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MILITARY REVIEW VOLUME XXXVI JANUARY 1957 NUMBER 10 CONTENTS The Great Illusions of 1939...... _...... _ .... _...... _ 3 Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, British Army, Retired Noah Phelps, Father of G2 ...... _...... 12 Colonel Benedict M_ Holden, Jr., United States Army, Retired Military Necessity, Humanity, and Military Government ...... _ 15 Major Ned A. Holsten, Military Police Corps The Most Potent Force...... ' ...... _.... __ ... _ 22 Brigadier General Charles E. Hoy, United States Army . Gl-Your Personal Staff Officer...... _...... ,. 26 Colonel John A. Gavin, Infantry 50,000 Neutral Soldiers-Austria's Rearmament Problem ...... _ 29 Doctor Milton Colvin The Contact Layer...... 36 Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Jones, Artillery Why Civil Works in the Corps of Engineers? ...... _ 40 Lieutenant Colonel Harold J. St. Clair, Corps of Engineers How,Much Constitutes a Trend? ...... _...... 47 Lieutenant Colonel Anthony L. Wermuth, Infantry A New Look for the· Soviet Ground Forces ...... 54 Lieutenant Colonel Irving Heymont, Infantry MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD...... 63 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ...... __ 73 The Organization of Future Armies...... _ 73 Swiss National Defense in the Atomic Age...... 85 The Soviet Union and Afghanistan ...... ,...... _... _... _ 88 The Armored Arm in the !ltomic Age ...... _... _ ...... _.... _... __ 90 The Importance of Patrols in Nuclear Warfare ...... '_' 95 The Base for Airborne Penetration ...... _..... _...... 97 Nuclear Arms and the Serviceman._...... 99 War and the Art of War.. ..._...... 102 A~r OP in Atomic Warfare ...... _...... _...... _ ...... 108 BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER_._.._...... '_"" 111 This copy is not for sale. It is intended for more than one reader. PLEASE READ IT AND PASS IT ALONG Military Review MISSION. The MILITARY REVIEW dissemi­ , nates modern military thought and EDITOR IN CHIEF current Army doctrine concerning LT COL WILLIAM D. McDOWELL, INF command and staff procedures of MANAGING EDITOR the division and higher echelons LT COL RODGER R. BANKSON, INF and provides a forum for articles which stimulate military thinking.' SPECIAL SECTIONS EDITOR Authors, civilian and military alike, LT COL ROBERT M. WALKER, ARTY are encouraged to submit articles SPANISH-AMERICAN EDITION which will assist in the fulfillment Editor of this mission. MAJ GILBERTO GONzALEz-JULIA, INF Assistant Editors MAJ TOMAS H. GUFFAIN, INF CAPT ORLANDO ORTIZ MORENO, INF POLICY. BRAZILIAN EDITION Editor Unless otherwise indicated, the LT COL HERMANN BERGQVIST, ARTY views expressed in the original arti­ Assistant Editor cles in this magazine are those of the LT COL T ACITO T. G. DE OLIVEIRA, INF individual authors and not neces­ sarily precisely those of the Depart­ Administrative Officer MAJ LINO BONUCCI, QMC ment of the Army or the Command and General Staff College. Production Officer Editor. MAJ JAMES A. TRENT, INF

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau, of the Budget 19 June 1956.

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the Command and General Stal! College at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. In the Englillh. Spanish. and PortuJrU""e lanJrUBlIes. Entered as lecond-claB8 matter AUJrUat 31. 1984• • t the Post Oftlce at Fort Leavenworth, KansaB, under the Act of March S, 1879. Subocrlptlon rates: $3.50 (US currency) • year In the United States, United State. military post oftlceo, and those countri"" which are membero of the Pan-American Postal Union (Including Spain): $'.50 a year In all other countrleo. The Great Illusions of 1939 Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, British Army, Retired

ON Friday, 1 September 1939, the Ger­ illusion which prevailed, among many peo­ man armies invaded Poland. On Sunday, ple, when the plunge was taken. For no 3 September, the British Government de­ reasonable calculation of the re$pective clared war on Germany, in fulfillment of forces and resources provided any ground the guarantee it had earlier given to Po­ for believing that the war could be "swift land. Six hours later the French Govern­ and short," or even for hoping that ment, more reluctantly, followed the France and Great Britain alone would be British lead. able to overcome Germany-however long In making his fateful announcement the the war continued. Even mOI;e green was 70-year old Prime Minister, Mr. Cham­ the assumption that "we now know the berlain, finished by saying: "I trust I may worst." live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and ~ a liberated Europh Too Much Misplaced Faith has been reestablished." Within less than There were illusions about the strength a month Poland had been overrun. Within of Poland. Lord Halifax-who as Foreign nine months most of Western Europe had Minister ought to have been well in­ been submerged by the spreading flood of formed-believed that Poland was of more war. And although Hitler was ultimately military value than Russia. and preferred overthrown, a liberated Europe has not to secure her as an ally. That was what been reestablished. Ten years later half he conveyed to the American Ambassador of Europe is enclosed within the "Iron on 24 March, a few days before the sud­ Curiain." den decision to offer our guarantee to Po­ land. In July the Inspector General of the" "We Now Know the Worst" Forces, General Ironside, visited the In welcoming the declaration of war, Polish Army and on his return gave what Mr. Greenwood, speaking for the Opposi­ Mr. Churchill calls a "mo~t favorable" re­ tion, expressed his relief that "the intol­ port on it. erable agony of suspense from which all There were still greater illusions about of us have suffered is over. We now know the French Army. Mr. Churchill himself the worst." From the volume of cheers it described it as "the most perfectly trained was clear that he was expressing the gen­ and faithful mobile force in Europe." eral feeling of the House. He ended: Each of those descriptive terms was far "May the war be swift and short, and from the truth, especially the last. In his may the peace which follows stand proudly memoirs he admits that when he saw the forever on the shattered ruin of an evil Commander in Chief of the French field name." armies a few days before the war, and, Such a conclusion revealed the state of saw the comparative figures of French'

The 1939 downfall of both France and Poland was not the result 01 a power imbalance, but can be directly attributed to reliance on out· . moded concepts in the face of Germany's effective armor employment 4 MILITAlty ltEVIE:W JkNUARY 1957 and German strength, be was so favorably accept Hitler's demands, it is clear ••• impressed as to say: "But you are the that they will in all probability be forced masters." to yield far more territory than he is de­ manding. It is also clear that France and Lloyd George Dissented Britain can do nothing effective to prevent This may help to explain the eagerness this los8 of territory, while very doubtful with which he joined in pressing the whether even the utmost military efforts French to hasten to declare war in sup­ on their part would avail to regain it• ••• port of Poland-the French Ambassador's The most probable result of prolonged ef­ dispatch said: "One of the most excited forts to restore Poland's territory would was Mr. Winston Churchill; bursts of his be the mutual exhaustion of all the war­ voice made the telephone vibrate." In ring countries, with the consequent estab­ March, too, Mr. Churchill had declared lishment of Russia's supremacy in Europe. himself "in the most complete agreement A more immediate danger to France with the Prime Minister" over the offer to and Britain is that the demonstration of guarantee Poland. Along with almost all their incapacity to preserve Poland will Great Britain's political leaders he had cause them such a loss of prestige in the dwelt on its value as a means of preserv­ eyes of the world that other aggressive­ ing peace. Mr. Lloyd George had been minded countries, now sitting on the fence, alone in pointing out its impracticability may be encouraged to join Germany in and danger-upon which The Times the combined effort to conquer and divide scoffed at his speech as "an outburst of up the British and French Empires. unconsolable pessimism from Mr. Lloyd George who now seems to inhabit an odd Strategically Unsound and remote world of his own." A further note emphasized the possibil: These illusions about the prospect were ity that before long the French would lose not shared, however, by a number of the heart and drop out of the war, and that more sober soldiers and modern-minded Great Britain would thus be left to con­ students of war, particularly the small tinue the war alone. "In sum, by making band here who had for long been expound­ our stand on ground that was strategically ing the new theory of mechanized warfare. unsound we have got into a very bad hole­ In the last week of August I had written perhaps the worst in our history:" an "appreciation" of the prospect and But this warning forecast was regarded sent it to various political leaders of the in most quarters as misplaced pessimism. different parties who had frequently con­ The prevailing mood of the moment was sulted me on strategic questions. Its supercharged with emotions that drowned somber summing-up was: the sense of immediate realities, and also obscured the long view. If the Poles decide to fight rather than Thus the train of European civilization Captain B. H. Liddell Hart is a British rushed into the long, dark tunnel from military authoritll and writer. He served which it only emerged after six exhausting through World War 1 and retired in 1927. years had passed. Even then the bright He was military correspondent of the Lon­ don Daily Telegraph, London Times. and sunlight of victory proved illusory. For military editor of the Encyclopedia Britan­ almost immediately the shadows deepened nica. He has written numerous books on and the train plunged into a further tun­ military 8ubjects and is the author of "Can nel-in which we are still traveling and We Defend the Middle East?" and "West­ anxiously wondering whether the "cold ern Defense Planning," which appeared in the December 1951 and June 1956 issues war" with Russia will turn into a hotter on the MILITAlty REVIEW. war than the last. . THE GREAT ILLUSIONS OF 1939 I)

Numbers Are Misleading larger than the total figure of divisions Could Poland have held out longer? conveys, for she had nearly 2,500,000 Could France and Great Britain have done "trained men" available to mobilize. more than they did to take the German pressure off Poland? On the face of the 110 Divisions for France figures of armed strength, as now known. France mobilized the equivalent of 110 the answer to both questions would, at first divisions, of which no less than 65 were sight, seem to be "yes." In numbers of active divisions. They included' five cav­ men Poland had sufficient to check the alry divisions, two mechanized divisions,

THE CAMPAIGN IN POLANO.1939 DiSpositions of OPPOsing Forces 31 August 1939 and German Pion From The Campaign in Poland, 1m Dep.l1ment 01 Mdit.ry Art end Engineering, United State. Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1945. '·~~~,~Z~,,~,~!~,~.~,:~~==~,o..-w!f

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German forces on her front. and at tbe and one armored division that was in least impose a long delay on their advance. process of being formed-the rest being It is equally apparent, on the figures, that infantry. Of the grand total, even after the French should have been able to defeat providing for the defense of Southern the German forces left to oppose them. France and North Africa against a possi­ The Polish Army consisted of 30 active ble threat from Italy, the French Com­ divisions and 10 reserve divisions. It had mand was able to concentrate 85 divisions also no less than 12 large cavalry brigades, on its northern front facing Germany. although only one of them was motorized. Moreover, France could mobilize 5,000,000 Its potential s,trength in numbers was even trained men. MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957

Great Britain had promised to send the German Command which was much four regular divisions to France at the alarmed at the slowness of the process. outset of war-besides providing for the The plain fact is that the German Army defense of the Middle East and the Far was not ready for war in 1939-a war East-and actually sent the equivalent of which they did not expect, relying on Hit­ five divisions. Because of the problem of ler's assurance. They had consented un­ sea transport, however, and the circuitous willingly to Hitler's desire to expand the route considered necessary to avoid alr army quickly, as they preferred a gradual attack, this initial contingent eould not process of building up thoroughly trained arrive until late in September. cadres, but Hitler had repeatedly told Besides her small but high quality Reg­ t'hem that there would be plenty of time ular Army, Great Britain was just in the for such training, as he had no intention of process of forming and equipping a Terri­ risking a major war before 1944 at the torial field army of 26 divisions, and on the earliest. Equipment, too, was still very outbreak of war the government had made short compared with the scale of the army. plans for expanding the total to 55 divi­ It i8 one of the great illUliiOnB of the sions. But it was known that the first con­ war that Germany's sweeping victories In tingent of this new force would not be the early stages were due to an over­ ready to enter the field until 1940. Mean­ whelming superiority of weapons as well time, Great Britain's main contribution as of numbers. It arose as a consequence could only be in the traditional form of of those victories but is as misleading as naval power exercising a sea blockade, a the earlier illusion here about the power form of pressure that was inherently slow and efficiency of the French and Polish to take effect. Armies-although not so dangerously mis­ leading as that proved to be. Great Britain had a bomber force of The second illusion is slow to fade. Even just over 600-double that' of France, in the latest volume of his war memoirs, although considerably less than half that Mr. Churchill speaks of the Germans hav­ of Germany-but in view of the limited ing at least a thousand "heavy tanks" in size and range of the machines then in 1940. The fact is that they had then no service, it could exert no serious effect by heavy tanks at all. At the start of the direct attack on Germany. war they had only a handful of medium tanks weighing barely 20 tons. Most of German Army Not Ready the tanks they used in Poland were of very Germany mobilized 98 divisions, of lightweight and thin armor. which 52 were active divisions (including six of Austria's). Of the remaining 46 Mass Made the Difference divisions, however, only 10 were fit for When we cast up the balance sheet it action on mobilization and even in these can be seen that the Poles and French to­ most of the men were recruits who had gether had the equivalent of 130 divisions only been serving about a month. The against a German total of 98 divisions, of other 36 divisions consisted mainly of which 36 were virtually untrained and veterans of World War I. 40-year olds unorganized. In numbers of "trained sol­ who 'had little acquaintance with modern diers" the balance against the Germans weapons and tactics. They were very short was much larger still. of artillery and other weapons. It took a What could be weighed against this ad­ long time to get these divisions organized verse numerical balance was that the and trained collectively to operate as such weightier combination was widely sep­ -longer even than had been reckoned by arated-divided into two parts by Ger­ THE GREAT ILLUSIONS OF 1939 '1 many's central position. The Germans they did not do so, for most of them still were able to attack the weaker of the two tended to think in old terms, while over. partners, while the French had to attack rating the French Army as much as Mr. the Germans' prepared defense if they Churchill did. were to bring re"iief to their ally. But the problem whether Poland could Even so, on a quantitative reckoning, . have held out, and France been more ef­ the Poles had large enough forces to hold fective in helping her, looks very different up the Germans' striking force that was when examined more closely-with the launched against them-which consisted clearer understanding of the inherent han-

THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND,1939 Situation at Dark, 20 September 1939 J! From The Campaign In Poland, Am Department of Military Art sod Engineering, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1945. 10 40 , 10 tOO SCAU ,. Willi

of 48 active' divisions. These were fol­ dicaps and of the new technique of war­ lowed up by some half dozen of the re­ fare that was first put into practice in serve divisions that were mobilized, but the 1939. From this modern viewpoint it campaign ended before they came into seemed impossible, even before the event, action. that the Poles could hold out or the French On the surface it would also appear that break through to their relief. That was the French had ample superiority to why I was led to make the prewar forecast crush the German forces in the west and quoted earlier which appeared to the break through to the Rhine. The German "statesmen" so unduly pessimistic, and so generals were astonished and relieved that contrary to the strength figures. 8 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1951'

I had been expounding this new tech­ , uer up to 1929, while our Experimental nique during the past 20 years, and trying Armored Force, the first in the world, had to shake people out of the old way of been formed in 1927 to tryout the new thought, especially the habit of reckoning theories which the exponents of high-speed military strength in terms of "rifles and tank warfare had been preaching for sev­ sabers." During the last few years I had eral years before that. He was fully ac­ been thinking out the counter to the new quainted with their ideas, and had visited method-as that was clearly the prime the Experimental Force at work. need of countries that would have to meet Even after leaving the government he attack-but it had proved as difficult to get always seemed to have a remarkable de­ the antidote developed as to get the power gree of "access to official information." In of the new "offensive injection" recognized. any Case this was not of great importance, since backward ideas prevailed in the Armor Tipped the Scales higher official circles in the War Office. Describing the collapse of Poland in his But during these later years Mr. Churchill memoirs, Mr. Churchill says: frequently had talks with the exponents of the fast-tank idea-at any rate with Gen­ Neither in France nor in Britain had eral FullE\r and myself, besides having there been any effective comprehension of read what we had written on the subject. the consequences of the new fact that ar­ The incomprehension of the new idea of mored vehicles could be made Capable of warfare, and official resistance to it, was withstanding artillery fire, and could ad­ even greater in France than in England; vance a hundred miles a day. and greater in Poland than in France. That statement is only too true, insofar That incomprehensi()n was the root of the as it applies to the bulk of the senior sol­ failure of both armies in 1939, and of the diers and statesmen of both countries. But French again, more disastrously, in 1940. he fails to mention that it was in Great Hopes Pinned on Cavalry Britain', first of all, that these new poten­ The Poles were antiquated in their rul­ tialities had been visualized and explained, ing military ideas and also, to a large ex­ publicly and unceasingly, by a small band tent, in the pattern of their forces. They of progressive military thinkers. still pinned their trust to the value of a In his latest volume, dealing with the large mass of horsed cavalry, and cher~ collapse of France in 1940, Mr. Churchill ished a pathetic belief in the possibility of makes the notable, if qualified, admission: carrying out cavalry charges. In that re­ Not having had access to official infor­ spect it might truly be said that their mation for so many years, I did not com­ ideas were 80 years out of date, since the prehend the violence of the revolution futility of cavalry charges had been shown effected since the last war by the incuI'sion as far back as the American Civil War, of a mass of fast-moving heavy armor. I although horse-minded soldiers continued knew about it, but it had not, altered my to shut their eyes to the lesson. The main­ inward convictions as it should have done. tenance of great masses of horsed cavalry by all armies during World War I, in the lt is an extraordinary confession, com­ hope of the opening that never came, had ing from the man who had played so great been the supreme farce of that static war. a part in sponsoring the tank in World The French, on the other hand, had War I. The admission is honorable in its many of the ingredients of an up-to-date frankness, but the initial excuse is weak, army, but they had not organized them into for he had been Chancellor of the Excheq­ such because their military ideas at the TIlE GREAT ILLUSIONS OF 1939 top were 20 years out of date. Contrary technique. It is only fair to say that some to the legends that arl>se after their de­ of the younger French soldiers, such as feat, they had more tanks than the Ger­ Colonel de Gaulle, showed a keen interest mans had built by the time the war came, . in the new ideas of tank warfare that were while a large proportion of their tanks being preached in England. But the higher were bigger and more thickly armored French generals paid little attention to than any of the German tanks, although these British-boT\1 "theories"-in marked not quite so fast. contrast to the way the new school of Ger­ But the French High Command still re­ man generals st~died them. As for the garded tanks through 1918 eyes, as serv­ Polish military chiefs, it is grimly amus­ ants of the infantry, or else as reconnais­ ing to recall tha~ when, in a book pub­ sance troops to supplement cavalry. Under lished two months before the war, I gently the spell of this old-fashioned way of expressed doubt whether they were wise; thought they had delayed organizing their to put faith in cavalry charges against: tanks in armored divisions, as the Germans modern arms, the Polish Foreign Office had done, and were still.inclined to employ was spurred to make an official protest to them in petty packets. ours against such a reflection on their Lacked Needed Air Cover realism! The weakness of the French, and still It is a mistake, however, to imagine more the Poles, in new-style ground forces that even the German Army was a really was made all the worse by their lack of efficient and modernly designed force. Not airpower to cover and support their ar· only was it unready for war as a whole, as mies. With the Poles that was due partly already shown, but the bulk of the active to lack of manufacturing resources, but divisions were out of date in pattern, while the French had no such excuse. In both the 0 conceptions of the higher command cases the needs of airpower had been sub­ still ran in old grooves. But it had cre­ ordinated to the building up of large-size ated a small number of new-type forma- . arnhes, because the voice of the generals tions by the time war broke out-four, was dominant in the distribution of the armored and four mechanized divisions, 'as i military budget, and the generals naturally well as four motorized infantry divisions. tended to favor the kind of force with to back them up. It was a small proportion which they were familiar. They were far of the total, but it counted for more than from realizing the extent to which the ef­ all the rest of the German Army-in the fectiveness of armies was dependent on absence of any similar new-type force on adequate air cover. the other side. G The downfall of both armies may be German Advantage Slight tracked to a fatal degree of self-satisfac­ At the same time- the German High tion at the top. In the case of the French Command had, rather hesitatingly, recog­ it had been fostered by their victory in nized the new theory of high-speed war­ World War I and the way that their part­ fare and was willing to give it a trial. ners had always deferred to their assump­ That was due, above all, to the enthusiastic tion of superior military knowledge. In advocacy of General Guderian and a few the case of the Poles it had been nourished others, and the way that their arguments by their defeat of the Russians in 1920. appealed to Hitler who, naturally, favored Complacency the Worst Sin any idea that promised a quick solution. The military leaders in both cases had In sum, the German A rmy achieved its long shown themselves arrogantly com­ amazing run of victories, not because placent about their armies and military it was overwhelming in strength. or 10 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1967 thoroughly modern in form, but because selves astride the rear of the main Polish it was a lew vital degrees more advanced armies which were cut off from their than· its opponents. bases and supplies. Although the Poles The campaign was brief. The arena struggled bravely they could not break was in many ways ideal for a demonstra­ out of the trap. Meantime other German tion of' the new blitzkrieg technique. Po­ mobile thrusts were spreading confusion land's frontiers were long and the interior and paralysis. flat, while the scarcity of good roads was Then, on the 17th, the armies of Soviet offset by the dryness of the weather. The Russia crossed Poland's eastern frontier. Germans were able to start from an en­ That blow in the back sealed her fate, veloping position, owing to their posses­ 'for there were scarcely any troops left sion of East Prussia on Poland's northern to oppose this second inv~sion. The cam­ flank and their occupation of Slovakia on paign became merely a mopping-up of her southern flank. The west of Poland stubborn Polish fragments prior to the was thus a huge salient that projected partition of Poland between Germany and between Germany's jaws. Russia-as agreed in the secret treaty Pride, possessiveness, and over-confi­ they had made. dence prompted the Polish Command to French Effort Restricted mass the bulk of their forces far forward, in or near the western provinces which Meantime the French had merely made had iten taken from Germany after a small dent in Germany's western front. WorIl"War I. This forward deployment It looked, and was, a feeble effort to re­ exposed them to a quick encirclement. At lieve the pressure on the"ir ally. In view the same time, the German air force of the weakness of the German forces wrecked the Polish railway system, thus and defenses it is natural to feel that they making it impossible for the unmechan­ could have done more. But, here again, ized Polish ground forces to shift their deeper analysis tends to correct the obvi­ positions or withdraw except by slow ous conclusion suggested by the compara­ marches on foot. tive figures of the opposing forces. Although the French northern frontier Deep Thrust Cut Lifeline \Vas 500 miles long, in attempting an of­ While the German flank thrusts helped fensive the French were confined to the to stretch and distract the Poles, the de­ narrow 90-mile sector from the Rhine to cisive stroke was delivered by Field Mar­ the Moselle, unless they violated the neu­ shal Walther von Reichenau's Army in trality of Belgium and Luxembourg. The the south center which had been allotted Germans were able to concentrate the the greater Ilart of the German armored best part of their available forces on this and mechanized groups. (Reichenau, al­ narrow sector, and they sowed the ap­ though not a tankman, had long shown proaches to their Siegfried Line with a an enthusiastic interest in the new theory thick belt of minefields, thus imposing de­ of tank strategy, had personally trans­ lay on the attackers. lated several of my books, describing Worse still, the French were unable to them as "setting new rules" for warfare.) start their offensive until about 17 Sep­ Penetrating a gap, one of Reichenau's tember, except for some preliminary prob­ armored corps raced through to the out­ ing attacks. By that date Poland was so skirts of Warsaw, Poland's capital, on 8 obviously collapsing that they had a good September. This deep thrust was quickly excuse for countermanding it. Their in­ followed up and the Germans placed them­ ('!apacity to strike earlier arose from their "

THE GREAT ILLUSIONS OF 1939 11 mobilization system which was inherently spurning Russia's proposals for jo.int ac­ out of date. It was the fatal product of tion-Mr. Churchill says in his memoirs: their reliance on a conscript army which When every aM at these aids and ad~ could not come effectively into action un­ vantag/is has been squandered and thrown ti! the mass of '''trained reserves" had been away, Great Britain advances, leading called up from their civil jobs, and the France by the hand, to guarantee the integ­ formations had been wade ready to op­ rity of Poland-of that very Poland which. erate. But the delay was increased by the with hyena appetite had only six months French Command's persistence in old before jQined in the pillage and destruction tactical ideas, particularly their view that of the Czechoslovak State. There was 8ense any offensive must be prepared by a mas­ in fighting for Czechoslovakia in 1938 sive artillery bombardment on the lines when the German Army could scarcely of World War I. They still regarded heavy put half-a-dozen trained divisions on the artillery as the essential "tin-opener" in Western Front, when the French with dealing with any defended position. But nearly 60 or 70 divisions could most cer­ the bulk of their heavy artillery had to tainly have rolled forward across the be brought out of storage, and could not Rhine or into the Ruhr. But this had beIJn be available until the last stage of mo­ judged unreasonable, rash, below the level bilization, the 16th day. That condition of modern intellectual thought and moral­ governed their preparationil to deliver an ity. Yet now at last the two Western offensive. Democracies declared themselves ready to For several years past one of France's stake their lives upon the territorial in­ political leaders, M. Paul Reynaud, had tegrity of Poland. History, which we are constantly argued that these conceptions told is mainly the record of the crimes, were out of date, and had urged the ne­ follies, and miseries of mankind, may be cessity of creating a professional mech­ scoured and ransacked to find a parallel anized force of professional soldiers ready to this sudden and complete reversal of for' instant action, instead of relying on five or six years' policy of easy-going the old and slow-mobilizing conscript mass. placatory appeasement, and its trans­ But he had been a voice crying in the formation almost overnight into a readi­ wilderness. French statesmen, like most ness to accept an obviously imminent war French soldiers, placed their trust in con­ on far worse conditions and on the great­ scription and numbers. est scale . .•• Here was decision at last, The military issue in 1939 can be taken at the worst possible moment and summed up in two sentences. In the east on the least satisfactory ground, which a hopelessly out-of-date army was quickly must surely lead to the slaughter of tens disintegrated by a small tank force, in of millions of peopllJ. combination with a superior air force, It is a striking verdict on our folly. Yet which put into practice a novel technique. Mr. Churchill himself had, in the heat of At the same time, in the west a slow-mo­ the moment, vigorously applauded Cham­ tion army could not develop any effective berlain's pressing offer of our guarantee pressure before it was too latlJ. to Poland. Why? He attempts no ade­ quate explanation. The Greater Mistake It is o.nly too evident that in 1939 he, Dealing with our entry into the war­ like most of Great Britain's leaders, acted after describing how we allowed Germany on a hot-headed impulse, instead of with to. rearm and then to swallow Austria and the cool-headed judgment that had been Czechoslovakia, while at the same time characteristic of British statesmanship_ Noah Phelps, father of G1 Colonel Benedict M. Holden, Jr., United State8 Army, Retired

T HE Armed Forces of the United Small Force-Big Mission States have long treasured the histories The purpose of the expedition was to and traditions handed down through the capture Fort Ticonderoga to gain years. In various places in the country, sorely needed supplies and equipment monuments a-nd plaques have been dedi­ for the American troops at Cambridge, cated to Grant, Dewey, Farragut, Teddy to strengthen the American morale through Roosevelt, Washington, Sherman, and a a victory over British Regulars and, at host of other military heroes and historic the same time, to ensure an early and personages whose vision and foresight overwhelming defeat of a British strong­ made possible the things we have. hold. It is true, as well, that the most colorful The original plan, hatched in Hartford figures of history are the leaders of com­ and financed by Colonel Samuel H. Par­ bat forces. This, too, is proper, for since sons, Silas Deane, and others, was devel­ the responsibility belongs to the com­ oped within days after Lexington,' and mander, what credit there is should be his Captain Phelps set out with 10 men to­ as well. ward the north. Joined by Colonel James It is true also, however, that no com­ Easton and 50 men at Pittsfield, Massa­ mander can accomplish his mission alone, chusetts, the party reached the Hampshire and too often too little is known of those Grants where Colonel Ethan Allen and his who have made his success possible. This Green Mountain Boys were added to the probably is due to the fact that staff of­ force. ficers who have demonstrated their capa­ Aeting independentlY, under the author­ bilities sometimes make their reputations ity of Massachusetts, Benedict Arnold, in later years as commanders and are also a Connecticut son, arrived on the remembered as such. scene with 56 of his troops charged with Somewhere in the dark recesses of the identical mission.' Arnold reluctantly his);ory the functions of the staff were consented to join forces with the Con­ developed and, over the years, have been necticut troops, but insisted upon sharing refined. For this reason, at long last it is the glory of the victory. (He stood at the appropriate that full credit for the suc­ side of Ethan Allen when, on 10 May cess of the operation of 10 May 1775 which 1775, the latter, in stirring tones, de­ resulted in the surrender of Fort Ticon­ manded the surrender of the Fort".•. in deroga be given to Captain NQah Phelps the name of the Great Jehovah and the of Simsbury, Conneeticut, first formal Continental Congress.") Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, of the With both Massachusetts and Connecti. American Army. cut represented equally in the field, the Strictly speaking, Captain Phelps was 1 The instigators were not reimbursed for theIr a member of the Connecticut Militia, but outlay of £3HO until 18 November 1775 the cause was a common one and Phelps ; Arnold, then a captain and commander of the New Haven Company, had been commissioned was an intelligence officer to the core. "colonel .-nd commander in chief" by Massachusettr NOAH PHELPS. FATHER OF G2 13

two unit commanders shared the respon­ time at Fort Ticonderoga. Almost the sibility, but Lieutenant Colonel Edward entire population in the area supported Mott of Connecticut was, strictly speak­ the Tory side and, the presence of an ing, commander of the operation and it American officer in the vicinity was was Mott's staff 'officers who did the plan­ scarcely anticipated. Phelps expected he ning. Elisha Phelps, also of Simsbury, would be treated as a Tory American and was ACofS, G4, serving as "commissary" was not disappointed. for the operation. He was assisted by a staff of four, one of whom, Simeon Beld­ Big Ears and Small Talk ing, later served as Quartermaster of the Openly he took a room at the inn near Continental Army in 1777. Phelps was the entrance to the fort on 8 May. It was commissary for Connecticut troops until a sleepless but informative night for the his death in 1776. intelligence officer because a group of British officers were dining loudly and Intelligence Was the Key long in' the adjoining apartment and, The Gl function seems to have been a feeling secure among British sympathizers, unit commander's responsibility for al­ "talked shop." The trend of their conversa­ though Barnabas Deane of Wethersfield tion made it clear to Captain Phelps that appears to have been charged with the re­ he should investigate the matter further. sponsibility of procuring reinforcements In addition, traveling light he had fOl'got­ and provisions, troop commanders enlisted ten to bring his razor. their own personnel for the initial opera­ On the morning of 9 May after break­ tion. There was little for the G3 to do, as fast, Captain Phelps strolled happily such, and the actual plan of operation through the gate of the fort, waved was developed after a "Council of War" cheerily at the sentry on duty, and com­ following receipt of the G2 report. Suc­ menced to look around. If anyone were to cess, or failure of the enterprise depended ask, he was looking for the post barber. upon the information gained through the It was at this point that he fell in with efforts of the ACofS, G2, Captain Noah Captain William Delaplace, the command­ Phelps. • ing officer of Fort Ticonderoga. Delaplace All that Captain Phelps knew on 8 May was an amiable man and volunteered to 1775 was that the British occupied Fort conduct the American personally to the . Ticonderoga. His mission, as is always the barber. The two strolled together in the mission of the intelligence officer, was to morning air, Delaplace asking questions as determine the enemy situation, strength, to American politics, armament, and

Success or failure of the Fort Ticonderoga enterprise depended upon information gained by Captain Noah Phelps during the course of the lirst recorded intelligence mission in the annals of US Armed Forces

and capabilities. To his advantage was troops, and, in his own way, seeking in­ the fact that since Lexington, Loyalist formation from Phelps which might be of minded Americans, declaring allegiance to use to the British. George III, had appeared from time to Phelps, all unprepared, gave him an­ swers which not only pleased Delaplace, I Noah Phelps. after servi("e in grade in the Continental Army through J777. was made lieu· but engendered a feeling of confidence and tenant coJonel, Regiment 18. Connecticut Militia, In 1778 and promoted to colonel in 1\1ay 1119 singleness of purpose wit~ the American. 14 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 19&7 Information concerning the disposition of he could not have done better. This was American troops in the vicinity of Cam­ the type of staff work which set the pat­ bridge was of no real benefit to the British tern for others to follow. commander of Fort Ticonderoga, nor could he have used it to advantage if it were. First Intelligence Mission Weak Defense, Wet Powder It is admitted that reports from civilians' As they passed a break in the wall of in and around Boston had been helpful in the fort, Phelps pointed to it and inquired determining the enemy situation in the whether the break would not be an easy early dl}YS of the Revolution, but the entrance for the Americans if any be as expedition of Captain Phelps is the first recorded intelligence mission in the annals bold as to consider an attempt to attack. of-the Armed Forces of the United States. "Yes," replied the confiding Briton "but It is interesting to note that in 1776 Cap­ that is not our greatest misfortun'e, for all our powder is damaged. Before we can tain Phelps was an officer in Colonel Ward's regiment, an ensign of which was use it we must sift it and dry it." The fact Joseph Hale, brother of Captain Nathan that the walk continued, Phelps was Hale, intelligence officer at Long Island. shaved, and slowly made his way, un­ challenged, to the boat landing is a Whether the exploit of Phelps encouraged Nathan Hale' has not been determined. remarkable tribute to a competent intel­ It is, perhaps, fitting that the first ligence officer. recorded G2 effort be one EO colorful and The boatman, a local Tory, admitted so reminiscent of the approved TV "cloak later that he never suspected Captain and dagger" pattel'n; nor does it dim the Phelps to be anything other than a Loy­ picture of the int1'epid Ethan Allen stand­ alist traveler. He wondered a little why ing under the very guns of Fort Ticon­ Phelps assisted in rowing the boat to gain deroga ana calling in resounding phrases additional speed after it had slowly for its surrendey. drifted out of sight of the fort, but in Captain Phelps fulfilled the duty of the those troubled times boatmen did not ask G2 to his commander. He collected, col­ questions. lated, and' evaluated the enemy situation, Captain Phelps reached the American It must be admitt"d that when Colonels camp during the afternoon of 9 May and Allen and JhMld stood fearlessly under made a full and complete report at the the British cannon they were well 8ware staff conference. He knew the enemy of the British inability to fight back­ strength, capabilities, and morale. He told short of throwing rocks or calling for a of the lack of security, the holes in the bayonet charge. The American colonl'is walls, and the ease of approach. Had he were betting on a sure thing, thanks to tl.e graduated at the head of his class from completion of his staff function by Captain the Command and General Staff College Noah Phelps, ACofS, G2. Colonel Benedict M. Holden, Jr., United He. probably would not have sought it States Army, Retired, is a graduate of for hImself because, to him, his exploit was Yale Univer8ity where he received his just part of an intelligence officer's job. but Bachelor of Law8 degree in 1991,.. He at­ tended the Command and General Staff somewhere, as an inspiration for other in­ College in 19M and was Assi8tant Chief telligence officers, there should be a record of Staff, G2, 1J,.th Antiaircraft Command of the doings of the "Father of G2." I. in the Southwe8t Pacific during World War II. l!e retired in 191,.7. af!d is pres­ • Captain. Nathan Hale was commissioned I heutenant In the 3d CQmpany, 7th Regiment on 6 ently Untted State8 Commls810ner Dis­ J~ly 1775, by whj~h time the full report ~f the trict of Connecticut, Hartford, wh;re he T.conderoga operatIon had been received Captain practices law. Phelps' participation included • MILITARY NECESSITY, HUMANITY, AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT Major Ned A. Holsten, Militaru Police C()rps Staff and Faculty, Civil Affairs and Military Government School

