AOTP UPDATE

“Voices of the Quchaqbar” SPECIAL EDITION – Understanding opiate trafficking in Afghanistan from the perspective of drug traffickers

2020

“Voices of the Quchaqbar”

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...... 5 Contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals...... 5 GLOSSARY…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...... 7 Trafficker’s Motivations are a Combination of “Need and Greed”...... 7 Family Ties are Important in Drug Trafficking Organizations Operations...... 7 Hierarchical and Flexible Trafficking Organizations...... 7 Co-operative Networks of Drug Trafficking Organizations...... 8 Interprovincial Trafficking of all Types of Opiates is Widespread...... 8 Protective Measures Taken During Trafficking...... 8 The Use of People with Dual Nationalities as Couriers...... 8 Most Traffickers Keep an Inventory of Opiates…...... 8 … to Facilitate a “just-in-time” Supply Process...... 9 Chemists and Cooks Recruited from the Region...... 9 Increased Involvement of Women in Opiate Trafficking...... 9 Drug Profits Invested in Different Sectors...... 9 Technological Developments have Helped Traffickers...... 9 Policy Implications and Further Research...... 10

SECTION 1: MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS BEHIND STARTING AND CONTINUING TO TRAFFICK ILLICIT DRUGS...... 11 Motivations for Starting to Traffick Opiates...... 13 SECTION 2: WHO ARE THE TRAFFICKERS? THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS...... 14

SECTION 3: BUSINESS MODELS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING NETWORKS...... 16 Internal Trafficking Methods and Modus Operandi...... 16 Reasons Behind Internal Trafficking Within Afghanistan...... 16 The Estimated Costs of nter-provincialI Trafficking...... 16 Main Destinations for Opiate Trafficking...... 17 Protective Measures Taken During Trafficking...... 19 Cross-Border Drug Trafficking...... 20 How Afghan Traffickers Assess Drug Trafficking Routes...... 21 Working with International Drug Traffickers...... 21 The ainM Illicit Opiate Markets in the Region...... 22 Poly-drug Trafficking by Afghan Drug Trafficking Organizations...... 22 Precursor Chemical Trafficking by Afghan Drug Trafficking Organizations...... 23

SECTION 4: TRAFFICKER’S VIEWS ON OPIATE PROCESSING...... 25 Estimated Production Capacity of Laboratories...... 25 Staffing Requirements for Laboratories...... 27 Recruitment of Chemists...... 27

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SECTION 5: WOMEN’S ROLE IN ILLICIT OPIATE TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF AFGHANISTAN...... 29

SECTION 6: THE STRUCTURE OF AFGHAN DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS...... 31 Overview of Afghan Drug Trafficking Organizations...... 31 Number of People in Drug Trafficking Organizations...... 31 Large Scale Traffickers...... 32 Mid- and Small- scale Traffickers...... 32 Management, Authority and Hierarchical Structure within Afghan Opiate Drug Trafficking Organizations...... 33 “Networks” of Drug Trafficking Organizations...... 35 Conflict Resolution in Afghan Trafficking Networks...... 35

SECTION 8: HOW TRAFFICKERS ESTIMATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND...... 37

SECTION 9: FINANCIAL AND MONETARY FEATURES of ILLICIT OPIATE TRAFFICKING...... 38 Payment to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs)...... 40 SECTION 10: HOW AFGHAN OPIATE TRAFFICKERS COMMUNICATE...... 42 Areas for Further Research...... 43 The otivationsM Behind Entering and Remaining in Opiate Trafficking...... 43 The Business Models of Afghan Drug Traffickers...... 43 Links Between Opiate Trafficking and Anti-Government Elements...... 43 The Role of Women in Opiate Trafficking...... 43

4 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

INTRODUCTION

For nearly two decades, Afghanistan also draws upon secondary data from Contribution to the has been the major source of the multiple sources, including UNODC’s Sustainable Development world’s illicit opium production. Opi- previous research and publications, Goals ates produced in Afghanistan impact international literature, country This report provides research that sup- governance and economic develop- reports, and sources from the scien- ports the implementation of several ment and continue to fuel insurgency, tific drug research domain. A detailed the Sustainable Development Goals. terrorism, corruption and poor health, description of the methodology and In particular: within Afghanistan, the south west the data tables used for the infograph- Asia region and further afield. The traf- ics used in this study can be found No Poverty. Poverty ficking of illicit opiates contributes to in an Annex at the UNODC website: has many dimensions, the destabilization of Afghanistan and https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ but its causes include countries along the main trafficking data-and-analysis/aotp.html unemployment, social exclusion, and routes. While there has been consid- Previous studies of those involved in high vulnerability of certain popula- erable research on opiate production drug trafficking, have largely been tions to disasters, diseases and other in Afghanistan, there are few detailed based around interviews with prison phenomena which prevent them from studies on how trafficking occurs in inmates convicted for drug related being productive. Some traffickers Afghanistan. This special update aims offences. By comparison, this research: to fill the knowledge gap on Drug interviewed for this report stated that • is one of the first qualitative studies avoiding poverty was one of the key Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) that involves self-identified, active motivating factors for becoming and how they operate in the context drug traffickers operating in Afghani- of Afghanistan. stan and who had not been convicted. involved in, and remaining in, the traf- ficking of opiates. Some traffickers This qualitative study is based on • contributes to filling several key gaps reported using the profits from opiate in-depth interviews conducted with in the knowledge on how drug traf- trafficking to meet immediate, subsis- 41 Afghan opiate traffickers – or fickers located in Afghanistan engage tence living costs, or large one-off costs Quchaqbar in Dari - who are directly in the trafficking of opiates. like a wedding. However, other traf- involved in the trafficking of opiates • contributes towards a well-informed fickers reported investing their profits in Afghanistan and abroad, and who international debate to guide efforts to elsewhere including back into the traf- are, mostly still active in the busi- counter illicit drug trafficking. ficking business or in real-estate and ness. Thirty-six of the interviewed • paves the ground for further quali- most drug traffickers interviewed in Quchaqbar were operating freely in tative field studies to address a wide this study said that they wanted to Afghanistan and had not been arrested range of the least studied areas, “earn money”. As a result, the link or convicted, while five were under including the role of women in the between drug trafficking and poverty arrest or in detention at the time of trafficking of opiates, the monetary is complex and can only be understood writing but had not been convicted. aspects of opiate trafficking (involv- if multiple social and economic factors The traffickers who were interviewed ing money transfer systems such as are considered. for this study were located in Afghan Hawala), and the links between drug provinces that bordered Uzbekistan, trafficking and the insurgency. Gender Equality. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Iran (Islamic Ending all discrimi- Republic of), and Pakistan, as well as nation against women in the capital, Kabul. These provinces and girls is not only a include: poppy cultivating provinces; basic human right, it provinces where there has been his- is crucial for a sustainable future; it is tory and evidence of opiate processing, proven that empowering women and and border provinces that are located girls helps economic growth and devel- on the major opiate trafficking routes opment. Traffickers interviewed for out of Afghanistan. The Quchaqbar this report mention their perception had authentic knowledge and hands- that the role of women in opiate traf- on experience of inter-provincial and ficking in Afghanistan has increased cross-border trafficking in drugs and in the past 5 years. While research on chemical precursors in Afghanistan women’s involvement in opium poppy and beyond. Information provided cultivation has been documented pre- by the drug traffickers provides the viously, this report shows that women backbone of the study, but the report are involved in many other aspects of

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the opiate business including acting as jobs to keep up with a growing labor The rule of law and development have couriers, working in labs and protect- force are still significant issues. The a significant interrelation and are ing opiate inventories. The report also traffickers interviewed for this report mutually reinforcing, making it highlights the issue that Afghan stated that one of the factors in essential for sustainable development women can be exploited by drug traf- becoming involved in opiate trafficking at the national and international level. ficking organizations to become in Afghanistan was the result of This report highlights how Afghan involved in opiate trafficking as a result insufficient licit employment drug trafficking organizations use their of losing their husband or head of the opportunities available in Afghanistan. profits to corrupt national authorities household, and as a means of escaping The report shows that while some of – particularly the police- and use some poverty. Understanding that women those who are currently involved in of their profits to fund the Taliban and are also involved in opiate trafficking opiate trafficking would like to other Anti-Government Elements. will encourage the development of participate in legal employment, the This undermines the rule of law within policies that will address the issue for lack of such opportunities means they Afghanistan and is a driver for the both men and women. believe they have no choice but to continuing conflict in the country. engage in illegal and potentially Decent work and harmful employ­ment. economic growth. Over the past 25 years Peace, justice and the number of strong institutions. workers living in Corruption, bribery, extreme poverty has declined theft and tax evasion dramatically, despite the lasting impact remain a considerable of the 2008 economic crisis and global concern in Afghanistan. Among the recession. However, slower growth, institutions most affected by widening inequalities, and not enough corruption are the judiciary and police.

Glossary

AGE Anti-Government Elements

ARQ Annual Response Questionnaire

CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

DAB Da Afghanistan Bank

DTO Drug Trafficking Organization

MCN Ministry of Counter Narcotics

ILO International Labor Office

IMO International Migration Organization

UAE United Arab Emirates

USD United States Dollar

USFOR-A United States Forces - Afghanistan

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

6 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Opiate trafficking in Afghanistan and Trafficker’s Motivations Family Ties are Important neighbouring countries, continues to are a Combination of in DTO’s Operations be a threat to the stability and devel- “Need and Greed” Many small, medium and large-scale opment of both Afghanistan and the Many traffickers reported that their Drug Trafficking Organizations oper- south west Asia region, and poses a main motivation for becoming ate in Afghanistan and in the countries threat to public health globally. This involved in opiate trafficking was along the main opiate trafficking qualitative study provides important the profit and money that could be routes. The information provided by insights about various aspects of the made. However, some also mentioned the interviewed Afghan drug traffick- modus operandi of domestic and cross- poverty and a lack of alternative licit ers provided a picture of DTOs both border drug trafficking and Afghan employment opportunities to meet large and small that are mainly based Drug Trafficking Organizations basic living costs. Other factors – on family-structures, around shared (DTOs). Drug traffickers operating including a permissive enabling tribal connections and localised neigh- in different locations in Afghanistan environment, more prevalent in some bourhoods. Interviews revealed a range provided first-hand information regions than others - also seemed to be of family based trafficking organiza- on their motivations for becoming important, with traffickers reporting tions, from the small – consisting two involved in the business, and how that others had encouraged them into or three family members operating in they operate their drug businesses, trafficking, or that drug trafficking was a single province or district - to much reflecting the diversity of trafficking in an easy business to become involved larger organizations consisting of Afghanistan. The traffickers were open in. While profit was an important many members of an extended family and willing to discuss and share their driver in traffickers becoming involved working together in Afghanistan and opinions, experiences, knowledge, and in trafficking, it appeared to be even Europe. observations. This encouraging level of more important as a motivation for cooperation potentially opens the way Hierarchical and Flexible traffickers remaining involved – once for further in-depth qualitative studies traffickers were involved, the prof- Trafficking Organizations with traffickers. its to be made, made it difficult for It was noticeable that, although pre- Although the sample size of this quali- them to give up trafficking in favor dominately family based, DTOs were tative study was moderate, it provided of licit alternatives, even if those were complex and able to mobilize indi- important insights about Afghan Drug available. This shows that the drivers viduals from different segments of Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and of entering and staying in the drug society to illicitly produce, transport, was significant given the challenges of trafficking business are complex and and distribute drugs, and sometimes locating suitable interviewees both in seem to be combination of “need and precursors, including across inter- terms of subject matter and in the greed”, depending on the socio-eco- national borders. The organization complex environment of Afghanistan. nomic context of those involved. of these activities occurs through a While the study provides details on certain aspects of opiate trafficking Lack of security No other op�on The focus on trust and use of family Key mo�va�onal forces (i.e. earning money members or close friends for trafficking and a lack of employment) coupled with business models, the understanding of ac�vity is important, as it provides an having no other op�on than drug trafficking extra degree of security and protec�on persuaded traffickers to traffic illicit opiates. DTOs in Afghanistan, and the region against law enforcement ac�vity. more widely, remains incomplete 1 Poverty and fragmentary. Further research is A quarter of the Ag�an labor force is unemployed, and 80 per cent of employment is vulnerable and insecure, 1 needed to fill in the gaps. The study comprising self- or own-account points to specific areas where future employment, day labor, or unpaid work. Earning Money research could invest in the future, A large propor�on (36.6 per cent) 4 of the traffickers interviewed stressed that earning money was a major driving force behind their for example women’s involvement involvement in drug trafficking. and role in opiate trafficking and the Social Environment 10 financial operations of DTOs. Several traffickers believed that their social environment 25%26 provided a significant contributory mo�va�on for There are several points of interest to them to traffic illicit drugs. be drawn from this qualitative study, with potential importance for policy 14 makers, criminal justice practitioners, Lack of Employment and researchers who are investigating Opportuni�es The lack of legal employment opportuni�es drug trafficking in Afghanistan and is the second most frequent mo�va�onal reason (15 per cent) for traffickers to enter world-wide: the illicit opiate trade.

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series of hierarchical relationships, usually overseen by the head of the 35 DTO. The study detected several func- tions/roles exercised by the heads of Assessing routes 23 Undertaking an assessment of the route is the most DTOs such as leadership, decision common protec�ve measure before trafficking opiates. Employing addi�onal people to serve as making, coordination, communica- security escort or to conduct reconnaissance of the Delaying transporta�on route in advance to iden�fy any poten�al problems. A number of traffickers delaying the transporta�on tion, problem solving, and conflict of illicit drugs un�l security issues were resolved. management. This appears to give the 12 DTOs sufficient flexibility to address new circumstances and make necessary Limit trade to trusted people changes to their modus operandi. Traffickers prefer to limit trades and to trade only with 5 those whom they trust, if risks appear to be high. Similarly, the quan�ty of illicit drugs trafficked in a Co-operative Networks shipment are some�mes decreased to reduce the risks Bribery (and presumably financial losses) should a shipment be Bribes are offered to influence delibera�ons and intercepted. ac�ons, including police ac�vi�es and judicial of DTO’s decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in ins�tu�ons. The delivery of public services within Many DTOs in Afghanistan worked 3 Afghanistan remains severely affected by bribery within broader “alliances”, loosely and corrup�on. coordinating and co-operating with Complex concealment methods Some traffickers use novel or sophis�cated 2 a wider network of similar organiza- methods to hide drugs and prevent detec�on. tions in the supply chain. Interviewed Informa�on gathering Some traffickers share informa�on about the best traffickers were able to source opiates, 1 trafficking routes to use, or security risks that might precursor chemicals and access to clan- Background check be present that might risk their opiate shipments. Some traffickers inves�gate their customers to destine laboratories from other DTOs make sure they are interested in purchasing 1 Working with Taliban drugs and are not police informants. across Afghanistan. In some cases, Some traffickers worked with or paid insurgents to there was a specific head of the wider protect shipments from law enforcement ac�vity. Swallowing drugs 1 network who co-ordinated the activi- Couriers mostly swallow drugs in order to protect the shipment from being detected. ties of several DTOs. There appear to 1 Using women or children be many advantages to being part of Most Afghan police are male so using women to traffick drug shipments make them les likely to be a wider network, including sharing searched. profits and risk, and sharing informa- tion about major trafficking routes, inter-provincial trafficking, as well The Use of People with but few disadvantages. DTO’s were as trafficking outside of Afghanistan, also generally co-operative rather than Dual Nationalities as with some traffickers stating that they Couriers competitive, although in some limited move illicit drugs towards provinces cases rivalries and violence between of Afghanistan that border other Several drug traffickers highlighted organizations was reported. countries, with the aim of trafficking the use of couriers with dual nation- abroad. alities to traffick opiates outside of Interprovincial Trafficking Afghanistan. While the profits from of all Types of Opiates is Protective Measures drug trafficking are attractive to Widespread Taken During Trafficking traffickers in Afghanistan, financial The study shows that there is a high Drug traffickers stated that they under- gain from trafficking also appeals to volume of inter-provincial opiate took risk assessments and applied a set Afghans with dual nationality living in trafficking within Afghanistan, in of risk mitigation measures to avoid the West who are willing to smuggle addition to international trafficking law enforcement interception, prevent heroin from Afghanistan to Europe across Afghanistan’s borders. While potential clashes with other DTOs, and North America. For example, some of the interviewed traffickers and to reduce the risk of theft when one interviewed trafficker, who runs could move opiates to neighbour- trafficking opiates and other types of a small drug trafficking organization ing countries or further afield, many drugs from one province to another or with six couriers, noted that the people of those interviewed only trafficked toward International borders. These working for him “all have a double within Afghanistan. This suggests protective measures include assessing nationality”, specifically Afghans who that smaller traffickers operate only the trafficking routes before shipping have lived in Europe and Canada for in a particular province or region but drugs, delaying transportation until a very long time. are able to supply opiates to the larger security had improved, limiting opiate Most Traffickers Keep an DTO’s who can move opiates to inter- deals to trusted people, using complex national markets. “High demand” and concealment methods and bribery, Inventory of Opiates… “high price” were important drivers information gathering including back- The majority of the traffickers inter- for inter-provincial opiate trafficking. ground checks on customers, working viewed had a small to medium size Avoiding law enforcement intercep- with the Taliban, or using women and trafficking business. Only six of the tion was also named as a reason for children to avoid security searches. interviewed traffickers reported that

