Mary Elizabeth Basile Chopas. Searching for Subversives: The Story of Italian Internment in Wartime America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017. xvi + 232 pp. $90.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-4696-3433-3.

Reviewed by Lawrence DiStasi

Published on H-FedHist (August, 2018)

Commissioned by Caryn E. Neumann (Miami University of Ohio Regionals)

Searching for Subversives by Mary Elizabeth uralized citizens, and the relation of all these to Basile Chopas has one main intention, and that is the harsher internment program against the Japa‐ to clarify the process employed by the US Depart‐ nese—Chopas is less successful. This may be due ment of Justice (DOJ) in the hearings it aforded to the fact that she is trying to summarize com‐ enemy aliens—ostensibly to sort out the immi‐ plex programs in single chapters or sometimes grants of Italian descent apprehended as “poten‐ single paragraphs. Any reader not intimately fa‐ tially dangerous” and therefore liable to intern‐ miliar with all these distinctions would be forgiv‐ ment during World War II. With regard to that in‐ en for emerging with a somewhat foggy notion of tention, Chopas does a creditable job of uncover‐ exactly what had happened to which individuals ing materials that have previously been unexam‐ or groups, why it had happened, and how it had ined, and that is a signifcant contribution to the happened. The impression she leaves is one of scholarship of the home-front internment confusion. process. Chopas fnds DOJ fles containing letters This is particularly noticeable in her second and other documents; she discovers the papers of chapter, “The Face of Selective Internment and several citizens who chaired the three-man hear‐ the Impact of Other Wartime Restrictions.” In her ing boards, such as Professor Erwin Griswold of frst summary, for example, Chopas correctly Harvard Law; and she attends to the debates refers to the attorney general’s initial late January within the government over how to bring the ene‐ order “establishing prohibited zones on the West my alien hearings into some kind of conformity Coast that all enemy aliens had to evacuate by with constitutional due process. February 24,” but then shifts to April 26, 1942, But internment is only one aspect of the noting that General Hugh Aloysius Drum, head of wartime measures employed against enemy the Eastern Defense Command, “proposed the aliens. With regard to the others—the restrictions classifcation of prohibited and restricted areas imposed on travel and possessions, the evacua‐ for the Eastern Defense Command ... but no mass tion of enemy aliens from prohibited zones on the evacuation” (p. 44). The question this raises is sim‐ West Coast, the attempt to expand those evacua‐ ple: a “prohibited zone” is, in fact, a zone in which tions to the Eastern and Southern Defense Com‐ whole classes of people, in this case enemy aliens, mands, the individual exclusion program for nat‐ are not allowed to remain, and must vacate. H-Net Reviews

Drum’s move was clearly interpreted by the attor‐ DeWitt. But Chopas’s discussion seems to forget ney general’s ofce at the time as exactly this, an about the DOJ and focuses on “military zones” attempt by the military to extend to the East Coast both with respect to this evacuation and the larg‐ the zones prohibited to enemy aliens already in er Japanese internment. She writes, “Although the place on the West Coast. That it was interpreted as Western Defense Command imposed evacuation preparation for a “mass evacuation” is clear from orders from military zones only on aliens in the the attorney general’s April 9, 1942, memo to Pres‐ Italian and German populations, family members ident Franklin Delano Roosevelt when he warned who were citizens often accompanied them. In of precisely this action, saying it had the possibili‐ contrast, both Japanese aliens and Japanese ty of “disafecting 17 million people.” Memos from American citizens were forced to leave their Attorney General Francis Biddle to the president homes” (p. 53). It is not clear whether this means and from Assistant Attorney General James Rowe to contrast the experience of European and Japa‐ to John McCloy, assistant secretary of war, then nese enemy aliens in the initial evacuation from made the same point after Drum’s military-zone prohibited zones, or whether the contrast is be‐ proposal. Both objected to the clear implication of tween the initial mass evacuation of only enemy Drum’s announcement: “The military order does, aliens and the later mass internment of all Japa‐ however, expressly apply to ‘Segregation and nese, aliens and citizens alike. Whatever the in‐ evacuation of enemy aliens.’”[1] But Chopas does tention, the confusion in terms and the focus ex‐ not reference or refect on this; instead she moves clusively on the military leaves the reader uncer‐ immediately to the military’s institution of its “in‐ tain, both here and in subsequent sections. dividual exclusion” program for “suspicious Ital‐ When she gets to chapter 3, “The Struggle for ian aliens and naturalized citizens from military Justice in the Internment Process,” Chopas gets to areas” (p. 44). This begins the confusion that con‐ the heart of her study and is on frmer ground. As tinues over the diference between programs in‐ noted above, her research uncovers valuable stituted by the military and those instituted by the sources regarding the internal “struggle” at the DOJ and the resultant confusion over terminology. DOJ to fnd some accord with constitutional due Readers might not be clear whether “evacuation” process in a program in which enemy aliens es‐ is a military program or the same as “exclusion,” sentially had no due process rights at all. Chopas or whether the exclusion of the Japanese Ameri‐ attributes at least some of this problem to the fact cans is the same as the individual exclusion of the that the wartime hearing process resembled not a Italian-born naturalized Americans from military legal trial but more nearly “the informality of the zones, or whether the proposed exclusion (or preliminary hearings in deportation proceedings” evacuation) of Italian enemy aliens from the en‐ (p. 76). The lack of “adherence to the rules of evi‐ tire Pacifc Slope by General John L. DeWitt was to dence” was similar in both cases, especially since be the same as the earlier exclusions (or evacua‐ “the alien was not acquainted with the charges in tions) by the DOJ. Previous scholarship has estab‐ his case because the purpose of the hearing was lished that the evacuation from West Coast pro‐ to discover evidence to be used against him” (p. hibited zones was instituted as a DOJ program. 75). Indeed, the US government made it clear that Though the Western Defense Command took over enemy aliens were not owed the hearings at all. its implementation on March 2, 1942, very little Biddle, in his Instructions to Alien Enemy Hearing changed save for the expansion of a few zones (in Board, Supplement #1, January 7, 1942, said Stockton, California, for example) and the exten‐ specifcally that “all alien enemies are subject to sion of curfew hours from the 9 p.m. curfew or‐ detention and internment for the duration of the dered by the DOJ to the 8 p.m. curfew ordered by war without hearing, which hearing has however