MILITARY government is not as wars were even more barbaric, brutal, and absolute as is generally believed-even callous. For centuries military command­ though it has been defined, as "the supreme ers engaged in any action that was sanc­ authority exercised by an armed occupying tioned by "military necessity," however force over the lands, properties, and in­ distasteful such action might be to more habitants of an enemy, allied, or domestic refined and sensitive temperaments. The territory." art of warfare was a manly art; death and There are those who insist that the dom­ the presence of mangled bodies strewn in inant criterion is "military necessity," puddles of blood across the battlefield was arising as it does out of the urgent de­ part of the experience of those who chose mands for· survival, security, and success such a military career. The enemy must in battle. The commander, they argue, be destroyed; glory and plunder rewarded must be supreme. the victorious. "Military necessity" allows the com­ To achieve such victories, license was al­ mander to do whatever he wishes, however lowed the practitioners of the art. Military slen,!ler the thread of justification. Disre­ men were the sole judges of what could be gard for personal and property rights is destroyed in order to reduce the enemy.to justified as long as military need can be submission. The rights of persons could be shown. Noncombatants are little different ignored if their presence or actions de­ from physical objects, rocks, trees, bridges, layed or diverted military victory. Looti~g and houses. If these "things" are in the lined the stomachs of soldiers with rich way of military success, destroy or re­ food, and their purses with rich treasure. move them. Whatever lay in the path of the warriors was theirs to take because to the victor be­ Military Necessity in the Raw longed the spoils; and might made right. It is evident that wars do destroy com­ Enemy noncombatants were not the ex­ munities, render people homeless, hungry, clusive donors. Even the inhabitants of and sick, dissolve family unity, and make friendly territory, whose misfortune it was orphans of children. The past decade or to have a battle fought in their neighbor­ so has shown the magnitude of that de­ hood, were subjected to foraging parties struction. and the quartering of troops in their Yet only a very few generations ago homes. The dignity of the nonmilitary in­

Milita~y necessity must be tempered at all times by considerations of, humanity. Long-run military successes and ultimate victories are only achieved on the side of social justice in international relations 16 MILITAlty ltEVIEW JANUARY 1957 dividual in a zone of combat required no come so deeply engrossed in the physical respect nor was his property sacred from means of achieving victory that they some­ terrestrial piracy if "military necessity" times are not in a position to maintain a could be shown. clear view of total warfare. For them, wars are fought in a vacuum, Necessity Versus Humanity on a battlefield from which all vestiges of Despite historical adherence to the pre­ humanity have been removed; on a sani­ cept of "military necessity" there is a rule tized battlefield where terrain, weather, more in consonance with the 20th century firepower, and similar tangible military and more easily sustained under the condi­ factors are the exclusive considerations. tions of total warfare. This is the rule of • - Too often overlooked is the increased in­ "military necessity tempered with human­ volvement in 20th century wars of the ity." inhabitants, resources, institutions, and Mode.rn warfare need not be savage nor civil facilities in the combat zone. Also need it be technically efficient. Rather it overlooked are the intangible factors in is better that it be politically efficient, and modern warfare, the psychological, socie­ that it achieve social justice in interna­ tal, and political means actually employed, tional relations. Even success in battles as well as the techniques of their employ­ may have to be foregone or delayed if the ment. ultimate victory is to merit the good opin­ The doctor is taught psychiatry as well ion of mankind, our own people as well as medicine and surgery. He learns that as others. "Destruction" and "reconstruc­ the physical body of bones and muscle, of tion" are the dual facets of modern war­ blood, and bowels, and guts, and other fare which embody both the military and ilhysical parts, contains also the ingredi­ the civil functions of the Army-functions ents of emotional and intellectual response inherent in the precept of "military ne­ which are controllable by him and which cessity and humanity.". control in large measure the reactions of The point of view presented here may the physical parts. not always be completely appreciated by So also must the military leader ac­ the "hardware soldiers" who tend to be- cept the intangible factors in modern war­ fare in which the essential ingredient is Major Ned A. Holsten served in North the humanity at the point of impact of his Africa and Sicily withlthe 10th Port Head­ quarters and with thJ Allied Commission military effort, whether that humanity be for Italy as economics officer at Rome, civilians in the target area of military op­ Milan and Trieste during World War II. erations, or enemy and even friendly sol­ He w~s an instructor of Military Govern­ diers whose efforts are strained with his ment History at the Provost Marshal General's School for three years prior to own. departure for Korea in January 1955. He Man's Control of Forces of Nature was with the Korea Civil Assistance Command as Chief of the Management Since the beginning of time the mind of and RePorts Branch until Novemb.er 1955, man has reacted to the forces of nature, and then was assigned to the Umted Na­ attempting to utiliZe those forces to serve tions Command, Office of Program Imple­ his own ends. Initially, the power under mentation, at Seoul. He is the author of "Military Government Logistics" and "illil­ his control was slight, as exemplified by itary .Government Logistical Functions" the bow and arrow. However, through the which appeared in the September 1953 and ­ ages the power he has brought under his . April 1.954 issues of the MILITARY RE­ control has increased at an incredible rate VIEW. He is now assigned to the staff and in each generation, culminating in our j faculty of the Civil Affairs and Military Government School. time with atomic energy. MILITARY NECESSIT~. HUMANITY. AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 17

Henry Adams proposed that the rate of General Winfield Scott balanced "human­ acceleration of man's control of the forces ity" against the urgency of "military ne­ of nature doubled every 10 years, and in­ cessity" in planning and condueting a creasing control of power is not likely to famous operation of that war. Confronted cease with our "Own generation any more with the choice between a siege or an as­ tl,an it stopped with the electric dynamo sault on the city of Vera Cruz, he de­ or with steam power 60 to 160 years ago. cided that a siege, although it might take Laws of acceleration are not limited to longer, would be equally successful. The the physical sphere. Parallel to man's in­ time gained by a quick assault would not creasing control of the forces of nature justify the larger "butcher's bill" (to use there has been noted a similar accelerated Scott's phrase) of casualties, not only trend in man's awareness of his humani­ among his own troops and those of the tarian capacity. Mexican defenders, but particularly among the civil populace. When Scott announced Humanitarianism Emerges his decision he was opposed by his generals As recently as a hundred years ago, a who favored the less subtle action of "an change in thinking began to be recognized assault. and "military necessity" came to be tem­ The landing of the American troops on pered by considerations of "humanity." the beachhead just south of Vera Cruz in We all know the story of Florence Night­ March 1847 was virtually unopposed and ingale, her glorious record in alleviating siege quickly followed. It was tragic that the suffering of the sick and wounded from the exposed inhabitants suffered more from the battlefields of the Crimean War, 1854­ the artillery bombardment than did the 56, and the organization she inspired, the enemy troops who were comparatively safe Red Cross. behind their strongly fortified positions. Also, there was Henri Dunant who wrote However, not only did the siege of the city a book after the Austro-Sardinian war in of Vera Cruz cause the civilian populace nor.thern Italy in 1859 when the wrecked to suffer injuries and death from direct . bodies of the wounded were abandoned in military action, but the inhabitants also the field and soldiers of bo~h sides were suffered from lack of food. Eventual ca­ left to die and become vulture carrion. His pitulation did not result from any weaken­ book so stirred world opinion that an in­ ing of the military capacity of the Mexi­ ternational conference was called to devise can defenders. Rather, the victory was a restraints upon the previously unlimited result of the pressure of public opinion license of warfare. within the city. aroused by the suffering· The American tradition has been con­ of the noncombatants, including women sistent with the trend toward considera­ and children. In the interest of humanity tions of "humanity." In fact, although the Mexican general was obliged to sur­ Nightingale and Dunant may be credited render. with having stimulated the initial effort One of the first measures upon taking on the international plane, the American Vera Cruz was to provide direct issues of contribution has given direction to that food rations to the hungry people. Among effort. particularly in providing a code of other rehabilitation measures, controls law for the treatment of people in the war were imposed upon prices to restrain the zone. upward spiral of cost which would have Origin of American Tradition put even the little locally produced food The story of the American contribution beyond reach of the poor. began during the war with Mexico, 1845-48. After the war General Scott was con­ 18 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 fronted with the problems arising out of lives of every man, woman, and child drawn the relations between. his troops and the into conflicts between governments. Mexican people. He insisted we were not Our American tradition has been that fighting the people of Mexico but the gov­ wars are waged against governments, not ernment of Santa Ana, and by a series of against people,and this social machine as­ general orders he established a rule of sures the required restraint upon the con­ respect for the persons and property' of duct of military men which, heretofore, in noncombatants. centuries past, was unrestrained by virtue During the War Between the States, of the license of "military necessity." President Lincoln engaged Francis Lieber, " Numerous other examples may be given a professor of government and political illustrating wherein the American tradi­ theory at Columbia University, to write what is well known in international law tion has given direction to the interna­ as the Lieber Code. Lieber refined what tional trend. We may recall that General Scott had called "martial law" and went Leonard Wood in the battle for Santiago, much beyond what Scott had contemplated. Cuba, in 1898, had hardly waited for the fighting to cease to begin his work to re­ lJIustrative of the tenor of the Lieber Code is the following excerpt: vive the city, remove the dead, give food to the people, and reestablish orderly civil As martial law is executed by military government for the protection of the lives force, it is encumbent upon tho8e who ad­ and property of the noncombatants. minister it to be strictly guided by the During World War II American civil principles of justice, honor, and humanity affairs and military government (CA/MG) -virtues adorning a 80ldier even more operations involved the most complex as than other men, for the very reason that well as the most primitive civilizations in he possesses the power of his arm8 against Europe, the Pacific, and the Orient. Pro­ the unarmed. visions for the sick, homeless, and hungry, What Lieber did was to codify the best and for the rehabilitation of economies de­ and most humane principles developed dur­ stroyed by warfare, involved literally tens ing centuries of custom a:nd practice. No of millions of tons of supplies and almost such work existed in any language and a hundred thousand technically competent it won immediate international acceptance. CA/MG personnel. The Germans adopted it in the Franco­ From the beginr.ing of the conflict in Prussian War of 1870. It also served to a Korea hardly a year passed that a million considerable extent as a model for the tons of supplies were not procured, stored, later Hague Conventions on the laws and transported, and distributed to end users customs of war on land, out of which among the civilian population. In Fisc.al emerged the well-known Geneva Conven­ Year 1955 alone the figure amounted to tions of 1929 for the protection of war at least three million tons. victims. It is evident that the American tradi­ Today, these international laws embody tion is dedicated to preserving intangible a structure of human ideals for the de­ human ideals in the conduct of war. There fense of humanity from the growing power is an increasing realization of the human of destruction in modern warfare. Com­ nature of modern warfare and"a greater bined they are a social machine as com­ use of "cold war" tactics wherein success­ plex as atomic machines and they involve ful techniques are more often ideological ramifications that reach down into the than materialistic. MILITARY NECESSITY, HUMANITY, AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT Pattern for the Future In this connection the name of the ac­ Needed, however, is an awareness that tivity could be, one of the following: Mili­ future wars may not be fought on "for­ tary Civil Administration; Civil, Affairs eign soil" where the people are foreigners Administration; Martial Law; State of and they, their institutions, and govern­ Siege; Civil Affairs; Government of Oc­ ments are regarded as "indigenou's," cupied Areas; Country Mission; Liaison; It is urged, wherever such a "foreign" Military Government; Civil Assistance; slant appears in staff documentation, that Civil Administration; Military Adminis­ it be removed and that recognition be given tration; or Occupation Administration. to the possibility of warfare being con­ ducted on American soil, in the midst of Gradations of Authority American citizens, refugees, and civil and However unpalatable the view may be, political institutions which are not likely "military necessity" as a right does give to be regarded as "indigenous," The les­ the military commander supreme author­ sons of Pearl Harbor, in this regard, can­ ity. Then, from this theoretically absolute not be too strongly reemphasized. position, there are lesser gradations of It behooves the commander to recognize that authority, and its concomitant respon­ that his offensive operations in foreign sibilities. according to the provisions of countries should include the same defen­ law and agreements. sive measures for the protection and well­ The situation in which this jurisdiction being of the civilian population that he is greatest is commonly known as military would employ in his own national terri­ government. and only rarely are other sit­ tory. However strong the appeal of ag­ uations of lesser jurisdiction not preceded gressive forward action, he must include by a transition period of military govern­ in his action provisions for the civil com­ ment, whether that is for two days or two munity which he brings under his power. months, more or less. Wherever it be, the military entrance on In liberated territory the form of civil territory establishes a unique relationship affairs administration is of lesser jurisdic­ wliich in foreign territory has characteris­ tion, generally defined in a specific civil tics similar to those in domestic territory. affairs agreement between the recognized The military commander acquires political de facto or de jure government of the status, executive. legislative. and judicial particular territory and the government in nature, in regard to the inhabitants, in­ of the military forces e~tering that terri­ stitutions, and resources of the territory; tory. Such administration may be, and of­ a form of constitutional dictatorship. ten is, initiated by a period of military Whether an objective area is classified government until the recognized govern­ as enemy, domestic, allied, or liberated, ment can be established. the limitations of these categories upon In occupied territory even military gov­ operations is a matter of degree, insofar ernment, initially supreme authority, is as those operations may be limited by soon scaled down to a lesser form of oc­ domestic law, international agreements cupation administration as a recognized affecting the area, or international agree­ government is established or reconstituted. ments and international law having gen­ However, with the possible exception of eral application. Sicily in 1943. and of Korea. Germany, In all cases, since military jurisdiction and the Ryukyus in 1945, during World extends to civil affairs related to military War II there was usually an agreement security and the military mission of the with a recognized sovereign government commander, there is an administration of stipulating the extent of military jurisdic­ the civil affairs of the territory. tion in civil I1,ffairs. In addition, our pres­ 20 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 ence in foreign territory has been with establishment of airheads deep in enemy­ other allies in most instances. Hence it held territory. can be said that United States military government operations actually have been Chain Link or Chain Mail and are likely to be rare, and to occur prin­ Such airheads could be made and ex­ cipally in the combat zone during the heat panded as little islands, growing in size of battle. and becoming as small continents in a sea of enemy territory, distributed acC'ording Annihilation, Stalemate, or Capitulation to a dispersed pattern of coverage over a Proposals have been made that future vast geographic area or land mass. In ad­ wars will minimize ground action. For the ,dition, such airheads could leapfrog one sake of argument, even if such were to be another, each becoming a bridgehead to the case, it is unlikely that there would another and all connected as in chain link not be military occupation of enemy-held 01' interlock as in chain mail. territory upon capitulation of the enemy. Devastation of the objective area may Regardless of the particular weapon or very well precede and accompany estab­ weapons system used to destroy the en­ lishment of an airhead. However, although emy capability or will to fight, our forces securing and expanding the airhead may eventually must be in parallel relation­ have dictated destruction, considerations ship in space and time to the enemy. of "military necessity" tempered by "hu­ Whether the destruction comes from manity" will require development of local above, from below, or by direct impact, resources and facilities to support the the ultimate effect must be one of three commander's military effort as well as to alternatives. They are: provide for the economic weIl-being of the 1. Annihilation.-A total destruction of civilian population coming under his au­ the enemy's military, economic, social, and thority. To do this he must apply the political resources. forces at his disposal to the reconstruc­ 2. Stalemate.-Neutralization of the ef­ tion of what he had previously SUbjected fectiveness of hostile action unaccompanied to destruction. by an overpowering and systematic reduc­ tion of the enemy's ratio of strength. Aerial Siege Warfare 3. Surrender or capitulation.-A cessa­ Such airheads could be in isolated areas, tion of hostile response. avoiding population concentrations, by­ Total annihilation of the enemy runs passing and even surrounding population counter to the conscience of humanity. concentrations in a scheme of encirclement Stalemate imposes an unrewarding sacri­ which would sever communications and fice of human and material resources. On movements of goods from production areas the other hand, capitulation demands that to consumer areas, thereby depriving pop­ it be followed by either a perimeter isola­ ulation concentrations of outside supplies tion of the enemy, as was attempted with for subsistence and for power, as well as Germany after World War I, or a token for conversion into goods and machines. or total occupation of enemy territory and This kind of aerial siege warfare might domination over enemy installations, as conceivably achieve the military aim to was the Rhineland later held in hostage reduce the will of the enemy and to gain after Wodd War I or all of Germany after eventual capitulation of enemy resistance World War II. without resort to devastation in areas of In the past, military entrance upon ter­ population concentrations. Thus again ritory has been by land or by sea; whereas, "military necessity" may be tempered by in the future, entrance may be gained by considerations of "humanity." The alter­ I ,j MILITARY NECESSITY. HUMANITY. AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 21 native would be aerial attacks upon popu­ Liddell Hart stated: lation concentrations. Strategic bombing concepts contemplate Even plainer are the dire effects of tnc selection of targets of primary importance long devastation of Germany and its dam­ to the power of the enemy to wage war; aging reaction on all, her neighbors in Generally, these would be logistical tar­ Europe. It has greatly increased the Allies gets, military and civilian manufacturing, burden in . . . trying to re8tore order out storage, transportation, power, communi­ of the chaos created. The wholesale bomb­ cations, and similar facilities. However, ing of Germany has proved the biggest of enemy administrative centers, military and boomerangs. political, where prosecution of the war Conclusion would be planned, supervised, and admin­ istered, probably also would be prime tar­ Even though enemy commanders may gets. It is inconceivable that population ignore the principle of "humanity" and concentrations, as such, would be selected thereby achieve momentary success in bat­ as targets. tle, even though it appears that "might In this regard, consider the opinion of makes right" and that "to the victors be­ Liddell Hart who, in his book, Defense of long the spoils," in reality, ultimate vic­ the W est, sti~atized the unstrategic tory is only on the side of social justice in bombing of German cities as militarily international relations. senseless destruction of civilian buildings Hence it may be stated that no matter and facilities only distantly related to the how all-important pure "military neces­ war effort. This increased the magnitude sity" may appear to the conduct of short­ of the consequent relief, rehabilitation, and range actions, long-run military success is reconstruction aspects of civil affairs and only achieved When "military necessity" is military government operations. • tempered by considerations of "humanity."

. We are making renewed and intensified efforts to develop a successful basic policy ·on the question of disarmament and we will persist in t!.tis effort. But until success is assured beyond doubt, the best prospects of peace and the grim essentials of security together demand the continuance of both our national and mutual defense programs. ./ The other free nations need the United States, and we need them, if a1\ are to be secure. Here is a clear case of interwoven self-interest. The necessary expenditures to equip and maintain United States Armed Forces of air and land and sea at strategic points beyond our borders are never called aid. The neces­ sary expenditures to enable other free nations associated with us to equip and maintain vital armed forces at these same strategic points beyond our borders should not be considered as aid. These, in fact, are defense alliance expenditures clearly safeguarding in the most desirable manner, and at times in the only possible way. the security of the United States and of other free nations.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower THE MOST POTENT fORCE Brigadier General Charles E. Hoy, United States Army Deputy Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Department of Defense \

IN AUSTRIA, Headquarters Tactical this point into focus--morale and morals. Command operated a noncommissioned of­ Examination reveals that these two ficers' academy with an obvious objective words have the. same derivation and, at -the production of high-caliber noncom­ one time, had the same meaning. Modern missioned officers. Selection to attend this usage has, however, assigned them dif­ academy, as in the case of similar ferent but related meanings. There is one schools in other commands of the United point of similarity, though, which deserves States Army, signified that an individual emphasis: both words express abstract possessed outstanding qualities and poten­ values. As such, they appeal to man's tials of leadership. His graduation meant mind. This mental appeal is made first to he had been taught the art of leadership the individual who, in turn, reflects the with its traits, principles, and techniques. product of the appeal for the betterment But is such formal instruction enough? of society. We should be concerned with what the A man's values, then, may be said to be future holds for the graduate of such a the sum 'total of his morals and of his leadership school. His qualities of leader­ morale. Without a high positive total of ship and the exacting training which he both, his value to and position in society has undergone form the foundation on certainly are questionable. And so it is which a bright future can be built. How with a military leader. He must possess a he uses his talents and develops his poten­ greater number of positive mental values tialities will determine his degree of suc­ and, in addition, must know how to develop cess as a leader. He has acquired the the maximum number of positive values in knowledge needed to lead men. His train­ his subordinates. ing has suited him for that leadership. Now it is up to him to apply this knowl­ Interdependent Factors edge and this ability. Good morale cannot be achieved at the While much effort is devoted to increas­ e"pense of morals. The immoral and ing the knowledge and perfecting the skills amoral man can never become a leader. of young leaders, we do not emphasize, as This is more basic than we may at first we should', another and equally important realize, since morale is the result of the element of individual leadership. We have influence which the leader must exert over worked hard to achieve a material and those he leads. If the moral influence is physical perfection, yet have neglected bad, then morale will suffer likewise. what President Eisenhower has called "the Morals may be defined, generally, as most potent force-the spiritual!" one's sense of values as to right and wrong . \ -the will to adhere to the right and re­ Morals and Morale Are Key frain from the wrong, even in the face of Just what are the spiritual forces so popular condemnation or in opposition to necessary for successful leadership? There established customs. are two words which can be used to bring Morale, it may be said, is the state of an THE MOST POTENT FOROE 23 individual's mind toward everything that and, consequently, its combat proficiency, affects him-an· attitude also affected by ultimately failing to accomplish its mis­ the attitude of the individual with whom sion. It is obvious that this condition can­ I he is dealing. Napoleon, in his statement not and must not be permitted to develop I on morale, said that, "75 percent of the in military leadership. ! success or failure of a military operation At times the military tradition of grip~ depends on morale." Now, how can the ing can, if not controlled by leaders, cause leader affect morale? bad results through its adverse effect on First, it must be remembered that mili­ morale. Too often there is an inclination I tary morale, as such, can be neither pur. for a weak military leader, or one who chased nor commanded: nor can it be won lacks loyalty, to ascribe either necessary by a leader in a popularity contest. It hardships, or his own errors, to the lack definitely cannot be had at the price of of understanding or foresight on the part sacrificed morals. It is the leader's task of his superior commander. When such to obtain morale by establishing conditions activity is indulged in, it is with the hope favorable to its development. Thus re­ of winning sympathy and popularity with sponsibility for the morale of a unit rests subordinates. It is rarely successful, how­ solely with its leader. ever, and the subordinates usually tab this leader as weak and, as a result, lose con­ Leader Has Obligation fidence in him. This lack of confidence The personnel of an organization natu­ starts the reaction cycle of failure, begin­ rally and rightfully hold their leader re­ ning with lowered morale. The real leader sponsible for the protection of their own never criticizes his superior in the presence interests, just as the members of a society of his subordinates. He must, if necessary, hold the government responsible for theirs. explain the reasons behind a superior's The soldier, as a subordinate, cannot ef­ orders even though he does not always fect a noticeable change in his own lot attempt to justify them. because he is by definition subordinate to a superior who exercises control over his Use Criticism and Praise very life and Over the conditions under The leader must always take a positive which that life is led. Therefore, the approach to the problem that confronts soldier has a right to expect, if not de­ him. Constructive criticism and appro­ mand, that his leader handle his interests priate praise, if wisely used, are two traits in a vigorous and fair manner: and the of positive leadership which will promote Our first line of defense is in our own mind. Today's leaders must take positive action to destroy any existing moral decay and to create a state of mind that will render the individual and the Nation immune to it

leader has a moral obligation to fulfill this morale. Criticism should be used only to expectation. ensure that an error is not committed The impression that everything is ex­ again or to improve on an existing solu­ pected from the subordinate and nothing tion. The only cure for unsatisfactory is given by the leader in return can spread performance is prompt and suitable rep­ through a unit like wildfire. Morale in that rimand or on-the-spot correction. Never unit will sink to a low level. Without high ignore a mistake! Never condone a failure! morale the unit will lose its esprit de corps Mistakes ignored or condoned establish a­ 24 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 bad habit, a habit which is contagious and my attitude toward skiing and toward the which eventually may become a custom instructor, and my morale improved pro­ within a unit. portionately. Reprimands also must be used wisely Some leaders dislike to praise and do so since they affeet different individuals in a only in a grudging manner. They feel that variety of ways. Some men become irked praise will spoil their subordinates. This is and resentful. Others become so frightened not true. Most subordinates will respond they are afraid to act and, eventually, lose favorably to praise j however, it must not their initiative and self-confidence. The be overdone to the point of creating a feel­ wise leader will use criticism and repri­ ing of indispensability in the individual. A mands in such a manner that they will leader must know how, when, and where produce positive results rather than nega­ to apply praise. He must also know how tive weaknesses. much praise should be applied in any given The use of sarcasm and bad temper situation. If praise is insincere or over­ must be avoided. Above all, the individual done, it will not achieve the desired results. must be made to feel that the correction At the present time, both morale and is for his benefit and that he should do morals within the Army need strengthen­ everything possible to prevent a recurrence ing. The accusation has been made that of his mistake. too many of our leaders are morally delin­ Be Judicious With Praise quent, or are lacking in a sense of moral Every human being hungers for praise. responsibility. General Charles L. Bolte, Recognition in the form of praise provides former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the strength and incentive to do better emphasized the matter of moral courage work. A personal incident may illustrate in a forceful manner when he stated: "The this: "When I was first lear-ning to ski, spiritual strength and sense of moral re­ admittedly I was terrible and fell all over sponsibility on the part of the members the hill. Finally, after one particularly of our Army constitute a real and vital tough faU, my instructor said to me, "Gen­ element of our total strength!' eral, you are doing much better; that is We must take this moral approach to the best fall you've made today." Need­ our young men-the potential leaders upon less to say this simple remark improved which the very life of the Army depends. They must not fall prey to the evil forces Brigadier General Charle8 E. Hoy i8 a of degeneration which will challenge their graduate of the Command and General Staff Col/ege and the National War Col­ chances for truly great leadership. As lege. He was Army Amphibious Advisor leaders they will be sorely tempted and, at to the Commander in Chief, United States times, will stand alone. If they require Fleet, and commanded the 334th Regiment, consolation in this, let it come from the 84th Infantry Division in Europe during fact that a leader must be someone apart World War II. In 1949 he was assigned to the Joint Intelligence Group, Office of -otherwise, he will fall into the dull the Joint Chiefs of Siaff. He went to Aus­ category of those who find it easier or tria in 1952 and -served in the G2 Section, more convenient to take the course of least Headquartcl-s, United States Forces, and resistance, a course that ends in leader­ as Commanding General of Headquq.rters Tadical Command, Austria. The author IIf ship failure. They must know their moral "Know Your Dark Horse," which appeared responsibilities and dedicate themselves to in the May 1955 iss/(e of the MILITARY higher principles. A- man's value is mean­ REVIEW, General Hoy is now Deputy ingful when the fight for right begins Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weap­ ons P1·oject, Department of DefensB, Wash­ within himself and is won through his own ington.. decisions. THE MOST POTENT FORCE 25 Real Leader Is a Teaeher Today's Fateful Challenge The reader, by now, may have begun to The young leaders of today are faced wonder at this sermonizing on the subject with the greatest challenge the world haS of morale and ethics. It may appear a ever known. OUI:' civilization is being subject more appropriate for the pUlpit threatened by a relentless and evil force-­ than for a discussion of leadership. Are a force completely devoid of morality. It leaders expected to be preachers as well? seeks to destroy by undermining human No, the leader is not a preacher. Rather, spirit. It seeks to use the individual's mind he is a teacher. as a battleground and .attempts to lower "How," a leader may ask, "does my his will to resist its noxious precepts. It conduct as an individual affect others or makes mockery of our morals, for the the Nation?" As a leader he is expectcd leaders of this evil force know that our to and does exert influence over his subor­ strength lies in our moral fiber and this. dinates. Further, if we agree to the history teaches, is what must be destroyed premise that the true greatness of nations in order to destroy a moral civilization. If is in those qualities which constitute the mQrals can be destroyed first, then the integrity of the individual, then the citizen materials of war are superfluous or at has an obligation to represent his country most are secondary instruments in the well as a soldier, and a greater obligation destruction of civilization. to represent it well if he is a leader. We have the'know-how, and we have the Throughout history the rise and fall of materials to make that know-how effective. all civilizations can be traced directly to But do we have the moral stamina to the moral fiber of the people. With the endure today'~ grim threat to western strengthening of this moral fiber we have civilization? elm we resist the inroads seen nations rise, and with its weakening made against dur morale and our morals? we have seen the great empires of the We can. We must! Every leader must take wodd collapse from the rot of moral decay. positive action to not only destroy any Whim the individual and, in turn, society existing moral decay, but to create a state becomes morally corrupt, the nation's of mind that jWill render the individual strength is sapped and moral degeneration and, consequently, the Nation immune to becomes complete. This is perhaps the it. most important lesson history has taught Our first line of defense is in our own us. mind.

The leader must know his business and the men must know that he knows. War is a terribly serious matter and our citizen· soldiers want their lives protected by experts. There may be the tendency to belittle the professional soldier in time of peace; but when war comes, our eitizens wal).t to feel that their destiny is in the hands of professionals. To become this professional, an officer must devote his lite to constant study and self·improvement. He will need to prepare himself by study, by actual command of small units and. most importantly. by unending reOection on the art of war for the exacting requirements of professional leadership in future war.