8 LICIT AND ILLICIT SECTORS WHERE DRUG PROFITS ARE INVESTED “Voices of the Quchaqbar” they owned a drug manufacturing lab- LICIT AND ILLICIT SECTORS WHERE DRUG PROFITS ARE INVESTED oratory, and most traffickers reported 5 Illicit drugs that they purchased heroin from labo- Some traffickers reinvest the majority of their profits back into their drug trade in order to develop ratory owners or bought opiates from their business. other traffickers. Almost all of the 5 Illicit drugs traffickers interviewed kept a portion Some traffickers reinvest the majority of their profits back into their drug trade in order to develop of their annual opiate production as their business. a reserve inventory. Most traffickers 7 7 reported that, over time, stored opi- Licit business Did not answer In some cases traffickers use profits from illegal activity to invest in licit ates lost their potency, but that they business, either as a front company or as a means of moving entirely into kept some7 of their product to meet the legal employment7 sector. Licit business Did not answer sudden demandsIn some cases traffickers for useopiates profits from cus- from illegal activity to invest in licit business, either as a front company tomers or otheror as a means traffickers. of moving entirely into Traffickers also reportedthe legal that employment only sector. a small portion 11 Real Estate and of opiate supplies were stored at pro- other sectors cessing sites – often only enough for a 11 Some traffickers diversify their Real Estate 11 investments. While investing in real estate they also invest in a specific production run – and that the Real estate in either Afghanistan Real Estate and number of other legal and illegal or outside the country is where other sectors business sectors. a significant proportion of opiate 11 Some traffickers diversify their majority of their production supplies money is invested. investments. While investing in Real Estate real estate they also invest in a wereReal kept estate in either in Afghanistan hidden locations away number of other legal and illegal or outside the country is where business sectors. a significant proportion of opiate frommoney the is invested. laboratories. … to Facilitate a “just-in- time” Supply Process that the countries mentioned by traf- licit businesses, or reinvesting drug fickers does not necessarily indicate profits into their drug businesses. In Traffickers had different perceptions the nationalities and/or citizenship of some cases, opiates are exchanged on recent trends in the demand for those chemists but only refer to where for other legal or illegal commodi- heroin, both within Afghanistan and they were recruited from. ties rather than cash. The majority of internationally. Slightly over 60 per traffickers use the Hawala system for cent of the participants assessed that Increased Involvement their transactions, and very few use demand for heroin in general was high of Women in Opiate the formal banking sector. Traffickers and increasing. Traffickers used their Trafficking also use part of their drug profits to opiate inventories in case they needed This study reveals male traffickers’ -per pay “taxes” – commonly Zakat and to respond to an unanticipated request ception that women’s involvement in Ushr – to insurgents for protection, from local or international demand. opiate trafficking has increased over the and to bribe public officials to facilitate They also appeared to source opiates past five years. The research suggested trafficking activity. to meet demand from other organiza- that, like opium poppy cultivation, tions or contacts in the wider trade Technological opiate trafficking in Afghanistan is Developments have if needed. Few traffickers had for- predominantly managed, controlled malised process for assessing demand and conducted by male individuals. Helped Traffickers and tended to supply opiates based on However, women do take part in a Many traffickers noted that their com- a specific request. This suggests that range of opiate trafficking activities, munication methods had changed opiate supply in Afghanistan, is driven including as couriers, in hiring other significantly in the past five years with by customer demand, through an women as couriers, processing opiates the growth of internet access and smart ad-hoc, “just-in-time” supply process. and providing information on traffick- cell phone technology. The traffickers Chemists and Cooks ing routes. However, there was no seemed to be comfortable in commu- nicating through common day-to-day Recruited from the evidence of women’s leadership roles in opiate trafficking organizations. internet-based mobile communica- Region tion tools, though some of them Skilled and experienced chemists play Drug Profits Invested in were cautious and took counter-secu- a pivotal role in opiate production and Different Sectors rity measures when communicating. producing quality heroin, and drug Many small DTOs use profits from This was confirmed by national law traffickers seek to recruit the best avail- opiate trafficking to meet their imme- enforcement authorities who generally able talent from around the region. diate living costs, build savings to struggled to intercept internet-based Chemists were reportedly recruited cope with economic shocks, or to communications. internally to Afghanistan (in Hel- meet larger expenses like weddings mand, Nangarhar, Badakhshan and or private schooling. Traffickers with Policy Implications and Kandahar provinces) and from abroad larger operations invest their profits Further Research (Pakistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) in several sectors including real-estate This report demonstrates that the driv- and Turkey). It is important to note inside and outside of Afghanistan, ers of drug trafficking in Afghanistan

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are diverse. Money is obviously a factor, This research study has begun to fill in however country-wide poverty, a lack some of the knowledge gaps associated of licit livelihood opportunities and with drug trafficking organizations a permissive social environment are in Afghanistan and how they oper- also motivating factors. The report also ate, both within Afghanistan and in shows that Quachaqbar are capable of a international markets. However, this high degree of complexity. Comments research was very much an initial from Quachaqbar across Afghanistan look at these issues, and in some cases demonstrated that traffickers were exposed areas that would benefit from adept at using modern communication further research. These areas include: methods, co-ordinating relationships further understanding the motiva- with multiple different actors includ- tions behind why traffickers enter and ing other trafficking organizations, remain involved in opiate trafficking, corrupt officials and insurgent groups, and the variety of business models of and developing complex conceal- Afghan drug traffickers. Links between ment methods for drug shipments. A opiate trafficking and Anti-Govern- multi-faceted approach, based on law ment Elements and the role of women enforcement, alternative development, in opiate trafficking are also important education and political will is required areas for future research. to address the drivers and the complex- ity of drug trafficking organizations in Afghanistan. The findings of this report dovetail with some activities either ongoing under the UNODC Afghanistan Country Office Program 2016-2020 or planned under the Program for 2021-2024. Expanding forensic intelli- gence capacity on heroin manufacture and trafficking – initiated under the current country program and to be extended under the future program, is urgently required. Heroin manufac- ture is a regional and global issue, and countries beyond Afghanistan would benefit from examining this topic in more detail. The Country Program has also, in conjunction with UN Women, initiated the concept “Empowering Women to Transform Social Norms Driving Opium Poppy Cultivation”. The findings in this report suggest that broadening the concept to also include trafficking may be beneficial.

10 “Voices of the Quchaqbar” SECTION 1: Motivational factors behind starting and continuing to traffick illicit drugs

and/or collectively influenced “…finding a proper drug traffickers in entering the job is difficult. And because drug business in Afghanistan. [the] drug trade has good money… The the quote to the left from I can support my family.” a trafficker based in Northern “I was motivated and encouraged Afghanistan highlights several by others into drug trafficking. I hold motivational forces (i.e. earn- an undergraduate degree, but I was ing money, power, having a unemployed and starting this business good life style, and influence was the only option [that] remained.” I know people who were over other people) that lie “I have no other income sources and I “broke before being involved behind involvement in illicit have still not repaid all my debt, so I in drug trafficking and after -get drug trafficking. need to continue in the business.” ting into this business now they are rich, influential and have a lot of sup- Motivations for “I have been a bus driver for a long time and [my] income was not suffi- port and that is why I wanted to do this Starting to Traffick business. cient to support [my] family[‘s] living Opiates expenses. Since I have started traffick- The personal and socio-economic ing drugs, [I have] managed to buy a house and send [my] kids to private Drug traffickers ”motivations of the interviewed traf- school.” smuggle drugs for a variety of reasons. fickers for their involvement in opiate This section seeks to explore the main trafficking are illustrated below. “I started this business for economic motivational factors for traffickers in Respondents gave multiple motiva- reasons and because of high living costs Afghanistan through interviewing a tions for them entering the opiate and [to pay] for my son’s wedding.” study group, exploring why traffickers trade. “I was a daily wage worker in Iran became involved in opiate traffick- The primary motivation for traffick- and the income was not sufficient, so ing and why they continued their ers in entering the drug business is I decided to to start drug trafficking involvement once they had entered undoubtedly the lure of money and since the income is good.” the business1. The interviews revealed personal enrichment, in an environ- a number of drivers that individually ment where there is a lack of social

Fig. 1: Motivational Factors for Starting to Traffick Opiates* (Number of Times Mentioned by Traffickers) security to provide resilience against Lack of security No other op�on economic shocks. Their choice to The focus on trust and use of family Key mo�va�onal forces (i.e. earning money members or close friends for trafficking and a lack of employment) coupled with ac�vity is important, as it provides an having no other op�on than drug trafficking start trafficking is well embedded in extra degree of security and protec�on persuaded traffickers to traffic illicit opiates. against law enforcement ac�vity. 1 an environment where employment and income can be scarce, irregular, Poverty A quarter of the Ag�an labor force and where conditions conducive to is unemployed, and 80 per cent of employment is vulnerable and insecure, 1 comprising self- or own-account illegal activities are permissive. Social employment, day labor, or unpaid work. Earning Money and economic factors, including A large propor�on (36.6 per cent) 4 of the traffickers interviewed country-wide poverty and a lack of stressed that earning money was a major driving force behind their involvement in drug trafficking. licit livelihood opportunities are also Social Environment 10 motivating factors. According to the Several traffickers believed that their social environment 25%26 World Bank, few Afghans have access provided a significant contributory mo�va�on for them to traffic illicit drugs. to sustainable, productive or remu- nerative employment. A quarter of 14 the labor force is unemployed, and 80 per cent of employment is vulner- Lack of Employment Opportuni�es able and insecure, comprising self- or The lack of legal employment opportuni�es is the second most frequent mo�va�onal own-account employment, day labor, reason (15 per cent) for traffickers to enter 2 the illicit opiate trade. or unpaid work . This requires people

* Some traffickers provided multiple motivational factors in answering to this question, so the total to seek other, sometimes illegal, means number of answers is higher than the 41 traffickers that were interviewed. 2 World Bank Country Overview, Afghanistan, 1 The major socio-demographic characteristics www.worldbank.org, accessed on 01 October of the study group are detailed in Section 2. 2019.

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of obtaining an income. More Social factors appear important with recently, the International Labour most participants indicating that they Office (ILO) reported that insuffi- “The profit from drug traf- use family members, friends, col- cient paid work affects almost half ficking is very good. It requires leagues and other contacts whom a billion people worldwide3, and very little investment and is an easy they know in their neighborhood a large proportion of traffickers job.” and whom they can trust, to assist interviewed for this report, across “It is easy to traffic drugs… and if in trafficking activity. For example, all regions of Afghanistan, stressed one had the necessary connections one trafficker suggested that the that earning money – often in the [anyone] would have done it.” “drug trade is a business that you do absence of any other licit employ- with friends and people you know “…the money is good, there is a lot of ment opportunities - was a major and trust. There are people from cash involved and it is an easy business driving force behind their involve- with less efforts [required].” different tribes and also friends ment in drug trafficking: and relatives that I work with”. The Detailed analysis of traffickers’ focus on trust and use of family answers to the question of “Can members or close friends for trafficking you please explain to us what motivated activity is important, as it may provide you to trade drugs?” indicates that also an easy business to enter and to an extra degree of security and protec- earning money from opiate traffick- remain involved in and required less tion against law enforcement activity. ing is either linked with “expectations effort than other work. The immediate physical and sociocul- of a pleasant and a comfortable life” Fifteen per cent of traffickers reported tural settings appeared to be exerting or is associated with coping with a lack of legal employment opportuni- an influence on individuals and/or “high living costs and/or difficult eco- ties as their main reason for starting encourage those who do not have the nomic conditions”. Statements from opiate trafficking. 37 per cent of the possibility to access legal employment traffickers contained the following interviewees were influenced by mul- opportunities to start trafficking. The expressions and key words: “making a tiple factors. In other words, both following quotes from the interviews, lot of money”, “having a good lifestyle”, major key motivational forces (i.e. from traffickers across Afghanistan, “economic issues”, “difficult conditions”, earning money and a lack of employ- underline the role and the influence “high living costs”, and “debt”. All of ment) coupled with other factors such of social environment, peers, friends, these key expressions demonstrate as a lack of (social) security or having no and family members in encouraging the multiplicity of economic reasons other option than drug trafficking per- people to start trafficking: motivating traffickers, and the influ- suaded those to traffic illicit opiates, ence on traffickers’ decision-making suggesting that involvement in the processes to start opiate trafficking. illicit drug business is more com- Some traffickers reported that they plex than simply earning money. used profits from trafficking to cover In the same manner that opium “I was motivated and large one-off costs, such as a wedding cultivation has become a crucial encouraged by others into drug or private schooling. Understanding pillar of Afghanistan’s economy trafficking.” more deeply the key drivers behind - not only for farmers, but also “Drug trafficking is a common business an individual’s involvement in drug the many communities who have in our province.” trafficking, would need to examine become dependent on the income “Because others do [it], we also do the socio-economic situation of indi- from opium poppy to sustain [drug trafficking].” vidual traffickers. Previous UNODC their livelihoods - the trafficking research on the motivation of opium of illicit drugs within Afghanistan “…because of money and having a poppy farmers identified the high sale also contributes significantly to the good life style like others.” price of opium, poverty, a chance to Afghan economy and provides “A friend of mine is a major drug traf- improve living conditions, gaining a employment opportunities. ficker. I used to work for his real estate high income from little land, a high Most of the motivational reasons agency [a front business] and as we demand for opium, lack of employ- for traffickers starting to traf- developed trust, he told me his real business and told me if I am inter- ment opportunities and insecurity as fick drugs stated above, could be reasons for cultivating opium poppy4. ested, he can teach me how to do the clustered under the category of business.” There was a sense from some traffick- economic and financial factors. ers that not only did opiate trafficking However, in addition to reporting “In our area if a man does not cultivate provide a good income, but that it was earning money, unemployment, and poppy or [do] drug smuggling, [he] will be addressed as a woman.” poverty, as motivational factors, 3 World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends several traffickers believed that 2020 International Labour Office (ILO), their social environment provided Geneva, January 2020. 4 UNODC Afghan Opium Survey: a significant contributory motiva- Socio-Economic Analysis, 2014. tion for them to traffic illicit drugs.

12 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

Motivations for Fig. 2: Motivational Factors for Continuing in the Illicit Opiate Trade* Continuing to Traffick (Number of Times Mentioned by Traffickers) Opiates No Answer Some traffickers did not answer this ques�on. The dominant factors associated with $ the continuation of illicit drug traf- Lack of Employment Corrup�on and Unfairness A minority of traffickers thought corrup�on Opportuni�es and weak governance was a jus�fica�on for con�nuing to traffic opiates ficking are shown in the chart below. Some traffickers considered a lack of employment to be the driving force behind their mo�va�on to engage in 1 Earning money appears to be the most illicit drug trafficking. important determinant for traffickers to continue in illicit drug trafficking Easy to do 2 There was a sense from some traffickers that not only did the – more so than initially becoming opiate trade provide a good income, but that it was also an easy business to enter and to remain involved in. Earning Money involved in trafficking. 54 per cent of 3 3 Earning money appears to be the most important determinant for traffickers to con�nue in illicit the participants agreed that earning drug trafficking. money was a major driver in their con- 5 No other op�on tinuing to traffick opiates, compared Once involved, the financial benefits 25%35 obtained from trafficking opiates make it with only 37 per cent of respondents difficult for traffickers to leave the trade. who said it was a motivation for start- 5 ing to traffick opiates. This suggests This is my Job that once involved, the financial ben- 31.7 per cent of traffickers consider illicit drug trafficking to be a proper business like any other efits obtained from trafficking opiates and do not see an alterna�ve. make it difficult for traffickers to stop trafficking once they had entered, especially in the context of limited employment opportunities mentioned * Traffickers gave multiple responses, so the total number of answers is more than the 41 traffickers interviewed. above. One group of the interviewed traffick- As an example, one of the interviewees ers, consider drug trafficking to be a is a well-established trafficker operat- business for which they don’t see an ing since the 1980s, who manages alternative: a large international drug traffick- ing organisation (trafficking outside of the region to North America and Europe). He indicated that he consid- ers himself to be a business person, “I will continue as long as there is corruption and unfair- who makes significant profits and ness and the government is not [strong] enjoys his wealth and lifestyle. The enough to stop drug trafficking…” power, social and economic status, influence, and excitement of living “I continued in the drug trade because a comfortable life are associated of its profit[ability], compared to many other jobs” with his willingness to continue in this role long after he has accu- “This is my business now. I have gained mulated significant wealth. experience and expertise in this busi- ness and have no interest in doing anything else. The drug trade also has good money.” “I have invested so much money in this business I am not able to leave now and need to continue.” “It is over 20 years [that] I have been in this business. This is now my job and [I] cannot do any other work.”

