United States Foreign Policy Towards Djibouti from George W. Bush to Donald J

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United States Foreign Policy Towards Djibouti from George W. Bush to Donald J. Trump: A Laboratory of U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa

Master's Thesis

BC. LUCIA MAJERČIAKOVÁ

Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D.

Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations

Brno 2018/2019

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS DJIBOUTI FROM GEORGE W. BUSH TO DONALD J. TRUMP: A LABORATORY OF U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Bibliographic Record

Author: Bc. Lucia Majerčiaková Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and European Studies Title of Thesis: United States Foreign Policy Towards Djibouti from George W. Bush to Donald J. Trump: A Laboratory of U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa Degree Programme: International Relations Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2018/2019 Number of Pages: 200 Keywords: Djibouti, United States, Bush, Obama, Trump, China, Horn of Africa, Africa, Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy, Economic Relations, Military Pre- sence

3 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS DJIBOUTI FROM GEORGE W. BUSH TO DONALD J. TRUMP: A LABORATORY OF U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Abstract

The thesis deals with the issue of the U.S.-Djibouti relations under the administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. The thesis shall examine and compare the continuity and change of the U.S. foreign policy towards Djibouti in the selected period. To that end, the thesis shall provide an outline of the overall Africa policy of each administration (including its security, economic and humanitarian aspects) and examine how those aspects manifested themselves in the U.S. approach to Djibouti. The thesis shall also look at regional developments and involvement of other foreign actors in Djibouti (China in particular) and examine their connections to the U.S.-Djibouti relations.

4 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS DJIBOUTI FROM GEORGE W. BUSH TO DONALD J. TRUMP: A LABORATORY OF U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Master's Thesis concerning the topic of United States Foreign Policy Towards Djibouti from George W. Bush to Donald J. Trump: A Laboratory of U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 5 May 2019

...... Bc. Lucia Majerčiaková

5 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS DJIBOUTI FROM GEORGE W. BUSH TO DONALD J. TRUMP: A LABORATORY OF U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D. for giving me the opportunity to complete my thesis under his supervision. I deeply appreciate all the advice, ideas, support and patience in guiding me through this research project. I would also like to express my gratitude to Ambassador David H. Shinn, Robin S. Cromer, Kelsey Lilley and Captain Charles J. De- Gilio who provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted the re-search. A special note of thanks should also be given to Ambassador Lange Schermerhorn for her kind help with all my questions and for providing me with research materials. I would also like to convey my appreciation to Mirek Tobiáš Hošman for all the constructive comments and suggestions that helped to improve the quality of the thesis. I am also greatly indebted to Lillian Do- nahue, Deborah Rheem, Sam Marino and Alexandra Katkinová for proof- reading this thesis. I would also like to express my appreciation to all of those with whom I have had the pleasure to work and study with at the Masaryk University. Many of my classmates became my close friends and I could not imagine my time at university without their support, help and friendship. No- body has been more important to me in the pursuit of this thesis than the members of my family. I would like to thank them for love and support that they extended to me in everything I pursue.

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS 7

Table of Contents

List of Maps 9

List of Tables 10

List of Terms and Acronyms 11

1 Introduction 13

2 Research Design and Methodology 16 2.1 Research Questions...... 17 2.2 Thesis Structure Outline ...... 17 2.3 Definitions and Methods of Data Collection ...... 19 2.4 Literature Overview ...... 23

3 Overview of the U.S.-Africa Relations 27

4 Overview of the U.S.- Djibouti Relations 37

5 Bush administration 47 5.1 Foreign Policy Aspects of the U.S.- Djibouti Relations ...... 49 5.2 Security Aspects of the U.S – Africa Relations ...... 55 5.3 Security Aspects of the U.S – Djibouti Relations ...... 61 5.4 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Africa Relations ...... 70 5.5 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations ...... 75 5.6 Conclusion ...... 79

6 Obama administration 85 6.1 Foreign Policy Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations ...... 87 6.2 Security Aspects of the U.S – Africa Relations ...... 96 6.3 Security Aspects of the U.S – Djibouti Relations ...... 102 6.4 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Africa Relations ...... 110

7 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS

6.5 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations ...... 116 6.6 Conclusion ...... 120

7 Trump administration 128 7.1 Foreign Policy Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations ...... 130 7.2 Security Aspects of the U.S – Africa Relations ...... 135 7.3 Security Aspects of the U.S – Djibouti Relations ...... 139 7.4 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Africa Relations ...... 147 7.5 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations ...... 152 7.6 Conclusion ...... 157

8 Conclusion 164

Bibliography 173 8.1 Primary Sources ...... 173 8.2 Secondary Sources ...... 184

8 LIST OF MAPS 9

List of Maps

1 - Map of Djibouti 37 2 - Area of Responsibility for Africa Command 59 3 - Security Threats in Africa During Obama's Administration 101 4 - Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti 134

9 10 LIST OF TABLES

List of Tables

1 - Security aid from United States to Djibouti (2001-2008) 68 2 - Top recipients of security aid from the United States to Africa (2001- 68 2008) 3 - Arm sales from the United States to Djibouti (2001-2008) 69 (deliveries only) 4 - Top recipients of arm sales between the United States and Africa 69 (2001-2008) 5 - Top recipients of economic aid from the United States to Africa 77 (2001-2008) 6 - Trade between the United States and Djibouti (2001-2008) 79 7 - Security aid from United States to Djibouti (2009-2016) 108 8 - Top recipients of security aid from the United States to Africa (2009- 108 2016) 9 - Arm sales from the United States to Djibouti (2009-2016) 109 10 - Top recipients of arm sales between the United States and Africa 109 (2009-2016) 11 - Top recipients of economic aid from the United States to Africa 117 (2009-2016) 12 - Trade between the United States and Djibouti (2009-2016) 120 13 – U.S. Drone Strikes in Somalia (2007-2018) 137 14 - Security aid from United States to Djibouti (2017-2018) 145 15 - Top recipients of security aid from the United States to Africa 145 (2017-2018) 16 - Arm sales from the United States to Djibouti (2017-2018) 146 17 - Top recipients of arm sales between the United States and Africa 146 (2017-2018) 18 - Top recipients of economic aid from the United States to Africa 153 (2017-2018) 19 - Trade between the United States and Djibouti (2017-2018) 154

10 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 11

List of Terms and Acronyms

ACOTA – Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program ACRI – Africa Crisis Responsibility Initiative AFRICOM – United States Africa Command AGOA – African Growth and Opportunity Act AMISOM – African Union Mission to Somalia APRRP or “A-Prep” – African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership BUILD – Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act CJTF-HOA – Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa DP World – Dubai Ports World EACTI – East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative EU NAVFOR – European Union Naval Force FEWSNET – Famine Early Warning System Network FNLA – National Front for the Liberation of Angola FRUD – Afar Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy FTF – Feed the Future Initiative GPOI – Global Peace Operations Initiative ICU – Islamic Courts Union IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development ILEA – International Law Enforcement Agency MCC – Millennium Challenge Corporation MPLA – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola NSPD – National Security Presidential Directive NSS – National Security Strategy

11 12 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

PEPFAR – President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief PREACT – Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism PSI – Pan Sahel Initiative SGI – Security Governance Initiative SWAPO – Southwest Africa People’s Organization TFG – Transitional Federal Government TFWG – Terrorist Financing Working Group TSCTI – Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative UNITA – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNITAF – Unified Task Force USABF – U.S.-Africa Business Forum USAID – United States Agency for International Development W-GDP – Women’s Global Development and Prosperity YALI – Young African Leaders Initiative

12 INTRODUCTION 13

1 Introduction

Last year in May, the United States accused China of pointing military- grade laser at the U.S aircraft and injuring some of its pilots. Since the tensions between the two countries were on a rise at the time the, the reports of such incidents were not the most surprising part of the news. It was the location of the incident. According to Pentagon, the incidents happened near the American base in Djibouti.