General Ma~'Well D. TayWr GI--Your Personal Staff Officer

Colonel John A. Gavin, Infantry Senior Army Advisor, Hawaii National Guard Advisor Detachment

No STAFF,officer has received more Improvements Are Many scathing criticisms in the past several In today's Army (as differentiated from years than G1. Every soldier who is ad­ the United States Army of World Wars I versely affected by a personnel action or and II) it is believed that by far the policy has seen fit to castigate the lot of majority of the problem areas referred to Gl's as a group, whether deserved or not. here have been given conscientious, meticu­ Policies and programs which involve such lous, sincere, and careful study by all close to the belt subjects as promotion, personnel associated with G1. In recent transfer, assignment, pay and allowances, months we have seen the results (with selection for higher schooling, and depend­ more to corne) of some of this study. ent medical care, ad infinitum, have been The Medicare Bill has been enacted into decreed by many to be inadequate, unfair, law; millions of dollars have been allocated arbitrary, or unsound. to relieve, to a degree, the housing short­ At the outset let us candidly admit that age in critical areas; survivors' benefits some mistakes have been made in the past. for active duty personnel are a reality; Let us also point up that some of these incentive pay for doctors and dentists is mistakes were the result of command and provided; unit rotation (Operation Gyro­ high-level decisions wherein the recom­ scope) is now history; a pay raise is cur­ mendations of G1 (after all, he is only a rently under study; action has been taken staff officer) were not taken. Most of all, to reduce the "humps" in the promotion let us face the fact that many personnel list by selective Regular officer procure­ policies and actions dealing with such ment; credit for cadet and ROTC service matters as promotion, forced elimination, fol' pay purposes has been proposed; the service pay, and others are influenced by basis for Overall Efficiency Index deter­ the limitations imposed by the Congress­ mination has been extended by two years approved budget which may have limita­ to enable a more comprehensive evaluation tions imposed by the Department of De­ of each officer's worth to the service; the fense or the Bureau of the Budget. When Reserve officer now has the protection of an unforeseen and undesirable cut in funds severance pay legislation. Certainly, all of is made, something has to give way these measures were either proposed by or whether it is a reduction in strength, a concurred in by Gl, Department of the temporary stalemate in promotions within Army. certain grades, or other similar actions. The irony of this clamor is that many The Best for the Most capable officers who actively participate Before the charge that a particular in the criticisms, studiously avoid a G1 change is unfair or unnecessary is leveled assignment which would place them in a it should be realized that the officer corpS position to rpcommend corrective actions to of the Army of the United States is made reso!ve the problem areas of their gripes. up of groups with varied backgrounds and GI-YOUR PERSONAL STAFF OFFICER 27 sources of commissions. Each of these and appreciate. The fact is that the very groups has its own interests which val"Y existence of Gl in the Army structure is from those of other groups. The inherent somewhat new. At the instigation of the selfishness of people sometimes warps their Honorable Elihu Root, fOl"mer Secretary viewpoint in these matters. On the other of War, the War Department was re­ hand, Gl at Department of the Army organized in 1903, with the result that the level must consider all factions or groups General Staff Corps was established. How­

and'· ensure that the over-all legislative ever, it was not until 1921 that the Person­ program as it affects individuals is fair to nel Division, War Department General all, or to as many as possible. Staff, was created. Previously, the person­ It is apparent that Gl's responsibilities nel functions had been charged to The are tremendous, varied in scope, concern Adjutant General. So, you may see that all problems dealing with the health, wel­ the United States Army went through fare, and morale of the individual soldier, World War I without a Gl at War Depart­ and embody many intangibles and impon­ ment level and hence can now more readily The time is here for all commanders at all echelons to become Gl con­ scious. The GI's responsibUities are tremendous and varied in scope­ and he can contribute immeasurably to the success of the commander

derables which are "not specifically as­ understand the antipathies that marked signed as a responsibility to any other human relations within the Army at the general staff section." He has a Gargan­ en~ of World War I. tuan job and no matter what he does, he cannot possibly please everyone. It is Gl Developed During War simply the nature of the beast, so to speak. It may be of interest to know that until There is another facet of this problem 1940 there was no provision in the tables I which far too few Army personnel realize of organization and equipment for a Gl ' 28 MILITARY REVIEW .JANUARY 1951 on the division staff. The instruction in and welfare. TMe commander cannot do the duties of a G1 at the Command and this job alone; lie must lean on his Gl or General Staff College from 1920 to 1940 personnel officer 1to propose policies which consisted of a rather hazy reference to his are fair and just to the majority, and to duties usually explained in a three- or follow through on their implementation. four-hour period of instruction where the Much progress has been made in the past duties of the headquarters commandant 11 years, the gripes earlier mentioned not­ were discussed in some detail. Is it no withstanding. The Congress has supported wonder then that there were problems and Gl-sponsored legislation designed to im­ mistakes made during World War II prove benefits to soldiers and their depend­ which served to attract adverse attention ents. to the personnel officer? Give Gl a Hand It was not until the end of World War II that, for the first time, the duties and It is submitted therefor that construc­ responsibilities of Gl were delineated in tive criticisms should supplant destructive an official manual, Field Manual 101-1, The gripes. Such criticism can be presented G1 Manual. Since that time this manual through balanced studies and articles for has been' revised and republished several service journals. Newly announced policies times. The more l"ecent edition contains should be studied before "sounding off." forward thinking ideas beamed at person­ It is well to remember also that a profes­ nel problems to be encountered in an sional soldier's career carries with it some atomic war, such as unit replacement and of the bitter with the sweet-an assign­ individual and unit rotation within a ment to a hardship area must be accepted theater to conserve manpower. from time to time. This applies to other The time has arrived when it is incum­ personnel actions which occur throughout bent on commanders at all echelons to a career. become Gl conscious. The proper person­ Commanders and staff officers must not nel management of a million men, partic­ sell Gl short. The importance of Gl train­ ularly American men, requires careful ing is emphasized by the following opin­ thought concerning all matters dealing ion, registered several years ago by Lieu­ with their individual and collective morale tenant General Williston B. Palmer. present Vice Chief of Staff of the United Colonel John A. Gavin was graduated States Army: from the United States Military Academy in 1932. During World War J1 he served I have thought a great deal for many a8 commanding officer, Harmon Field, years about the functions of the different Newfoundland; assistant G3, Headquar­ general staff Bectione. Each is different ters, Army Ground Forces; and as execu­ tive officer, G3 Section, Headquarters, from the others. It may surprise you to Fifteenth Army in Europe. He was an know that G1 is the spot in which I pre,­ in8tl'uctor from 1946 to 1948 at the Com­ fer to train my future chief of Btaff. mand and General Staff College, was in the G1 Section, Headquarters, USARCARIB, A short time later a member of the and 8erved in various capacities in the student body at the Command and General Far East Command during 1950-51. Upon Staff College asked General Palmer why his return to the United States he attended the Army War College and in 1952 became he had made the above statement. His G1, Academic Staff, CGSC, subsequently reply was to the effect that an officer being assigned as Executive tor Instruc­ trained in the Gl job could and would tion. He was 4sBigned to USARPAC in relieve him, the commander, of many ad­ June 1955 where he is Senior Army Ad­ visor, Hawaii ;Wational Gua.rd Advisor ministrative headaches which are common Detachment, Fort Ruger. to all commanders. 50,000 NEUTRAL SOLDIERS l Austria's Rearmament Problem Doctor Milton Colvin, Assistant Professor for Sociology/Anthropology, Montana State University

Historu teachf!s us that the desire 01 they want an army and what they expect a people to remain neutral can best be of it, it is necessary to go back to the realized Ulhen backed up bU the means February-March days of 1938, when the of self-defense. Julius Raab, Austrian world stood by and watched Nazi Ger­ Bundeskanzler many by subterfuge and force take over the Austrian Government, and then by Anschluss, put an end to Austria as an UNLIKE Germany, Austria, following independent nation. The Austrians learned World War II, was not denied the right then that the precondition to outside help of self-defense; although, of course, as is the capacity and will for ~elf-defense. long as the four-power occupation of the Austrians are determined to have both. country was a fact, no army was needed. They remember all too well that at the It was de facto disarmament not de jure. time of the Nazi move against Austria, one As far back as the summer of 1945 the of the reasons given by the European de­ provisJonal government of Dr. Karl Ren­ mocracies for failure to help was the ex­ ner set up a special office to prepare for cuse that it was all over, a fait accompli, the time when the Austrians would again before action could be taken. The new Aus­ have an army. With the signing of the trian Army is to see that this does not Austrian State Treaty in May 1955, and happen again. the subsequent withdrawal of all occupa­ tion troops, the 10-year theoretical ques­ Hold Until Help Comes tion of creating an army became an actual This army is to be tough enough to make one. any would-be aggressor think twice before attacking, and to give the world time, The Why of an Army through sturdy defense, to brand him as One may well ask why it is that Austria, such if he should attack. A staunch de­ Ii small nation with a coalition government fense would make possible effective out­ pledged to "perpetual neutrality," wants side aid by giving friendly powers the an army. What do they expect of it? Are necessary days in which to mobilize. The these expectations realistic in terms of Austrians have not forgotten that South military possibilities? Korea asked for help and got it; they For,a good part of the answer as to why remember, however, that it was nip and

Why does Austria, a small nation with a coalition government pledged to "perpetual neutrality," want an army? Can a citizens' army best fight a technological war. or will a professional army do a better job? 30 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 tuck whether sufficient aid would get there that certain nonatomic powers might think before a capitulation. They would like Aus­ Austria a quick and quiet victiin for a tria to do better in case of attack. localized aggressive action. There is no Austrians have no illusions about their restraint in the State Treaty upon lesser military ability to resist a full.fiedged So­ powers, dependent upon a great power, viet offensive. They do, however, put some such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, or trust in Article 2 of the State Treaty separate and apart from a great power, which says that the four signatory powers, such as Yugoslavia, requiring them to re­ the Soviet Union, the United States, spect Austrian territorial integrity and France, and Great Britain, will "respect independence. Six such lesser powers the independence and the territorial in­ border Austria. One or a combination of tegrity of Austria." They put, perhaps, several might attack. more trust in their feeling that mutual Should this happen, the Austrians in­ fear of the consequences of an atomic war tend to do more than fire a few protest will act as a reasonable guarantee that shots and then quit and be posthumously neither the Soviet Union nor the Western lamented in a special sympathy session of allies would violate their treaty obligations the United Nations General Assembly. vis a vis Austria, thus provoking retalia. They expect the future Austrian Army to tory action of one against the other. make any struggle a bloody one; and they are determined to have a good army. Watch Smaller Neighbors Austrians know that NATO would Limiti:ng Military Factors hardly tolerate Soviet troops on the Al­ What kind of an army Austria can have, pine passes of the Austrian-Swiss and that is to say, its future military effective­ Austrian-Italian borders, nor would NATO ness, depends in large measure upon the be happy to have West Germany out­ following four factors: flanked by Russian garrisons in Western 1. 'the very definite personnel and arma­ Austria. They also know that the other ment restrictions imposed upon Austria by side of the coin is that the Soviet Union the State Treaty of May 1955. could not permit a NATO wedge into Cen­ 2. The attitudes of the young Austrians tral Europe. who will make up this army; their will­ The Austrians are far more worried ingness or unwillingness to do a good job Doctor Milton Colvin was educated at of soldiering. Yale University and at the University of 3. The ability of the Austrian econ,omy Heidelberg, Germany, where he received to support an army, even one of limited his Ph.D. in 1953. During World War II he served with the 509th Parachute Infan­ size. try Battalion and the Ranger Task Force 4. The strategie problems that go with in Europe and Africa. He was a membe'r an attempted defense of an exposed posi­ of the United States Displaced Persons tion in the heart of a Communist dom­ Commission from 1948 to 1950 working with refugees in Austria and Germany. In inated Central Europe. June 1953 he became head of Austrian op­ erations for the National Committee for a Experienced Soldiers Out Free ,Europe and remained in this posi­ tion, again working with refugee groups, Article 12 of Section II of the Austrian particularly Hunga"ian and Czech es­ State Treaty prohibits military service to capees, until August 1954 when he re­ all Austrians who se. :cd in the rank of turned to the United States. Since 1954 colonel or any higher rank in the German he has been Assistant Professor of Sociol­ armed forces from April 1938 to the Ger­ ogy and Anthropology at Montana State University in Missoula, Montana. man capitulation in May 1945. The same 60,000 NEUTRAL SOLDIERS-AUSTRIA'S REARMAMENT PROBLEM 31 article forbids military duty to Austrians 3n kilometers." This is something less than who had been members of the Nazi Party 'th~ maximum range of the American or leaders in Nazi affiliated organizations 155-mm rifle. Furthermore, the signatory such as the National Socialist Soldiers' powers to the State Treaty reserve the Association (Nationalsozisti8che Soldaten­ right to prohibit weapons which "may be bund) or the National Socialist Officers' evolved as ·a result of scientific develop­ Association (National8oziali8ti8che Offi­ ment"-a clear veto to military techno­ zier8vereinigung). Thus many of the best .logical progress. military trained men of Austria find them­ Special emphasis is also directed to the selves in the category "nonusable." The fact that Austria may not "acquire or Russians c&.n be expected to keep a close possess war material of German manu­ watch over . all choice of high officer per­ facture, origin, or design," except that sonnel, seeing to it that both the letter and material left behind in Austria by the the spirit of the restrictions are followed. German Army after the ending of hostili­ Already the Austrian Communist news­ ties in May 1945. Such equipment can be papers are denouncing the first staff offi­ used in "restricted quantities." Tanks, cer appomtments of the government, and planes, and artillery handed over to the headlining 'JA Rebirth of the Nazi Wehr­ Austrians by the withdrawing occupation macht" and editoralizing that "men forces are, according to Austrian news re­ trained to march on Moscow cannot change ports, of relatively little military value. their ways and serve a neutral Austria." The Men to Be Called As it is, of the first eight colonels se­ The new Austrian Army is to be a citi­ lected by the government to make up the zens' army. This is what the people want. new Austrian Military Staff, or "dwarf Its planned size is to be about 50,000, di­ general staff" (ZwerggeneraI8tabe8) in the vided, after proper introductory training, terminology of the Communists, all had into nine brigades.. servea as majors or lieutenant colonels in Length of compulsory military service the German Wehrmacht in World War II, now stands at nine months, conceded by six of them being at one time or another all as too short a period to give adeguate German General Staff officers. battle preparation. There is strong hope, It might be noted, however, that it is however, that eventually this service can not only the Communists who have ex­ be lengthened. pressed displeasure with the choice of offi­ All recruits will have to undergo bal;\ic cer personnel. The Socialists of the coali­ infantry training. Later, those who apply tion government 8.re reluctant to see too for specialized work may have the oppor­ many former officers of the old Austrian tunity to attend service branch schools. Bunde8heer again in uniform. The scars A Panzer school is to be set up at lIorsch­ of the 1934 civil war still show. ing near Linz where 24 Soviet T-84 tanks are on hand. Air training is to be at Tulln Even Limited in Weapons near Vienna. The Soviets have turned over Article 13 of Section II of the State to the Austrians eight Yak 18'8, but only Treaty deals with the prohibition of spe­ one Austrian can presently- fly them; and cial ~eapons, and states that "Austria he, because he served in the rank o,f colonel cannot cQnstruct or experiment with weap­ in the German Luftwaffe, is barred from ons adaptable now or in the future to mass service under Article 12 of the State destruction." It lists among such weapons: Treaty. A group of experts and defense "guided missiles, specialized assault craft, officials have been visiting the Fiat air­ and guns with range exceeding more than craft works in Turin, Italy. Turbojet 32 MILITARY REVIEW , JANuARY 1957 planes are manufactured there. Infantry comments of Jahrgang 1937. Unfortu­ and engineer training is to be set up in nately, there is some ground for disturb­ the Tyrol. ance on this point. Several ugly incidents among gendarmerie cadre personnel have Land Police to Be Cadre received rather sensational play in the Headquarters of the new Austrian Army Austrian press. (One particular incident is in the Dominikanerbastei in Vienna. It in which a young recruit to the gendar­ is this office that is directing the receiving merie fired upon a noncommissioned of­ of all recruits. The gendarmerie, the Aus­ ficer as a result of name calling got signal trian land police, make up the basic cadre. press attention.) They have been more or less trained for ' Fear Political Influence this job since 1945. The first conscript group called to duty is the class (Jahr­ Also contrl'butl'ng to the general re­ gang) 1937. Of this group, 15,000 donned luctance to serve and the apathy with uniforms on 1 October 1956; the rest, which, by their own comments, many of another 15,000, will be up for call in early this group will perform military duty, is 1957. Austrian 'physicians estimate that the feeling that first, there is no glory to at least one-third of all youths in the be found in a modern-day army; and see­ draft age brackets will be found physically ond, that the army will be part of political unfit for military service. party strife as was the Bundesheer through~ut the history of the First Re· Military Call Unpopular public. It is among these 18- and 19-year oids Many elderly Austrians who reminisce of Jahrgang 1937 that Austrian news­ aloud on the glories of the Kaiser's Army fail to grasp the fact that what they say papers have been conducting American makes no impression whatsoever on the type sociological polls of preservice atti­ Austrian youth of military age. Kaiser tudes. The results are disappointing. Franz Josef and Kaiser Karl are as much "Enthusiasm and patriotism would ap­ a part of the past as Rudolf von Hapsburg. pear to be as militarily antiquated as It is the second point, however-the in· Hannibal's elephant," reports the Neuer trusion of politics into the army-that is Kuner Am Wochenende in an article on more vital. It goes to the heart of a real 28 January 1956 entitled "Jahrgang 1937 problem. Austrians want to serve Aus­ vor der Kaserne." "Most of those inter­ tria and not a political party! But do the viewed are looking toward military serv­ parties understand this? It would seem ice as a nasty business to be gotten over they do not. The Socialist Party press with as soon as possible," editorializes the and the People's Party press both stress Salzburger Nachrichten. What causes the desirability of having officers and of­ these attitudes? ficer candidates come from party ranks. The answer is, of course, many things. Alas, like the House of Bourbon, they For one it is the books they read and the seem to "have learned nothing and for­ films they see. It is the American book, gotten nothing..•• " From Here to Eternity, and the German Perhaps the following quotation from book, 0/8-15.' They set the standards of the article "Jahrgang 1937 vor der Ka­ expectations. The word Kommie, which serne" best summarizes the attitude prob­ is difficult to put into English, but which lem: is symbolical of all that Mr. Jones and Herr • • • apart from his toothbrwlh, kil Kirst find brutal and degrading in army razor, and his pinup girls, the Austrian life, comes up over and over again in the recruit will bring in his llUitcase to the 60.000 NEUTRAL SOLDIERS-AUSTRIA'S REARMAMENT PROBLEM 33 kaserne a set of rather firmly planted EUropean states. The United States hav­ prejudices toward military life, It is to ing put Austria on her feet will tend to be the task of the officers and noncommis­ pass out of the picture. sioned officers, by,t more so of the State as maker of ideals, to rid him of these atti­ Must Listen to Economists tudes..•• Austria must ask of her military men that they operate within sound economic The Army and the Economy principles. This is what is meant by the term Wehrwirtschaft. It implies no ad hoc The estimated cost to Austria to build an army of 50,000 men is approximately casual relationship between the military and the national economists, but rather 100 million dollars. It would cost about close and constant liaison between them; the same annually to maintain it. in short, a sort of covoice or Mitbestimm­ The Austrian State Treaty puts Austria ungsrecht, in formulation of defense in a hole economically. To ransom their policy. The leading Austrian economic industrial and agricultural assets in the periodical, Berichte und Informationen, eastern part of their country, which was has been agitating for this, but so far Soviet occupied, the Austrians must sup­ there is no evidence that either the govern­ ply the Russians 150 million dollars worth ment or military circles have given heed of goods over a 10-year period. More im­ to the demand. portant, they must make oil deliveries to Although rearmament will have far­ the Russians during the same period that reaching >repercussions on employment will cost Austria the equivalent of 236 figures, currency stability, and the over-all million dollars. This means, according to production of national goods, two surface some Western oil experts, that Austria advantages grow out of the fact that Aus­ will have little more than enough oil to tria will have a citizens' army, and that satisfy her own requirements. She might this army must adjust itself to treaty re­ evel'l.· have to import oil for her modest strictions on armament. The first and military purposes, relatively minor one is that a citizens' army is cheaper than a professional army; Occupation Money Missed pay rates can be lower. The second and The withdrawal of all occupation troops more important factor is that restrictions deprives Austria of some 60 million dol­ against so-called heavy armament make lars worth of foreign currency each year, it possible for Austrian light industry to the bulk of which was spent by American equip the army. The truck and armamertt soldiers and families. The changeover factories in Steyr, the powder factories in from an occupied nation, to some degree Troifach and Hirtenberg, the arsenals at artificially supported by outside spending BIumau and St. Lamprecht, and other in­ aid, to an independent nation having to dustrial plants will find in rearmament an bear the cost of its own defense, requires economic uplift. The same is true for tex­ tremendous economic adjustments. tile factories meeting uniform demands. American aid alone under the Marshall General Liebitsky, Austrian Chief of Staff, Plan totaled more than one billion dollars. in a newspaper ~rticle has estimated that Normally speaking, it is not American as much as 70 percent of the military policy to give economic aid to neutral na­ budget will flow back into the Austrian tions. Austria is an avowed neutral. economy. Moreover, she will be tied to the Soviet Small communities already are pres­ bloc by her treaty obligations and by her suring for garrisons so that they, may en- . traditional commercial links with eastern joy the soldiers' pay. Since strategic fac­ 84 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 tors will make it necessary for garrisons See No Easy Solution to be widely spread, many stand to profit When General Nils Swedlund" Com­ from this trade. mander in Chief of the Swedish Army, came to Vienna for a series of talks on de­ Cannot Match Neighbors fense problems of a small nation, the Still, when all is said and done, the per Austrians listened politely; but general capita military budget of all of Austria's newspaper comment was to the effect that six neighboring nations stands higher the best thing Austria could do would be than that which the Austrian Government to trade geographical positions with feels th~ economy will I?ermit for Austria. -Sweden. Bundeskanzler Raab struck a This is particularly true for the Commu­ sympathetic chord with his countrymen nist nations of Czechoslovakia and Hun­ when he recently stated that Austrian gary. Between them they have more than neutrality meant "to take the best of both 350,000· troops on active duty. worlds and live in neither." Still, this is no solution to the problem of self-defense. Real Strategic Problems There is the question of garrisoning this On 18 January 1956 Julius Raab said: armr. From an economic standpoint it would seem only sensible to make maxi­ In setting up the new garrisons, due ac­ mum use of camps and kasernes already count shall be given to frontiers which in existence. The Austrian economy simply we feel to be particularly sensitive ones. does not permit large-scale bhilding .of At present, Austria is a military vac­ military installations when sufficient num­ uum. An armed force of 7,000 men must bers are already on hand or could be made defend her frontiers against aggression. so with minor repair. Unhappily, strategic This is a military absurdity; but unfor­ consitlerations dictate otherwise. tunately, not one that is easy to improve, Present Bases Misplaced let alone, correct. The huge former American Camp Roe­ The plain fact of the matter is that der, near Salzburg, big enough to house Austria is geographically badly handi­ almost one-third of the Austrian Army as capped; particularly so when looked at now planned, cannot be used. Again, it is from a Western or free world point of in the wrong place! There are other simi­ view. If the term "sensitive frontier" is lar examples that could be cited. applied to those bordering the Communist In addition to the economic factor of nations, then only against Yugoslavia is housing troops, over-all strategy will have there anything like a natural barrier for to contend with considerable pressure on defense. It is open country that faces local levels to have soldiers stationed near Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and Vienna their homes. is no more than one hour's drive from the The planned division of the army into Hungarian line. nine brigades is an attempt to accent mo­ Almost one-third of Austria's popula­ bility to make up for lack of mass. Un­ tion Jives in the capital city! Most of the fortunately, the topography of the country Austrian oil and heavy industry is near makes this difficult. A look at the map frontiers-the wrong frontiers! It is this shows why. It is rather clear what parts problem, the problem of Wehrgeograph­ of Austria could not be defended in case ischen Gesichtspunkte, that keeps the of a large-scale Communist inspired at­ lights burning nights at the Dominikaner­ tack from the east. The best roads would bastei. quickly be in the hands of the enemy. 60,000 NEUTRAL SOLDIERS-AUSTRIA'S REARMAMENT PROBLEM 35 Austria is too small a country to be able _ In creating an army, they see themselves to afford the argument whether a fluid or beset by dreadful paradoxes, pulls, and a stationary defense would be the better tensions. They must have an army, but strategical or tactical move. The Austri~ the economy will hardly support it; it is ans would have no choice but to attempt their own independent army, but it is con~ to hold in the mountains. trolled from the outside by crippling treaty Behind the entire defense question, how­ restrictions. There is enthusiasm for an ever, is a disturbing thought. It is the un­ army on the part of those not likely to answered question of whether a citizens' serve, but there is no enthusiasm on the army can best fight a technological war, part of those who must serve in that army. or whether a professional (and expensive) Whatever type of an army they have, they army might not do it better. This is being must defend a strategic nightmare, debated right now in Switzerland, particu­ There is an old cliche about the differ­ larly in Swiss military publications. The ence between Germany and Austria. Austrians are on the border listening. In Germany -the situation is serious Is It Worth the Effort? but not hopeless. In Austria the sit­ The Austrians are not by nature a dour uation is hopeless 'but not serious. people; but a hard history has made them The tragedy of Austria is that it has be­ somewhat skeptical and rather realistic. come serious too!

The death of Stalin has brought no basic change in Soviet policy. It remains expansive not merely out of greed but because it fears freedom. That was the most distressing aspect of the Berlin Conference. We discussed with Mr. '. Molotov time after time, both ill formal meetings and privately, the granting of liberty to the peoples of East Germany and Austria. Mr. Molotov said, and I believe he said with conviction, that the Soviet Government could not tolerate an extension of freedom because it feared that freedom might be aJ>used. To Soviet Communists, freedom is frightening. To them it is inconsistent with order. Also they know that freedom is contagious. That is why they feel that they wiII not be safe until they have liqUidated freedom as a major force in world affairs. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles The Contact Layer J .1 I Lieutenant C-clonel Raymond G. Jones, Artillery Student, Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama

W HEN the first caveman clubbed a the progressive element versus the vested neighboring villager and was aided and interest. Ironically enough, the vested in­ abetted by a friend who threw a rock at , terest more often than not finds itself re­ the other fellow, the ground forces staked cast in the progressive role as time goes a claim in the "contact layer"-that lower on. It is interesting to note that scientific layer of the atmosphere in direct contact evolution works to destroy older compart­ with the earth. Later, as the need for or­ mentation and to establish new spheres. ganization was recognized, cavemen prob­ Perhaps the services of the future will ably developed several groups of "club­ consist of two-Terrestrial and Celestial bers" and "rock-throwers." The clubbers Forces. rushed the enemy while the rock-throwers threw stones at him-fire and movement. Inflexibility Dangerous But even then there very probably were In this age of accelerated mechanieal arguments as to who was what when a and scientific advaneement, formal agree­ clubber rushed but threw his club in his ments to define interservice responsibili. excitement, or a thrower, unable to con­ ties must be subjected to almost continual tain himself, joined the rush and cracked evaluation and revision if they are to an enemy skull with a rock in his hand. avoid the risk of throttling progress. This At that very time there probably arose evolution is fraught with many familiar the first low-level interservice controversy roadblocks, detours, and similar hazards -the rock-throwers versus the clubbers­ in the form of shortsightedness, contrari­ all of which only serves to point up the ness, branch and service bigotry, inertia, fact that the contact layer, although com­ politics, and just plain tough sledding-;:­ posed largely of air, has been the exclu­ which is the running mate of progress in sive province of and increasingly utilized any field. by the ground forces until the relatively The point here is to suggest further de­ recent past. lineation of the strata in which respective Further delineation of geographic or at­ military forces operate so as to isolate and mospheric strata through which our vari­ clarify service interests with respect to OliS Armed Forces operate may provide an each other, thereby crystallizing opposing additional and easier approach to the solu­ positions. and bringing about conditions tion of many of the problems confronting favorable to solution of these problems the services today. during the current phase of evolution. If The services presently are organized, such delineation can be achieved, it should broadly, on a land, sea, and air basis. This result in a more properly channeled and has come about through an evolutionary directed research and development effort process tied closely to advancement in sci­ as well as improved ability of the various ence and mechanics. Progress is accom­ serviees to concentrate within proper areaS panied and in1luenced by the struggle of of responsibility. TBI: CONTACT LAYER 87 Air Foree Job Important difficulties. Since this medium is air and This proposed additional area or stra­ not terra firma the air forces feel it is tum, the "contact layer," extends upward their domain and the general nomencla­ from the earth's surface to an unspecified ture used to describe it lumps it into this altitude. The exact upper elevation of the all-inclusive term, "air." contact layer is definitely a problem. It Today, all firepower is delivered through could vary from theater to theater depend­ this layer, vertical assaults and envelop­ ing upon the nature of major operational ments take place in it, and Army and Ma­ missions. The Joint Staff could well es­ rine Corps aircraft operate almost exclu­ tablish upper and lower limits for this var­ sively within it. It is a stratum as vital iation. An attempt to establish upper lim­ to the ground forces as the surface of the its here would only serve to complicate our earth itself. We err in calling it "air" and discussion unduly. permitting its inclusion in the general Before proceeding it must be empha­ term of "atmosphere." sized that there is little quarrel with the Earlier, direct support of ground troops Air Force on many of the missions pres­ was mentioned as an Air Force mission. ently assigned to that arm which affect Lack of the word "close" in this phrase ground combat. On the contrary, most was a deliberate omission-the basis for objective and thinking ground command­ the next point of discussion. ers, Army and Marine Corps, are as anx­ An analysis of close support and its im­ ious as any Air Force officer to ensure plications to ground forces actions will that we first destroy the enemy air and more clearly define what the Army desires. gain superiority. that we interdict the In the first place, the Army needs, as battlefield, and that direct support is pro­ never before, support not only by its own vided to ground troops. All of our most agencies but by those of air and naval esteemed commanders are unanimous in forces as well. The Army does not ask for the correctness of this doctrine. command of these supporting forces. It ·Vital Air Force responsibilities such as asks that they adhere to clearly defined achieving air superiority, interdiction, pro­ operational controls comparable to those viding column cover, and reconnaissance established for supporting weapons of "any are not only important but essential to the type. These controls increase in restriction success of ground combat. The ground and in the degree they are required by the forces assist and support the Air Force in ground commander in direct proportion to the execution of its mission by contribu­ the proximity of these supporting actions ting to air defense and the protection of to the immediate area of ground combat. Further delineation of geographic or atmospheric strata through which our various Armed Forces operate may provide an additional and easier approach to the solution of many problems confronting the services bases, airfields, and ground installations At present there should be no change in from ground attack. what support the Army wants from the Air Force. Contact Layer Not "Air" But if most of our common problems are "Close" Support Needed analyzed, it is apparent t~at the subject For "close" support purposes the'Army of operations in the contaJ:t layer is the requires a weapon not only controlled but basis for most of the present interservice commanded at the proper Army level. This . 38 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 level wi11 depend upon the characteristics of craft required to fulfill the role of air­ of the means of this close support, for ex­ borne ground force tank destrqyer or block­ ample, its range and delivery capability. house buster is as different from the fighter Since it will operate in the same area as bomber as any other weapon desjgned for our normal supporting artillery, it must a specific mission. be an Army weapon when used operation­ ally. Is this a description of a jet fighter, Overlap Is Desirable or a fighter-bomber type aircraft? Per­ It would, perhaps, be capable of elimi­ haps; perhaps not. What is needed is a nating targets similar to some of those weapon which can shoot from a stationary commonly destroyed by conventional fighter or movable aerial platform, over or in the bombers, but under an entirely different immediate vicinity of supported forces, to set of circumstances and in an entirely be used against enemy ground forces within different location. For example, mortars, the immediate battle area of troops in recoilless rockets, howitZers, and guns all contact. have some common targets. Each of these This weapon, conceivably, could have no weapons is required to fulfill a definite role possible utilization in an Air Force and its basic characteristics are designed counterair or interdiction role, and would to permit it to accomplish this. It is highly no more deprive the Air Force of its de­ desirable that the Air Force ~ghter be able sired aerial strength and capability than to carry a bomb load, be able to strafe the cannon or machinegun. It is purely with machinegun or rockets, and ,!n occa­ accidental or inadvertent that this sion provide c/oBe support on an emer­ "weapon" may have to have a propeller gency basis, just as any weapon should or wings to stay up. Its operation is re­ have emergency or secondary missions as, stricted entirely to the contact layer which, for example, the use of tanks in an indi­ as stated before, is a ground force stratum. rect fire role. But development effort should Its additional characteristics of range, de­ go into an airborne close support weapon livery capability, weapon and fuel capac­ with antitank capabilities to supplement ity, armor protection, and speed undoubt­ conventional artillery and ground based edly would be such as to render it antitank weapons. completely unsuitable for any fighter or If this development must start in the tactical air force type of mission. The type form of the present or W orId War II fighter bomber, certainly no usurpation of Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Jones an Air Force craft or mission is intended. was graduated from Harvard College in Rather, it should. be regarded as fortunate 1939. He served with the 2d Armored Di­ vision Artillery during all of its major that a tested and proved weapons system campaigns in World War II. After being is available as a point of departure for assigned as Assistant Director of Instruc­ stlch development. General Taylor summed tion at the Cavalry School, and attending the Field Artillery School, he returned up the situation in a recent address to the overseas where he was S3 of the 96th Association of the United States Army Field Artillery Group; G2, 2d Armored when he stated: "The tactical missile fam­ Division; and commanded the 517th Ar­ ily is already reducing the Army's reo mored Field Artillery Battalion. He at­ tended the 1953-51. Regular Course of the quirement for close combat air support. Command and General Staff College and This trend will continue." was Secretary General Staff, Headquar­ ters, Continental Army Command, Fort Reconnaissance Is Vital Monroe, Virginia, until being a88igned to . Likewise in the field of reconnaissance the Army Aviation Center as a 8tudent in the Senior Army Officer Flight Training the requirement for Air Force support ClMB. very definitely wi1l exist within the in­ THE CONTACT LAYER

definite future. But the Army also needs stricting the development of any agency its own aerial reconnaissance within the for the delivery of firepower upon the contact layer-reconnaissance capable

, The Army is vitally interested in strategic mobility-the ability to move rapidly to distant points about the earth's surface to apply military force in accordance with our national policies and decisions. This requirement for stra­ tegic mobility will face the Army as a phase of general or local war, We must be prepared to move quickly and stamp out "brush fires" wherever they may occur before they break out into general war. The means of transportation used will depend on the situation. If the time factor is urgent, if enemy bombing damages our ports, or if enemy submarines obstruct our sealanes, the Army must look to the air for its strategic mobility. We have a long way to go to reach a state of readiness in airborne strategic mobility consonant with the needs of the i Army. There is much to be done by the Air Force, by civil aviation, and by the Army itself in order to produce the cooperative results required.