13 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION SECTION 2: Who are the traffickers? The socio-demograpic characteristics of drug traffickers

Some of the socio-demographic char- Fig. 3: Age Grouping of Interviewed Traffickers acteristics of the opiate traffickers who were part of the study group are out- 35 to 49 years lined below. These socio-demographic 24 characteristics include age, gender, the size of drug trafficking activity, years of experience in drug trafficking, extent of legal business activity, and their consumption of drugs. Other 50 to 60 years socio-demographic details were also 20 to 34 years obtained, including trafficker’s role in opiate trafficking organizations, their motivations for continuing to be part of a DTO and their involvement in running an opiate laboratory. These characteristics are covered in more detail in later sections of the report. > 60 years The average age of the interviewed traffickers was 43 years, with the youngest respondent aged 22 and the oldest 65 years old. 76 per cent SIZE OF DRUG TRADE BUSINESS Fig. 4: Quantity of Opiates Trafficked (Kgs), per Month, �N=41� were younger than 50 years. All of the by Interviewed Drug Traffickers 41 interviewed traffickers were male. While previous studies illuminated the Large (≥ 41 kg) kg kg kg kg kg role of women in poppy cultivation Large traffickers were those 5 who moved more than 41 kilograms and opium production , the research 5 of opiates per month kg kg kg kg kg kg team was unable to interview female traffickers. kg kg kg kg kg kg Medium (>10 – < 41 kg) kg kg kg kg kg kg In the wider literature on drug traffick- Medium traffickers were those ho moved ing, there is no standard classification 18 between 11 and 41 kilograms of opiates per month used for determining whether a traf- kg kg kg kg kg kg ficker should be considered a large Small (1 to 10 kg) kg kg kg kg kg kg Small traffickers were those who or small trafficker. For this study, the moved 10 kilograms of opiates, or less, 18 per month threshold volume of drug trafficking kg kg kg kg kg kg activities was defined as the follow- ing amounts of opiates trafficked per Fig. 5: Years of Experience of Interviewed Drug Traffickers month: small scale trafficker 1-10 kg; EXPERIENCE IN DRUG TRADE �YEARS� �N=41� medium scale trafficker 11-40 kg; and large-scale trafficker ≥ 41 kg. According to the above classification, 16 16 of the 41 study participants, 18 self- identified themselves as small scale traffickers, with the remaining 23 (56 8 per cent) self-identifying as medium and large-scale drug traffickers. Only one of the interviewed traffickers could 1 be a considered a large-scale interna- tional trafficker, with a large heroin

5 UNODC World Drug Report 2018; UNODC Thematic Booklet “Women and Drugs: Drug use, drug supply and their consequences”, 2018; MCN/UNODC Afghanistan opium survey 0-5 Years 6-15 Years 16-30 Years Missing 2016 “ Value

14 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

CONSUMING DRUGS business supplying markets in Europe Fig. 6: Drug Consumption by Interviewed Traffickers�N=41� and North America, in addition to south-west Asia. The interviewed traffickers had differ- ent levels of seniority and experience in the business from the very junior (an inexperienced drug courier who had 12 29 Yes No Traffickers have consumed, Traffickers reported that they been involved in trafficking for one or currently consume, illicit drugs had never used illegal drugs. including heroin, opium, hashish and methamphetamine month, arrested at Kabul International (locally known as Shisha). Airport trying to smuggle the drugs to India), to a senior and experienced drug trafficker who has been traffick- ing illicit drugs for 30 years. Some 24 Map 1: Number of Drug Traffickers Interviewed, by province traffickers had more than five years CHINA of drug trafficking experience, with a UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN range of between 6 and 30 years. Of TURKMENISTAN 4 the others, 16 had five or less years of JAWZJAN 4 KUNDUZ TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN experience in trafficking. The major- BALKH

FARYAB SAMANGAN BAGHLAN ity of interviewed traffickers could SARI PUL Jammu PANJSHER NURISTAN BADGHIS therefore be considered to be relatively PARWAN KAPISA and BAMYAN KUNAR LAGHMAN

8 KABUL well-established traffickers, with eight WARDAK 5 Kashmir 4 HERAT GHOR traffickers being very well established LOGAR NANGARHAR DAYKUNDI PAKTYA having 16 or more years of experience GHAZNI KHOST

URUZGAN in opiate trafficking. FARAH PAKISTAN PAKTIKA 4 ZABUL Of the study group, twelve respondents # Number of Key Informants Poppy cultivation (ha), 2018 Poppy free said they have consumed, or cur- NIMROZ KANDAHAR HILMAND IRAN Less than 1,000 ha (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC rently consume, illicit drugs including 1,001 - 10,000 ha OF) 4 4 4 INDIA heroin, opium, hashish and metham- 10,001 - 20,000 ha 20,000 - 30,000 ha phetamine (locally known as Shisha). More than 30,000 ha

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Of the twelve, four said that they Source:Control in Jammu UNODC. and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. consumed hashish and one consumed The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorse- ment or acceptance by the United Nations. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control opium. The other six respondents in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has reported that they consumed opiates not yet been agreed upon by the parties. for “quality control” purposes, but in their opinion, this did not make The interviewed traffickers came from them addicts or frequent drug users. several provinces within Afghanistan. The one large-scale drug trafficker who The participants come from and/or was interviewed reported, “I have been operate in: poppy cultivating prov- using Shisha (meth) for the last few years. inces; provinces where there has been I had to stay awake during the night for history and evidence of opiate process- my business and needed something strong ing; and/or border provinces that are to keep me awake and Shisha was very located on the major opiates traffick- helpful”. ing routes out of Afghanistan.

15 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

SECTION 3: Business models of drug trafficking networks

described a business model to Helmand through the routes under whereby “small scale illicit Taliban control”. Another drug traf- drug traders buy the opium ficker provided a detailed account of from farmers, then sell to the his modus operandi concerning inter- medium level traders. At the provincial trafficking: “If the shipment end of the trade-chain are the is large then [we] organize a security major drug dealers who oper- escort, if small then we smuggle with a ate at the national level”. Two motorbike or sometimes with a car. If the other drug traffickers from security is tight in Farah, then we traffic [The] drug trade is a the same region supported to Helmand and Nimroz and from there “business that you do with friends this observation by saying to outside Afghanistan”. He added that and people you know and trust. that it was the “medium and “the amount of trafficking is linked to major level traffickers [who are] the prices in Farah, Nimroz, and Iran involved in inter-provincial traf- as well as to the demand. If the prices are One ficking”. One of them added that my high in Helmand and Bahram Chah7, of the objec- ”“business is small and limited so [I] do then we traffic there”. tives of this research is to shed light not know much about this… [however] on the different business models of the major drug traffickers can answer Reasons for Internal drug traffickers and drug trafficking this question since this is their area of Trafficking Within organizations operating in Afghani- business”. Afghanistan stan. Business-related information These statements are in line with the provided by the drug traffickers, cov- concentric trafficking circles model. ered subjects including the number In this model, the peripheral circle is and size of illicit opiate laboratories, dominated by small-scale traffickers the volume of heroin production, the who sell the drugs to the inner “There are a number of rea- recruitment of chemists and/or cooks, circles. Major traffickers at the the number of laboratory workers, and sons namely, demand in other centre of the circle are those who provinces, restrictions and increase the extent of trafficking of other drug traffic large quantities of opiates to in patrolling in certain provinces, the types and commodities. This knowl- international destinations6. While trafficking routes are known to the edge facilitates further understanding this model is relatively simplistic, law enforcement in some provinces of the characteristics of drug traffick- the trafficker’s responses suggest and sometimes there are high profits ing networks operating in Afghanistan. that, in part, this model may to traffic heroin to a certain province.” Internal Trafficking apply to opiate trafficking within Methods and Modus Afghanistan. A senior trafficker interviewed in this Operandi This study study, and based in western Afghani- Traffickers were asked to describe sought to understand what drives stan, described his trafficking activity how they organize their drug traf- inter-provincial trafficking within as following: “[I]smuggle from Farah ficking in Afghanistan. Generally, the Afghanistan. The major motiva- to Nimroz since the Taliban provide interviewed drug traffickers transport tional factors for inter-provincial protection and sometimes from Farah opium, heroin and other types of drug trafficking were reported to be: to Helmand, provided that the route is drugs, as well as the heroin precur- high demand for opiates in other open, and the prices are high”. Another sor chemical acetic anhydride, from provinces, greater financial gain and drug trafficker stated, “We smuggle district to district and province to profit, high quality of drugs and from Farah to border areas with Iran. province within Afghanistan. Some avoiding law enforcement intercep- If the security along the border is tight 22 of 41 drug traffickers reported tion. “High demand” for opiates was and we do not get support and protec- only moving drugs between provinces the most recurrent reason given by tion from the Taliban, then we smuggle within Afghanistan but did not traffick outside Afghanistan’s external borders. 7 Bahram Chah is a large drug market lying Such inter-provincial trafficking was 6 Some of these large-scale traffickers in directly on the border between Afghanistan Afghanistan, who have been convicted for and Pakistan. Built by the drug trafficker Haji a wide-spread practice among the drug trafficking offenses include Haji Juma Juma Khan in the late 1990s, it has become a study group. A trafficker from East- Khan (Helmand/Nimroz), Haji Baghcho long-standing drug trafficking point as well as (Nangahar), Haji Watan (Nangarhar), Haji Lal a major Taliban stronghold, highlighting the ern Afghanistan, who has trafficked Jan (Helmand) and Haji Bashir Noorzai (Kan- nexus between the drugs trade and the insur- illicit drugs for the last three years dahar). gency.

16 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

the interviewed traffickers, with 21 of Table 1: The Cost in USD of Transportation of 1kg Heroin Within them referring to the “high demand in Afghanistan other provinces” as an important driver for inter-provincial opiate trafficking. ROUTE PRICE IN USD-$ Narrative text analysis revealed that From Badakhshan to Kunduz and Takhar 150 for this study group, the opiate market within Afghanistan is demand-driven. From Badakhshan to Kabul 200 Demand in other provinces is also From Balkh to other provinces 100-127 closely linked with trafficking outside of Afghanistan, with nine traffickers From Farah to Helmand and Herat 300-350 stating that they move illicit drugs From Balkh, Jalalabad, and Kandahar to Helmand 45-95 towards Afghan provinces that border neighbouring countries, in order to Within Herat 80-200 traffick drugs outside of Afghani- Average price from Provinces to Kabul 80-150 stan. Economic and financial factors are also clearly important, with the From Jalalabad to Kandahar 80-90 “high price” of opiates in other prov- From Balkh to Kandahar 80-90 inces being the second most frequent answer to describe the reasons behind From Nangarhar to Kabul 20-60 trafficking internally within Afghani- From Nimroz to Helmand 300-360 stan. Indeed, one trafficker was very brief and straightforward in his reply, From Farah to Nimroz 350 stating that illicit opiates were traf- ficked internally “because of the higher price in certain provinces”. Traffickers around USD 300-360 (from Nimroz including Iranian Rial (Toman), Pak- in some provinces reported that they to Helmand). Even though Nimroz istani Rupees (Kaldar), and Afghan sought higher quality drugs from other and Helmand have a strong Taliban Afghanis. During the analysis of provinces. For example, Badakhshan and Anti-Government Element (AGE) survey reports those currencies were 8 province has long had a reputation for presence, ongoing counter-insurgency converted to US Dollars . and counter-narcotics operations in high quality processing, so traffickers Main Destinations for those provinces may increase the risk, either bought heroin from the prov- Opiate Trafficking ince and trafficked it to their home and therefore compensation, required provinces or sent their opium there when trafficking opiates. The cost Traffickers gave a range of answers for processing. for Herat was provided by an inter- when questioned about the final inter- viewed trafficker in another province, nal destinations within Afghanistan The Estimated Costs who estimated that trafficking a kilo for their opiate shipments. According of Interprovincial of heroin across Herat province cost to traffickers from Northern Afghani- Trafficking between USD 80-200. stan, illicit opiates depart from Argo, Derayem, Wardoj, Tashkan, and Traffickers were asked to describe Two drug traffickers shared their Kishim districts in Badakhshan prov- the cost of transporting opiates knowledge on the cost of transpor- ince for trafficking to Eshkashim, within provinces in Afghanistan. The tation to destinations outside of Yaftel, Shahar Bozor Ragh, and estimated costs reported by the respon- Afghanistan. From Kabul to Canada, Sheghnan districts in the vicinity of dents were based on their experience the transportation cost of 1kg of the Afghan-Tajik border, presumably and knowledge and was contingent heroin was reported as being between for onward trafficking to Central Asia upon risk factors including the time USD 7,000-10,000, while to unspeci- and potentially beyond. One drug and location of trafficking activity, the fied countries in Europe the cost was trafficker added that illicit drugs were quality of the drug trafficked, and other between USD 4,000-6,000. One of trafficked from Badakhshan to Takhar factors. From the data shown below, the interviewees - a courier- reported and, in particular, Khaja Bahuddin the lowest value for the cost of inter- that he was paid USD 2 per gram to district. Traffickers from Northern nal transportation for 1 kg of heroin smuggle heroin to India, equivalent to Afghanistan also reported that from reported by traffickers was 20 USD USD 2,000 per kilogram. Participants

(from Nangarhar to Kabul), whereas appeared to use a range of different 8 Exchange rates for October 2019 were used the highest transportation cost was currencies to pay for transport costs, for the conversion.

17 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

Map 2: Trafficking Routes in Badakhshan as described by Drug Traffickers

UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN CHINA UZBEKISTAN TURKMENISTAN

Jammu

and KYRGYZSTAN AFGHANISTAN Kashmir

CHINA

IRAN PAKISTAN Nusai (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF) INDIA Shaki Darwaz Darwaz-e-Balla UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN

Kofab

Khwahan

Aikhanoum Raghestan Shighnan Yangi Qala Yawan Darqad Chahab Kohestan Shegnan Khwajabahawuddin Yaftal-e-Sufla Shirkhan Bandar Arghanjkhwa Shahr-e-Buzorg Dasht-e- Qala Fayzabad Kaldar Emamsaheb Rostaq Argo Shuhada Wakhan Khwajaghar Baharak KUNDUZ Dasht-e-Archi TAKHAR Hazarsumuch Khash Qala-e-Zal Darayem Eshkashem Baharak Jorm Eshkmesh Khulm Kunduz Kalafgan Keshem Teshkan Warduj Taloqan Broghol Chardarah Khanabad Bangi Aliabad Chal Namakab Farkhar Tagab Hazrat-e- Sultan Yamgan Zebak Eshkashem Baghlan-e-Jadid

Aybak Burka Guzargah-e- Nur Fereng Wa Gharu Dara-e- Suf-e- Payin Warsaj BADAKHSHAN Jammu Pul-e- khumri Nahrin Khuram Wa Sarbagh Khwajahejran and Dara-e Suf-e-Bala Khost Wa Fereng Koran wa Monjan Kashmir Dahana-e-Ghori BAGHLAN SAMANGAN Barg-e- Matal Dehsalah PAKISTAN Ruy-e-Duab Andarab Paryan Pul-e-Hesar North-eastern Region Doshi Khenjan Kamdesh Khenj (Hes-e- Awal) Mandol Official Border Crossing Point Kahmard Bazarak Poruns Tala Wa barfak Shutul PANJSHER NURISTAN Salang Rukha Waygal Nari Sayghan Dara Duab Ghaziabad Opiates trafficking route Shibar Shinwari Nurgeram Wama BAMYAN Poruns Source:The boundaries UNODC. and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by IndiaKAPISA and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The boundaries PARWANand names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Balkh province, illicit opiates are of Afghanistan passing through Zabul customers from Herat and Helmand trafficked to destinations in Sari Pul and Uruzgan provinces to Helmand, and [his] business is going well”, sug- (Kohastanat district), Farah, Faryab, as well as to Nimroz, probably for gesting that trafficking from Kandahar Helmand, and Jawazjan provinces. onward trafficking to Iran and Paki- to Herat and Helmand also occurs. The major destination for opiate stan, passing by both official and Another southern based trafficker trafficking from Farah province, men- unofficial borders crossing and cus- reported that opiates were trafficked tioned by interviewed drug traffickers, toms points to reach these countries. from Mazar-i Sharif in Balkh prov- was reportedly the Islamic Republic of Confirming other statements, one ince through Bamyan to Helmand. Iran, with some drugs also trafficked to trafficker reported the inter-provin- The statements from traffickers in Nimroz in Afghanistan. From Herat, cial trafficking of heroin, opium and Afghanistan’s Southern Region, sug- major destinations for trafficked opi- hashish into Helmand province from gests a considerable north-south and ates included Farah Province and other multiple areas including Balkh, Nan- east-south flow of opiates from other districts within Herat province, and garhar, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Herat, regions of Afghanistan to the southern neighbouring countries including and Nimroz provinces. Another drug region. the Islamic Republic of Iran. From trafficker from Southern Afghanistan, For international trafficking, the Nimroz province, traffickers reported underlined the extent of inter-provin- surveyed drug traffickers stated that that the main destination for trafficked cial drug trafficking in Afghanistan. In over the last ten years Iran, Pakistan, opiates were Iran and specifically to his observation, he noted that heroin India, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Zabol city in Iran’s Sistan va Baluch- was trafficked to Helmand from Nan- Tanzania, United States, Canada and istan province. garhar, Balkh, Uruzgan, Kandahar, the Netherlands have been the major In the eyes of the interviewed traffick- Zabul, and Kunduz. international destinations for the traf- ers located in Southern Afghanistan, Interviewed drug traffickers also ficking of their opiates. According to the major destination for illicit drugs reported that illicit drugs are trafficked the interviewed traffickers, illicit opi- trafficked into Helmand, was to other to Kandahar province from Balkh, ates are trafficked from Herat, Farah, locations in Helmand. They also Farah, Helmand, Herat and from Jalal- Nimroz, Kandahar and Nangarhar reported that opiates are trafficked abad city in Nangarhar. One southern to Kabul, most likely for onwards from eastern and northern provinces trafficker reported that he has “many trafficking to international markets.