At first glance, this small desert nation in the Horn of Africa does not fit the description of an area of strategic interest of the world’s major powers. The country’s size is comparable to the one third of the Czech Republic, its natural resources are very limited, and 90% of its territory is covered by desert. Neverthe- less, Djibouti is at the moment the only country in the world where French, U.S., German, Italian, Spanish, Japanese and Chinese military forces are stationed sim- ultaneously, and Saudi Arabia might soon have an official base as well. So, what makes Djibouti such an appealing destination for the world’s major powers?

When Djibouti became independent in 1977, it had one paved road and less than a square mile of arable land (Reel 2016). The New York Times described it as completely lacking natural resources “except sand, salt, and 20,000 camels“ and predicted the new state would get swallowed up by one of its larger neighbors - Ethiopia or Somalia - because it was “so impoverished that it cannot stand on its own” (Darnton 1977).

Yet, decades have passed, and Djibouti’s bigger neighbors got entrenched in reoccurring wars, internal instability and humanitarian crises of all kinds, which left them with little space to pay attention to their small neighbor. Thus, Djibouti has survived as a sovereign state and, what is more, it was largely spared of the

13 14 INTRODUCTION troubling developments that plagued its surroundings. The UNHRC has even described it as an “oasis of peace in a stormy desert” (UNHCR n.d.).

It was precisely the country’s sleepiness that became one of its biggest strenghts. Additionally, Djibouti’s location at the crossroads of Africa and the Mid- dle East, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb that represents one the world’s busiest maritime shipping routes have become another key asset of the tiny Red Sea nation. Those qualities did not go unoticed in Washington after 9/11 when it was in search for a stable location for its counteterrorism activities in the Horn of Africa. As Bloomberg’s reporter Monte Reel put it, at that time “Djibouti was about the only country in the neighborhood that wasn’t on fire“(Reel 2016). Djibouti was eager to welcome such opportunity and from 2003 started hosting U.S. military personnel at the Camp Lemonnier.

The establishment of the U.S. military presence in Djibouti marked a key milestone in the U.S.-Djibouti relations as well as in the American policy towards Africa as a whole since Camp Lemonnier has remained the only enduring U.S. military installation on the continent. The number of the U.S. personnel stationed in Djibouti has gradually increased and the small desert nation is now referred to by the highest-ranking U.S. officials as a “strong partner” (Tillerson 2018).

So, how did Djibouti evolve from being largely peripheral to the U.S. strategic interests until the beginning of this millennia into what the former U.S. Sec- retary of State Tillerson described as “stong partner”? How did the American approach to this small nation develop and what role did the external actors and regional developments play in their relations? By examing these and more detailed questions that will be introduced in the following chapter, the author wishes to analyze the developments of the U.S. policy towards Djibouti and examine the involvement of foreign actors and their connection to the U.S. approach to the

14 INTRODUCTION 15 country. Since the interactions between Djibouti and the United States prior to the 2001 were very scarce, the thesis will focus its research on the administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump.

Even though Djibouti has gained a more prominent position among the U.S. policymakers and it has recently made the headlines in the media all over the world, it still seems to escape the interests of the academia. The academic literature on the U.S.-Djibouti relations is more than scarce. Although there is a limited number of works devoted to specific time periods or areas of the U.S.-Djibouti relations, to the knowledge of the author, there is no single volume that provides a comprehensive overview of various aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti relations. The author believes that in times of growing American attention to the country, there is an increasing need for understanding of the dynamics behind the U.S.-Djibouti relations. The analysis of the developments of the U.S. relations with Djibouti shall, therefore, help the reader to understand the current developments of their relations in a larger context and to provide a basis for research of a more specific topic connected to this understudied issue.

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2 Research Design and Methodology

Given the nature of the topic, the most suitable research methods are those of qualitative character. As Jennifer Mason stated qualitative reseach: “has an un- rivalled capacity to constitute compelling arguments about how things work in particular context” (J. Mason 2002, 1). As the thesis shall prove in the following chapters, the U.S.-Djibouti relations are interlinked with the regional context, with the U.S. interests in the region and its overall policy towards Africa. The nuances and complexity of the connections between Djiboutian and American interests in the Djibouti’s surrounding region and the involvement of multiple foreign actors in the country create an environment that can be best assessed qualitatively by using methodologies that Mason described as those that celebrate “depth, context and complexity” (J. Mason 2002, 1).

The thesis shall approach the topic via the means of interpretative analysis with elements of small-N comparative case study. It shall approach each of the administrations – George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump – as a specific case study and compare their differences. As Viola Bureau and Heidi Houl- berg Salomonsen point out, a comparative case study systematically identifies similarities and differences between the cases compared, which in turn could form the basis of the subsequent formulation of hypotheses or simply add new perspectives and highlight aspects of the cases, which may not otherwise have been subject to the researcher’s inquiry (Bureau, Salomonsen 2012, 10). This thesis aims for the latter, as its aim is not to test or generate theories, but to provide in-depth analysis and understanding of an understudied, yet important issue. Thus, according to Petr Drulák, from the epistemological-methodological perspective, the thesis could be described as interpretative qualitative research (Drulák 2008, 15). Since the thesis shall provide a comprenhensive analysis of an understudied topic, it shall not only

16 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 17 address a gap within the literature but it could also serve as a valuable source for future studies with explanatory ambitions.

2.1 Research Questions

The research questions set forth are: . How did the American foreign policy (including its security, economic and humanitarian aspects) towards Africa and Djibouti in particular, evolve during the Bush, Obama, Trump administrations? What were the similarities and differences in their approaches? . How did the regional developments and involvement of other foreign actors (China in particular) in Djibouti affect the U.S. approach to the country? . How did the American perception of the Chinese activities in Djibouti evolve? What were the differences between the perceptions of the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations?

2.2 Thesis Structure Outline

The thesis is structured into three main parts and the introductory chapter. The introductory chapter shall provide a brief historical overview of the U.S.-Af- rica relations and the relations between the United States and Djibouti in particular. The historical overview will cover the period starting from the first encounters between Africa and the U.S. until the beginning of the George W. Bush’s presidency. Since the presidency of the George W. Bush marked the beginning of intensified relations between the U.S and Djibouti, as was already explained above, the period covering the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump shall constitute the main focus of the thesis and therefore there shall be a chapter devoted to each administration.

17 18 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The beginning of each of the main chapters shall start with an overview of the overall U.S.-Africa policy of the administration in question, outline its general approach to the continent and mention the most important policy documents regarding Africa. The thesis does not aim to provide an analysis of the U.S. relations with any other country besides Djibouti and if developments in other African countries are mentioned, it is because they are linked to the U.S.-Djibouti relations or serve as an example of an overall U.S. policy towards the continent.