• • • • • • I The Army has powerful new weapons, but it is the combination of firepower and mobility that wins wars. The Army's firepower is growing steadily, but I . the development of adequate mobility is lagging behind. The Army does not yet have the degree of mobility on the sea or in the air which it considers es­ sential to enable it to bring its firepower to possible areas of decision in suf­ ficient quantities at the rate required. Under Secreta1'1/ 01 the Army Charles C. Finucane Why Ciuil Works In the Corps of Engineers1

Lieutenant Colonel Harold J. St. Clair, Corps of Engineers Office of the District Engl~eer, Chicago District

"C IVIL works assignments are in­ What History Reveals volving United States Army engineers in As early as 1824 Congress undertook pork-barr~1 politics." "Why doesn't the the task of develpping our rivers and har­ Corps concentrate on military work­ bors on a national scale. It was President roads, bridges, minefielcJ, demolitions?" Monroe who assi~ned to the Corps of En­ "Civil works (flood control, rivers, har­ gineers the responsibility for waterway bors, and navigation) call for civilian re­ improvement and maintenance. sponsibility." Most often such opinions are Prior to that time, of course, Army en­ expressed by officers of the other arms gineers had long been active in public as and services although, it is reluctantly well as military affairs. It was in 1745 that .admitted, even some officers of the Corps Colonel Richard Gridley, the first Chief of Engineers have expressed similar views. Engineer, led his forces in reducing the Every department of the Government French Fort of Louisburg. Later, in the occasionally is subjected to public criti­ French and Indian War, it was Colonel cism. More often than not such criticism Gridley Who climbed the heights and stood is either biased or completely unjustified. with Wolfe at Quebec. When Washington Over the years the Civil Works Program became President, the Corps was estab­ of the Corps of Engineers has been a lished as a force of artillerists and engi­ favorite target of Government reorgan­ neers, and, in 1802, the present organiza­ izers, and numerous plans for transfer of tion of the Corps was authorized by these responsibilities to other Federal action of Congress. agencies have been proposed. As a result military personnel, as well as the general Assisted US Expansion public, have a one-sided view that is harm­ From these early beginnings, Army en­ ful-if not dangerous-to the national in­ gineers helped spearhead the continental terest. expansion of the United States. Backed up The Army's service schools in their in­ by a virile and determined government, struction quite properly emphasize the they guided the surveying and mapping basic combat mission of the Corps of En-' of the wilderness, fighting hostile Indians ginee!;,s and, to a lesser degree, its' tech­ and equally hostile forces of naturEl across nical service missions in theat~s of opera­ the continent. The Erie Canal, completed tion. While the historic responsibility of in 1825, was a pivotal event in the Na­ the Corps for civil works is mentioned on tion's reach toward the riches of the in­ occasion, the true effect of this work on terior and one .which contributed much to national defense seldom is recognized. the amazing growth of what 'was then a WHY CIVIL" WORKS IN THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS? 41 I small village, New York City. The Corps These civil works are surveyed, planned. of Engineers charted the Chesapeake and and constructed by the Corps of Engineers Ohio Canal, extended the National Road only after specific authorizations by Con­ from the Cumberland to the Ohio and be­ gress. These authOrizations are based on yond, and surveyed transcontinental rail­ recommendations by the Chief' of Engi­ roads to help weave the ever-expanding nellrs and are transmitted to Congress by transport network that today makes our the Secretary of the Army after coordi­ country the most mobile Nation on earth. nation with affected states and other Fed­ Engineering exploration helped traverse eral agencies and after clearance by the the Great Plains, found passage through Bureau of the Budget. the Rockies, and rode the turbulent Colum­ Needs Determine Projects bia to its mouth at the Pacific. American history is filled with' such names as Long, Projects originate in the needs of local people and are studied and planned by the Fremont, Bonneville, and a host of other Corps in close cooperation with local in­ engineer pathfinders. The record discloses dividuals, organizations, cities, towns, and how Army engineers made the Ohio, Mis­ souri, and Mississippi Rivers safe for nav­ other governmental units concerned. Nu­ merous public hearings are held so that igation; how they opened deep-draft har­ the views of both proponents and op­ bors on the Great Lakes, and how they ponents are given full consideration ip built and maintained lighthouses at coastal formulation of plans and recommenda­ harbors and on the lakes and rivers to tions. make possible safer navigation. Only with this long tradition of skilled accomplish­ Over 3,000 projects in every state of the ment in mind can the Corps' Civil Works Union have been authorized by Congress. Program be considered in proper perspec­ Over 7 billion dollars have been appropri­ ated for this work. Although constituting tive. one of the largest segments of Federal Today's Vast Program public works, the accomplishments are lit­ The Civil Works Program which Con­ tle known to the public. In reality they gress, by successive steps over the past 132 represent one of our best investments. of years, has assigned to the Corps of Engi­ public funds from both a military and a neers include Federal improvements of civil viewpoint. rivers and harbors for navigation, flood control, and related water resources devel­ Harbors Speed Progress opments. In recent years the development Civil works funds invested by the Gov­ of hydroelectric power, authorized by Con- ernment in the work of the Corps of En- Practical civil works experience, coupled with a thorough knowledge of military requirements. produces the ability and leadership so ur­ gently necessary to the rapid performance of vital wartime tasks

gress in connection with the aforemen­ gineers have produced for the United tioned projects, has !;lecome an important States a system of the best commercial element in the program. With water'short­ coastal harbors in the world-286 of them ages experienced in many areas of the in all. Not one of these, in its original con­ country. the inclusion of water supply dition, could have handled modern vessels storage in Corps of Engineers' reservoirs now using these ports, These projects have is becoming increasingly important. 'served to launch the men and materiels 42 MILITARY REVIEW . .JANUARY 19~1 from which our overseas victories were mitted establishment of additional ship­ forged in two crucial world wars. They yards far inland for construction of much­ have proved as indispensable to our Mili­ needed seagoing warcraft, as well as the tary Establishment as airports which far facilities for floating these crafts to ocean more often than harbors are regarded as ports. . military installations. Recent years record increasingly impor. Federal expenditures for harbor de­ tant waterway developments. Completion velopment, although restricted to major of work now in progress will link Pitts­ channels, basins, and related protective , burgh to Omaha and Montreal and Min­ features, invariably inspire port develop­ neapolis to Texas, Mexico, and even South ment by local interests that benefit both 'America in economical waterway trans­ military and industrial interests. Such im­ port. provements start a sort of chain reaction. The great Ohio-Mississippi-Missourl For example, since initiation of work on system fused with the St. Lawrence­ the St. Lawrence Seaway, practically every Great Lakes system and the Gulf Intra­ Great Lakes Harbor, from small fishing coastal Waterway by the Calumet-Sag boat and recreational harbors to main navigation project will constitute an in· heavy-duty ports with great industrial tracontinental trade route that will pro­ and military potentials, has improvements tect a vast amount of shipping from en· planned or underway. emy submarine operations in the event of another war. In addition, this transporta­ Inland Waterways Extended tion system, when completed, will com­ Similar Government investment in prise a commercial "crossroad" which Corps' "know-how" also has brought for promises to open opportunities for devel­ this Nation nearly 28,000 miles of im­ opment of the United States hinterland proved inland waterways which today are which stagger the imagination. Such de­ carrying millions of tons of freight at velopment cannot help but add greatly to some of the lowest carrier rates paid by the strength and security of the entire commerce and industry. In wartime this Western Hemisphere. waterway network provided efficient han­ dling of a tremendous amount of bulk Flood Control Benefits freight which other systems of transporta­ Flood control as a Federal responsibil­ tion, already heavily burdened, could not ity assigned to the Corps is in compara­ have carried. This waterway system per- tive infancy. (Congress did not accept it as a national obligation until 1936.) In Lieutenant Colonel Harold J. St. Clair this brief period substantial progress has served with the 815th, B06th, and 81Bth Engineer Combat Battalions during World been made. Flood control projects com· War II. He was among the first group of pleted since that time already have pre­ Army officers selected lor Army Mobili­ vented flood damages amounting to twice zation Training at the University 0/ Pitts­ the total cost of the projects. The Na· burgh in 1946 and in 1950 attended the lith Engineer Officers' Advanced Class at tion's major industries, with their immense Fort Belvoir, Virginia, subsequently being supporting populations, are located pri­ assigned as executive officer, Department marily in water basins. Uncontrolled floods 01 Military Arts, at The Engineer School. lie was with the Logistics Staff Office at in such areas comprise a threat to the en­ SHAPE in Paris/rom 1958 to 1954. Upon .tire Nation, for industrial strength is a his graduation from the 1951.-55 Regular major component of national defense. Course 0/ the Command and General Staff A floc>d menace still exists in every river College, he assumed his present fJosition as executive officer, Chicago District, Corps valley, for there is no major river basin 01 Engineers. .in the country where planned flood control· WHY CIVIL' WORKS IN THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS! ,43 systems have been fully completed. As the that analytical attention, will be directed. Nation grows the value of farming and The activity to be appraised involves industrial areas to be protected also in­ work of the largest engineering organiza­ creases. tion in the world. It is an organization Hydroelectric Power which performs global Army and Air The importance of hydroelectric power Force military construction as well as eivil development in the Civil Works Program works. It is capable of undertaking any has grown with the increasing needs of conceivable assignment-tlie Manhattan the Nation and of the defense industry for Project, the Panama Canal, the St. Law­ electrical energy. TwentY-five hydroelec­ rence Seaway, an airfield'in Saudi Ara­ tric plants have been completed and 14 are bia, or a pipeline in Alaska, ad infinitum. under construction. The total installed ca­ In the continental United States the or­ pacity in these projects will be about 7.5 ganization is divided into 10 divisions million kilowatts initially. Although the which, in turn, are subdivided into 40 dis­ Corps of Engineers constructs and op­ tricts. Division engineers report directly erates these plants, the power is turned to the Chief of Engineers in Washington; over to the Department of Interior for district engineers report to division en­ marketing as prescribed by law. gineers. District engineers have responsi­ Other benefits result from the compre­ bility for design and construction of all hensive and coordinated work of the Corps. civil works and all Army and Air Force Municipal water supplies are provided for construction projects within their districts. 37 cities and important facilities for pres­ Civilians Are Nucleus ervation of fish and wildlife and for rec­ Key executive positions in divisions and reational purposes are afforded by civil districts are filled by Regular Army offi~ works reservoirs. ' cers. Permanent civil-service employees Obviously, there shohld be little reluc­ constitute the staff of division and dis­ taBce to acknowledge military desirability trict officers. These staffs provide an en­ of 'good harbors, navigable inland water­ during nucleus of highly qualified engi­ ways, effective flood control works and ex­ neers capable of activating the bulk of tensive hydroelectric power. Yet the skep­ civil work design and construction and of tical may insist that the Army has no expanding or contracting rapidly to meet business engaging in this type of work. varying military construction require­ However, careful study of the engineering ments generated by the continual 'shifts organization that currently executes these and maneuvers of global strategy. public works, together with an analysis of By the very nature of our politieal and its capabilities, should convince the most strategic doctrine, rapid mobilization unbelieving of the value of such activity rather than large standing forces is the to all who are concerned with national de­ essence of the United States defense pol­ fense. icy. The extremely rapid construction of Organized for Dual Jol) Army and Air Force training bases and Duality of organization pe~mits the installations is essential to our survival. Corps of Engineers to deploy for both the A large well-distributed constructiol\ force miss,ions of fighting and of building. Nom­ is, therefore, more important than any inally, about three-fourths of the Corps' other mobilization provision, since all other total effort is given over to military re­ mobilization depends upon construction quirements. The remaining one-fourth is first. The magnitude of the increase in elCpended on civil works and military con­ wartime construction can be appreciated struction. It is to this remaining quarter by comparing the total expenditure of ap­ 44 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957

proximately 250 million dollars for both ment that provides for speedy mobilization military and civil construction in 1939 in war and that also can be geared to effi­ with the expenditure in 1943 of over four cient . development of the country's vital billion dollars. resources in peace. Modern warfare re­ quires a construction service capable and Rapid Mobilization experienced in moving into areas which Existing district offices keep in constant have been subjected to large-scale destruc­ contact with the local construction indus­ tion and restoring essential facilities. try. Through this relationship the Na­ The capability of the Corps in dealing tion's enormous engineering and construc­ with disaster was demonstrated in the fall tion potential can be marshaled with of 1955 when Hurricane Diane, accompa­ maximum rapidity. Such a capability is nied by unprecedented floods, virtually im­ unique in military history-a factor which mobilized the industry and commerce of must not be underrated and certainly not all New England. By Presidential order ignored. Only so long as our organized construction forces can build bigger, bet­ the Federal Civil Defense' Agency was ter, and faster, can we expect to maintain made responsible for relief and rehabilita­ national supremacy. The Korean conflict tion work in this area. 1'he director im­ mediately designated the Corps of Engi­ demonstrated the value of such organiza­ tion. Vast new military installations were neers as the reconstruction force for the built at opposite ends of the earth within Federal Civil Defense Agency. Existing a few months. It is significant that civil division and district offices in the devas­ works construction was not reduced to a tated area immediately initiated action in ,'point that endangered national safety in response to the need. These offices, sup­ any degree. plemented with Corps personnel from all over the United States, organized and di­ Even during Korean hostilities, airbases rected the work of local construction forces and other installations were being built in and succeeded in restoring essential utili­ practically every part of the free world, ties, services, and communications within from the equator to the Arctic. And the a relatively few days. same organization which met these needs has resumed its normal activity with re­ Invaluable Training spect to harbor, dam, levee, and floodwall Although the requirement for a national construction with speed that amazed all military construction organization is ac­ those who understood the problems in­ cepted, skeptics may still ask: "Why use volved. Regular Army engineer personnel in form­ ing such an organization 1" In such cases A Unique Capability the fact overlooked is that the broad ex­ The economy and military value of this perience gained by Engineer officers in dual organization for priority construc­ planning, organizing, and directing large tion is obvious and has been supported by civil undertakings in time of peace pro­ incumbent secretaries of war since 1800. vides the greatest practical training pro- ' The Corps' constant preparedness to as­ gram that is available to any of the com­ sume an emergency war load, in addition bat arms or technical services. Almost 10 to meeting civil works needs, is enjoyed by years before World War II General Mac­ no other nation. Continuation of this dual Arthur, when Chi,ef of Staff of the Army, organization appears to be one of the stated that administration of civil works most economical investments our Govern­ "furnishes officers of the Corps with the ment can make, because here is an instru­ finest possible peacetime training in mani­ WHY CIVIL WORKS IN TliE CORPS OF E:NGI:NEERST 45 fold construction, engineering, and. pro­ General of Italian State Railways, bas curement tasks that devolve upon them pointed out that the American Army en­ in time of war." gineers "revealed a technical training_ This practical civil works experience, which no word can sufficiently praise." coupled with 8' knowledge of military re­ And captured Japanese documents show quirements, produces the ability and lead­ amazement at the ability of the Americans ership necessary to accomplish major war­ in engineering and use of heavy construc­ time tasks in logistics and command. It tion machinery. was no accident that in World War II World War II provides many examples (almost without exception) major lines of of our superiority in military engineering. communication and logistic functions were In the Pacific the Japanese had developed organized and commanded by officers with a four-engine bomber with both the carry­ peacetime civil works experience. Appar­ ing capacity and the range that could have ently General Eisenhower was of the same been as deadly for our airbases as our opinion when, in 1947 while Chief of Staff, B-21/s were for theirs. But Japanese air­ he added: field construction methods were amazingly I have always believed that not only did poor. The multitude of conscripted labor­ the Army engineers do a ,splendid job in ers who were forced to break coral by hand the river and harbor works, but I believe and push it on narrow-gauge cars to the the rivers and harbors do more to train roads and airstrips could not begin to our engineers in the large conceptions by match our timing nor the efficiency of our which they did their job in war than any­ construction methods. thing else they could do. In Europe Hitler miscalculated the abil­ ity of our engineers to rehabilitate the A Recognized Advantage disabled ports of France and Belgium. Not only our own highest military au­ Troops and supplies poured into the Eu­ thorities but even senior officers of the ropean theater of operations at even British, French, Canadian, and Australian greater than peacetime capacity through Armies have attributed United States ports that had been completely demolished World War II superiority in military en­ only a few weeks following their capture. gineering to the peacetime experience af­ forded our officers on major civil works. No Polities, P.lease! The Engineer in Chief of the Australian As previously stated the Corps of En­ Army sought legislation which would en­ gineers does not initiate civil works proj­ able the Royal Australian Engineers to ects, and contrary_ to an infrequently secure peacetime civil works experience expressed opinion does not engage in po-' by placing such works under their direct litical activity on behalf of projects. The charge. Corps as an entity has no political opinions From the enemy side of World War II in- such matters. The people themselves, we have outspoken testimony. General Al­ through congressional action, must bring! fred Jacob, who was nearest to being a such work into being. In the execution of; Chief of Engineers for the German Army, its civil works responsibilities, the Corps points out the theoretical and inadequate of Engineers does exactly what it is told nature of the peacetime training of Ger­ to do by Congress. man Army engineers. He states that "in It must be understood, however, that the I'eacetime there was no construction serv­ Corps does have a decisive responsibility ice and not even cadres for it." for seeing that work proposed is neces­ Italian General Di Ra~~ondo, Director sary, and that its completion will repre­ 46 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1967 sent at least a full dollar's value (benefit ception concerning the Corps' basic com­ to cost ratio in excess of unity) to the Na­ bat mission. Lieutenant General Samuel tioli. There are, inevitably, differences of D. Sturgis, Jr., recently retired former opinion as to what is most essential, but Chief of Engineers, has stated the posi­ fortunately such probll!ms generally can tion concisely to officers of the Corps: be resolved by a solid, factual understand­ The combat role of the Corps of Engi­ ing among amenable individuals or or­ neers is our fundamental, basic role in the ganizations. Army scheme of things. We must plug it and support it and saturate it and per­ Needs Continue to Grow f01'm it beyond the shadow of any doubt in Actually, when compared to this Na­ , the minds 01 the Chief 01 Staff, the Gen­ tion's potential, little more than superficial e1"al Staff, and the Army commanders. effort has be!)n made to apply existing en­ Without question the engineer soldier gineering and technical skills to the task will continue in combat, by feats of either of controlling rivers, developing harbors, construction or destruction, to assist the and directing development of the Nation's advance of our combat forces or to delay natural resources. As population grows, the advance of an enemy. He will become it is estimated that demands for flood con­ even more valuable and, consequently, even trol, navigation improvement, hydroelec­ more vulnerable than in Korea, where en­ tric power, water supply, and other benefits gineer casualties were second only to those will double every 60 years. sustained by the infantry. Within the past few years it has become increasingly clear that all uses of water The Heart of the Matter are interrelated. Each development of It seems impossible to avoid the conclu­ water usage or control affects every other sion that the COJPs of Engineers' respon­ development in "existing or potential river sibility for civil works is important to the basins. The fullest practical use of water Army and to the National Defense Pro. resources requires integrated, comprehen­ gram for three major reasons: sive, river-basin planning and develop­ 1. Practical peacetime training is af­ ment. As an illustration, a serious water forded engineer officers through valuable shortage in the city of New Orleans has . civil works experience. been avoided by the timely operation of 2. A nationwide organization in being Fort Peck Dam and related releases from is made available for rapidly mobilizing other water-conservation structures far the Nation's construction potential to meet upstream. This fact gains major signifi­ a domestic disaster or defense emergency. cance when one realizes that the Fort 3. The products of the Corps' Civil Peck Dam is located in the mountains of Works Program-good harbors, navigable Montana over 2,500 miles from New Or­ waterways, flood-free valleys, and large leans. Such long-range, large-scale plan­ hydroelectric plants-are essential ele· ning and development demands a perma­ ments in the prosecution of war as well as nent, experienced organization, free of in progressive economic development of political pressures. the country. With the Corps' civil works responsibll. The Corps' Combat Role ity viewed in this perspective, it should be From the standpoint of tradition and apparent that this very significant contri. experience the Corps of Engineers fully bution to the capability of the Nation, as expects to continue spearheading future a whole, and to its military forces, in par­ civil developments of the type under dis­ ticular, requires far more thoughtful con· cussion. However, this implies no miscon­ sideration in the days ahead. How Much Constitutes ATrend? Another Look at Unification Lieut!!nant Colonel Anthony L. Wermuth, Infant1"1/ 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division

IN 1926 Congress held hearings on a bill between opposing positions and not enough relating to a now-familiar subject: Uni­ on the extensive areas of agreement. fication of the Armed Forces. At one point in the hearings, Mr. Dwight F. Morrow Record Is Confusing addressed a prophetic remark to the mem­ A student who has hit only the high­ bers of that committee: " ••. you have only lights on the record may overidentify cer­ begun. When the youngest member of this tain views with each service. For example, committee has reached the chairmanship lie may conclude that in the past the by seniority you will still be discussing Army has always advocated unification, this question." that the Navy has always opposed it, and Today. 30 yllars later, the subject of uni­ that the Air Force favored unification in fication of the Armed Forces is coming to name but was really seeking separation the fore again. Air Force spokesmen, be­ of military affairs into three coequal areas ginning with General Spaatz, have recently of land, sea, and air. begun to apply what is apparently a con­ It appears that in the latter instance certed impetus behind the formation of a the Air Force may be revising its objec­ sil)gle service, and others have taken up tive. Charles J. V. Murphy wrote in the the issue. May 1966 Fortune: There are many sides to this question Only a deccule ago, when the proc6i3 0/ and many opinions about it; most of the unification was started, most of the out­ important ones have been heard several standing military leculers, including Gen­ times, some at exhaustive length. Espe­ eral Eisenhower, came out strongly /0'1' CJ cially during the latter phases of World #tingle service e8tablishment, with a Bingle War II, and during the postwar period General Stall. The Navy sank the scheme. When the National Security Act of 1947 was being debated, anyone who followed Whether this statement is accurate in the single platform of congressional hear­ all respects may be debatable, as well as ings had ample opportunity to hear the whether it would have even the same de­ pros and cons of unification. gree of applicability today. In any event, i Like all important questions, this one is it may be oversimplifying the views of the ! enormously complicated, involving not only respective services to categorize them so § .relevant facts, differing interpretations of elCclusively. Some of the "outstanding mil­ i relevant facts, and varying ideas, but also itary leaders" to whom Mr. Murphy refers ! different personal and institutional read­ were Navy officers. ings of history, and variant philosophies Perhaps a few highlights from the longer of organiZation and of war. And as in most record may be cited hereto illustrate the debates about great qUestions, too Dluch considerable history of this problem which stress may have been laid on the differences is far older than a decade. One of the most 48 MILITARY REVIEW J"ANUARY 1957 exhaustive and valuable analyses of the early claims for autonomy which led Sec­ genesis of defense unification is a study retary of War Baker to remark in his made in pursuit of a Harvard doctorate by Annual Report for 1919: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence J. Legere, To separate them makes them rival serv­ and her.e it may be well to interpolate sev­ ices with the whole trail of evils which eral of his points. He writes: such rivalry 'creates, evils which in time The genesis of the long-lived principle of peace mean contention before Congre88 01 cooperation in American military tra­ for unbalanced appropriations, griellance8 dition is found in the jOt'nt operations of and fretfulness about relative rank and the Revolution. The record. of relations be­ , rapidity of promotion, and in time of war tween the Army and Navy under the prin­ the sub8titution of • _ . service prides for ciple of mutual cooperation was not a a single emotion of pride in one service. particularly proud. one. The United States neller entered a war prior to 19.t,.1 with. Many Proposals Submitted any~hing which could be dignified by be­ In 1922 the first formal proposal was ing called a joint war plan, developed made for a single department of defense, through peacetime staff work. • •• It is in the form of a recommendation sent to no eXaggeration to say that joint opera­ President Harding by a joint congres­ tions were inarked by concord and success sional committee on reorganization of the when the Army and Navy leaders got along executive branch of the Government. When well together, and by friction and failures the 69th Congress convened in December when they did not. 1925, more than 15 bills were introduced providing for various organizations such Proposed Unified Commands as a department of national defense, a Legere continues: "In 1910 the other­ separate or unified air force, or a council wise useless Joint Board made a proposal of national defense. for joint operations by which unified com­ In 1926 General Drum submitted to a mand would obtain, the first such proposal House Committee a study made by the for United States doctrine"-the actual Army's G3 entitled, "Discussion of a Coun· recommendation by the Board said that cil of National Defense," and concluding "mere cooperation • • • should not be per­ that "inefficient compromises" had been mitted to exist . . • divided responsibility reached on such questions as unity of com­ invites failure." This latter recommenda­ mand, roles and missions, air programs, tion by the old Joint Board was signed by and manpower. Also in 1926 Represents- Our militt;lry problems cannot be deferred indefinitely, but must be reo 80lved correctly bll military men who talk to each other, listen to each other, understand each other, and who, finally, agree with each other

Admiral George Dewey, the senior mem­ tive J. P. Hill said: "It is absolutely es­ ber,-and was endorsed by both the Secre­ sential that any secretary of defense have taries of War and Navy, as well as the a super general staff ••• coordinating the President. However, legislation was re­ Army and Navy and air and natipnal quired, and after the Navy in 1913 re­ resources." versed its position, the project died. One of the central dilemmas that faced After World War I, airmen set up their the services during the years when veri· HOW MUCH CONSTITUTES A TRE1ND? 49 - ous unification proposals were discussed the National Security Act of 1947, and was whether to argue service roles on the thus to some degree a more solid basis is . basis of mission or element. For example, available for evaluating unific,lltion than the argument arose in 1920 as to which mere predictions, fears, prejudices, enthu­ service should- operate Army transports. siasms, suspicions, or guesses. Some of Says Legere: "The Navy came very close ·the expressed fears have been proved to claiming the transports because they · groundless;. others, perhaps, have been af­ moved on the water"-that is, using the firmed. How has unification worked out? same type of "element basis" for argu­ Is everyone satisfied with it in its current ment as was used by many airpower en. form? Is anyone satisfied? thusiasts who insisted that every impor­ tant machine that flies in air must be part I Arguers Avoid Issues of an air force, whatever the mission may . Actually, there is in this field, perhaps be. more than in most others, a tendency for On the whole, howev~r, the Navy has two people to talk on opposite sides of the consistently stuck to mission basis-that question, to use the same words but to is, that a service must retain all things mean different things by them, and to jg. needed to accomplish its mission, whether nore blandly the great areas within the the things moved on land, sea, or air; and question on which they would agree if in many important discussions the Army they ever stopped to investigate such areas. has also argued on the mission basis. 'this It is a lot like the argument between dilemma led to seeming inconsistencies "conservatives" and "liberals." Many a when the Army and Navy opposed a sepa­ conservative spokesman says, "I believe rate air force as violating the principle conservatism is best because-"; and then of unity of command, yet prior to World he proceeds to cite those features of con­ War II the two could not reach agreement servatism which are universally sound. at­ 01\ the application of the same principle tractive, and persuasive. Then, continues to. their own joint operations. the conservative spokesman, "I believe lib­ Whatever the merits of advance predic­ eralism is bad because-"; and then he tions, pro or con, a form of unification be­ proceeds to cite only those aspects of lib­ came the law of the land in 1947. It was eralism which are generally impractical, too advanced for some critics, not ad­ fantastic, and alienating. In return, the vanced enough to suit others. We have liberal spokesman cites'the favorable ex­ had some nine years of experience with tremes of liberalism and the unfavorable extremes of conservatism. Each thus con­ Lieutenant Colonel Anthony L. Wermuth has been a frequent contributor to the tributes to confusing instead of clarifying I MILITARY REVIEW. A graduate of the 1940 the issues, for both are actually avoiding class of the United States Military Acad. the real issues between them. emy, he holds a Master of Arts degree from Columbia University. His military Argument Still Rages service inoludes duty as battalion com­ mander and Gs of the Southern Landing In this fashion some advocates of a sin­ Force on Kiska Island; instructor and as­ · gle Armed Forces staff in the Defense De­ sistant profesBor of English at West Point; partment w:U contend that every service Headquarters, USAREUR, and Headquar. ters, European Command; Assistant Sec­ believes in and practices at every level the retary General Staff, Office of the Chief principle of command by one man, that of Staff, Department of the Army; and in modern military operations are too 'intri­ the Plans Division, Office of the A8sistant cately interdependent and too critical to Chief of Staff, GS. He is presently assigned the Nation's security to be entrusted to a t~ the !lIst Infantry, !l4tk Infantry Divi· .ton. system of cooperation that might-but that 50 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 also might not-work. He cites the con­ been expressed but which 1 have never fusion, waste, duplication, and veritable been able to understand-is a fe(lr that ex­ disasters that have occurred due to break­ ecutives, including military officers, will be downs in "cooperation." assigned to supervise weapons or units in On the opposite side, opponents of a which they have not personally served. single staff argue that such an organiza­ Even as late as June 1956, a former offi­ tion leads to a "man on horseback," that it cial of a military department, when asked provides too easy opportunities to ignore his opinion of possible unification, replied the views of large segments of opinion out­ that it did not make much sense to him side the experience of the top man, or even because, among other reasons, "artillery. that a single department would be too men would' be assigned to command de­ large and complex for one man to control. stroyers." In connection with this last point it is Leaders Can Be Found interesting to note that James Forrestal Such a peculiar expectation can be read­ testified before congressional committees ily refuted on two levels of argument. The his opinion that a single defense depart­ first is that, at the highest levels, the qual­ ment would be too large for one man. Sub­ ities essential for commanders and staff sequently, in 1947, Mr. Forrestal became officers must of necessity include the abil­ the first head of the single Department of ity to supervise large enterprises which Defense--a position which, it should be include some activities which the com­ added, he filled with great distinction. mander has not personally performed. There are, and obviously will continue to· Not Too Big for One Man be, many admirals of the Navy assigned It cannot be successfully held that any command 01.' staff supervision over opera­ organization, however large, military or tions involving destroyers but who, like otherwise, is "too big" for one man; and artillerymen, have not personally served to hold so is to demean our powers, to take on destroyers. counsel of small fears, and to allege an This requirement is common to all serv­ incapacity to cope with whatever prob­ ices, indeed to all large enterprises; and lems the future brings. I expect, for exam­ all services meet it by necessarily assign­ ple, that this Nation will always have a ing to certain commanders and staff offi­ single President, no matter how big the cers responsibility :tor supervising many Nation becomes. The number of his as­ activities which they have not personally sistants, the duties of his Cabinet, the or­ performed on their way up. Commanders ganizations through which he discharges of Army infantry divisions are not always, his responsibilities-all these may change by any means, general officers whose en­ with the passage of time. We should ex­ tire previous service has been in infantry. pect them to. But we should not expect On the other hand, an infantry-experi­ that when the Nation becomes of a certain enced division commander commands a size, the President will have to become two unit in which there are lesser units of in­ people or three or a committee. Similarly, fantry, artillery, engineers, signal, quar­ less comprehensive organizations than the termaster, armor, medics, and others. What natiQllal one supervised by the Chief Ex­ Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Opera­ ecutive will doubtless prove to be adapta­ tions has himself been a medic, engineer, ble to the future; and executives will pilot, comptroller, and all the other spe­ doubtless be found who are equal to the cialists he commands, as well as all varie- . challenges. ties of line officer? The President has never A related; fear-one which has often delivered mail, but he supervises the Post HOW MUCH CONSTITUTES A TREND? 51 Office Department along with all his other Mr. Mark Watson of the Baltimore Sun responsibilities. and Mr. Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times, both distinguished commentators No Real Problem Exists on military affairs, have recently published An additiol\al, if minor, refut!'tion is their observations that the military ad­ that, at lesser levels, it is a relatively visors' roles are being gradually diminished simple matter of personnel assignment to in importance. The National Security Act keep the right man out of the wrong place. of 1947 contains a specific provision that The Army has been assigning thousands the Secretary of Defense will not form a of artillery unit commanders for years and military staff. has yet to assign one to such positions as chief surgeon of an Army hospital or chief Secretary Needs Stair scientist of an electronic research labo­ It is the contention here that in order to ratory. Similarly, the Navy has found it conduct the affairs of the Department of relatively simple to keep destroyers and Defense, the secretary must have a staff submarines out of the command of procure­ and that he has, in fact, developed one. ment specialists or construction engineers. And, since he is forbidden by law to have There are many other points to be ar­ a military staff, the inevitable staff that gued about unification, and it appears he has developed will have to be, and is, likely that opportunities will soon be given civilian. to hear t\tem all at least once more. With­ It has been remarked often enough in out in this discussion pretending to give recent years that in World War II the anywhere near comprehensive coverage of total Armed Forces of the United States both sides of the problem, I would like to numbered three times the size of the cur­ discuss two special trends whose signifi­ rent establishment, but that the wartime cance increases continuously. Both of them establishment was supervised by seven to tend to argue that greater unification 10 civilians of assistant secretary rank or wilUld be desirable. I do not pretend even higher, whereas the current much smaller that my discussion will include all that establishment is supervised by approxi­ can be said about these two points, but mately 40 to 50 civilians of similar rank. both are worth the thoughtful considera­ And below these highest ranks, the De­ tion of all military and civilian citizens partment of Defense has been developing con~ern~d with dev?loping an ?Ptim~m or­ a multilayered zone, above the military gamzatlOn for natIonal security. ~ services, which steadily multiplies and sub­ divides into increasing numbers of civilian Two Dangerous Trends supervisors. The two trends are: ! 1. There is some reason to feel that the Hear the Military Voice military voice within the Department of Unification under legislation permitting Defen8e organization is becoming harder or requiring the Secretary of Defense to and harder to hear, as the top layers of establish a military staff at the top of the the Department of Defense become in­ Defense Department would alleviate this creasingly staffed by civilians. increasing "civilianization" and give per­ 2. The interrelationship of all armed haps greater weight to the military ad­ forc6s in. modern warfare appears to war­ vice of military men. rant development of more effective means No valuable tradition of any service or for the resolution of conflicting military unit need be lost. There is no problem in­ views by military men among the military volved that could not be resolved by men staffs in Washington. of good will addressing themselves to the 52 llILITARY REVIEW .J4NUARY 1967 problem of staff unification. T~e issue of The second major ·trend to receive com­ civilian control would be larg~ly irrele­ ment in this discussion concerns the need vant to such a change; for civilian control to provide a more effective organizational would be just as thoroughly assured under means whereby military issues can be de­ such an arrangement as it is now. bated and resolved. It can be held that The constitutional powers of the Presi­ there does not now exist a really effective dent and Congress over the Armed Forces military organizational joint arena at the would be unshaken. The civilian line of seat of Government. The Joint Staff in the top supervision would still comprise sev­ Pentagon is actually very limited in its eral layers of "insurance" of the principle powers and responsibilities. Its main re­ of civilian control: the President, the Na­ 'Sponsibility is largely confined, not to tional Security Council (and the Opera­ planning and policymaking, but to propos­ tions Coordinating Board), the Secretary ing plans and policies. It implements and of Defense, the Under Secretary of De­ supervises nothing. Outside Washington, fense, and such Assistant Secretaries of of course, there are in existence several Defense as were considered necessary. operationally effective joints staffs which The development of such a military staff, both plan and supervise operations, such embracing representatives of all types of as the staffs of SACEUR, SACLANT, military experience, would provide an au­ USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCARIB, thoritative and responsible vehicle for the CINCFE, and CINCAL. resolution of military views, and military affairs would be conducted by military men Present System Weak unquestionably responsible to civilian con­ There are many vehicles, committees, trol. Incidentally, such an arrangement commissions, briefings, liaison offices, and would clarify a peculiar difference in the councils through which respective service statutory roles of the military chiefs of views are given varying oppor~unities to the services. In the National Security Act, be heard in Waahington. Most of them the Chief of Naval Operations and the seem to be far too compartmentalized and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have com­ far too restrained by effective attachment mand missions written into their duties, to individual service views and "party but the Chief of Staff of the Army has no lines." The result has been that many of expressed command function. the most important issues of national mil· Leadership Is Easential itary policy and doctrine have yet to be In underlining the indispensability of resolved. hearing military men on military affairs, In the past decade, particularly, as the we may desire to recall the advice of media of mass communications have been Henry L. Stimson, the great United States perfected and expanded in influence Secretary of War during both world wars: throughout all phases of our lives-tele­ Within the Army, war brings more VISion, radio, newspapers, magazines, changes still. In the making ol·a citizen books-such platforms have come increas­ army the central is81J.e is leadership; 01 ingly to be utilized for the advancement BUch leaderBhip war is the final teBt. But of partisan views on matters which are this leadership must be military; the' con­ not wholly within the purview of the par­ fidenCe 01 the Army and the country must tisan. Even in commercial advertisements, be confidence in soldiers • •• the pearl 01 partisan interpretations of alleged national highest price lor a democracy at war is military policy, which are well beyond the well-placed confidence in its military lead­ special provinee of the special pleader, are' ership. thunderously advanced and achieve eer­ HOW MUCH CONSTITUTES A TREND? 58 tain effectiveness in partly informing, and preparations. There is a sense in which partly misinforming, a most articulate each service can be said to envision a dif. electorate, which in tUrn supports one side ferent war. < or the other in these debates through con­ gressional, pr~ss, or other pressures., Unanswered Questions Thtul the solutions to military issues are Does anyone know with certainty what coming to be more and more subject to the next major war will be like? If not, the effects 01 influential partisan views, what are the most dangerous possible kinds not only through the validity of the ideas of war, and what are the most likelY kinds themselves, but also through successful of war? Do we accept destruction as the exploitation of the media of mIlSS commu­ SUpreme objective of military action? Do nication-supported in certain instances we agree on a strategy of accepting great by commercial interests with a stake in destruction among ourselves, provided we partisanship. can only visit somewhat greater destruc­ tion on an opponent? If not, what other Dangerous Meddling types of military actions are desirable or Many of the most crucial and funda­ probable or possible? What preparations mental military issues that demand reso­ are we making to cope with all the major lution soon are being overtly and sub,tly possible and probable types of war? Do pushed toward not-always-satisfactory we need allies today? Will we need them resolution by these methods of partisan­ <10 years from now? TWenty years from ship in magazines and advertising col­ umns. I will mention only one example now? What actions will have, to be per­ here. In its May 1956 issue, the magazine formed by land, sea, and air forces in each Air Force (published by the Air Force of the possible and probable types of war? Association) said in a staff-written ar­ Will fission weapons be used in the next ti.cle: "But national strategy doesn't fore­ waf? Can anyone be certain that they will see a decisive role for US ground troops be used? Can anyone be certain that they in any kind of nuclear war, global or will not be used? Will fusion weapons be peripheral." That such alleged "foresight" used? ' is "national strategy" will come as news These, and a thousand related questions to those actually responsible for making -a million related questions-must be the decisions on national strategy. thoroughly and objectively explored and, The military problems which face us to the extent possible, answers must be cannot be deferred indefinitely. They must reached. There are many nonmilitary as­ be resolved with dispatch, and they must pects to these questions, involving judg­ be resolved correctly. The broader-than­ ments and decisions by nonmilitary men; military problems must be resolved by ci­ but insofar as they are military questions, vilian authorities. The military problems they must be largely resolved by military must be resolved by military men who men-men of character, oj ea:perience, of listen objectively to each other and come judgment, of objectivity-men aware' 01 to agreed conclusions. the awful crisis that is upon us and' the Apparently, agreement has not yet been awful consequences of taking a wrong reached on the ,solutions to such funda­ course. They must be resolved by military m,ental questions as what the next war will men who talk to each other; who listen to be like, what military preparations we each other; who understand each other; should make to meet it, and what priori­ and who fina,lly, after talking, listening, ties should be assigned among the \farious and understanding, agree with each, other. ANew Looh for the SOlliet Ground forces Lieutenant Colonel Irving Heymont, Infantry Faculty, Command and General Staff College

