JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected)
JMSDF STAFF COLLEGE REVIEW
JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE STAFF COLLEGE REVIEW
Volume2 English Version (Selected) MAY 2013 MAY 2012
Foreword IWASAKI Hidetoshi 2
Challenges for JMSDF after Post- Cold SUGIMOTO Yoichi War Era HIRAYAMA Shigetoshi INOUE Takashi USHIROGATA Keitaro 3
PLAN’s Influence on PLA Decision Making System : Perception Gap between PLA and PLAN YAMAMOTO Katsuya 30 Over Sea
India-Japan Maritime Security PANNEERSELVAM, Prakash 67 Cooperation (1999-2009): A Report
Introduction of Writers From the Editors
Cover: Ice Breaker JS SHIRASE operating in the Antarctic Ocean
1 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) Foreword
The year of 2012 was the sixtieth anniversary of the JMSDF foundation. Japanese celebrate our sixtieth birthdays to review our lives in the past and refresh our minds for the future. The JMSDF contributing to the international security environment for sixty years should take this opportunity to trace its history and find a destination where we should navigate from this time on by overlooking current international situation. The JMSDF Staff College has published two Japanese version of JMSDF Staff College Review with total 14 original essays in 2012, and this time we selected three of them for the second volume of English version. A paper co-authored by SUGIMOTO, HIRAYAMA, INOUE and USHIROGATA is about an opinion what capabilities and functions the JMSDF should have around 2030 and what scheme should be put forward for adjusting to change in international circumstances. They also analyze the changes in preconception of the international situation surrounding Japan. YAMAMOTO’s paper is an examination of the true nature of Chinese People’s Liberation Army through his experience served as a Defense Attaché to Beijing. He clarifies that PLA has a strong army-centric sense which even affects maritime issue by analyzing PLA Navy’s influence upon Central Military Commissions and China’s decision making system. Considering the security policy of Japan, it is quite effective to know a domestic structure of our neighbouring country and its Navy’s positioning. In addition, it is also beneficial for us to promote defense exchanges and cooperation with other countries in the future. Mr. PANNEERSELVAM, Prakash was the first foreign visiting fellow of the JMSDF Staff College and conducted research on Japan- India Maritime Security Cooperation from 2011 to 2012. The paper summarizes his one year study and provides us a new view on a relationship between Japan and India. I hope these essays are helpful to readers those who studying security issues. IWASAKI Hidetoshi
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Challenges for JMSDF after the Post-Cold War Era
SUGIMOTO Yoichi, HIRAYAMA Shigetoshi INOUE Takashi, USHIROGATA Keitaro
Introduction – Anchors aweigh – “Annual Report on the Japanese Economy in 1956” (subtitled “Growth of Japanese Economy and Its Modernization”) issued in July 1956 stated in its conclusion that “Japan is no longer in the post-war period1.” A half century has passed since “the post-war period” was over, and more than 20 years since the Cold War era – in which the world feared a collision of East and West – was ended. We expected that new, peaceful days would come “after the end of the Cold War.” However, as Hubert Vedrine said, what we saw in the post-Cold War period was the blast of ethnic conflicts and religious disputes which had been contained in the international community in the Cold War period, and the reality was that “in globalized world, terrorism is also global2.” Although in the Cold War era there was the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the “balance of power” of the two superpowers worked really well and a variety of international systems to support the stability of the polarized world were developed in this period3. Right now it is the transition that the mono-polar world led by the United States after the end of the Cold War changes to the multi-polar world. The multi-polar world that human beings had experienced in the past few centuries was the world where the neighboring powers located on the western edge of the “World Island,” which was called Europe, had contested with each other. However, the multi-polar world that we now live in is the globalized world where human beings are mutually dependent although they live under different political systems and have different values because of a variety of different races and religions. This is the first
1 The Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on the Japanese Economy 1956, Printing Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of Japan, 1956. 2 Huvert Vedrine, History strikes back, Brookings institution press, 2008, pp. 17-18 3 Tetsuya Umemoto, The US Global Strategy and the International Order, Minerva-shobo, 2010, p. 21.
3 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) experience in the world history. It is impossible to give a firm answer to the question of what international order can work in this new multi-polar world and if the balance of power, for example, can function as it worked in Europe in the past. We are now in the midst of change where the “complication of an interconnected global environment where economic power, access to resources, and cutting edge technologies are redefining national power4.” And, the speed of change is being ever accelerated.
Let’s turn our eyes to Japan. Japan is the sixth largest maritime nation in the world with a total of approximately 4.47 million square kilometers of territorial waters and exclusive economic zone5. As Japan is surrounded by waters in all directions, 99.7% of total tonnage of imports and exports is transported by ocean shipping. As Japan’s lifeline, shipping is of paramount importance for Japan to support its economy and its citizens’ life6. Marine container cargo movement of Japan amounts to about 12% of the world’s total volume. Thus, Japan’s shipping business supports amenities of the world’s life7 . Peace and stability of vast water areas and enormously long sea lanes for Japan’s shipping cannot be maintained only by Japan’s own efforts, but by a variety of international schemes, such as the Japan-US alliance, and many countries’ international contributions. However, as Kyoichi Tachikawa pointed out, it is actually the case that “Japan is not very conscious of the fact that it enjoys the benefits of today’s stable international order, nor is it well aware of how such order is established and maintained8.” On the other hand, Eiichi Funada mentioned that “the Gulf War and the
4 Juan Zarate, “Playing a New Geoeconomic Game” 2012 Global Forecast, CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/2012-global-forecast (Last access date: May 9, 2012). 5 Total size of territorial waters and exclusive economic zone of Japan is about twelve times larger than its land territory. Its coastline is about 35 thousand kilometers long (equivalent to 88% of the earth’s circumference), and it is the sixth longest in the world. 6 Annual Marine Report in 2011, Maritime Bureau of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011, http://www.mlit.go.jp/maritime/kaijireport/kairepo10.html (Last access date: May 21, 2012). 7 The Japanese Shipowners’ Association, “SHIPPING NOW” p. 2, http://www.jsanet.or.jp/data/pdf/shippingnow2012a.pdf (Last access date: October 1, 2012). 8 Kyoichi Tachikawa, “Sea Power,” Kyoichi Tachikawa, et al. (Eds.), Sea Power – Its Theory and Practice –, Fuyo Shobo Press, 2008, p. 57.
4 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) detachment of the minesweeping squadron of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) after the end of the Gulf War were the real turning point of the security policy of Japan. Japan has learnt from a series of these events that in the post-Cold War era a regional conflict even in a very remote area may pose a threat to Japan’s safety and that in some situations Japan may be required to utilize its defense capacity in order to protect its own interest and the interest of the international society9.” Thus, the view of Japanese citizens on maritime security is changing, and this change reflects the expansion of roles of JMSDF. During the periods after the end of the Cold War and after the end of the post-Cold War era, JMSDF has been expanded its role of conventional “defense of Japan” to conduct various activities for regional stabilization, and cooperation for antiterrorist measures, etc. In response to the demands of the times, JMSDF has carried out a variety of missions and navy men and women on site have dedicated their efforts. International situations are still uncertain and the conflicts with neighboring countries over the territory become more than mere diplomatic issues. These situations cause problems in maritime security and generate sources of discord. High expectations are placed on JMSDF in these situations. In the paper contributed to the JMSDF’s periodical “Hatou10” in 2008 titled “Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in the New Maritime Era11 ,” RADM Tomohisa Takei, then-Director General of Operation and Planning Department, Maritime Staff Office, JMSDF, presented the objectives of JMSDF to cope with the international situations at the time and the directions to which JMSDF should go to achieve such objectives. The objectives and the measures to achieve them proposed in Takei (2008) remain to be thought-provoking even in light of the today’s international situations. However, the international situations have
9 Eiichi Funada, “Sea Power and the Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” Kyoichi Tachikawa, et al. (Eds.), Sea Power – Its Theory and Practice –, Fuyo Shobo Press, 2008, p. 298. 10 Hatau is a periodical of a group of people in JMSDF studying art of war. Purpose of the club is to “contribute to improvement of members’ knowledge in art of warfare and relevant general knowledge in broad areas including strategies, tactics, logistics, command and control, history of warfare, operations and tasks.” 11 Tomohisa Takei, “Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime Era”, Hatou, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 2-29 Please refer to the following URL to see the full text of this paper: http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/images/c-030/c-030_eng.pdf
5 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) slightly changed from those written in Takei (2008), and such changes are proven by several examples, such as an advance of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into the oceans backed by the significant expansion of China’s military forces, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and new defense strategy of the United States (“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” in January 2012), etc. Therefore, it is the fact that JMSDF is required to establish new strategic concepts with broader perspective for the future. Takei (2008) stated that “For fellow ‘Hatou’ readers, consider the future of JMSDF using this paper as a trigger for future discussion12.” This paper is intended to give an answer to Takei’s request four years ago. In this paper, the authors would like to consider how the Japan’s maritime defense should be in the new, significantly changing security environment. For this purpose, we first study the interdependent and globalized world order with diversified values which human beings have never experienced and the future security environment that Japan will face. Then, we will consider future vision of the Japan’s maritime defense.
Chapter 1: Challenges to the conventional ideas of international community and changes in the concept of international community
Fareed Zakaria stated that “There have been three tectonic power shift over the last five hundred years, fundamental changes in the distribution of power that have reshaped international life – its politics, economics, and culture. The first was the rise of Western world, a process that began in the fifteenth century and accelerated dramatically in the late eighteenth century. The second shift, which took place in the closing years of the nineteenth century, was the rise of the United States. We are now living through the third great power shift of modern era. It could be called ‘the rise of the rest’13.” It is no wonder that our conventional ideas of international situations would be changing when the significant changes as are described by Zakarai would be happening in the world.
12 Ibid., p. 28. 13 Fareed Zakaria, The post-American world, W.W.Norton, 2009, pp. 1-2.
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In this Chapter, the authors study these changes focusing on “actors,” “location of activities” and “actions,” which are the elements of international community.
(1) Re-emergence of sovereign states After the end of the Cold War, international institutions, such as the United Nations and non-state actors represented mainly by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) come under the spotlight in terms of their active roles in restoration of peace in the failed states. Jessica T. Mathews stated in 1997 that “They (national governments) are sharing powers – including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The steady concentration of power in the hand of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while14.” Akihiko Tanaka developed a hypothesis about the characteristics of international politics described above and called it as “new medievalism.” The reason for this name is resemblance between the European Middle Ages before modern times and the contemporary world. In the former period, Europe was constituted not only by the Holy Roman Empire and other kingdoms but also by civil bodies, such as principalities, chivalric orders, city-states and leagues of towns, as well as religious bodies, such as the Roman Catholic Church, the Bishops and religious orders, all of which had extremely complex relationships with each other. This situation is very similar to the contemporary world where many different kinds of non-state actors emerge including multinational corporations, inter-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, and very complex relationships are built up among sovereign states and non-state actors15. However, 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the reality of today is, as described by Joseph S. Nye, that “world government is not around the corner. And
14 Jessica Matthews, “Power Shift”, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1997, Vol. 76, p. 50. 15 Akihiko Tanaka, World Politics – Japan’s Diplomacy in Globalization, Chikuma-shobo, 2000, pp. 33-39.
7 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) non-state actors present new challenges to government, they do not replace states16.” In other words, the world does not go in the direction that the power of sovereign states is transferred to non-state actors, such as international organizations, NGOs, etc. Rather, the international systems surpassing sovereign states become dysfunctional, and the roles of sovereign states as decision-makers and their importance as main actors of the international politics are positively re-valued. So, sovereign states are emerging again.
(2) Challenge to freedom of navigation During the period of Pax Britannica, the British Empire controlled seas of the world, and it sought the freedom of navigation. In the period when the US Navy replaced the Royal Navy and is leading and controlling maritime activities, main roles of the US Navy and the naval forces of the West are to maintain the peace of the sea which facilitates free trade and to keep the international order of the sea in a way to promote the free market economy. The international order of the sea is being challenged today. For example, having successfully transformed it into the second largest economy in the world, China adopts its own interpretation of the law of the sea – very different from the conventional one – to restrict freedom of activities of foreign warships in China’s exclusive economic zone. China also makes its own allegation of sovereignty of the sea not in accordance with the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. It claims the concept of “Ocean Territory,” under which China retains the sovereignty of the sea area as if it had exclusively “owned” such “ocean territory.” These are serious challenges to the freedom of navigation. However, no international system functions to make a judgment on these issues, and they are left to the negotiations between the countries concerned. As Kenneth N. Waltz mentioned, “National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation17.” Therefore, if a dispute over the “sea” – where the freedom of navigation might be threatened or the areas covered by the
16 Joseph S. Nye Jr., David Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: an introduction to theory and history (8th ed.), Longman, 2011, p.2 17 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, 2010, p. 113.
8 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) sovereignty claims might be overlapping – cannot be solved through negotiation, there is a risk that it would be escalated into a conflict in the future.
(3) Justice required Since ancient times, troops are required to be lethal. In the modern age, warfare is considered to be distinguished from needless slaughter and harm. Therefore, the law of armed conflicts is established and warfare must be legal under that law. In addition, it is considered that use of force is allowed only if the UN Security Council resolution is adopted. So, legitimacy becomes one of the indispensable requirements for military actions. At present in the 21st century, we are posed an additional challenge that warfare must look (morally) right. In other words, it is not sufficient in these days that our action is right, but it must be viewed to be right. In the theory of international relations, it has been thought that ethics have limitations in international relations. Nye and Welch mentioned four reasons for the limits on ethics in international relation as follows: “One is the weak international consensus on values. Second, states are not individuals. States are abstractions, and although their leaders are individuals, statesmen are judged differently than when they act as individuals.” “A third reason ethics plays a lesser role in international politics is the complexity of causation.” “Finally, there is the argument that the institutions of international society are particularly weak and that disjunction between order and justice is greater in international than domestic politics18.” However, as Michael Walzer pointed out, “justice has become, in all Western countries, one of the tests that any proposed military strategy or tactic has to meet19.” So, the ethical aspect is so important that no one can ignore it any more in the use of military force. Nowadays all the details of use of military force are reported by international media to everywhere across the world. In this situation, an “assertion to be made by the state that its use of military force is right” becomes increasingly important. The relation with media is as important as military
18 Nye, Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: an introduction to theory and history, pp. 22-23. 19 Michael Walzer, Arguing about war, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 12.
9 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) combat. Actions taken by us must be reported by CNN, for example, that we are morally right. Otherwise, we may lose both domestic and international support and may spoil a good cause of war even though we win military battles. Walzer further pointed out in relation to the Gulf War that “(political) necessities were shaped in turn by the media coverage of the war – by the immediate access of the media to the battle and of people the world over to the media20.” He added that transmission of information through the Internet made it possible that “the media are omnipresent, and the whole world is watching21.” In relation to this point, the US President Bill Clinton issued the “President Decision Direction – PDD 6822” in April 1999 to address the problems identified during the military missions in Kosovo and Haiti. Under the PDD 68, the system is established to influence foreign audiences in support of US foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of the United States23. In 2001 when the anti-US sentiment was heightened in the Muslim countries which stemmed from the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the US Defense Science Board (DSB) set out the “strategic communications” (SC) for the first time in its report24. In order to avoid needless hostilities, the United States begins to take the strategy to disseminate accurate information of its strategic intention in an appropriate manner when it conducts military intervention in international conflicts. Nowadays, JMSDF is expected to broaden its range of activities along with the diversifications of the roles of the Japan Self-Defense Force. In such situation, it is the time for JMSDF to understand that it is required to pay careful attention to “strategic communications.”
20 Ibid., p. 11. 21 Ibid., p. 11. 22 Federation of American Scientists, International Public Information (IPI) Presidential Decision Directive PDD68, 30 April 1999, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm (Last access date: October 12, 2012). 23 Tetsuya Yano, “Development in the US Strategic Communication (SC) Policy,” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, March 2011, p. 3. 24 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, October 2001, pp. 2. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA396312.pdf (Last access date: October 12, 2012).
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Chapter 2: Overview of regional situations
In order to figure out what the Japan’s maritime defense capacity should be in international situations where conventional ideas have been changing, it is important to understand the world of “today” and in the “future” in which Japan is situated. In this Chapter, we look over the regional situations surrounding Japan objectively. In doing so, first, we take a helicopter view of the entire world, and then, look into the current status and the future prospect of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the latter of which have more impact on Japan directly.
(1) Trends in international situations Looking around today’s security environment surrounding Japan: in North Korea the extremely alien dictatorship of Kim Jong-un is being established; we have to tentatively accept domestically-oriented and diplomatically-unstable attitudes in some major countries including China, South Korea and the United States due to change in their leadership; Russia is modernizing its far-east military forces; and the United States cuts military expenditure and reviews its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. These are some of the various factors that will have a diversified impact on Japan’s fate in the coming decade or two. European countries are facing serious debt crisis, and it is unclear to what extent they can respond to the expectations of the United States that has reviewed its strategy and will cut military expenditure. In particular, the sharing of roles and responsibilities between the US and Europe for the stabilization in the Middle-East will have a direct link with the US military realignment which may define the level of the US present in the Asia-Pacific. This will have a direct consequence on the need of cost to be paid by Japan for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. So, we are required to pay careful attention to the relationship between the US and Europe. In addition, if the European Union will lift the arms embargo against China, this will have a significant impact on the military balance in the Asia-Pacific. In this respect, there seems to be a perception gap between the US and Europe on China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific and its impact on the regional security. So, this may affect Japan’s security environment significantly. Matsuzaki
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(2012) deals with this point in detail25. In the Middle-East, there are some countries which are politically unstable or suffer weak ruling power. Risks exist that those countries will turn into failed states or religious fundamentalists. There is also the risk that they will connect to international terrorist organizations. Concerning the Palestinian problem, George Ball pointed out that “One option is to settle, another is to fight, a third to let matters fester in a state that is neither war nor peace.” “Yet, unhappily for everyone, there is little prospect that the political authorities on either side can muster the cohesion and domestic consensus that will permit them to take the painful initiative and make the accommodations necessary to a settlement.26” This means that no one has any clue to a solution at the moment and it is highly probable that the current situation will continue in the near future. In Africa, there is no specific indication that the political and economic backwardness will improve shortly. In the past decade, Africa has been filled with darkness, such as the civil wars and the ensuing massacre in Rwanda and Sudan, and the failed state Somalia and the piracy problem. It is unlikely in the near-future in Africa that we no longer see any riots, genocide, failed states, and so forth.
(2) Security environment surrounding Japan Characteristics of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region are as follows: Military tensions exist in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan after the end of the Cold War; traditional hostilities remain unsolved including territorial disputes in the the Takeshima Islands (Liancourt Rocks) and the Northern Territories; there are political and ideological differences as well as economic, ethnic, religious or territorial discrepancies or disputes which may possibly be developed into military conflicts under certain conditions27; the region is composed
25 Miyuki Matsuzaki, “EU’s Lifting of Arms Embargo against China – Influence given by the United States,” JMSDF Staff College Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2012, pp. 45-63. 26 George W. Ball, “Slogans and Realities”, Foreign Affairs, Jul 1969, pp. 627-628. 27 The National Institute for Defense Studies, Problems of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, The National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan and Military Strategy Research Center of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, March 2008, p. 8.
12 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) of a variety of countries with different political systems, different economic structures or difference in maturity. These are the factors which may endanger the stability of the security environment in the region. The US new defense strategy “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” issued in January 2012 picks up the following keywords: (i) rebalancing U.S. Forces with emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, (ii) building partners, and (iii) the integration of capacities28. It is reasonably understood that the United States has difficulty in performing the role of “world’s policeman” on its own against the background that the cut in defense budget comes to reality. It is also imaginable that the US will require its allies and friends to bear an appropriate level of various burden. Christopher Layne pointed out that, coming to a turning point, the United States is facing both “decline” and “imperial overstretch.” It may place more emphasis on “offshore balancing strategy” which is its new strategy. In that case, the United States will reduce its overseas presence, reset the strategic priorities and transfer the burden to the countries in East Asia and Europe. The United States will refrain from ground force’s intervention, and will concentrate the resources in the navy and air force29. In the meantime, the Japan-US alliance is considered to be working effectively in years to come. However, as mentioned in the third report issued by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye concerning the US-Japan alliance in August 201230, Japan and the US may reach the common understanding that, taking its new roles and missions into account, Japan must undertake more responsibility for defense both of its homeland and of areas that Japan and the US jointly cover. In that case, it is expected that the review of the current “Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” will be accelerated.
28 “Dempsey explains Defense Strategy at Nation’s Oldest ‘Think Tank’” JCS hp http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=900 (Last access date: May 1, 2012). 29 Christopher Layne, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing” The National Interest, January 12, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405 (Last access date: June 12, 2012). 30 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S-Japan Alliance Anchoring Stability in Asia - A Report of the CSIS Japan Chair August 2012,” http://csis.org/publication/120810_Armitage_USJapanAlliance_Web.pdf (Last access date: August 23, 2012).
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China will remain to be assertive in claiming its sovereignty in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as well as its territorial rights over the islands in those Seas. It will continue to take coercive behaviors by law enforcement agencies, to engage in modernization of its military forces at a fast pace focusing more on navy and air force, to enhance their activities, and to try to build its capacity for A2/AD (Anti-Access & Area-Denial). Together with the least transparency in its intention, it is very difficult to calculate and predict China’s influence on peace and stability in the region. China has a lot of domestic problems, such as the aging population with the low birth rate and income disparity. It would be difficult to see a quick solution in the near future. China will soon overtake the United States in economic power and will progress to the world’s superpower. However, in order to avoid public dissatisfaction and criticism being directed to the Communist Party of China and to use external issues to divert the public eye from domestic problems, China would possibly maintain its tough stance against foreign countries, and in particular, portray Japan a potential “foreign enemy.” The primary objective of the North Korea is to maintain the dictatorship under “Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s Juche philosophy.” The only realistic option to achieve this is “status quo.” North Korea will not make any significant policy change and will continue its brinkmanship diplomacy making provocation and compromise alternatively. It continues its efforts for nuclear development and ballistic missile deployment, which it believes, by building on its success, to deter foreign attacks and to attract public respect domestically. A variety of disputes existing in the Southeast Asia can be narrowed down to the following four issues: (i) allegedly overlapping sovereignty in the South China Sea; (ii) vaguely defined “nine-dash line” asserted by China; (iii) different interpretations adopted by the United States and China over the freedom of military activities in the EEZ; and (iv) the confrontation between China and ASEAN members in establishing the “Code of Conduct.” In every issue, China is involved. Particularly, in the dispute of sovereignty in the South China Sea and territorial rights over the islands in that Sea, the fixed division remains to be in existence between China as a regional power and the coast countries as a group of small countries. It is expected that the countries disputing against China want to strengthen their ties with Japan, the US, India or other countries to confront
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China diplomatically and militarily.