2 H-Net Reviews been provided, not as a matter of right, but in or‐ ceive a ‘statement of the charges,’ ... were not con‐ der to permit them to present facts in their be‐ strued to apply to interned enemy aliens who had half.”[2] Equally surprising is the fact that the at‐ not been charged with any criminal ofenses” (p. torney general was under no obligation to heed 75). This gets to the real Catch-22 in the entire in‐ the recommendations of his own hearing boards. ternment process. Suspect enemy aliens were ap‐ In many cases where the hearing board found prehended based on secret FBI reports and the le‐ that the enemy alien constituted no threat to pub‐ gal authority of the Enemy Alien Act of 1798. This lic safety and should be paroled, the attorney gen‐ latter made aliens of nations with whom the US eral countered the recommendation and ordered was at war “enemy aliens” and so, automatically the person interned. For instance, Cesare Pasqua’s subject to apprehension, confnement, and depor‐ Order for Internment signed by Biddle says quite tation. The question that naturally arises, of openly: “WHEREAS, the Alien Enemy Hearing course, is: what purpose did the so-called hear‐ Board has recommended that said alien enemy be ings serve? The hearings were called variously a paroled; and it appearing from the evidence be‐ “courtesy” and an attempt at “fairness.” Instruc‐ fore me that said alien enemy should be interned; tions to the hearing boards cited by Chopas out‐ NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that said alien line some guidelines to follow: “internment was enemy be interned.”[3] for those of ‘dangerous character’; those ‘consid‐ Chopas addresses this situation from several ered not so dangerous’ were granted parole ...; angles. She points out that the government in ef‐ and those ‘found to be harmless to the public safe‐ fect prejudged aliens, operating on the principle ty’ were released from government custody” (p. that the enemy alien was presumed guilty until he 81). Chopas is very keen about the “tension” here, could prove his innocence. She terms this “pre‐ and so posits the relevant and often-made conclu‐ sumptive guilt” and rightly maintains that this sion: “barring evidence of specifc acts of disloyal‐ was one of the defects in the government’s ty or threats to the public’s safety, the board’s de‐ process. She then terms this the “tension between termination of loyalty through interrogation of legal guarantees for enemy aliens and what in‐ the alien enemies was necessarily fawed” (p. 84). ternees felt would be a just process for deciding But again, the same question continues to whether they posed a danger to society” (p. 74). arise. If the detained enemy alien was not allowed But, of course, it is more than “tension.” A rather to know the charges alleged against him or her, large gulf existed between due-process rights and if guilt was presumed, obviating charges to guaranteed to all persons under the US Constitu‐ begin with, what could the hearings determine? tion and the “rights” of enemy aliens apprehend‐ Despite her awareness of this, Chopas nonetheless ed for possible internment. Chopas rightly focuses uncovers specifcs about the valiant attempts of on the single most common complaint of in‐ some hearing boards to make solid judgments. ternees themselves: that they were unable to She fnds in Griswold’s papers evidence of an at‐ know the charges against them, and hence unable tempt to uphold “the spirit of due process stan‐ to mount a cogent defense. Chopas also points out dards in the hearings” (p. 85). Chopas notes, in the that, though the 1929 Geneva Convention was hearing for Ubaldo Guidi-Buttrini, a radio an‐ supposed to be the standard to which the intern‐ nouncer in , that even though he was seen ment program conformed, its provisions regard‐ as an “ardent advocate of Fascism” who posed a ing “procedural protections” were “not interpret‐ threat because of his radio infuence, the board ed to have any applicability to the alien enemy recommended parole with supervision. This was hearings.” That is, the “provisions of Article 60, because “Griswold appreciated the diference be‐ paragraph (c), requiring that prisoners of war re‐ tween having associations with the enemy and ac‐