Similar to the case of the U.S.-Djibouti relations, the academic literature on the Washington’s approach to the African continent as a whole remains limited. Alt- hough, this topic has undoubtedly attracted more scholarly interest than the U.S. relations with Djibouti and there are numerous works devoted to the U.S.-Africa relations, to the knowledge of the author, there is no single volume that provides a comprehensive overview of various aspects of the U.S.-Africa relations from the first encounters between the two sides of the Atlantic until the present moment. For that reason, the author believes that including such sections in the thesis would not only be valuable in order to understand the environment of the U.S.-Djibouti relations but would also help to address the gaps in the study of the U.S.-Africa relations and potentially serve as a basis for more specific research of the field.

Each of the main chapters shall consist of 3 main sub-chapters:  Foreign Policy Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations – specifically, the thesis shall examine the developments in the U.S.-Djibouti diplomatic relations. It shall also look at the regional developments that involve both Djibouti’s and the U.S. interests and point out the instances of their cooperation/conflict in the region. The section will also analyze involvement of other foreign actors in Djibouti and their impact on the U.S.-Djibouti relations.

18 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 19

 Security Aspects of the U.S – Africa/Djibouti Relations - specifically, the thesis shall examine the overall outlines of the U.S.-Africa security policy, and the way the U.S. National Security Strategies and other strategic documents are translated into its approach to the continent. The thesis shall further examine the details of the security aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti relations, assess the differences among the administrations and examine how was the overall U.S. security approach to the continent connected to U.S. approach to Djibouti.  Developmental, Humanitarian and Trade Aspects of the U.S.-Africa/Dji- bouti Relations - specifically, the thesis shall examine the overall outlines of the U.S.-Africa trade, humanitarian and developmental policies. The thesis will further examine the details of the trade, humanitarian and developmental aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti relations, assesse the differences among the administrations and examine how was the overall U.S. trade, humanitarian and developmental approach to the continent connected to the U.S. approach to Djibouti.

2.3 Definitions and Methods of Data Collection

 Security Aid – For the purposes of this thesis, security aid will be defined as the U.S. foreign military financing, training and equipment provided to Djibouti’s security sector, including the military, police, and ministries associated with the control of the security forces. Security aid includes programs funded through the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. State Department.  Arms Sales – For the purposes of this thesis, arms sales will be defined as U.S. military equipment and services sold to Djibouti.

19 20 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

 Economic Aid – For the purposes of this thesis, economic aid will be defined as U.S. development and humanitarian aid provided to Djibouti. Eco- nomic aid includes programs funded through the State Department and its subsidiary the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as non-security programs funded by the U.S. Defense Department. o Development aid – includes programs that focus on sustainable economic progress and sociopolitical stability. o Humanitarian aid – includes programs that focus on the immediate alleviation of humanitarian emergencies, both natural and man-made disasters, as well as problems resulting from conflict associated with failed or failing states.  Trade - For the purposes of this thesis, trade will be defined as movement of goods between the U.S. and Djibouti. The data include government and non-government shipments of goods, and exclude transactions with U.S. military, diplomatic and consular installations abroad, U.S. goods returned to the United States by its Armed Forces, personal and household effects of travelers, and in-transit shipments.

The definition of trade is following the definition put forward by United States Census Bureau. The United States Census Bureau will also serve as a source of the trade statistics data. Similarly, the definition of security aid, arms sales and economic aid is following the definition of the Security Assistance Monitor that will serve as a source of the data for these categories. Security Assistance Monitor database includes data on over 30 separate U.S. security aid funding accounts or programs. All the data included originate from U.S. government reports that the Security Assistance Monitor usually acquires through Freedom of Information Act requests, congressional offices, U.S. government websites, or occasionally Gov-

20 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 21 ernment Accountability Office or Congressional Research Service reports. The author has decided to use this database since it summarizes all publicly available data on U.S. foreign security and economic aid programs. Even though the U.S. government maintains two public databases (Foreign Aid Dashboard or Foreign Aid Explorer), these databases do not include data on certain U.S. security aid programs funded by the Defense Department. Since the Security Assistance Monitor includes that data, the author believes that the data provided by Security Assistance Monitor provide a summary that would prove difficult for the author to obtain herself.

Nevertheless, in order to verify the information provided by the Security Assistance Monitor, the data on arm sales, security and economic aid shall be compared to the data provided in the primary and secondary literature used in this thesis and any significant differences shall be noted. Nonetheless, the tables will only include the data provided by Security Assistance Monitor in order to maintain vis- ual continuity. Statistical data for the Trump administration will only include the first two years of his presidency (2017-2018), and in certain cases only 2017, since more recent information is not yet available.

Each chapter will also analyze various secondary sources (more details in the literature overview section), and primary sources (including excerpts from speeches of state officials, press releases, factsheets and summaries available on official websites of the U.S. and Djiboutian governmental agencies and international organizations, and official documents – such as Africa Strategies, National Security Strategies, Country Reports on Terrorism, AFRICOM Posture State- ments, National Security Decision Directives, Public Papers of the U.S. Presidents, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and other).

2.3.1 Expert Interviews Expert interviews shall be used as another method for collecting data, primarily due to limited availability of information on this topic. For the purpose of

21 22 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY this thesis, the term “expert” follows the definition put forward by Gläser and Lau- del who define expert as a person who possesses: “special knowledge of a social phenomenon which the interviewer is interested in” (Gläser, Laudel 2009, 117). Therefore, the author has strived to select people with special knowledge of the U.S.-Djibouti relations, U.S. relations with the countries of the Horn of Africa region and U.S.-Africa relations in general.

As Alexander Bogner, Beate Littig and Wolfgang Menz mentioned in their book “Interviewing Experts”, according to Michael Meuser and Ulrike Nagel the term expert can be expanded to include not only members of the professional func- tional elite, but also people actively involved in shaping public affairs, such as NGO representatives (Bogner, Littig, Menz 2009, 7). In line with this definition, author interviewed experts with military, governmental and non-governmental af- filiation. Additionally, the author has tried to maintain balance between the specific areas of the expert’s expertise.

However, when it comes to the question of nationality, the author did not manage to assemble a balanced group of interviewees – as all of them are U.S nationals. Even though, the author has contacted various Djiboutian governmental institutions, such as the Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti in the United States or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Djibouti and research institutes such as the Center for Study and Research of Djibouti - Institute of Political and Strategic Studies, the author did not receive response in any of the cases, and therefore the thesis does not include interviews with Djiboutian experts.

The author has conducted interviews with following experts (all interviewees consented in writing to the interview and acknowledged that their statements could be used in the thesis):

22 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 23

. Robin S. Cromer - Foreign Policy Advisor at the U.S. Africa Command (note: Ms. Cromer’s comments do not represent official AFRICOM views) . David H. Shinn – Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University, former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and to Burkina Faso, former Director for East African Affairs at the U.S. Depart- ment of State . Kelsey Lilley – Policy Analyst at Yorktown Solutions, Washington DC based advisory firm providing risk analysis and strategic advice, former Assistant Director at the Atlantic Council Africa Center . Lange Schermerhorn – former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Dji- bouti, former Political Advisor to the Commanding General of the Com- bined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa . Captain Charles J. DeGilio - Commanding Officer, Camp Lemonnier

Due to diverse background of the interviewees, the questions the author has asked differed in each interview and often helped to provide, explain or elaborate on the information missing in the primary and secondary sources. For that reason, the results of the interviews shall not be analyzed in a quantitative manner but shall solely serve as a source of additional data for the resulting qualitative analysis and the interview excerpts shall be included in all the main parts of the thesis. Despite the indubitable value of the expert interviews, the interviews do not serve as a primary method of data collection and their excerpts shall serve as an addition to the analysis of the primary and secondary sources.

