused, because OKH appearance as a still-vast empire. effectively became the supreme headquarters for operations on the eastern front, In any event, there seemed leaving OKW responsibility for the other parts of the war. The navy had its OKM little real danger. AGC had weathered (Oberkommando der Marine), and the air force the OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe). repeated Soviet attacks since the first Complicating matters further was the Waffen SS, the combat branch of the larger counteroffensive in front of Moscow overall SS organization. By 1944 the Waffen SS constituted a major part of the German in December 1941. There was no ground force, ranging from elite panzer divisions to low-grade formations recruited reason to believe the Soviets would to fight partisans. Administratively the Waffen SS was under its chief, Himmler, but be any more capable of gaining a operationally it was in both the OKW and OKH chains of command. All that needs major victory against the army group to be kept in mind when considering German command arrangements. ★ in 1944 than they had been earlier. At the same time, the defenses of AGC were theoretically sound. » continued from page 8 detected signs of the true Red Army The Germans had dug multiple buildup. The situation eventually lines of trenches, often fronted with Finally there was the fact Soviet became so obvious even Field Marshal minefields and barbed wire. The Captured German Troops are Marched Through Moscow maskirovka worked: it convinced Ernst Busch, commander of AGC idea was the Red Army would suf- OKH the coming offensive would be and a complete toady to Hitler, called fer heavy attrition simply getting to the forward trenches. Meanwhile tions with truck-mounted infantry and into the offensive, that the full gravity in the south. German reserves were for action. He appealed directly to through those outer defenses. the Red Army assault echelon had engineers, cavalry, motorized logistics of the situation impressed itself on him. accordingly shifted there, especially the dictator, recommending AGC Hitler had also declared several sent forward battalion-sized units and masses of tanks. They moved Added to that was the near-cessation the vital mechanized units. Among be pulled back to form a new—and towns “fortresses”—foremost among to conduct reconnaissance in force, off-road and bypassed the fortresses, of timely information coming from the other such formations, LVI Panzer shorter—defensive line. That would them , , and probing the enemy trench line for leaving their garrisons to be mopped up front. Given the chaos and the destruc- Corps was pulled out of AGC and sent allow for a concentration of reserve Bobruysk—to be held at all costs. weak points and seizing gaps. by follow-on forces or, in some cases, to tion of command centers, reports to Ukraine. Out of units within the army group itself, and Since those locales dominated the Then, as planned, tank-supported be overrun as they attempted to escape. couldn’t be gotten smoothly and swiftly some 4,800 tanks and assault guns on would also work to unhinge any Red Byelorussian road and rail network, Soviet infantry and combat engineers With Soviet spearheads racing up the chain of command or orders the front, the Germans left only 550 Army offensive insofar as it would have their possession would disrupt any attacked into the German lines, quickly forward, OKH committed several passed down. German commanders in AGC. Another critical shortage was to be reorganized and planned anew. Soviet advance, which was expected clearing them. The German defenses, divisions to AGC. At Minsk, 5th Panzer at all levels were often operating in in the air: AGC had but 40 operational Hitler, however, had become to have to run along those major while well prepared, were too thin. Division, reinforced by the 505th Heavy the dark. That rendered cohesive fighters to defend the skies above it. unwilling to abandon large chunks of lines of communication for logistical Some divisions held up to 19 miles of (Tiger) Tank Battalion, counterat- counter-action difficult to impossible. Nonetheless the Germans weren’t the captured territory still left to him. reasons. All that would give OKH front, when no more than six miles tacked. They succeeded in wrecking Throughout the campaign a totally blind to the potential threat to He believed (rightly) territory once time to assemble mobile reserves was considered best for defense. Soviet much of 3rd Guard Tank Corps and number of German army and corps AGC. Various front line commanders abandoned would never be regained. to counterattack Soviet spearheads. divisions often each attacked on front- keeping the rail line open a few days, commanders demanded permission With those spearheads destroyed or ages of under 1.25 miles. That gave the allowing for the evacuation of the to withdraw from positions that were disrupted, any offensive would be Red Army a tremendous concentration remnants of the units in that vicinity. being encircled. In some cases Hitler stopped and the front restored. of combat power at critical points. Overall, though, the counterattacks refused, in others he acceded, but often Accordingly, Hitler dismissed The successive German lines of didn’t change the larger