WHILE the startling postwar devel­ fire in keeping with the new Soviet em· opment of the Soviet air forces since World phasis on assault and area fire. The new War II may have received more public at­ Soviet small arms, issued to units within tention, the changes and developments in the last few years, are in keeping with this the Soviet ground forces have been many emphasis. All of the new small arms fire and equally far-reaching. a common cartridge, a fact which greatly With the end of World War II the So­ simplifies logistical requirements. viets embarked on a program to develop a highly mobile army possessing great firepower and shock action. The develop­ ment of an army with these characteristics coincided with the development of tactical atomic weapons. The characteristics re­ quired of forces for atomic warfare are precisely the same that the Soviets started to develop as a result of the lessons of Wodd War II. Now the Soviet ground forces development program is reaping a bonus effect that all modern armies must be equipped to fight on the atomic battle. field. In the field of weapons the Soviets have takeJ full cognizance of the good and bad features of their wartime models. In fact, apparently only a few-the very best-of Left to right: Semiautomatic Rifle, Sub· machinegun, Light Machinegun their wartime weapons have been retained. Before World War II Soviet small-arms In recent May Day parades the Soviets design stressed accuracy of fire. During have shown two new mortars of I60·mm and after the war the trend was toward and 240-mm caliber. The new I60-mm mor­ the development of increased automatic tar apparently is an improvement of the The Soviets are not putting all their eggs in an atomic b'asket-devel. ·opments in ground forces now in being have given the Soviet Army the means to achieve greater firepower, maneuverability, and mobility A NEW LOOK FOR THE SOVIET GRbU:ND FORCES 55

M1949 model, and probably has an in­ creased range capability. The 240-mm mor­ tar is an innovation. Probably no other army in the world has an operational mor­ tar of such la"rge caliber. The range of such a mortar should well approximate that of a light field artillery piece. It is also not inconceivable that an atomic shell may be developed for a mortar of that caliber. Postwar neld and antiaircraft artillery developments have been most extensive. Shortly after the war the 76-mm divisional 160-mm Mortar gun was replaced by an 85-mm gun which is well suited for- indirect fire and for use ties. The new 203-mm gun-hoWitzer, con­ as an antitank piece. sidering its caliber and range, may well be Other new artillery weapons seen in re­ capable of firing an atomic artillery round. cent parades are a new 122-mm field gun, Mobility of artillery also has been en­ a lOO-mm field antitank gun, a 152-mm hanced by the development of high-speed howitzer and a new 203-mm gun-howitzer. artillery tractors. One such tractor, uti­ P,11 these new models indicate more mo­ lizing a medium tank type suspension, ap­ bile ~ieces and increased range capabiIi­ peared in the 1955 May Day parade.

85-mm Divisional Gun 56 MtLITARY REVrEW JANUARY 1957

152-mm Howitzer

203-mm Gun-Howitzer

122-mm Field Gun

240-mm Mortar

:.. A NEW LOOK FOR THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES 57 In .the. field of heavy rocket launchel'S, bility because of spin stabilization rather the Mta and M81 K4tushas of Wodd War than the old fin stabilized weapons. A very II fame have been replaced with new self­ new large rocket launcher capable of fir­ propelled launchel'S of' 6-inch and 9-inch ing four large diameter rockets was first caliber. These launchers, judging from reo seen in 1954 parades. Some speculate that ports of experts who have seen them, this new rocket may in time have an atomic probably have increased accuracy and sta­ capability.

6-inch Rocket Launcher (16 round)

9·inch Rocket Launcher (12 round) 68 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1967 Apparently cognizant of the western strength in the air, the Soviets have not A number of the photographs used neglected antiaircraft artillery develop­ to illustrate this article are being pub­ ments, particularly for close support of lished here for the first time since troops. The wartime 12.7-mm, single bar­ their release.-Editor. rel, antiaircraft machinegun has been reo

4-round Rocket Launcher

57-mm AA Gun A NEW LOOK FOR THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES 59 placed by a larger caliber rapid firing wagons are things of the past. The organic heavy antiaircraft machinegun in single, v~hicle authorization for the rifle division twin, and quadruple barrel versions. has been increased tremendously. In addi­ Other new Soviet antiaircraft artillery tion, the Soviets, judging from the recent weapons are of 57-mm, IOO-mm, and May Day parades and articles in the Soviet 122-mm caliber. These new weapons are press, have developed amphibious vehicles believed equipped with indirect and radar of varying capacity. Equivalent and im­ controlsi giving the Soviets a well-balanced proved versions of the United States am­ family of modern antiaircraft artillery phibian J,4-ton truck and DUKW are weapons. known. Armored personnel carriers have Mobility of ground forces both on the been developed. Production of these vehi­ ground and in the air has not been neg­ cles must be extensive as they are known lected. Long supply columns of horse-drawn to be utilized in satellite armies. One model

122-mm A~ Gun IOO-mm AA Gun

Quadruple AA Machinegun " IOO·mm Field Gun 60 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1951 lOO-mm cannon as compared to the 85-mm cannon of the T-84. With the demonstrated interest of the Soviets and their sateUitea in infrared development it is not incon­ ceivable that the new tanks are equipped witb infrared devices to facilitate night combat and cross-country movements, characteristics which are especially desir­ able on the battlefield of maneuver. It can be inferred from the Soviet bargain sales of T-sJ,. tanks to Egypt and other Near East countries that the troop issue of the Armored Personnel Carrier. 6 x 6 new T-54 medium tanks must be on a large scale. widely seen is an open topped lightly ar­ Mobility of grouml forces in the air has mored 6 x 6. Large numbers of this vehicle been greatly increased. After witnessing certainly improve the Soviet cross-country the 1956 Soviet Aviation Day show Gen­ mobility and ability to traverse radio­ eral Nathan Twining, Chief of Staff of logically contaminated areas. the United States Air Force, and his In the field of armor the Soviets have group reported seeing large tail-loading developed new medium. heavy, and am­ air transports similar outwardly to the phibian tanks. The new medium and heavy new United States Air Force C-l!!/J Pro­ tanks have more powerful and better en-. vider transport. New heavy transports gines, and lower silhouettes than the bat­ also were observed. The Soviets also have tle tested T-/JJ,. medium and JS-/J heavy been active in the helicopter field. The live­ tanks. The new medium tank mounts a place helicopter, the Hare, appeared in

Medium Tank T·51 (IOO·mm) A NEW LOOK FOR THE SOVIET GROUND FOROES

1951. The clamshell door Hound helicopter recent developments. There has been no appeared in 1953 and has an estimated significant increase in the SoViet produc­ capacity of one and one-half tons or 16 tion rate of heavy and medium bombers. troops. The most recent Soviet helicopter, However, the Soviets are increasing the the Horse, appeared in 1956. This helicop­ ter is estimated to carry a payl~ad of Lieutenant Colonel Irving Heymont is a about five tons, or approximately 50 fully frequent contributor to the MILITARY RE­ armed men. VIEW, and is the author of "The KUm80ng Salient Bl,lttle" (August 1954), "Leader­ The devel~pments in the Soviet ground 8hip of the Czech Satellite Army" (Sep­ forces described, plus others, have given tember 1956), and "How Will Aggressor the Soviet Army the means to achieve Fight an Atomic War?" (October 1956). greater firepower, maneuverability, and During World War II he served in Europe mobility. Recent Soviet unit reorganiza­ with the 5th Infantry Regiment. He was an ROTC instructor at the College of the tions, which have, for example, just about City of New York for four years; was doubled the number of tanks in the mech­ graduated from the Regular t'ourse of the anized division, have utilized the new equip­ CGSC'in 1952; commanded the 1st Bat­ ment to achieve a tremendous increase in talion,160th Infantry Regiment, in Korea; the combat capabilities of Soviet units for was advisor to the Chief of Staff of the mobile operations. Republic of Korea II Corps; and was Ga, Headquarters, Fort Devens, Massachu­ The true significance of this program setts, until assigned to his present position can be determined in the light of other on the faculty of the CGSC in July 1955.

Hound Helicopter 62. MILITARY REVIEW. JANUARY 1957

HQrse Helicopter number of planes available for air defeme selves cannot decide the outcome of an and close support of army units. Jet plan.es armed struggle. Along with atomic and are rapidly replacing conventional close hydrogen weapons, in spite of their tre· support aircraft. General Twining's party mendous destructive power, large armieB at the 1956 Soviet Aviation Day show and a tremendous quantity of ordinary reported seeing experimental twin-jet arms will be drawn into military ·opera­ planes designed specifically for close sup­ tions. port of ground forces. Taking all these facto.s into account, it Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet Defense is apparent that the Soviets are prepared Minister, has publicly proclaimed the in­ to fight either an atomic or nonatomic war crease in the firepower of Soviet ground with their forces now in being. It can be units. In fact, in a letter to the noted New further concluded that the Soviets are not . York Times military analyst, Mr. Hanson putting all their eggs in an atomic basket­ Baldwin, Marshal Zhukov said: , certainly not an intercontinental bomber A irpower and nuclear weapons by them- basket.

Military force disposed as a deterrent obviously needs to be organized, com­ manded. deployed, and trained so it can be applied quickly and decisively against any form of aggression.·The deterrent force should have an appropriate atomic cauability, and it should also be clearlY able to achieve its mission decisively without being dependent solely on atomic weapons. It is obvious that such a fo,rce must include a major proportion of ground elements. It must be able to cope with any devious threat that can be contrived by the Communist mind, be it an urban riot. a border war, a plotted insurrection, or aU·out agression.

Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker UNITED STATES Submarine Commissioned carry the most modern bombs, rockets, and The submarine Darter, latest undersea­ missiles.-Commercial release. craft of the United States Fleet, is said Retractable Rotor System to be exceedingly quiet in operation. The Study analysis and design plans for a 260-foot Darter is equipped with conven­ retractable folding rotor system have been tional diesel engines.-News item. completed. For vertical takeoffs and land­ Delta-Wing Navy Fighter ings, the aircraft will extend and use its rotor system. When cruising speed is at- The Navy's supersonic jet fighter, the FsD Skylancer, can be used as a general­ purpose day fighter, an all-weather inter­ ceptor, or a fixed-point interceptor. Al­ though complete performance data on the Skylancer has not been released, it is said

Folding retractable rotor system tained the rotor will be stopped, folded, and retracted. The rotor blades are pro­ pelled by ram-jet engines in their tips, F5D Skylancer and the entire separately powered system folds to approximately one-third its nor­ to have more speed and longer range than mal diameter for retraction into the air­ the F.t,.D-1 Skyray which it closely resem­ craft.-Commercial release. bles in appearance. The F.t,.D-1 holds three world speed records and is now in fleet Lightweight Rifle service. Designed for catapult takeoff from The development of a ritle which weighs all types of carriers, production versions only six pounds, three pounds less than of the F5D .will have an electronically con­ the Garand M-1, has been announced. trolled autopilot system and is equipped to Soon to be field tested, the new ritle fea­ , 64 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957

tures an aluminum alloy barrel and a plas­ Foxhole Digger tic stock. It uses standard .30-caliber am­ Foxholes can be dug in 90 seconds with munition, fires either semiautomatic or a device that utiliZes a bazooka like tube fully automatic, and is said to be especially held vertically above the ground by a tri­ suitable for use by paratroopers.-News pod frame. The device fires an exploBive item. charge into the ground which is detonated by a delayed, action fuze, leaving a crater Name Change about four feet deep and approximately The Beechcraft Model 95 Badger, a four­ four and one-half feet wide.-News item. place, twin-engine plane which completed its initial tests recently, is to be renamed. , Seaway Progress The change of name is considered neces- One section of the United States portion of the Saint Lawrence Seaway has been 'completed. This section is at the upstream end of the 10-mile-long Sault Canal, north· east of Massena, New York, and west of the Eisenhower locks. The entire length of the 27-foot-deep international seaway is scheduled to be ready for navigation by 1959.-News item. Short Tak.eoff Plane The Helio Courier, which can take off in less than 500 feet and clear a 50-foot bar­ The former Badger rier, is under test by the Army in its sa1"Y to prevent confusion with the So­ search for aircraft with this particular viets' Tu-l04 jet bomber (MILITARY RE­ capability. The Courier has a 600-mile VIEW, Jun 1956, p 71 and Jul 1956, p 71) range, a cruising speed of 150 miles an which has been given the name of Badger hour, and utilizes a high-lift slotted flap for identification purposes. The change in to permit safe, slow flight under 30 miles name is being made at the request of the an hour.-Official release. United States Air Force, however, the new name for the Model 95 has not been an­ Atomic-Powered Vessels nounced.-Commercial release. Plans are being made for the construc· tion of the world's first atomic-powered 'Sidewinder' Operational surface warship in 1957, and a nuclear· The Sidewinde.r air-to-air missile, de­ powered aircraft carrier in 1958. The first veloped by the Navy and recently adopted vessel will be an 11,000-ton light cruiser for use by the Air Force (MILITARY RE­ with an atomic reactor which will cost an VIEW, Dec 1956 p 64), is now operational estimated 18 million dollars. The nuclear­ with fleet units at sea. Two Navy squad­ powered aircraft carrier will displace 85,. rons equipped with the Sidewinder are the 000 tons and will carry eight atomic re­ Attack4f3quadron 46 of the USS Randolph, actors. It will be the world's biggest vessel which is in the Sixth Fleet in the Medi­ and will be capable of a speed of about 33 terranean, and the Fighter Squadron 211 knots. In addition to the atomic submarine of the USS Bon Homme Richard with the Nautilu8, 15 other atomic undersea ves· Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific.-Of­ sels are completed, under construction, or ficial release. authorized. Two commercial type vessels MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 65 are also planned. A 12,OOO-ton combina­ to be dropped from an airplane or pro­ tion passenger and cargo ship, designed jected from a surface ship for delayed to use atomic propulsion, is scheduled to detonation.-News ftem. be ready for service in 1959, and it is planned that a nuclear-powered 38,OOO-ton, Lifejackets Improved 707-foot supertanker will be constructed A recently perfected lifesaving device in 1961 at an estimated cost of 3'7 million automatically inflates a "Mae West" type dollars.-News item. Iifejacket upon contact with water. The mechanism weighs only five ounces and Small-Caliber Rocket is said to be able to inflate a Iifejacket The Little John, officially designated the within 15 seconds after immersion.-News XM47, is a small-caliber field artillery item. free rocket. It is 318-mm (approximately 13 inches) in diameter and 12 feet long. Protedive Clothing Performance data on this weapon has not The United States Navy has perfected two types of suits to protect the wearer while handling rocket propellants and other hazardous fuels-a general-purpose suit to protect workers in maintenance and operation of storage tanks and power­ plants, and a special suit for use in short· duration, highly hazardous operations such

The 318·mm Little John rocket been released for publication. It is being built at the Redstone Arsenal.-Official re­ lease. Carr;'!r Readied The USS Ranger (MILITARY REVIEW, Nov '1956, p 71), recently launched For­ restal dass aircraft carrier, displaces 60,­ 000 tons, and will displace 70,000 to 80,000 Navy protective suits tons when fully loaded. The supercarrier is capable of speeds up to 35 knots, and as refueling. Both suits are fabricated of will carry the A3D Skywamor and the rubber and butyl-coated cotton. The gen­ FSU Crusader.-News item. eral-purpose suit has protected ventilation openings and a quick escape feature. The Atomic Antisubmarine Weapon special-purpose suit is a one-piece design An atomic antisubmarine weapon, the with attached foot covering and detach­ Lulu. is said to be capable of killing sub­ able gloves. An air supply system for ven­ marines within miles of the point of ex­ tilation and breathing is incorporated into plosion, and can be set to go off at con· this suit since the wearer is completely siderable depth under water. It is designed enclosed.-Official release. 66 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 Sattle Surveillance Radar helicopter powered by two rotor tip­ The world's smallest radar set, the mounted, ram-jet engines developing 40­ AN/PPS-4, will provide mobile Army pounds thrust each. The engines each forces with local battle area surveillance of weigh about 12 pounds and have no mov­ enemy movement despite smoke, darkness, ing parts. The tail rotor and accessories or fog. In this radar the cathode ray tube are driven from the power takeoff on the is eliminated and audible sjgnals are pro- main rotor column. In starting, a small gasoline engine is used to bring the main rotor up to 50 revolutions per minute at which speed the ramjets start function­ • ,ing. The craft has a flight endurance of about one-half hour and a maximum speed of 80 miles an hour.-Official release. Tanker Reactivation Eight Military Sea Transport Service tankers are being reactivated for commer­ cial use. The eight vessels have a full load displacement of 22,380 tons and a cargo capacity of 140,000 barrels each. Addi­ tionally, 13 T-2 fleet tankers are planned Lightweight radar for transfer from the reserve fleet to serv­ ice use in the near future. The fleet tank­ duc~'d when contact with a moving soldier ers will be manned by Navy personnel, are or vehicle i,s made, permitting the opera­ 523 feet in length, and have a speed of 15 tor to detect movement up to 6,000 yards knots.-Official release. away. The set is contained in a 14-inch square metal case and is powered by a Single-Shot Flamethrower lightweight generator. The combined A single-shot flamethrower, especially weight of the radar set and the generator designed for paratrooper use, is in the final is about 85 p.ounds.-Official release. stage of development. The weapon, which weighs only 26 V2 pounds, can be carried Test and Experimentation Center by paratroopers as part of their jump The testing of new organizations, equip­ packs. Its two-gallon fuel supply is in­ ment, and tactics will be centralized at the sufficient for protracted operation; how­ Army's Test and Experimentation Center ever, the flamethrower is expected to be at Fort Ord, California. Sixteen civilian of particular value in attacking fortified scientists and 57 military personnel will positions.-Official release. be assigned to the test center headquar­ ters. It is expected that the Army Techni­ Nuclear Accord cal Services will make use of the new cen­ An 82-nation conference has agreed on ter for experimentation and testing of neW' terms for the establishment of a world technical equipment.-Official release. atoms-for-peace agency. Under the agree­ ment, the atoms-for-peace board of gover" Ram-Jet Helicopter nors would have authority to send inspec­ First deliveries of the Army's YH-S2 tors into recipient nations to assure that ram-jet helicopter have. been made to the materials furnished to such nations and Army Aviation Test Board. The YH-S2 is the byproducts from those materials are a two-place, two-blade, single main roter not used for military purposes. The agree­ MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD ment will become effective after ratifica­ quirements in remote areas where it is too tion by the legislative bodies of the sig­ costly to transport conventional fuels.­ natories. The United States has promised Official release. to make 11,000 pounds of Uranium 235 available to the newly established Inter­ Hil-and·Run Weapon national Atomic' Energy Agency which is A 13 million-dollar order has been placed about one-fourth of the 20,000 kilograms for production of the Ontos, the Marine of U 235 earmarked by the United States Corps' new hit-and-run weapon. The On- for use by friendly nations in the develop­ ment of peaceful atomic programs. The Soviet Union indicated earlier that she would make 50 kilograms available to the agency when it became operational, and Great Britain is said to be prepared to make an initial contribution.-News item. Air Defense The design of Nike antiaircraft defense installations at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland has been completed. Construc­ Marine Corps' Ontas tion of these facilities will start in the near future.-Official release. tos carries six 106-mm recoilless rifles and depends on'its speed and maneuverability Military Nuclear Powerplant rather than heavy armor for protection. The Army's first nuclear reactor power­ In addition to its major armament the 8%­ plant is under construction at Fort Bel­ ton vehicle is armed with four .50-caliber VOir:, Virginia, as a joint project of the spotting rifles and a .30-caliber machine­ gun. The spotting rifles are used to range in on targets, assuring accuracy of fire of the larger weapons. The six major cal­ iber rifles can be fired independently, in pairs, or simultaneously from a position within the vehicle. The Ontos is driven by a 145-horsepower engine and can climb a 40 percent grade.-News item. '

Ships for Missile Program Two merchant type vessels are sched­ uled for conversion as part of the Navy's Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Pro­ gram. The Garden Mariner (EAG-153), Nuclear reactor with model in foreground one of the ships scheduled for conversion, Atomic Energy Commission and the De­ has been renamed the Compass Island. partment of Defense. When completed it The other, the Empire State Mariner will be operated for experimental pur­ (EAG-154) has not yet been renamed. The poses and to train personnel in its opera­ Mariner class vessels are 560 feet long, tion. The nuclear reactor is designed to displace 13,000 tons, and have a speed of provide power and heat for military re­ 20 knots.-News item. 68 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 PANAMA ALBANIA New Towing Device Submarine Sase A radically new type of towing macbine Submarine pens capable of accommodat­ will be used for pulling ships through the ing an estimated 100 submarines reportedly Panama Canal. Working in pairs, tbe new bave been cut into tbe aOO-foot-high cliffs electrically powered "locomotives" will of the port of Valona. Tbe construction of the base was started'in 1948 and includes tbe barbor of Valona, three airfields in the vicinity, and the island of Saseno in the harbor entrance. The airbases have under­ ground storage for gasoline. The entire complex is defended by batteries of rockets and artillery.-News item. EAST GERMANY Nuclear Research Plans Approximately 100 farm families have been displaced from their bomes near Dresden in Saxony to make room for an atomic research center to be constructed Canal locomotive there. The families have been relocated in Mecklenburg according to a report. The pass the towcables to the ship by use of material required for the research center a 75-foot lightweight boom. The ship is is being furnished by the Soviet Union.­ protected from striking the canal wall by News item. a rolling rubber-tired fender. Twenty­ seven of the new units will be used in FRANCE place of 57 of the older type now in use.-. Antisubmarine Plane Commercial release. The Breguet 1050 Alize, a carrier-based plane designed for antisubmarine warfare, CHINA has completed its first test flights. The Oil Production Plans Alize was developed from the experimental Communist China expects to be self­ prototypes Vultur 960 and 965, and is supporting in oil production within 12 years according to a recent announcement. Total output planned for 1956 was 1,200,­ 000 tons, about one-third of the national requirement. During the second five-year plan which ends in 1962, production is ex­ pected to rise to between five and six mil­ lion tons annually. Nearly half of this year's production comes from the Yumen Breguet 1050 AUze field in northwest China which bas in­ creased its production by one-half over planned for use on the French aircraft last year. The over-all increase in produc­ carriers now in production. It is powered tion is expected to come from two sup­ by a 2,000-horsepower Rolls-Royce Dart posedly very rich oilfields on the border engine, and carries a crew of three when of Tibet and at Karamai in Sinkiang.­ acting in its hunter-killer antisubmarine News item. role. This aircraft bas a flight duration of MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 69 four hc>urs, is equipped with a complete Britain is under consideration" by the Japan , electronic detection unit, and can be armed Atomic Energy Commission.-News· item. with bc>mbs and rockets. Its characteristics are such that it is considered especially GREAT BRITAIN suitable for use on smaller aircraft car­ Engine Developments riers.-Commercial release. Two jet turbine engines, the Gyron (MILITARY REVIEW, Nov 1955, P '70) and AUSTRALIA the Gyron Junior, were exhibited recently. Titanium Production The Gyron, which was initially tested at Major deposits of rutile from which ti­ 15,000-pounds thrust without reheat, has tanium is derived have been found in many been operating at considerably increased of the beaches of Australia. Titanium, which is lighter than steel, cobalt, or chro­ mium, has a melting point of 1,820 degrees centigrade-almost three times that of aluminum. Many present supersonic jet fighters use as much as 800 pounds of ti­ tanium in their construction. In 1955 Aus­ tralia produced about 15,000 tons of ti­ tanium, and is presently estimated to have a reserve of 700,000 tons of high-grade ore containing about 40 pounds of titanium to the cubic yard. The" only other western Gyron and Gyron Junior sources of titanium are Mexico, with an annual production of 24,000 tons, and the output during the past year. It is receiving United States with 10,000 tons.-News flight tests in one of the engine nacelles item. of a Short Sperrin jet bomber. The Sper­ rin features two jet engines mounted ver­ JAPAN tically in each wing. The Gyron Junior Antarctic Expedition embodies, in a smaller scale, the design Japan's first major Antarctic exploration features of the Gyron and is being de- will consist of the 2,200-ton expedition ship, the Soya Maru, and a converted coast guard supply ship. Preliminary sur­ vey of a base camp in Prince Harald Land is expected to be completed b:y February 1957, and the main party of 30 persons will leave Japan in November 1957 to stay in the Antarctic for a year. Explorations will be made in cooperation with 11 other Flying testbed for GyraR nations taking part in the survey.-News item. veloped for supersonic military aircraft in high-level interception and tactical roles. Uranium Mining Operations It has already passed unofficial flight tests Uranium mining has begun on deposits at designed thrust. Its characteristics of discovered in 1955 in western Honshu and low specific weight and small frontal area near Tottori. The purchase of atomic re­ are considered especially important for actors from the United States and Great use in interceptors.-Commercial release. '70 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1967

Deepwater Fording to be stationary. "True motion" radar is A 50-ton Centurion tank has been floated said to eliminate the need for course plot­ successfully in a recent d~~onstration of ~ing.-News item. newly developed deepwater fording tech­ niques. The system used with the Centurion Thrust Reversing Brake A device for reversing the thrust of a jet engine to provide braking power for speedy jet planes has been successfully tested in a Hawker Hunter. The installa. tion on the Hunter has fins set vertically in rectangular slots cut in each side of the rear part of the fuselage where they can divert the flow of the jet exhaust outward and forward. In normal flight these fins are closed by shutters mounted inside the fuselage. The shutters are arranged to move rearward and inward in a single movement to expose the fins and obstruct the normal exhaust orifice.-News item.

Jet Trainer The Hunting Percival P.8J,. Jet Provost was designed for the express purpose of training pilots in the handling of jet air· craft from the beginning of ,their flying career. It is intended to take the student Centurion takes to water pilot through both primary and basic jet training and into advanced training. The consisted of a collapsible, waterproof screen around the top surfaces allowing the turret lids to remain open. The screen is raised by hydraulic pistons, and the bottom and sides are sealed. Two propellers mounted in the rear provide motive power in deep water.-Official release.

'True Motion' Radar A "true. motion" radarscope has been announced 'in which the exact movement of all vessels in range is shown, including the ship on which the radar is mounted. In conventional radar the transmitting ship is shown at the center of the screen The P.811et Provost and' all other movement is relative, but (By courtesy

Supermarine Swift FR Mk.5 (By courtesy 'Aeronautics') the wings, and wing panels to smooth the airflow. It is propelled by a Rolls-Royce Avon turbojet engine with afterburner. Performance data is not available but an earlier version of this plane, the Mk.4, has flown at a speed of over 735 miles an hour.-Commercial release. Twin-Engine Salety The B'l'istol 178 helicopter (MILITARY REVIEW, Sep 1955, p 67) is powered by two 850-ho.rsepower Alvis Leonides Major

. ~~ , ~ .'--=- ~ '\ "-. ~ ~ . . .

Bristol 113 Mk.3 engines, each of which turns the rotor lo­ cated above it. The two rotors are con­ area is said to be at Provideniya with nected by a synchronization shaft which minor airbases at Anadyr,-Opuka, and Ust permits one engine to drive both rotors in Kamchatsk. The main Soviet Army, Air case of an engine failure. The 178 weighs Force, and Navy base in the Bering Sea almost five tons empty and can carry up is at Petropavlovsk to the south.-News to 13 passengers.-Official release. item. 72 MIL~TARY REVIEW JANUARY 1967 Antarctic Exploration Voice of America transmitter. Future dis­ The Soviet Union's second major Ant­ cussions are planned to determine the final arctic expedition is setting up two scien­ disposition of these facilities. Tangier has tific stations in the central portion of the been an international free port since 1923, southernmost continent. The Soviet Ant­ except during 1940-45, when it was occu­ arctic' headquarters will be at Mirny on the pied by Spain.-News item. Knox coast of Wilkes Land. One station, to be called Sovietskaya, will be near the BRAZIL so-called pole of inaccessibility and more Automotive Manufacture than 1,200 miles from Mirny in the center A new truck factory in operation at Sao of an unexplored region which is said to Paulo is expected to turn out 3,000 trucks be about the size of Europe. Supplies for' during the first six months of 1957. A this station will be flown in. The other sci­ yearly production of 12,000 is planned. A entific station, Vostok, will be near the modern version of a German truck is now geomagnetic pole at latitude 79°30', about in production and a 10-ton truck and a 930 miles from the expedition headquar­ heavy four wheel drive agricultural vehi. tefs. Vostok will be supplied by tractor cle are planned in the near future. This fae­ trains and air transport.-News item. tory is also manufacturing diesel motors for trucks and buses. Although many parts WEST GERMANY for the diesel engines are presently im· Aircraft Ordered ported, 96 percent of the parts needed will In addition to the 16 Fairey Gannet anti­ be locally produced by 1960.-News item. submarine aircraft under order for the new West German Air Force (MILITARY AFGHANISTAN REVIEW, D'ec 1956, p 71), orders have been Planes Delivered placed for 50 Bristol 171 Sycamore heli­ Eleven MiG jet fighters have been de­ copters and 68 Seahawk Mk.4 single-seat livered to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union naval fighters. The Seahawk Mk.4 is pow­ under the provisions of arms aid pacts ered by a single Rolls-Royce Nene lOS signed by Afghanistan, the USSR, and 5,OOO-pounds thrust turbojet engine Czechoslovakia. A new airstrip for the use mounted centrally in the fuselage with air of the Afghan Air Force MiG'8 has been intake 'and jet exhausts located in the constructed at Mazar-i-Sharif, about five wingroot. The plane is provided with un­ minutes by plane from the Soviet jet base derwing drop tanks, armed with four at Termez, where it ill reported the Afghan 20-mm cannon mounted in the nose, and is MiG'8 wiII be serviced. Before the arrival capable of carrying bombs or rocket pro­ of the Soviet jets, the Royal Afghan Air jectiles on underwing racks.-News item. Force consisted of a few pre-World War II Italian single-engine biplanes and sev­ MOROCCO eral obsolete British two-engine reconnais­ Internafionl:" Rule Ends sance aircraft. The delivery of the jet air­ International rule of Tangier, now part craft is said to have no connection with of independent Morocco, has been officially the 100 million-dollar economic credit pre­ ended with the signing of the final act of viously given Afghanistan by the Soviets, the Tangier conference. Under the act the Afghanistan has a 40,OOO-man army and nine signatory powers renounced all rights is reported to have ordered over 20 million within the city. Principal interest of the dollars worth of arms and equipment from United States in Tangier involves three the USSR and Czechoslovakia under aD major radio installations which include a eight-year credit plan.-News item. The Organization of Future Armies Traml"ted and dle'Bted b,. tlte MILITARY REVIEW from lin "rtld. b,. Lieutenant Colonel F. O. Mllaehe In "W.hrkllnde" ~German,.) June and Jul,. 1956.