18 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

Map 3: Official and Unofficial Border Crossings in Afghanistan, and Trafficking Flows Reported by Drug Traffickers

Nusai UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN ShakiDarwaz Darwaz-e-Balla Kofab Aikhanum Khwahan

Raghestan Shighnan Yangi QalaYawan Aqina Hairatan Shirkhan Bandar Darqad Chahab Kohestan Shegnan Khamyab Shahr-e-Buzorg TURKMENISTAN Qarqin Khwajabahawuddin Arghanjkhwa Shortepa Dasht-e- Qala Khan-e-Char Bagh Sharak-e-Hayratan Rostaq Fayzabad Shuhada Mingajik Dawlatabad Kaldar Emamsaheb Argo Eshkashem Wakhan Qorghan KhashBaharak Khwajadukoh Mardyan Nahr-e- Shahi Qala-e-Zal Dasht-e-Archi Kunduz Baharak Kalafgan Darayem Qaramqol Andkhoy Khanaqa Balkh Dehdadi Khulm Eshkmesh Taloqan KeshemTeshkan Jorm Shiberghan Fayzabad Charbulak Marmul ChardarahKUNDUZ Warduj Bangi Dawlatabad JAWZJAN BALKH Khanabad Namakab Broghol Chemtal Feroznakhchir Aliabad Chal Farkhar Tagab Yamgan Zebak Charkent Hazrat-e- Sultan Sar-e-Pul Baghlan-e-Jadid Eshkashem BADAKHSHAN Qushtepa Sholgareh Shirintagab Aybak Burka Warsaj Sayad Gosfandi Dara-e- Suf-e- Payin Pul-e- khumri Khwajasabzposh Khuram Wa Sarbagh Nahrin Khwajahejran TAKHAR Almar Darzab Sozmaqala Keshendeh Bilcheragh Zari BAGHLAN Koran wa Monjan Dahana-e-Ghori Pashtunkot SAMANGAN Khost Wa Fereng Barg-e- Matal Ghormach Dara-e Suf-e-Bala Dehsalah Qaysar Garziwan Ruy-e-Duab Andarab Paryan FARYAB Doshi Towraghondi Balkhab Khenjan Kamdesh Balamurghab Kohestanat PANJSHERMandol Poruns Jammu Kohestan Kahmard SARI PUL Tala Wa barfak SalangShutul NURISTAN Nari Shinwari Dara Duab Gulran Muqur BADGHIS Charsadra Sayghan Wama Waygal Ghaziabad Ghorband Nejrab Nurgeram Kushk Jawand Shigal Wa sheltan Yakawlang BAMYAN Shekhali KAPISA Alingar Chapadara and Kushk-e-Kohna Abkamari Qadis Shibar Surkh-e- Parsa KUNAR Dangam Islam Qala Qala-e-Naw AFGHANISTAN Bamyan PARWAN Tagab LAGHMAN Sarkani Chaghcharan Alishang Nurgal Kabul Mehtarlam Kohsan Injil Lal Wa Sarjangal Khaskunar Karukh Dawlatyar Hesa-e- Awal-e- Behsud Jalrez Kama Kashmir Chisht-e-Sharif Panjab Goshta Zindajan Herat Markaz-e-Behsud PaghmanKABUL Behsud Obe WARDAK Nerkh Hesarak Sherzad Lalpur Khogyani Rodat Pashtunzarghun Sang-e-Takht Daymirdad Mohammadagha Ghoryan GHOR Waras Azra Kot DoLayna Ashtarlay Chak NANGARHARDurbaba Torkham Guzara HERAT Tolak LOGAR Achin Shahrak Dehbala Farsi Khadir Saydabad Pul-e- Alam Alikhel (Jaji) Nili Miramor Nawur Jaghatu Ahmadaba Sayedkaram Shahrestan Kharwar Adraskan Rashidan Gardez Musakhel Jajimaydan Saghar Pasaband DAYKUNDI Ghazni Sabari Taywarah kiti Ajrestan GHAZNI Jaghatu Dehyak PAKTYA Bak Gizab Waghaz Zurmat KHOSTTerezayi Malestan Andar Zadran Khost Shindand Kajran Qarabagh Sharan Gurbuz Purchaman Baghran Jaghuri ZirukSperaTani Giro Yosufkhel Ghulam Khan Anardara Khasuruzgan UrgunGyan Shahid-e-Hassas Chora Muqur Kakar Abband Omna Sarrawzah Balabuluk FARAH Tirinkot Khak-e-Safed Gelan SarobiBermel Gulestan Dehrawud URUZGAN Janikhel Daychopan Dila Shahjoy Pushtrod Nawzad Kajaki Arghandab PAKTIKA Qala-e-Kah Musaqalah Nesh Miyanshin Gomal Farah Nawa Wazakhah Bakwa Mizan Qalat Nawbahar Washer Sangin Shibkoh Ghorak Shahwalikot Khakrez ZABUL Turwo (Tarwe) Tarnak Wa Jaldak Wormamay Lash-e-Juwayn Nahr-e-Saraj Shinkay Shomulzay Arghandab Abu Naser Farahi Khashrod Atghar Zheray Daman Nad-e-Ali Maywand Kandahar Arghestan Lashkargah Maruf Kang NIMROZ Nawa-e-Barakzaiy PAKISTAN Chakhansur Panjwayi Zaranj Spinboldak Zaranj Reg HILMAND Wesh Official Border Crossing Point KANDAHAR IRAN Unofficial Border Crossing Point (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC Garmser Opiates trafficking route Charburjak Reg Shorabak OF) Deh-e-shu Ring road INDIA Road

Source: UNODC. TheThe boundaries boundaries and andnames names shown shown and the designationsand the designations used on this mapused do on not this imply map official do endorsement not imply orofficial acceptance endorsement by the United orNations. acceptance Dashed linesby the represent United undetermined Nations. The dotted line boundaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed representsupon by the approximatelyparties. the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Fig. 7: Risk Mitigation Measures Taken by Drug Traffickers to Protect Large shipments of opiates appear to Drug Shipments (Number of Times Mentioned by Traffickers) be trafficked through insecure areas outside of Government control, while smaller shipments are sent through 35 the main roads that are under Gov- ernment control. Drugs are trafficked Assessing routes 23 Undertaking an assessment of the route is the most along the National Ring Road from common protec�ve measure before trafficking opiates. Employing addi�onal people to serve as the provinces of Herat, Farah, Nimroz, security escort or to conduct reconnaissance of the Delaying transporta�on route in advance to iden�fy any poten�al problems. A number of traffickers delaying the transporta�on Kandahar and Nangahar to reach of illicit drugs un�l security issues were resolved. Kabul. 12

Protective Measures Limit trade to trusted people Traffickers prefer to limit trades and to trade only with 5 Taken During Trafficking those whom they trust, if risks appear to be high. Similarly, the quan�ty of illicit drugs trafficked in a shipment are some�mes decreased to reduce the risks Bribery When moving opiates and other types (and presumably financial losses) should a shipment be Bribes are offered to influence delibera�ons and intercepted. ac�ons, including police ac�vi�es and judicial of drugs from one province to another, decisions, thereby eroding the rule of law and trust in ins�tu�ons. The delivery of public services within the interviewed drug traffickers stated 3 Afghanistan remains severely affected by bribery that they undertook risk assessments and corrup�on. and applied a set of risk mitigation Complex concealment methods Some traffickers use novel or sophis�cated 2 measures to avoid law enforcement methods to hide drugs and prevent detec�on. interception, prevent potential clashes Informa�on gathering 1 Some traffickers share informa�on about the best with other DTOs, and reduce the pos- trafficking routes to use, or security risks that might be present that might risk their opiate shipments. sibility of the theft of their opiates. The Background check Some traffickers inves�gate their customers to figure below presents the breakdown make sure they are interested in purchasing 1 Working with Taliban drugs and are not police informants. Some traffickers worked with or paid insurgents to of the protective measures described. protect shipments from law enforcement ac�vity. Swallowing drugs 1 Undertaking an assessment of the Couriers mostly swallow drugs in order to route prior to trafficking, was the most protect the shipment from being detected. 1 Using women or children common protective measure made by Most Afghan police are male so using women to traffick drug shipments make them les likely to be searched. 19 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

traffickers before they shipped only one trafficker explicitly referred opiates. This involved employ- to seeking the cooperation of the “Protective measures ing additional people to serve as Taliban as a protective measure, depend on the situation, a security escort or to conduct trafficking route and destination. We suggesting that the Taliban may reconnaissance of the route in have police officers working with us play a limited role in providing advance to identify any potential at the provinces, along the trafficking protection for drug trafficking problems. Six traffickers stated routes and at the borders.” – at least for the traffickers inter- that when security was tightened viewed. Several factors may explain “Smuggling is usually happening at in their provinces, and especially this result, including the relatively night. We have people who go and if there had been a recent drug check the route, coordinators who small sample of traffickers inter- related seizure or arrest made in work with the police checkpoints, viewed and a possible concern that province, they moved their people who know the route very well. from traffickers that too close drugs to other provinces. In We have [a] security escort as well as engagement with the Taliban or connection with increased law informants among [the] police and other AGEs may actually generate enforcement presence and actions, Taliban.” greater risk to their business due traffickers reported that when a “We… have corrupt government offi- to counter-insurgency operations. new chief of police and/or new cials on our payroll.” governor was appointed they con- Cross-Border Drug sidered these new appointments “I have people who travel different Trafficking routes/roads [by] motorcycle to assess to be a force majeure requiring The study sought information the situation and if I am stopped by a need to apply counter-security law enforcement along the way while regarding the major arrangements measures and to transport illicit trafficking, I make a deal with them.” drug traffickers made for cross- drugs to other provinces. border opiates smuggling to other The second most common coun- countries. Traffickers were asked to termeasure against risks, was share their experience, knowledge and delaying the transportation of illicit was observations regarding the trafficking drugs until the situation had stabi- his way of of opiates across Afghanistan’s national lised. When risks appeared to be high, deterring male law enforcement offi- borders. Respondents were very brief traffickers preferred to limit activity cers from stopping and searching the and direct in their responses, probably and to traffick only with those people vehicle. because this question was sensitive or whom they trust. Similarly, traffickers DTOs appear to be sensitive, because they had limited knowledge sometimes decreased the quantity of responsive and adaptive to changing about cross border trafficking activity. illicit drugs trafficked in a shipment conditions and are aware of security Just over half of participants (51 per to reduce the risks (and presumably issues. The wider literature on drug cent) were of the view that both official to reduce financial losses should a trafficking describes the most suc- and unofficial border crossing points shipment be intercepted). Drug traf- cessful dealers as those who are able are used in trafficking illicit drugs. Just fickers also stated that bribing public to adapt to new circumstances and over a third (34 per cent) believed that officials was used as a protective mea- exploit new opportunities10. The only unofficial border crossing points sure. Bribes are offered to influence interviewed traffickers do appear to were used as a point of departure. A deliberations and actions, including try to identify and measure the risks small number of traffickers (3 per cent) police activities thereby eroding the to their shipments and take calculated thought that only official border cross- rule of law and trust in institutions, actions to mitigate them. In the course ings were used in external trafficking. and the delivery of public services of conducting risk assessments, they One trafficker suggested that “traf- within Afghanistan is severely affected reported that they collect and gather ficking [generally] takes place through by bribery and corruption9. information from civil and govern- unofficial border crossings. When there mental sources and can cooperate with are no issues with official border crossings Drug traffickers also reported that they and the situation is good, then official apply a range of concealment methods anti-Government elements and tribal authorities in exchange for freedom of border crossings are also used, particu- and make background checks of their larly during holidays and at weekends”. customers to reduce risks. For example, movement for the members of their one trafficker - a courier who has been organisation as well as their drugs. In a meeting with CNPA in August 2019, Afghan government officials working as a transporter moving illicit Although the “cooperation” or “sym- drugs between provinces for several biotic” relations between the Taliban War: An Oral History of the Helmand Con- DTOs - stated that during trafficking and drug traffickers are frequently ref- flict. Hurst and Co., 2012 (Page 107-108), Peters, G. Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs operations, he ensures that women and 11 erenced in literature , in this study and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War, St. children are present in his vehicle. This Martin’s Press, 2009, pages 121 and 123, and Inkster, N & Comoli, V, Drugs, Insecurity 10 Costa Storti, C., de Grauwe, P. Illicit Trade and Failed States: The Problems of Prohibition, 9 UNODC Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent and the Global Economy, MIT Press, 2012. International Institute of Strategic Studies Patterns and Trends, 2012. 11 For example, see: Martin, M. An Intimate 2012, Pages 80-81.

20 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

Fig. 8: Points Where Drugs from Afghanistan are Trafficked Across happens through roads controlled by Borders to Other Countries (Number of Times Mentioned by the Taliban and, that areas under Tali- Traffickers) ban control are increasingly used for Did not Answer trafficking of drugs from one province to another14. Other traffickers had a Unofficial Border Crossing different assessment and reported that Points and Airports the roads under the Government’s Both Official and Unofficial control were a better option when Border Crossing Points engaging in cross-border drug traf- ficking, possibly because they could Unofficial Border Crossing Points bribe officials to let the shipments pass unopposed. Official Border Crossing Points Working with International Drug 0 5 10 15 20 25 Traffickers Interviewed traffickers were asked to assessed that drug trafficking from the One of the research questions in this what extent they work with interna- four international airports in Afghan- study related to the strategies that tional drug traffickers. Almost half of istan12 had increased in the last five opiate traffickers use to overcome the interviewed drug traffickers (19 years.13 Two interviewed traffickers the risks associated with transporting traffickers) said they worked with also indicated that airports were being drugs and to understand how they international drug traffickers. The used to smuggle heroin to India and a choose the best routes. The largest pro- other part of the interviewed traffickers third interviewed trafficker described portion of respondents (41 per cent) (18 traffickers) said they did not work his heroin trafficking modus operandi preferred to use roads where there was with international traffickers and only using persons with dual nationality to limited control by the Government or operated in Afghanistan. The remain- smuggle heroin to Europe and North no presence of law enforcement. Seven America. Although he didn’t specifi- respondents (17 per cent) reported ing drug traffickers did not answer this cally mention airports, his modus using roads close to the Afghanistan- question or said they did not have operandi was clearly based around the Pakistan border. According to some knowledge on this matter. use of air couriers. He also revealed interviewed traffickers, and also con- Some of those who work with interna- that when moving drugs across official firmed by Afghanistan’s CNPA, opiate tional smugglers shared their working borders, his organisation traffics small trafficking from Nangarhar, Bada- arrangements. For example, one inter- amounts of drugs (possibly swallowed khshan and Kabul provinces often viewee from western Afghanistan said: or hidden by couriers) and uses “com- plex concealment methods” to disguise Fig. 9: Types of Routes for Cross-border Trafficking Reported by drugs. Traffickers. How Traffickers Assess the Risk Associated with Different Drug LIMITED CONTROL Trafficking Routes The largest proportion of respondents (17) preferred to use roads where there was either limited control by the Government or no CLOSE TO BORDER presence of law Seven respondents enforcement. reported using roads close to the Afghanistan- Pakistan border. ROADS UNDER “The best route TALIBAN CONTROL Four respondents from ROADS UNDER Nangarhar, Badakhshan is a route where there are and Kabul provinces GOVERNMENTAL specifically reported that CONTROL more corrupt police officers, they often used the roads Three respondents from controlled by the Taliban. Nangarhar province CNPA officials also reported that roads under we do info exchange and regu- reported changes in the Government’s control some interprovincial were a better option lar update along the trafficking trafficking routes within (possibly through Afghanistan. bribery). route.”

12 These are Kabul International Airport, Kanda- har International Airport, Herat International Airport, and Mazar-e Sharif International Air- port. 13 Meeting with CNPA officials, August 2019, 14 Meeting with CNPA officials, August 2019, Kabul, Afghanistan. Kabul, Afghanistan.