2.4 Literature Overview

To the knowledge of the author, although there are a few publications looking into the U.S.-Djibouti relations, there is none that would specifically look into the issue as this thesis does since the other works tend to focus on specific time

23 24 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY periods or specific areas of their relations. Even though the sources on the U.S.- Africa relations in general are significantly more numerous, they also tend to concentrate on selected aspects, administrations, countries, events or time periods.

For information on historical overview of the U.S.-Africa relations, multiple works painted the needed picture. Peter Schraeder’s volume called “United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change” was very helpful in understanding the initial phases of the formation of U.S. Africa policy in the post-World War II period. The works of James J. Hentz and James H. Meriwether proved to be very useful sources of information on the developments during later stages of the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War era. The works of various African authors enriched the chapter and emphasized different aspects of the U.S.-Africa relations. The contributions of the Kenyan historians Godfrey Muriuki and Macharia Munene to the book titled „The United States and Africa: From Independence to the End of the Cold War“ presented a very compendious summary of the main developments during the Cold War and more recent developments were well summarized in Adekeye Adebajo‘s article „Africa and America in an Age of Terror.“

In regards to historical overview of the U.S.-Djibouti relations, Abdo A. Abdallah’s „State Building, Independence and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Djibouti“ presented a valuable source of information on developments in Djibouti since its independence. The works of Peter Woodward, Ambassador David Shinn and Ambassador Schermerhorn proved to be useful sources of information on the developments during later stages of the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.

As for the Bush administration and its approach to Africa, the article by Nicolas van de Walle titled „US policy towards Africa: The Bush legacy and the Obama administration“ provided a valuable overall summary and analysis. The

24 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 25 work of Peter J. Pham titled „The Development of the United States Africa Command and its Role in America’s Africa Policy under George W. Bush and Barack Obama“ and Lauren Ploch,’s article called „Africa Command: U.S. Stra- tegic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa“proved to be useful sources of information in regard to security relations between the U.S. and Africa. As a background source on the U.S.-Djibouti relations, the works of African authors proved especially beneficial. To name a few, valuable was for example the title by Berouk Mesfin, Peter Kagwanja and the volume of African-Canadian Thomas Kwasi Tieku. On security aspects of relations with Djibouti, the chapter written by John Davis and Andrew Othieno titled “Djibouti’s Pre-Eminent Role in the War on Terror” in the volume called “Africa and the War on Terrorism” included valuable data.

For information on the Obama administration, it proved beneficial to follow the analyses of Nicolas van de Walle and George Klay Kieh’s chapter in the book titled “Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy“ that both provided an overall assessment of the Obama’s Africa policy. The African- American perspective was represented in the work of Fredline M'cormack and Amadu Kaba titled "The Obama Administration and U.S.-Africa Relations." Similar to the literature used in the previous chapter, African authors provided insightful information about the development in Djibouti and it surroundings. In this regard, the work of Abdinur Mohamud proved especially useful. Another valuable piece about Djibouti and its security relations with the U.S. was written by Degang Sun and Yahia H. Zoubir and titled "The Eagle’s Nest in the Horn of Africa: US Military Strategic Deployment in Djibouti." Moreover, there were numerous works on Chinese engagement in Africa. To name a few, valuable was for example the work of Jayanna Krupakar and the piece written by Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker and Patrick deGategno titled "China’s Military Support Facility in

25 26 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base," that both offered insightful analysis of the Chinese presence in Djibouti.

As for the Trump administration and its approach to Africa, since the topic is very recent, the academic literature remains limited. The work that stands out in this regard is Christopher Griffin’s article titled “Trump and the Al Qaeda and ISIS Networks in Africa” that shades the light on the recent American military involvement on the continent. In order to compensate for the shortages in the academic secondary resources, analytical work of renowned think tanks was studied carefully. To highlight a few, experts from the Atlantic Council Africa Center - Jona- than Gass and Kelsey Lilley – provided valuable assessment of the overall Trump’s Africa policy but also analyses the current development in Djibouti and its surrounding region. Worth mentioning are also analyses by Camille Lons from Car- negie Endowment for International Peace or Landry Signé and Nathaniel D.F. Al- len from Brookings. Experts from Africa-based think tanks also provided beneficial insights, for example the work of Peter Fabricius from Institute for Security Studies shed light on the American but also Chinese military presence on the continent. Analyses of Ambassador David Shinn provided another useful source of information on the Chinese presence in Djibouti and the book titled “How China sees the World” written by John M. Friend and Bradley A. Thayer provided a valuable background on the U.S. perception of the Chinese activities in Africa as a whole.

Moreover, media reports, and NGO factsheets, and summaries helped in tracing some of the key figures, names, and events. The author was striving to use a balanced selection of sources, that would represent both American/Western and African authors. Unfortunately, there is no Djiboutian academic literature included as the author could not find any publicly available sources in English written by Djiboutian authors.

26 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 27

3 Overview of the U.S.-Africa Relations

One of the first recorded cases of North America’s involvement with Africa took place in 1619 when a Dutch ship sold twenty Africans into slavery in the British colonies (Schraeder 1994, 2). Even though during three centuries of this infamous practice British North American colonies comprised less than 5% of total slave trade in the Western hemisphere (Tindall, Shi 1994, 39), its legacy four centuries later is roughly 13% of the overall U.S. population claiming an African- American heritage (United States Census Bureau 2018). Slaves brought by force from Africa, and their descendants who continued to live in slavery until the 1808, became essential to development of the American South and the country as a whole (Copson 2007, 3). Despite long historical and cultural ties between the United States and Africa, there is a consensus among scholars that from the founding of the republic in 1789 to the present, Africa have typically been low on the list of U.S. interests and priorities (Schraeder 1994, 2).

Most scholars also agree that the relations between the U.S. and Africa have gone through three major phases: the Cold War; the period between 1990 and 1998; and the post-1998 period. Although, there were encounters between the U.S. and Africa during the colonial period as well, they were sporadic and majority of diplomatic relations between Washington and Africa at that time went through European colonial powers (Lyons 2015). Africa did not generate much interest in the United States during the First and Second World Wars either as it was not the one of the major theaters of those conflicts.

However, the Cold War marked an important shift in the U.S. involvement on African continent. The consensual academic position is that U.S.-Africa relations between 1950 and 1990 revolved around Cold War dynamics (Tieku 2012). The decade of Africa – the 1960s was also one of the most heated decades of the

27 28 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS

Cold War (Hentz 2004, 27) and since African nations began to regain their independence at the height of the East-West competition (Muriuki 1995, 5) it became very important to Washington that the newly independent states should not fall into crutches of Moscow. For this reason until the end of the Cold War, US policy in the region was geared towards preventing the Soviet Union from gaining influence in Africa (Muriuki 1995, 5). However, on a few occasions, an eminent humanitarian emergency such as the civil war in Biafra in the 1960s or the Ethiopian famine of the 1980s created interest outside of the Cold War framework (Lyons 2015).

During the first decades of the Cold War, two American politicians stressed the necessity of rethinking U.S. policy towards Africa. Schraeder notes that in 1957, then Vice President Richard Nixon stated: “for too many years, Africa in the minds of many Americans has been regarded as a remote and mysterious continent which was the special province of big game hunters, explorers and motion picture makers” (Schraeder 1994, 1). Recognizing the importance of Africa - especially within the context of the Cold War - Nixon recommended the creation of a separate Bureau of African Affairs within the State Department, an idea which reached fru- ition in 1958 (Schraeder 1994, 1).