THE development of atomic weapons a purely scl;lematic clarification of the presents problems of a new kind to future problem is not without its value, since warfare. No wonder that the study of from it further conclusions may be drawn how the armies of tomorrow will be or­ that will bring us closer to our goal. ganized, equipped, engaged, and supplied is . being so zealously pursued. It is not The Form of War easy to find the correct answer, and any Basically, wars in the future may have attempt in this direction cannot be suc­ the following forms: cessful until a number of fundamental Case A: Simultaneous, total engage­ questions have been answered. ment of all existing weapons against the Naturally, it must be taken for granted rear and front areas, to include tactical that atomic weapons will be employed in atomic weapons for the support of the future military conflicts. The modes of conventional army units. their employment may be very diverse, Case B: A war in which the employ­ however, and it is not at all certain­ ment of atomic weapons on the field of rather, uncertain-that a conflict must or battle is limited. will start with sudden, total atomic at­ Case C: Wars in which only conven­ tacks. The fact that today all great powers tional materiel is used and of a form have these weapons at their disposal similar to that used toward the end of renders their emproyment an extremely World War II. "two-edged" one. Political considerations Case D: Guerrilla war, uprisings or also must be accorded their place. local wars, which, in the future and prin­ Without practical experience, which cipally outside of Europe, will probably only a war could provide, it is hardly play a very important role. possible to determine what types of war­ It goes without saying that there could fare modern armies must be prepared for be a great number of variants of these except in a very general manner. Yet even four basic forms of war but it is more 74 MILITARY REVIEW difficult to determine the forms of these. to make the enormous expenditures re­ On the basis of history, in most cases, quired by modern warfare. Meanwhile, hostilities break out under very complex the power which is discreetly supporting circumstances, often under conditions the uprising supplies it' weapons along which would really not warrant the use with propaganda. These wars attempt to of atomic weapons in any form. There cut the adversary off from his sources of can be no doubt that the first forms of raw materials and trading areas in order 'fighting will have a decisive, determining to be able to deal the decisive blow in the influence on the way in which Ithe war political field to an adversary which is develops, and no one can say ill' advance now impoverished by inflation and under­ how the latter will shape itself. ,mined socially. Atomic weapons will perhaps be used In order to support these statements only gradually at first, their employment with a few facts, we offer the following: increasing as dictated by the combat op­ With the money that was swallowed erations-perhaps in decisive phases, or up by the conflict in Korea and Indo­ only in critical situations. Combat forces china, both the United States and which are fighting on their own soil or France would have been able to equip whose national territory is exposed to their armed forces in the most modern retaliatory attacks will think twice before way. they begin the use of means which might If we divide the sum of money which ensure them momentary success on the was spent for maintaining the security field of battle, but the consequences of service in Malaya by the number of which would be hard to predict. guerrilla forces rendered innocuous, we This situation is the reason for the find that every partisan cost the Brit­ obvious effort of Soviet Russia to avoid ish Government $3,060. a direct clash with great powers, and to In Algeria, at the present time, more settle in remote theaters of war the dif­ than 300,000 men are necessary for an­ ferences in interest which divide them. nihilating an average of 100 terrorists This is shown by the conflict in Korea, per day. Airplanes pursue very small as well as by that in Indochina and North bands of Fellaghas-which is a very Africa-perhaps soon in the Middle East. costly "sport." The loss of her North It is indirect strategy in "small steps" African possessions would mean to which, considered separately, do not war­ France a yearly loss of 700 billion rant the use of atomic weapons-both for francs in exchange and result in un­ political reasons and because of a lack of employment for from three to four· paying targets. million persons. The loss of Great Britain's oil wells The Aim of War in the Middle East would result in loss The principal concern in this struggle of employment for some five million is no longer the classical aim of war as persons in England. It is obvious that stated by Clausewitz: "the destruction of directly or indirectly all European the enemy army in battle" in order to countries without exception would be clear the way for diplomatic procedures, affected. but the involvement of the advorsary in The envelopment of our Continent guerrilla wars while the instigating power from the south-by way of North Africa remains as aloof as possible. -together with a frontal political What is sought is to strike a blow on thrust along the Iron Curtain, could be the adversary's economy by forcing him fatal for Europe without the employ­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

ment of a single atom bomb being nec­ china, American war materiel played an essary. important role, even on the other side. Such simultaneously, politically, econom­ and in spite of all the lessons that have ically, and militarily conducted and mu­ been learned, similar cases are to be looked tually coordinated guerrilla wars can forward to in the future. hardly be regarded as "the continuation The supposition is logical that guerrilla of policy by other means!' This sharp wars could corne to possess the character­ dividing line once drawn by Clausewitz istics of major wars, and indicates that has lost much of its original meaning, the danger of bringing on a total atomic since both concepts-war and policy­ conflict should be avoided as far as pos­ overlap one another incomparably more sible. Numerous possibilities for unleash­ than formerly. One can live in peaceful ing such a conflict are offered our adver­ coexistence with a power, yet at the same saries in the Southeast Asiatic area which time practically be at war with it. is rich in zinc, chrome, nickel, and rubber, Conflicting Interests as well as in the Middle East with its oil deposits. In the present struggle the situation of This world situation also must be taken the Western Powers is especially difficult. into account in considering the armies of Their various short-range interests in the future, which must be organized in overseas areas conflict with one another conformity with their probable tasks. It which renders difficult all efforts to solve would be a mistake to constitute armies their problems in a joint an.d farsighted without taking into account the existing manner. Besides, there are obstacles of an political situation, just as it would be 'a ideological nature. The fact seems to be mistake to put one's foreign policies into forgotten all too often that according to effect with no regard for strategic prob­ the communistic ideology, uprisings in lems. Both domains-that of foreign policy colonial or semicolonial countries are to be and that of strategy-must not be sepa­ supported even when they are purely rated from one another. Armed forces nationalistic in their character, since have always been the instrument of a 'nationalization is looked,on as a necessary definite policy, and on this account it is intermediate stage to communism. Expe­ hardly possible to speak of the organiza­ riences, thus far, appear to confirm the tion of armies without, at the same time, correctness of this idea. touching on political questions. No less disadvantageously operates the In Europe the necessity of a defensive circumstance that the West possesses no shield along the Iron Curtain is obvious. actual counter ideology that would be This, however, would be of little use with­ capable of neutralizing communism. The out having armed forces at our disposal attempt to counterbalance these deficien­ capable of protecting western civilization cies by generous economic aid, in view of from economic strangulation by the re­ the enormous amount that would be re­ quirement for the protection of overseas quired, can hardly lead to the necessary interests. And both of these missions re­ results. quire units of an entirely different type. Politically, it is also a method which is attended by very unfavorable 'repercus­ Total Atomic War: Case A sions, as donors of money are never held The total engagement of atomic weap­ , in affection but are ,more apt to be looked ons of all kinds against rear areas and I down on and, in the end, hated. The mili­ battlefronts would seem to be the least tary aid that has already been given has probable hypothesis of the war of the led to a few surprises. In Korea and Indo­ future. In spite of the fact that we nat­ I ------76 MILITARY REVIEW, JANUARY 1961 urally must consider such a situation, it 3. Whether a decision can be obtained would be a mistake to shape the army of at all without an occupation of the enemy's the future exclusively with this in view. territory with adequate forces. Even the most violent atomic offensive However this may be-since the hinter­ could hardly eliminate all the adversary's land will become as much a battlefield as capability to retaliate-counterattacks the front area-a practically all-embrac­ would follow almost immediately. This ing organization will be indispensable would, logically, lead to the total destruc­ there. And this organization can only then tion of both sides, although states of a be really effective, and even then only centralized structure, like those of the perhaps, if it has sufficient means at its West, are incomparably more vulnerable. ' disposal and is controlled by a military Such a mutual suicide can, however, never staff. constitute the basis of intelligent war­ The experiences of the last war showed. fare. It would be tantamount to the nega­ both in Germany and En~land, that the tion of any strategic thinking whatsoever, tasks which present themselves in major a strategy that would be least suited for air attacks cannot be satisfactorily handled solving these problems which lie at the by the various civil air-protection services root of the conflict. organized under emergency conditions. In the caSe of a total atomic war the whose fields of authority often overlapped decisive weapons would be the large bombs and which were also inadequately equipped whose effects would bring all activity in from the material point of view. In case the adversary's country to a practical of an atomic war these defects would be standstill. In such a situation it is possible multiplied. that the conventional combat forces in the Due to the great number and variety front areas would play only a subordinate of these tasks, as well as their extensive­ role. From this arises, theoretically, the ness, they could be satisfactorily handled possibility of conducting such a war with only by groupments organized, equipped, only relatively small, but highly mobile and led similarly to an army. armies with center of gravity in air forces Among others its missions would be: and, in cooperation with them, the air de­ 1. To strengthen the air force. fense and air protection organizations. 2. To set up r:)scue and cleanup teams This is, in a few words, the present, as well as to add to fire-fighting organi­ official Western concept. Any doubts con­ :zations. cerning its correctness will here be in­ 3. The evacuation of populations, dicated only in passing. Questions which their feeding and medical attention. -in addition to the already mentioned 4. The shifting of industrial estab­ danger of mutual suicide-remain open lishments. are: 5. The quick restoration of communi­ 1. Whether the employment of atomic cation networks, traffic routes. electric weapons would not result in such a crip­ power stations, and manufacturing pling of both sides that the possibility of establishments. mobile ground operations would be com­ 6. To decontaminate areas contami­ pletely, or largely, eliminated. nated by radioactivity; or to carry ou~ '2. Whether the consequent destruc­ demolitions. tion would not result in such disorganiza­ 7. The reinforcement of the various tion that the operations of the armies military police services. would degenerate into generali:zed guer­ It goes without saying that strong rilla warfare. " discipline is as necessary in operations of FOREIG~ MILITARY DIGESTS 77 this type as in purely military operations. problem relative to the depth to which What merits serious refiection is the they are employed is more complicated. question whether the army of the future, The result of the struggle between conven­ or at least a part of it, ought not to be tional combat forces is contingent on the trained for two different kinds of employ­ result of the tactical air battle. Part of ment: on the one hand for combat employ­ this, naturally, is the effort to destroy the ment in the front area; on the other hand, enemy air wings with atom bombs as for the operations mentioned, in the qulckly· as possible in their bases, which hinterland. are often situated at a depth of 300 miles In the latter case the "cperational or more back of the fighting front. orders" of the division would no longer Whether the supreme war command will be for attack or defense, but for evacua­ make no use of atomic weapons for a tions, cleanups, and fire extinguishing. The short while; only at the beginning; or place of the hand weapons would be taken only in certain theaters or, within these, by the shovel and ax; the place of the only in certain sectors-all these are tank by the bulldozer. The entire national questions which exert a decisive influence on the problem of the organization, the area would have to be divided into air equipment, the employment, and the com­ defense districts within which all services mand of future armies. and troops w~uld be under the orders of a single command. Minor as well as higher As is well known the forms that fight­ reserve formations would have to be ing assumes are very decisively determined ready constantly in most probable tar­ by the interaction momentarily existing get areas. These superficially expressed -between firepower and capacity for move­ thoughts are certainly worthy of further ment. Increase of firepower not only can reflection, for >in an actual case the lives clear the way for attacks, but even more of millions of individuals could be depend­ so, assists the defender in blocking an at­ ent on the nature of such an organization. tack. Increase of firepower has always been a greater boon to the defender than Limited Atomics: Case B the attacker. In this era in which the fire­ If atomic w4!apons were employed only power of both sides cripples the adver­ in the front urea, then the question is sary's movements, fighting fronts are posed whether their employment would not becoming fixed. The reasons for this are give rise to a development which, like a obvious: chain reaction, would unavoidably develop 1. Defense is a form of combat that into a total atomic war. This danger seems is based on fire rather than on move­ unavoidable, since it would be difficult to ment, while attack is based mainly on draw a precise line between the tactical movement which is supported by fire. and the strategic use of the atomic 2. While the concentration of fire is weapon. The dividing line between these possible from widely separated positions, two modes of employment could be the in attack operations the concentration size of the long-range atomic rockets or of forces-in one form or another, bombs employed, and the depth to which sooner or later-is unavoidable. As a they made their effects felt in the front result of this, in an atomic war, also, area. the necessary dispersion can be more It may be regarded as certain that the easily reali:l:ed in defense than in attack. small, 20-kiloton missiles would be more 3. T}:Ie defense rather than the at­ than sufficient for producing the effect tacker, who must be mobile in the ter­ that is necessary on a field of battle. The rain and, therefore, operate in the open, 78 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 is in a position to protect himself not all too easily be the victim of enemy in­ only by means of dispersion but also by fantry operating in the form of small field fortifications. shock detachments. And if the mechanized 4. The defender lives, as a rule, on formations should close in together too supplies found where he is located, while much in order to defend themselves the attacker must bring up his supplies against such a method of combat, they continually. would again present a target for atomic The repetition of these self-evident facts weapons. is not without reason, for if the fire ef­ What has just been said indicates that fects should outweigh the possibilities of even in an atomic war of this type, suf­ movement, positional warfare would be-' ficiently strong infantry would be indis­ come inevitable. In such a case a war pensable. It is difficult to grasp the logic would impose different requirements on of those who see the art of atomic war­ armies with respect to organization and fare in compelling the adversary to con­ equipment than are foreseen in present centrate his forces yet at the same time planning. plan to operate in a dispersed form. Such Basically, there are two possibilities for a method of combat, without a time and escaping the devastating effects of atomic space filling element, seems impossible of weapons. The one consists in rapid action realization. Lightly equipped infantry -in continual, lightning-like movement. would be necessary to force the enemy to It is questionable though, in spite of all concentrate his forces and to fill up the mechanization, whether one can be fast spaces between our own dispersed battle enough to get away from the much faster elements. Any extensive loosening Lp of plane carrying the atom bomb. In addition mechanized forces is hardly capable of to this, there is still one other possibility realization without such an element serv­ that is imaginable. This is based less on ing as a binding material between them. ~perational speed than on movement on The infantry divisions destined for this foot, which permits a wider dispersion of type of mission could be both very simply the units, under which condition camou­ organized and equipped-which would also flage can be more easily employed. Protec­ lighten the problem of their supply. Their tion by digging in would also play an armament could mainly consist of hand important role. If, in the case of the first weapons, antitank weapons, mortars, and method, the main forces engaged in the a few battalions of field artillery. Of great b;1ttle are the mechanized units, in the importance, however, would be thorough second case it is infantry operating across training in assault techniques which would country. On a battlefield dominated by have to compensate for their lack of heavy atomic weapons, in spite of the difference equipment. Great marching ability; cross­ in them, both methods would be indispen­ country operations in loose formation yet sable, since they mutually complement one at the same time maintaining cohesion; another. masterful ability in camouflaging and in That the use of atomic weapons will rapidly digging themselves in; striking require a greater loosening up within the with lightning-like suddenness and disap­ unit~ is self-evident. To be sure, there are pearing just as suddenly-all these things limits beyond which loosening up cannot are the indispensable requirements of suc­ go, for without a certain measure of con­ Cess. centration an attack can possess neither Of course, it must be noted that among the necessary shock force nor coherence. the numerous tasks that fall to the lot of Excessively loose mechanized units could infantry with this high degree of training FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

there are two that clash with one another. combat units than the cumbersome serv­ A unit which is destined for the defense ices whiCh are obliged to folloW them. of fortified positions is basically suited Thus too great a dependence of mech­ for other requirements than those of the anized forces on complex auxiliary serv­ waging of small wars. Nevertheless, there ices would certainly, in an atomic war, appear to be grounds for hope that an constitute their Achilles' heel.· intermediate path will be found. Summarizing, we may say that on the One of the most difficult questions is atomic battlefield not everything can be that relative to the future of the armored handled by machines alone. On the eon­ arm. For in an atomic war a unit that is trary, it may very easily be that under dependent on too many vehicles could find the extremely hard circumstances of ,its mobility greatly reduced. In other atomic battles, simple, easily supplied, words, this means that not only the purely and easily moved, small combat equipment tactical requirements relative to its em­ will prove more dependable. Success will ployment, but also the problems connected perhaps be still more dependent on the with the supply and repair services in the capabilities of the individual foot soldier organization of the army of the future than in the past. will be matters of great decisiveness. Mechanized troops will he indispensable The present armored divisions comprise in the form of small units. They will have 17,291 men and 3,912 vehicles of various to operate in connection with infantry. types, a mass that could hardly be main­ However, it would be a mistake to attempt tained in motion under atomic fire. Of to bind the mor.e mobile arm too tightly these figures, however, only about half to the slower one. These two entirely dif­ applies to the actual fighting forces; the ferent types of movement must be com­ remainder applies to the various auxiliary bined in an interaction in which the services which are organically connected mechanized forces constitute the adhesive with the division. The division slice for element between them with respect to time such a unit includes an additional 25,000 and space. men belonging to corps, army, and service organizations which are required for Conventional Combat: Case C maintaining the division. It is quite conceivable that both sides That it would be impossible to fight an will guard against the use of atomic atomic battle with armies organized in weapons. In this case the two sides would such a manner is self-evident. Under such contendIwith essentially the same combat conditions, separately operating armored means we were acquainted with in the brigades seem much more suitable than last war. Yet in spite of this, it is proba­ divisions. It must be noted, however, that ble that the situation would no longer be small formations, if they are to operate the same and, as a result, the forms of with the same independence as the present combat would be different. ones, would require a still higher percent­ Mechanized warfare or blitzkrieg re­ age of various auxiliary services. quires-to be successful-almost absolute Naturally, small formations are much air superiority. Only when this condition more mobile and easier to command. But is fulfilled can the enormous supply rl!­ in spite of everything, whether mechanized quirements be fulfilled. What happens, forces are engaged in a compact mass, or however, when one is faced with an adve*­ widely dispersed, their, great supply re­ sary who also has a powerful air force at quirements remain practically unchanged. his disposal? Would blitz warfare also be FUrthermore, it is easier to loosen up the, possible under those circumstances? 80 MILITARY:lEVIEW JANUARY 1951 The more evenly matched the two air bly increased. From these considerations forces are to one another, the more dif­ it follows that the supply of troops frOnt! ficult the attainment of air superiority the .air-or air operations in general-in becomes. In peacetime exercises the term case of a powerful air adversary, will no "air superiority" is too often and too longer be as easily conducted as before. easily uttered. It is "assumed" that we Moreover, it is hard to imagine that the have attained this after a large part of necessary quantities 'of supplies-except the enemy's air force has been destroyed in exceptional cases-could be delivered by on the ground. What, however, if the air. The situation is still further compli· enemy instantly replies and also system­ cated by the fact that today, radar appara­ atically destroys our airfields? It goes tus is already able to spot air movements without saying that seizure of the initia- ' at a distance of 400 miles which renders it tive plays no small role in the matter. It possible for the highly mobile fighter will hardly be possible to prevent the ad­ aviation to stop the hetlvy transport plane.s versary from striking back with enough before they are able to reach their desti­ force to knock out a large part of his op­ nations. ponent's aircraft on the ground. As regards ground action, special con­ Absolute air supremacy would mean sideration has been given the development that one' had complete freedom 'of action of antitank weapons since the last war. over the enemy's territory and was able Armor-piercing weapons of low manu­ to hermetically seal off his own skies facturing cost and easy to transport make against enemy incursions. Theoretically, it possible to equip even small infantry such a situation is conceivable only on the units with effective weapons. This is an assumption that the enemy has no air­ additional circumstance which points to craft. In all other cases the term "air the fact that the possibilities of movement SUperiority" can metln only a relative con­ of mechanized forces will no longer be the dition. Air battles are like a great pen­ same as before, even when no atomic dulum swinging over the combat area. The weapons are employed. one that has more or better planes has more chances of effecting frequent incur­ Uprisings or Local Wars: Case D sions into the other's skies although, at What has thus far been said has been the same time, reducing his ab~lity to chiefly in reference to the European thea­ protect his own skies fully. ' ter of the war. While here we tensely From this we see that the more nearly await the adversary at the main gate­ the two air forces are matched, the more at the Iron Curtain-he appears, as mat­ difficult the movements of the mechanized ters stand in the world today, rather to units on the ground will hecome. Situa­ have the intention of slipping in at the tions like the one in Normandy where back door. As a result of this, powers with almoRt 10,000 Allied planes were faced overseas interests should be resolved, in with only 270 German planes will hardly the future, to combat uprisings and local be repeated. Let us stop and consider wars to a hitherto unparalleled extent. whether the landing would have been at Entirely different requirements for or­ all successful if the Luftwaffe, at that ganization, equipment, and mode of en­ time,. had even 3,000 planes at its disposal. gagement must be met than in Europe, There is the additional fact that since although it is not at all impossible that the end of the war both bombsights and even here similar problems could one day the effectiveness of aircraft weapons, arise. especiallY of rockets, have been considera­ Basically, this type of war could be I­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 81

either guerrilla warfa-re with the eharae. are not without their value, espeeially in ter of an uprising, the adversary having the guarding of highways and roads and no regular troops at his disposai, or wars other communication routes. Helicopter with small states with more or less mod­ commandos are still more effective, but in ernly equipped but small fighting forces. the majority of cases, since they are en­ As a further alternative we could gaged only when summoned, they arrive imagine the ease of the armies of great too late. powers fighting with modern equipment Heavy equipment.-i-with the exception of in extra-European theaters. Such a thea. a few lightly armored 'lCehicles-is, gen­ ter could easily be the Middle East. Here, erally speaking, useless and constitutes an likewise, combat operations with or with­ encumbrance for the forces. Artillery is out atomic weapons could occur. Uprisings, employed in no greater concentrations such as those of the Druseans, Armenians, than individual batteries and operates and Azerbaidzhanians, would likely lend mostly in direct fire since the adver­ to thll fighting the character of guerrilla sary has no cannon. Air reconnaissance, war which could also easily be the case in whether by planes or helicopters, plays a Europe. very important role in such fighting, but Here, again, the conventional division the direct intervention of airplanes in the is much too fixed to be really effective. ground fighting is extremely costly con~ For what to begin with was an uprising sidering the results that can actually be can, with time and after certain successes attained. and in case of plentiful foreign aid, de­ Guerrillas operate mostly in small bands velop into a semiregular war in which which are difficult to identify, and mostly guerrilla methods alternate with regular in the direction of the least resistance, operations. This was the case in Indo­ that is, in those areas unoccupied by their china. It can also just as easily happen adversary's troops. Any other tactics t~at in wars waged against small states, would involve them in fighting with an bOth methods-guerrilla and regular tac­ adversary who is far superior to them in tics-work hand in hand from the begin­ strength, armament, and supply facilities. ning, or that after the destruction of the Mobile detachments of regular forces, adversary's regular troops the struggle therefore, find a truly paying engagement continues as gullrrilla war. only when their unitsf operating on foot or otherwise, succeed in forcing the guer­ The Combat of Uprisings rilla fighters into an impasse where they In North Africa we are now in the phase are forced to remain until the arrival of of the uprising. What are the character­ the motorized assault commandos. istics of this fighting? To be at all suc­ Such situations, however, seldom occur cessful in guerrilla warfare one is obliged since the adversary uses every means to to occupy cUI. important points simultane­ avoid a fight and because the troops avail­ ously and continuously, while, at the same able are usually sufficiently strong to an­ time, that portion of the terrain that is nihilate him. Due to this, reserves play a contaminated by the uprising must be different role here than in -regular fight­ cleaned up by systematic combing. Both ing-namely, that of assault commandos. tasks require the engagement of a very Anything like the formation of points of considerable human potential. Mechanized main effort hardly enters the picture. In Units, because of the terrain ditliculties, spite of this, however, deep organization can play only a subordinate role here. To in combing the terrain is indispensable. be sure, higbly mobile assault commandos The great adva~tage of the guerrillas 82 lULlTARY REVIEW JANUARY 196T lies in their thorough knowledge of the In both cases the units operate in terrain as well as their support by the greater areas than in regular fighting. In population. The farther they are driven local defense the companies of a battalion from their home area the more difficult may be separated from one another by a their situation becomes, ~ince they neither distance as great as six or seven miles. In know the terrain nor the population there. combing the continental area the'combat For this reason, uprisings are confined sector of a company may be as much as mostly to their originallocale. two miles in breadth, while a unit of ap­ As a rule, clashes are of short duration. proximately battalion size often operates Cooperation between different arms within in a seetor normally equal to that of a the framework of higher units (an elecep­ division. tion is constituted by cooperation with' It follows from this that in guerrilla aviation) seldom occurs. In cases where war the signal communication service has aircraft intervene in ground fighting it to deal with far greater distances and usually occurs as a result of observation must, therefore, be provided with entirely on the part of the aviation itself. The different radio equipment than in normal composition of units for a given operation engagements. Since the adversary neither is based on terrain, situation, and mission. has aircraft Jlor antiaircraft defense, a In this war the reinforced company large percent of what is needed can be constitutes the basic unit. transported by air. This is more easily A permanent organization of three or accomplished since these requirements are four companies into battalions possesses relatively slight because of the infrequency only an administrative significance, seldom and short duration of the clashes with a tactical one. The relatively simple mode the adversary. As is quite understandable, of fighting makes it possible to place from motorized supply columns must be es­ sile to 10 companies undf,r a single com­ corted. mand center which mates the command setup and the supply services more ef­ In general it can be said that, from a ficient. purely technical point of view, the con­ The combat of uprisings possesses two ducting of guerrilla wars represents a partially overlapping forms: simple mode of warfare. It requires, it is 1. The local defense of all important true, troops which in both organization points together with a wateh maintained and equipment are entirely different from over the areas between these, and secur­ those which are needed in normal fight­ ing the communication routes by means of ing-troops which are greatly superior in permanent counterguerrilla patrols. Mo­ numbers to those of the adversary. Today, torized or mounted assault commandos go in Africa, we find some 15,000 rebels fac­ into action on call. This method is called, ing 350,000 soldiers, the majority of which at the present time in North Africa, qua­ will probably never fire a shot, and yet, drillage. without their presence the problem can 2. The systematic combing of the "con­ hardly be solved. The costly defense equip­ taminated" area-a "roundup"-by widely ment of the divisions which have been dispersed infantry or cavalry forces back transferred to North Africa has been left of which. in the seco~d echelon, small in France, for it would be useless in North mototized units of about company strength Africa. The troops accustomed to travel­ are held in readiness for action with their ing in jeeps have had to learn to march heavy weapons (machineguns, mortars, or on foot again. light field guns). In North Africa this is Today, in the case of many planners. called ratis8lSge. the fact Beems to have been forgotten that FOREIGN MILI'l'ARY DIGEST~ 83 troops who have been accustomed to amount actually necessary. Its practical marching on foot can be easily transported possibilities would also be limited by the in ve)licles, but the reverse is hard to ac­ fact that the adversary would hardly complish. Of the four methods of combat have the time to train his people (whose thus far analyzed, guerrilla war is the technical capabilities are usually of a very one in which machines are least able to low order) in the use of modern equip­ take the place of men. It is a slow, nerve­ ment, and organize them into really ef­ racking type of fighting in which final fective units. Foreign instructors, due to success is made up of numerous small language difficulties and lack of famili­ operations which, of themselves, are arity with local con,ditions, are not able seemingly insignificant. It is a type of to solve this problem satisfactorily. An fighting that can very easily, undermine exception to this exists in the case of small the morale of the troops, in spite of the arms delivered to the guerrilla fighters fact that losses are insignificant. It is a and, very possibly, aircraft piloted, by type of war whose moral and political foreign pilots. repercussions in the home country are Western Powers can almost always greater since the feeling does not exist count on overwhelming air superiority in in the minds of the people that they are such wars. Naturally this has a far-reach­ engaged in a war, a war which, if it is ing influence on the command, organiza­ lost-or perhaps even if it is not lost­ tion, equipment, and employment of ground may be extremely ruinous. forces. In the fighting against the regular Small Overseas States formations of the enemy, mechanized units are obviously of greater significance, To the categories of war thus far but are employed in formations considera­ analyzed should be added military opera­ bly smaller than armored divisions and, tions against small overseas states, states generally speaking, are equipped with which possess but small . regular combat light type tanks. Since, as a rule, the forces. The liquidation of these formations enemy has only a limited number of tanks would, in any case, rbe the first war ob­ at his disposal, the number of armor­ jective. At the same time, everything piercing weapons in one's own organiza­ possible must be done to prevent the tion can be considerably .reduced. For the fighting from developing into a guerrilla same reason, in warfare of this kind cer­ war. That combat with regular forces tain units will also require less artillery likewise requires the use of modern war than in Eqrope. Attacks can very often materiel is self-evident. Yet even as be prepared by air bombardments which regards this point conditions will be dif­ are more easily effected since the adver~ ferent from those in a EUropean theater. sary has neither aviation nor antiaircraft Generally speaking, the areas in which the defense means. As a logical consequence units must operate will be considerably this, in turn, permits a reduction of anti­ greater. The formation of continuous aircraft defense within one's own units. fronts will be the exception. Under these circumstances one's troops It is important to note that a Western can be largely supplied by air. Moreover, Power. will normally be able to count on because of the great distances involved, superiority in point of materiel, especially airborne operations may assume a special where it is possible to cut the adversary, importance. Here, again, as in the last oil' from outside help by means of a naval war, these may operate hand-in-hand witli or other form of blockade. Moreover, such mechanized formations, seizing possession aid even then could aeld?m attain the of important points for the latter in 84 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 advance. Their hlitz-like occupation of the neither be determined nor understood. enemy's airbases in order to prevent a These are important, however. reinforcement of his aviation would be of Armies organized solely for total atomic special importance. war represent an extreme case, They could We repeat once more that the first and be engaged only in collaboration with large most important operational objective, is and small atomic weapons-a type of war the total liquidation of the enemy's regu. which for the reasons mentioned stands the least chance of realization. From this lar combat forces, at the same time dojng it follows, logically, that armies organized everything possible to prevent the fighting solelY in view of this type of war can from developing into guerrilla warfare. easily find themselves in the situation For this purpose simply equipped infan., where they will either be obliged to make try units are required in sufficient num­ use of their suicidal atomic weapons or bers to operate, as in the combat of upris­ completely renounce resistance of another ings, along with small, motorized assault type. Such a one-sided organization could commands. Even while the operations are easily lead to the hasty use of atomie in progress against the regular forces, the equipment even when this was too risky. terrain that is seized must be occupied Armies which are organized only for with sufficient density. conventional warfare (about as in 1939-45) In conclusion, we add the following would, again, because of their cumbrous­ warning: Woe to the power that embarks ness, hardly be usable on a field of battle on such an adventure, even against an ad­ on which atomic weapons are tactically versary who has at his disposal but few employed. regular forces, if it relies too much on the Between these two extremes stands the effectiveness of its modern war machines. system (Case B) proposed in this article In a few days' time, these probably will which is based on small mechanized units be able to conduct the fighting with ease (of about the strength of armored brigades against the regular forces to victorious or motorized infantry brigades), and on end. What thl~y cannot do, however, is pre­ a relatively simply equipped mass of in­ vent the development of a guerrilla war fantry. Such an organization appears to which can bind this power for years, in be the most suitable for all four of the spite of all the victories it has won. There­ types of combat mentioned, not only from fore, in wars of this type, sufficiently the purely tactical or technical point of strong infantry forces, precisely because view, but, since it would be less costly, of the great expanse of the territories of from the economic point of view. the overseas 8mall states, are an indispen­ Practically speaking, this means that in sable prerequisite for success. the case of a total atomic war, in which the center of gravity is mainly in the air Summary force, only the mechanized units would be Our perhaps somewhat long-drawn-out engaged in the actual front areas, while analysis of the four conceivable types of the greater part of the units in the rear war has resembled the method of the math­ areas are reorganized into rescue and ematicians who fill three blackboards with cleanup' detachments. figures, from left to right, deducing one How the organization indicated in Case equation from the other, and, finally, on B would likely succeed on a battlefield the last blackboard, in the lower right­ dominated only by tactical atomic weap­ hand corner, come to a few important ons has already been discussed in the anal­ formulas, formulas which,. otherwise, could ysis of this form of war. In a European FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 85 theater of war a proportion of two infan­ try divisions, with some of the army ar­ try divisions to one mechanized bl\igade· tillery. The solution proposed here may should be established. not be perfect, but it is more advantageous Such an org!\nization is suitable for em­ than an army that is organized for only ployment in Case C, that is, if atomic one type of war. weapons came to be used at all. In case Armies organized in this way have at . of emergency, one could include three their disposal sufficient infantry to engage mechanized brigades in an armored divi­ in guerrilla warfare and, at the same time, sion and supplement the usual artillery mechanized units which are more nearly of the latter, as well as that of the infan­ adapted for local warfare.

Swiss Notional Defense in the Atomic Age DI"..ted by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Urs Schwarz in the ··S....iI. Itoview of World Allal,." (Switzerland) September 1956.

