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PDF Download the Korsun Pocket: the Encirclement and Breakout Of THE KORSUN POCKET: THE ENCIRCLEMENT AND BREAKOUT OF A GERMAN ARMY IN THE EAST, 1944 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Niklas Zetterling,Anders Frankson | 320 pages | 08 Sep 2008 | Casemate Books | 9781932033885 | English | Havertown, United States Battle of Korsun-Cherkassy Under Erich von Manstein, however, the Germans were able to avoid serious defeats, while at the same time fending off Hitler's insane orders to hold on to useless territory. Then, in January , a disaster happened. Six divisions of Army Group South became surrounded after sudden attacks by the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts under command of generals Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev around the village of Korsun near the larger town of Cherkassy on the Dnieper. The Germans' greatest fear was the prospect of another Stalingrad, the catastrophe that had occurred precisely one year before. This time, though, Manstein was in control from the start, and he immediately rearranged his Army Group to rescue his trapped divisions. A major panzer drive got underway, led by General der Panzertruppen Hans Hube, a survivor from Stalingrad pocket, which promptly ran up against several soviet tank armies. Leading the break-in was Franz Baeke with his Tiger and Panther-tanks. Led by the strongest formation within the pocket, SS Wiking, the trapped forces surged out and soon rejoined the surrounding panzer divisions who had been fully engaged in weakening the ring. When dawn broke, the Soviets realized their prey was escaping. Although the Germans within the pocket lost nearly all of their heavy weapons and left many wounded behind, their escape was effected. Stalin, having anticipated another Stalingrad, was left with little but an empty bag, as Army Group South—this time—had pulled off a rescue. The battles fought in and around Korsun rank as among the most interesting of the Second World War, an opinion only made stronger after reading Zetterling and Frankson's thoroughly researched and well written account. The quality of research undertaken is very impressive… very readable and fascinating. Indeed, we could have described the German activities in much more detail, but we had to prioritise the material in order to produce a reasonably balanced book. For the Soviet side, on the other hand, we have included as much as possible of what we found relevant and reasonably reliable. Despite these limitations it has been our intention to present as much new information as possible, with references to enable the deeply interested reader to look for further information about the battle. The maps deserve some comments. We have used a variety of sources to produce them and the level of detail available in the sources differed considerably. Thus the information found in the maps is varied. In some cases we have opted to include information on the location of specific units, even though we do not have information on the location of all units involved. Finally it must be said that the frontlines were not always as clearly defined as they appear on the maps. In many situations the units were stretched over wide areas, with very little infantry to maintain a coherent defensive front. In such situations both sides often resorted to maintaining control over the villages and keeping an eye on the terrain in between. In such situations the frontlines indicated on the maps can at best be regarded as approximate. We hope to have written a book that can be read by those who wish to discover something they have not read about before, as well as by those who have a deep interest in World War II and already possess an extensive knowledge about the conflict. Whether we have succeeded or not is up to the readers to judge. Our judgment is that the book has benefited considerably by the assistance of various other people: Karl-Heinz Frieser, Kamen Nevenkin, Mirko Bayerl, and especially Egor Sjtjekotichin, who helped us with Soviet archival documents. In the afternoon on 8 February , Colonel Hans Viebig, commander of the German th Infantry Regiment, picked up the phone and tried to contact some of his superior commanders. He had just received important information and it was necessary to immediately convey it. Sapauschke was told that a Soviet jeep, carrying a large white flag and accompanied by trumpet blasts, had approached the defense lines of the th Infantry. Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket - Wikipedia At the July Battle of Kursk, however, Red Army troops beat their enemy in a battle fought on German terms, first stopping the surging panzer attacks and then launching a powerful Soviet counteroffensive that pushed the Germans back along a broad front. The Red Army has seized the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. Now, in a new Red Army offensive that began two days ago, your tank army has the opportunity to deal another stunning blow to German forces. Although the German army has lost the strategic initiative, it remains a skilled and dangerous foe. The Germans are particularly adept at conducting defensive operations, and as the second day of the offensive ends, they have again hammered home this fact. To successfully trap the enemy forces in the salient, you must call upon all your skill and combat experience. When the Red Army crossed the Dnepr River in force in December , large elements of German 8th Army and 1st Panzer Army over 80, troops remained in a northward- thrusting salient in the front line centered on the town of Korsun-Shevchenkovskii. Although German generals advised Hitler to withdraw the dangerously exposed units, he refused. He is adamant that the salient must be held as a springboard for future operations to re-establish the front line along the western bank of the Dnepr. Stavka, the Soviet high command, has directed a pincer maneuver by 1st Ukrainian Front and 2d Ukrainian Front. Forces from each front will attack from their respective sides of the salient and link up at Zvenigorod. However, your army is greatly understrength from previous fighting. Instead of its authorized tanks and self-propelled assault guns, it fields only tanks and 18 self-propelled assault guns. The 20th and 29th tank corps are in the first echelon leading the attack, while 18th Tank Corps stands by as your second echelon. Other enemy units in the region, however, are within striking distance and could counterattack the flanks of your advance. German defenses in your sector consist of strongly entrenched positions with mines, barbed wire and other anti-tank obstacles. Yet experience has shown that exceptionally strong defensive positions typically represent an economy of force tactic meant to compensate for smaller troop strength. Thus you assume the Germans will have fewer troops facing your attackers in those positions. Despite the risk of heavy tank losses during an attempt to complete the breakthrough, you requested permission from Konev to commit your two first echelon tank corps. He concurred, and your lead corps advanced 18 kilometers through the German first line of defense. Last night, during the evening briefing at your command post, the intelligence officer reported a German second line of defense held by two seriously depleted infantry divisions near the villages of Kapitanovka and Tishkovka. However, he also reported German 3d and 14th panzer divisions rapidly approaching from the south. Conferring with your chief of staff, Colonel Vladimir Baskakov, you decided not to wait for the rifle divisions to catch up and you continued your attack. By noon, forward brigades had pushed German defenders from Kapitanovka and reached Tishkovka. Pleased with the progress, you encouraged the corps commander to reach Lebedin by nightfall. By 11 p. Meanwhile, 29th Tank Corps reported that its advance had slowed. You traveled to its command post to review the situation. While the corps had captured Turiya, extremely heavy German resistance made further advance costly and difficult. Advancing your army beyond the support of the infantry rifle divisions invites a German counterattack that could cut off your breakthrough attack. Therefore, under this plan your lead corps will halt and temporarily turn to the defense until the slower-moving infantry divisions catch up, before resuming the attack later. These two units will press on to link up with 1st Ukrainian Front at Zvenigorod to close the encirclement of German forces in the salient. Concerned that reduced combat strength and exposed lines of communications make your tank army extremely vulnerable to German panzer counterattacks, you decide to turn temporarily to the defense. You order 29th Tank Corps to halt its westward advance and face south to form an outer defensive ring, and then you direct 20th Tank Corps to face west and north to defend against enemy units in the salient to the north. At a. January 27, German counterattacks begin in the south with tanks from 3d, 11th and 14th panzer divisions. Meanwhile, 3d Panzer Division continues to delay the advance of Soviet 53d Army rifle units, preventing them from protecting the shoulder of your breakthrough attack. To the north, German th Infantry Division facing 4th Guards Army is reinforced by additional infantry units and an SS Viking Division armored element, and then it counterattacks south toward Kapitanovka. The situation is potentially disastrous. Konev visits and tells you he is sending anti-tank, artillery and infantry reinforcements to contain and destroy the enemy counterattacks. You order a tank brigade from each forward corps to reopen the lines of communications. Konev also indicates 4th Guards Army is attacking toward Pastorskoye, while 53d Army maintains pressure on 3d Panzer Division. Your forces cannot dislodge German 11th Panzer Division, which now holds the southern half of Kapitanovka and the high ground to the east. The 11th Panzer supports 14th Panzer Division at Tishkovka, dominating your lines of communications and cutting off your headquarters from the lead tank corps.
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