21 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

“We meet with Iranian traffickers and Tajikistan (three traffickers), India make the deal and necessary arrange- (four traffickers), and Turkmenistan ments. A money dealer (Hawaladar) and Uzbekistan (one trafficker each). then provides a financial guaran- “I used to travel a lot to tee for the Iranian trader and we India, Dubai, Pakistan, Iran, Poly-drug deliver the drugs to our Iranian Turkey, and Holland, but [during] the Trafficking by Afghan partner in the border area and later last two years, I have been in Afghani- Opiate DTO’s get our money from a money dealer”. stan due to some issues with my travel. While the focus of this study was Another drug trafficker from the I cannot give you the details, but I have to interview and understand the same region, further underlined had problems in India, Dubai, Iran and the role of a Hawaladar in acting recently Pakistan.” perspectives of opiate traffickers oper- as a trustee or notary between the seller ating in Afghanistan, some exploration and buyer, in addition to transfer- was done as to whether opiate DTO’s ring funds. The trafficker said: “With also trafficked other drugs or precur- Iranian traders, based on trust and a sor chemicals. The study group almost travel to neighbouring countries for financial guarantee from a Hawala- evenly divided into two. 20 drug traf- the purpose of drug trafficking, confin- dar, I deliver the heroin and they pay fickers reported that they only traffick ing their trafficking activity is limited me immediate wherever I want”. The in opiates. In comparison, 17 drug to within Afghanistan. Hawala financial transaction system traffickers stated that in addition to will be discussed in later sections. The Main Illicit Drug opiates they had also trafficked other Interviewed traffickers provided a Markets in the Region drugs, including cannabis (hashish), mixed picture on whether drug deals methamphetamine (in the form of Traffickers were asked to share their are made with international traffick- tablets), crystal meth, other synthetic perception on the most promising drug ers inside Afghanistan or abroad. One drugs (unspecified), and Tablet K17. trafficker reported that “foreign trad- market among the neighbouring coun- Of the small-scale traffickers inter- ers have people who come to the area tries. Participants acknowledged one viewed, 61 per cent stated that they and some of them work as a courier and or more countries in their responses. smuggle outside Afghanistan”. Between A common view was that Iran and did not engage in the trafficking other 2014-2019, Afghanistan has arrested Pakistan were the most promising types of drugs or precursor chemicals, and charged 23 foreign nationals illicit opiate markets in the region. with only 28 per cent reporting having for drug trafficking offences from Iran was stated by twenty-five traffick- trafficked methamphetamine tablets Afghanistan, suggesting that some ers, followed by Pakistan (twenty-two and hashish in addition to opiates. foreign drug trafficking organiza- traffickers). Less frequently were By comparison, only 39 per cent of tions enter Afghanistan to make drug 15 Fig. 10: Destination Markets where Interviewed Traffickers Sell transactions . Drugs, (Number of Times Mentioned by Traffickers) Thirty-seven per cent of the traffickers Turkmenistan interviewed reported that they travel Uzbekistan to other countries (Iran, Pakistan and UAE) to sell drugs, with some travel- ling every two to three months to make Tajikistan trafficking deals. One drug trafficker 1 indicated that he travelled after every 1 one or two “deals” abroad, “to meet his India Islamic Republic contacts and discuss the business and [to] 3 of Iran also import legal products to Afghani- 4 stan”. Several participants reported that they have a legitimate business 25 passport16 that makes easier to travel abroad. However, the majority of the study group indicated that they do not 22 Pakistan 15 CNJC Annual Reports, 2014/2015- 2018/2019. 16 A business passport is a specific type of pass- port issued by the Afghan government to major business people in Afghanistan to help facilitate visas for business purpose, rather than for tourism. In that respect it is like a 17 Tablet K is a general name for an unknown diplomatic passport, but for commercial rather drug type commonly reported as being sold than government purposes. and consumed in Afghanistan.

22 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

Fig. 11: Range of Illicit Drugs, in Addition to Opiates, Trafficked by Afghan Opiate Traffickers (NumberTYPES of Times OF Mentioned ILLICIT by DRUGS Traffickers) AND SUBSTANCES TRAFFICKED

OPIUM AND HEROIN (only) 20 “Yes, I know precursors very well. I know that ‘European’ type is the best.”

within Afghanistan. Four drug traf- DID NOT fickers who were involved in the ANSWER 3 trafficking of acetic anhydride as well as opiates, reported that the precursor SHISHA AND CRYSTAL METH 5 was sourced from Iran and Pakistan. A large-scale trafficker added Europe as a further source of the chemical. State- ments by other traffickers who did not HASHISH, SHISHA, traffick in acetic anhydride supported 7 SYNTHETIC DRUGS, AND TABLET K the claims made by those who did traffic the precursor chemical. Sixteen K TAB K TAB traffickers mentioned Pakistan as the source of the acetic anhydride that was trafficked into Afghanistan, while 12 mentioned the Islamic Republic of ACETIC ANHYDRIDE, Iran as the source. Two participants HASHISH, AND SHISHA 4 indicated China as the source of acetic anhydride used in Afghan heroin SYNTHETIC DRUGS manufacture, while Turkmenistan, 2 (unspecified) the UAE, and Europe were reported by one respondent each. The reference the mid-level traffickers did not traffic in Afghanistan have diversified some to Turkmenistan was based on the per- other types of drugs, with the majority Afghan opiate DTOs – mainly the ception of one trafficker rather than (55 per cent) of mid-level drug traffick- larger organizations – appear to be on his direct involvement in acetic ers reporting that they were involved using their connections and experi- anhydride trafficking, and it opens up in the trafficking of methamphetamine ence in opiate trafficking to traffic the question whether acetic anhydride tablets and crystal, hashish and acetic other drug types as well. Since there trafficking is still ongoing through anhydride in addition to opiates. The has been long-standing production Central Asia. Previous UNODC figures for large scale traffickers were of cannabis in Afghanistan, the poly- research suggested that trafficking of similar, albeit the sample size was trafficking of cannabis and opiate may the precursor through the northern 19 smaller. Sixty per cent of the large-scale reflect established operations. Newly route had significantly declined . interviewed traffickers reported that emerging methamphetamine manu- It should be noted that the locations they were involved in the trafficking facturing18 in Afghanistan is presenting reported by traffickers as source of of hashish, Tablet K, synthetic tablets Afghan DTOs, traditionally engaged acetic anhydride, do not necessarily (unspecified) and acetic anhydride in only in opiate or hashish trafficking, point to illicit manufacturing or diver- addition to opiates. The remaining 40 new opportunities to diversify their sion of the chemical in those locations. per cent said they were not involved in trafficking portfolio. These locations were simply the places other types of drug trafficking. There where traffickers thought it had been was no correlation between the loca- Precursor Chemical sourced, and they could well be transit tion of traffickers and their trafficking Trafficking by Afghan locations rather than sources. As with behaviour patterns in relation to other DTO’s the trafficking of opiates, participants types of illicit drugs. The study group was asked to share suggested that both official and unof- It therefore seems that small-scale traf- their knowledge regarding the traf- ficial border routes were used to traffic fickers in the study were more likely ficking of the heroin precursor precursor chemicals into Afghanistan. to engage only in opium and heroin chemical acetic anhydride into and trafficking, while the large and mid- scale traffickers were more likely to 18 UNAMA, “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians 19 The UNODC report, “Afghan Opiate Traf- in Armed Conflict. Special Report: Airstrikes ficking Along the Northern Route” stated that traffic other drug types in addition to on alleged drug processing facilities, Farah 5th AA trafficking from Central Asia had almost opiates. As the types of drugs available May 2019,” Page 7. completely stopped.

23 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

One group of drug traffickers, who were not directly involved in the traf- ficking of acetic anhydride, listed the provinces within Afghanistan where the chemical was trafficked. According to six participants, acetic anhydride entered Afghanistan mainly through Nimroz and Herat provinces. Along this route, traffickers believed that the chemical was trafficked both through official customs posts and unofficial border crossing points. Traffickers from western Afghanistan suggested a number of routes for the trafficking of acetic anhydride, with one stat- ing that “acetic anhydride is smuggled through Nimroz and Herat customs, and through unofficial crossing routes to Bahram Chah and Gerda Jungle20 and then to Helmand”. Another trafficker, from the same region, reported that the chemical was trafficked to Herat and Nimroz customs through unof- ficial border crossing points and areas in Afghanistan such as Bahram Chah, Kalata Nazar and Deh Dost Moham- mad. A third trafficker, also from the western region of Afghanistan said that acetic anhydride comes through “Nimroz and Herat customs and some- times from Farah customs concealed inside legal products... [also] from Islam Qala and Pule Abrishm and Abo Nasar Farahi customs”, with a fourth trafficker reporting that “acetic anhydride arrives into Afghanistan through official customs in Herat and Nimroz and sometimes from Gerda Jangl of Helmand and also through the customs in Farah”.

20 Girdi Jangle [Gerda Jungle] is in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.

24 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

SECTION 4: Trafficker's views on opiate processing

Out of the 41 traffickers, only six said that “we have a small laboratory in they are quickly re-established. A 2013 they owned a drug laboratory where Helmand province that has limited study published by the Ministry of they processed opium into morphine production and sometimes we need to Counter Narcotics of Afghanistan and heroin. The 83 per cent who did purchase from Jalalabad to meet the (MCN) indicated that heroin labora- not own a drug laboratory – includ- demand of our customers”. He did not tories were operating in Badakhshan, ing large traffickers as well as smaller mention any laboratories in his own Balkh, Faryab, Badghis, Kandahar, traffickers - reported either buying province, and his statement supports Helmand, Nangarhar, Farah and heroin directly from laboratory the view that the traffickers may not Herat, but the number could not be owners or other traffickers or send- necessarily have comprehensive knowl- accurately determined.26 The small ing their opium to independent labs edge of laboratories in their provinces. numbers of laboratories reported in operating elsewhere to be processed. Another potential reason for conflict- each province by the interviewed traf- Traffickers were asked about their per- ing reports could be that laboratories fickers may be a reflection of the fact ception, observation and knowledge of are generally becoming more compact that traffickers might only have a very opiate laboratories in their province and mobile in order not to be noticed localised understanding of the extent of origin21. Based on the information and destroyed by law enforcement. of heroin manufacturing activity in a reported by traffickers it is possible to Determining the number of laborato- province or district. draw some conclusions on the number ries active in Afghanistan at any one and location of laboratories, although time is challenging, given that labora- Fig. 12: Number of heroin laboratories it should be noted that it is solely based dismantled by the Government tories are frequently located in areas of Afghanistan, 2012-2019 on their knowledge, which in some outside of the government’s control, 74 cases was not comprehensive. and are, by their nature, hidden and 71 72 22 Information provided by the inter- increasingly mobile. A number of 57 viewed traffickers revealed that they clandestine opiate processing labora- 50 were aware of the presence of between tories across Afghanistan have been 41 one and ten laboratories operating destroyed over the years23. According 33 in Balkh, Badakhshan, Herat, and to media sources, USFOR-A destroyed Kandahar and of 10-20 illicit opium 200 heroin laboratories between 24 manufacturing laboratories in Farah 2017 and 2018 , while over the past 5 and Nimroz. Some traffickers believed eight years, CNPA reported the dis- that there might be nearer 20 or 30 mantlement of a total of 329 heroin laboratories in Farah. One trafficker manufacturing laboratories across the 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 25 considered that the number of labora- country . These operations may have Source: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and tories in Nangarhar was more than 40. influenced the number of laborato- Paris Pact Fact Sheet. Traffickers could not assess the number ries present in the Afghan territories, of laboratories in Helmand but two although, even when laboratories are Estimated Production of them reported they were “many” reportedly dismantled, in many cases Capacity of Laboratories in the province. The number of labo- ratories in Kandahar also could not A common view amongst interviewed be assessed by interviewees, although 22 Meeting with CNPA officials, August 2019, traffickers was that the capacity of an Kabul, Afghanistan. opiate laboratory was variable, with the one large-scale international drug 23 For example, the Afghan Special Mission Unit trafficker interviewed highlighted that CF-333 was responsible for dismantling a the capacity subject to: the number number of heroin labs in Southern and East- of people working at the particular some “big labs are in Helmand, Kan- ern Afghanistan. See LSE “Bombing of heroin dahar, and Farah”. labs in Afghanistan: The latest act in the theatre laboratory; the size of the facility; the of counter narcotics”, Mansfield, D. January knowledge, skills and experience of Some of the feedback given by traf- 2018 & UNAMA, “Afghanistan Protection of the chemists and cooks and the level fickers on the presence of laboratories Civilians in Armed Conflict. Special Report: Airstrikes on alleged drug processing facilities, and urgency attached to the demand was contradictory possibly because Farah 5th May 2019”. for opiates. Smaller, urban labora- of security concerns, loyalty to the 24 Nissenbaum, D. “Months of U.S. strikes have tories were deemed to have a lower laboratories’ owner, or simply lack of failed to curtail Taliban opium trade: the effort to put pressure on the insurgency in Afghanistan production capacity than larger, rural knowledge. One trafficker reported hasn’t crippled a major source of the group’s laboratories. The capacity of labora- revenue”, Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-drug- tories reported by traffickers also does 21 It should be noted that there was no ground trade-persists-despite-u-s-strikes-1533726120 checking of the reported laboratory locations, 25 Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the perception of those interviewed may (CNPA), Afghanistan ARQ response 2012- 26 MCN Afghanistan Interprovincial opiate traf- be subject to individual biases. 2019 and Paris Pact Fact Sheet 2012-2019. ficking dynamics, November 2013.

25 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION MONTHLY PRODUCTION Fig. 13: EstimateACCORDING of Monthly TO LAB Heroin OWNING Production KEY INFORMANTS (Unknown purity) of Heroin Laboratories by Interviewed Drug Traffickers Who Owned a Laboratory, (5 respondents) “10% [of raw material] is kept in the lab and the remain- ing [amounts] are stored in the village 1 1 1 1 1 storage.” “Raw materials such as opium and AA are stored somewhere secure not in the labs.” “The bulk of raw materials such as opium and precursors are stored away

45 to 60kg 60kg 90kg 105kg 90 to 600kg from the labs in the homes. During production days, they transport the amount of raw materials needed for PERCEPTION OF KEY INFORMANTS the day and once heroin is produced, Fig. 14: Estimate of MonthlyON Heroin THE AGERAGE Production MONTHLY (Unknown PRODUCTION purity) �KG� of Heroin Laboratories by Interviewed Drug Traffickers they are taken away from the labs and who did not own a Laboratory (25 respondents) kept somewhere else.” 9 “Raw materials, such as opium and AA, are stored in a nearby village and are transported to the lab from time 6 6 to time and when needed. After heroin is produced, it is either sold while still 2 2 in the lab or [is] moved to somewhere else for storage.” “[We] keep raw material needed for a production cycle and keep the bulk somewhere else, away from the lab.” kg kg kg kg “Raw materials are kept somewhere kg else. The daily production materials are 200 to 400 60 to 200 41 to 60 11 to 40 1 to 10 kept in the lab.”

not account for variations in purity of capacity was reported to be between produced opiates, or the addition of 1-60 kgs per month by traffick- adulterants to the final product. ers from Badakhshan, Balkh, Farah, Due to these variable factors, a vari- Nimroz and Herat provinces, and heroin labs across Afghanistan28. It is ety of perspectives were expressed between 61-180 kg by traffickers in possible that in the case of laboratories by the traffickers when discussing Helmand and Kandahar as well as located in Helmand, Kandahar, Bada- the estimated production capacity Herat and Balkh. Eight traffickers khshan and Nangarhar, - provinces, for laboratories. The average capaci- located in Herat, Helmand, and Nan- which have a long history of heroin ties reported below are based on the garhar provinces reported an average manufacture relative to other parts of knowledge that traffickers had on how capacity of over 300 kgs per month Afghanistan - greater experience may laboratories operate, which for some for laboratories in those provinces. lead to a more efficient manufacturing traffickers may not have been very So even within a province there were process, although this requires further thorough. significant differences in perception of how much heroin a lab could produce. research. The estimated production capacity UNODC research in 2011 estimated In describing the logistics of the opiate of an opiate laboratory reported by that laboratories in Kandahar and manufacturing process, almost 80 per traffickers may not reflect the real Helmand had an annual manufac- cent of respondents stated that drug capacity for a variety of reasons. Sig- turing capacity of around 1,300 kg of traffickers store the raw materials used nificant variations in estimates, with heroin27. in opiate manufacture in a separate informants reporting average monthly location from the actual laboratory. production in labs ranging from a few The participants’ general view and Only the necessary amount required kilograms to more than 300 kg, con- knowledge of laboratories and their to produce an order was kept on firm that perception. Most informants capacity is in line with previous site, while supplies of precursors and stated monthly production was an research findings by the UNDOC and amount of between 1 and 60 kg. the Government of Afghanistan on the number of workers and capacity of There does not seem to be a link 28 MCN Afghanistan Interprovincial opiate trafficking dynamics, November 2013 and between Afghan regions and reported 27 UNODC The Global Afghan Opiate Trade: A UNODC The Global Afghan Opiate Trade: A capacity of a laboratory. Production Threat Assessment, 2011. Threat Assessment, 2011.