By THE premature publication of re­ the hydrogen bomb, by its very existence ports on the studies made in the United prevent the outbreak of a war. Should a States regarding the new possibilities of war break out all the same, this strategic warfare, a worldwide controversy about air force would annihilate the airbases of the principles of modern strategy has been the enemy and thus paralyze him. It is set in motion. It is true that the effects the old idea of the "fleet in being"; Amer­ of providing the air, land, and naval forces ica hopes to keep the peace by means of of the world powers with tactical atomic her air fClrce, as Great Britain used to do wt!llpons on the methods of warfare, and, by means of her fleet. therefore, on the organization and equip­ ment of all armed forces, have been under New Strategy close study for years. But even in Great From the beginning, some powerful ar­ Britain, where the new strategical theories guments have been advanced against this are the most advanced, such drastic steps way of thinking. Captairi Liddell Hart, for as are now being contemplated in the' Pen­ instance, more than a year ago explained tagon have never before been examined. that such a strategy, if it were to be The general trend of all these studies is adopted by NATO, would prove helpless well known: The ground troops are to be against the most likely form of aggres­ reduced in size and generously' equipped sion-Communist infiltration, internal re­ with tactical atomic weapons, but made volt, and local attacks by "volunteers." If more mobile. For their support a strong nuclear weapons were used against such tactical air force with a corresponding forms of attack, they would lead to the system of bases is to he established. The very thing that is to be avoided at all costs, navies, too, will emphasize smaller and a general war with weapons of mass anni­ faster 'units, and planes. hilation. For this reason-so the critics of But" the real backbone of defense would the new strategy are pointing out-a real be the strategic air force. Equipped, first, deterrent, to be effective in every case, with intercontinental bombers and, later most certainly requires the presence of on, with large-caliber guided missiles of armed forces in the classical sense, but maximum range, it could, as a carrier of they would have to be adapted to the new 86 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 weapons. Even in the United States the The other possibility is a major war. last word has by no means, been spoken It might, on the basis of disarmament eon­ yet on this issue. ventions, or as a result of the deterring It is the shape of the armies and their effect of the strategic atom bomb, be fought alignments in the next few years that without any nuclear weapons; or it might provides the tremendous theme of the con- be the Armageddon in which the powers troversy going on between the SDviet Union try to fight and annihilate each other with and her satellites on one hand, and the their atomic missiles. United States and the powers close to her The very fact of there being two possi­ on the other-partly in the form of dis- bilities shows that no revolutionary, one­ armament talks, and partly in the form of, sided solution is possible for our defense pressure and counterpressure. problem. Unlike, perhaps, the world pow. Switzerland, as a small neutral state, ers we must be prepared for events in is of no significance to this dispute and can quite different forms and beyond our con. have no part in it. But she must constantly trol. Our "classical" army is very versa. measure her defense against all possible tile already. This versatility has to be pre­ threats and try to keep pace with develop- served and increased. To try to copy the ments in the world around her. armies of the great powers would be sense. The Swiss foreign-policy course is clearly less. The frequent criticism that Switzer­ defined, in that the policy of armed neu- land is planning to build a "pocket.size trality is the proved and, in our situation, edition" of a great-power army has been only possible means of safeguarding our negated by developments, for both a stra­ independent existence. We are spared all tegic air force and an aerial defense by the dilemmas confronting other small and fighter planes are quite unthinkable in our medium states, as to whether or not they conditions. The cost, as well as the limited should take part in certain alliances and space at our disposal, places these two military agreements. But the question we weapons, essential for a great-power army, do have to answer is, what are the best out of the question for Switzerland. weapons for our neutrality? What is the nature of the threat these The Four Essentials weapons will have to meet? In all proba- What we need are four compone1lts: a bility, an attack upon us by a single power strong frontier defense, a mobile, versatile with the rest of the world all around at "classical" army, an effective aerial de­ peace is politically unthinkable today. Any fense, and a home guard with a double military action against our territory, there- fUllction-to combat subversion, sabotage, fore, would most likely be part of a larger and revolt, and as a civil defense against conflict. This does not mean, however, that air attack. Our present task is not the dis­ we might not have to fight alone even in cussion of the details of organization, ar· auch a situation. maments, tactics, and training 'of these Two main possibilities have to be taken four parts of our national defense, but let into consideration. One would develop from us make it clear that We already possess a situation in which the whole of Europe, some of these defensive weapons. Where or large parts of it, would be seething with necessary, we are capable of setting them a Communist-instigated political revolu- up and maintaining them with our own tion. Gangs, partisans, and refugees would resources, and they are effective. try to cross our frontiers, while in the in­ terior foreign agents would attempt to Frontier Defense seize power in cooperation with traitorous Whether or not the strategy of the world native elements. powers is completely revolutionized, the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 87 probability of "small confticts"-as Gen­ necessity it can maintain itself in the re" eral Maxwell Taylor recently stated-is duit (inner fortress), or harass an .in­ growing. In such conflicts, when no atomic vader by small-scale warfare. weapons, or only those with limited effects In the case of a major war, an army as are used, a strong defense of the frontier here described would mean a hope of sur­ and a mobile army to support it are indis­ vival. The picture 'of a full-scale attack pensable to our country. Provided her neu­ upon our country, conducted with strategic trality can be preserved, this form of weapons and hydrogen bombs, is too defense in the traditional sense will safe­ ghastly to be imagined. No one knows just guard Switzerland from a spread of the what it would look like. It is hardly possi­ conflagration to her territory. ble, therefore, to plan for protection and defense against it. Defense by deterrent, Mobile Armll by the threat of a counterblow is out of the Should we be attacked, however, the de­ question for us, because neither the size fense of the frontier and a mobile army of our country nor our economic potential would be the only effective answer. Let it would make that possible. The small depth not be said that our army is too weak, in of the country also forbids a defense by any case, against an attack by a great fighter-pursuit planes. power, for even a great power can apply Home Guard only limited forces to the front we have to defend. As a rule it will be engaged on A strong ground-to-air defense with those weapons which our "conventional" several fronts at the same time. It is significant and encouraging for us that army will have to have in any case, and the setting up of German armed forces is which our industry can produce in first­ rate quality, however, would be effectiv.e. considered of, great importance both by Furthermore, in the case of the catastrophe NATO and by the Soviets. An army of 600,000 men, consisting of 12 divisions and of a strategic bombardment the organism of a disciplined army would stand the 1,300 planes, is regarded as a factor of greatest chance of survival. Only a well­ weight in global developments. trained army- could help save and feed the Why then should our army, with as civilian population, seal up contaminated many divisions moving in a space much areas, prevent· panic, lawlessness, and re­ smaller than the forces of the German volt-provided anything can be done at Federal RepUblic will have to fill, and with all. Its fortifications and underground in­ a terrain much easier to defend, not be stallations might possibly provide shelter highly effective for our part of Europe? for hundreds of thousands; its means of Aerial Defense transportation and its supplies might prove the salvation of many. Obviously, this army has to be adapted Summarization to modern conditions. It has to be trained , ' with a view to atomic weapons. Its mo­ We need not, for this reason, transform bility and firepower have to be increased; our army into a gigantic civilian defen!je the tactical air force, particularly, with organization. On the contrary, for the very its maximum mobility and firepower has reason of the unpredictable nature of the to be built up. Then, however, it will be in threat, we have to keep it as flexible as a position to adapt to any possible threat; possible. Experience has shown that an it can protect the vital parts of our coun­ army capable of coping with its military try. from its ~rontier positions, it can in task can be successfully assigned to any some parts of our territory block .the en­ other task by its leaders. emy's passage; in the eyent of desperate Switzerland is in a position to develop 88 MILITARY REVIEW .JANUARY 1957 and 'to maintain sulih a modern and versa­ to conquer our skeptical attitude. Cer­ tile army. We are ·spending three percent tainly we must not "arm for the last of our national income on an instrument war." But neither should we hold back of defense which is not to be looked down with our efforts because we cannot clearly upon. although it has a few weaknesses. visualize the picture of a possible war of The Netherlands spends 6.3 percent, and the future. poor Italy 5.6 percent of, their national The only thing to be recognized clearly income for defense purposes. The United is that a war may be very unlikely, but States sacrifices 17.6 percent of her huge quite possible. And such a war might come income for defense. in any of several various forms. In order A slight increase of our expenditure. to be as well prepared as is humanly possi­ quite bearable for our people, would enable ble for all these contingencies, we need the us to create the most modern army imagin­ strong and versatile army outlined in this able within our limitations. We have but article.

The Souiet Union and Afghanistan

D~ested by the MILITARY REVIEW from a eop,.rljfhted artlel" by LI...t ....nt Colonel H. E. Crocker in "The Army Q..arterly" (Great Britain) April 1956.

THE interest displayed by the Soviet The Afghan Army is woefully deficient Union in Afghanistan hks been consider­ in small arms, notably in rifles, weapons ably increased in recent years. Soviet ex­ of several vintages and with different cal­ perts and technicians, who number close ibers still being in use. to a thousand men, are employed in the A tentative approach was made early construction of roads, oil storage plants, ,in 1955 to the British Government for a bakeries, and other projects. In addition, supply of arms, but this was refused on the Soviet Union has made Afghanistan the grounds of Afghan hostility toward a present of a number of omnibuses and a Pakistan, a Commonwealth country. Af­ lOO-bed hospital. She has advanced a loan ghan Air Force pilots have, however, been of approximately 5~01\arS, chiefly trained in England, but the country is in goods. ill provided with modern aircraft: Several Preparations for the' construction of an airfield's have been constructed at Herat, oil pipeline to rUn from Maza-i-Sharif to Kandahar, and Jelalabad. Termez on the Afghan frontier, and an alternate route to Khalif, are well under Strategic Situation way. The routes have been reconnoitered Afghanistan occupies a position of ex­ by the Soviets, and it is expected that con­ treme strategic importance vis-a-vis the struction will follow in the near future. Soviet Union and Pakistan, forming as she At the time of writing there is no infor­ does a salient in the Western line of de­ mation available as to the extension of the fense against northern aggression between lines to Kabul., The visit of Bulganin and two members of the Baghdad Pact-Iran Khr~shchev to Kabul is said to presage and Pakistan. The Afghan Government' even further aids for ,Afghanistan from has declared its policy of strict neutrality the USSR, although the nature of these and desires to remain on terms of friendly aids is not stated. rl!lations with all its neighbors. It refuses, FOREIGN MILITARY J)IGESTS 89 however, to be drawn into the Baghdad munist propaganda day and night, chiefly Pact. directed against Islam. There is also a The fact that Pakistan joined the Bagh­ school for training foreign Communists in dad Pact caused a feeling of deep resent­ sabotage, civil disturbance, and the inau. ment on the p~rt of the Soviets who now guration of strikes. have the pretext for regarding Afghani­ At the same time that Bulganin and stan as a "weaker brother" surrounded on Khrushchev were entertained at Kabul, all sides by hostile countries closely allied the authorities in the border states in So­ to "Western Imperialists." The refusal of viet territory were arresting leading Mos­ Great Britain to help with a supply of lems, some of whom were executed-aU of armS, together with the lavish generosity which has added considerably to the dis­ of the Soviets, has had the undoubted ef­ fect of drawing Afghanistan closer to a • TASHKENT ,.~. friendship with the Soviet Union in the CHINA last few years. It may even be that this $INKIANG'l-, friendship will develop still closer and, ~(\ ,..... perhaps, even lead to an open alliance be­ TERMEZ , •••• ­ tween the USSR and Afghanistan. ) . r I ./ • HERAT • ~.!!UL Invasion of Mghanistan ) AFGHANISTAN ( Many leading Afghans regard an inva­ l, • KANDAH;;:'; IRAN sion of their country by the Soviet Union ~; ( as inevitable. They look with apprehen­ ~__...... '" PAKISTAN sion at the numbers of Soviet experts now "",-"\ at work in their country on the construc­ /:) tion of roads in and near Kabul which, : tI-!ey consider, can only be designed for strategic pUrposeS. The capture of Soviet agents at Ter­ mez, Herat, and Kandahar adds consid­ erably to their feelings of anxiety. Some quiet felt at Kabul. The· broadcasts, which of these agents were provided with large are plainly audible in Afghanistan, have sums of money and letters f«;lr the purpose roused bitter feelings of' resentment of bribing Afghan leaders to induce their against the Soviets on the part of the mass troops to offer no effective resistance to any Soviet invasion that might occur. The of the Afghan people who are, for the Soviet reply to a strongly worded protest most part, devout Moslems. offered the excuse that these agents were As far as can be ascertained there do employed against Iran, a pretext that not appear to be any signs of a fifth col­ would only deceive those who are ready umn in Afghanistan; but the fact that to believe in Soviet assurances. some highly placed Afghans have been ap­ The Afghans view with grave apprehen­ proached by Soviet agents with heavy sion the establishment of a vast military bribes has caused much disquiet. It is con­ center at Tashkent which embraces about sidered that the strength of the Moslems' 200 ndles of country, extending as far as faith would be sufficient to act as a deter­ Bokhara and Samarkand. It includes mil­ rent to any approach of communism. This itary training depots, airfields, and a pow­ possibly may be so, but it should not be erful radio station which pours out Com­ relied on too implicitly. 90 :MILITARY REVllilW .JANUARY' 1957 It is considered at Kabul that a Com­ Afghanistan and would allow easy access munist invasion, should it occur, would be for an invasion from China. It is noticeable mounted from any of the following direc­ that the Soviets invariably employ the tions: from across the Oxus; from the troops of their allies whenever possible in west via Herat and Kandahar; or from preference to their own-as was the case the east via the Padak Corridor and Sin­ in Korea with armies of Chinese "volun­ kiang. teers." The corridor passes to the north The Ox'us is over a mile wide and has of Kashmir and would thus avoid tres­ no bridges. Crossings are made in heavy passing into Pakistan or Indian territory. barges. The mountains in Afghanistan, An invasion from this direction would' with their passes 14,000 to 18,000 feet above avoid the mountains involved in the route sea level, blocked with snow during the' across the Oxus and would find well-paved winter months, would offer formidable ob­ roads, hospitals, and oil installations all stacles to large movements of troops and ready for their use. Sl10uld an invasion transport. be contemplated this is the likely route. The route i from the west would involve Although relations between the Soviet a long and difficult line of communication Union and Afghanistan are for the mo­ along the Kabul-Kandahar route. The ment on a friendly basis, the possibilities presence of Soviet agents at these cities of a Soviet invasion of their country is not may be regarded, however, as pointing to lost sight of by leading Afghans who have Soviet intentions in this direction. not forgotten the "peaceful" occupation of The Padak Corridor, recently ceded to Tibet on the pretext of "rescuing the in­ the USSR, leads directly from the Chinese habitants from the evil machinations of province of Sinkiang to the northeast of the Western Imperialists."

The Armored Arm in the Atomic Age T.....I.te

THE Divi8ion Mecanique Rapide (DMR) The Genesis (rapid mechanized division) has, since its The DMR was born of the necessity for creation, continued to be the object of im­ increasing the efficiency of the French passioned controversy. Partisans and ad­ forces. Considerations of a political na­ versaries vie with one another in argu­ ture, including the weakness of the West­ ments relative to the missions it can fulfill, ern Nations in the face of the Soviet its structure, and its employment. threat, certainly explain this necessity. Behind those disagreements we often But it was dictated, above all, by technical find a lack of understanding of the ideas imperatives. which presided at the elaboration of its The formulas which issued from World . formula. War II have shown themselves from day In the genesis of the DMR and in anal­ to day to be less suited for the new condi­ ysis ·of the reasons which dictated its ma­ tions of combat. Military systems at all teriel and its organization, however, can levels are closely joined with advance­ be found the facts which refute the criti­ ments in armament and in five years these cisms and point up the reasons for its ar­ advancements have been greater than in mament for organization. all the 20 centuries that have gone before. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 91 The genesis of the DMR was not a su­ latter in the domains of speed and stra­ perficial revamping, a minor touching up tegic mobility. Let us note, tinally, that in its structure or organization-as the .the logistical difficulties associated with defenders of established concepts still the employment of an armored vehicle and maintain. It was a transformation, a com­ which operate as a brake on capacities for plete recasting, which of necessity con­ movement are very considerable in com­ sidered the possibility of war on an atomic parison with those associated with the com­ scale. batant on foot. Thus it is easy to understand why the The Materiel tactical mobility of a large unit is con­ The principal elements on which the effi­ siderable b.ut its strategic mobility and ciency of a large unit depends are: capac-~ comparative speed of movement are me­ ity for movement, firepower, the protec­ diocre when the ratio of vehicles to men tion provided by the materiel itself, and is small. organization-that is to say, the manner When this ratio increases, tactical mo­ in which the individual elements are as­ bility diminishes. Strategic mobility and sociated. speed increase at first, as Lieutenant Colo­ Capacity for movement may be measured nel F. O. Miksche showed very well in one ill speed and in tactical and strategic mo­ of his studies, then, under the influence bility. of logistical friction passes through a max­ This capacity for movement depends imum and decreases rapidly. strictly on the nature of the materiel and There exists, therefore, an optimum the relative proportion of men and indi­ proportion of vehicles to men. Motoriza­ vidual elements. The nature of the mate­ tion, in this domain as in many others, is riel quite obviously exerts its influence on as detrimental by excess as by lack of it. all the forms of capacity for movement. This proportion may be established at ap­ In the case of full-track materiel, tac­ proximately one vehicle to each five men. ticlll capacity for cross-country mobility This is much exceeded in the present and speed is developed. The inverse phe­ French armored division. nomenon is seen in the case of wheeled ve­ Firepower is a function of the ratio of hicles. But whether they be track or armament to men and the intrinsic power wheeled vehicles, the tactical and strategic of the armament. The intrinsic power of mobility and speed of the materiel is reg­ this materiel differs from the capacity for ularly reduced when their tonnage is in­ movement in that, generally speaking, it creased. ' is directly proportional to its weight. Finally, multiplication of the types of Finally, protection depends on the ratio materiel ,in a large unit has the same ef­ of armored vehicles to men and the pro­ fect as increase of tonnage, due to the tection afforded by the armored vehicles. increase in maintenance and repair opera­ This also increases with the weight of the tions it requires. materiel. From the relative importance accorded All excessive increase of weight result­ in the division' to personnel and materiel, ing from an ill-considered increase of fire­ we are immediately aware of which of the power or, still more, of protection, results three aspects of capacity for movement in a dangerous diminution of capacity for will receive the greatest emphasis. movement and, consequently, of the effi­ The human being possesses a tactical ciency of the military system contem­ mobility, a flexibility, far superior to that plated. Military history abounds in testi­ of the most highly perfected vehicle. On monials of this truth. the other hand, he cannot compete with the If, as a number of authors imply or 92 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 directly affirm, these three characteristics associated logistical difficulties are im­ vary in direct proportion to the weight of measurably increased in an atomic situa­ the materiel, the problem would' then be tion. The classical material is no longer greatly simplified:' weight would consti­ suited for any other use than for perform­ tute the panacea. But such is by no means ing those missions for which the atomic the case. weapons cannot be used. On the contrary, the problem is to at­ These are, briefly, the principal reasons tempt to reconcile opposed requirements why the 14.5-ton light tank AMX and the and to determine for the DMR what por­ EBR armored reconnaissance car were se­ tion of the sum total was to be allotted lected as the basic armored vehicles of the respectively to capacity for movement, fire­ DMR. These are the reasons why heavy power, and protection. materiel was systematically passed by. The fundamental eharaeteristic of a To be sure, the addition of Patton tanks large unit of cavalry is not its speed-an or more pQ.werful artillery pieces-in ac­ improper and restrictive term--'-but its rel­ cordance with suggestions frequently made ative capacity for movement in comparison -would increase the power of the DMR. with large infantry units. But their presence would dangerously di­ It is this relative speed which permits minish its possibilities of relative speed it to reconn"it~r, cover, and exploit. When and, all things considered, would reduce it is depriven "f this speed for any reason, its effectiveness. it may render limited services, but it is Although the requirement for lightness eertainly incapable of fulfilling the mis­ has truly been taken into account, the need sions of cavalry. for austerity and simplicity haye not been In the DMR it was necessary, therefore, satisfied. This is the principal criticism to place main emphasis on capacity for that can be made of this large unit. movement. This had to be far superior to Its roster of equipment comprises some that of the classical armored division or 40 types of vehicles and 20 types of weap­ it would not be capable of performing the ons. The ratio of vehicles to men is almost tactical mission problem for which it was the same as in the armored division. created. If the DMR is to be able to truly claim The inevitable consequence of this was mobility and lightness, and if it does not that the weight of the materiel and the wish to lose the benefit of the qualities number of different types of materiel had possessed by its combat materiel, it must to be reduced to the minimum, and the still undergo a major reduction of weight. ratio of vehicles to men brought as closely as possible to the optimum proportion. Organization The first slogan to inscribe in letters of In addition to the nature and quantity gold on the banner of this unit was, there­ of its materiel, the effectiveness of a large fore: lightness, austerity, simplicity. unit depends on the manner in which it is It goes without saying that this light­ organized. The atomic era, which is also ening-this increase in relative speed­ that of jet-powered aviation, has brought could not be realized save at the cost of profound changes here: a reduction of firepower and protection, The aeroatomic phenomenon accelerated even though the atomic phenomenon did the process of evolution which began a attenuate the consequences in large meas­ century and a half ago under the influence ure. of the advances made in armament, and As a matter of fact, classical weapons made it necessary to associate, organically, seem ridiculously weak in the face of the the different arms at a much lower level firepower of the new weapons, and their of the military hierarchy. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 93 The explanation' of this is simple: in­ Unfortunately, it has two defects: it is creased firepower, and the progress ef­ contrary to two of the lessons from World fected in delivery means, gave rise to the War II, and it is in conflict with the par­ requirement for dispersion and difficulties ticular natures of arms. It must be recog­ of battlefield movement. Under this double nized that the fractionization of the units influence the time required for the trans­ of the armored arm is contrary to the portation of reserves to a given point methods advocated by Guderian and Rom­ could not but increase-decreasing, there­ mel. fore, the ability of the commander to in­ The decentralization of the artillery ma­ fluence the course of battle by the use of teriel constitutes a mortal infraction of reserves. the golden rule of the artillerymen firmly rooted in hundreds of war experiences. Combined-Arms Regiment And the conservatives do not fail to cite It is thus that the first organic combined­ equally illustrious examples in support of arms complex, which was realized under their argument.. Napoleon in the echelon of the army corps, What they forget is that since Sedan, was located a century later at the level of technique has made giant strides and that . the division. In 1945 the armored group the methods of 1940 would be anachronous constituted the smallest, organic, com­ today. bined-arms cell. The concentration of the 1st, 2d, and COMPOSITION OF THE DMR AS 10th Armored Divisions at Sedan on 13 RELEASED IN SEPTEMBER 1955 May 1940 was a stroke of genius under the contiitions of that time. Today, it would Division staff and headquarters doubtless only give its author the right to One signal company figure in the long list of incompetent gen­ One service battalion erals after Soubise and Bazaine. One intelligence group What sense can there be, under the 6~e reconnaissance regiment menace of a few of today'a atomic weap­ Two combined-arms regiments ons, in the deployment of artillery such as One infantry regiment that realized by the Russians on the One artillery battalion (l05-mm SP) Eastern Front? One antiaircraft battalion But one would still accept the combined­ One engineer battalion arms regiment as an innovation in the tac­ Approximate strength-7,500 tical field if it did not constitute a serious Approximate number vehicles-2,000 blow to the particular angle from which each of the individual arms is prone to Under these conditions it was inevitable view matters. The criticisms, voiced in the that this' evolution should be accelerated most convinced tone, poorly conceal the in the atomic era. fears felt in regard to continued posses­ Such is the philosophy of the Regiment sion of previously acquired privileges. Inter-A rme8 (RIA) (combined-arms reg­ And the power of these interests· is such iInent): the association, within a unit of that we see appearing, alongside of two from 1,000 to 1,500 men, of homogeneous RIA's, a homogeneous regiment of infan­ infantry, armored, artillery, and other try. Contrary to all logic the divisionary units. artillery succeeds in maintaining under its In common with all prefabricated solu­ control groups that it will no longer be tions, this one is of but mediocre worth, able to concentrate except in maneuvers. but it is, all in all, the least unsatisfactory. It is important to determine how many MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1967 of these combined-arms regiments are to on an average, to solve &11 the tactical be allotted to the DMR. Here. the parti­ problems of the field of battle. As a matter sans of the tertiary and quaternary order of fact, only experience in minute detail enter the lists, each one referring to a can make it possible to decide how much geometric figure as possessing all the vir­ infantry and artillery should have been as­ tues. As a matter of fact, be it one order sociated with the armored squadrons. or another, it is still a compromise. The more pawns the general of the di­ Conclusions vision has, the more his opportunities for From this study three conclusions may be drawn: The appearance, then the development of the atomic phenomenon. made neces­ sary a complete revision of the structure of our forces. The DMR was born of this necessity. Destined to replace an armored division which was now outmoded and to fulfill all the missions calling for great relative speed of movement, it must, even though sacri­ ficing, in part, classical firepower and an­ tiquated protection, be marked by light­ 14.s-ton light tank AMX ness, austerity, and simplicity. Destined for dispersed combat in the maneuver increase and the more the cost midst of the worst conditions relative to of his maneuvers will be reduced. But two imperatives reduce the number of RIA's that can be employed. The first is the difficulties of cc,mmand which re­ duce the ceiling to .five or six. The second is sordid reasons relative to manpower. This second consideration turned out to be the decisive one and the DMR was as­ signed two RIA's-a figure which, quite obviously, is devoid of all logic. What importance finally was to be at­ tributed in the DMR to the elementary units of the other arms? There.must be a cavalry unit whose es­ EBR armored reconnaissance car sential characteristic was to be-we repeat -relative speed of movement and which communications, it must favor the integra­ was to be capable of fulfilling all missions tion of the arms even at the sacrifice of requiring relative speed of movement. The their particular capabilities. elementary cavalry units, the 14.5-ton Excessive heaviness, motorization, and ta~k AMX and EBR armored car units, centralization are still the fundamental were to constitute the skeleton around vices of the French military system, which the rest was to be established. whether it is called on to face an atomic The compositipn of each combined-arms war or the ideological warfare announced regiment was to be such as to permit it. by Lenin 40 years ago. J FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

'The Importante of Patrols in .Nuclear Warfare Dill.sted by the MILITARY REVIEW from _ .opyrlrhted arti.le by Brlll_dier M. R. Roberts in the "Journal of the Royal United Servi.e Institution"

THE advent of the '1tomic weapon will of the enemy's widely dispersed defended enforce both on attackers and defenders a posts in turn and destroy them piecemeal. dispersion far greater than has ever be­ fore been practiced on European battle­ "Killing Ground" fields. It follows, then, that the greater There is nothing new in this concept of thel dispersion, the greater becomes the attack. It was practiced in Burma first importance of minor tactics and the greater by the Japanese and then by the British the need for junior leaders of superlative wherever the terrain made it necessary. skill. The object of the defense was not to From the days of General Braddock we stop all the gaps, but to entiee the attacker have suffered initial disaster in wars into a good '''killing ground" in the heart against supposedly inferior enemies w.ho of his defended area. The object of the at­ were skilled in fighting in fast-moving, tacker was to discover, before his attack, widely dispersed small columns. In mod­ the enemy's dispositions with such ac­ ern and comparatively modern times the curacy that he could avoid the traps and Boer commandos had us in dire distress, demolish the enemy's strong points one by - and in 1940 and 1941 we had no anSWer one by attacking them from the most un­ to the fast-moving, deep-penetrating Pan­ expected direction. zer columns or, later, the infiltration of the From the above it must be obvious that Japanese infantryman. the first requisite is patrol work of the we had our successes. We had highest order. An engineer general once ~True, remarked: . them in the Peninsular War, thanks to the development of the light infantry 'tactics You can make an intelligent chap by by the "Sepoy General" as he was some­ intensive training into a rea80nably good times called in his earlier days; in the ·field engineer in six months, but you will Crimea, because both sides used to invite be lucky to make him into a first-class in­ their ladies to come out and watch the im­ fantry 80ldier in 18, and an infantry 8ol­ pending battles; in the Kaiser's war, be­ dier is no damn good unless he is first­ cause the Germans believed in the over­ class. On patrol, a bad one is a menace to . whelming mass and we had learned from his comrad.es . the Boer War the true power of the rifle When one considers training, it always skillfully handled by comparatively small helps to be sure from the outset of the numbers. standard you wish to achieve. Any platoon But look at the future. However good commander who is given a map reference the senior commander's plan may be, its 'of a point a normal day's march away. success in an atomic war may depend on and about two hours' daylight for pre­ the ability of company, platoon, and even liminary reconnaissance, should be able section commanders to get to a given point to get his platoon there by dawn the fol­ by a given time. There, they will join other lowing morning, even though all roads and similar subunits on the battlefield for an tracks leading to it are under possible' attack, preferably at night, on one or more surveillance by the enemy. 96 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1957 Competitive Practice that each individual 80ldier and each unit Real efficiency in patrolling comes from learned that their effort was to be a part constant competitive practice. It is only 0/ a vastly bigger operation. This served by pitting his wits against another's over the double purpose of assuring that the and over again that a patrol leader be­ individual soldier, if captured, could not gins to realize how to act in emergency. reveal knowledge.of the opel'ati(m, and To have to think something up quickly, that the units performed their patrol work when a false move probably means death, with added fervor knowing that they them. is a desperate situation to be in unless selves would utilize the knowledge gained one has a prepared mind and great con­ thereby. fidence. It is this type of situation which Patrols from the companies were sent will often face the small party moving , three to four miles behind the enemy's for­ independently into enemy territory. ward defenses, and detailed information Anyone who was in Burma knows how filtered to the rear. From the detailed in­ difficult it was to get identifications of formation they secured it was not difficult Japanese in the early days during their to build up the final plan and establish a deep and rapid infiltrations. The reason jumpoff time, based on the amount of time was simply that they had ingrained in the furthest company wl}uld need to make them the precept that when you moved the approach march. you moved fast, that you were always cov­ The procedure outlined is for dealing ered, and that you never went out of sight with a well-established position of widely of the covering party. dispersed but mutually supporting de­ No adage has had more lipservice paid to fended localities. The first time it was put it than the time-honored "time spent in into practice a great deal of detailed in­ reconnaissance is seldom wasted." And formation came in to include such things certainly the collection of knowledge about as pictures of tree snipers sitting in their the enemy's Widely dispersed, atomic de­ trees, and Japanese feeding in their "cook­ fenses requires a system of carefully house" in what they thought was a def­ planned and competently executed patrol­ iladed ravine behhid a forward outpost. ling. One of the greatest difficulties of realis­ The following is the system employed tic and adequate training in patrol work by a division which helped to inflict the is that it tends to be looked on as "elemen­ first major defeat on the Japanese in tary" stuff on which recruits are brought Burma. It worked against a confident and, up. Commanding officers are almost of· up to then, consistently victorious enemy. fended if asked whether their junior lead­ Well in advance of the operation-it ers can take out a patrol, and yet it is might be weeks in the case of a large-scale the most difficult single operation of war, operation-the division commander gave requiring continual practice to produce his regimental commanders a very brief anything close to perfection. And perfec­ outline of his proposed plan and their part tion is the only acceptable standard. in it. The regimental commanders then Another difficulty is that, in maneuvers, passed it on as a regimental plan to the patrolling is very difficult to umpire. There battalions, the battalion commanders is a tendency among umpires to rule out briefed the company commanders on the highly skilled or daring patrol work on battalion plan, and so on down to the pla­ the grounds that "it couldn't have been toons. It was not until just before zero done if there had been bullets flying." A hour that eVeryone was brought into the patrol that has been seen is often adjudged picture. And it was not until thia time to have been dealt with, and yet a skillful. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 97 patrol leader can achieve a great deal by some stage in the reconnaissance period, allowing part of his patrol to be seen at representatives of the armored units must the right place. accompany the infantry patrols. If the These difficulties in training must be infantry is to be taken forward in ar­ overcome, because the infantry attack of mored vehicles, the carrying unit must be the atomic age probably will be composed "in" on reconnaissance from a very early of a large number of fighting patrols, each stage. It follows that armored units, timed to reach a certain point at a given whether fighting or carrying, must· be time, each one entirely self-contained from trained to work with infantry patrols. the time it moves off until it arrives at A very considerable portion of the unit the point where it is due to fall on the training period should be devoted to patrol enemy post which is its objective, in com­ exercises up to regimental level, even pany with one or more other patrols which though it takes all the officers and senior have arrived there by a different route. noncommissioned officers of another reg­ iment to umpire them. Umpiring is, after Armored Units all, very fine training. Up to now nothing has been said about The division, corps, or army maneuvers armor which will be required to be up with that follow must be framed so that deep the infantry when the assault opens, but and skilled patrol work is an essential which, for obvious reasons, may have to part of the operation-then the men will start its approach long after the infantry. be interested as well as commanders and Its route also must be preselected and at staff.

The Bose for Airborne Penetration D1e..ted by the MILITARY REVIEW from an artiel. by Commander R. A. H. Millar in the "Australian Al'mJ' Journal" Jul7 1956.