Chapter 3: New challenges to Japan’s maritime defense capacity
In the new situations where conventional ideas of the international community have been changing and the countries’ interests are intricately intertwined with each other as a result of globalization, Japan is exposed to a variety of difficult issues – e.g. the rise of China – due to the harsh security environment surrounding Japan. How should Japan deal with these issues? Japan’s main field of operations to face its challenges would be the sea, and its maritime defense capacity is expected to make a significant contribution to operations. Therefore, it is no doubt that JMSDF is a leading force for Japan’s future security. In this Chapter, bearing the idea on what the future JMSDF should be, we try to clarify the JMSDF’s current status and the direction to which JMSDF should go from now on.
(1) To which direction should JMSDF go? The Basic Policy for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in 1957 provided that “The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel any such aggression, with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy31.” Having started from the efforts to achieve this objective, JMSDF has been developing necessary defense power and has been conducting education and training not only to protect the sovereignty, territory and citizens of Japan from a variety of threats but also to defend sea lanes which are indispensable to the existence and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation and a trading nation. JMSDF’s efforts made thus far to secure the “existence and prosperity of Japan” can be said to be “local,” meaning that they are limited in the surrounding
31 Basic Policy of National Defense, adopted by the National Defense Council and Cabinet on May 20, 1957.
15 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) areas of Japan due to the JMSDF’s ability. Japan has relied on the US Navy to fill the shortage of its maritime defense capacity. At the same time, JMSDF has sometimes complemented the activities of the US Navy; thereby JMSDF has developed the basis of Japan’s maritime defense capacity. The relationship between JMSDF and the US Navy is, metaphorically speaking, the “shield-and-spear” relation, under which JMSDF and the US Navy have been sharing roles. We try to show the position of JMSDF in the coordinate with two fixed perpendicular directed lines, of which the vertical line shows maritime defense capability with a lower side indicating “complementary” and an upper side indicating “self-reliant,” and of which the horizontal line shows the coverage of the Japan’s maritime defense capacity with a left side meaning “local” and a right side meaning “global.” In this coordinate, the position of JMSDF before the end of the Cold War is shown in the third quadrant (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Position of JMSDF in the period between its foundation and the Cold War era (depicted by the authors) Self-reliant
Local Global
Cold War era
Complementary
After the Cold War ended, Japan has been required not only to protect “its existence and prosperity” but also to contribute to the “peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region” as well as “improvement in the global security environment.” If we try to show the today’s position of JMSDF in the coordinate, JMSDF’s capability remains to be “complimentary” for the US Navy and its area coverage is expanding from “local” to “global,” which means its position in the coordinate
16 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) moving to the middle of the horizontal line (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Position of JMSDF in the post-Cold war era (depicted by the authors)
Self-reliant
Local Global Post-Cold War era
Cold War ear End of Post- Cold War era
Complementary
In the future, the United States will face difficulty in solely maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The US presence in the region will change in accordance with its strategy under the “offshore balancing” strategy. Meanwhile, China, a newly rising power, will increasingly be strengthened, and will have a significant impact on the regional security with its unclear intention. In order to firmly secure Japan’s security in this situation, it is necessary to maintain the solid Japan-US alliance. This requires Japan to appropriately take over from the US its roles and burdens in response to the US global strategy. In other words, Japan has to take a wider range of responsibilities for regional security in order to remain to be the most important US ally (i.e. the US partner). If the US Navy reduces its overseas presence globally or reduces it temporarily in the Asia-Pacific region due to, for example, its involvement in the conflict in the Middle East or other areas, JMSDF is required to be capable of assuring regional peace and stability on behalf of the US Navy. At present, JMSDF lacks a certain level of “self-reliance” to achieve this. Looking at its future status as mentioned above, the direction to which JMSDF should go is to increase its self-reliant capability which is required to effectively and firmly maintain the alliance with the US Navy – such alliance
17 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) works as both “shield” and “spear.” If we try to specify this in the coordinate, the position of JMSDF should be “shifted to the center of the two perpendicular lines” by making a 90-degree turn to the upper side from the previous shift at the direction of “global” (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Future position of JMSDF (depicted by the authors)
Self-reliant
Post-Post-Cold War era
Local Global
Cold War era
End of Post-
Cold War era
Post-Cold War era Complementary
(2) Roles to be undertaken by JMSDF Due to the cut in defense expenditures in the United States and the downward trend in Europe, Japan is required to fulfil more significant roles for the international community while appropriately applying the limited budget due to the strained Japan’s state finances. More in particular, departing from its complementary role to the US Navy, JMSDF must be capable of taking over a reasonable level of burden from the US Navy and of dealing with security issues independently by increasing integration with Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces. Meanwhile, there are various unstable factors in the vicinity of Japan, such as China’s foray into the sea and North Korea’s nuclear development. To cope with this situation, Japan needs to strengthen the friendly relations with ASEAN members and other neighboring countries and to support their capacity building. In the globalized international community, it is no longer possible to defend sea lanes – which are Japan’s lifeline – solely by Japan, but it requires to establish cooperative relations not only with the US and Europe but also with neighboring
18 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) countries including China and Southeast Asian countries and with outer regions including Middle Eastern countries. Under such circumstances, JMSDF needs to be capable of dealing with all of the security situations ranging from those in peacetime to those in warfare. JMSDF must be structured appropriately to achieve its objectives that are required in these various situations in the future by flexibly changing its capacity while keeping its core capability – required after the end of the post-Cold War era as described above – as a basis of its existence. If we try to illustrate this in the coordinate, the center circle as shown in Figure 3 indicates JMSDF’s capability which is the basis for future change in its capacity; the future objectives will be positioned in each of the quadrants depending on the capacity that JMSDF needs to obtain and the area that JMSDF is required to cover; and JMSDF’s change in its capacity required to achieve these objectives (which is called “capacity shift”) is shown by the stretch of the center circle to cover the objectives positioned in the quadrants. In the following sections, we will take up four of the future objectives to be achieved by JMSDF and will position them in the coordinate. Then, we shall study the roles to be performed by JMSDF and the form of the “capacity shift” in the coordinate.
(i) Defense of Japan A. Roles To ensure peace and stability of Japan To establish and maintain highly flexible and adaptable maritime defense capacity tightly integrated with Ground Defense Force and Air Defense Force to protect Japan’s territory; to deter attacks and invasions against Japan by its own efforts; if the deterrence fails, to defeat the invasion as in an early stage as possible and eliminate threats. To support law enforcement in the sea area under the jurisdiction of Japan Every country has a maritime law enforcement agency for the front line of maritime security. In Japan it is Japan Coast Guard. If a maritime incident is intensified in a way that exceeds the capacity of
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Japan Coast Guard, JMSDF should come to the front line. This is not desirable as it manifests the escalation of the incident. Therefore, JMSDF has to maintain close cooperation with Japan Coast Guard in its law enforcement activities and to support it in improvement of its ability. B. Form of “capacity shift” Objective of “Defense of Japan” have the “local” nature, requiring the ultimate highest level of self-reliance. It means that this objective lies in the second quadrant in the coordinate. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 4:
Figure 4: The first capacity shift (depicted by the authors)
Self-reliant
Defense of Japan
Local Global
Complementary
(ii) Regional stabilization A. Roles To contribute to establishment of regional security frameworks under international norms To improve relationships and strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries and countries adjacent to sea lanes of Japan through defense exchanges To contribute to capacity building of countries in the region, in particular, capacity building of their navy and law enforcement agency
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To gather information through ISR and to share intelligence with allies and friends To contribute to the establishment of common rules To perform a balancer role for countries in the region in cooperation with the United States To carry out disaster relief and humanitarian assistance B. Form of “capacity shift” Objective of “regional stabilization” equally requires self-reliant capability and complementary capability. At the same time it widely ranges from “local” to “global.” Therefore, it locates in the center of the coordinate. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The second capacity shift (depicted by the authors)
Self-reliant
Regional stabilization
Local Global
Complementary
(iii) Improvement in global security environment A. Roles To participate in international efforts to establish international norms for maritime security To engage in international cooperation beyond the region; in particular, in cooperation with the US and Europe, to engage in international cooperation activities for regional stabilization in order to protect Japan’s globalized interest.
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To provide cooperation for non-proliferation of mass-destruction weapons To secure strategic access (to contribute to establishment of stable international community) To carry out activities for, and provide assistance in, ensuring security in sea lanes, overseas production bases and markets of Japan To strengthen cooperation with the US and to increase capability for international communications B. Form of “capacity shift” Objective of “improvement in global security environment” requires both efforts of Japan itself and efforts from a viewpoint of strengthening the Japan-US alliance. So, it requires both self-reliant capability and complementary capability equally. The area coverage tends to be “global.” Therefore, it locates in the center of the first quadrant and the fourth quadrant and spread on the horizontal line. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: The third capacity shift (depicted by the authors)
Self-reliant
Local Global
Improvement in global
security environment
Complementary
(iv) Linkage from sea to land A. Roles To advance into coastal areas which may affect maritime safety and stability
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To cooperate for rebuilding of the countries or areas which were degenerated into a nest of international terrorism (support for the failed states) To cooperate for UN peace keeping operations B. Form of “capacity shift” Objective of “linkage from sea to land” involves a wide range of geographical areas from “local” to “global.” As it concerns to provide effective support consistently in various areas, it tends to require self-reliant capability. Therefore, it directs to the upper side in the coordinate. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: The fourth capacity shift (depicted by the authors) Self-reliant
Linkage from sea to land
Local Global
Complementary
In summary, Japan’s maritime defense capacity in the future is required to achieve its objectives by changing its capacity in response to the requirements of these objectives (as illustrated by the deformation of the circles in the above coordinate) on the basis of its basic capability (which is shown in the center of the coordinate). For this purpose, JMSDF should not limit its capacity to meet a specific objective, but must increase its flexibility and diverseness to achieve all objectives (which are positioned in all quadrants), and thus sets its future direction.
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Chapter 4: “Capacity” needed for steering new course
In order to realize what JMSDF should be in the future and to ensure that JMSDF consistently satisfies its requirements as described in the previous Chapter, it is necessary for JMSDF to expand its comprehensive capacity (which is indicated by the increase of area of the center circle shown in the above coordinate) and also to maximize its flexibility which is indigenous to it and to fully utilize its multifunctional capacity to attain all objectives (which is indicated by the enlargement of deformed circles spread in the quadrants). In this connection, JMSDF must have the following capacities which have been demanded for a long period of time: “deterrence” which enables JMSDF to confront the threats against the country’s security environment; and “command of the sea” and “sea denial” which are needed if the deterrence fails. However, in order to exert these capacities effectively, JMSDF at the moment needs the assistance of the United States, which is dependent on the firmness of the Japan-US alliance. In sum, JMSDF must acquire the “capacity” to support the “deterrence,” “command of the sea” and “sea denial” which is currently fulfilled by the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific region in addition to JMSDF’s current “capacity” to contribute to the defense of Japan. Furthermore, JMSDF must at all times maintain strong ties with the US to cope with any situations. In this Chapter, we would like to specify each of JMSDF’s own “capacities” which are necessary for JMSDF to perform the above-mentioned functions and to complete the “capacity shift” as mentioned above (in the coordinate, successful shifting of capacities is illustrated by enlargement of the deformed circles).
(1) Access capability from sea to land If the deterrence fails, the “command of the sea” is lost and the islands in the home waters are occupied, we must conduct an “amphibious operation” to recapture the occupied islands. To secure our advantage in the operation, we must have the capacity to project our armed force from the sea to certain points of the land. In other words, we must have the means to secure the “access from sea to land” whenever we need it. Meanwhile, such capacity and means can be used in peacetime to carry out effective humanitarian assistance or disaster relief, and
24 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) also to support for capacity building of neighboring countries. In this respect, the access capability from sea to land is considered as one of the important elements of Japan’s national power. In the Great East Japan Earthquake, JMSDF conducted, by using its destroyers and their on-board helicopters and boats, search and rescue activities for disaster victims, transportation of goods, information gathering and other activities to save many lives in the coastal areas isolated due to disruption of roads or breakdown loss of other access means for rescue activities. As the access capability from sea to land is essential to conduct a variety of operations in coastal areas at an advantage, it should be considered that development and expansion of “seabasing function32” – the function to conduct operations from a combatant ship floating off the coast using it as an operating base – is one of the goals to be achieved by JMSDF in the near future. With the “seabasing function” as one of its core capabilities, JMSDF can provide the basis for integration of its various capacities – including maritime transportation, information gathering, searching and risk elimination including minesweeping, etc. – with the basic transportation capacity of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the terminal transportation capacity of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. Troops composed in this way can have the access capability from sea to land being controlled by one commander in a joint manner and combining each of capabilities currently owned by Japan Self-Defense Forces. This means the “reformation” of existing defense capacities. Through this reformation, it is expected that JSDF is able to maintain its strategic posture of defense-orientation without new armament, produce a certain deterrent effect in peacetime and suppress an escalation of conflict. Importance of “seabasing function” and measures to materialize it are discussed partly in Shimodaira (2012)33.
32 “Lessons Learnt from the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Interim Report)” Ministry of Defense of Japan, August 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/pdf/k_chukan.pdf (Last access date: October 31, 2012). 33 Takuya Shimodaira, “Future of Seabasing – Basic Policy of National Defense (2010) and the post-Great East Japan Earthquake – “ JMSDF Staff College Review Vol. 2 No. 1, May 2012.
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(2) Ballistic Missile Defense Despite the efforts of the international community, proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass-destruction is continuing. In the vicinity of our country, Russia and China have nuclear missiles and North Korea is actively engaging in the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense is based on the multi-tier defense system consisting of an upper-tier defense through the SM-3 equipped 6 Aegis destroyers and a lower-tier defense through the Patriot PAC-334 missile system. It is possible that, in order to counter Japan’s ballistic missile defense, the neighboring countries may expand missile deployment or provide missiles with intercept-avoidance capability (by maneuvering missiles at a terminal phase to avoid interceptions). To cope with this situation, it is necessary to improve the capacity of anti-ballistic missiles system, such as expansion of defense range, improvement of reliability, etc. and to prepare a means of neutralizing missiles before their launch.
(3) Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) As a basis for supporting the aforementioned capacities, a superior ability in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is required. In many cases, success in maritime operation is dependent on whether we can group and maintaining a single display of all existing conditions relevant to the operation, which is named Common Operational Picture (COP). Information obtained through patrol and surveillance activities plays an important role in making political judgment at an early stage of operation. In addition, information at a strategic level is particularly important, and must be analyzed constantly and deeply not only in terms of military capability of potential adversaries but also a variety of factors including their politics, economy, finance, traditions, history and culture. In order to do this, it is necessary to enhance and upgrade IT-related equipment adopting the most updated scientific technologies and to develop highly-skilled intelligence analyst in a planned
34 Ministry of Defense of Japan (Ed.), Defense of Japan in 2012, 2012, p. 126.
26 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) manner. However, it must be noted that intelligence is always incomplete and should not be accepted and believed blindly. A commander should at any time be prepared to make his judgment and decision even when only incomplete intelligence is available to him.
Conclusion: New horizon In this paper, we have discussed the concept of maritime defense capacity which is changing along with the development of the international community that is facing new challenges. Taking the future security environment into account, we have studied the current position of JMSDF and to which course it should steer. We have also studied how JMSDF should expand its capacities on the basis of its current capabilities and how it should approach to achieving its future objectives. We have presented our study results in this paper. Samuel P. Huntington warned the US Navy which was said to have become useless and was questioned about the reason for existence after WWII that “if the service does not possess a well defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.35” “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and beyond (1976NDPG)” prepared in the Cold War era primarily focused on military contingency. “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and beyond (1995 NDPG)” prepared after the end of the Cold War expanded the roles of our country’s defense capacity from the defense of Japan to include response to domestic emergencies, such as the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake or the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. “The National Defense Program Guidelines for 2005 and beyond (“2004NDPG)” emphasized the threats posed by non-governmental organizations, an example of which was the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the US. The current “National Defense Program Guidelines for 2011
35 Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” Proceedings, Vol.80, No.5, May 1954, http://blog.usni.org/2009/03/09/from-our-archive-national-policy-and-the-transoceanic-navy-by- samuel-p-huntington/ (last access date: May 21, 2012).
27 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) and beyond (2010NDPG)” has reviewed the “Basic Defense Concept” which was literally the basis of building of Japan’s defense capacity and has presented the “Dynamic Defense Concept” instead. Japan has consistently entrusted a major part of national security to the United States, and put priority on the economic development. In his statement that “Maintaining the asymmetric alliance with the United States, relying on U.S. forces based in Japan, refusing to adopt offensive rules of engagement, and continuing a cheap ride with limited defense budgets, all point toward the extension, rather than the discarding, of Japan’s post-war grand strategy. The Yoshida Doctrine is not in tatters, it has been updated,36” Richard J. Samuels criticizes Japan’s light-armed and economic- development-prioritized policy between the 1950s and the 1980s. This policy has resulted in the current unbalanced defense capacity of Japan. The world is quickly changing from the “post-Cold War era” – in which the United States led the mono-polar world as only one super power – through the 9.11 terrorist attacks to “the period after the end of post-Cold War era (post-post-Cold War era)” – in which the multi-polar structured world has come out. We believe that we had completely departed from the Cold War concept, and have adjusted ourselves to the security environment in the after-Cold War era as well as the post-Cold War era. However, has the world have been moving further forward? Layne (2012) emphasizes the necessity to keep up the changes of the times by saying that “history never ends, that change is always inevitable, that nations and civilizations rise and fall, and that no era can last forever. Now it can be seen that the post-World War II era … is the Old Order – and it is and Old Order in crisis, which means it is nearing its end. History, as always, is moving forward.37” We, the JMSDF, have to continue to change in response to the changes in the times. The current security environment has already begun to change, and will
36 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell University Press, 2008, p.107. 37 Christopher Layne, “The Global Power Shift from West to East” The National Interest, May-June 2012,
28 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) never stop changing. JMSDF has to stand before a variety of challenges posed by the “post-post-Cold War era.”
“Japan is no longer in the post-Cold War period.”
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the Ministry of Defense or the Japan Self-Defense Force.
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People's Liberation Army Navy’s Influence on People’s Liberation Army’s Decision-Making System －Perception Gap between PLA and PLAN over Sea－
YAMAMOTO Katsuya
Introduction It is undoubtedly clear that recently the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increasingly been active and expanding its activities in the surrounding areas of Japan. It is also confirmed that China’s Naval Surface Combatants have advanced into the Pacific Ocean every year since 2008. PLA’s activities, particularly the activities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), are understood to be based on the China’s economic development strategy emphasizing an expansion of its activities into ocean areas. The latest defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2010” defines the role of the PLA as to “safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests” together with the security of China’s lands, territorial waters and airspace 1 . Admiral Wu Shengli, the Commander of the PLAN (the top position of the PLAN), stated that “China holds enormous strategic interests in the sea. ……. To effectively safeguard our national maritime interests we must build a powerful navy2.” Thus, Admiral Wu showed his strong will to advance into the sea. Facing the increased activities of the PLAN, neighboring countries including Japan as well as the United States tend to think that the PLA as a whole is actively seeking its interest in the sea and that it is evidenced by the PLAN’s visible forays into the ocean. Experts of military strategy of China have also been focusing on China’s naval strategy in their recent studies. However, as the PLA has its English name of the People’s Liberation Army, the army (i.e. PLA Ground Force) remains the core of the PLA, and this has not changed ever since the
1 People’s republic of China State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 2011 http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-03/31/content_4249942.htm (Last access date: January 25, 2012) 2 Wu Shengli, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy that meet the requirement of the Historical Mission for our Army,” Qiushi, July 2009 http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2007/200714/200907/t20090707_6624.htm (Last access date: December 19, 2011)
30 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) foundation of the China’s military force. If you look at the PLA’s composition of service arms, you will notice the fact that the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) still outweighs other forces such as navy or air force. Therefore, it is too early to say, solely based on the intensifying activities of the PLAN, that the PLAN’s weight within the PLA has changed and that the PLA has turned its main interest toward the sea. The author worked in China as the Defense Attaché for three years and some months since 2008, and had an opportunities to watch the PLA in person. From my experience in China, I cannot stop feeling strange with the gap between the people’s perspective in Japan that the PLAN’s activities represent the PLA’s general intent and my observation of the PLAN’s position within the PLA. There have been many studies on the PLA’s decision making-system such as: “Politics of Contemporary China” (Kazuko Mouri3) and “Military Forces of China” (Ryo Asano4), both focusing on the relation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the PLA; and “The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century: Second Edition” (Bernard D. Cole5), studying the PLAN and the PLA from the viewpoint of maritime security. In this paper, I would like to discuss the PLA’s decision-making system from the viewpoint of the PLAN’s position and its power within the PLA. This point has not been studied well in previous research. In Chapter 1, I would like to provide an overview of the structure of the PLA’s decision-making system which constitutes the essential part of the PLA, to analyze the PLAN’s position within the PLA and to clarify that the PLAGF has a predominant influence in the PLA. In Chapter 2, I would like to provide an outline of the China’s military diplomacy and to confirm that the PLAGF plays more important roles than others in the China’s military diplomacy. Based on the analysis in Chapter 2, I would like to summarize in Chapter 3 the view of the PLA － in which the PLAGF is predominant － on China’s security situations, and to study what interest the PLA has in the sea and naval power. In this paper, I would like to demonstrate that there is the gap between the PLA’s
3 Kazuko Mouri, New edition: Politics of Contemporary China, The University of Nagoya Press, 2004. 4 Ryo Asano, Military Forces of China” Soudo-sha, 2009. 5 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century: Second Edition, Naval Institute Press, 2010.
31 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) view on the sea and the PLAN’s actual activities, which explains the reason for my strange feeling mentioned above, and to clarify that the PLAN’s influence in the PLA’s decision-making system is limited. This study covers the period approximately between 2008 and 2011. The reason why I take 2008 as a starting point is that around that time the PLAN has started to go beyond the so-called First Island Chain and has done it repeatedly. I stayed in China most of the time during that period.