26 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

Fig. 15: Range of Workers Needed at Laboratories Owned by main country of origin of recruited Interviewed Traffickers laboratory chemists (14 drug traffick- 90 ers), followed by Iran (8 traffickers) 80 and Turkey (3 traffickers). Within 70 Afghanistan, Helmand province was 60 reported as the main place where 50 chemists were recruited from (10 drug 40 traffickers), followed by Nangarhar (8 30 traffickers), Badakhshan (2 traffickers) 20 and Kandahar (1 trafficker). Several 10 traffickers stated more than one name 0 of a country and/or province in a con- Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab ditional manner, for example either owner 1 owner 2 owner 3 owner 4 owner 5 owner 6 “Pakistan or Iran”, “Pakistan and Iran” or “Pakistan, if not then Helmand” as opiates were kept away from the labo- reported that “in the laboratory, 20 the origins of chemists. ratories and were often hidden in more people work in two sections [shifts] and Traffickers from western and south- isolated areas. monthly 45-60 kgs. The laboratory works ern Afghanistan indicated that Afghan all days except weekends, holidays, and nationals have been hired as chemists Staffing Requirements when the security situation is not good”. or cooks, with one southern trafficker for Laboratories reporting that: “Most of the experts Drug traffickers were also asked for Recruitment of Chemists come from Pakistan and Iran and there their opinions on the workforce Heroin manufacture is a complex are few Afghans who can also produce requirement for opiate laboratories. and time-consuming process. The heroin”; This was supported by tes- The six traffickers who reported that chemists29 who turn raw opium into timony from other southern based they own a heroin manufacturing morphine and heroin play an impor- traffickers who suggested that “There laboratory gave different numbers tant role both in terms of the amount are also Afghans who learned how to pro- of persons required to run a heroin and the quality of the opiates pro- duce heroin, but their number is very laboratory. A laboratory workforce was duced. Chemists are supported by limited”; other traffickers from western defined as chemists, cooks and other cooks - and other workers at labs who staff, including people who protected possess some practical experience and Fig. 16: Countries from Where Chemists the labs and those who provided sup- basic knowledge of the manufacturing are Recruited (Number of Times plies to keep the labs functioning. process. Given that skilled and expe- Mentioned by Traffickers) rienced chemists play a pivotal role in Over half of the traffickers inter- 25 viewed, reported that the number opiate manufacturing and producing of staff equiredr by a laboratory is quality heroin, drug traffickers seek to 20 recruit the best available talent from between 10 to 20 people. For example, 15 one trafficker whose laboratory was around the region. When participants destroyed by the police in the previous were asked from where chemists were 10 year, stated that he had had 16 people found or hired, respondents provided working at that laboratory. The traf- one or more country or province. It is 5 important to note that the countries fickers who did not own a laboratory 0 mentioned by traffickers does not nec- provided diverse answers regarding the Afghanistan Iran Pakistan Turkey number of people needed at a labora- essarily indicate the nationalities and/ tory. In their accounts, answers ranged or citizenship of those chemists but from between two people for a small only refer to where they were recruited Fig. 17: Afghan Provinces from Where urban laboratory, up to 40, 50 or even from. Chemists are Recruited, (Number 80 people – numbers which are gener- After Afghanistan (21 traffickers), of Trafficker Answers) ally considered too high for all but the Pakistan was acknowledged as the 12 largest laboratories. Their answers may 10 reflect the fact that the size and capac- 29 For the purposes of this research, chemists 8 ity of heroin manufacturing labs vary, are defined as those who have a rudimentary understanding of chemical processes and a although clearly, the limited knowl- certain amount of formal chemical training 6 edge of those not owning a laboratory such as a high school level or degree level understanding of chemistry. Cooks are defined 4 is an important factor to consider. The as those who do not have any formal training 2 study came across some interesting but may have learnt how to process heroin observations concerning how clandes- from word or mouth instruction or being shown how to carry out the process by a 0 tine laboratories operate. A trafficker chemist. Helma nd Nangarhar Badakhshan Kanda ha r

27 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

Afghanistan reported that “qualified and experienced cooks/chemists are usually hired from Pakistan; if [this is] not possible, then from Helmand the local chemists are hired”, and “Paki- stanis are more experts, the waste from the production made by a Pakistani is less than a Helmandi cook.” It is also worth noting the comments from two traf- fickers, who stressed that “the location of chemists is not an important issue… as long as the chemist is experienced and qualified”. These statements support the view that some drug traffickers are ready and prepared to hire chem- ists from wherever they can be found, provided that they have the necessary skills and experience.

28 “Voices of the Quchaqbar” SECTION 5: Women's role in illicit opiate trafficking in the context of Afghanistan

“Women’s roles are in opiate trafficking only focused mostly on trafficking through the knowledge and assisting with production of and experience of male heroin in the labs.” traffickers. However, the opinions, observations “Women are good at hiring other and experience of male women and gaining their trust.” drug traffickers still pro- “Women help with opium poppy har- vides some information vesting, drug trafficking and retail to increase the knowl- selling, especially in the villages close Women are involved in edge on women’s role in to the neighboring countries.” “drug trafficking. They are Afghanistan’s complex “Women’s involvement in drug traf- also responsible for hiring couri- drug trafficking picture. ficking is increasing and drug traders ers by targeting women who are the Previous literature and prefer to hire more women to do head of the household or women who research examined trafficking.” are struggling with poverty and unem- ployment. It is easy to convince these women’s participation “Women’s role has been [the] provision categories to join us since the profit in opium cultivation of assistance and support. They have from drug trafficking is very attractive. within Afghanistan, but not had a leading role in the trade.” Sometimes we used pregnant women women’s participation “My first wife helps with heroin produc- for trafficking. in opiate trafficking has tion at home. She is also doing some largely remained unre- work on the concealment method for searched. Women and children small amounts of trafficking to outside While research ”provide unpaid labour in the Afghanistan, and sometimes takes care on issues related to cultivation opium poppy and of the small stock we keep at home women who consume drugs has harvesting opium gum.32 Research from time to time.” improved in recent years, little con- suggested that Afghan women “Women have been mainly assisting sideration has yet been given to largely play a passive role in terms with drug trafficking and gathering understanding women’s participation of decision-making in opium cul- intelligence about trafficking routes in the supply chain, including illicit tivation, with few being able to as well as the assessment of traffick- drug crop cultivation, drug manufac- influence the decision by the male ing routes.” turing and drug trafficking30. What head of the household on whether “Women take care of the inventories, research that has been done on wom- to cultivate opium poppy33. provide protection when the Govern- en’s participation in drug trafficking Like opium poppy cultivation, ment is searching the village, and assist has largely examined drug trafficking opiate trafficking in Afghanistan in trafficking from time to time.” in Latin America or Europe: none has is predominantly managed, con- 31 been done in Afghanistan . Investi- trolled and conducted by male gating Afghan women’s position in individuals. However, 66 per drug supply and trafficking was a key cent of traffickers interviewed for 34 research question in order to help this study acknowledged that women years . narrow the knowledge gap on this have various roles in opiate traffick- The role of the arrested women in the topic. ing. In contrast, 34 per cent believed opiate industry is unclear, but it is However, at the time of the data col- that women were not involved in traf- likely that the majority were couriers. lection, the research team was not ficking. A number of traffickers (61 While the majority of traffickers able to include female traffickers into per cent) mentioned that not only reported the increased role of women the sample group for cultural rea- are women involved in opiate traf- in trafficking, and that they fulfil sev- sons and due to the lack of access to ficking, but that their involvement eral roles in the opiate business, none female traffickers. This is one of the has increased over the past five years. provided any evidence of women’s key limitations of the study, which can During a meeting with UNODC involvement in the management layer examine and explore the role of women experts, CNPA officials also believed of opiate trafficking organizations35. women’s participation in opiate traf- 30 UNODC World Drug Report 2018; UNODC ficking has increased in the past five 34 Meeting with CNPA officials, August 2019, Thematic Booklet “Women and Drugs: Drug Kabul, Afghanistan. use, drug supply and their consequences”, 2018. 35 Based on the interview responses, there was 31 For example, see Carey, E. “Women Drug 32 MCN/UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey no evidence of a senior Afghan female equiva- Traffickers: Mules, Bosses and Organized Report, 2016. lent to the Mexican female cocaine trafficker Crime”, 2014. 33 UNODC World Drug Report 2016. nicknamed “The Queen of the Pacific” or the

29 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

In general, traffickers from southern Afghanistan reported that women did not take part in opiate trafficking. The same picture was provided for Balkh province. According to 15 traffickers, women take part in the manufacture of illicit drugs, either poppy cultivation or processing of opiates. 12 traffick- ers reported that women are involved in trafficking, acting as couriers. For example, one trafficker reported that “there is one woman who works for me. She is Afghan-Canadian and smuggles heroin to Canada”. Another trafficker who reported women’s involvement in opiate trafficking concurred with the role of women as couriers: “most of the time when trafficking to India, women are being used as a courier”. There was a general perception that women were often employed as couri- ers since they are less likely to stopped and searched during security opera- tions, which are usually conducted by men. The interviews revealed that in addition to manufacturing and trafficking, women are employed in several other related roles, including the concealment of drugs prior to ship- ping36, gathering information, hiring other people (usually other women) as couriers, providing logistical support and securing or protecting drug ship- ments. However, one respondent also commented that “sometimes they are also being abused by drug traffickers”.

Colombian “Godmother of Cocaine” Griselda Blanco. 36 For example, in some cases women are involved in sewing heroin into carpets which are then transported out of Afghanistan.

30 “Voices of the Quchaqbar” SECTION 6: The structure of Afghan Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO´s)

Afghanistan, which were similar to the concentric traf- Defining Organizations and ficking circles model. At the Networks outer rim, and in the high- For the purpose of this study, a Drug Traf- est numbers, are itinerant ficking Organization (DTO) defined as traffickers who buy opium an organization made up of a number of from farmers and trade on people (two or more) who are involved a seasonal basis during the in the trafficking of drugs, either within main period of opium pro- Afghanistan, or to external markets, or a combination of both. While trafficking drugs, duction. One step closer to if we are attacked by Gov- the core of large traffickers For the purpose of this study, a Drug Traf- “ ficking Network is defined as a group ernment forces, the head of the are the middle-level traffick- of DTO’s who work together for mutual network decides whether to fight back ers. They are still relatively benefit, and who co-operate with each or escape. small-scale actors and their other to a degree. engagement in drug trafficking also tends to be seasonal. The major- ”ity of the traffickers interviewed for this study (88 per cent), fit into one identifying themselves as facilitators Overview of Afghan of these two categories. According to or couriers. Some 17 traffickers identi- DTO’s 2006 UN and World Bank research, at fied as part of a wider drug trafficking Many small, medium and large-scale the centre of the illicit opiate business organization consisting of between organizations are involved in drug were large-scale, specialist and highly 6 to 20 people, with the remaining trafficking in Afghanistan and in the organized drug traffickers who bought 24 participants working as individual countries along the main traffick- opiates throughout the year, and often traders/traffickers. Of the traffickers ing routes. However, it is difficult to arranged shipping to border areas or who worked with a DTO, 94 per cent provide an accurate estimate of their directly abroad of quantities some- had a strong desire to continue to be number and size. In 2007, a UNODC times amounting to several tons40. This part of that organization with only one survey estimated that the total number core might consist of a relatively small participant expressing an intention to of mid- and high-level traffickers in number of traffickers, who potentially cease working as part of a group. The Afghanistan was between 800 and own land and might be quite wealthy number of individuals and their inter- 900 but was unable to determine the and have significant tribal or politi- relations, roles, and responsibilities are number of small-scale traffickers in cal influence. Few of the traffickers a key part of understanding the struc- the country. Previous research has also interviewed for the present study are ture of DTOs. identified a possible structure of DTOs in that category. For this study, traf- and the movement of opiates within fickers were asked about the structure Fig. 18: Distribution of Traffickers by Afghanistan in terms of interlinking of their DTO, including the size, the Size of NUMBERWorkforce OF(Number PEOPLE of concentric trafficking circles, with each membership and whether they were Responses)WORKING FOR KEY INFORMANTS layer selling to the next37. While such part of a wider network or alliance of a model simplifies the complexities several DTOs. of the situation on the ground, the model helps to understand some of Number of People the potential trafficking structures that in DTO’s operate in Afghanistan38. Traffickers were asked about the struc- Other research on Afghan’s drug ture of their DTO, including the size, industry39 revealed some charac- the membership and whether they teristics of the DTOs operating in were part of a wider network or alli- ance of several DTOs. Ninety-three 37 Paoli, L., Greenfield, V.A. and Reuter, P. The per cent of respondents identified World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut? themselves as drug traffickers, with Oxford University Press, 2009. 38 Bewley-Taylor, D. “Drug Trafficking and only three traffickers (7 per cent) Organized Crime in Afghanistan”, The RUSI Journal, 158:6, 6-17, 2013. 40 For example, the major trafficker Haji Juma 39 UNODC & The World Bank Afghan’s Drug Khan could move up to 40 tons shipments of Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and drugs at a time from Afghanistan to interna- Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, 2006. tional markets.

31 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

Table 2: Summary of structure and organisation of DTOs based on respondents’ answers

LARGE-SCALE MID-SCALE SMALL-SCALE TRAFFICKERS TRAFFICKERS TRAFFICKERS (N=5) (N=18) (N=18)

Percentage of interviewed traffickers that employ 61 39 0 more than 10 people

Percentage of interviewed traffickers whose DTO 100 50 16 is part of a wider drug trafficking network

Percentage of interviewed traffickers that involve 80 50 39 family member(s)

Percentage of interviewed traffickers that travel 60 33 33 to other countries to traffic drugs

Some 23 drug traffickers (56 per cent) Large Scale Traffickers41 Mid- and Small- scale 42 indicated that their workforce includes In the study group for this report, five Traffickers people from their family and/or tribe. drug traffickers (12 per cent) identi- The remaining 36 drug traffickers (88 Amongst these, 16 respondents sug- fied themselves as large-scale illicit per cent) divided equally under the gested that the share of family/tribe drug traffickers. Self-identified large- categories of mid and small-scale drug members within their working net- scale drug traffickers interviewed for traffickers and came from all regions work was over 50 per cent (up to 100 this study came from northern, west- of Afghanistan. Four out of eighteen per cent). Some 13 participants (32 ern and eastern Afghanistan, from of the mid-scale traffickers (22 per per cent) said none of the workers in provinces that border Uzbekistan, cent) reported that they own a drug their DTO belong to their family and/ Tajikistan, Iran (Islamic Republic manufacturing laboratory. In terms or tribe. of), and Pakistan. The majority of the of the size of their DTO’s, one third Traffickers reported that they are large traffickers employ more than 10 of the mid-scale traffickers employ 10 cautious when hiring people out- people, and they have the ability to or more people, the remaining two side of their immediate confidence travel to neighbouring countries to thirds work with smaller numbers of and trust zone. Trust and confidence establish business connections with people. The mid-scale drug traffick- play a crucial role in the hiring pro- their partners and arrange cross border ers interviewed appeared to be mostly cess, with many traffickers reporting trafficking activity. All the large-scale trafficking inter-provincially within that they run reference checks before traffickers reported being part of a Afghanistan. Two thirds of mid-scale hiring people for various tasks such as wider network made up of several co- drug traffickers reported that they did couriers and drivers. Six of the nine operating DTOs, and 80 percent of not travel to other countries as part of respondents who reported working them had one or more family members their drug trafficking business. Half of alone also hired people on an ad-hoc involved in opiate trafficking. Only them reported that their DTO worked basis to meet a specific need, such as one of the large-scale traffickers owned with a wider network of several DTOs, processing opiates or couriering drugs a heroin manufacturing laboratory to and 50 per cent had one or more family abroad. produce his own opiates - the majority members involved in their DTO. Several informants highlighted that of large-scale traffickers purchased opi- 78 per cent of the small-scale traffick- paying a good amount of money not ates from other traffickers or directly ers reported working with between 1 only attracts couriers to traffick opiates from laboratories. In terms of cross to 6 people, and none of them employ inside Afghanistan, but also appeals to border drug trafficking, the interviews more than 7 people. The remaining 22 Afghans with dual nationality living in confirmed that it is mainly the large- per cent, reported that they work alone the West who are willing to smuggle scale drug traffickers who are involved as independent traffickers or couriers. heroin from Afghanistan to Europe with drug trafficking across interna- The number of small-scale drug traf- and North America. One trafficker, tional borders, whereas inter-provincial fickers who have family member(s) who runs a small drug trafficking trafficking within Afghanistan was involved in drug trafficking is relatively network with six couriers, noted more common amongst large- mid- less than the large and mid-scale drug that the people working for him “all and small-scale traffickers. traffickers. have a double nationality”, specifically Afghans who have lived in Europe and 42 As discussed in Section 2 mid-scale traffickers Canada for a very long time. Dual for this study, were defined as being able to nationality appears to be an attractive 41 As discussed in Section 2 large scale traffickers traffick between 11 and 40 kilograms of opi- for this study were defined as being able to ates per month. Small scale traffickers were trait for Afghan DTOs seeking to traf- traffic more than 40 kilograms of opiates per defined as being able to traffick 10 kilograms fick opiates to international markets. month. or less of opiates per month.

32 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

“It has been a long time. In the early years of Karzai’s first presidential term I took over the lead- ership of the network from my father who decided to retire in his early 80’s. I have seven brothers and five sisters, and six step- brothers and -sisters. We don’t have a good Based in Afghanistan relationship with our stepbrothers and -sis- Father ters. Three of my brothers were involved [in – retired trafficker Brothers. drug trafficking], the eldest one who worked Based in Europe Became addicts with my father became an addict and he and gave up Brother – trafficking is no longer in the business. Two younger drug trafficker brothers became addicts later and are no Sister – longer in the business. One of my brothers drug trafficker Brother – is living in Turkey, who is a member of the legitimate network. One brother and sister are based businessman in Europe, who are members of the net- Brothers-in-law work. Another brother, also in Europe, is – drug traffickers not interested in this business and he has a Based in Turkey hotel. Two of my sister’s husbands are also members of my network. I have four sons Brother Eldest sons – and one little daughter from my first wife drug traffickers and one little girl from my second wife. The Interviewee Direct member of DTO two eldest sons and my first wife also help with the business.” A major trafficker describing the extent of his family’s involvement in his opiate business

Structure of Afghan Drug Trafficking Organizations, Based on Trafficker Interviews “I worked independently with my wife. She helped with Brother facilitation/coordination and traf- ficking of drugs.” “I work independently [from a wider network or alliance, with] my wife, my son and my brother.”

Son Wife “I work independently [from a wider network or alliance, but] two of my brothers are working with me. When needed, I hire up to 6 people to help Brother Brother me produce Chaynak.” Wife “Women take care of the inventories, provide protection when the Govern- ment is searching the village, and assist in trafficking from time to time.”