3 H-Net Reviews tively participating in initiatives against the Unit‐ assume the percentage remained at this level ed States” (p. 84). In other words, Griswold, a pro‐ throughout. fessor at Harvard Law, understood the guarantees What Chopas does not emphasize quite of due process. Unfortunately for Guidi-Buttrini, enough, for me, is the blatant contradiction at the as an enemy alien he was up against other rules, heart of the entire process. This is best signifed and Biddle overruled his Boston hearing board by something Chopas does not reference—the se‐ and ordered him interned. In his second hearing, rious problem noted by the DOJ itself with its cate‐ on December 14, 1942, Guidi-Buttrini did no bet‐ gory of “potentially dangerous.” This phrase is ter: the Boston board again “expected the govern‐ found not only in each Order for Internment from ment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the attorney general as the “cause” of the in‐ Guidi-Buttrini was engaged in seditious activity ternee’s apprehension—in other words, being against the United States,” and again recommend‐ “potentially dangerous to the public peace and ed parole but again was overruled by the attorney safety of the United States”—but also in corre‐ general (p. 86). spondence from Edward Ennis, head of the Alien Chopas goes on to carefully examine the hear‐ Enemy Control Unit in the DOJ when he tried to ings of seven interned individuals, and the allega‐ explain her husband’s internment to Olga Trento tions against them, most of whom were eventual‐ of San Francisco. He wrote to Trento on June 4, ly given second hearings and paroled or released. 1942: “[Name blanked out] was apprehended as a In most cases, the individual was not informed of potentially dangerous alien enemy.... The power the charges against him. Chopas provides the like‐ of internment of aliens of Italian nationality ... is ly basis of the government’s suspicions in these exercised whenever it is believed that such person cases, noting that most often it was associations ... may possibly be disloyal to the United States. It with Italian government ofces; membership in is not necessary that he be guilty of any specifc suspect organizations, such as the Fascist Party acts of a subversive nature” (emphasis added).[4] when in or the Ex-Combattenti when in the Moreover, the attorney general himself perma‐ US, or even, in the case of former prostitute nently cashiered the entire idea in a 1943 memo Pauline Tedesco, “underworld associations”; or to J. Edgar Hoover, ordering the FBI director to comments denigrating democracy or exalting Fas‐ dispense completely with the concept of potential cism or both. Along the way, Chopas informs us of “dangerousness,” writing that “this classifcation the numbers of Italian enemy aliens interned is inherently unreliable.”[5] This devaluation of so (343, including 46 from Latin America) and the central a category would seem to be crucial to any very small percentage of the enemy alien popula‐ discussion about why or through what process tion they represented (fve-hundredths of 1 per‐ Italian enemy aliens were interned. cent). She also gives us the important fgures for One would also like to know what, in the the number of cases heard by the one hundred hearing process, led some enemy aliens to be hearing boards across the US, at least as of Colum‐ paroled or outright released, and how many of bus Day 1942: of 635 hearings, 232 Italian enemy these there were. Chopas gives us ample informa‐ aliens were interned (p. 71). She then gives us a tion on internees who were paroled or released percentage, as of May 1942, of 42 percent interned after re-hearings. We also know that the opera (p. 81). Despite the slight diference between 36.5 star Ezio Pinza, apprehended in March 1942, suc‐ percent in October and 42 percent in May, these ceeded in reversing his board’s recommendation are valuable fgures to have, especially if we can to intern when he got a second hearing and was paroled. But it would help the analysis immeasur‐

4 H-Net Reviews ably if one knew exactly what impressed the hearing board enough to get it to recommend pa‐ role or release, and in what number of cases this recommendation was actually accepted by the at‐ torney general. Still, the information Chopas has provided adds a good deal to our understanding of the in‐ ternment process for Italian enemy aliens, and for that she deserves ample credit. Notes [1]. Francis Biddle to Franklin Delano Roo‐ sevelt, April 9, 1942, and James Rowe to John Mc‐ Cloy, April 28, 1942, James Rowe Papers, Contain‐ er 33, FDR Library, Hyde Park, . [2]. Francis Biddle, Instructions to Alien Ene‐ my Hearing Board, Supplement #1, January 7, 1942, RG 85, General fles 1942-45, Fort Missoula, Montana, WWII Internment fles, INS, NARA I, cit‐ ed in Lawrence DiStasi, Branded: How Italian Im‐ migrants Became ‘Enemies’ during World War II (Bolinas, CA: Sanniti Publications, 2016), 87. [3]. Cesare Pasqua Order for Internment, cit‐ ed in DiStasi, Branded, 88-89. [4]. Edward Ennis to Olga Trento, June 4, 1942, cited in DiStasi, Branded, 117. [5]. Francis Biddle to J. Edgar Hoover, July 16, 1943, Guttadauro FBI fle, 100-5901, cited in Lawrence DiStasi, Una Storia Segreta (Berkeley, CA: Heyday Books, 2001), 26.

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Citation: Lawrence DiStasi. Review of Chopas, Mary Elizabeth Basile. Searching for Subversives: The Story of Italian Internment in Wartime America. H-FedHist, H-Net Reviews. August, 2018.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=51844

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