Chapter 1: PLA’s decision-making system In order to understand the PLA, a massive organization with more than 2.4 million officers and soldiers, it is essential to know at first the core decision-making structure of the PLA. In this Chapter, recognizing the PLA’s relationship with the Communist Party of China (CPC) which is regarded as a body ensuring “civilian control” of the PLA in a very unique way of China, I would like to provide an overview of the PLA’s decision- making system and to clarify the predominance of the PLAGF in that system. One of the educational materials for the CPC’s executive officers, “National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period6,” edited by General Li Jinai, one of the members of the Central Military Committee and the Director of General Political Department of the PLA, provides detailed information of the China’s decision-making mechanism on national defense policy. I used the information in this book as base materials for my study.
(1) Central body of the CPC and the PLA In China’s political system, the PLA as a military organization is separated and independent from the State Council, China’s state’s administrative body. As opposed to the Japanese system where the Prime Minister who represents the national government concurrently takes a position of the commander-in-chief of the Self-Defense Force, the Chinese Premier of the State Council does not command the PLA. China’s supreme decision-making body on national defense policy is the Central body of the CPC. More in concrete, the Central Committee of
6 Li Jinai (Ed.), National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, Renmin Chubanshe (People’s Publishing House), Beijing, 2008.
32 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) the CPC (the Central Committee) and the Politburo are designated as the supreme leading (lingdão) body7 for national defense. Leading power conferred to the Central Committee and the Politburo includes (i) decision-making on overriding principles and important institutions of national defense, (ii) leadership in important defense activities, (iii) supreme command over all military forces and (iv) guidance for building and developing economic society in conjunction with defense activities8. The term “decision-making on overriding principles … of national defense” is understood to mean (i) to decide national defense policy and military strategy in line with overall strategy of national security and development, (ii) to decide on, and coordinate among, security-related strategies in politics, military, economy, science and technology, diplomacy and other areas, (iii) to establish a plan for building and developing military force and (iv) to formulate objectives, strategic plans, guiding principles and allocation of duties to promote building of military force9. The term “supreme command over all military forces” of the Central Committee is understood to include (i) leadership for building and development of military forces, (ii) operational command to carry out operational mission of military forces and (iii) coordination and control over duties of military forces in peacetime10. In contrast to the CPC’s power on national defense policy, the power of the State Council is limited. It does not have any supreme decision-making power in relation to national defense issues, nor does it have any supreme command over military forces. This is why the PLA is called as the forces for the CPC but not as the national defense forces.
(2) Central Military Commissions (CMC) A. Central Military Commission of the CPC and the Central Military Commission
7 Generally in China, the term “ leading (lingdão)” means to imply directions and orders with enforcement power (Tomoki Kamo, Politics of Contemporary China and the National People’s Congress – Functional Reform of the NPC and Change in Relations between “Leaders and Followers,” Keio University Press, 2006, p. 19 etc. 8 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, pp. 124-125 9 Ibid. p. 125 10 Ibid. p. 127
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of the PRC In order to lead the PLA, the Central body of the CPC establishes the CMC as its part of organization which works as the supreme military leading body. In addition, the supreme military decision-making body is also organized at the state’s level which is the Central Military Commission of the PRC11. So, there are two different organizations, however, they are completely the same in terms of members and the leading functions toward the PLA, so they are de facto one organization12. CMC has absolute power over the PLA as it is delegated the following authorities: (i) to exercise a unified command over all military forces (including the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (CAPF) and citizen’s militia), (ii) to determine operational objectives of military strategy and military forces, (iii) to build the PLA’s military force, to establish rules and regulations and to guide and administer an implementation of plans, (iv) to submit bills to the National People’s Congress (NPC) or the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), (v) in accordance with the Constitution of the PRC or the laws, to adopt and publish military rules and regulations and to issue orders, (vi) to determine the PLA’s organization and organic units and to define roles and responsibilities of each of General Departments, Military Regions, Service Arms and Senior Command/Research Academies, (vii) in accordance with general laws or military laws, to decide on appointments and dismissals for all members of the military forces, to provide them with training and to give them rewards or punishments, (viii) in cooperation with the State Council, to approve plans and implementation of armament of all military forces and to guide and administer development of scientific technology and production for national defense, (ix) in cooperation with the State Council, to administer defense spending and defense assets and (x) to exercise other powers assigned to it under the laws13.
11 Constitution of the PRC, article 93, the Central People’s Government of PRC, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62714.htm (Last access date: February 12, 2012). 12 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, p. 134 13 PRC National Defense Act, article 13, Ministry of National Defense of PRC, http://www.god.gov.cn/policy/2009-09/15/content_4088018.htm (Last access date: February 12, 2012).
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B. Members of the CMC CMC consists of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members. It forms a collegial body and exerts its power collectively. Current members of the CMC are as follows: (i) Hu Jintao, Chairman, and Xi Jinping, Vice-Chairman, who are the civilian leaders, (ii) two members of Vice-Chairman who have a title of General (of the PLAGF)14 and (iii) eight members who are concurrently serving as the Minister of National Defense, Chief of General Staff, Director of General Political Department, Director of General Logistics Department, Director of General Armament Department, Commander of the PLAN, Commander of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Commander of Second Artillery Corps respectively15. As you may notice, four members of the CMC concurrently assume the top position of executive departments of the CMC respectively, which are General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department, which are collectively called General Departments of the CMC. There are ten members of the CMC who have military title, among whom eight members belong to the PLAGF. All four directors of General Departments are also officers of the PLAGF. From the PLAN and the PLAAF, only Commanders of these service arms are appointed as the CMC members. It is too obvious that the PLAGF has an overwhelmingly greater number of representations in the CMC.
C. Hierarchy in the CMC (a) Hierarchy as member of the CPC The members of the CMC have different positions in the CPC, regardless of the CMC being a collegial body that exerts its power collectively.
14 In the PLA, ranks of PLAN and PLAAF are called with the name of service arms, such as Navy Admiral and Air Force Colonel, while ranks of PLAGF are simply called without the name of service arm, such as General and Colonel. This also indicates something different between PLAGF and PLAN/PLAAF in positioning within the PLA. 15 Leadership of General Departments of the Military Commission, Ministry of National Defense of PRC, http://www.mod.gov.cn/leader/index.htm (Last access date: December 22, 2011).
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Figure 1: Hierarchy within the CMC
DIR of General Logistics DIR of General Armament
(The Figure is prepared by the author based on the information obtained from the website of the Chinese government and other materials.)
Hu Jintao, Chairman of the CMC, is the President of the PRC as well as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, which is the top position of the CPC. Xi Jinping, Vice-Chairman of the CMC, is Vice President of the PRC, and is also one of the members of the Central Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC. General Guo Baoxiong and General Xu Caihou, who belong to the PLAGF but have no post within the PLAGF, assume full-time positions as Vice-Chairman of the CMC, and they are the members of the Central Politburo of the CPC, which is immediately beneath the Central Politburo Standing Committee, usually called as “Central body of the CPC.” Except these three Vice-Chairmen, other CMC members are the members of the Central Committee of the CPC, which is immediately beneath the Central Politburo of the CPC. Figure 1 presents what I have described above in a graphic way. Ranking of the CMC members in the CPC is definitive and decisive, and persons who are ranked higher in the CPC are expected to have larger influence on decisions of the CMC although the CMC makes decisions on a consensus basis. Wu Shengli, the Commander of the PLAN, is only sailor in the CMC. He is recently elected as the member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and is presumably lower in the
36 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) hierarchy of the CPC than other CMC members.
(b) Hierarchy as military personnel According to Article 11 of the Regulation on the Military Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army16, Chief of General Staff and Director of General Political Department are ranked higher than “officers at the level of commander of a major military command.” This “officers at the level of commander of a major military command” is understood to be the position of Commanders of Military Regions (MR) and the equivalent positions, to which General or Lieutenant General is usually assigned. Among the top positions of the four General Departments, Director of General Logistics Department and Director of General Armament Department are ranked as “officers at the level of commander of a major military command” like Commander of MR. The same applies to three Commanders of Service Arms (i.e. Commander of PLAN, Commander of PLAAF and Commander of Second Artillery Corps), and they are ranked as “officers at the level of commander of a major military command.” In the General Staff Department and General Political Department, Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Director of General Political Department are also ranked as “officers at the level of commander of a major military command.”
Table 1: Posts and ranks of the PLA personnel
Post Rank (army rank) Assignment
Chief of the General Staff, General Director of the General Political Department Director of General Armament Department, Director of General Logistics Officers at the level of Department, General or commander of a major Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General military command Deputy Director of the General Political Department, Commander of PLAN, Commander of MR,
16 Regulation on the Military Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Central People’s Government of PRC, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/gm/content_63642.htm (Last access date: December 23, 2011).
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Commander of PLA Air Force, President of Military Academies etc. Officers at the level of deputy commander of a Lieutenant General or Deputy Commander of MR, major military Major General Fleet Commander command Chief of Combat Operations from Officers at the level of Major General or General Staff, corps commander Lieutenant General Chief of Foreign Affairs Office from Ministry of National Defense, etc. Officers at the level of Major General or President of Dalian Naval deputy corps Senior Colonel Academy commander Division Commanders, Officers at the level of Senior Colonel or Destroyer division Commanders, division commander Major General etc. Officers at the level of Colonel or deputy division Brigade Commanders, etc Senior Colonel commander Regiment Commanders, Officers at the level of Colonel or Commanding officer of Destroyers, regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel etc.
Officers at the level of Lieutenant Colonel or Deputy regiment commanders, etc deputy regiment Major commander
Officers at the level of Major or Battalion commanders, etc. battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel
Officers at the level of Deputy battalion commanders, etc. deputy battalion Captain or Major
commander
Officers at the level of Captain or Lieutenant Company commanders, etc. company commander
Officers at the level of Deputy company commanders, etc. deputy company Lieutenant or Captain
commander
Officers at the level of Second Lieutenant or Platoon leaders, etc. platoon leader Lieutenant
(The table is prepared by the author based on the Regulation on the Military Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and other materials.)
In terms of posts assigned to the PLA officers, Chief of General Staff and
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Director of General Political Department, who hold a higher position in the CMC, are ranked the highest among the heads of four General Departments. These four General Departments are positioned at the same level as the ministries and commissions of State Council which are the counterpart to the central government’s ministries and agencies of Japan. So, General Staff Department and General Political Department are positioned higher not only than other General Departments but also higher than the ministries and commissions of State Council. Minister of National Defense is not only one of the ministers of the State Council (who correspond to the ministers of central government of Japan) but also Vice Premier of the State Council, ranked higher than other ministers. He is also one of the members of the Standing Committee, which is an inner cabinet of the State Council17. Recently, officers who had served as the Chief of General Staff or other positions of the CMC have been appointed as the Minister of National Defense. Summarizing the above, the ranking of the members of the CMC seems to be as follows: (1) Hu Jintao, Chairman; (2) Xi Jinping, Vice-Chairman; (3) Guo Baoxiong and Xu Caihou, both assigned to Vice-Chairman; (4) Liang Guanglie, Minister of National Defense, Chen Bingde, Chief of General Staff and Li Jinai, Director of General Political Department and (5) other CMC members. Members ranked numbers 3 (two persons) and 4 (three persons) above are all from the PLAGF. In contrast, Admiral Wu Shengli is the only CMC member from the PLAN. As he is promoted to Admiral after he is appointed as the Commander of the PLAN, he is relatively a newly-arrived Admiral among the CMC members. Chairman Hu Jintao and Vice-Chairman Xi Jinping are concurrently serving as President and Vice President of the PRC respectively. Therefore, two Vice-Chairmen, Guo Baoxiong and Xu Caihou are the only CMC members working full-time for the CMC who hold the membership of the Central Politburo of the CPC. So, we can imagine that they are relatively influential in the CMC.
17 People’s Republic of China State Council Organization Act, the Central People’s Government of PRC, http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-06/10/content_5548.htm (Last access date: December 23, 2011). Standing Committee consists of Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councilors and Secretary General of the State Council.
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Other members of the CMC are also engaged in other full-time assignments, such as Minister of National Defense, Directors of the General Departments or the Commanders of the Service Arms. Consequently, these two Vice-Chairmen seem to be playing an important role to connect the Central body of the CPC with the nerve center of the PLA on a daily basis.
(3) Executive Departments of the CMC A. Four General Departments (General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department) Executive functions of the CMC are carried out by each of four General Departments of the CMC, i.e. General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armament Department. The CMC executes operational commands, guides army building and exerts other power to all military forces through these four General Departments. The General Staff Department is the CMC’s military operation body leading all military forces in military operations. It is responsible for building all military forces and directing all military actions. It consists of various divisions undertaking command, military intelligence, communication, training, mobilization, electronic warfare, aviation, foreign affairs, etc. The General Political Department is the CMC’s political work body leading the PLA in political works and carrying out the CPC’s activities in the PLA. It consists of various divisions undertaking organization, human resources, propaganda, security, discipline inspection, mass works, etc. The General Logistics Department is the CMC’s logistics operations body leading the PLA in logistics operations. It consists of various divisions including those undertaking finance, military goods, fuel, sanitary service, traffic and transportation, military facility construction, etc. The General Armament Department is a part of the CMC organization in charge of armament leading the PLA in equipping weapons and supplies. It consists of various divisions undertaking armament planning, armament for service arms and branches, scientific and technological research, procurement,
40 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) etc.18 The CMC is a decision-making body on the issues assigned to each of the four General Departments. In the case of China, we usually can make a guess as to ranks or powers of internal institutions or organizations of the CPC, the State Council or the PLA by comparing ranks of top leaders assigned to such institutions or organizations. As mentioned above, Chief of General Staff and Director of General Political Department are ranked higher than Directors of other General Departments and the Commanders of Service Arms and Military Regions. Thus, General Staff Department which is responsible for military operations and General Political Department which is responsible for human resources and the CPC’s political works are given a special status in the decision-making system of the PLA and have more power than other Departments/Service Arms/MRs. Most of high-ranking officers working for the CMC and the General Departments are the officers of the PLAGF19. Naval officers and Air Force officers are rarely seen in these departments. Foreign military attachés staying in Beijing often meet the staff officers of the General Departments, most of who belong to the PLAGF.
B. Organizational structure of the PLAGF for operational command and control PLAN, PLAAF and the Second Artillery Corps under the leadership of the CMC have leading bodies within each of service arms which are called “General Departments” consisting of Headquarters 20 , Political Department, Logistics Department and Armament Department, each of which are connected to the four General Departments of the CMC respectively. In the case of PLAN, the Commander of the PLAN and the Political Commissars of the PLAN are appointed as heads of the PLAN’s General Departments.
18 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, pp. 137-139. 19 Leadership of General Departments of the Military Commission, Ministry of National Defense of PRC, etc. 20 Chief of Staff of the PLAN is appointed as the head of Headquarters of the PLAN.
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Figure 2: Flow of leadership (lingdão)
(The Figure is prepared by the author based on the information in “National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period” and other materials.) There is no independent leading body in the PLAGF, but each of the seven Military Regions of the PLAGF has a Headquarters, Political Department, Integrated Logistics (liánqin) Department21 and Armament Department which are linked to the four of the CMC’s General Departments respectively. In accordance with the functions assigned to it, each of the CMC’s General Departments – most of its members are the PLAGF officers – gives directions and commands to the seven Military Regions, PLAN and PLAAF through its counterpart general departments in each of the MRs and service arms. This flow of directions and commands is illustrated in Figure 2 above. As far as we know from media reports, the four General Departments of the CMC are structured primarily to direct the PLAGF. Within the organization of the General Staff Department which is in charge of operational commands, the Naval (Operation) Bureau headed by Senior Captain (PLAN) is responsible for the naval operations, and this Bureau is directly under the Combat Operation Command Department, to which Major General (PLAGF) is assigned as a head of the department. At the same level of the Combat Operation Command Department,
21 Each of the Military Regions has in its organization air force and fleet under its command. So the MR is responsible for logistics not only for ground force but for unified command including navy and air force (equivalent to joint force). This is way the MR’s logistics department is called integrated logistics (liánqin) department.
42 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) there are two departments, which are the Military Training Department in charge of training of the PLAGF and Army Aviation Department in charge of air unit of the PLAGF (one of the service arms of the PLAGF). Apparently, the organizational unit responsible for the naval operations is ranked lower than these PLAGF’s departments. This organizational structure indicates the position of naval operations in the decision-making mechanism of the PLA, meaning that, inside the PLA, the PLAN is still regarded as one of the support arms for the PLAGF.
Figure 3: General Staff Department (Combat Operation Command Department & Naval (Operation) Bureau) and PLAN
As(The the Figure PLA is prepared is primarily by the author dedicated based to on carrythe information out ground in “PLA operations, Daily” and the other materials.) resources allocated to naval operations in the PLA’s leading organization may be limited. To the contrary, it is specifically mentioned that the Nuclear Submarines receives direct commands of the CMC as the Second Artillery Corps do, both of which engage in strategic counterattacks22. It can be said that this reflects that the PLAN’s activities including naval operations may to a considerable extent be left in the PLAN’s hands.
(4) Does the PLAN have much influence on the strategic decisions of the PLA? It is very much possible that the influence of the PLAN and PLAAF is limited on the strategic decision of the PLA. The Strategic Planning Department was established in the General Staff Department on November 22, 2011. Assignment of the Strategic Planning Department includes (i) research on
22 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, pp. 154 & 159.
43 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) strategically important issues and (ii) preparation of development and improvement plans of military forces23. This indicates that the Department may be developed into a core unit of the strategic decision in the PLA. In the inauguration ceremony, Guo Baoxiong, Vice-Chairman of the CMC, was invited as a guest of honor, and it was attended not only by the people in the General Staff Department but also by the leaders of major institutions engaging in the strategic decisions of the entire PLA － including the four General Departments, National Defense University and Academy of Military Science － and the leaders of the relevant state institutions. The establishment of the Strategic Planning Department was extensively published by the Ministry of National Defense emphasizing the importance of the Department in the entire PLA24. However, I have failed to find any press articles reporting the attendance of leaders of the PLAN and PLAAF at the ceremony. It is often the case in China that information in press reports concerning actual or possible attendees at an important ceremony gives a critical clue to power or rank of such attendees or relevant institutions which the ceremony concerns. Accordingly, an absence of such high-ranking officers of the PLAN and the PLAAF as are at the same level of the attendees from the four General Departments indicates that it may be highly possible that neither PLAN nor PLAAF participate in the important decision-making process of the PLA including strategic decisions covering the entire PLA.
Chapter 2: PLA’s military diplomacy In order to analyze in which issues the PLA has an interest in peacetime, it is important to verify to which arms the PLA gives priority in updating its armament and on which training the PLA puts focus. In addition, it is equally important to verify which country’s army the PLA has contacted and what military diplomacy it has developed. In this Chapter, I would like to provide an
23 “An inauguration meeting was held for Strategic Planning Department of the People’s Liberation Army on November 22 in Beijing,” Ministry of National Defense of PRC, November 23, 2011, http://www.mod.gov.cn/auth/2011-11/22/content_4318443.html (Last access date: November 23, 2011). 24 In the inauguration ceremony for Military Intelligence Department which was established at the same time of the establishment of Strategic Planning Department, Vice-Chairman of the CMC did not seem to attend it, and it is reported that the ceremony was organized by Chief of General Staff and below.
44 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) outline of what roles are performed by military diplomacy in China and to confirm that the PLAGF carries more weight in the China’s military diplomacy than other service arms.
(1) Independency of China’s military diplomacy It is mentioned that the China’s military diplomacy is “a part of the nation’s entire diplomatic strategy and policy” as well as “a part of the nation’s military strategy and national defense policy,” and is “subject to the entire nation’s political, diplomatic and military strategy25.” As mentioned above, the PLA and the State Council are independent from each other, and the State Council’s intervention in the PLA’s issues is very limited. China’s military diplomacy is promoted under the direct leadership of the Central body of the CPC and the CMC. Current China’s diplomatic policy is simply represented by the words “Harmonious Society (héxié shiìjiè).” There are a variety of organizations in China exerting influence on the country’s diplomacy, that include not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which corresponds to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) but also the Ministry of Commerce, the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Culture, etc. that are involved in the economic, cultural and other matters. The slogan of “Harmonious Society” is given to the ministries and commissions including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by their ruling bodies respectively, and they construe it in their own way and take actions independently. So it is very difficult to coordinate among ministries and commissions even though they are under the same umbrella of the State Council. To solve this problem, the Central body of the CPC has a small group named the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs immediately under the Politburo Standing Committee led by the General Secretary Hu Jintao. This small group is responsible for coordination and guidance among relevant ministries and commissions26.
25 Zhãng Wei “Cultivation and Building of China’s Characteristic Military Diplomacy” China Military Online (Online version of the “PLA Daily”), http//www.chinamil.com.cn/item/saloon/lunyuan/276.asp (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 26 Táng Liàng “Relationship between Communist Party of China and Politics in Contemporary China,” Keio University Press, 1997, pp. 52 and etc.
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However, the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs does not seem to provide cooperation or coordination for foreign affairs on a daily basis, and it looks like the PLA carries out its own activities of military diplomacy. There are some examples of this: one is the test flight of the stealth jet J-20 at the time when the US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates visited China; and the other is the PLA’s reaction to the collision of China’s fishing boat with Japan Coast Guard’s patrol vessel in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. While the Ministry of National Defense – but not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs － assumes primary responsibility for the acceptance of Mr. Gates’ visit to China as a part of its military diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for arranging a courtesy visit of foreign dignitaries to the President of the PRC. Generally speaking, a test flight of prototype aircraft has nothing to do with diplomatic schedule. However, given the diplomatic circumstances at that time, one can expect that the authorities responsible for foreign affairs would carefully study possible impact of the test flight given to the foreign counterpart and discuss it with relevant people before taking any actions. Nonetheless, no discussion or coordination seems to have taken place between the PLA and the State Council at the time. This incident brought serious negative consequences on China. China’s opaqueness was widely publicized by the US Defense Secretary. Foreign mass media reported that President Hu Jintao might not hold control over the PLA. The collision between China’s fishing boat and Japan Coast Guard’s patrol vessel in the waters near the Senkaku Islands deteriorated the relationship between both countries’ foreign authorities. The Chinese Ministries of State Council took a series of quick actions, such as an arrest of Japanese expatriate employees, a slowdown of export of rare-earth materials to Japan, an imposition of voluntary restriction on Chinese visiting to Japan, a halt of invitation of Japanese students to the 2010 Shanghai Expo, etc., which worsened the relationship with Japan. On the other hand, there was no change for a while in the attitude of the Ministry of National Defense concerning the acceptance of the Training Squadron of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. After a long while, the PLA eventually decided not to receive the visit of Japan’s war ships to China. This indicates that at an early stage of the collision incident the PLA may have estimated the incident’s
46 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) impact on the relationship with Japan more optimistically than the State Council. These examples demonstrate that the PLA’s military diplomacy is not necessarily consistent with the general diplomacy developed by the State Council.