Temporary workers hired Interviewee to produce Chaynak Direct member of DTO Temporary member of DTO

Management, Authority and Hierarchical According to the responses given in the supply chain. The size of the Structure Within Afghan by Afghan drug traffickers, many organisation is relatively small, and the Opiate DTO´s DTOs within Afghanistan appear to majority of workforce mainly comes be family-based structures, loosely from family members, associates based DTOs are complex and mobilize coordinating and cooperating with a on tribal connections, and from the individuals from different segments wider network of similar organizations local neighbourhood of a trafficker: of society to produce, transport, and

33 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

“I was working indepen-

dently [from a wider network Brother Son or alliance]. Between 10-15 per- sons were working for me but during the working season, the number was increasing.” “[I am a] member of a network. We Members of DTO Temporary smuggle drugs with more confidence workers since the network is there to help and Non-family members of DTO support when needed. My eldest son Interviewee and one of my brothers [help, and] 16 Direct member of DTO people work for me.” Temporary member of DTO “There are two other people that work for me. One of them traffics drugs to

the districts, the other one is based at Brother- the border and deals with traffickers in-law Brother at the border on the Afghan side, or traffickers on the other side.” Associate Associate “I work independently but have close – cross-border – trafficking cooperation with relatives – [my] trafficking between districts brother, my son, my brother-in-law Son Wife and when necessary my wife.” Head of DTO Member of DTO

traffic drugs, and sometimes precursors, an assessment of the trafficking routes, as coordination with other DTOs including across borders. Direction of and decides about the size of opiate and government structures are also these activities occurs through a series consignments. associated with the head of DTOs. of authority relationships in which One trafficker reported that manage- These managerial roles and responsi- superiors and subordinates interact. ment makes decisions “concerning bilities are similar to those that could Hierarchy, statements of rules, adapt- the business with other groups/organi- be observed in licit businesses. One ability, coordination, and recruitment zations, security related decisions, and drug trafficker reported that “when or promotion are common features coordination with traders with outside trafficking drugs, if we are attacked of complex organizations and Afghan by Government forces, the head of the of the country”. Another trafficker opiate trafficking organizations can be network decides whether to fight back from western Afghanistan stated, the examined against those identifiable or escape”. This is a clear indicator of leader of the DTO “is responsible for characteristics43. a command-and-control, as well as coordination, leadership, coordination leadership, function attached to the Interviews for this current research with government officials, and solving management of that trafficker’s DTO. sought to identify some of the struc- problems” , including conflict manage- Members of DTOs clearly work under tural components of DTOs operating ment: “Problems and conflicts are solved in Afghanistan, including topics such a chain of command and they are by the manager and his decisions are as leadership; hierarchy of author- aware of the decision-making process binding and should be taken seriously”. ity; coordination, communication and the defined division of labour. A second trafficker from the western and decision-making processes, and One drug trafficker described the man- region reported that “management finds division of labour. According to the ager of his DTO as being someone customers, does business with other [drug respondents, the management of a who shows “leadership in smuggling, trafficking] organizations, and exercises DTO could be one person or a team signs agreements, solves problems with of managers, that provides overall [a] coordination function”. other networks, Government and law leadership, takes decisions about the These statements illustrate that there enforcement”. Another trafficker sale and purchase of drugs, provides are hierarchical functions or roles such reported a similar situation: “the head as leadership, decision making, coor- of the organisation is responsible for 43 Benson, J. S., & Decker, S. “The organiza- dination, communication, problem the management [of the DTO] and tional structure of international drug smug- solving, and conflict management maintaining communication with gling”, Journal of Criminal Justice, 38(2), 130-138, 2010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j. exercised by the heads of DTOs. partners and is in charge of the coor- jcrimjus.2010.01.001 Some tasks and responsibilities such dination with other DTOs”. A third

34 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

trafficker revealed that the manage- ment of his DTO takes “decisions related to strengthening coordination “Having relationship with other [drug] organizations is with other DTO’s and provision of important in this business. For instance, one of the organizations I work financial support to the members if with [has] a good coverage of southern Afghanistan, where there is a lot of opium available, and sometimes I buy opium from them and sell they lose their heroin shipments or them acetic anhydride or order their labs to produce heroin for me, or heroin is damaged due to the bad one of their chemists comes to Herat to produce heroin for me when I weather conditions”. need [it]. The advantages of being a member of a network [of DTO’s] Commenting on the role of manage- are numerous and depends on the nature of your relationship with the ment, one of the interviewees said: network.” “Being member of a network is good since it can help solve problems, and whenever needed the support of the network is there for you. I wanted to continue since I was aware of the situation along all the trafficking routes and I had the opportunity to exchange ideas and coordinate “If it is a family organiza- with other members [of the network]”. “If someone is member of an tion such as my organization, alliance they are being protected. I wanted to be part of an alliance and then the elder brother who runs the it was important to me. All the major decisions are made by the head business makes most of the decisions, of the alliance. Usually the head of the alliance decides how to resolve but there are times that you need to the conflicts within the group. Members of an alliance share the safe consult with your other members. In trafficking route among each other”. this kind of organization, while power “[I am a] member of a network. It is not possible to work alone. Depend- and influence are important at the end ing on the needs of the networks and geographical location, groups of the day, what matters is that we work together and hold face to face meetings once they build trust”. make a good decision that is beneficial “The network has more resources to support us during [a] crisis and for the family business and, taking into when there are problems [but] you have to obey the rules and regula- account the nature of our relationship, tions of the network and cannot act independently. The profit is also less we do not want any of the members to compared to when one is independent. Coordination and cooperation be arrested”. with other networks occur through face to face meetings and follow up through phone calls”. “I don’t always work with [a] network, only when needed. I started work- ing, occasionally, with a network four years ago. [The] head of network This statement contains several impor- is responsible for management and maintaining communication with tant characteristics of a family-run partners and is in charge of coordination with other DTOs. Every [DTO] Afghan DTO. The respondent stated does their own work, and only when needed, cooperate with each other that his three brothers had started off on issues such as sale, production and trafficking”. the business of trafficking opiates, but later all three had become drug addicts and had to quit from the busi- ness, where upon he took over control “Networks” of DTO´s of the DTO. He, as the eldest male In addition to describing the structure the membership was being arrested. member of the organisation there- of their individual DTO, a number Some respondents suggested also that fore, makes most of the decisions and of interviewees reported that they the potential profit from opiate sales from time-to-time consults with the and their DTO was part of a broader was less when being a member of a other members of the DTO. While “network” or “alliance” made up of network. Some of the drug traffickers the person in the position of seniority several DTO’s that co-operated with expressed their loyalty to the network, occupies a dominant role in exerting each other for mutual benefit and sup- agreeing with the statement that “as power and influence at the manage- port. All of the large-scale traffickers, long as I am alive and not arrested, I ment level, in this case, there is also and half of the mid-scale traffick- will be part of the network”. Although room for consultation with the other ers reported that they were part of six traffickers reported that they paid family members. a broader network of several DTO’s to join their drug trafficking network, The social functions of DTO leader- while only 16 per cent of the small- the majority did not. ship is also worth noting. According scale traffickers reported that they were part of such a networked organization. Conflict Resolution to one drug trafficker, the leader of a in Afghan trafficking DTO sometimes also embraces social The members of the drug traffick- responsibilities i.e. providing financial ing networks reported that they Networks support to the family of members of enjoyed being part of the structure, “Sometimes conflicts are never resolved, the DTO or contributing funds to which offered many advantages. The and the networks become enem[ies] of tribal elders. only identified risk associated with each other and compete”.

35 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

Illegal drug markets have been members of a DTO or a wider network State authorities.” 50 As drug flows in described as ‘stateless’ settings44, leav- not to act in any way that is calculated Afghanistan are relatively static, this ing members to resolve their problems to, or likely to, breach the trust and may in part account for the lack of and disputes without the benefit of confidence of the head of the DTO or violence between Afghan DTOs. The legal mediating agents and guide- its members. In cases where a lack of perception of violence associated with lines.45, 46 The narrative analysis of the trust or confidence develops from an drug trafficking can also be a product of answers from 17 of the interviewed unresolved conflict, the members may biases associated with the overwhelm- traffickers, operating within traffick- leave the organization or sometimes ing attention to extreme situations of ing networks,47 showed that conflict even become each other’s enemy and violence, and some researchers have resolution amongst Afghan trafficking try to take revenge. suggested that drug markets and the organizations, usually rests with the Slightly differing from the top-down actors within them can be relatively 51 head of the DTO or the wider net- approach to conflict resolution, one peaceful . Violence between DTOs is work. Interviewees did not provide trafficker from the western region often the last option, with consensus a detailed account of the reasons for suggested that conflicts are addressed agreements and the identification of internal conflict within or between through discussion and negotiation various alternatives to violence often 52 DTOs. However, some general infor- among the members and are not applied by drug traffickers . In the mation was given. One drug trafficker just resolved by the head of a DTO. Afghan context, understanding drug from the south stated that “whenever Another drug trafficker also echoed related violence is made more com- there is a seizure, then there is a conflict this practice: “In our case, we have a plicated by the on-going insurgency among the [DTOs in a] network and consultation meeting to resolve the con- within the country. usually such conflicts are solved by the flicts”. Third-party mediation is also Among the 17 traffickers who money”. The majority of those who suggested as an option. Another traf- answered the question on drug related provided information on internal con- ficker stated, “if the conflicts among violence, only one reported the killing flict (mainly traffickers from western the networks were not solved, parties of DTO members, as being a response Afghanistan) felt that conflicts are became enem[ies] of each other and to disagreements. According to this resolved by the head of their organiza- start competing. Sometimes negotia- trafficker, “in most cases, conflicts are tion and other senior members of the tions or a third-party intervention [is] not resolved and creates a lack of trust group. A participant stated that “the required to solve the problems and among the members and sometimes ends head of the organisation tries to solve the make a peace”. This statement sug- up in the assassination of one or more problems and the members also cooperate gests that a conflict between parties members of the network”. The killing of with each other”. One trafficker added are sometimes addressed by third-party network members and/or other types an important dimension in conflict mediators and conciliators, who act as of violence was not reported by other resolution: “decisions are binding and an independent broker between con- drug traffickers. This limited reporting should be taken seriously”. This conflict flicting parties. Drug traffickers did suggests that drug trafficking may not resolution pattern conforms with the not describe the third-party mediators. produce a large amount of violence cultural, tribal and ethnic customs, In the absence of legally binding con- in Afghanistan, but more research is codes, and practices across Afghani- tractual arrangements found in the needed to test this assumption. stan, where conflicts are frequently legal public or private sectors, actors resolved through a co-operative, con- in illegal drug markets can turn to sensus based, ‘Shura’ process, overseen violence. This study was not able to by those with a degree of formal or measure the scale of violence within, informal authority48. There appears or between, Afghan drug trafficking to be an implied obligation on the organizations. However, violence associated with drug trafficking orga-

44 Wilkins, C. “A ‘new institutional economics’ nizations is not a given and defining approach to the reliability of street-level drug drug related violence can be challeng- transactions”, Contemporary Drug Problems, ing49. UNODC’s Global Study on 28, 679–693, 2001. 45 Cooney, M. Warriors and peacemakers: How Homicide suggests that it “is not so third parties shape violence, New York: New much the quantities of trafficked drugs York University Press, 1998. as changes in flows, that destabilize the 46 Jacques, S. “The necessary conditions for retalia- 50 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2019 tion: Toward a theory of non-violent and violent market and drive violence among drug Vienna, (2019), Page 100. forms in drug markets”, Justice Quarterly, 27, trafficking organizations, or between 51 Duran-Martinez, A. “The multiple dimensions 186–205, 2010. drug trafficking organizations and of drug related violence”, Peace in Progress No. 47 Only those who operated in drug trafficking 35 Drug Violence in Latin America, Novem- networks were asked about network and man- ber 2018 and Reuter, P. Disorganized crime, agement related questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. 48 United Nations Development Programme 52 Meeson, J., & Morselli, C. “La violence et la (UNDP) Afghanistan, “Local conflict 49 Duran-Martinez, A. “The multiple dimensions re´solution des conflits aupre`s des trafiquants management: An analysis of local conflict of drug related violence”, Peace in Progress No. de cocaıne” [Violence and conflict resolution management approaches in Baghlan, Balkh, 35 Drug Violence in Latin America, Novem- amongst cocaine traffickers], Criminologie, Helmand, and Nangarhar”, November 2013. ber 2018. 45, 213–241, 2012.

36 “Voices of the Quchaqbar” SECTION 8: How Afghan traffickers estimate supply and demand

Fig. 20: Annual Opiate Stock (kg), However, some drug traf- ANNUAL OPIATE STOCK fickers believed the level of Kept by Interviewed TraffickersSTORED (NumberBY KEY INFORMANTS of demand for heroin inside Responses) Afghanistan was good. Six participants, from the north- 10 to 30kg ern and eastern regions of Afghanistan thought demand had increased, with a respon- “the number I don’t do any estima- dent stating that 40 to 70kg tion. I have fixed customers of drug users has increased “ inside the country, as a result who do retail business and request Few amounts me to send them heroin. the demand has increased too”. 18 Another respondent from the No details 7 eastern region made a comparison 3 Opium supply ”with the past and thought that “the in Afghanistan fluctuates year on demand has increased compared to few 2 year, causing the market to react by years ago”. adjusting prices.53 Drug traffickers While the surveyed drug traffickers were asked to share their strategies and did not report any specific methods in how they supplied opium and heroin relation to their supply strategy, 73 per to meet international and local cent of them reported that they keep demand, and how they reacted to “We do not have a com- a portion of their annual heroin fluctuations of demand and supply puter system to make a demand inventory for at least six months. in the market. Overall, traffick- estimation. We traffick when there is a All the large-scale traffickers and ers provided diverse observations request from our contacts on the other many middle-scale traffickers regarding local and international side of the border.” (83 per cent,) stated that they kept demand for drugs. Traffickers had a portion of their heroin aside as an different perceptions on recent trends inventory. The proportion of small- in the demand for heroin, both within scale traffickers who keep inventories Afghanistan and internationally. was a bit lower, at slightly over 55 per Slightly over 60 per cent of the par- Analysis of drug traffickers’ responses cent. All participants confirmed that ticipants (26 out of 41) assessed that suggests that the surveyed traffickers after one to two years both morphine demand for heroin in general was high do not employ a formal, analytical and heroin start to lose quality, and and increasing. However, they had method to predict the level of demand therefore many do not keep heroin in varying opinions with regard to inter- for coming months or years, and they storage for a long time. According to nal and international demand. are comfortable using their opiate inventories in case they need to traffickers, storage locations should be Traffickers from southern and western respond to an unanticipated request dry and cool. For those 73 per cent Afghanistan assessed that, in compari- from local or international demand. who stockpile opiates, 18 traffickers son to past years, the current demand This suggests that opiate supply, within out of 30 (60 per cent) keep 10 to for heroin had declined. According to Afghanistan is driven by demand, or 30 per cent of their heroin supply as one of them: “the demand has decreased a reserve stock. Seven drug traffickers compared to previous years. The major an ad-hoc, “just-in-time” supply pro- cess (taking account of the level of (23 per cent) keep 40 to 70 per cent of traffickers don’t have contacts with for- their stock in reserve. Four drug traf- eign traders like in the past and there is individual drug inventories). It appears from the interviews, that opiates are fickers (13 percent) suggested that they more control at the borders”. One fifth only kept a small, unspecified, percent- of surveyed traffickers - mainly those widely available, and if a trafficker has a request for opiates that he cannot age of their annual heroin inventory from the provinces of Farah, Helmand, as a stock. Herat, and Nimroz - reported that fulfil within his own inventory, he can local demand for heroin had declined, obtain them from traffickers in his dis- whereas international demand was trict, province or wider network. high.

53 MCN/UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2018.

37 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION SECTION 9: Financial and monetary issues related to illicit opiate trafficking

with other commodities The study group was asked to share imported inside Afghani- opinions on the licit or illicit sectors stan including fuel, food or the profits generated from opiate traf- vehicles; or exchanging opi- ficking are invested in. 27 per cent of ates for other drugs (such as drug traffickers (7 per cent small-scale Tablet K), acetic anhydride, and 20 per cent mid-scale drug traf- weapons, and other commod- fickers) reported that opiate trafficking ities. Only one respondent profits were invested in real estate mar- reported that he used the kets (although it was unclear if this was I have a few legal busi- formal banking system for in Afghanistan, abroad or a combina- “nesses, but they are not financial settlements with tion of the two). In addition to real for generating income. I need to his business partners. Where estate, 27 per cent of respondents, said show to the people that I have a job cash payments were made, the money was re-invested in their otherwise, people in the neighbour- both for international and drug business, “kept with Hawaladar”, hood might ask where I get the money. domestic trafficking, US dol- or was used for bribing government Having a legal business is good to shut lars were reported as the most officials. 17 per cent reported that the people’s mouth. commonly used currency, they invested the drug profits in licit followed by Pakistani Rupees business. and Iranian Toman. Euros were the Understanding how Some traffickers stated that in addition ”fifth most frequently used currency Afghan opiate traffickers make finan- to investing in licit business, they kept after the local currency, the Afghani. cial transactions was a key objective of a portion of their drug profits with One participant reported that he used this study. The first question sought to their Hawaladar to give credits and United Arab Emirates Dirham in cash examine how opiate traffickers arrange receive additional profits from realized payments with business partners. monetary relations with their business interest. In the view of the respondent, partners, which financial instruments When arranging opiate trafficking “the money generated from illicit drug were used, and where they keep their deals, 26 drug traffickers (63 per cent) trafficking was kept with the money financial assets/resources. The second stated that they received advanced dealers/Hawaladars and sometimes also was to explore traffickers’ payments payment from their trading partners [earned] interest”55. to Anti-Government Elements (AGE) before shipping the opiates. Only 22 under the pretext of Islamic ‘taxes’, per cent of the participants did not Traffickers were asked whether they such as Ushr, Zakat, and Eidi54 as well receive pre-payment, while one partici- also had a licit employment or business. as other payment motivations such as pant commented that he sometimes Some 23 drug traffickers said that they security and protection payments and collected a deposit. had never worked in, or owned, a licit voluntary contributions. business, and they became involved in opiate trafficking because of the lack of For this study traffickers were asked other licit opportunities. Of these 23 to describe how monetary relations traffickers, 21 expressed their desire to with their business partners were entirely migrate to legitimate business “I use drug money for sup- arranged and how outstanding sectors (e.g. agriculture, animal balances were settled. The partici- porting my family and reinvesting in my [drug] business." husbandry, import businesses, real pants stated that they either use estate, and car dealership) at some Hawala exclusively, or Hawala in “I don’t have a legal business. I have point in the future, should suitable combination with other payment bought land in Helmand and hired alternative employment become farmers to cultivate poppy.” tools. Some 15 drug traffickers out available. Some 15 drug traffickers of 41 reported that they only use “Investment outside Afghanistan, in (37 per cent) said that in addition Hawala to make financial trans- real estate, [the] purchase of gold and to their drug trafficking activity, actions. Some 25 drug traffickers other valuable stones. Those with small they were also operating in licit reported that in addition to using scale trafficking earn [only] enough to business sectors such as real estate, support their daily living expenses.” the Hawala system, they arrange construction, and carpet vending financial settlements either by: “Money is invested in different sectors. businesses. direct cash payments; exchange The Taliban usually buy weapons.” 55 Generally, interest is not earned in 54 Eidi is a form of payment made during Islamic finance, so it is unusual that the Eid (a Muslim festival) from elders this trafficker reported that he receives to children/youth. interest on drug profits.