course of it was too late to do any good. Units Busch’s concerns and sent him back to defense quickly collapsed, as there the campaign. There simply weren’t that attempted to fall back generally his headquarters. That ended debate simply weren’t enough troops to man sufficient reserves to deal with all the didn’t get far. The fast moving Red Army on the issue, at least until the offensive them properly, and there was even less breakthroughs. Even where they were mobile echelon cut them off and then exploded not long afterward. Busch available to back them up. AGC had committed, the counterattacking forces cut them to pieces. For example, on had been picked for the job because he only four divisions in reserve, and only arrived piecemeal. There never was any 24 June Hitler authorized a breakout was a Nazi stalwart and, unlike some two of them were mechanized. Any corps-level counterattack conducted from the fortress of Vitebsk. Four of the other field marshals, he wasn’t further reinforcements would have to from a position that had a chance to divisions attempted to fight their way one to dispute the Fuehrer’s wisdom. come from either pulling units off the completely destroy a major Soviet west only to be surrounded again once line, scraping together rear echelon breakthrough force. Making matters in the open: 27,000 men were lost. Execution personnel into battlegroups, or by being worse, Soviet air superiority meant The Soviet tank armies could dispatched from elsewhere on the front. the panzers were operating without move quickly and hit hard over open On 22 June the calm was shattered The intensity of the Soviet offensive Luftwaffe support. That deprived them terrain; the cavalry-mechanized groups by the roar of Red Army artillery kept most of the army group’s divisions of close combat support and aerial were just as effective in the woods beginning what turned into one of engaged, and even when units could reconnaissance, as well as exposing and swamps, and the motorized rifle the greatest barrages in history. The be pulled off the line they found them- them to attacks by Soviet aircraft. divisions could be shifted quickly in objective wasn’t simply to destroy the selves remaining under attack. Soviet Another reason for the weak support. German mobility, meanwhile, German defenses. Rather, it employed mobile units drove deep, overrunning German initial response was Hitler still was declining. A growing POL a form of deception: shortly after German units even as they tried to rede- believed the assault on AGC was only a (petroleum-oil-lubricants) shortage the first barrage lifted, a second one ploy. As for the fortresses, they quickly diversion, and the primary Soviet attack frequently paralyzed panzer operations. opened. That caught in the open many turned into liabilities. The Red Army was yet to start in the south. It wasn’t The infantry divisions, which relied German POWs are Marched East Past a Captured Tiger Tank Germans moving from their shelters was prepared for cross-country opera- until the first week of July, two weeks mainly on horse-drawn transport,

10 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 11 Red Army Deep Operations that would put the other side in an untenable be made by rifle (infantry) divisions, saving counterparts. One came from the fact Soviet manpower situation: with even the The artillery divisions could provide position, forcing the overall collapse of his the strength of the tank armies for mobile there were plenty of additional tanks and most ruthless mobilization there weren’t incredible amounts of firepower, but they By 1944 the Workers and Peasants resistance – and then destroy him outright. operations after those breakthroughs. assault guns in reserve. When an armored enough qualified men to properly fill the were less useful in mobile situations. Red Army, as the Red Army units were organized to fight Tank and mechanized corps in turn vehicle was lost in combat, or was down for ranks. Accordingly, units on critical fronts One of the major shortcomings of were then known, had come a long way that kind of campaign, with tank armies in consisted of a combination of tank, maintenance, it could be quickly replaced, were maintained at higher strengths than the overall Soviet system was the lack of since the Germans invaded. By the time the lead. A tank army was about the size mechanized and motorized rifle brigades. thereby allowing operations to continue. those defending secondary sectors or in indirect-fire artillery at the divisional level. Bagration opened, the Red Army had evolved of a Western corps, consisting of two tank They actually deployed in combat as The Red Army also made good use reserve. For Bagration, assault divisions were That was because the Red Army lacked the into a generally well-trained and well-led and one mechanized corps. The latter were combined-arms task forces. The tank of independent detachments. They were generally reinforced to about 6,000 men. trained personnel and equipment needed force, with an organization suited to the actually division-sized, but the term “corps” brigades, for example, were actually about brigade-sized formations built around a Another Red Army practice was to maintain complex fire control networks. kind