(2) Predominance of PLAGF in military diplomacy A. Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defense
The Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense is in charge of practical businesses of the PLA’s military diplomacy. The Ministry of National Defense is one of the ministries and commissions of the State Council, but practical tasks of the Ministry are undertaken by the General Departments of the
Figure 4: Contact for Military Diplomacy (Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defense)
Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office
(The Figure is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials.)
PLA27. Military diplomacy is assigned to the General Staff Department as one of its tasks. This indicates that the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense is in its actual status one of the divisions of the General Staff Department (Foreign Affairs Bureau of Combat Operation Command Department of the General Staff Department28). One of the staff of the Foreign Affairs Office whom I met when I stayed in Beijing as Defense Attaché gave me his name card specifying his affiliation of the “Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense” and “Foreign Affairs Office of the Central Military Commission.” This also indicates that all organizational units in charge of foreign affairs within the
27 Li, National Defense and Army Building in a New Century and a New Period, p. 122. 28 Jun-ichi Takeda “The People’s Liberation Army” Business-sha, 2008, p.85.
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Ministry of National Defense, General Staff Department and the Central Military Commission are combined and virtually integrated into one entity. In the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, it is the North East Asian Affairs Section of Asian Affairs Bureau that is in charge of issues with Japan. This section consists of several military officers who are engaged in military diplomatic tasks toward Japan, including the Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Office, to which Major General (of PLAGF) is assigned, Director of Asian Affairs Bureau, to which Senior Colonel (of PLAGF) is assigned, and Chief of North East Asian Affairs Section, to which Lieutenant Colonel (of PLAGF) is assigned. I do not know that there are any sailors in this section except an interpreter (as of the end of 2011). This section also deals with foreign affairs with South Korea, North Korea and Mongolia. So, they are not occupied by the issues with Japan nor do they have many ocean or naval issues to handle. They are the contact persons with the Japanese attachés in China, and are the Chinese representatives to the consultation or negotiation with foreign countries’ defense authorities, such as Working-Level Talks on Maritime Communication Mechanisms between Japan and China’s Defense authorities. Most of the people working for Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense are the PLAGF officers. Four or five people are appointed as Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Office, one of whom is the Rear Admiral of PLAN. The Senior Colonel of PLAAF is appointed as Director of the General Affairs Bureau of Foreign Affairs Office who is in charge of diplomatic protocol. These are a few of the personnel of PLAN and PLAAF whom I can name. PLAGF officers dominate not only the Asian Affairs Bureau but also other offices of the Foreign Affairs Office. The Rear Admiral of PLAN, who is only one Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office with naval career, is responsible for American and Pacific affairs. According to one of the staff of the Headquarters of PLAN, PLA’s human resource management is made in a “linear” fashion, meaning that most of the officers who are currently engaging in foreign affairs start working for foreign affairs from the beginning of their entering into PLA after graduation from the university or other education and continue their career to deal with those matters. They rarely work on front-line duties. Thus, while some of them are very skillful in
48 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) diplomacy and are sometimes known to foreigners as tough negotiators, they do not have much knowledge about military operations. Most of these people are PLAGF officers and have some knowledge about ground troop’s operations environment though this is very different from that of maritime operations. Therefore, it is very difficult for them to share common knowledge of maritime operations with their foreign counterparts, such as Japanese officers who have much experience in fleet or air operations. PLAN has a unit called the “Foreign Affairs Bureau.” This is one of the units of the “General Affairs Office of Headquarters of PLAN,” which is in charge of general administration of the Headquarters. The Foreign Affairs Bureau, headed by an officer in the class of Navy Captain, provides PLAN’s contact for foreign countries’ naval delegation visiting China or foreign naval attachés stationing in China. It deals with diplomatic protocols as its main business, and is not given any power to negotiate with foreign military delegations as a representative of the Ministry of National Defense. It is similar to the liaison office of local troops under the Military Regions. Recently, many countries’ military organizations including Japan have arranged a consultation scheme with their foreign counterparts at a working level in various frameworks, such as one between joint forces or between service arms, which is sometimes called “staff talks.” The PLA has been frequently invited by many countries including Japan to have bilateral staff talks. The United States and China have set up a maritime consultation scheme under the MMCA (Military Maritime Consultative Agreement). While the US Pacific Command represents the United States to this consultation, the PLA is represented by the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense. So, there is thin representation of PLAN to this scheme. Furthermore, the power delegated to the PLA representatives is limited29. Defense Ministers level of Japan and China have agreed to promote the staff talks30. Nonetheless, the attitude of PLA representatives to set up the talks is not
29 Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issue for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, February 2012, p. 25. 30 “Joint Press Release” Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 20, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2009/03/20.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011).
49 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) positive, and tends to restrict it to a dialogue of policy issues, which PLA representatives – actually they are people of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense – are in charge. The PLA has recently been expanding the PLAN’s activities as its means of military diplomacy, such as counter-piracy operations, port visits to foreign countries, joint exercises with foreign navies, etc 31 . Nonetheless, from the above-mentioned examples I would say that the PLA’s military diplomacy is dominated by the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense – effectively it is the General Staff Department – and that PLA does not consider to involve other service arms (such as navy, air force) actively in its military diplomacy32.
B. Military Attachés In 1974 (two years after the normalization of diplomatic relations), Japan and China started communication between defense authorities by mutually exchanging attachés to each other’s country (an officer of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force was dispatched to China). Since then, Japan has dispatched an officer of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force in 1995 to China and an officer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2000. Currently, three attachés, one each from the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, are stationed in the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. On the other hands, there are several military attachés in the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo at the moment. They are Defense attaché, Army attaché, Deputy Defense attaché and a few assistant military attachés. It is the fact that, not only current members of military attachés in Tokyo but also those who have stayed the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, almost all of whom are PLAGF officers. Businesses concerning maritime or airspace issues have been served by the
31 “More practical, active and open China’s military diplomacy – Director of Foreign Affairs Office of Ministry of National Defense talks about the China’s military diplomacy in 2011” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, January 17, 2012, http://chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/contentnes/2012-01/17/content_76342.htm (Last access date: January 19, 2012). 32 It is interesting that Deputy Director of Foreign Affair Office of Ministry of National Defense who is in charge of Japan retreated from PLAGF to PLAN Admiral at the just time of publishing of this paper’s Japanese edition.
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Defense attaché. Most of them used to study in universities in Japan, and have been working for the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo more than one time. So, among the PLA they are quite knowledgeable and insightful about Japan. However, they do not have expertise in navy and maritime issues. This situation is not only in Japan, but there are the same situations in other countries. While China sends military attachés to more than a hundred countries33, most of them are PLAGF officers. According to one of the staff of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, there are a few diplomatic missions abroad, in which a PLAN officer is included. These few examples are the Chinese Mission to the UN and Chinese Embassies in the US, the UK and Russia. So, not only in Japan but also in other countries, there are many Chinese diplomatic missions in which only PLAGF officers are involved. It is somewhat puzzling that there is no naval officer in the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo even in the situation where maritime issues are taken up in every meeting with Japan – including high-level talks or defense ministers’ meetings as one of the important agenda. I would say that this explains that the PLA does not have much interest in maritime issues. The Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, a part of the General Staff Department, is responsible for contact with foreign military attachés staying in China. In the same way, the General Staff Department (actually it is the Military Intelligence Department) is responsible for giving instructions to Chinese military attachés staying in foreign countries34. It is unknown to what extent the Ground Force attachés are given the relevant knowledge of military situations with PLAN, PLAAF and other service arms and share the interests with these service arms through (the Military Intelligence Department of) the General Staff Department.
33 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, 2011, p. 65. 34 The author watched the program of CCTV broadcast on the Chinese New Year Eve in 2010 that Major General Yang Hui, Director of Military Intelligence Department of the General Staff Department read the message on behalf of the Chinese people encouraging military attachés staying in the world and the message on behalf of those military attachés thanking the Chinese people for their support.
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Chapter 3: PLA’s view on maritime security Based on the analysis in previous Chapters, in which I have articulated PLAGF’s predominance in the PLA’s decision-making and military diplomacy, I would like to take up a few examples of the PLA’s military diplomacy in this Chapter, and look over the priority issues of the PLA’s military diplomacy and the PLA’s view on national security.
(1) PLA’s focus on domestic issues China’s defense white paper, which is issued approximately biyearly, explains the PLA’s view on security situations. In the latest defense white paper, it is mentioned that “The Asia-Pacific security situation is generally stable. … Nevertheless, Asia-Pacific security is becoming more intricate and volatile35.” It continues that “Regional pressure points drag on and without solution in sight. There is intermittent tension on the Korean Peninsula. The security situation in Afghanistan remains serious. Political turbulence persists in some countries. Ethnic and religious discords are evident. Disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests flare up occasionally. And terrorist, separatist and extremist activities run amok.” It summarizes the Asia-Pacific security situation stating that “Profound changes are taking shape in the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape.” It concludes that relevant major powers, particularly the United States, is reinforcing its military regional alliance and increasing its involvement in regional security affairs. As for security challenges that China is facing, the defense white paper states that “China is meanwhile confronted by more diverse and complex security challenges.” It continues that “China has vast territories and territorial seas. It is in a critical phase of the building of a harmonious society in an all-round way. Therefore, it faces heavy demands in safeguarding national security.” As the biggest obstacles and threats inflicting serious damage on China’s national security and social stability, the white paper takes up the following issues in order: “Taiwan independence activists;” “East Turkistan independence movement;” and “Tibet independence movement.” Following these issues, it refers at first to the
35 China’s National Defense in 2010. The information concerning the PLA mentioned in this Chapter is extracted from this book.
52 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) pressure built up in preserving China's territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests, and then, non-traditional security concerns, such as existing terrorism threats, energy resources, finance, information and natural disasters. Finally, it criticizes that the United States continues to sell weapons to Taiwan, severely impeding Sino-US relations and impairing the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Concerning China’s relationship with Taiwan, while China severely accuses the US of its arms export to Taiwan, the economic ties between China and Taiwan have been deepened since Ma Yingjiu has formed the government in March 2008. The defense white paper states that “China seeks the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations accords with the interests and aspirations of compatriots on both sides of the Straits, and this is widely applauded by the international community.” According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011” issued by the US Department of Defense, it appears that China is “prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes long term reunification remains possible and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits36.” Summarizing the above, the issues that China recognizes as threat against its stable development, and therefore, the highest priority to which the PLA must give are mainly domestic issues, such as East Turkistan (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) independence and Tibet independence. Consequently, the PLA has more military interest37 in the countries with which China shares the borders in its western and southern regions, and as a result, has relatively lower military interest in the sea. It can be said from the PLA’s military viewpoint that the PLA may have lower military interest in Japan compared to the other countries with which China shares common borders because there is a “natural barrier38” between Japan and China which is water. From the viewpoint of the PLAGF, it has much higher military interest in the ground forces of the bordering countries than Japan
36 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, 2011, p. 48. 37 In this paper, the term “military interest” means to include militaristic threats and concerns. 38 Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 180.
53 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) since the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force does not have any intention or capability to carry out the transoceanic invasion into the mainland China. The PLA does not have more military interest in the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (except the JASDF’s cutting-edge scientific technologies) than the air forces of the bordering countries as the JASDF does not have long-distance and transoceanic air strike capabilities. I do not say that the PLA does not have any military interest in Japan at all. It sometimes sends a warning to Japan. For example, in its official newspaper “PLA Daily” it expresses concern over revival of the Japanese Militarism, and criticizes Japan’s new National Defense Program Guideline. As mentioned above, however, the PLA puts in its decision-making relatively lower priority on the relationship with Japan. Accordingly, it is possible that leaders and staff in the PLA’s supreme leading bodies – most of whom are PLAGF officers – do not pay much attention, nor do they allocate substantial resources of their military diplomacy, to Japan.
(2) High-level military diplomacy Diplomatic protocol is of great importance in diplomacy. The information, such as the rank of officials who attend the courtesy visit or the format of meeting, gives us important indication of the diplomatic relationship between the countries. Especially, China is the country that has historically emphasized hierarchy and formalities, and thus pays special attention to counterparts or formats of meetings at their visit to foreign countries and takes special care in formalities in receiving foreign guests in China. This is known in some examples: Chinese mass media’s reaction －moving from joy to sorrow － to the way how the United States received the visit of President Hu Jintao; and the tumultuous process in which Vice President Xi Jinping’s audience with the Emperor of Japan was materialized when he visited Japan in 2009. At the time of visit of high-level leaders of military or defense organizations of foreign countries, we can have an indication of the level of interest that the PLA has in such country’s military force by checking who in the PLA actually attended the meeting with such country’s visitors. The higher the PLA leader who met the foreign visitors is ranked in the PLA hierarchy, the greater military interest the
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PLA has in such country or its military force. From this viewpoint, we have to pay attention to the appearance of the CMC Vice-Chairmen, in the foreign countries’ courtesy visits or the meetings with foreign officials. Table 2 lists the foreign defense officers’ visits in China, on which one or two of the CMC Vice-Chairmen met the foreign representatives or received their courtesy visits.
Table 2: Senior officers of foreign armies to whom CMC Vice-Chairmen have met
(The Table is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials.)
In summary, Table 2 shows that one of the CMC Vice-Chairmen met the following foreign representatives in their visits to China: (i) the Defense Minister or the equivalent high-ranking officials of South Korea or some of the Central Asian or Southeast Asian countries; (ii) the Commander of armed force at the national level or the equivalent top-ranking military officers of Russia, Australia or some Eastern European countries; (iii) the Commander of ground force or the equivalent top-ranking military officers in service arms of Pakistan or Bangladesh; and (iv) the military officers at the next-highest rank, such as Deputy Commander or Vice Minister, of Vietnam, the United States, New Zealand, Turkey, North Korea or Italy. The PLA has a regular meeting with North Korea and Vietnam, which are
55 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) regarded as communist fraternal countries due to their historical relations, at the level of director of political department (4-star General-level). This indicates strong ties between the PLA and the military forces of North Korea and Vietnam. The CMC Vice-Chairman received a courtesy visit of the Commander of the US Pacific Command. This indicates that China has a high interest in the US military powers in the Asia-Pacific region, which China’s military force may confront. The Commander of the US Pacific Command is one of the few navy officers whose courtesy visit is accepted by Vice-Chairman Guo Baoxiong. Diplomacy with the United States is one of the highest priority issues of China’s foreign strategy39. China is said to have a regular meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Army of Pakistan and Bangladesh, which indicates China’s interest in the southern border areas and India. China’s close relation with Russia and Eastern European countries seems to have been historically developed since the Cold War era and is still continuing. Central Asia is important to China as one of the energy sources. It is also geopolitically important where the Islamic extremists are active which supported the separatist and independent movement in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in the past40. Table 3 shows the CMC Vice-Chairmen’s trips abroad (except
Table 3: CMC Vice-Chairmen’s trips abroad (except Vice-Chairman Xi Jinping as Vice President of the PRC)
(The Table is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials. )
39 Rumi Aoyama, “China’s External Strategy and the United States,” Ryosei Kokubun (Ed.), China’s Governance Capability – Analysis on Mutual Relationship between Politics, Economy and Diplomacy, Keio University Press, 2006, p. 262. 40 Shigemitsu Konno, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Ryosei Kokubun (Ed.), China’s Governance Capability – Analysis on Mutual Relationship between Politics, Economy and Diplomacy, Keio University Press, 2006, p. 358.
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Vice-Chairman Xi Jinping travelling as Vice President of the PRC) since 2008 when the CMC was reformed into the current organization. In this Table, we can identify the CMC Vice-Chairmen’s visits to: (i) the United States and Russia; (ii) communist fraternal countries, such as Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea; (iii) former communist countries in Eastern Europe; (iv) Middle Eastern countries including Turkey; (v) the ASEAN member states; and (vi) Latin American countries. The overview of the countries, delegates of which are accepted by the CMC Vice-Chairmen, and the countries where the CMC Vice-Chairmen visited, indicates the regions in which the PLA has military interest, and implied that even in such regions it does not have much interest in maritime issues41. In the first half of 2011, both Vice-Chairman and Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie frequently visited ASEAN member states. These visits are reasonably seen as their attempt to overcome the difficulties in the issues of the South China Sea, in which the United States was actively involved at that time. If we look at the contacts of personnel between Japan and China, there has been no official visit of the CMC Vice-Chairman to Japan after General Cao Gangchuan, then-Minister of National Defense, was invited to Japan by then-Defense Minister Masahiko Komura in August 2007. After General Cao Gangchuan retired and the CMC was reformed into the current organization, the CMC Vice-Chairman has never had a meeting with high-level Japanese officials, such as the Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, etc. To the present, it is said that each of two Vice-Chairmen stopped over in Japan during transit to their trips abroad and spent some time for sightseeing. Even on such occasions, there seems to be no contact with the relevant persons of Japanese defense authorities. While Japan’s Chief of Joint Staff visited China, his Chinese counterpart, the PLA’s Chief of General Staff, has never come to Japan. When the Chiefs of Staff of Japan’s Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces came to China, they paid a
41 It is interesting that China and New Zealand had developed frequent mutual exchange between their military forces. For example, while in 2011 Vice-Chairman Guo Baoxiong and Director of General Political Department Li Jinai visited New Zealand together with the China’s Naval Surface Combatant, a courtesy visit of NZ Deputy Minister was accepted by Vice-Chairman Guo Baoxiong.
57 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) courtesy visit to the Minister of Nation Defense, but not to the PLA’s Chief of General Staff. I would have to say that the PLA’s way of dealing with the Japanese defense officials indicates that the PLA has lower military interest in Japan than other countries mentioned above. As Japan and China are separated by the sea, they may feel easy to Japan or may have a superiority feeling over Japan from their military viewpoint rather than having a fear of Japan.
(3) Consultation for Maritime Communication Mechanism Since the waters or airspace where a country’s navy carries out its activities are adjacent or overlapping to those of the other country’s navy, the countries have sought and developed a variety of communication frameworks or mechanisms ever since the Cold War era to prevent unexpected incidents and to control risks at the time of contingencies42. Top leaders of Japan and China have shared concern over contingency situations on the sea as the PLAN is increasingly expanding its activities. However, despite the agreement reached between top leaders of both countries, they have failed to establish any mechanisms for dialogue or communication, and their discussions have been dragged on for a long period of time without success. I have tried to verify the PLA’s intention in the consultation with Japan for a maritime communication mechanism on the basis of the report made by the “PLA Daily43” at the time or the facts that no information was publicized in the “PLA Daily.” At the time when Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, visited Japan on April 11, 2007, the governments of Japan and China issued the joint press release specifying that “a communication mechanism between the two defense authorities will be established, and thereby, prevent the occurrence of
42 In detail, please refer to the following: David Griffiths, U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building- Paradigms, Precedents, and Prospects, Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 2010; Takahiro Ishihara “Japan’s Naval Strategy – Focusing on International Institutionalization of the INCSEA (Incidents at Sea Agreement) – “ Hatou (A club magazine of JMSDF) No. 211, November 2010; Takahiro Ishihara, “ Japan’s Naval Strategy (No. 2) – Recent Development in the western Pacific” Hatou (A club magazine of JMSDF) No. 212, January 2011. 43 “PLA Daily” is an official publication of the PLA under the direct control of the General Political Department. It is one of the sources that gives us correct information of the PLA’s intention.
58 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) unforeseen circumstances at sea.” On the following day, the “PLA Daily” published the same information in China44, which indicates that both governments’ concern over maritime security was shared by the PLA. On August 30, 2007, Japan’s then-Defense Minister Masahiko Komura and China’s then-Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan reaffirmed that “both countries agree to establish the communication mechanism between their respective defense authorities to prevent the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances and to maintain security in the East China Sea. Both countries’ experts will have a joint working group meeting as soon as possible to accelerate the consultation process45.” The article of the “PLA Daily” on the following day referred to the Defense Ministers’ meeting and the agreement to “accelerate the consultation process46.” Six months after the meeting of both countries’ Defense Ministers, the 1st Working-Level Talks on a maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China (hereinafter referred to as “Working-Level Talks”) was held on April 1, 2008. The “PLA Daily” did not publish anything about the Working-Level Talks. However, both countries’ governments published their top leaders’ “joint press release47” on May 7, 2008 when President of the PRC Hu Jintao visited Japan, in which they appreciated the result of the Working-Level Talks and would continue their efforts. At that time, although the “PLA Daily” published many articles of President’s visits to Japan, it reported nothing about the “Working-Level Talks” and the “joint press release” (which include 70 points of agreement including promotion of defense exchange). This implies the PLA’s negative attitude toward the Working-Level Talks. Defense authorities of both countries could not make any progress in the
44 Japan-China joint press release, “PLA Daily” China Military Online, April 12, 2007. 45 Joint press release of Japan-China defense authorities, Ministry of defense of Japan, August 30, 2007, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2007/08/30a.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 46 “ Cao Gangchuan had a meeting with Japan’s Defense Minister.” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, August 31, 2007, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbxl/2007-08/31/content_935137.htm (Last access date: December 22, 2011). 47 Joint press release on enforcing exchange and cooperation between governments of Japan and China” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 10, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/0805_kp.html (Last access date: December 22 , 2011).
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Working-Level Talks until Japan’s then-Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada visited China on March 20, 2009. In his visit, he agreed with China’s Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie that “defense authorities of both countries will continue their talks to establish the maritime communication mechanism as soon as possible. The second meeting of the Working-Level Talks was held in the first half of 2009 in Tokyo48.” This information was published by the “PLA Daily” on the following day49. However, no progress was made for the Working-Level Talks, and Japan’s then-Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa agreed with China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie who visited Japan on November 27, 2009 that “the second meeting of the Working-Level Talks will be held in Tokyo promptly in order to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities at an early date50.” This was published in the “PLA Daily” on the following day51. After Six months of the both countries’ defense ministers’ meeting, the second meeting of the Working-Level Talks was held in Tokyo on July 26, 2010. In this second meeting it was agreed that the next meeting would be held in Beijing in 201052.” However, nothing was reported in the “PLA Daily” about the meeting. After that, the collision incident happened between the Chinese fishing boat and the Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. After such incident, then-Defense Minister Kitazawa and his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie had a meeting on October 11, 2010 in Hanoi, in which they
48 Joint press release, Ministry of Defense of Japan, March 20, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2009/03/20.html (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 49 “China and Japan have reached ten points of agreement on defense exchange.” “PLA Daily” http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbxl/2009-03/21/content_1696203.htm (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 50 Joint press release, Ministry of Defense of Japan, November 27, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/youjin/2009/11/27b.html (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 51 Joint press release of Japan-China defense authorities, Ministry of Defense of Japan, November 28, 2009, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2009-11/28/content_14095.htm (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 52 “The second meeting of the Working-Level Talks on maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China (Summary of Results)” Ministry of Defense of Japan, July 26, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/nikoku/asia/kaijo_02.html (Last access date: December 22 , 2011).