38 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

LICIT AND ILLICIT SECTORS WHERE DRUG PROFITS ARE INVESTED Fig. 21: Business Sectors Where Drug Profits are Invested, as cost of making fund transfers between Reported by Traffickers (Number of Responses) major international centres averages between two to five per cent. The final 5 fee paid for the transfer ultimately Illicit drugs depends on the volume of the transac- Some traffickers reinvest the majority of their profits back into their drug trade in order to develop tion, the financial relationship between their business. the remitter and the Hawaladar, the currency of exchange, the destination of funds, and the negotiating skills of 7 7 both parties and their understanding Licit business Did not answer of how the market operates. In some cases traffickers use profits from illegal activity to invest in licit Generally, Hawala dealers should business, either as a front company or as a means of moving entirely into the legal employment sector. be registered and report regularly on money transactions61. However, until recently none of Afghanistan’s 11 Hawaladars were registered by the Real Estate and Government, until efforts to regulate other sectors 62 11 Some traffickers diversify their the industry increased . As per the Da investments. While investing in Real Estate real estate they also invest in a Real estate in either Afghanistan number of other legal and illegal Afghanistan Bank (DAB) regulation, or outside the country is where business sectors. a significant proportion of opiate money transfer can only be conducted money is invested. through the following: money trans- mission, cheque cashing, and currency exchange. Any person providing these The information provided by traf- channels57. The role of Hawala in services are defined as Money Ser- fickers suggests that there is space in Afghanistan has been enhanced due vice Providers (Hawaladar) and are the real estate market to invest profits to the decades of conflict, and espe- legally required to obtain a business from opiate trafficking, although the cially under the Taliban regime when license from the Financial Supervi- geographical location of where opiate the Hawala markets fully replaced the sion Department of DAB. According traffickers invest in the real estate sector formal banking system. As the only to the 2018 Annual Report of the was unclear. The research shows that facility for the transfer of money inside Financial Transactions and Report 63 profits from opiate trafficking pene- and outside of Afghanistan, the system Analysis Centre of Afghanistan , trate both the illicit and licit business involves a complex interplay of actors, 1,245 Hawaladars were registered, sectors, and that much of the profits with a strong potential to be misused spread across Afghanistan’s regions as from drug trafficking by Afghan traf- for illicit purposes58. shown below. However, despite efforts to register and regulate the Hawala ficking organizations remains mostly According to a 2003 study, Hawala industry, there is no clear indication within Afghanistan. transfers between major international of how many Hawalas are in Afghani- Only a small segment of the Afghan cities can take, on average, six to twelve stan. It is likely that the majority of population has access to formal bank- hours and much less for transfers hawalas remain unregistered, and even ing services. According to the World between cities inside Afghanistan59. registered Hawalas may not report all Bank, as of 2018, 15 percent of the Commonly, 24-48 hours is required transactions64. population over 15 years old had an for transfers between countries with a account at a financial institution or different time zone or where commu- with a mobile-money-service pro- nications are less reliable60. The direct 46, 2013. 56 61 Da Afghanistan Bank https://dab.gov.af/sites/ vider . This does not include the default/files/2018-12/DABLaw1English_2. Hawala system, which in Arabic 57 The World Bank & The International Mon- pdf, accessed on 08 October 2019. simply means ‘transfer’, and refers etary Fund Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An 62 International Migration Organization, (IMO) Analysis of the Informal Hawala System, 2003. “Afghan Remittance overview and Trends: broadly to money transfer mecha- 58 UNODC Financial Flows linked to the Illicit Annex to Afghanistan Migration Profile”. Page nisms which exist in the absence of, Production and Trafficking of Afghan Opiates, 46, 2013. or parallel to, conventional banking 2008. 63 Da Afghanistan Bank, Financial Intelligence 59 The World Bank & The International Mon- Unit Annual Report 2018 http://www. etary Fund Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An fintraca.gov.af/assets/Annual%20Report/ Analysis of the Informal Hawala System, 2003. FinTRACA_Annual%20Report_2018.pdf, 56 The World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/ 60 International Migration Organization, (IMO) accessed on 08 October 2019. indicator/FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS, accessed on 31 “Afghan Remittance overview and Trends: 64 FATF “The role of Hawala and other similar October 2019. Annex to Afghanistan Migration Profile”. Page service providers in money laundering and

39 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

Map 4: Number of Officially Registered Hawaladars in Afghanistan as of 2018 CHINA

UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

BADAKHSHAN JAWZJAN KUNDUZ TAKHAR BALKH NORTH-EASTERN REGION

FARYAB NORTHERN REGION BAGHLAN SARI PUL SAMANGAN Jammu

PANJSHER NURISTAN BADGHIS PARWAN BAMYAN KAPISA KUNAR and LAGHMAN

KABUL EASTERN REGION WARDAK Kashmir WESTERN REGION NANGRAHAR HERAT GHOR LOGAR

DAYKUNDI GHAZNI PAKTYA KHOST

CENTRAL REGION URUZGAN FARAH Officially Registered PAKTIKA Hawaladars ZABUL in Afghanistan, 2018

PAKISTAN 80 SOUTH-EASTERN REGION 120 IRAN HILMAND 133 (ISLAMIC NIMROZ REPUBLIC 149 INDIA OF) KANDAHAR SOUTH-WESTERN REGION 205

338

369

Source:The boundaries Financial and namesTransaction shown and and the Reports designations Analysis used on Centre this map of do Afghanistan not imply official (FinTRACA), endorsement or Annual acceptance Report by the 2018. United Nations.Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Payment to Anti-Govern- insurgent commanders are also made drug traffickers (12 per cent) did not ment Elements (AGEs) by drug traffickers, and the Taliban specify the Taliban but confirmed that receive large ad hoc donations from Most of the profits generated from they paid money to AGEs. The most major traders in the narcotics busi- drug trafficking benefit traffickers, frequent reason behind the payment ness65. However, as the main economic but some go to corrupt government to the Taliban and other AGEs was the activity in areas under Taliban and officials and insurgents within Afghan- need for security or protection. Ushr other AGE control is farming, a sig- istan. Where they can, AGEs raise two was referenced 13 times, which was nificant proportion of which is poppy forms of traditional taxation, namely, followed by Zakat. Nine participants cultivation, Ushr collected from opium Ushr a tax on agriculture and other acknowledged voluntary payments to poppy cultivation is possibly the main natural resources, and Zakat, a man- the AGEs and to the Taliban. The fear source of their income from opiates, datory religious tax on wealth. In of the consequences of not paying the rather than payments by traffickers66. addition to these traditional taxes, Taliban was found thrice in the inter- traffickers also pay AGE’s to protect Drug traffickers were asked about view transcripts. possible payments to AGE and their drug shipments and labs that are in Profits obtained from an illicit busi- observations on this matter. Of all AGE controlled territory. While tax ness is not a subject to a tax, and in interviewed traffickers, 34 (83 per cent) is normally defined as a compulsory theory are exempt from Ushr and contribution to legitimate States in confirmed that they made payments to 67 Zakat but are subject to a criminal relation to legitimate profits, drug the Taliban for different reasons. Five justice response such as seizure, con- traffickers described taxes in the con- fiscation, investigation, prosecution text of illicit activities and non-state 65 For example, the court transcripts of the trial of a major Afghan drug trafficker and Tali- and adjudication. However, one drug actors, Ushr, Zakat and other forms ban financier Abdul Sattar reported that he trafficker from southern Afghanistan of payments regulated in Islam can made an individual donation of around USD be considered a tax under Islamic 333,000 to senior Taliban commanders from said: “In areas under the Taliban’s con- drug profits. trol, drug trafficking is not a crime”. This law. Voluntary donations to senior 66 UNSC, First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team statement underlines that some drug submitted pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) terrorist financing” 25, 2013; https://www.fatf- concerning the Taliban and associated individu- ban” this could be a catch-all for a range of gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Role- als and entities, S/2012/683. insurgent and violent actors, who may or may of-hawala-and-similar-in-ml-tf.pdf 67 While the respondents mentioned “The Tali- not share the ideals of the Taliban movement.

40 “Voices of the Quchaqbar” traffickers see drug profits as legitimate This means that, theoretically, for profits and probably justify their pay- example, a Taliban commander in ment to the Taliban either as a tax or Kandahar providing protection for Ushr/Zakat. a ton of heroin moving through his Traffickers were asked to estimate area of control could potentially make the amount of money they paid to between USD 63,000 and 95,000 for the Taliban and other AGE’s for the a ton of heroin moving through their protection of their trafficking activity. area, which is a considerable sum for Study participants provided a range a Taliban field commander, but far of different figures suggesting that in less than what traffickers could make Kandahar 10,000-15,000 Pakistani in selling the same amount of heroin Kaldar (USD 63-95) are paid to the in Afghanistan: approximately USD Taliban per kilogram of heroin and 2 million. The amount of money 5,000 Pakistani Rupee (32 USD) for charged by the Taliban and other a kilogram of opium; while in Hel- AGEs as protection and transit fees mand payments were approximately appears to be rather low, relative to USD 83 per kilogram of heroin, and the value of the opiates, and further in Farah 1,500 Afghani (USD 20) per research is required to explore the fac- kilo of opium. A kilogram of high- tors behind this. It should be noted quality crystal heroin can be sold for that, based on traffickers’ responses, some USD 2,10068 in Afghanistan, so the Taliban do not appear to be sys- the payments to the Taliban appear tematically paid by traffickers. Some to range only between 3-5 per cent of interviewed traffickers suggested that the value of the drug if it were sold in they only paid the Taliban if they are Afghanistan. stopped by insurgents while traffick- ing, rather than having formalised, regular or established procedures:

“When [the] Taliban stop a drug shipment, they ask for money and we pay them.” “If we encounter [the] Taliban, then [we] need to pay protection payment to them.” “We have no security related problems inside Afghanistan since [the] Taliban provide protection, but in Iran there are challenges posed by the Iranian law enforcement.” “[The] Taliban promise [that] they [will] maintain our security and provide pro- tection and ask for money in return.” “We pay cash and provide weapons to the Taliban.”

68 Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Monthly Price Report October 2019, Ministry of Inter- nal Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Page 10.

41 AOTP - SPECIAL EDITION

SECTION 10: How Afghan opiate traffickers communicate

Several drug traffickers Although the majority of traffickers reported that they had interviewed believed that changes in completely migrated from communication methods were benefi- Thuraya satellite phone com- cial, one drug trafficker believed that munication to internet-based such changes worked against DTOs. mobile phone applications. According to him, everything (includ- However, due to the inter- ing communications) was subject to ruption of or limited local the Government’s monitoring. He said mobile network service in that “communication has changed a Communication has some provinces and in remote lot compared to five years ago when “changed a lot. In the past, we parts of southern and western the borders were open but now used only satellite phones but now Afghanistan (including Hel- everything is under control including we have access to the internet. mand, Kandahar, Nimroz, communication”. and Farah), some traffickers Although traffickers seemed to be com- do continue to use Thuraya. fortable in communicating through ”The study also interviewed members of common day-to-day communication Drug traffickers were asked about their communication the CNPA to understand their view on tools, some of them were cautious and methods. The majority of respondents the changes in trafficker communica- took security measures when commu- employed multiple methods and used tions. The CNPA confirmed that the nicating. Several traffickers reported different tools to communicate with use of mobiles phones and the internet that they arranged initial meetings with their team members, business part- was more frequent than in the past. business partners through individual ners, and others. The majority of drug CNPA officers also stated that inter- messengers, and only later agreed on traffickers (82 per cent) believed that net-based communication methods the ways and means for further com- over the last five years communication used by traffickers were proving to be munications. Another group of drug methods and tools used by traffickers a challenge, as the CNPA did not have traffickers employed other techniques, have significantly changed. Accord- the capability to intercept or monitor such as regularly changing both the ing to them, access to the internet and this type of communication. mobile phone and individual SIM smartphone applications, including encrypted messaging services that Fig. 22: Communication Tools and Methods Used by Opiate facilitate audio and video commu- Traffickers nications, were considered to be the driving force in this change. Some 27 drug traffickers reported that in addition to the local mobile M ) phone networks, smartphone appli- o 17 bil s ( cations such as Facebook Messenger, e phone Telegram, WhatsApp, Viber, and W ) W ) h 2 WeChat as well as non-smart phone eChat (2 atsApp (1 systems including Thuraya satellite phones were used. The latter and face-to-face meetings were reported COMMUNICATION as being more frequently used in the TOOLS and METHODS

past, especially during the late 1990s Used by F T a e e 3) ce ac legram ( Opiate Traffickers M to F ) and early 2000s when Afghanistan ee�ng (8 F s re w communication infrastructure was far q ie u rv en e less developed. However, following the cy Int Detected in increased availability of internet access and mobile phone service provision

throughout Afghanistan, drug traf- ( ) s F ) a T 7 ac (3 t h ya ( ebook el ura e) fickers have reportedly increasingly lite phon relied on mobile phone service pro-

viders and smart phone applications Viber (3) to communicate.

42 “Voices of the Quchaqbar”

cards, using pre-communicated and than in licit employment. Many traf- The Role of Women in agreed upon codewords when using fickers in this present study expressed Opiate Trafficking mobile phones, or keeping verbal com- an interest in eventually migrating into This research provided some initial munication and SMS and/or other licit employment, and further research insights into women’s involvement messages short and brief. Some inter- could examine what factors would in opiate trafficking, and the range of viewed traffickers acknowledged using encourage them to do so. areas in which they were involved in. several code words refer to opium, However, this research only examined heroin, morphine and other types of The Business Models of the issue from the perspective of male drugs, but in the context of this study, Afghan Drug Traffickers traffickers. Understanding the moti- those keywords were largely not made Traffickers interviewed for this study vations behind why women become explicit. Only one trafficker, divulged gave different examples of how they involved in opiate trafficking, women’s some codewords that he used: “When operate their businesses. Some traffick- roles in trafficking organizations, and communicating over local mobile net- ers only engaged in trafficking between their thoughts and beliefs about traf- work, we use words such as powder, provinces in Afghanistan, some only ficking– from a female perspective – is Goara, Talka”. trafficked outside of Afghanistan a key area of future research. Areas for Further and others had a combination of Research the two. Some traffickers only traf- ficked to neighbouring countries, and This research study has begun to fill in others could traffick further afield to some of the knowledge gaps associated North America and Europe. While with drug trafficking organizations some traffickers described a business in Afghanistan and how they oper- process that corresponded to the con- ate, both within Afghanistan and in centric trafficker circle model, others international markets. This research described a very different system. Fur- has explored how trafficking organi- ther research is required to explore the zations are structured and operate; the motivations for traffickers enter- different types of business models in ing and remaining in the illicit opiate Afghanistan, including how they are business; the role of women in Afghan structured, the extent of traffickers drug trafficking organizations; the capabilities and how they interact financial methods used by traffickers; with trafficking organizations outside their links to corrupt governance and of Afghanistan. insurgents, and their understanding Links Between Opiate of opiate processing. However, this Trafficking and Anti- research was very much an initial Government Elements look at these issues, and in some cases exposed areas that would benefit from This study demonstrated that traf- further research. fickers did interact with and pay the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The Motivations Behind But the extent of this interaction was Entering and Remaining unclear. Some traffickers suggested in Opiate Trafficking that they only pay the Taliban when This research highlighted the fact that they were stopped and asked to, and for many traffickers, the motivations the amounts traffickers paid to AGEs for entering and remaining in the illicit was rather low. Further research could drug business were a combination of shed light on the extent of traffickers need and greed. However, the factors relations with insurgent groups and driving people to become involved how they work together. This research in opiate trafficking are complex and only looked at the question of drug require further study including a more trafficker- insurgent relations from the detailed look at the socio-economic perspective of the traffickers. Further backgrounds of those involved, and research could also examine the insur- the reasons why they continue to par- gent’s perception of drug trafficking ticipate in an illegal business rather and their relationship with traffickers.

43