The following year, then Senator John F. Kennedy became the chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His interest in Africa was particularly visible in course of his 1960 campaign, during which he repeatedly criticized the Eisenhower administration for neglecting “the needs and aspirations of the African people” and stressed that the U.S. should be supportive of anti-colonialism and self-determination (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum 2019). In order to counter what he perceived as a decline of American prestige in Africa at the expense of growing Soviet influence, Kennedy concluded that: “we must embark on a bold and imaginative new

28 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 29 program for the development of Africa” (Kennedy 1960). In 1961, Kennedy’s administration established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps and these programs were intended to serve more than purely humanitarian purposes. According to Divon and Derman, Kennedy stated that while aid is a way to fulfil humanitarian responsibilities, it also enhances the security of the United States in the battle against communism since it allows the U.S. to confront the Soviet Union in the battle for the hearts and minds of people of Africa and other developing regions (Divon, Derman 2017, 68).

The suggestions presented by both Nixon and Kennedy were aiming on up- grading Africa to a position of a bigger priority within the policymaking establishment in accordance with changing international realities. Yet despite important changes in U.S. policies towards Africa which came about after these leaders voiced their opinions, scholars have generally continued to assess the levels of attention devoted to the continent as low (Schraeder 1994, 2).

For the most part of the Cold War period, the worth of individual African states was embedded primarily in their importance in Washington’s strategic competition with Moscow. The case of Congo (known as Zaire between 1971 and 1997) serves as an example of this Cold War rationale behind the American involvement in Africa. Congo had become independent from Belgium in 1960 and was almost immediately confronted with a series of internal conflicts. When Moise Tshombe, head of the mineral-rich province Katanga, launched a secessionist re- bellion, the Soviet Union responded by sending weapons and technicians to support his cause (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum 2019). Congo- lese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba sought help from the United Nations to re- store order, however, he himself ended up being ousted by the chief of staff of the army Joseph-Désiré Mobutu who received clandestine support from the CIA (Horvitz, Catherwood 2014, 305). As a leftist and nationalist favoring nonaligned

29 30 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS policy, Lumumba was viewed as a threat to the U.S. interests in the context of the Cold War (Horvitz, Catherwood 2014, 305). However, Mobutu turned out to be a ruthless dictator who crushed dissent and jailed or executed his opponents. Yet, the Cold War logic dictated that he should retain American support and aid since he positioned himself as a devoted anticommunist (Muriuki 1995, 6).

Following Vietnam and Watergate, Congress tried to limit the emphasis on the Cold War thinking and several pieces of legislations linking foreign aid to human rights were passed (Munene 1995, 29). The spirit of distancing Washington from undemocratic states also affected the presidential campaign of 1976 during which the Democratic candidate – Jimmy Carter, emphasized human rights as a major concern (Munene 1995, 29). However, despite a stated commitment to human rights and the need to decrease ties with authoritarian dictatorships, the Carter administration largely failed to follow through on this promise in the case of Mo- butu. Carter’s initial strong rhetoric ultimately gave way to acceptance of a consensus within the security establishment that Mobutu’s fall would lead to chaos and instability (Schraeder 1994, 7). As President Carter stated in 1979: “the US recognizes that the maintenance of well-being and independence of Zaire under Mobutu’s leadership is an important aspect of our own well-being and security” (Carter 1979).

Similar to Jimmy Carter, President Reagan assumed office confident that he could negate the Vietnam-Watergate disillusionment in foreign policy (Munene 1995, 43). Major Africa issues facing his administration included South Africa, internal conflict in Angola and struggle for independence in Namibia. On the onset of Reagan’s administration, Namibia still remained governed by South Africa and when neighboring Angola gained independence, the South African government worried that the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) could use An- gola as a base of operations against the white minority and leadership in Namibia

30 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 31

(Meriwether 2015, 386). Yet, even when Angola became independent, it immediately found itself in the middle of a civil war prolonged by Cold War machinations (Meriwether 2015, 386).

The road to Angola’s independence was complicated by the existence of three competing movements determined to gain control- National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Muriuki 1995, 7). Similar to the case of Congo/Zaire, American involvement in the conflict was motivated primarily by the East-West rivalry and for that reason, when Soviet support for MPLA began to arrive, FNLA-UNITA coalition received aid from the U.S. (Muriuki 1995, 7). As the National Security Decision Directive Number 212 clearly stated, Washington’s main objective in this conflict was to: “reduce and possibly eliminate Soviet and Soviet-proxy influence and opportunities in Angola and Southern Africa” (Reagan 1986). The movement of South African forces into Angola just weeks before formal independence led to Cuba shortly afterwards countering the invasion force with its own troops (Meriwether 2015, 386). However, neither side was capable of inflicting a decisive defeat on the other thereby creating a stalemate which stretched into the 1980s (Muriuki 1995, 8).

Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, spent almost 8 years working on a conflict resolution in Angola (Hentz 2004, 23). In 1981, the U.S. announced a policy of “constructive engagement” (Hentz 2004, 28), a regional policy that was trying to push forward the Cuban departure from Angola by linking this event with Namibia’s gaining independence (Meriwether 2015, 386) as indicated in the National Security Decision Directive Number 274: “the U.S. will continue to use all available diplomatic opportunities to bring negotiations on Cuban troops withdrawal and Namibian independence to successful

31 32 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS conclusion“ (Reagan 1987). Less than a month before the end of the Reagan presidency, agreements were signed in New York which culminated in the Namibian independence (Meriwether 2015, 387). Along with this came the withdrawal from Angola of Cuban and South African forces. However, whether this outcome can be attributed to the Reagan’s policy of constructive engagement, the actions of Cuba, or the changed thinking in South Africa is still a subject of academic debate (Meriwether 2015, 387).

Apartheid in South Africa was also an important part of the public debate during the Reagan‘s presidency (Meriwether 2015, 378). Reagan viewed the South African Government as an important ally claiming that: “we cannot aban- don a country that stood beside us in every war we ever fought” (Reagan 1984, 1090). However, such position helped to create the impression that his administration perceived the human rights abuses in South Africa as lesser evils compared to the prospect of the spread of communism (Muriuki 1995, 6). The objective to “use U.S. influence to reduce the prospect of revolutionary violence and the opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence” was also at the core of the National Security Decision Directive Number 187 (Reagan 1985). Even though Reagan repeatedly spoke against apartheid, he was also clear about his opposition to economic sanctions against South African regime (Meriwether 2015). After South Africa’s crackdown on black activists in 1986, Congress overrode Reagan’s veto and imposed its own sanctions (Munene 1995, 38). The Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986 banned new investments and imports until the South Afri- can government ended the state of emergency, released political prisoners (including Nelson Mandela), established a timetable for ending apartheid laws, and began negotiations toward majority rule (Meriwether 2015, 385).

The end of the Cold War brought along big shifts in the distribution of power, which translated to changes in the U.S. approach to foreign policy. The

32 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 33

Cold War dynamics was no longer the driving force behind its engagement overseas and even though that may have seemed as good news for Africa, it actually had negative consequences on their relations since the end of the East-West rivalry made Africa visibly less relevant to American foreign policy. In the immediate post-Cold War era, American policy towards the continent struggled with the strategic empty space created by the Soviet collapse (Hentz 2004, 25). Without a clear enemy to target, U.S. policymakers found it difficult to connect African issues with U.S. interests and there is a consensus among scholars that the period of mid-1990s marks a low point in U.S.-Africa relations (Tieku 2012). Africa’s significance was shrinking not only in strategic terms but also in terms of economy, as the level of assistance dropped significantly and the United States also scaled down its diplomatic presence on the continent (Rojčík 2001, 28).