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Figure 4: Information reported by the “PLA Daily” about the maritime communication mechanism between Japan and China
(The Table is prepared by the author based on the information in “PLA Daily” and other materials. )
“agreed that it is necessary to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities as early as possible53.” In June 2011 in Singapore, they also “agreed to hold the third meeting of the Working-Level Talks as soon as possible in order to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities54.” Despite these agreements, neither the third meeting of the Working-Level Talks was held in 2011 nor did the articles in the “PLA Daily” mention anything about the maritime communication mechanism although it published the defense ministers’ meeting in Hanoi and Singapore55. Furthermore, in the Foreign Ministers meeting in November 201156 and the
53 “Talks between defense ministers of Japan and China (Summary)” Ministry of Defense of Japan, October 11, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2010/10/11_gaiyou.html (Last access date: December 12 , 2011). 54 “Summary of the meeting between defense ministers of Japan and China” Ministry of Defense of Japan, June 4, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2011/06/04g.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 55 “Liang Guanglie had a meeting with Japanese defense Minister.” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, October 12, 2010, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2010-10/12/content_40232.htm; “ Liang Guanglie had meetings with the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Defense Minister of New Zealand, Defense Minister of South Korea, Defense Minister of Japan and the US Deputy secretary of State respectively.” “PLA Daily” China Military Online, June 5, 2011, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2011-06/05/content_59243.htm (Last access to both articles on December 12, 2011). 56 “Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba paid a courtesy visit to the Premier of the State Council of the PRC Wen Jiabao (Summary).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 23, 2011,
61 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) subsequent summit meeting in the following month, the Japanese government proposed to China to organize the “Senior Officials Talks on Maritime Issues57” involving not only defense authorities but also all relevant maritime organizations of both countries. The “PLA Daily” did not report anything about the discussion on this proposal. This is one of the evidences demonstrating that the PLA has the exclusive authority over China’s military diplomacy and that its military diplomacy is not necessarily coordinated with the diplomacy engaged in by the State Council which is China’s central government. Although Defense Ministers of Japan and China agreed to establish the maritime communication mechanism between both countries’ defense authorities in 2007, they have made very slow progress in the working-level consultations and have failed to establish any mechanism so far. This shows the PLA’s negative attitude toward establishment of maritime communication mechanism with Japan. This also proves that the PLA has neither much interest in, nor any urgent need for, the mechanism to prevent the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances at sea while the PLA has expanded its activities in the sea areas surrounding Japan. As mentioned above, although China has the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with the United States which is similar to the attempted mechanism of maritime communication with Japan, the PLA has not shown any positive interest in the existing consultation scheme with the US58.
(4) PLA’s view: “Ocean Territory” The PLA’s view on the sea is represented by the words “Ocean Territory.” The words have been frequently used by a variety of people including those of the CPC, the State Council as well as the PLA when they talk about China’s maritime interest. The words mean to include not only contiguous sea zone but also exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, and they called them “the
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_gemba/china1111/meeting3.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 57 “Japan-China Summit Meeting (Summary)” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 25, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_noda/china_1112/pm_meeting_1112.html (Last access date: December 12, 2011). 58 Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts,”, pp. 24-26.
62 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) waters under the jurisdiction of the state59.” China’s view of “Ocean Territory” and their interpretation of EEZ under such view seem to represent the concept that China regards areas and spaces covered by the “Ocean Territory” and the airspace above as if they were their land territory and territorial airspace. This view or interpretation gives a clear contrast to the conventional interpretation adopted by the United States or other maritime nations that they must be able to enjoy as much benefits of freedom as possible from the sea. The concept of the “Ocean Territory” is easy to understand for the PLA, most of whose officers and soldiers belong to the ground force and who are not so familiar with the international laws and customs of the sea. It seems that this concept is an extension of the ground force’s traditional concept of land territory which they consider to consist of “our territory and their territory with a border line.” It seems that such concept is transplanted into their concept of the sea. The PLA is promoting this concept among PLA officers and soldiers through the “China Defense Paper (Zhōng guó guófáng bào), one of the affiliated papers of the “PLA Daily,” and other media60. The concept of applying territorial restrictions on the sea like the land may resultantly bind the PLAN’s activities despite the PLAN’s efforts to increase its activities on the sea. This indicates that the concept is not developed taking the expansion of the nation’s naval force into account. This is also seen as one of the evidences that the PLA remains the ground force-centered military forces of the continental state.
Chapter 4: Conclusion It is no doubt that China considers the advancement into the sea and ocean development as one of its overriding principles for national development. Also, China has intentionally invested huge resources in the PLAN, one of the means of advancement into the sea. Accordingly, the PLAN’s ability is expanding and its activities are increasing. However, these facts do not necessarily suggest that the
59 State Oceanic Administration, Institute for Ocean development Strategy, Report on China’s Ocean Development in 2011, Haiyang Chubanshe (Ocean Press), 2011, p. 22. 60 The full text of relevant article can be seen in the reprinted version in Xinhuanet (Internet version of China’s national news agency Xinhua News Agency (http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2010-12/07/c_12854815.htm). (Last access date: December 22, 2011).
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PLA has its greatest interest in the sea. I can get a glimpse of this by studying the structure of the PLA’s decision-making system, the military diplomacy the PLA has developed and the PLA’s view on national security as I described above. So far as the PLA’s decision-making bodies are mostly composed of PLAGF officers, it is inevitable that the PLAGF’s conception disproportionately outweighs and the PLA tends to have a major interest in domestic issues. The PLA recognizes domestic issues as the biggest threat and puts more focus on them rather than the frictions with foreign countries at the sea. As a result, the PLA does not have relatively higher military interest in the sea, and leaves daily maritime operations to the PLAN. Relatively lower interest China’s military diplomatic authorities have in the maritime and naval issues are one of the reasons why Japan and other neighboring countries cannot dispel concerns over the expansion of the PLAN. The PLAN has gained experience and knowledge through its contacts with other countries’ navies. However, the PLAN does not have much power to give influence on the PLA’s military diplomacy, and the PLA’s military diplomacy does not reflect the PLAN’s intent. Furthermore, the PLAN was not authorized to exchange opinions with other countries’ navies on strategic and political matters. This makes it difficult for the PLAN and other countries’ navies to exploit opportunities to reduce conflicts or avoid misunderstanding thought dialogue. The gap between the PLA’s view on the sea and the PLAN’s recognition on the maritime issues, the latter of which is represented by the statement of the PLAN’s Commander Wu Shengli mentioned at the beginning of this paper, is a major factor which causes the neighboring countries including Japan that face the intensifying activities of the PLAN to be increasingly concerned about China and the PLA.
Closing comment The PLA is called as “Armed Forces for the Communist Party of China,” and has very different organizations and decision-making mechanisms from those of Japan and other democratic nations. It is difficult for us to understand their decision-making and their pattern of behavior by our standard. The PLA looks tightly-integrated and a monolithic organization having the Chairman of the CMC
64 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) as a top leader and led by the absolute leadership of the Central body of the CPC. However, the appearance of the PLA from outside the country that looks significantly expanding its naval power is very different from how the PLA looks like inside the country. The major reason for this difference is the gap of the views on the sea between the PLA and the PLAN which is a part of the PLA, and this gap is caused by the structure of the Ground Force-centric PLA and the difference of views on geopolitical threat between the PLA and the PLAN. The gap between the PLA and the PLAN cannot be filled without such a structural reform that the PLAN can have reasonable influence on decision-making and military diplomacy of the entire PLA. But, it would not be easy. However, unless the PLA could solve this gap, it would be difficult for the defense authorities of neighboring countries including Japan to have a deepened discussion over the maritime security issues with the PLA. People in each country’s defense authorities are required to continue their efforts to stimulate the interest in maritime security issues among leaders of the PLA who come out to the stages of military diplomacy including the Vice-Chairman of the CMC, the Chief of General Staff and the Minister for National Defense, and to invite them to the forum of discussions. Mr. Nan Li, Associate Professor of the US Naval War College, said that “as long as the PLA remains to be the forces of the CPC, it pays the most attention to domestic issues, and will not change its structure led by the PLAGF.” At the same time, he emphasizes the analysis from the personality viewpoint mentioning that “in parallel with the structural considerations, PLA leaders’ personality and their human relations are equally important in Chinese society61.” At the time when the CPC leaders will change in autumn of 2012, it is expected to reshuffle the PLA leaders, and it is rumored inside and outside China that the PLAN’s Commander Wu Shengli may be promoted to Vice-Chairman of the CMC or the Minister of National Defense. Vice-Chairman of the CMC is the highest position for PLA military officers, and the Minister of National Defense is responsible for military diplomacy. If Admiral Wu Shengli would be promoted to Vice-Chairman of the CMC or Minister of National Defense, it would not just be the case that he would
61 I interviewed Mr. Nan Li personality at the US Naval War College in March 2012.
65 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) be the first Admiral who is appointed to such offices62, but also the case that the number of naval officers would be doubled in the CMC together with newly-appointed Commander of the PLAN. This situation could give a good opportunity to reduce the gap between the PLA’s view and the PLAN’s view on the sea. China calls Japan as “a neighbor country separated only by a narrow strip of water.” Waters where the PLA, in particular the PLAN, carries out its activities are the sea areas surrounding Japan. Therefore, the changes in the structure or leadership of the PLA’s decision-making system would have a significant impact not only on the relationship between both countries’ defense authorities but also on the security environment of both countries. Japan must pay careful attention to those changes constantly, and continue its efforts to facilitate communication between both countries’ defense authorities.
62 There was an example that Liu Huaqing who had been in the position of the PLAN Commander was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of the CMC in 1989. However, at the time of appointment he had resigned the PLAN Commander and had the title of General (of PLAGF). So, he was not the Admiral when he was in the office of the CMC Vice-Chairman.
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India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation (1999-2009) : A Report
PANNEERSELVAM, Prakash Guest Researcher
“A Strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” Former Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe Speech at the Indian parliament, 22 August 2007
Introduction India-Japan interactions have been marked by goodwill and singularly free from any structural impediments. However, the bilateral relationship between the two started to take centre stage only after the end of Cold War. However, both countries refrained from discussing defence and security matters, until Prime Minister Mori visit to India in 2000. The brief talk between two Prime Ministers in New Delhi removed many deadlocks in the bilateral relationship. Since then, India-Japan relationship maintained steady course and attained the stature of “Strategic Partnership” in 2005. The remarkable change in Indo-Japan relationship in the post-Cold War dramatically changed the security perspective of Asia-pacific region. Notably, maritime security cooperation between the two countries captured global attention. At the same time, the growing interaction between two naval forces in the recent years raised some serious questions about the intention and objectives of India-Japan maritime security cooperation. A preliminary literature survey on this topic reveals that, not too many research works has been done on this subject. Most of literature on India-Japan relationship largely focuses on complicated relationship that existed between two countries during post-world war era or bilateral relationship in Post-Cold War. This policy analysis is important because it focuses exclusively on India-Japan maritime security cooperation to identify the key factor to strengthen the strategic cooperation. In the pragmatic international system, it is crucially important to
67 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) analysis and identifies weakness and strength in the strategic cooperation. This paper will critically analyse India-Japan maritime security cooperation. Since, after Alondra Rainbow incident in 1999, both India-Japan seriously pushed cooperation in maritime field. Therefore, this research will focus on the time period of 1999-2009.
Brief History India-Japan relationship is deeply rooted in historical and cultural interaction. Osamu Kondo says, Japanese thought that the world consisted of three countries, namely Japan, China and India.1 As a neighboring country, Japanese were well aware of Chinese tradition and culture, as Buddhism become popular among Japanese, India came to be known as the country of Buddha. Many Japanese Buddhist monks tried to visit India, after many attempts few succeeded to reach India. Konga Zammai is one of the monks entered mainland of India in 818. From India sub-continent, a Buddhist priest called Bodhisen third son of Tamil Pallavan King travelled to Japan from China in 735. But, sea-route is not explored until 1548 when three Japanese Christians visited Goa, first Japanese to travel across Indian Ocean to reach India.2 Apart from those rare incidents, India remained almost inaccessible to Japanese. Further, a national seclusion order in 1635 and 1639 severely restricted all foreign ships to enter Japan and prohibits Japanese to visit abroad. The self-imposed isolation policy severely restrained Japanese interaction with the international community. Despite the restriction, British East India Company sent their ships Return to Japan in 1674 to reopen direct trade, but the ship was not allowed to enter Japan and sent back to India.3 Otherwise, British East Indian Company had great desire for Japan could have established deep economic relationship. Japan isolation policy came to an end in 1854 after Commodore Perry order to open the Japanese port to the US merchant ships. Japanese never
1 Osamu Kondo, Japan and the Indian Ocean at the Times of the Mughal Empire, with Special reference to Gujarat, Satish Chandran (ed.). The Indian Ocean: Exploration in History, Commerce and Politics (New Delhi 1987) 2 Ibid 3 Edward Maunde Thompson(eds), Diary of Richard Cooks: cape merchant in the English factory in Japan, 1615-1622, with correspondence, (New York: 1964)
68 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) seen steam boat realized the importance of industrialization to match itself with foreign power. The spur in thinking rapidly changed Japan into modern industrial nation in the late 19th century. Indians under the British colonial rule saw Japan as a role model for development. Many Indian eminent scholars visited Japan during this period to study the transformation in the society. Then, Japan military victory over Russia, thrilled Indian freedom struggle movement in the Sub-continent. In many ways, historical and cultural events influenced each other principles and ideas in different ways. But, in political terms the relationship failed to gain momentum because of Japan policy in Cold War is largely governed by two factors, the legacies of the Second World War and the compulsion of the Cold War.4 During World War II, Japanese Imperial Army’s aggression over East Asia and Southeast Asian strained Japanese image abroad. As the result, Japan’s Post-World War external policies are largely governed to make over Japan’s image in Asia. Interestingly, India did not claim war reparations from Japan. At the same time, Indian Justice Radha Bindo Pal’s dissentient judgment in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East caught Japanese attention on Judge Pal and on India. In 1952, Japan regained sovereignty and India signed peace treaty with Japan in the same year. Before the bilateral relationship reaches its potential, Cold War politics strained the relationship. Japan skeptical about India’s non-alignment policy limits Tokyo ties with New Delhi to trade and development assistance. The relationships seemingly become active only after the end of Cold War. The importances of non-military threats and issues like terrorism, piracy, proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) have assumed new importance.5 The change in the security environment in the post-cold war and the emergence of non-traditional security threat subsequently changed the dynamics of security relations between the two nations. India-Japan has also realized the importance to rejuvenate the diplomatic ties to sustain peace and security of Asia. The bilateral relationship stagnated during Cold War assumed new position in the post-Cold War. As a maritime nation, two countries understood the importance of
4 K.V Kesavan, India and Japan Changing Dimension of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, ORF Occasional Paper#14 (New Delhi: 2010) 5 Ibid
69 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) security of Sea-lane have also shown great willingness to work hand-in-hand to combat non-traditional security threats to safeguard safety and security of maritime space.
Building Maritime Security Cooperation: Glimpse on Joint Statements Any study on India-Japan maritime security cooperation could thus be incomplete without analyzing the Joint Statements. The Joint Statements, the visit of high dignitaries from both the sides signifies the importance of the bilateral relationship in the new millennium. Therefore, the study made an attempt to explain in detail about the various Joint Statements issued between 1999-2009, to understand the nature of bilateral relationship and the importance of maritime security cooperation. Prime Minister Mori landmark visit to India in August 2000, signifies both Japan and India resolve to take their bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level. During the discussion Prime Minister Mori and Indian counter part Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed to establish the “Global Partnership in the 21st century.”6 Prime Minister Mori visit to India reflects a major strategic change in Japanese regional diplomacy. Nevertheless, Mori was the first Prime Minister from Japan to institutionalize high level dialogue, comprehensive security dialogue, cooperation in anti-piracy operation and security dialogue between Japan and India. During this period, Indian Defence minister travelled to Japan and hold discussion on exchange of ship visit and bilateral security dialogue with Foreign Minister Yohei Kono and Japanese Defence Agency Director General, T. Kawara.7 By July, both Japan and India started first session on Comprehensive Security Dialogue and military-to-military talk to discuss ways and means to further enhance bilateral defence cooperation. As the bilateral relation compounds into new form, Japan government on 26 October 2001 announces to discontinue the measure on India, which the Japanese government had taken in response to the nuclear tests conducted by Indian in
6 C. Raja Mohan, India, Japan unveil new global partnership, The Hindu, 24 August 2000, http://www.hindu.com/2000/08/24/stories/01240001.htm 7 Minister of External Affair India, Annual Report 2000-2001.
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May 1998.8 Followed by Yoshiro Mori former prime minister three day visit to India as a special envoy of Japanese premier Junichiro Koizumi to discuss about “Japan-India global partnership” and regional issues like Afghanistan, terrorism, which helped to uplift bilateral relationship, strained by 1998 pokharan nuclear test. Commenting on the new development in the bilateral relationship, Japanese ambassador to India Hiroshi Hirabayashi says the "discontinuation of economic measures by the government of Japan will pave the way for resumption of loan and grant assistance to new projects in India, thereby propelling India-Japan relations into a new phase of friendship and cooperation." 9 The mutual understanding finally led two head of the state to sign the historical accord called Japan-India Joint Declaration.
Japan-India Joint Declaration-2001 On December 2001, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid visit to Japan. This was the first visit since Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit in 1992. The visiting Indian Prime Minister and Japanese counter part Junichiro Koizumi agreed to strengthen the Global Partnership for the 21st Century based on “strategic convergence and economic complementaries.” After discussion on wide range of bilateral and regional issue a substantive Japan-India Joint declaration was issued on 10 December 2001. This was for the first time both Japan and India have set forth for active bilateral security cooperation for:
“Comprehensive Security Dialogue covering the entire range of issues of mutual concern including disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as Military-to-Military consultations, and also confirmed that the two sides would hold a dialogue on counter-terrorism in the framework of the Japan-India Comprehensive Security Dialogue.”10
8 See, Japan-India Joint Declaration, MOFA, December 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/joint0112.html 9 Former Japanese Premier Mori Visit to India, The Times of India, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2001-10-26/india/27218291_1_india-and-japan-indi a-japan-relations-japanese-leader. 10 See, “Joint Statement on Japan-India Joint Declaration,” MOFA.
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As Japan increasingly worried about the regional and global issue the joint statement will enhance moderate cooperation in security field to combat non-traditional security threats in Indian Ocean. More interestingly, the issue of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is classified under the global challenges not under bilateral relation was a great relief for India, which remain source of contention in bilateral talk. Japan positive gesture towards the bilateral relationship is well received in Indian strategic circle. At the same time, Japan acknowledges rescue of hijacked Alondra rainbow in 1999 by Indian Navy-Coast Guard. In overall, the joint statement made, both the countries to realize strategic importance for getting together to contribute to regional and global security. Prime Minister Mori’s visit in 2000 and reciprocal visit made by Indian counterpart in 2001 to Tokyo paved a new way ahead in establishing strong bilateral defence mechanism, which led Koizumi to visit India in 2005 to widen the cooperation in maritime field.
Towards India-Japan Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of India-Japan Global Partnership-2005. Both the nations continued their effort to concertise the India-Japan Global partnership in the 21st century. Defence authorities take this opportunity to broaden and deepen the security cooperation. As a significant step forward, Cabinet Minister and Director General of Defence Agency of Japan Mr. Shigeru Ishiba visited India in 2003 on an invitation from Indian Defence Ministry to discuss nuclear nexus between Pakistan and North Korea. Japanese Ambassador Mr. Yasukuni Enoki describe this is an “indicator of the growing strategic importance of India in Japan’s eyes.”11 On the other hand, nuclear remains the flashpoint in the bilateral relationship. On the sideline of Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) in China, on foreign ministerial meeting Japan Ministry of Foreign Affair Kawaguchi Yoriko insisted that India should sign and ratify CTBT and NPT.12 While, India maintained its commitment to self moratorium on
11 Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Yasukuni Enoki’s Message (2004-2007), http://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/About_Us/Ambassador_Message_Enoki.html 12 Satu P. Limaye, India-East Asia Relations: 2004: A Year of Living Actively,
72 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) no-further nuclear test and determined to maintain strict control over export of nuclear and missile technology. In the meantime, Japan foreign office issuing statements asking India to refrain from testing ballistic missile, catered negative feeling in rapidly advancing strategic relationship between two nations.13 Despite, Japan lifting of economic sanction on India after demonstration of its nuclear capability in 1998, Japan fundamental stand on India’s nuclear and missile development remain unchanged. However, Japan is cautious in not allowing nuclear issue to overshadow ongoing bilateral cooperation with India. Particularly, Japanese ambassador to India Mr. Yasukuni Enoki in various media interaction and public speech, he emphasized:
“Japan will position India as a major power in Asian and international society and that Japan has strong desire to strengthen its global partnership with India which is essential for stability, prosperity and peace of the world. This is the number one message our foreign minister delivered to the Indian side (2004). We have no doubt that India is also seeing Japan in the same paradigm.”14
India has also understood Japanese sentiment towards nuclear issue, seeks common ground in establishing meaningful bilateral strategic relationship. As piracy and armed robbery started to hurt Japanese SLOC’s in Southeast Asian water, India stepped up its cooperation in maritime field. An Indian delegation headed by Deputy Director General Prabhakaran Paleri of Coast Guard attend meeting of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia in 2003. In the same year, an Indian Coast Guard
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0404qindia_eastasia.pdf 13 See, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on a Missile Launch Test by India, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/index.html 14 Subhash Kapil, Japan-India Strategic Dialogue Requires More Political Synergy, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1264.html
73 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) vessel visited Japan to take part in fourth India-Japan Coast Guard exercise, to mark the event Director General of Coast Guard and Vice Admiral Suresh Mehta visited Japan to witness the exercise.15 As becoming Chief of Naval Staff in 2006, Admiral Suresh Mehta supervised many joint Coast Guard exercise and played key role in institutionalizing bilateral maritime cooperation with Japan. Nevertheless, Indian Coast Guard Director General Prabhakaran Paleri equally played important role in structuring Japan-India maritime cooperation, even after his retirement from Indian Coast guard Mr. P. Paleri through his writing, he continued his effort to strengthen bilateral cooperation in maritime field and he was a visiting fellow to Tokyo based Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) a reputed maritime think-thank in Japan. In ministerial level, on sideline of ASEAN+3 in Vientiane on November 27 2004, Japan Foreign Minister and Indian External Affair meet and discussed wide range of issue covering economic relation, United Nation reform, environmental issue, maritime security and disarmament and non-proliferation issue.16 Once again, Japan insisted India to sign NPT, India clarified that it had no intention of signing the NPT. Ahead of Prime Minister meeting, the Foreign Minister talk remains crucial to refine the context of the bilateral relation. On 29th November, Prime Minister Koizumi met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and discussed the course of bilateral relation, including various regional and global issues. In that meeting Prime Minister Koizumi appreciates, Indian Prime Minister’s Vision on “arc of advantage,” across which there would be large-scale movement of people, capital, ideas, and creativity.17 The idea of “Arc of Advantage” is well received by the Japanese. In fact, speaking ahead of official visit to India, Prime Minister Koizumi said “Japan and India are sharing strategic interests in realizing what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls an “arc of prosperity” in Asia as well as in dealing with such international issues as terrorism, the environment, energy and U.N. reform,"18
15 India’s Minister of External Affair Annual Report 2003-2004. 16 Japan-India Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Summary), MOFA, 27 November 2004, http://www.mofa.go.jp/%5Cregion/asia-paci/india/meet0411-2.html 17 PM’s Address at Third India-ASEAN Business Summit, 19 October 2004, http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=30. 18 Japan, India share strategic agenda, claims Koizumi, Japan Times, 30 April 2005,
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The shared vision carried by the two Prime Ministers helped to realize the full potential of their global partnership for peace and prosperity. The highlight of the talk was indubitably to reinforce the Japan-India Global Partnership, which was agreed between former prime mister Mori and Vajpayee in 2000. Further, to enhance the partnership in bilateral, regional and global level. Two Prime Ministers issued Joint statement and an “Eight-fold Initiative,” which comprised measure for cooperation in eight key areas of interaction:19 1) enhanced dialogue and exchange 2) comprehensive economic engagement 3) enhanced security dialogue and cooperation 4) science and technology initiative 5) cultural and academic initiatives and strengthening of people-to-people contacts 6) Cooperation in ushering a new Asian era. 7) Cooperation in U.N and other international organization. 8) Responding to International Challenges.