of campaign it was conducting. was adopted because of the importance of the size of Western tank battalions, but with tank or assault gun regiment and reinforced to designate as “Guards” units whose As the diagrams indicate, the tank and Offensive doctrine was based on “deep those formations. Both types of corps were infantry and some heavy weapons added. The with infantry, engineers and what have performance was superior. Guards mechanized corps lacked the artillery operations.” A campaign was to begin used for mobile operations, with tank corps motorized rifle brigades had a complement you. They operated independently, units were in turn provided with better regiment found in the panzer divisions, and with multiple thrusts coming from different more likely to be found on the offensive. of light artillery and mortars for up front conducting reconnaissance, exploiting weak manpower and more equipment. even the rifle divisions’ artillery was light directions in order to disorient the other side’s Mechanized corps were there to hold firepower. The corps also had its own assault points in the enemy line and overrun- The artillery division was a unique compared to that of their counterparts in command. Mobile units were to break through captured terrain but, given their large tank gun regiments, which doubled as mobile ning enemy rear area formations. Red Army formation. They concentrated other nations’ armies. Still, their system the front and thrust into the enemy rear area. component, they often also proved useful anti-tank platforms and direct-fire artillery. Soviet rifle divisions were smaller than large numbers of guns, howitzers, heavy worked, and well enough to gain one of the The idea wasn’t simply to defeat the enemy in the attack. Soviet doctrine called for Late-war Soviet mechanized forces their Western counterparts, averaging only mortars and rocket launchers (the latter greatest victories of World War II. ★ in individual , but to grab objectives breakthroughs of the forward enemy line to had other advantages over their German 3,000 to 6,000 effectives. That reflected the termed “guards mortars” in Soviet parlance).

found themselves moving much for shredding infantry assaults, but they resistance, Bagration came to a halt— Once Bagration began, the Germans Red Army and ran up its casualties. SELECTED SOURCES having accomplished its objectives. As for the Soviets, they won because slower than their Soviet counterparts. couldn’t be everywhere at once. A flak were slow to move in the reserves and Battistelli, Pier Paolo. Panzer Divisions 1944-45. Oxford: Added to the havoc was the Soviet unit pushed forward to defend against air cover needed to do much about it. they were well prepared for the kind of Osprey, 2009. offensive they conducted. They mixed Connor, Lt. Col. William. Analysis of Deep Attack air force. German ground formations a Soviet breakthrough was not going Summary While Hitler is frequently criticized Operations: Operation Bagration, Byelorussia 22 moving during daylight hours came to be available to guard reinforcement for his stand-fast orders, they actually deception, operational planning, and June-29 . Fort Leavenworth: Combat combined ground and air attacks to Studies Institute, 1987. under attack from above and, given and supply columns from aerial attack. With the conclusion of Bagration made some sense here. The Germans Davies, W.J.K. German Army Handbook. New York: Arco, that Bagration had opened during the With AGC collapsing, Hitler relieved the Red Army had cleared the Germans lacked the logistics to conduct a war gain a victory across the entire theater. 1977. The Red Army fought in depth, while Dunn, Walter. Soviet . Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, longest days of summer, that further Busch and replaced him with Field out of the Soviet Union except for a of maneuver, especially in the face of 2000. paralyzed movement. The lack of Marshal . Known as the on the Baltic coast. In western the new Soviet mobility and airpower. the Germans could at best make a lin- Dupuy, Col. Trevor N. & Paul Martell. Great Battles on the ear defense. Even had counterattacking Eastern Front. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1982. Luftwaffe fighters meant air attack had “Fuehrer’s Fireman,” Model scraped Europe, Anglo-Allied armies were Holding fortresses therefore made as Glantz, David. Colossus Reborn. Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas to be endured, with the main German together reserves and tried to salvage racing toward the Rhine. Hitler’s dream much sense as anything else. During panzers shattered a Soviet spearhead, Press, 2005. that wouldn’t have changed the overall Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von. Lost Victories. St. Paul: response coming only from flak units. something, but by that time it was too of a greater Reich had been shattered. cross-country retreats the Germans Zenith, 2004. They were effective, but found them- late. Some 25 of AGC’s divisions had Probably the most important ended up losing large numbers of course of the fighting. OKH had no Mitcham, Samuel. The German Defeat in the East. plan for AGC other than to hang on. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2001. selves over-tasked. They were expected been destroyed; the biggest debacle decision the Germans made took place troops in futile withdrawals in which Muller, Richard. The German Air War in Russia. Baltimore: to not only fend off Soviet airplanes, since Stalingrad. Soviet spearheads prior to the start of the offensive. That only a few demoralized stragglers made Effectively, Stavka was fighting at the Nautical & Aviation, 1992. strategic and operational levels while Murray, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat. Maxwell Air Force but also to shore up the line on the reached the River and the was to downplay the possibility of any it back to friendly lines. Defending the Base: Air University Press, 1983. ground. The famous “88” flak gun was outskirts of Warsaw on 7 August. There, major Soviet action against AGC. That fortresses to the last, while eventu- OKH was trying to secure a tactical Zaloga, Steven & Leland Ness. Red Army Handbook, 1939- an incredible tank killer; and the 20mm at the end of their line of communica- meant German reserves, and OKH’s ally leading to the loss of the divisions victory. In the end the Stavka approach 45. Gloucestershire: UK, 1998. and 37mm automatic guns were useful tion and facing stiffening German attention, were focused elsewhere. holding them, at least delayed the won the day and the campaign. ✪

12 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 13 German Forces on the be assigned to the divisions, and there were commander and let him execute it using his Eastern Front, 1944 plenty of heavy tank killers, assault guns, own initiative. The idea was, since the man and armored self-propelled flak weapons. on the scene had the best intelligence about In late 1943 the German Army initiated a The problem remained, though, that there the situation, he could exploit it to maximal major reorganization of its combat divisions. was too much front to be covered and not effect. That also cut out the command delays The number of men per division was reduced, enough men or tanks to do it properly. Firepower caused by running information and orders up but the firepower of each was increased. That alone couldn’t hold a line against a determined and down the chain of command. Commanders can be seen in the organizational tables, and attacker. With only six infantry battalions formed kampfgruppen (battlegroups) from it reflected the Germans’ overall manpower instead of the former nine, a division that got subordinate units. They were combined-arms situation: there was a growing lack of personnel cut up in combat had little in the way of internal formations tailored for specific missions. qualified for combat arms. The changeover reserves. Adding to that dilemma were increas- The problem there came from the fact that also had to do with the late-war tendency of ing shortfalls in training. All that came to mean by the summer of 1944 the system was breaking Hitler to order the creation of entirely new units more and more often simply disintegrated down. The main reason for that was the loss of divisions rather than rebuilding shattered ones. when heavily attacked. During Bagration many experienced personnel who could provide effec- Standard infantry divisions therefore German infantry units panicked and ran. tive lower-echelon leadership. Another was, as came to have two infantry battalions per A similar dilemma was faced by the panzer the Germans were thrown on the defensive they regiment instead of three. At the same time, divisions. While they generally maintained also lost the initiative. In the confused fighting those units’ firepower was vastly increased a higher standard of training, they had six that took place during Bagration, commanders with larger caliber weapons: 75mm anti-tank maneuver battalions (eight if the reconnaissance had to respond to Red Army attacks without guns replaced 50mm; 120mm mortars were and engineer battalions are included). While the sufficient information. Coordination fell apart assigned to battalions, and large numbers new tanks and assault guns were often superior as communications were disrupted and of man-portable anti-tank rocket launchers, to their Red army counterparts, once lost in headquarters overrun. The loss of air superiority Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck, were issued. combat or by breakdown they couldn’t be quickly meant aerial reconnaissance couldn’t provide Also, the divisional reconnaissance (fusilier) replaced. Germany didn’t have the capacity the missing picture of the local situation. and engineer battalions were henceforth to produce large numbers of reserve vehicles, The Germans responded by increasingly cen- fully trained and equipped as combat troops, unlike the Soviet Union (which also had growing tralizing their command-control. Since local com- and therefore became useful as assault and numbers of US and British Lend Lease vehicles). manders no longer had sufficient information to reserve units. The divisions each received a Nonetheless, the Germans could usually deal with their situations, higher echelons had company of assault guns to further increase maintain an edge in tactical situations. Their to step in and issue orders. Hitler is sometimes their punch and to act as mobile tank