After the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa was driven by President George H. W. Bush’s vision of a “New World Order“ (Ploch 2011, 31). Bush administration was engaged in conflict resolution in the Eastern and Southern Africa but its involvement on the continent was dominated by the deployment of American troops to Somalia in 1992 under the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (Ploch 2011, 31). Operation was aimed at protecting relief supplies in Somalia and at the time it was the most expensive humanitarian operation ever undertaken (Hentz 2004, 31). When President Clinton was sworn into office in 1993, there were 25 400 American troops in Somalia (Hesse 2007, 327). Despite their large numbers and plentiful resources, the operation ended in disaster epito- mized in October 1993 when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and 73 wounded in Mog- adishu during the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident (Hentz 2004, 31). News reports broadcasted images of Somalis dragging dead bodies of American soldiers through the streets and under intense pressure, Clinton announced the end of direct American involvement in Somalia only 3 days later (Hesse 2007, 328).

33 34 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS

Because of the devastating experience in Somalia, the Clinton administration reconsidered it foreign policy objectives and drastically scaled down the American involvement in peacekeeping (Silver 2015, 1). Unfortunately, Rwanda became a kind of sacrificial lamb for these peacekeeping restrictions (Silver 2015, 56). Even though Rwanda had been struggling with internal problems long before Clinton came to power, it was during his term when the violence in the country reached its peak. The roots of the Rwandan conflict date back to the colonial period, in which two ethnic groups - the Hutus and the Tutsis - competed for domi- nance over the country. When Rwanda gained independence, the majority Hutu seized power and thereafter sporadically persecuted Tutsis (Infranco 2011). The situation culminated in 1994, when Hutus started with mass killings of Tutsi population and others who opposed their plans. The genocide occurred over the course of approximately 100 days in 1994 during which more than 800 000 civilians - primarily Tutsi, but also moderate Hutus – lost their lives (Encyclopædia Britannica 2015).

In 1994, the prospect of American military intervention in a small and strategically insignificant African country sounded precisely like the kind of scenario the U.S. government wished to avoid. Even though the U.S. government was repeatedly informed about the deteriorating situation in Rwanda and had an opportunity to intervene before the major waves of killings began, the Clinton administration feared the possible consequences (Silver 2015, 44). In fact, as the massa- cres gained pace, the formation of a peacekeeping force was stopped by a U.S. vote in the UN Security Council that blocked the operation’s financing (Hesse 2007, 328). Moreover, when the killings in Rwanda reached their peak in April 1994, the most distressing symbol of U.S. refusal to act was the constant rejection of the administration to use the word ‘genocide’, because under the 1948 Genocide Con- vention it would necessitate action (Hentz 2004, 32).

34 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 35

American inaction in Rwanda did not go unnoticed and President Clinton tried to improve the U.S.-Africa relations during his second term in office. Clin- ton made an unusual tour of Africa in March 1998, which included his famous mea culpa for doing less to stop the genocide in Rwanda (Hentz 2004, 23). Made- leine Albright described his visit as “the first comprehensive trip to Africa ever undertaken by a sitting American president”, and at 11 days it was also Clinton’s longest official foreign travel (Hesse 2007, 333). This revival of interest helped to create a couple of new initiatives such as the Africa Crisis Responsibility Initiative (ACRI) that was meant to strengthen the capacity of African armies to intervene in humanitarian crises and based on the idea was that the United States would contribute to stabilization efforts in areas of low strategic interest by providing financial resources, and therefore avoid being drawn into politically risky interventions (Adebajo 2003, 178).

Nevertheless, most of the Clinton’s Africa policies were centered on economic reforms and trade. In 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) that granted more generous access to African goods in selected sectors of the American market (Adebajo 2003, 178). Before this legislation passed, Africa was the only continent (with the exception of Antarctica) for which the United States had no trade policy (Hesse 2007, 331). Close to the time of Clinton‘s second visit of Africa in August of 2000, the president signed his last Africa-related piece of legislation, the Trade and Development Act that concentrated at encouraging reforms that would entice foreign investment in African countries (Hesse 2007, 334).

Nonetheless, in general, for the most of Clinton’s second term, Africa was still low on the list of American strategic priorities. It was not until the simultane- ous bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 that Africa started receiving more American attention. The embassy bombings, in which an

35 36 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS estimated 260 people were killed and about 5000 wounded (Anderson 1998, 75), introduced the American public to Usama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida, who claimed responsibility for both of the attacks (CIA 2018). The bombings were the first major salvo in Al-Qaida’s war against the United States and a precursor to other Al- Qaida attacks on U.S. targets (Wildman 2018). When the terrorist threat demonstrated itself in even deadlier form on September 11, Africa became an arena in the Global War on Terror, which marked another important milestone in the U.S.-Af- rica relations.

36 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS 37

4 Overview of the U.S.- Djibouti Relations

Map 1 - Map of Djibouti Source: United Nations, Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section (2011)

37 38 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS

Djibouti as a state in its modern form is largely a result of French colonial rule (Abdallah 2008, 269). Prior to the arrival of French, the area was inhabited by two prominent ethnic groups – Afars, related to some ethnic groups in Ethiopia and Issas, related to Somalis (CIA 1967). However, there was no clearly defined territorial demarcation or a political framework which tied the two groups together (Abdallah 2008, 271) and the first time they came under one rule was in 1896 when the French established a colony called French Somaliland (Cutbill, Schraeder 2019).

French interest in Djibouti was primarily connected to its strategic location. The rise of maritime trade, and most importantly, the construction of the Suez Ca- nal in 1869 drove Europeans’ search for bases along the Red Sea coast and the Gulf of Aden (Stratfor 2017). The French first came to the area in the 1860s as they were searching for a gateway to their colonies in Asia and a base from which to counter British influence in Africa (Abdallah 2008, 271). The newly established colony soon gained a much greater importance thanks to access it gave France to the natural resources of Ethiopia (Stratfor 2017).

The wave of independence demands that erupted all over African colonies in the aftermath of the Second World War affected French Somaliland as well. In 1966, an uprising calling for independence from the French emerged and the colonial power decided to respond by organizing a referendum about the future of the territory. However if the population of French Somaliland were to opt for independence, France threatened to withdraw all assistance to the country with immediate effect (Abdallah 2008, 272). Moreover, the possibility of French Somali- land’s independence was met with concerns in neighboring countries – Ethiopia and Somalia – that feared that the territory might come under the control of the other (CIA 1967). The Somalis often viewed the territory of French Somaliland as

38 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS 39 an extension of “Greater Somalia” (CIA 1967), and the country was equally important to Ethiopians due to the existence of a railway that managed the transport of goods between Ethiopia and the port of Djibouti (Stratfor 2017). The people of French Somaliland shared its neighbor’s fears about the possibility of invasion from either Somalia or Ethiopia and consequently opted for the country’s continuation under the French rule (Hamilton 2017).

That same year, the colony changed its name to French Territory of the Afars and the Issas in an attempt to defuse the tensions between the country’s main ethnic groups. However, this administrative change did not end the internal turmoil that was partially fueled by the French preference for the Afars overs the Issas (CIA 1967). In 1977, France could no longer face the pressure and decided to or- ganize another referendum. This time people overwhelmingly voted for independence and the Republic of Djibouti became an independent country on 27th of June 1977 with Hassan Gouled Aptidon as its president. New constitution split power between Afars and Issas, granting the office of the president to the Issas and the post of the Prime Minister to the Afars. However, the Afar position in the government declined because the office of the president was made more powerful (Abdallah 2008, 273).