Many of the issues incorporated in the “Eight-fold Imitative” were already mentioned in the 2001- Joint Declaration. However, this was the first time, cooperation in maritime field between two countries received acknowledgement from highest level. The two leaders recognized the importance of safety and security of international maritime traffic, directed:
“both countries to work together on a sustained basis, including the annual Japan Coast Guard-Indian Coast Guard talks, joint exercises against piracy as well as cooperation through means of information sharing and technical assistance. The Japan Coast Guard and the Indian Coast Guard will commence efforts to establish a framework of effective cooperation. The two leaders, in view http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20050430a2.html. 19 See, “Joint Statement on Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership,” MOFA.
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of the importance of maritime security, also instructed the Maritime Self Defence Force of Japan and the Indian Navy to enhance their cooperation, including through exchange of views, friendship visits and other similar activities.”20
From this Joint statement, both the countries ensured that the exchanges and dialogue in the security and defence field will further help to cement cooperation in maritime field. Most importantly, holding annual Prime Minister level meeting and launch of high level strategic dialogue between National Security Advisor and Advisor to Japanese Prime Minister reflects the need for long term political, economic and strategic interests. The Joint Statement further reflects, the “urgency” from both the sides to expand the level of cooperation to catch the missed opportunities. Analysts view the “political synergy of Indo-Japanese cooperation is essential not just to further bilateral relations, but for the greater cause of a more secure Asia-Pacific region.” 21 The threat perception of two countries regarding to piracy and maritime terrorism are identical. The crucial choke points such as Hormuz Straits, Gulf of Aden and Straits of Malacca would be equally a concern to both India and Japan. Moreover, Japan’s strategic opening with India will withhold its political grip over Indian Ocean and South Asia, which Japan tried to achieve through ODA and financial assistance for decades. Further, the transformational visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan in December 2006 has led the relation to ink Strategic Partnership.
Global and Strategic Partnership-2006 As the two countries, inching towards signing a “Global and Strategic partnership, the maritime security attained significant attention in India-Japan relation. Both sides have acquired a new dynamism and momentum, especially
20 See, “Joint Statement on Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership,” MOFA. 21 Arpita Mathur, Koizumi’s visit to India: Forgotten Friendship to Achieve Partnership, IDSA Commentary, 2 July 2005, http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/Koizumi%E2%80%99sVisittoIndia%20_ArpitaMat hur_020605
76 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) since the landmark visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to India in 2005. Defence Minister Pranab Mukerjee on an official visit to Tokyo in May 2006, met his counterpart Mr. Fukushiro Nukaga, Minister of State for Defence of Japan and Mr. Kazuo Kitagawa Minister of land, Infrastructure and Transport in two separate occasion to discuss the range of defence cooperation between two countries. During the talk, both sides reaffirmed the desire to enhance cooperation to tackle transnational organized crime at sea such as piracy, armed robbery, illegal arms and drug trafficking, illegal migration, cooperation in search and rescue operation, and protection of marine environment. The Coast Guard received highest priority, as two Coast Guards have conducted several rounds of Joint exercise both in Japan and India. During this period, heads of two Coast Guards signed Memorandum of Cooperation in maritime security and safety. The Joint statement signed during Indian Defence minister visit to Japan in May 2006 has put placed a structured framework for a dialogue and cooperation in the security field.22 Moreover, Prime Minister Visit to Tokyo in December 2006 heightened the bilateral relationship into new height. Particularly, after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed his keen interest in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's proposal to open a four-way strategic dialogue that involves Japan, India, Australia and the United States in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun ahead of his visit to Japan on 13th December.23 The spectacular speech in the Japanese diet on 14 December 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s reassuring words propelled bilateral relation into a new and dynamic phase:24
…common values and the enormous economic complementarities that exist between us to build a strong partnership of the highest mutual importance…Strong ties between India and Japan will be a major factor in building an open and inclusive Asia and in enhancing peace and stability in the Asian region and beyond.
22 Joint Statement, Visit of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Ministry of Defence to Japan, 25 May 2006, Embassy of India, Japan 23 Singh Keen on Strategic Talk, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 2, 2006. 24 PM’s address to Joint Session of the Diet, 14 December 2006, http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=23318
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…Like Japan, India sees nuclear power as a viable and clean energy source to meet its growing energy requirements. We seek Japan’s support in helping put in place innovative and forward-looking approaches of the international community to make this possible. I would like to affirm that India’s commitment to universal nuclear disarmament remains unshaken. - Speech of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Japanese Diet (Parliament)
Further, Indian Prime Minister elaborated on security issues and importance of “promoting defence cooperation, including for protection of sea-lanes to secure our trade and energy flow.” After, India and the US agreed upon civil nuclear cooperation in 2005. Focus of Indo-Japan debate gradually shifted to civil nuclear cooperation. But, Japan realized the need of nuclear energy to India, agreed to discuss civil nuclear cooperation and also supported India’s stand globally. Even in the Joint Statement called as “Strategic and Global Partnership” Japan agreed to “discuss the international civil nuclear cooperation framework with respect to India.” At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister told journalist that “India should respond to the concerns of the international community and workout appropriate safeguard with the IAEA.” Indian Prime Minister responded positively, that “There is adequate appreciation of the fact that India needs nuclear power for its energy security and I am convinced that when the time comes, Japan will be on our side.”25 Tokyo flipping stands on nuclear issue is understandable, because Japan is the first nation to suffer the brunt of nuclear weapon. Gingerly, India moved nuclear issue with Japan not with urgent at the same it insisted Tokyo to take note of India’s growing energy demand. On the other hand, Japan-India endorsed “Strategic and Global partnership” making a new opening in Indo-Japan relationship.
25 PM: Japan will be on our side in NSG, The Times of India, 17 December 2007
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Source: The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe, greeting each other after signing an agreement on Indo-Japan Strategic partnership, in Tokyo on December 15, 2006, http://pib.nic.in/release/phsmall.asp?phid=11625
Especially, in defence and security aspects the joint statement imparted stronger political and strategic dimensions to bilateral relations. As the two sides agree to work closely: “to enhance cooperation in capacity building, technical assistance and information sharing between their respective agencies and undertake anti-piracy measures. They share the view that India and Japan must cooperate closely to ensure the safety and security of international maritime traffic that are vital for their economic well-being as well as that of the region.”26
As Japan-India relationship is growing stronger and deeper, at the same time Japan is undergoing constant change in defence policy. During this time, Prime Minister Shnizo Abe elevated the stature of the defence Agency to Ministry level. Unlike other Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe is vocal about amending the Article 9 of Japanese constitution. The qualitative shift in Japan’s defence policy is not directly related to its growing relationship with India. However, the beginning of
26 See, “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global partnership,” MOFA.
79 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) new innovation in Japanese defence establishment will subsequently expanded the scope of Self-Defence Force cooperation with India. As a strong advocator of defence and security matters, Prime Minister Abe view India is full of potential and key player in the indo-pacific region. On the other hand, India preoccupied with nuclear deal with the US, failed to reciprocate Japanese view on the strategic partnership. Naturally, India worried about its entry into Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and Japan attitude over nuclear cooperation with India, acted as a strong pressure on New Delhi to send special envoy to negotiate with Tokyo. Most importantly, India doesn’t want to continue the mistake of neglecting Japan in international agenda.27 Through the public speech made by Prime Minister’s Special envoy Shyam Saran and External Affair Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the Japan Institute of International Affair (JIIA) it is clear India made desperate attempt to get Tokyo’s support and forum nod for access to the resources and technology in this field.28 However, both the countries kept the nuclear issue not to overturn the strategic and global partnership.
Road Map for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global partnership-2007 Like his predecessor Koizumi, Prime Minister Abe who uphold assertive diplomacy and a greater role for Japan in global politics, sensed importance of India in regional politics. His visit to India in 2007, as part of a bilateral agreement to have high level annual summits was carefully watched by the observers for a major announcement on nuclear deal and quadrilateral strategic forum. As he did, by accompanying large contingent of ministers, 243 business representatives of top Japanese companies and 12 vice-chancellors from Japan universities for an active participation in bilateral relation. In diplomatic level, two sides continued the talk on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and to upgrade exchanges in security and defence field. While addressing
27 Following Nuclear Test in 1998, India sent special envoy to major western capitals, but failed to send one special envoy to Japan. Being a major donor and economic power house of Asia, Japan 28 Transcript of Address by Shri Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of the Prime Minister at the Japan Institute of International Affairs on 15 January 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/feb07/transcript_saran_japan.pdf
80 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) joint session of Indian parliament titled “Confluence of the two seas” on August 22, 2007 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe got wide appreciation from the Indian parliamentarian. In that speech, Prime Minister Shnizo Abe made three crucial remarks pinpointing the state of the bilateral cooperation:29 “rediscovered India as a partner that shares the same values and interests and also as a friend that will work alongside us to enrich the seas of freedom and prosperity, which will be open and transparent to all.” “this "broader Asia" will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia.” “India and Japan have vital interests in the security of sea lanes. From now on let us together bear this weighty responsibility that has been entrusted to us, by joining forces with like-minded countries.” -Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Speech at Indian Parliament
From his speech in Indian parliament, it is clear The Prime Minister of Japan optimistic about the future of the bilateral relation and favors stronger and deeper strategic ties with India. Mr. Abe interest in creating working relation between India, the US and Australia, which is also called as quadrilateral forum received great attention. Finally, Mr. Abe’s mentioned about sharing responsibility on the security related issue, especially on maritime domain reflects Japan willingness to accept crucial role in Asian security. Over the last few years, Japan-India relationship broadened and deepened enough to call it as a strategic and global partnership. To upgrade the present level of cooperation, the two Prime Ministers issued Joint statement for “New Dimensions to the strategic and global partnership between India and Japan.” In which, the detailed working plan has been announced to sustain the strategic cooperation in long term. Importantly:
29 “Confluence of Two Seas,” Speech by Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, MOFA, 22 August 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html
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“The two leaders reorganized common interests in such fields as maintaining the safety and security of sea lanes in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, and fighting against transnational crimes, terrorism, piracy and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”30
The cooperation in security field gained significance space in the Joint Statement. Further, two prime ministers assured to deepen strategic level dialogue at various levels, including strengthening defence exchange and cooperation between the Coast Guards. On ground, for the first time Indian navy, JMSDF and US navy conducted their first multilateral exercise called TRILATEX-07 in Pacific.31 Followed by, JMSDF participated along with Australia, Singapore Navies in Malabar-07 exercises in Bay of Bengal. The participation of JMSDF vessels first time in the exercise along with Australian and Singapore navies in Indian Ocean was widely seen as a result of series of discussion and talk between armed force of Japan and India. The Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ambitious Quadrilateral Forum failed to gain momentum after Australia backed-off from the idea. Moreover, the resignation of Shinzo Abe from Prime Minister and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) winning upper house election had put a pull stop to the idea of Quadrilateral forum. The newly elected law maker Yasuo Fukuda is largely seen with a dovish personality and soft handler of diplomatic issues. Unlike his predecessor Koizumi and Abe, Fukuda is not conservative on foreign policy; since he stayed in office for short period it is tough to determine his view on Japan interest with India. However, both Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his Indian counterpart never miss the opportunity to meet and discuss bilateral issue on the sidelines of the East Asian Summit in Singapore. In 2008, former foreign minister Taro Aso basically belongs to
30 See, “Joint Statement on Road Map for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global partnership,” MOFA. 31 TRILATEX-07 concludes, Frontier India, 17 April 2007, http://frontierindia.net/trilatex-07-concludes
82 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) conservative stand on foreign policy and known for his tough stand against North Korea took over as the Prime Minister of Japan. Aftermath of 2008 Mumbai attack, in a public speech Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso stated "This kind of terrorism is unforgivable, extremely despicable and vicious. I feel strong resentment and deeply condemn it. Japan is with the Indian people who are fighting against terrorism and we will cooperate with the Indian government."32 The statement from highest position of the government was seen as a major move forward in building strong bilateral cooperation with India. Though Japan, always stated that the issue of Kashmir should be resolved within the ambit of the Shimla Agreement. In several occasions in the past, Japan official stand on Kashmir remain dubious. During Obuchi Keizo as a Foreign Minister he advocated an international conference for finding solution to Kashmir issue.33 Japan keenness to play a lead role in resolving the Kashmir issue displeased India diplomatic circle. Even during 1998, Kargil War, Japan government took very lenient stance; Japanese news paper Yomiuri Shimbun reported that “It is only natural for Indians to enjoy their "victory" this time. But resentment of the Indian military runs deep among local residents. In addition, the operation did not bring a fundamental solution to the Kashmir problem."34 Japan neutral lines for demanding “peaceful settlement” and fail to condemn Pakistan for starting the fight seriously irked India. Finally, Indian diplomat concluded that Japan have no independent opinion on the issue rather it take the cue from the US. The miss-communication and lack of understanding led to soreness in relationship temporarily, but it was gradually rectified by the visit of Prime Minister Mori in 2000. In 2008, Taro Aso built consciousness within his government to build its relationship with India.
32Mumbai attacks: Reaction from International leaders to terrorism, The Telegraph, 27 November 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/3529971/Mumbai-attacks-Reaction-fro m-international-leaders-to-terrorism-Bombay-India.html 33 Takako Hirose, Japan’s Role in South Asia in the Post-Cold War Period, (eds) K.V Kesavan and Lalima Varma, Japan-South Asia: Security and Economic Perspectives, (New Delhi:2000) 34 India after Kargil: Diplomacy and Politics, Implications and Trends, India Focus, August 1999, Vol4, No3.
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Advancement of Strategic and Global Partnership-2008 Japan-India relationship sailed peacefully and achieved another milestone in 2008 by signing a joint statement on the advancement of strategic and global partnership between the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on his second bilateral visit to Japan in less than two years signifies the great importance that India attaches to its relationship with Japan. Following the pursuit of Global and Strategic Partnership two sides agreed upon to beef up the cooperation and to device action plan during the annual summits. In a major breakthrough, two Prime Ministers issued “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India.” Affirming, their commitment to cooperate in following field:35
1. Information exchange and policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia Pacific region and on long-term strategic and global issues. 2. Bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia, in particular the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ReCAAP processes. 3. Defence dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the Joint Statement signed in May 2006 between the two Defence Ministries. 4. Cooperation between Coast Guards 5. Safety of transport 6. Fight against terrorism and transnational crimes 7. Sharing of experiences in peacekeeping and peacebuilding 8. Disaster management 9. Disarmament and non-proliferation
The Joint Declaration also devised a planned mechanism to achieve the global and strategic partnership which was agreed by both the side in 2006. The consultation on the defence and security matters was designed in two way process, 1) cooperation in foreign office level and 2) cooperation between two armed forces. In foreign office level, a) two sides agreed to conduct strategic dialogue at Foreign
35 See, “Joint Statement on Joint Declaration on Security cooperation between India and Japan,” MOFA.
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Minister-level, b) Meeting between the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affair of Japan and the Foreign Secretary of India, c) Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-proliferation at Director General/ Joint Secretary Level, d) Track 1.5 strategic dialogue. Consultation are agreed to concretize the above mention cooperation between the two countries. Similarly, the cooperation in defence forces includes, a) meeting between defence ministers, b) Meetings between the Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan and the Defence Secretary of India including Defence Policy Dialogue, c) Military-to-Military Talks at Director General/Joint Secretary level, d) Exchange of service chiefs, e) Navy-to-Navy Staff Talks, f) Service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises. The nine elements listed in cooperation field are already agreed upon by two sides during defence ministers meeting in 2006. In fact, all these nine elements in security cooperation were in operation since 2006. The devised mechanism for cooperation, Japan-India has started consultation on major field even before the 2008-Joint Declaration. However, the Joint Declaration is symbolically important to prove two countries stake in regional and global issues. By reaffirming 2006 Joint Statement, two Prime Ministers have also proved to global strategic community that Japan-India is actively collaborating in defence and security field. Meantime, the piracy and hijacking of the ships in Gulf of Aden by Somalia pirates gradually engulfed the maritime discussion. In October 2008, the United Nation Security Council passed resolution 1838 calling on nation to employ military force to repress the act of piracy.36 Indian government approved navy’s proposal to send warships to east African coast to protect Indian merchant ship.37 Japan a largest user of Hormuz straits and Gulf of Aden stumbled by the piracy activity in the west of Indian Ocean. The revolutionary change in domestic politics, the defeat of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August 2009 election and rise of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) into power for the first time in the fifty years raised serious question about the security issues and bilateral diplomatic relationship with India.
36 UN Security Council backs force against pirates, Maritime Journal, 9 October 2008, http://www.maritimejournal.com/news101/un_security_council_backs_force_against_pirates 37 India Rushes warship to the Gulf of Aden, The Economic Times, 18 October 2008, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-10-18/news/28381516_1_warship-aden-stea lth-frigate
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New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership-2009 New administration under Yukio Hatoyama leadership is equally interested in expanding bilateral defence and security talk with India. The new governing party DPJ placed equal importance in the bilateral relationship with India as LDP did. The high-level visit and talk between foreign and defence minister is actively pursued under the Hatoyama leadership. In April 2009, Four Indian naval warships visited Japan for a bilateral and trilateral Malabar exercise with Japan and the US. JMSDF participation in the series of Malabar exercise emphasis growing need of cooperation among regional navies. Besides to that, Indian Defence Minister visited Japan in November 2009 to meet his counterpart Mr. Toshimi Kitazawa to discuss on defence exchanges and cooperation between Japan and India and on the regional and international security situation played an important role in devising the action plan for the defence cooperation and exchange.38 The bilateral minister level discussion help to conclude possible cooperation between two armed force’s, which was signed during Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to India in December 2009. On his maiden visit to India, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Indian counterpart Mr. Manmohan Singh signed two Joint Statements. Firstly, “Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India.” The action plan indicates:
Annual Subcabinet / Senior Officials 2+2 dialogue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense of Japan / Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defense of India） Annual bilateral naval exercises, alternately off India and Japan, to enhance cooperation and core ability for maritime operation and disaster relief Multilateral Naval Exercises, when possible Passing Exercise (PASSEX) during ship visits
38 See, Joint Press Statement, http://www.embassyofindiajapan.org/new/documents/bilateral/8-J%20P%20Statement%20on %202009.pdf
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Participation as observers in major army and air force exercise
After the US and Australia, Japan agreed to expand the strategic dialogue to 2+2 consultation at senior officer level with India. This was the first time, India will engage in such a high level “2+2 dialogue” with Japan. Further, the positive change in maritime cooperation will allow the two countries naval force to participate in multilateral and bilateral naval exercise. The PASSEX will further enhance the scope of cooperation and communication maritime security operation or humanitarian relief. Secondly, “New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership” Joint Statement reiterated the importance of annual summit and expressed satisfactory for deepening:39 Annual strategic dialogue between foreign ministers, To hold annual defence ministerial meeting. Framework at the Subcabinet / Senior Official - level 2 plus 2 dialogue. Japan enthusiastic about expanding relationship with India was clearly visible during Hatoyama visit to India. In the past ten years (1999-2009), Japan-India bilateral relationship was undergone notable changes. Especially, after India’s nuclear test, followed by Kargil war temporarily put South Asian in nuclear flashpoint. However, India effort to delink the Kargil issue with the nuclear war elevated New Delhi position to responsible player in Asia-pacific region. Moreover, India’s growing economic clout and need for nuclear weapon to protect itself from Chinese and Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail convinced international community to accept India’s sentiment over the issue. Nevertheless, India is not accepted as a “Nuclear Weapon State” formally; but India attained international attention in gaining reputed nation with growing GDP. After economic liberalization in 1990’s, India adopted “Look East Policy” to progress in economic field. In the meantime, Japan politico-economic and security policy shifting from Cold War setup exactly matches the trajectory path of India’s vision of Asia. The Prime Minister Mori realized the growing convergence in the field of economics, politics, security, energy and nuclear disarmament field urged
39 See, “Joint Statement New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership,” MOFA
87 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) him to travel to India in 2000 to sign a historical Joint Statement, which remains a root for Japan-India to achieve the high standard in the bilateral relationship.