killers. units still had highly trained staffs and more stereotyped for placing individual divisions, The panzer (armored) and panzer grenadier radios. That allowed for better command-control regiments and battalions on his strategic (armored infantry) divisions also saw increases than in the Red Army. German fire control situation maps, but often the picture seen from in firepower. The standard tanks shifted to procedures were also more efficient, allowing OKH was more accurate than the one available up-gunned Panzer IVs and the Panzer V Panther. units to call in large amounts of artillery, thereby to those units’ commanders. In any event, what There was a larger assignment of assault guns, often salvaging otherwise hopeless situations. all that indicates is, by the time of Bagration, self-propelled artillery, mobile flak weapons German organization was also flexible. the system that had given the Wehrmacht its and halftracks. Corps and army-level heavy The practice was for higher headquarters previous victories was no longer working. ★ tank (Panzer VI Tiger) battalions could also to assign a mission to a lower-echelon

14 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 15 German Weapons & Equipment

The information in the charts is drawn from the official tables of organization and equipment; units in the field would have varying amounts due to any number of factors. The Germans also differently equipped the divisions in their various mobilization waves. The 1939 infantry division was the official organization at the start of the war. It remained in effect until late 1943, when the 1944 reorganization took over. The tanks of the 1941 panzer division were mainly Panzer IIIs, with some Panzer IIs and IVs. By 1944 they were divided between Panzer IVs and Vs. Another thing to consider is that divisions would have additional units attached to them depending on their tactical mission; they could include assault gun, flak and heavy panzer battalions. The “other AFV” category doesn’t include halftracks, which were frequently used as infantry fighting vehicles, mobile command posts, combat engineer transport and towed heavy weapons and flak guns. The 1944 panzer division had 264 halftracks of various types. ★

German Weapons & Equipment

Unit 1939 Infantry 1944 Infantry 1941 Panzer 1944 Panzer 1944 Panzer Tiger Tank Division Division Division Division grenadier Battalion Division Soviet Force in US Lendlease Equipment outside Minsk Men 17,200 12,300 15,600 13,700 13,800 649 Tanks - - 191 168 - 45 Soviet Weapons & Equipment, 1944 Assault guns - 14 6 43 79 - Other AFV 3 12 (*) 48 + 10 (*) 62 + 30 (*) 42 + 12 (*) 3 (*) Unit Rifle Division Tank Mechanized Corps Cavalry Tank Artillery Infantry 8,000 5,500 5,500 4,200 7,000 - Corps Corps Brigade Division Machineguns 643 1,503 1,067 1,231 1,101 108 Men 9,380 12,010 17,400 18,700 1,306 10,869 AT Rifles 90 - 45 - - - Tanks - 209 197 103 (**) 65 - AT RL - 108 - ? 45 - Assault guns - 49 49 - - - 50 mm mortars 84 - - - - - Other AFV 20 20 - - 3 - 81mm Mortar 58 48 30 46 52 - Infantry 6,300 3,800 7,100 6,700 (***) 480 - 120mm mortars - 28 - 16 24 - Machineguns 605 517 895 804 410 ? 20mm + 37mm AA 12 12 19 68 36 3 AT Rifles 212 207 375 400 24 ? 37mm + 50mm AT 38 - 45 - - - AT RL ------75 mm AT + guns 20 39 12 34 41 - 50mm mortars 56 - - - - - 88 mm AA/AT - - - 12 12 - 82mm Mortar 83 52 100 108 6 - 105mm guns + 36 33 24 24 24 - 120mm mortars 21 42 54 56 - 108 howitzers 37mm AA 12 15 18 34 - - 150mm guns + 18 15 24 30 30 - 45mm + 57mm AT 48 28 44 48 4 - howitzers 76 mm guns 32 12-48 36-64 96 4 72 Motor transport 942 615 2,900 2,685 2,637 145 122mm guns/howitzers 12 - - - - 84 Horse drawn 1,133 1,466 - - - - wagons 152mm guns/howitzers - - - - - 68 203mm howitzers - - - - - 24 Multiple rocket -8 8 8 - - Notes launchers Men: total manpower of the unit. Motor transport 182 (*) 1,610 2,120 892 156 1,276 Tanks: total number of tanks; in some cases, this includes command and observation vehicles. Assault Guns: all self-propelled direct fire antitank and infantry support guns. Horse drawn wagons 642 - - 1,316 - - Other AFV (armored fighting vehicles): total of armored cars and self-propelled artillery. (*) self-propelled flak guns, also counted under the 20/37/88mm lines. Infantry: manpower in the unit’s infantry formations; may include recon personnel. Notes Machineguns: this may in some cases include weapons mounted on AFV. As with the Germans, actual Soviet equipment issuance varied. Many of the tank and mechanized AA: antiaircraft (flak) guns. corps didn’t receive their assigned anti-tank regiments until late in the war, hence the varying number AA/AT: dual purpose antiaircraft/antitank guns. of 76mm guns. Rifle divisions had different authorized strengths depending on the sector of the front to AT: antitank guns. which they were assigned. The artillery division numbers are for typical “breakthrough” units. AT RL: Panzerschreck antitank rocket launchers; Panzerfausts not counted. (*) Rifle divisions assigned to breakthrough formations would have had a higher number of motor vehicles. AT + guns: total of antitank and infantry support guns. (**) Total of tanks plus AFV. Guns + howitzers: total of howitzers and infantry support guns. (***) Mounted troops. “mm”: caliber of weapons.