Despite its newly gained independence, Djibouti’s former colonial power retained strong influence over the country for the following decades (Styan 2013, 3). Under the terms of the 1977 treaty between France and Djibouti, Paris was obligated to defend the country against external aggression and in return, France received unlimited access to Djiboutian air and maritime facilities (CIA 1986, 9). On the top of Djibouti’s security dependance on France, its economy depended on it as well since the country needed foreign aid – mostly French – for economic survival (CIA 1986, 1).

39 40 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS

The year 1977 also marked the beginning of formal diplomatic relations between Djibouti and the United States, although the commencement of the relations between the two countries can be traced to 1929, when the United States established consular representation in the French Somaliland (United States Department of State Bureau of African Affairs 2018). Despite the country’s international recognition, its viability as a sovereign state was questioned by many due to fears that the small newly established country would be caught up in a struggle between its rival neighbors - Ethiopia and Somalia (Cutbill, Schraeder 2019).

From the first days of its independence, the regional dynamics has been a very important factor influencing not only the developments inside Djibouti but also its relations with the United States. Developments in the country’s surroundings affected the small coastal state not only because of its limited size but also due porous borders, weak governance of its neigh-bors and complex interconnected ethnic composition of the region. As Am-bassador Schermerhorn stressed it is important to look at the Horn in totality since the events in one part often influence the developments in other parts (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). Robin Cromer also noted the importance of looking at the developments in the country’s surroundings when assessing American relations with Djibouti since its larger neighbors are “important to the U.S. which makes Djibouti important too” (Cromer, Interview 2019). Indeed, since Djibouti’s establishment, its main foreign policy issues were often connected to its bigger neighbors – Ethiopia and Somalia. Simi- larity, for the most part of the 20th century, American foreign policy in the Horn of Africa revolved around these two countries.

During the Cold War, American approach to the Horn just like to other parts of Africa was largely determined by the Cold War logic. American security establishment feared that a hostile takeover of the Horn would enhance the capability of America’s rivals to destabilize pro-Western governments in the Middle East and

40 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS 41

Africa, interrupt commercial shipping lines and deny American access to the Mid- dle Eastern oil (Lefebvre 1992, 15). As then National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski mentioned in his memoirs, the spread of the Soviet influence in the Horn would mean that: “not only will the access to Suez be threatened, and this involves the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia and Iran, but there will be a serious and direct political threat to Saudi Arabia. This is something we simply cannot ignore” (Brzezinski 1983, 181). Therefore, the U.S. consistently worked on maintaining allies in the region. Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie was courted from the 1940s to the 1970s. However, the 1974 - 1977 Ethiopian revolution marked Selas- sie’s fall and the rise to power of a Soviet-backed Mengistu Haile Mariam, which meant that the U.S.-Ethiopian military relations were terminated and that the So- mali regime of Siad Barre started to receive American attention instead (Schraeder 1992, 571).

But as soon as the United States moved towards alliance with Somalia, a war between the two countries over disputed border region of Ogaden erupted. Ethiopia turned to its new ally for help and soon after the Soviet and Cuban troops arrived to help Ethiopia defend against Somali attacks (Oberdorfer 1978). Even though the United States did not provide military support to the Somalis during the war, it initiated the delivery of military aid not long thereafter (Shinn 2011). As stated in the Presidential Directive 32, the U.S.: “did not approve the deployment of a United States aircraft carrier to the area” but worked to ensure that it allies “collectively deplore the Soviet and Cuban role in Ethiopia” (Carter 1978). How- ever, those ways of support did not prove sufficient and even though the Somalis initially took most of the Ogaden, the logistical constrains, uncoherent planning and mostly the intervention of the Soviet and Cuban forces ultimately contributed to their defeat (CIA 1980, 1). Despite the end of the conventional war in 1978, the clashes between the two countries continued and it took 10 years to sign an official peace accord.

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The conflict in Ogaden affected Djibouti as well. It brought about deterioration of Afar – Issa relations inside Djibouti, as each group supported the cause of their respective ethnic relatives in the neighboring countries. However, no Dji- boutian leader, Afar nor Issa, condoned unification with either of the larger states and Djibouti was officially applying policy of neutrality with regard to the conflict (Cutbill, Schraeder 2019). In line with the policy of neutrality, Djibouti hosted negotiations between Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s leaders that resulted in a series of ac- cords in 1989 (Cutbill, Schraeder 2019).

For years after the independence Djibouti managed to remain comparatively stable compared to its conflict-torn neighbors. Despite the fact that country’s inhabitants remained poor and economy depended heavily on the port, the French garrison and the rail link to Addis Ababa, the President Hassan Gouled Aptidon seemed to preserve a relative balance between the communities and pursued cau- tious policies internationally (Woodward 2006, 89). Indeed, according to a CIA report published in 1986, Hassan Gouled Aptidon “has skillfully navigated a moderate, pro-Western course for Djibouti by keeping the country out of the region’s chronic conflicts” (CIA 1986, 1) and is “a staunch advocate of continued US and French military access to his country’s strategic port and airfield” (CIA 1986, xiii). Even though Djibouti has been a predominantly Muslim country that often followed the policies of it moderate Arab neighbors, it is also a tiny country surrounded by bigger and continuously unstable regimes, and therefore its government has appreciated French security protection and supported Western interests in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East in order to maintain this support. In the course of the Cold War, Djibouti provided France but also the United States with access to its port and airfield, including short-notice US Navy ship visits and re- connaissance flights (CIA 1986, 7-9).

42 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS 43

Despite the occasional military usage, Djibouti held little significance for America during the Cold War era and was largely viewed as a French base serving the latter’s offshore interests (Woodward 2006, 89). However, the prospective worth of Djibouti to the U.S. was demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War. France and the United States used it as a base for their forces in the Gulf and Washington welcomed the position taken by Djibouti (Woodward 2006, 89). George H. W. Bush even personally met with the President Gouled in Washington and addressed warm comments to Djibouti and its leader by saying: “today I want to thank one small nation which took up a very large challenge in the Persian Gulf war- the Republic of Djibouti ... Djibouti saw Saddam Hussein’s aggression as an intoler- able precedent for small nations everywhere. It joined the coalition of forces against Saddam Hussein. By opening its airfields, its seaports, its territorial waters to allies, Djibouti aided allied forces to liberate Kuwait quickly and efficiently. … I want to thank you again, for your warm welcome, Your Excellency (president Hassan Gouled Aptidon) which Djibouti has always extended to our Navy, and your support of the United States soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast- guardsmen was indeed essential to our coalition success” (Bush 1991).

Despite that, similar to many other African nations, Djibouti also experienced cuts of the U.S. diplomatic presence during the 1990s that were aimed at reducing costs associated with power projection once the Soviet Union no longer posed a threat (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). Even though the early post-Cold War period that was marked by disappearance of the Soviet, it also brought along new security challenges in the Horn. Mengistu government in Ethiopia fell to rebel forces, Said Barre was removed from power in Somalia and northwest Somalia, known as Somaliland, unilaterally declared independence. In 1991, Eritrea achieved de facto independence from Ethiopia and two years later legally ratified that status (Shinn 2011). The deteriorating security situation in the Horn did not go unnoticed in the U.S. and Washington decided to act on one of the most pressing

43 44 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS issues – instability and famine in Somalia. However, as was described in more detail in the previous chapter, the operation did not end up as expected and in the aftermath of the Black Hawk incident, the U.S. minimized its engagement in So- malia, despite the fact that the country underwent continuous crises throughout the decade (Shinn 2011). During the campaign in Somalia, Djibouti again allowed the United States to use the facilities on their soil (United States Institute of Peace 2004, 8) and allowed its forces to frequently transit under an informal understanding, which was largely forgotten by the U.S. (Schermerhorn 2005, 73).