Joint Statement: Outcome Japan-India relationship is relatively new in political and security arena. Therefore, to build consciousness and trust in both sides, Prime Ministers lead the initiative to issue Joint Statement to find possible area of cooperation and to enhance communication from both sides to avoid distrust in the growing bilateral relationship. In the Joint Statement, defence and security aspects received much larger space from the beginning making it as core pillar of the bilateral relation. Meanwhile, Japan sensitivity towards piracy and maritime security threats in Indo-pacific region grabbed India’s attention to the issue. India already making strong initiative in maritime domain realized the need for cooperation with Japan in the area of maritime security to form a combined effort to fight non-traditional security threats in the Indian Ocean. Three underlining points from the Joint Statement: 1) Both countries shares mutual understanding on the regional and global issues. 2) The security of Sea-lane in Indian Ocean is inexorably links with national security of two nations. 3) Maritime Security Cooperation plays pivotal role in bilateral relationship. Among the armed forces, the naval forces have lots in common to cooperate in dealing with non-traditional security threats. Apart from defence and security aspects, Japan-India relationship in economic, politics and diplomacy gained significant attention during this period. After Prime Minister Mori visit to India in 2000, Japan-India relationship has undergone significant qualitative changes. By 2009, Japan ranked sixth largest in cumulative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow into India. During this period, Japanese companies have made huge investments worth of US $ 2, 530 billion into Indian market.40 The list of Japanese company operating in India
40 Ministry of External Affair India, Annual Report 2009-2010
88 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) also increased from 300 in 2005 to 627 companies in 2009.41 Moreover, India has become largest recipient of Japanese ODA since 2004 drawing huge sum of money to build countries infrastructure. During Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visit in 2007, two countries set trade target of US $ 20 billion by 2010. Due to surge in the global economy two countries reached US $ 17.7 billion mark falling short of actually set target in 2011. 42 The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) which came into force in August 2011 is expected to boost two side trades. Between, 1999-2009 bilateral trade increased significantly, FDI flow from Japan has shown upward trend, India topped ODA and other economic assistance from Japan and finalization of CEPA will bring abundance opportunity in economic and trade field. In diplomacy, leaders visiting each other countries have become regular practice since 2005. In fact, both countries religiously following the rule to have annual India-Japan summit to discuss the bilateral and global issue to coordinate and formulate the policy. Under the aegis of Prime Ministers, two countries foreign, defence and economic ministers have conducted several bilateral discussions on their respective field to deepen the cooperation. The annual summit continued in the consecutive years, with broader vision for “Japan-India Strategic and Global partnership in the next decade-2010” and “Vision for the Enhancement of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership upon entering the year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations-2011.”
Detail VIP Visit between India and Japan Years India to Japan Japan to India Total 1990-1999 14 13 27 2000-2004 11 12 23 2005-2009 30 31 61 Source: MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/index.html The quantum jump in the VIP visits to two countries during (1999-2009) is a valid evidence to prove the intensity of discussion and willingness to find a way
41 Ibid 42 Ministry of External Affair India, Annual Report 2010-2011
89 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) forward to achieve peace and stability in Asia. The signing of CEPA and Civil Nuclear Cooperation deal finally brings to the conclusion. Japan-India relation has gone further to resolve the bilateral and global issue amicably with giving positive node on the relationship status. In the line of discussion on maritime cooperation, it is crucially important to analysis the cooperation between two maritime agencies.
Cooperation between Navies and Coast Guard As Japan and India relation new to defence and security, the cooperation between two countries armed forces was negligible during Cold War. During 1990’s, there was no big development in defence and security relationship between two countries, except navy’s goodwill visits to both countries ports. However, Indian navy as part of “Look East Policy” conducting Joint naval exercise with the US (Malabar) since 1992 and with Singapore (SIMBEX) since 1993 to establish defence cooperation with Asia-pacific countries. In that way, Indian navy created an opportunity to call upon Japanese port in 1995 on a good will mission. In the following year, JMSDF training ship visited Mumbai on its tour to Indian Ocean Region. However, two sides refrained from taking any initiative to discuss defence and security matters. In the all time low relationship, interestingly India Chief of Naval Staff, Mr Vishnu Bagwat visit to Japan in 1997 came in surprise to strategic experts and raised several question about the possible defence cooperation between two countries. The doubt was clarified, by visiting Japan’s Vice Minister for Defence Kastuhito Asano who agreed to conduct bilateral defence consultation on issue related to Asia and maritime security. This was the first time, high ranking parliamentarian from Japan’s Defence Agency visited India to discuss about the security consultation, generated sense of confidence in pursuing the bilateral relationship further. Followed by, another high ranking officer from Japan’s defence agency visited India to start the Secretary-level talk. The talk in civilian level slowly graduated to defence personnel level, when Admiral Yasumasa Yamamoto Chief of Maritime Staff of the JMSDF visited New Delhi from 4-8 February 1998, was the first visit by JMSDF Chief of Maritime Staff to India. On his maiden visit to India, Admiral Yamamoto held discussion
90 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) with Indian counter part Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat about strategic and security issues. In the high profile talk, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat suggested exchange of officers; Admiral Yamamoto readily agreed to offer a seat for an Indian officer in the Japan’s National Institute of Defence Studies (NIDS).43 Already, JSDF officers have provision to undergo training in India’s Defence Service Staff College. The agreement will allow Indian officer to visit Japan and interact deeply with defence personnel’s in Japan. Further, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat proposed “Joint Rescue Mission” for a disaster relief operation and emphasized on bilateral cooperation between two sides. When the relationship was in the nascent stage three incidents positively affected cooperation between two sides naval forces: 1) 1998 Nuclear Test conducted by India 2) Hijack of Japanese owned Alondra Rainbow incident. 3) September 11 attack on the US Due to nuclear weapon test in 1998, countries like UK, USA and Australia had imposed ban on exchange training with Indian Navy.44 However, Japan didn’t impose such ban rather Indian navy officer have been deputed to Japan during this period. Despite, Japanese government imposed strong economic measure on India. This positive response from Japanese side facilitates to deepen the trust level in the bilateral relationship.
Arrested Pirates of M.V Alondra Rainbow
Source: Indian Coast Guard
43 Bidya Bikash Basu, “Indo-Japan Naval Cooperation,” Strategic Analysis, May 1998, pp.321-323. 44 Ministry of Defence India, Annual Report 1999-2000
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In another incident, the rescue of hijacked M.V Alondra rainbow by the Indian Coast Guard and Navy in November 1999 received great appreciation from Japan.45 While Japan severely battling piracy off Malacca straits, the successful capture of pirates by Indian maritime force become sensational news in Japan. Realizing the importance of information sharing and anti-piracy operation skills to battle piracy and armed robbery, starting from 2000 Japanese Coast Guard commenced annual maritime exercise with Indian Coast Guard. Besides, Al Qaeda attack on the US on 11th September 2001 shattered global security environment. Japan under Koizumi administration immediately enacted anti-terrorism special measure law and other law to amend the self-defence Force law. In November, JMSDF warship dispatched to Indian Ocean for information gathering. By December 2001, three months after September 11 attack, JMSDF replenishment ships commenced refueling operation in the Indian Ocean. Since 2001, JMSDF vessels were present in Indian Ocean in a mission to support the US initiative “war on terror” campaigner. Therefore, these three crucial incidents helped two sides to understand the regional and global issue. Moreover, Indian Coast Guard holds great reasonability in Indian Ocean. The Search and Rescue mission of Indian Coast Guard covers almost entire major sea-routes in the Indian Ocean. Every year thousands of Japanese owned/controlled merchant vessels/tankers have to pass through India Ocean to reach Japan. Realizing the sense of responsibility the Indian Coast Guard hold, Japan Coast Guard realized the opportunity to strengthen its cooperation with Indian counterpart to enhance its capability and to assure the safety of Japanese ship to reach home safely. Since 2000, Japanese Coast Guard under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism held regular bilateral maritime exercise with Indian Coast guard.
45 See, Capture of Pirates Ship MV Alondra Rainbow in a Joint Operation by the Coast Guard and Navy, http://indiancoastguard.nic.in/indiancoastguard/sar/Rainbow.html
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Source: Indian Coast Guard
As series of consultation continuing on Ministerial level between two sides, a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) was signed on 24 November 2006 by DGICG and Commandant of JCG for “the establishment of collaborative relationship to combat crime at sea and develop regional cooperation between Indian Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard.” The MoC envisage strong cooperation in following field46: 1) Sharing information on preventing and responding to acts of crime at sea such as piracy, armed robbery, maritime violence and crimes, acts against maritime security, drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal migration at sea and protection of marine environment. 2) Carrying out search and rescue operation at sea. 3) Exchange of information and facilitation of technical assistance on combating marine pollution. 4) Exchange of technical assistance, wherever feasible, for taking preventive and protective measure for addressing natural disaster like tsunamis and super cyclones.
46 See, Indo-Japan Coast Guard Combine Exercise “SAHYOG-KAIJIN 2006”, 21-26 November 2006, Indian Coast Guard.
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Moreover, heads of two Coast Guards regularly met and exchange notes on the sideline of Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agency Meeting (HACGAM). The process of cooperation between Coast Guard agencies was initiated by Japan consequent the capture of the pirated vessels M.V Alondra Rainbow by the Indian navy and Coast Guard in 1999.47 The first meeting of HACGAM held at Tokyo in 2004, since then every year heads of Asian Coast Guard meets regularly to discuss range of maritime security issues. Japan serious about combating piracy and armed robbery in Asian water proposed to establish inter-government working group, which later on developed into a Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). The agreement is aimed at to promote regional cooperation, information sharing, Capacity building, and cooperation for mutual legal Assistance and extradition of the offender among the members state to suppress piracy and armed robbery in Asian water. Based on the agreement, an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) was established in Singapore, which will act as contact centre. India become the tenth country to ratify the agreement and designates Indian Coast Guard as a focal point for ReCAAP in India. This further broadens Indo-Japan maritime cooperation in international forum. In 2012, 11th bilateral high-level meeting between Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard and Director General of the Indian Coast Guard held at New Delhi, followed by JCG-ICG participated in combined exercise off the Chennai coast. The High-Level Meeting agreed on the following points:48 1) Each agency should conduct adequate patrol in water off its own coast in order to prevent Piracy and ensure safety of navigation to the extent possible. 2) Each agency should inform its point of contact of each agency to each other in order to receive/handle distress alert from the other agency’s related ship attacked by pirates or in case of other emergency that navigates around off its own coast, and conduct necessary rescue operation for the above mentioned ship to the extent possible, in case any assistance is required.
47 8th Head of Asian Coast Guard Agencies meeting scheduled to be held in New Delhi, 19 July 2012, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=85413 48 The 11th Bilateral High-Level Meeting Between the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard and the Directed General of the Indian Coast Guard and the JCG-ICG Combined Exercise.
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3) Each party should share information and its expertise on anti-piracy and conduct combined exercise including radio communication exercise between its MRCCs (maritime rescue coordination centre) in order to enhance counter-piracy capability of both parties. The frequent visit of serving naval chief from both the sides, exchange of ships and maritime exercise in the past twelve years (2000-2012) entrusted great reasonability on both the sides to safeguarding the good order at sea. Navies from both sides have also shown great interest in the ongoing combined exercise between JCG-ICG. The strategic implication attached to naval drill or joint naval exercise had cautioned both side leaders to move cautiously on this issue. However, Navy of both sides has been conducting regular PASSEX (Passage Exercise) during the ships visit to each other ports.
JMSDF-Indian Navy Since 1957, JMSDF Overseas Training Cruise visits Indian Ocean and Indian port as part of regular training activity for junior officers who have graduated from the general officer candidate to course at the Maritime Officer Candidate School. But, the full-fledged navy-to-navy cooperation surfaced only after the visit of Prime Minister Mori in 2000. Then the exchange of defence ministers and visit of service chief in the following years gradually elevated Japan-India relationship into strategic levels. When we talk about strategic level, Navy-to-Navy cooperation plays a crucial role in determining the future course of the bilateral relationship. Both Japan and India are maritime country immensely depend upon overseas resources and trade for sustainable economics. In terms of security challenges, both countries national security is also closely netted with the maritime environment. Therefore, in the post-Cold War two countries arranged bilateral agreement to enhance regional and maritime security in the Indian Ocean. The Joint Statement on Defence and Security Cooperation-2006 and 2009 laid specific scope of cooperation between the two armed forces. To mark the new beginning in the bilateral defence and security cooperation, two countries navies first time participated in joint naval drill along with the US navy called as TRILATEX-07 in the Pacific Ocean off the Boso peninsula, central Japan in April
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2007.49 In the six-hour naval exercise, three navies performed basic drill of communicating among each other through radio transmission and flag signaling. This followed by Malabar series of exercise in Bay of Bengal on September 2007. Annually conducted bilateral Malabar exercise gained more strategic significance, when India invited Japan, Singapore and Australia navies to participate in the multilateral naval exercise.50 On Indian Navy request, JMSDF Destroyer JS Yuudachi (DD-103) and JS Oonami (DD-111) participated in the naval drill.
During Malabar-2007, JMSDF Destroyer JS Yuudachi (DD 103) leads the formation of ships in the Bay of Bengal
Source: wn.com
In the six-day exercise, more than 20,000 personnel, twenty eight warship and 150 aircraft were involved in the exercise.51 In an effort to increase interoperability among the participant, the five nations worked together to improve their anti-submarine warfare, anti-piracy, humanitarian and combat skills. Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana claimed, this was the first time Malabar-2007,
49Trilateral naval exercise in Pacific Ocean, The Hindu, 17 April 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/17/stories/2007041703491300.htm 50 Gurpeet S Khurana, Joint Naval Exercises: A Post-Malabar 2007 Appraisal for India, IPCS Issue Brief, September 2007 51 Kitty Hawk, Allies Complete Malabar Exercise, Department of Navy , United States of America, 9 October 2007, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=31737
96 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) has generated a lot of international interest.52 Considering the change in the venue from western sea board of Indian Ocean to Bay of Bengal close to international sea route and the idea to include Japan, Singapore and Australia into the Indo-US Malabar series raised serious question about the nature of the cooperation. Already, China registered strong protest against four nations (India, Japan, the US and Australia) exploratory talk on “quadrilateral Forum” on the sideline of the ARF Security policy meeting in May 2007. Despite Chinese apprehension over the multilateral naval exercise, India, Japan and the US navies continued their Malabar-2009 off the coast of Okinawa from April 26th to May 3rd close to Chinese water. During the exercise, three navy conducted series of drill related to anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, air defence, live fire gunnery training and Visit Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) technique. The Malabar-2009 is significant because it was second time JMSDF operating along with the US and India navy in the Pacific Ocean. In 2010, the tsunami, Earthquake and Fukushima crisis prevented Japan from taking part in the Malabar series of exercise. Since, Japan not yet recovered completely from the triple disaster in 2010, India-US bilateral Malabar Exercise continued without Japan in 2011. But, Malabar-2007 and 2009 envisages naval cooperation is not mere diplomatic venture or symbolic gesture for goodwill relationship. Rather, a good opportunity for India and Japan naval forces to derive tangible operational experience from such exercises. Meantime, Navy-to-Navy talk made significant progress in building a consensus for Joint Action Plan. In 2011, Indian Defence Minister A.K Antony and his Japan counterpart discussed about bilateral naval exercise apart from multilateral ones.53 As two sides agreed for bilateral naval exercise, in 2012 Japan-India conducted first naval exercise in pacific water. The first bilateral naval exercise named as “JIMEX-12,” four naval warships from Indian side and two JMSDF destroyer, one maritime patrol aircraft and a helicopter belong to JMSDF participated in the basic maneuvering exercise covering Humanitarian Aid & Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations and Visit,
52 Gurpeet S Khurana, Joint Naval Exercises: A Post-Malabar 2007 Appraisal for India, IPCS Issue Brief, September 2007 53Antony’s visit to give a push to defence ties, The Hindu, 31 October 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2583285.ece
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Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) drills, which form a part of Anti-Piracy operations.54 During the inauguration ceremony, Rear Admiral P Ajith Kumar said, this exercise is basically designed to increase interoperability between two navies in the sphere of maritime security and HA/DR operations. The first bilateral naval exercise coinciding with the celebration of Indo-Japan sixty years of diplomatic relationship mark a new beginning in the bilateral relationship. In the sixty-years of diplomatic relationship, both Japan and India had never come this much close in economic, political and security area. Particularly, during (1999-2009) Japan-India made tremendous progress in defence and security cooperation. Noted Japan Times columnist Brhama Chellney called “Asia's booming economies are bound by sea, and maritime democracies like Japan and India must work together to help build a stable, liberal, rules-based order in Asia.” 55 Japanese strategic experts have high regards for India, particularly Indian navy is seen by Japanese as a strong seagoing naval force in the region with decade of experience in operating aircraft career and fixed wing aircraft in Indian Ocean Region.56 Given Indian Navy geostrategic impetus in the Indian Ocean Region, JMSDF seeks to expand cooperation with Indian navy to perform a proactive role in maintaining good order at sea. Nevertheless, JMSDF one of the largest non-nuclear and most sophisticated navy in the world will certainly benefit Indian Navy. Therefore, the cooperation will mutually benefit two navies and also enhances the maritime security operational capability, whenever the necessary arise.
The US and China factor in Indo-Japan maritime cooperation The US and China factors plays a crucial role in shaping the bilateral interaction between India and Japan. Naturally, India, Japan and the US face no ideological, cultural, historical or territorial disputes; rather there is considerable opportunity for the three nations to work side-by-side on economics, energy,
54 First Bilateral Maritime Exercise between India and Japan “Jimex 12” to commence on 09 June 12, 8 June 2012, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=84780 55 Brhama Chellaney, Build Japan-India naval ties, The Japan Times, 28 December 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20111228bc.html 56 Opinion is based on the interview with eminent scholars, serving and retired JMSDF officials
98 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) foreign and security policy. Therefore, US act as a positive impact factor in Indo-Japan cooperation, while on the contrary China attributes negative role. Both, Japan and India have ideological, historical and territorial disputes with China. Attack on India and occupation of Indian Territory by Chinese PLA during 1962 war, illegally aiding Pakistan missile programme and China’s “String of Pearls” strategy to encircle India have casted negative shadow on Indo-Sino relationship. In terms of economic relationship Japan enjoys close relationship with China, but issues pertained to historical factors looming large as an obstacle in Japan-China relationship. In addition, dispute over Senkaku Island and issue of navigation in South China Sea seriously threatens Japanese sense of security in the region. China building strong naval force, views the emerging cooperation between India and Japan are part of the US strategy to counter Chine PLA-Navy expansion plan in Indian Ocean. Dr Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China project manager at the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists, talking about Indo-Japan Space prgramme he stated that "They (China) are more concerned about what this implies about US intentions rather than what it implies about the intentions of the Japanese or the Indians, particularly as it concerns space."57 But, this argument is well applicable to every aspect of Indo-Japan strategic cooperation. China objects to naval exercise in the region “accusing the participant for conspiring in a sinister plot to contain China” is apparent. Security analyst’s fear that Chinese reactions to closer Indo-Japanese naval ties will constrain the scope of bilateral interaction.58 Therefore, it is necessary to understand the impact factor of the US and China in Indo-Japan maritime cooperation.
The US Factor During Cold War, India-US bilateral relationship was cold and strained by suspicion. The ideological war between two super powers (US-USSR) prevented
57 Peter J Brown, China fears India-Japan Space alliance, Asian Times, 12 November 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JK12Df02.html 58 James R Holmes, Andrew C Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty First Century, (New York: 2009).
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India from joining either of the club and remained non-aligned country, which irked the US. Following, the collapse of Soviet Union the relationship between India and US started to buildup. Then, the relationship saw temporary watershed after India went for nuclear test in 1998. Despite the nuclear hiccup, in 2000 US President Bill Clinton travelled to India and restored the momentum in the bilateral relationship with New Delhi. After September 11 attack, the dynamics of Indo-US relation changed even drastically, as Secretary of State Colin Powell mentioned it, “since the terrorist attack on the United States we reshaped the whole region-reinvigorated US-India Relationship.”59 For the US, Indian Ocean emerges as a crucial pathway in fight against Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan. Therefore, President George W. Bush favoured India’s position in quickly changing global politics. This was reflected when US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in an interview said “We love the idea of being able to call on occasion on Indian ports, naval ships we hope it will be good for US-India relations.”60 By 2004, India-US signed Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), followed by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Indian counterpart Pranab Mukerji signed the “New Framework for the India-United States Defence Relationship” on June 2005. Despite domestic pressure and legal complications over civil nuclear cooperation, both the countries successfully signed Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. Equivalently, Indo-US defence and security cooperation gained attention and made significant headway during this period. India’s Ministry of Defence is reportedly planning to double its arms procurement and likely to spend over 20 million US dollar more than twice the amount it spent in the past ten years on an annual basis.61 To improve the interoperability between
59War on terror reinvigorated Indo-US relation, The Times of India, 6 February 2002, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/War-on-terror-reinvigorated-Indo-US-relations/articl eshow/1264666200.cms? 60Ravi Tomar, India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment, Research Paper No. 20, Parliament of Australia, 25 June 2002, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Libra ry/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP20 61 India’s 10’s latest defence procurement programmes, The Economic Times, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/features/et-slideshows/indias-10-latest-defence-procurem ent-programmes/indias-10-latest-defence-procurement-programmes/quickiearticleshow/36949 83.cms
100 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) two navies, Indian Navy shifting its priority towards the US based manufacture to arm rapidly expanding Indian naval fleet. The recent induction of INS Jalashwa, P8I Maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft from the US will solidifies the ongoing navy-to-navy cooperation. Generally, Indian armed forces policy to diversify the arm procurement greatly benefited the US manufactures, which substantially helps to increase military-to-military coordination. On the other hand, naval diplomacy paved a new opening in Indo-US relationship. For the first time the US, Australia, Japan and India jointly coordinated Tsunami relief operations in 2004.62 The coordination between the like minded countries in HR/DR operation increased the awareness among the leading navies about the necessary of regular joint exercise. Subsequently, the bilateral relationship began to attain multilateral level, when three nations (the US, Japan, Australia) Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on 18 March 2006, agreed on to foster their support and “recognized the importance of reinforcing our global partnership with India.”63 Consequently, in 2007, India-US-Japan conducted first multilateral naval exercise called TRILATEX-07 off central Japan. Followed by, India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore navies took part Malabar series of exercise off bay Bengal in Indian Ocean. Naval analysts believe this is a part of Indo-US bilateral cooperation, to advance the relationship by joining hands with like minded country in Asia-pacific region. During this period (1999-2009), Japan and the US held series of high profile meeting, discussion with Indian counterpart separately to consolidate India position in the global politics. The US foresaw India’s growing ties with Japan as an opportunity to bring India onboard to form a trilateral strategic arrangement. In 2007, US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, communiqué clearly states that “build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation, recognizing that India's continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region” as a common objective in
62 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and relief Operations, CRS Report for Congress, 10 February 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32715.pdf. 63 Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United States, MOFA, 18 March 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0603-2.html
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Japan-the US relationship 64 After the failure of “Quad” initiative, the US cautious in moving forward to form a small dialogue group, preferred less confrontational approach vis-à-vis China.65 In December 2011, three countries foreign minister held their first trilateral dialogue in Washington. After the four hours of discussion, all the three quickly declined that the meeting is not aimed at China.66 One step forward, Japan foreign minister KoichiroGemba expressed Japan and US willingness to conduct similar dialogue process with China. In fact, the trilateral talk concluded without finding agenda for the trilateral cooperation. In sum, the US played key role in linking India with Japan to form a trilateral dialogue. As the three nation initiative gaining momentum, China remains a major concern for all the three nations. The trio had also realized the success of Indo-Japan-US trilateral dialogue is depends upon, how effectively they delink issues pertained to China. However, China’s recent spat with Japan over Senkaku Island and freedom of navigation in South China Sea likely to make the trilateral dialogue more vulnerable to Chinese diplomatic offensive.