THERE can be no doubt that the success lack of airfields will be .very keenly felt. of a long-range penetration by land forces It is currently accepted in staff circles that depends on transportation. Their infiltra­ one of the first targets to be neutralized is tion, probably by air, is mandatory to suc­ enemy airfields. cess. But what of the exfiltration? Has that A field capable of operating heavy troop­ no bearing on their morale? Should air be carrying aircraft is expensive to build and employed for this? difficult to defend. In the event of a "limited" war it could Geographical Factor be that some local airfields would be ten­ Much of Southeast Asia is within 200 able, but airfields in Southeast Asia are miles of the coast. He who controls the sea at a premium; they would be taxed to the (and here a degree of air control is also breaking point in endeavoring to achieve required) can produce his raiders within and maintain air superiority. It would be 200 miles of their target by sea, and could unwise to plan on their being available for evacuate them when their task has been penetration' projects. completed. Recently, at Bangkok, a demonstration Throughout Southeast Asia in time of was put on where 35 helicopters, operat­ war (and that is the assumed state) the ing from the USS Princeton, transported 98 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 19&1 a marine battalion ashore, and subse­ say, three carriers, is ideal f~r land force quently showed how the elements of sur­ support operations. One farrier provides prise, mobility, and economy of force could day defense of the group. the second night be exploited. It was a· lesson which any defense, and the third the main military thinking man could apply to practically support aircraft. If one should be dam­ any military operation, but the type to aged, the others provide the "spare deck," which it is particularly suited is the raid that is, the alternate' landing facilities. type operation. In raider type operations the helicopter, operating from its floating base, can ferry Additional Methods personnel and supplies ashore. The re­ To the methods of by "sea, land, and air" quired landing area is small, certainly not should be added: by sea and land, and by, as large as that required for parachuting sea and naval air. troops. Sea and Land Helicopters are vulnerable, however. It Much of the land communications of In­ is not beyond imagination to visualize an dochina, of peninsular Thailand, of Ma­ aircraft designed to parachute men and laya, and peninsular Burma follow the supplies, and yet be capable of landing on, coast. In many instances there is no alter­ and being catapulted off, a, carrier. native. Is this not an ideal circumstance The carrier can provide protection; it for landing the raiding party by sea? They is capable of giving fire support to the can be deposited where they wish, and forces on the ground sho.uld they require when their task is completed they can be it; it can attack and neutralize any enemy evacuated and moved to a new area for airfields and installations within a dan­ further operations. They thus retain the gerous radius; and it can withdraw from initiative, achieve surprise, maintain their the hornet's nest at will and by its mobil­ mobility, employ the greatest economy of ity can confuse and disperse the enemy's forces, and their morale is sustained. defense.

Aircraft Carrier8 I 'Sea and Naval Air The aircraft carrier is a floati~g air­ The combination of sea transport to the field complete with its own fighter defense, general area, and the use of naval air to fire-fighting appliances, fuel supplies, am­ the specific area of operations, can, per­ munition supplies, aircraft control sys­ haps, provide the most efficient method of tems, and air-warning devices, but which infiltration, of resupply, and eventual evac­ is able to move from theater to theater, uation. The force can be given close sup­ to strike and withdraw, to seek, out weak port in the field and can employ those spots, and to disperse an enemy's defenses. basic principles of war without which no The small carrier group, c?mprising, operation deserves success.

MOVING? If you are moving, please notify the MILITARY REVIEW, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, of your change of address. Be sure to include your name, old address, and nerD address. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 99 Nuclear Arms dnd the Seruia:eman Dllleated by the MIUTARY REVIEW from a cop)'rlllhted artl.le by Colonel T. I. Lloyd I.. "The Royal Enllineere Journal" (Great Britain) December 1954.

THERE is long continuing discussion on coins on a chart or map. But we are not the functions of the services in this atomic in the least interested in his fleets, forma­ era, to include the navy, army, air force, tions, or groups of airfields which may and merchant marine. But the end re­ survive in part. We are as one solitary sult will turn on one simply expressed re­ man, trying to visualize atomic bursts and quirement which is that the functions decide what behavior they will induce in must be humanly possible. For any serv­ 'us. We occupy at the very most a dozen ice is primarily a collection of human be­ square feet. A nuclear burst strikes a ings, and unless we study and remember zone of square miles: solidly, like a gi­ at all times the peculiarities of man, and gantic steam hammer or power press, more especially such of them as can be ex­ flaming l.ot, missing nothing. And our pected to corne to the surface in nuclear greatest personal peril used to be the warfare, we shall certainly go astray in bullet, or perhaps a shell or bomb frag­ our argument. ment not very much larger. This is no longer true. Humanly Possible This is easily assessed in terms of Gas Warfare muscle and endurance; it is determinable The last-and only-time we were con­ empirically, at least, when human control fronted with a war hazard of this kind of a complex machine is in question; but was on 22 April 1915 when the Germans beyond the realm of the tangible the first used gas. The gas cloud, flowing pli.rase is full of uncertainties which have along downwind, could not miss. It was a been only partially explored, and scarcely roller rather than a hammer, and eri'atic at all in a nuclear context. with the wind, but the analogy is not al­ The tendency today is to leave the ques­ together too pale to serve. tion of how man will behave in nuclear How did man react on that occasion? warfare to the scientists or-since there We can take pride in remembering that is some doubt about psychology as a sci­ within a very few days-aided by external ence-to the psychologists. But surely, factors such as the improvisation of res­ knowing our own minds at least as pirators, the limitations of the weapon, thoroughly as any psychologist (we hope), German ineptitude, and the vagaries of we are under some obligation to try to the weather-he had steeled himself to worry it out for ourselves. We might set meet the threat; but the fact remains about this on the following lines. that on 22 April 1915 man ran "from First, taking the worm's eye view of Ypres to Dunkerque." nuclear warfare, we single out the one Surprise came into it, and men differ, but transcendent characteristic of an atomic the way in which on that April day entire air burst-and perhaps this will be enough units and formations dissolved in the face for our entire purpose. It is that an atomic of the irresistible-or seemingly irresist­ burst cannot miss. ible-cannot be ignored. Many things At once the strategist or higher tactician suddenly ceased to be humanly possible, questions this, illUstrating his point with perhaps because as C. R. M. F. Crutwell 100 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1907 " says in his book, A" History of the Great it "as men and continue their allotted role War: within the function of their 'service? Certainly there is at least one possi­ In the face of gas, without protection, bility of bounds being imposed, although individuality was annihilated; the soldier whether, under the particular circum­ in the trench became a mere passive re­ stances envisaged, they will appear reason­ cipient of torture and death. A final stage able to us is another matter, for the seemed to be reached'in the whole tendency bounds contemplated will have been im­ of modern scientific warfare to depress posed by the enemy, on himself, volun­ and make of no effect individual bravery, tarily. It will be conventional war with enterprise, and skill. Again, nearly every one, strictly limited nuclear element. Two soldier is or becomes a fatalist on active' possible examples of this type of warfare service; it quietens his nerves to believe will be given here. that his chance will be favorable or the reverse. But his fatalism depends upon Our first example will comprise the em­ the belief that he has a chance. If the ployment of nuclear weapons for block­ very air he breathes is poison, his chance ade purposes. Sea blockade has often is gone: he is merely a destined victim for achieved, or come desperately near to the slaughter. achieving, the full war aims of a com­ batant power. Since, for geographical Degrading is perhaps the word for the reasons, one contestant is normally more experience these men underwent. It seems susceptible to it than another, it is un­ that human beings are infinitely degraded likely to be banned by international agree­ by the close menace of some foul, lethal ment in advance of all war being so out­ thing, immeasurably bigger than them­ lawed. We, of all peoples, shall do best selves, against which there is no defense. to take it into account in studying future It revolts them, and saps their very es­ war. sence so that they almost cease to belong Suppose that the blockader decides to to the higMr, reasoning animal group­ use his nuclear weapons for the purpose, ()r if they do reason, they all come to the but at the same time solemnly undertakes same conclusion. They tUrn from the not to employ them elsewhere than over thing, instinctively, blindly, just as any the high seas, never striking the hostile healthy individual turns from vain sui­ mainland, nor even its coastline, and cide. never, accordingly, risking the fulfillment • If, on the other hand, the menace can of current prognostications about nuclear be brought within bounds, its only effect war wiping out entire populations and may be to increase the fury and savagery civilizations. of the fighting; such at any rate was the Under these circumstances it is con­ sequel in gas warfare. A Canadian di­ ceivable that the blockaded nation and its vision put up a stout defense against the allies will hesitate, for a period at least, second gas attack only two days after the before retaliating against the blockader'S first, and by 2 May a gas attack had ac­ cities, or indeed against his territory any­ tually been repelled. where, for that type of retaliation, they can be sure, will be met in kind-the Countermeasures gloves will be off. So the situation en­ Is there any possibility of the atomic visaged may n~t be too fanciful; in any menace being countered like gas, or be­ event it is imaginable, which is all that ing in any other respect confined within matters here where we only need a nuclear reasonable bounds, so that men may face background against which we can see­ FOREIG:N MILITARY DIGESTS 101 and measure--ourselves, and perhaps de­ the spearhead of invasion, running the cide whether we, in the role of ordinary gauntlet across the desert. We have gained servicemen, will be able to carryon the surprise and a flying start. For the pres­ functions of our services. ent there is no ground opposition and we This form of blockade would mean that have tremendous air support, so that no day and night, at a frequency depending bombs threaten us, only guided missiles. on our enemy's nuclear resources, bursts Our tank gives us fair protection so long would be occurring off our shores, close as we are not too near ground zero. In enough to imperil coastal shipping, but our minds we are fanatically determined not close enough to cause damage on land. to right some imagined wrong to our Sometimes our enemy would have means forefathers, and-perhaps most potent of of reconnaissance or other intelligence all-we I now that once we are across the enabling him to detect targets; at other desert we shall be comparatively safe. times he would fire blindly into the coastal Also, we look forward to getting to grips zone. If manned aircraft were still in with the people who have unleashed these vogue for atom bombing, they would come weapons. Yes, we will drive on while we on opportunity missions. survive. Our task is humanly possible: the function of the armor is to that ex­ Land Action tent feasible. In our second example of limited nuclear Next, let us consider a slightly later warfare the contestants are neighboring phase in the war, and deem ourselves em­ countr,ies, but between them lies a wide ployed on the desert lines of communica­ desert; the aggressor is coming across it. tion, as vehicle driver, crew member of His lines of communication will, in due a transport aircraft, or working member course, traverse it. A 'desert, like the high in one pf the many static establishments seas, constitutes a clear atomic target needed on any line of communication. area where civilians and civilization are not Nuclear attack on the desert continues; in hazard, so there will be nothing unrea­ we have seen its effects. sonable in the defender, or conceivably Where can we draw the inspiration that some third power interested in restoring enabled the armor to win through? Our peace, announcing that the desert will be tasks are humdrum and the odds mount treated as a field for nuclear warfare on against us as we repeat 'our crossings or the same terms as the high seas in the continue to dwell in the danger zone. previous example. Meanwhile the "teeth" are having, we It might have been interesting to put think, an easier time. Possibly we of the ourselves first in the shoes of the aggres­ "tail," in anticipation of this ordeal, were sor commander in chief or government on recruited from tougher material and receiving this ultimatum, but we are here trained in a tougher school. In any event, concerned with humans, and judging from as in the blockade example, there will be the events of this century the heads of some critical level of odds. aggressor states are not cast quite in hu­ Conclusion man mold: we could never be sure of fol­ The examples we take will always re­ lowing the workings of their minds. In solve into a question of odds. These should this particular instance we will just pre­ be calculable, at least approximately, for sume they persist, without retaliating, particular circumstances, by teams of and so the war becomes nuclear, but only planners and scientists. ,It seems not il­ over the desert. logical that this process should be carried Let us first put ourselves in a tank, in out at first in respect to limited nuclear 102 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1961 ' war, as typified in the examples given. can operate in restricted nuclear war Then must follow a decision as to what then will be the time for them to consider is humanly possible and what is not. Sup­ functioning in full-scale nuclear war. pose that at this stage we ourselves are Meanwhile, they have, of course, ample consulted, as ordinary servicemen, in re­ field for study in conventional warfare. gard to the critical level of odds at '9hich They must not get rusty at that: it still our unit can be relied upon to continue to may happen and it always was difficult function-to return to the danger zone enough. or to march toward the sound of the There is also, of course, the national (atomic) guns. One direct hit destroys problem of surviving, as distinct from physically, we know. How many near functioning, in full-scale nuclear warfare. ' misses shall we say are required to destroy It again will be difficult enough, but morally? Does a near miss really miss? luckily the solution need not run counter Once the services are satisfied that they to human nature.

War and the Art of War Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from a coPYrighted article by Colonel J .. Lunkiewic::z in "Bellona" Issue Number 1. 1956.

EVERY field of human activity has its by the vision of atomic war, regards all immutable laws, in spite of any change of previous means of combat as obsolete and forr>! which may be produced by the in­ the eternal laws of strategy as irrevocably cessant development of means employed. ended. It would seem that that is too ex· This truth applies equally to the laws of treme a theory. war which remain immutable although the The transformations of war are due to means for the conduct of war and military changes of combat methods arising from operations change. the particular characteristics of the com­ The most characteristic features of mod­ bat means employed. These are changes ern war are the mobility of ground and in the form of combat, but not in its air forces and the power of its atomic com­ nature which always remains the same. bat means. Therefore, in spite of the frightful power The transformation of the mass of in­ of destruction of present combat means, fantry to an armored, motorized mass, as the principles of strategy will continue to well as the global range of bombers and be binding. The great difficulty lies in the speed of supersonic fighters, has knowing how to apply them under the brought about an enormous increase in completely changed conditions and possi­ the significance of time--a diminution of bilities of atomic war. This art is the ex­ the value of space. The tactical and op­ pression of command ability supported by erational thinking of commanders must military knowledge and psychic endurance. be adapted to this reevaluation of speed of movement, as well as to new systems of Politics and Strategy command. The possibility of the complete War is the most powerful phenomenon destruction of large areas by atomic ex­ of ideological and political struggles. It plosions has given rise to a new schoo'l of is an act by force for the imposition of military thought. This school, frightened one's will on the enemy. The aim of war FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 103 is the achievement of dominance for one's of political action for the attainment of political aims. the aims of war. 4-11 of them are interde­ The aims of war and the means em­ pendent and their precise collaboration ployed for corrducting it are determined unifies the direction of the war. In order to by politics. Strategy, on the other hand, avoid a detrimental diversity of tasks, makes use of all available means for the each "of them must have its own directive attainment of the objectives indicated by organ capable of discharging its individual politics. Out of these circumstances arises task with the greatest effectiveness. the necessity of the subordination of strat­ A reduction of the importance of armed egy to the military direction, in order that, forces in favor of other factors (particu­ as Clausewitz put it, the "political aim larly those relative to material resources) like a scarlet thread may extend through is not only erroneous but downright haWl­ the whole of the military operations." fu!. Armed forces by their physical action ' This transcendency of politics over strat­ perform the "act of violence," hence they egy comes from the basic principle of the always have been and will be the decisive subordination of war to the political factor in war. All other means, without thought. However, strategy in the solution regard to.their development and magni­ of its problems must be independent of tude of effect, are only an adjunct assist­ politics. ing and facilita~ing this "act of violence." Both of these fields must mutually un­ Human Energy derstand one another, know each other's possibilities and needs, and cooperate The development of technical knowledge closely with one another on this basis. ceaselessly increases the possibilities of Clausewitz said: military technique, and this augments the military effectiveness of armed forces. In War should harmonize entirely with the spite of the enormous significance of a(~ of politics, and politic8 should shape means, human energy is and will continue these to conform with the means possessed. to be the principal factor in war, and the Napoleon explained: enormous transformation of war brought about by its technicalization has height­ Every war must be methodical, for every ened the worth of the soldier and espe­ war must be waged in accordance with the cially of the commanders. principles and regulations of the art of war-in short, in accordance with its aim8 Military policy is the synthesis of the -must be waged with account being taken general policy of the state with regard to of the forces possessed. the requirements of war and the security of the state. Its task is the organization In order to avoid friction between the and employment of the military forces of authorities directing the war and those the state for the ends of war. For this"'( directing the military operations, the tasks reason, it embraces all the problems hav­ and fields of action and collaboration of ing to do with the conduct of war as well both these groups must be clearly and ex­ as with the security of the state. haustively defined by law. ' Military policy is directed by the su­ The military power of the state elI\-' perior directing body of war already exist­ brace's all the fields of the life and activity ing in time of peace and usually designated of the population and state-in particular as the Council of National Defense. This the psYchological, political, economic, and body prepares the military force of the physical. ' state, fixes the objectives and manner of These factors are the principal means the conduct of war, ensures the unifica­ 104 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1967 tion of war by teaming the activities of the years 1796-97, he said to the Austrian all military factors for the objectives,of Parliament: war, and ensures the internal security of There are many good generals in Eu­ the state. . rope, but they possess this fault, that they The multiplicity of the forms of war see too many things at once. I Bee in war exercises a strong influence on military only one thing-the enemy masses, whick legislation. Both World Wars I and 'II I endeavor to annihilate, certain that have provi.ded proof of this. The point of secondary matters will be dealt with at a departure and the organizational founda­ single blow.' tion of the collective military effort of the nation and government is the law relative Accordingly, he always tenaciously en­ to the supreme military authorities. deavored to secure a quick and definite Combat is the armed overcoming of the decision by the annihilation of the living forces of the enemy by operational ma­ enemy. This is the most important phase of military operations. The direct aim {)f neuver and tactical concentration of fire. combat is the annihilation of the living Mechanical Rules forces of the enemy. All material objects Although the application of the prin­ and centers, without regard to their im­ portance (tactical, operational, scientific, ciples of one field to another field is usually political, or materiel), possess but a rela­ improper, in the destruction of living tive value. Their capture or destruction forces it is possible to note certain me­ are only means facilitating the defeat of chanical laws. According to Napoleon: the hostile armed forces. "The strength of armed forces, like quan­ tity of motion in mechanics, is measured This concept was evident in the mind of by amount of mass and speed." With this Miltiades. In the spring of the year 490 rule are joined two others: the first, the B. C. the Persians under the leadership greater force destroys the smaller force; of the Mede, Datis and the Persian, Arta­ the second, the lesser force, to\ a certain phernes, landed on the east coast of At­ extent, has the ability to gradu!lUy check tica, on the Marathon plain. The majority the motion of the larger force apd, in the of the 10 Athenian leaders advised the end, destroy it. defense of the capital until the time of the arrival of the Spartan reinforcements. In The first rule forms the main basis of spite of this opinion, Miltiades with faith the principle of the military art, of the in the Greek morale moved with 10,000 economy of forces in space and time which soldiers against a superior force of Per­ Napoleon so wisely developed and em­ sians. At Marathon, applying superiority ployed. From the point of view of the of forces on both wings, he defeated the second rule we may consider the classic Persians, after which he returned hur­ battle at Cannae in the year 216 B. C. in riedly to Athens to forestal! an invasion which Hannibal, by use of a double envel­ there. Miltiades did not wait passively opment, surrounded and annihilated a for the enemy in the city (in spite of its Roman army of twice his strength. great cultural, political, and economic Strategy is the art of operating with importance), but confident of the Greek armed forces for attaining the aims of superiority, despite numerical inferiority war. It is by nature monolithic, joining sought victory in an offensive battIe. together in space and time individual op­ The combat objective was clearly defined erations in which various types of armed by the 27-year-old General Bonaparte. In forces cooperate. his first magnificent campaigns in Italy in Strategy, like all arts, is an individual­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ; 105 istic, creation. It is created by the com­ dependent on an estimate of situations and mander in chief (or a team of several possibilities of action of omi's own forces, individuals conducting the military opera­ of those of possible adversaries, of allies tions) on the basis of the unchanging in the existing geopolitical and geostrate­ principles of the art of war. The skill a gic framework, and one's own military commander reveals in applying these plans. under various conditions of operation The importance of a knowledge of the constitutes the expression of his talent. military art was distinctly emphasized by As Sun Tzu Wu explains it: Sun Tzu Wu: How easy it is to point out the tacti

changing. The modes of conducting war the theory of war and the art of war con­ and military actions, dependent as they tinue with unchanging principles and are on developments in the means of war­ methodical application under changed con­ fare, change continuously. For this reason ditions of action.

Air OP in Atomic Warfare Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW ftom a copyrighted article by Captain K. Perkins in "The Journal of t~e Royal Artillery" (Great Britain) July 1956.

THE tactics which artillery will employ the fire risk and the chance of unservice­ in atomic warfare, and the detailed tech­ ability due to scorching. niques, together with suggested changes The division artillery, therefore, needs in organization, have recently been the to be assured of engineer assistance when­ subject of close examination. But it is ever a move is contemplated. Some type surprising that little or no mention has of cov"r as outlined above shOUld be pro­ been made of what is probably the most vided as standing operating procedure. vulnerable unit in the divisional artillery, the air observation post (OP). The role Deployment of air OP is an important one and is not The aircraft must be deployed in such likely to diminish when increased disper­ a manner that one atomic missile will ac­ sion is forced upon us by the threat of count for as few planes as possible. At atomic missiles. the same time servicing requirements must be met and there must be control. Per­ Protection sonal briefing of pilots should be possible. The comparatively frail construction of Several alternatives are: light aircraft and the difficulty of afford­ 1. Use a single landing field in the di­ ing them adequate protection makes the visional area. air OP flight more vulnerable than most 2. Have a landing ground well to the to atomic attack. The manuals show that rear where it will be safe from the effects a 20-kiloton bomb exploded at 2,000 feet of an atomic attack on the forward areas can be expected to wreck a light aircraft and out of range of many ground-to­ standing in the open 3,000 yards from ground missiles. . ground zero. We can assume that any ex­ 3. Use several landing grounds; dis­ posed aircraft fabric will burn at 1,500 perse the aircraft singly. yards. 4. Disperse by using two landing With engineer assistance it is a fairly grounds within the divisional area. simple task to provide blast walls for air­ craft dispersal; but, while a bulldozer can The Single Landing Field quickly push up SUbstantial protection With this method the flight is deployed against horizontal blast, it is virtually im­ together, preferably close to division ar­ possible to provide solid overhead cover for tillery headquarters. It is the favored each aircraft. A cover made from nonin­ method in conventional battle and has flammable canvas stretched across each much to recommend it. It allows the most dispersal would give protection from the economical and efficient aircraft servicingj . effects of thermal radiation and so lessen the flight commander has good control and FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 109 can personally brief and debrief his pilots; sian. In addition, much time is lost when only one landing ground is required; and aircraft are unserviceable at their section administration is simplified. ' landing grounds awaiting the arrival of The ,main disadvantage is that a single a mechanic and spare parts from head· atomic'missile 'will put the entire air sec­ quarters. tion out of action. Dispersal on Two Airfields Rear Area With small adjustments to the existing If deploye!I at an airstrip some 30 miles' organization it is possiple to split the flight back, the flight will have the advantages in two and operate indefinitely with no resulting from concentration while enjoy­ loss of control or deterioration in servic­ ing immunity from atomic shells, free flight ing. One landing strip will be positioned rockets, anL the smaller guided missiles. as near division artillery headquarters as It will also have nothing to fear from an possible; flight headquarters will be here. atomic attack on the division it is support­ The second landing field with the remain­ ing. It is, however, not unlikely that a con­ ing airplanes will be situated at such a ventional assault will be supported by distance that one atomic missile will not atomic attack on maintenance areas. A account for the entire flight. It will be single bomb could destroy all aircraft, possible for a pilot to drive between the leaving the. divisional artillery to fight a two landing grounds each evening so that battle without aerial observation. There briefing can be done personally. This are other disadvantages: method of deployment would facilitate con­ 1. The flight commander who must be trol and maintenance, permit easier "leap­ near division artillery headquarters is di­ .frogging" of headquarters, and operate vorced from his flight and must rely on with less equipment and vehicles. radio or telephone to span the 30 miles to his pilots. When battle is joined such con­ Future Deployment tiol will be uncertain. Concentration at a single airstrip or 2. Pilots will be required to land near landing ground invites complete destruc­ division artillery headquarters for brief­ tion and should not be risked. Complete ing. This will involve considerable waste dispersion causes' loss of efficiency and of eifo1 in arrangements for camouflage, poor control. Although'the same detailed transport, and possibly fuel. method of deployment may not always be 3. Urgent calls for sorties will be sub­ possible, it is safe to say that splitting the ject to considerable delay. flight gives maximum security and mo~ bility consistent with limitations imposed Dispersion by Single Aircraft by operating requirements. With sections taking protective meas· ures and deploying their planes about Reconnaissance 5,000 yards apart, one atomic missile is , In atomic warfare the provision of ac­ unlikely to account for more than one air· curate, up-to-date information will be vi­ naft. Unfortunately, practice shows that tal. The ground OP can seldom observe prolonged detachment of sections is un­ deep enough to send early warning of satiSfactory. Out of a number of reasons large enemy movements. Photo reconnais­ the most important are loss of adequate sance may well be completely misleading control, particularly during the fluid op­ by the time it reaches divisional level, and erations, and deterioration of aircraft the average airstrike pilot will be too well servicing due to lack of skilled supervi­ occupied to produce much intelligence. In 116 MILITARY REVIEW .JANUARY 1957 defense the air OP. through constant sur­ Commanders will expect the air OP's to veillance, knows his sector intimately and get into the air, find out what is happening is able to produce up-to-the-minute infor­ on the other side, and look for targets. mation. His activity is limited at night, The present tactics are based on the as­ but he can still observe and may often sumption that enemy fighters or antiair. give useful intelligence, particularly if the craft will account for any light aircraft enemy is careless with lights. venturing much above ground level. Pilots In an attac:, supported by atomic weap­ differ in their estimation of the dangers ons, success will depend upon the forward of modern fighters. In the past, J antiair­ elements and foUowup echelons moving in craft has presented no undue risk to the the right directions, avoiding devastated areas and bottlenecks, and breaking out higher-flying air OP's. It is sufficient to with the minimtlm of delay. During this say that, unless the air OP is prepared to phase the air OP will be able to send in. accept any risks attendant on higher and valuable reports. A commander spending less restricted flying, he might as well not a few minutes as a passenger could see at fly at all. for he will produce little useful a glance the ground, the situation, and the result. possibilities. Conclusions With larger gaps between defended lo­ Aircraft must be given solid protection calities there will probably be much ground like any other equipment. This will have which is invisible to ground OP's and which can be covered ,only by the air OP. to be provided by engineers. At the very least, each dispersal must have blast walls Future Tactics and a roof which will minimize the risk of Air OP tactics need revision for both scorching or burning. artillery adjustment and reconnaissance. The air section should never deploy on Present tactics emphasize that the air­ one landing ground nor should it disperse craft and target area should be intervisi­ so completely that efficiency and control ble only during a few seconds at each fall are impaired. There should, instead, be a of shot. At all other times the aircraft is slight reorganization to facilitate deploy­ meant to fly close to the ground in friendly ment to two airfields, and the opportunity areas. Using such tactics, the air OP will should be taken to prune vehicles and be able to engage a few worthwhile tar­ equipment. gets but will produce little information of The wider frontages and longer ranges any value. At the same time, the radio will require broad and deep observation. net between the aircraft and distant gun The reconnaissance role will in('rease in positions is often unworkable. importance. To cope with all this the air The air OP must, therefore, fly higher OP must fly higher and, when necessary, and be less restricted in his movements. abandon the security of friendly areas. In a war of dispersion, penetration be­ Flying tactics should encourage initiative tween enemy localities may be possible. rather than, as at present, dampen it.

We must stay strong enough to hurt anyone who hurts us. We want to have the ability to strike back and wound him so badly that he is not likely to chal­ lenge us.

Gtmeral Nathan F. Twining EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE GOV­ GRAY FOX. By Burke Davis. 466 Pages. ERNMENT. By Robert G. Neumann. 818 Rinehart & Co., Ine., New York. $6.00. Pages. McGraw-Hill Book Co.. Inc., New By LT COL IRVING HEYMONT, Inl York. $6.50. This is a fascinating one-volume biog­ By LT COL MITCHEL GOLDENTHAL, CE raphy of General Robert E. Lee during the This book is a scholarly treatment of Civil War years. the subject of government. The first part The author calls General Lee "Gray deals with the governments of Great Brit­ Fox" because of boldness in splitting his ain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Un­ army before a superior force at Second ion. The remainder covers a comparative Manassas and Antietam and winning the analysis of governments as well as politi­ victory. His boldness is further exempli­ fied in the manner in which he drove the cal concepts and institutions which are Union forces during the incredible Seven not confined to the four nations covered in Days' Campaign on the Peninsula in 1862. the first part. Lee was not only bold, but also audacious. The author feels that government is a He made the most breathtaking moves­ livIng subject. First, one must study its as if he could literally smell out the in­ hi;torical background to learn where its tent of the enemy. Seldom did he prove to concepts and institutions come from. Ade­ be wrong. quate historical background is given be­ The writing is very vivid and exciting. cause the author feels, for example, that Mr. Davis employs the technique of briefly the present role of Parliament in Great depicting the backgroun'd of each battle Britain cannot be understood without some and introducing a participant who tells knowledge of the gradual development what he saw. This extensive use of con­ of parliamentary institutions; or that temporary descriptive material leaves the France's government is not comprehend­ reader with the feeling as if he were really ible unless the French Revolution and the present at the time. From this volume the reader can get a fear of "Caesarism" is considered; and deeper insight into the inscrutable Lee­ finally, that Russia's present policies have the man, rather than the myth. However, been formulated as much by the direc­ 'the "Marble Model," as Lee was known in tions of its streams and the impact of the his West Point days, cloaked himself with Mongols as by Marx and Engels. such strict self-imposed discipline that it The analysis of available facts or in­ is difficult to penetrate to the true depth terpretation is handled in a superb man· of his personality. , nero Military personnel will find this book Carefully researched and very well extremely rewarding in assisting in the un· written, the Gray FOIl1 will be of interest derstanding of current events and trends. to all readers-military or civilian. 112 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1951 TURKEY IN MY TIME. By. Ahmed Emin TUNISIA FACES THE FUTURE. 205 ya:lman. 294 Pages. University of Okla· Pages. Le Monde Ec:onomique, Paris. $6.00. homa Press, Norman, Okla. $4.00. By LT COL WILLIAM D. McDOWELL, ]11,1 By MAJ' ROIlERT H. ALLAN JR., CE Since it appears inevitable that this In the first 50 years of the 20th century work will be labeled as propaganda by Turkey has risen from the death bed of both Communists and extreme Nationalist the "sick man of Europe" to occupy an factions, it might be wise to admit the outstanding place among the progressive, accusation. It is white propaganda and of liberal, peace-loving nations of the free the highest order. world. At the same time, it is an eloquent plea The author, an outstanding journalist for understanding. As the publisher, Gas· ton Lionel Franco, states France's case: and one of the most respected and loved men in his native Turkey, lived his adult . . . Tunisia will constitute both a teet life during this period and found the for­ and a precedent which, lar transcending tunes of the rising Republic intricately the bounds of Franco-Tunisian relations, interwoven with his own. will assume full significance in the inter· From the final decay of the Ottoman national field. Empire, Mr. Yalman describes the Young In format, style, and literary excellence Turk revolution, vividly reviews Turkey's it is similar to Fortune. Published simul. mistakes and sacrifices during World War taneously in French and English it is I on the side of Germany; and reminds us designed for worldwide distribution. again that stupidity remains the determin­ In a series of staff-written articles, the ing factor in shaping history as he reviews historical, economic, political, ethnic, and the shameful conduct of England, France, religious development of Tunisia are and Greece in administering the peace brought into focus. In effect, it is a strong treaty following World War I as they indictment against abrupt and ill-conceived awaited the final dismemberment of the nationalistic movements which result in "sick man's" estate. fertile fields for Communist intrusion. At All this created a favorable situation for the same time, it admits the necessity for action on the part of Ataturk to save his progressive, evolutionary recognition of nation and give birth to the Republic of the inherent rights of underdeveloped Turkey. nations. Mr. Yalman shows clearly that he is All in all, it represents a form of states­ completely aware of the geopolitical con­ manship much improved over that which siderations in the Middle East and the preceded the division of Indochina. It is a strategic influences that his country has readable statement of France's case and on Western diplomacy as he weaves the worthy of study and understanding story of his life skillfully into the story throughout the free world. It will have of Turkey as America's ally in World War little or no effect on Communist thinking II, her first free elections in 1950, and, or planning but wiJI not provide new propaganda fodder. It is recommended for finally, the fighting on Cyprus. military men who must be informed on in­ There is real interest in this easily read ternational affairs. book for the student of the strategy of the Mediterranean, parj;icularly for those who THE LAND. THEY FOUGHT FOR. By have had the good fortune to live or travel Clifford Dowdey. 438 Pages. Doubleday'! in this most hospitable country. Co., Inc., New York. $5.25. Ii MILITARY REVIEW ANNUAL AWARD

The best -articles submitted by military writer8 and published in the MILITARY REVIEW during the period November 1955 through October 1956 inclusive have been reviewed by the Faculty Board of the Command and General Staff College. ,The fol­ lowing article was selected to receive the Annual A ward of $350:­

DIEN BIEN PHU ANI) THE FUTURE OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS Lieutenant Colonel Norman E. Martin

The other monthly award winners that were considered in the Annual Award p.ompetition were: Month Title and Author Nov Communist Indoctrination Methods, Chaplain (Lt Col) Benedict A. Hender80n Dec Beating the Guerrilla, Lt Col John E. Beebe, Jr. Jan The Helicopter in Early Link-Up Operations, Lt Col Stuart M. Seaton Feb Who Takes Over?, Lt Col Clarence C. DeReu8 Mar Motivating "Ivan": Indoctrination in the Soviet Army, Lt Col Edward R. Wainhouse Apr In Defense of the Army, Lt Col Wallace C. Magathan, Jr. 7 Jut Needed: Joint Doctrine on Close Air Support, Col Gordon A. Mobn, II Aug Hold the Power and Bear the Responsibility, Capt Theodore J. Lepski :Sep Impact of Atomic Weapons on Defense, Lt Col Lewis C. Taynton Oct Evolutionary Changes to Artillery Tactics, Lt Col Orville L. Tobiason

The MILITARY REVIEW and the Command and General Staft' College assume no responsi. bility for the factual accuracy of the information contained in the MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD and the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS sections of this publi­ cation. The items are printed for the purpose of stimulating discussion and interest, and no offici!,} endorsement of the views, opinions, or factual statements is to !;Ie implied.-The Editor. DISTRIBUTION: ACTIVE ARMY (overseas distribution only) : OS Maj Comd (50); OS Base Comd (10); Armies (25); Corps (10); (10); Brig (5). NG & USAR: None.