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The Battle of Minsk attack and communications broke down. The road system couldn’t support the mass of The run-up to the Battle of Minsk began on vehicles and men desperately trying to make 24 June. On that date Gen. Kurt von Tippelskirch, their way west. The situation became so bad commander of AGC’s Fourth Army, ordered that German artillerymen, after firing off the ambushing Soviet detachments, but the situa- his divisions to fall back from the front line as last of their ammunition, spiked their guns and tion was obviously growing only more desperate their positions there had become untenable in mounted their horses to escape as cavalry. for the Germans. At the River, von the face of the Soviet offensive. Tippelskirch On 26 June, Fourth Army received a Saucken established a bridgehead to cover the VON SAUCKEN wanted to make a stand in front of Minsk in reprieve when 5th Panzer Division, from Army withdrawal of whatever units could escape. order to cover the retreat of the remnants of Group North Ukraine, was committed to the On 29 June, leading elements of 3rd his XXXIX Panzer Corps and XXVII Army Corps, Minsk sector. It was – relative to actual 1944 Guards Mechanized and 29th Tank Corps and then move his command back behind the German battlefield standards – a full strength crossed the Berezina. Soviet engineers Berezina River in good order. The dilemma unit with 75 Panthers and 55 Mark IVs. The quickly threw up bridges for follow-on units was in finding units able to conduct such a division was also accompanied by the 505th and truck convoys. With the Red Army stand. The XXXIX Panzer was an armored unit Heavy Tank battalion with 29 Tigers. Tippelskirch thereby operating to the west of Minsk, the in name only: all its divisions were actually formed the 5th and 505th into another KG, German position in and around the city was infantry. Fourth Army’s two panzer grenadier Group von Saucken, likewise named after its untenable. Even Hitler saw that, and on 2 divisions were fully engaged on the front line, commander, Gen. . July he authorized Minsk’s evacuation. and the one other mobile unit in the area, the On the 27th von Saucken reached Minsk. There were rearguard actions on the night Feldhernhalle Panzer Grenadier Division of Hitler had declared the city a “fortress,” but of 2/3 July, as 2nd Guards Tank Corps fought its AGC’s reserve, had already been mauled as there were scarcely 2,000 armed and organized way into Minsk. As the sun rose on the morning it fought to try to stop the Soviet offensive. troops there for the defense. Other than that, of the 3rd, the Red Army was effectively in Tippelskirch therefore threw together there were additional uncounted thousands control of Minsk. During that night Group von the remnants of some divisions, combining of disorganized stragglers and panicky Saucken blew up the last of the German-held them with some rear-area security units, rear-echelon personnel milling about. Their bridges over the Berezina and joined the general into a new kampfgruppe dubbed Group contribution was only to create further chaos. retreat west. The Wehrmacht was thus cleared von Gottberg after its commanding officer. The Red Army’s 3rd Guards Tank Corps of from the territory of the prewar Soviet Union. That KG was to conduct a delaying action Fifth Tank Army was racing toward Minsk, and Even so, the Battle of Minsk did show some until further reinforcements arrived. it ran into KG von Saucken while it was still possibilities for the Germans. A full-strength The KG couldn’t hold, though, as the Soviets at the railroad station. The KG got the better panzer division had proved able to stymie had already penetrated the front deeply at too of that engagement, quickly destroying almost an offensive being conducted by an entire many places; and Red Army mobile groups 300 Soviet tanks; however, Fifth Tank Army kept Soviet tank army and then go on to conduct were ranging deep into the rear area. Local attacking, taking the station on the following an effective delaying action. The dilemma for German withdrawals were turning into routs day. Von Saucken fell back to the west. Several the Germans, of course, was they no longer as columns were hammered by Soviet air running fights ensued, with elements of the KG had enough such units on the front. ★

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