China Factor China vehemently opposes any form of cooperation between India, Japan, and the US. In fact China relentlessly try to contain growth by placing obstacle in Indian development pattern by encouraging Pakistan and supplying illicit nuclear reactor design, weapon grade plutonium, transfer of 5000 ring magnets and the Khusba reactor which has helped to train hundred of Pakistani engineers.67 Moreover, China has been hostile to Indo-US nuclear deal; the leading Chinese newspaper People’s Daily the mouth piece of ruling communist party of China repeatedly published editorials criticizing Bush government for
64 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation, MOFA, 1 May 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html. 65 K.V Kesavan, India and Japan Changing Dimension of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, ORF Occasional Paper#14 (New Delhi: 2010) 66 Inside the first ever US-Japan-India trilateral meeting, Foreign Policy, 23 December 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/23/inside_the_first_ever_us_japan_india_trilat eral_meeting. 67 Mihir Kumar Roy, Security environment in the Indian Ocean,
102 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) signing bilateral civil nuclear agreement with India.68 Besides to that, China had opposed both India and Japan candidature for permanent membership in UN Security Council.69 But, the Challenge from now on could be how to deal with growing Chinese PLA-Navy in Indo-pacific region. Peter Navarro and Greg Autry’s documentary called “Death by China: Confronting the Dragon-A Global Call to Action” in which they claim “The People Republic of China is moving forward at Manhattan Project speed to develop a blue water navy capability.”70 Many Indian and Japanese scholar have also agreed to the fact, that China’s PLA-Navy acquired latest technology like purloined sonar’s, radars and submarine launched missile such as US W-88 Ultra Compact, missile guidance and submarine tracking technologies with her access to the US technology. JGSDF General (Rtd) Taki says “Chinese ambitious about building a large ocean going fleets is likely to have an adverse effect on the regional security.” Between 1995 and 2008, the PLA-Navy commissioned approximately thirty-eight new submarine into service, an average of 2.9 submarines per year.71 In addition, newly inducted aircraft career ex-Varyag, under construction Chinese built aircraft career scheduled to hit dock in 2015 and highly modernized surface fleet poses serious challenge to countries who share maritime realm with China. In Indian Ocean, China devised strategy to contain India by building chain of naval facility in Sri Lanka, Mayanmar and Pakistan, which is famously known as “String of Pearl-Strategy.” But, Japan faces even more serious trouble in its territorial water from intruding Chinese ships. Since, Japan immensely depends upon those areas for energy and trade fears Chinese naval activity could possibly interrupt flow of maritime traffic in that area. The Picture (below) clearly indicates Chinese military/non-military vessels trespassing Japanese territorial water. Defence of
68 China attacks Indo-US Nuclear deal, Rediff India, 4 November 2005, http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/nov/04ndeal.htm. 69 China opposes Japan’s bid for security council, The Michigan Daily, 13 April 2005, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/china-opposes-japans-bid-security-council. 70 See the Documentary on Death by China: Confronting the Dragon-A Global Call to Action , http://www.deathbychina.com/ 71 Peter Dutton, Scouting, Signaling and Gatekeeping, Chinese Naval Operation in Japanese water and the international law implications, China Maritime Studies, US NAVAL WAR College,
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Japan 2011, stated that Chinese navy and other organization as following objective to conduct maritime activity in Japanese water.72 The first objective is to intercept naval operation by enemies in water as far as possible from the country in order to defend Chinese territories and territorial water. The second one is to develop military capability to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. The third is to acquire, maintain and protect maritime rights and interest. The fourth is to defend SLOC of China. Japanese is also paying close attention to Chinese activity near Japanese territory water and Chinese activity in South China Sea.
Chinese Activities in the water of Japan
Source: Defence of Japan 2011, Ministry of Defence
Given Chinese maritime activity near Japan and Indian Ocean, it is clear China will expand PLA-Navy maritime activity, surveillance, naval training and exercises in East China and South China Sea. Moreover, China is deeply suspicious about growing bilateral maritime cooperation between India and Japan. Particularly, a day before first ever official security consultation between India, Japan, the US and Australia in 2007, China issued demarches to each of the
72 Defence of Japan 2011, Ministry of Defence.
104 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) participant to know the purpose of the meeting. 73 In the same year, India-Japan-US conducted first ever multilateral naval drill close to Chinese water in Pacific Ocean. In response to the naval drill, People’s Daily Chinese news paper editorial criticized saying “It is absolutely not new for Japan and the U.S. to sit down and plot conspiracies together but it is rather intriguing to get India involved.”74 But, both India and Japan tried hard to relive China from any misconception about ongoing maritime exercise in Pacific and Bay Bengal. Even, at the time of signing Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008, Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe made it clear that the agreement on defence and Security cooperation is not aimed at any third country. In response to media person question, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, “We regard security cooperation with India as very important ... There was a mention of China — and we do not have any assumption of a third country as a target such as China.”75 Despite the assurance from India and Japan, Prof Kesavan says, “China views the evolving bilateral closeness with considerable suspicion and it has voiced its misgiving in no uncertain terms.”76 Given the geopolitical significance of the region, China will continue to negate every aspect of India-Japan partnership. To allying anxieties of China, Prof Kesavan suggest both India and Japan should make use of Track II, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-pacific (CSCAP) and ARF to address growing Chinese naval strength.77 At the same time, Admiral (Rtd) Mihir Roy warns “latent ambition of China’s Blue Water Navy cannot be brushed under the carpet to avoid rocking the boat of bilateral trade between US, China, and Japan.”78 Therefore, strategic analyst advices, both India-Japan should act in caution to avoid any head-on collision with China, which will not only derail Indo-Japan
73 Siddhartha vardarajan, Four Power meeting drew Chinese demarches, Global Research, 10 June 2007, http://www.globalresearch.ca/four-power-meeting-drew-chinese-d-marche/?print=1. 74 A “goodwill” joint naval drill, People’s Daily, http://english.people.com.cn/200704/21/eng20070421_368521.html. 75 Siddarth Vardarajan, India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China, The Hindu, 23 October 2008, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/article1362046.ece 76 K.V Kesavan, India and Japan Changing Dimension of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, ORF Occasional Paper#14 (New Delhi: 2010) 77 Ibid 78 Mihir Kumar Roy, Security Environment in the Indian Ocean, OPRF,
105 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) defence and security cooperation, rather it will have similar implication on regional security order in Indo-Pacific region.
The US and China Status on Indo-Japan Maritime Cooperation The US China Indo-Japan (Overall) Bilateral Relation Supportive Cautious Indo-Japan Deepening Defence Ties Supportive Cautious Indo-Japan Bilateral Maritime Welcoming Cautious naval/Coast Guard Exercise Indo-Japan Multilateral Naval Exercise Welcoming Hostile like Malabar-07,09 and TRILATEX-07 Source: Compiled by Author based on the preliminary assessment.
The Table (above) clearly states the status of the US and China over India-Japan maritime cooperation. The speeding cooperation between the two countries is seen as positive growths by the US, in contrast China see its part of “containment policy.” It is important for India and Japan to respect the two perspectives and act accordingly to sustain the development in the bilateral cooperation.
Task before India and Japan Finally, the study likes to elaborate three crucial tasks to strengthen full-fledging strategic cooperation between India and Japan. 1) India-Japan Maritime Cooperation should declare war “Global Piracy and Armed Robbery,” 2) Bilaterally, India-Japan economic cooperation will demand robust interoperability between two navies, 3) To jointly develop defence system. These task required, strong political direction from two sides and strong diplomatic initiative to turn the maritime cooperation into robust security partnership.
India-Japan Maritime Cooperation should declare “War on Global Piracy” IMB Piracy reporting centre (IMB-PRC) reports shows there is significant rise in piracy and armed robbery around the globe. In the first half of 2012, total 210 ships reported piracy attack and 23 ships are reportedly hijacked by pirates. Out of 23 ships, 13 ships have been hijacked by Somalia pirates in Indian
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Ocean.79 According to report, as many as 188 seafarers, along with 11 ships were currently held by Somalia pirates in captivity. Moreover, Somali pirates moving out from traditional ground into to deep sea to hijack ships, which have become major concern for the coalition force operating in anti-piracy activity in western Indian Ocean. Apart from Somalia incident, in the last few years piracy in west Africa/Gulf of Guinea have increased considerably, says Sam Bateman.80 The recent spur of piracy incident in the Gulf of Guinea seems to be more worrying. The attackers are more violent, crew members are sometimes kidnapped for ransoms and hijacking of vessels to steal cargo etc escalated safety and security of seafarers and transportation in that region.81
Actual Piracy Attack Worldwide 2012
Source: IMB-PRC
Apart from petty theft like stealing crew’s valuables and ships machinery part there was no serious piracy incident reported in Southeast Asian water and Indian subcontinent. Thanks to coordination and cooperation between littoral navies that helped to reduce serious piracy crime like hijacking the ships in the
79 Piracy and Armed Robbery News and Figure, ICC Commercial Crime Service, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures 80 Sam Batman, Calming troubled waters- Global and regional strategies for countering piracy, Special Report, Australia Strategic Policy Institute, Issue 47 August 2012. 81 Freedom C. Onuoha, Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, 12 June 2012, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/06/2012612123210113333.htm
107 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) region. However, the piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism remains major challenge to maritime nation ferrying goods via these crucial points. Both, India and Japan are major user of sea route of this region. Invariably, the security of the sea-lane connects both nations together in addressing the issue of good order at sea. In a step forward to achieve the common goal, India-Japan should expand maritime security cooperation beyond regional dimension and pursue Piracy as a “Global Threat.
India-Japan economic cooperation will demand robust interoperability between two navies As this report mentioned it already, India-Japan trade and economic relationship advancing in a fast pace. According to survey conducted by Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) says that 90% Japanese companies cited India as the “future growth potential of the local market,” a clear indication of expectation for the Indian market.82 Besides, the Japanese companies have identifies two costal states with large port facilities, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu as an ideal place to setup manufacturing plant in India. The presence of port facility and the their location next to international SLOC provides an advantage to Japanese manufactures to export finished goods to African, West Asia and European continent using sea-route.
Promising Regions within India
Source: Survey Report on Overseas Business Operation by Japanese manufacturing Companies, Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
82 Survey Report on Overseas Business Operation by Japanese manufacturing companies, Japan Bank of International Cooperation, December 2011.
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In fact, Japan ODA in 1980’s helped to modernize and rehabilitates four major ports in India: modernization of Haldia port; construction of scrapping yards in pipava port; dredging of Tuticorin port; and supply of harbor dredgers to deepen the depth of Indian ports.83 Japan long standing interest in building India’s infrastructure is also aimed at improves countries ability to transport faster from ports. The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor is one of the mega projects both India and Japan agreed jointly to develop industrial corridor to connect with Mumbai port. This will facilitates Japanese companies to setup industries, manufacturing plants and exports goods from India to overseas through shipping from Mumbai. Tamil Nadu another costal state in eastern board attracts large Japanese investment into the state. Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu said, “Noting that 422 Japanese companies have operational base in India, of which 286 are in Tamil Nadu.” 84 Tetsusaburo, Hayashi, executive vice-president, JETRO also expressed his interest in Tamil Nadu “because of its competitive advantages like ports with connectivity to South East Asia, West Asia, Europe and Africa, skilled manpower and investor-friendly state government and industries.”85 Growing economic opportunity increases government stake in protecting international sea-lane from unlawful activity. Presently, Japan enjoys naval interoperability only with the US force. In days to come, both India and Japan will be operating and communicating more frequently, so it is important both navies should realize the need for regular naval exercise and exchange officers each other sides to increase interoperability between navies. The interaction will facilitates two navies to discuss future regional and global security challenges.
83 Ken Kobayashi, Indo-Economic Cooperation for Development of Maritime Industries and Infrastructure, (eds) Indo-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, 13 October 2006. 84TN to woo more Japanese companies, The Hindu, 12 February 2012, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/government-and-policy/article28 85719.ece 85 Japanese firms to increase investment in Tamil Nadu, The Economic Times, 25 January 2012, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/japanese-firms-to-increase-i nvestment-in-tamil-nadu/articleshow/11632398.cms.
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Jointly Develop Defence System Japan’s Post-War Constitution “renounce act of belligerency” at first hand. Further to reposition as a “peace loving country,” in 1976 Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato imposed “exporting arms” under “Three Principles.”86 In 1983, Japan decided to transfer of military technology to the US as an exception to the “Three Principle.”87.” But, Nippon Keidanren kept strong pressure on government to ease the blanket ban on arms export. 88 Because, Nippon Keidanren argues that Japan defence industry losing competency to global players and is limited to meet domestic demand under “the Three Principles.” After series of careful consideration and taking into account of National defence Program Guideline for fiscal 2011, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda established new rules for “On guideline for overseas Transfer of Defence Equipment.”89 According to the new guidelines: Japan may participate in joint projects to develop and produce military equipment and technology with other countries. Overseas transfer of defence equipment is aimed to support peace-building and humanitarian objective. Overall, Japan policy on arms export need further changes to accommodate newly emerging regional and global security environment. Critics have warned the ban “have meant the nation's defense industry has been unable to take part in international projects to develop and produce military equipment.”90 On the other side, India offers lucrative business opportunity to Japanese defence industry, India will be spending at least an additional $50 billion for its naval build-up from 2012 to 2017. Outgoing Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma disclosed that the government has granted Acceptance of Necessity (AON) for naval acquisitions
86 Japan Policies on the Control of Arms Export, MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html. 87 Norio Iwata, Procurement Policy and Defence of Japan, Japan Defence Agency 88 David Isenberg, little lift to Japanese arms ban, Asian Times, 19 January 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/NA19Dh01.html. 89 Statements by the Chief Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of defence Equipment etc, 27 December 2007, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/others/201112/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/01/31/20111227DANW A_e.pdf. 90Govt decides to ease arms export ban / Way clear for joint intl arms development, The daily Yomiuri, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111227003855.htm
110 JMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected) worth Rs. 2,73,000 cr (approximately $ 50 billion).91 Trapping the opportunity in defence export will further enhance India-Japan strategic cooperation. ShinMaywa Industries major supplier of US-2 SAR (Rearch and rescue) amphibious aircraft to JMSDF responded to the Indian Navy’s request for Information (RFI) for amphibious aircraft. This was first time, Japanese companies or ShinMaywa participated in Defexpo2012, paving new way in Indo-Japan strategic cooperation. General Manger of ShinMaywa Mr. Yasuo Kawanishi and Advisor Rear Admiral (RTD) Katsuhiko Tomimatsu expressed that the “company (ShinMaywa) is interested to introduce Japanese defence product to Indian Navy.” Apart from that, both India and Japan can mutually benefit from jointly developing missile defence system, naval destroyers for HA/DR operations and other technologies of mutual security.
Policy Recommendations
India-Japan maritime security cooperation is inexorably linked with security of Indian Ocean. Indo-Japan Coast Guard plays a crucial role in establishing the maritime security cooperation. The cooperation should continue further to enhance the maritime security cooperation between the two agencies. Navy-to-navy cooperation needs greater political attention to build strong maritime security cooperation between two countries. Respectively, two navies should enhance Inter-operability and swift response. Japan major user of Indian Ocean is largely worried about the lack of knowledge and intelligence about the region. India and Japan could benefit by sharing intelligence in maritime domain in there respective region. Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) should focus more on the development
91India approves $50 billion naval buildup, SP’s NavalForce.net, 13 August 2012, http://www.spsnavalforces.net/news/?id=21&h=India-approves-$50-billion-naval-build-up
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of Indian Costal states- Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Kerala, Orissa, Gujarat and Bengal. Indo-Japan Coastal Security Working Group- As two countries costal area are vulnerable to external threat, the working group should be constituted to discuss and exchange ideas between two defence agencies to deal with costal security. Apart from costal security, two sides can benefit by exchanging views on maritime terrorism, port security, cargo screening and marine environment protection etc. Indo-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation is presently focusing on security of “Big Vessels” (ULCC, VLCC, Cargo ships etc). In the current security scenario, the Indo-Japan maritime security cooperation should also focus on security of “Smaller Vessels” (Fishing boats, Trawlers, Large Barge, Research Ships etc) monitoring these “Smaller Vessels” is crucially important to security of Indo-pacific region. Given India’s spending on defence, Japanese economy can benefit if it relax arms exporting policy. Two countries can mutually benefit from jointly developing defence system. To address Chinese concern, both India and Japan should make best use of regional and international institution to allay Chinese fear. India-Japan-US trilateral dialogue will certainly help to achieve peace and security of Indo-Pacific region. The three countries should continue the trilateral maritime exercise to strengthen inter-operability between India-Japan-US naval forces.
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Contributors
IWASAKI Hidetoshi Vice President, JMSDF Staff College National Defense Academy (1987) US Naval Post Graduate School General Course, National Institute for Defense Studies Staff, Office of Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for Security and Crisis Management / Commanding Officer, JS Mineyuki (DD 124) / Chief Staff Officer & Operation Staff, Commander Escort Flotilla 3 / Chief, C4I Systems Section, MSO / Commander, Escort Division 5 / Director, C4I Systems Division, MSO Chairman of Strategic Study Group
SUGIMOTO Yoichi Head of Strategies & Operations Studies Group BA in Literature, Waseda University Australian Command and Staff College Postgraduate Diploma in Business Administration of Queensland University of Technology Commanding Officer, JS Yubari (DE 227) / Defense Attaché to Norway / Chief of Bilateral Operations Section, Joint Staff / Commander, Escort Division 2
HIRAYAMA Shigetoshi Staff, Research Department National Defense Academy (1988) UK Joint Services Command and Staff College MA in Defense Studies, King’s College, London Commanding Officer, JS Yubari (DE 227) / Naval Attaché for Russia
INOUE Takashi Senior Researcher LLB, Tohoku Gakuin University Exchange Officer at the U.S. Naval Academy Staff, Fleet Escort Force / Commanding Officer, JS Matsuyuki (DD 130) / Plans and Programs Division, MSO Main coordinator of strategic talks between the JMSDF Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College within the framework of the Asia Pacific Study Group (APSG)
USHIROGATA Keitaro Researcher (Strategies and Operations) National Defense Academy (1997) Staff Officer, Training Squadron / Navigation Officer, JS Mineyuki (DD 124) / Navigation Officer, JS Atago (DDG 177) / Staff Officer, Fleet Escort Force
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YAMAMOTO Katsuya Chief, International Policy Planning Section, J-5, Joint Staff National Defense Academy (1990) General Course, National Institute for Defense Studies College for Defense Studies, National Defense University, PLA, China Commanding Officer, JS Shirayuki (DD 123 ) / Defense and Naval Attaché to China / Former Senior Researcher, JMSDF Staff College, contributed to promoting strategic talks between the U.S. Naval War College within the framework of the Asia Pacific Study Group
Mr. R.PANNERSELVAM, Prakash BA in Defence & Strategic Studies, University of Madras MA in Defence & Strategic Studies, University of Madras Master of Philosophy, Japanese Division, Centre for International Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University scholarship of JAPAN FOUNDATION for the year 2011 the first visiting fellow of MSC 2011-2012 Currently, he is purring Ph D Degree from J.N.U, New Delhi.
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From the Editors
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review is the editorial works of the staff and students’ papers from the viewpoint of security issues concerning the course of action of Japan as a maritime nation, and seeking maritime defense strategies and policies suited for today. The purpose of this publication is to provide an opportunity for free and open-minded opinion exchange to the experts of security studies all over the world. The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Defense Ministry of Japan. Material not bearing a copyright notice may be freely reproduced; however, it is requested that the author and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review be credited.
JMSDF Staff College Review Advisory Board CHAIRMAN Vice Adm. FUKUMOTO Izuru; President
VICE CHAIRMAN Rear Adm. IWASAKI Hidetoshi; Vice President
MEMBERS Capt. KUNO Keiichi; Director of Research Department Capt. TAKAHASHI Takamichi; Director of Education Department Capt. SHIMODAIRA Takuya; Head of Maritime Operations Education Office Capt. SUGIMOTO Yoichi; Head of Strategies & Operations Studies Group Capt. INOUE Takashi; Senior Researcher Cdr. ISHIHARA Takahiro; Instructor, Security & Strategies Education Office Cdr. YAGI Naoto; Instructor, Security & Strategies Education Office Cdr. KURATANI Masashi; Instructor, Leadership & Military History Education Office
JMSDF Staff College Review Editorial Board Capt. TAKAHASHI Hidemasa; Chief of International Planning Section Cdr. KUMAGAI Takakazu; Staff Officer, International Planning Section LtCdr. IGARASHI Naomi; Staff Officer, International Planning Section LtCdr. MIZUNO Tatsuhiko; Staff Officer, International Planning Section
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College Review Volume2 English Version (Selected) Published on 31st May, 2013 by JMSDF Staff College 2-2-1, Nakameguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8933 Japan Phone: +81-3-3719-7451 (International Planning Section) Website: http://www.msc.go.jp/mschp/SSG/eng_SSG.html Strategic Study Group Office Printed at JMSDF Print Supply Unit Copyright (C) JMSDF MSC All rights reserved
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