In the course of 1990s, even the generally stable Djibouti experienced instability and conflict. The problems were connected to the internal tensions between its main ethnic groups. From Djibouti’s independence onwards, the Issa hegemony was increasingly strengthened as they controlled the presidency, key government ministries and outnumbered the Afars in the military and security services (CIA 1986, 4). That led to vocal Afar opposition, recurring governmental crises, ban on opposition parties and culminated in a civil war that lasted from 1991 to 1994 (Hamilton 2017). The fighting continued even despite adoption of a new constitution in 1992 that allowed multi-party system - however only four political parties were permitted to register (Hamilton 2017). The opposition was gathered under an umbrella organization called Afar Front for the Restoration of Unity and De- mocracy (Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie - FRUD) (Abdallah 2008, 276). By mid-1992 FRUD controlled approximately two-thirds of the state territory, yet in the course of the conflict, FRUD split into two fractions one of which negotiated a settlement with the government and became a legal political party (Hamilton 2017).

The settlement agreement signed in 1994 between the moderate fraction of FRUD and the Djiboutian government for the most part marked the end of the civil war. However, the radical wing of the party called FRUD – Renaissance, continued

44 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.- DJIBOUTI RELATIONS 45 with the armed clashes with the government all throughout the late 1990s and signed a peace agreement with the government only in 2000 (Ciment 2015, 153). Due to good relations between the Djiboutian government and the U.S., when the trouble associated with the FRUD occurred, Washington showed support to the Djiboutian government by sending a small contingent to help with training (Woodward 2006, 89).

On the top of the internal pressures, an external conflict erupted in Dji- bouti’s neighborhood at the end of 1990s. As a consequence of 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia lost access to Eritrea’s port and subsequently started overwhelmingly relying on Djiboutian ports to process its imports and exports (Lilley 2018). Djibouti gradually became almost the sole conduit for maritime trade for its sizeable neighbor, handling an estimated 90% of Ethiopia’s trade (Stratfor 2017, 4). That greatly reinforced not only the economic but also political and security ties between the two countries which culminated in signing a military cooperation protocol in 1999 (Mesfin 2008, 2).

When it comes to American approach to the Horn of Africa and Djibouti in particular in the 1990s, the Mogadishu incident marked the beginning of a period of U.S. retrenchment in the region and American involvement mainly took form of providing aid supplies. When the American military presence in the Horn abruptly declined following the Black Hawk Down incident, the U.S. defense attaché in Djibouti withdrew, aid flow declined and the USAID closed its programs in the country, citing budgetary reasons (United States Institute of Peace 2004, 8). De- spite lack of American interest in the country, Djibouti continued to permit access for the U.S military without conditions or compensation (United States Institute of Peace 2004, 8).

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However, there was one issue that kept Americans engaged in the Horn – the presence of radical Islam. The U.S. started to be aware about the existence of this form of extremism in this part of Africa already in 1991 when Osama bin Laden moved his headquarters to Khartoum and was not asked to leave by the Sudanese government until 1996, which led to visible deterioration of the U.S - Sudanese relations (Shinn 2011). Moreover, many countries in the region had significant Muslim population, dysfunctional governments and impoverished popula- tions which raised American concerns about their vulnerability to the ideas of radical Islam. The embassy bombings of 1998 confirmed those worries and once the 9/11 put the War on Terror on the top of the American security agenda, the countries of the Horn, including Djibouti found themselves on the forefront of this fight on the African continent.

46 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 47

5 Bush administration

When George W. Bush became president in 2001 he seemed to have no great interest in Africa and certainly no conviction that the region was important to the United States (Copson 2007, 16). As a presidential candidate he had referred to Africa as a country rather than a continent, and had said that Africa would be low on his list of policy priorities (Hesse 2007, 335). Peter Pham mentions that when a television interviewer asked Bush about Africa’s role in his future foreign policy during his presidential campaign, he responded that: “at some point in time the president’s got to clearly define what the national strategic interests are, and while Africa may be important, it doesn’t fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them“(Pham, 2014, 248).

For that reason, his trip to 5 African countries in 2003 came as a surprise to many. The most shocking aspect of the visit was the introduction of the ambitious Africa oriented plans of his administration. During the trip, President Bush presented his Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) that focused on HIV/AIDS prevention and announced the establishment of a Millennium Challenge Corpora- tion (MCC) to provide aid to underdeveloped countries (Hesse 2007, 335). The administration also worked on promoting trade flows between the U.S. and Africa. The most notable initiative in this regard was the adoption of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) that enhanced market access to the United States for African countries (African Growth and Opportunity Act 2019).

Despite various humanitarian and economic efforts of the Bush administration, the security aspects of the U.S.-Africa relations seemed to have played a dominant role in his Africa policy. The embassy bombings of 1998 alerted U.S. officials to the presence of radical Islam in Africa and the need to counter this form of

47 48 BUSH ADMINISTRATION terrorism had been put on the foreign policy agenda already by the Clinton administration (Walle 2010). Thus, the incoming Bush administration was affected by a policy change that had already started, however, the events of 9/11 brought about an overall shift in the U.S. foreign policy that influenced American approach to African continent as well. As Theresa Whelan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, noted while speaking about the U.S. interests in Africa: „it should be rather obvious and no big surprise to anyone what we see our national security interests linked to, particularly in the context of the post-9/11 environment“ (Whelan 2008).

The 9/11 attacks led the Bush administration to embrace more realist logic of self-interest (Tieku 2012). For the Bush’s White House, the combination of Africa’s weak and failing states, high levels of poverty, slow economic growth, and a substantial Muslim population indicated that the continent, especially its Eastern part could turn out to be a fertile ground for radical Islam (Walle 2010). These concerns led to an increase in the U.S. military activities in the region. Al- ready in 2002, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established and in 2007 President Bush directed the creation of United States Af- rica Command -AFRICOM.

Not only did President Bush introduce many new initiatives, he also outlined the overall contours of the U.S. Africa strategy in the 2006 National Se- curity Presidential Directive 50 (NSPD 50), which was the first NSPD dedicaded to the U.S. strategy for Africa since the one issued in 1992 by President Bush's father (Whelan 2008). Even though the document is not accessible for public, its summary was outlined by Whelan who stated that the U.S. objectives on the con- tinenet included: „building capacity; consolidating democratic transitions; bolstering fragile states; strengthening regional organizations; strengthen regional

48 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 49 security; stimulating economic development and growth; and providing humanitarian and development assistance“ (Whelan 2008).

Furthermore, there were some highly positioned African-Americans in the Bush administration during both of his terms in office, although the assessments of their influence on the Africa policy varies across the academic literature. During Bush’ first term, Colin Powell became the first African-American Secretary of State and showed interest in African issues, especially in case of Darfur, where he stressed the need for an active role of the U.S. in the peace negotiations. His successor on the post of Secretary of State during Bush’s second term was also an African-American - Condoleezza Rice, who introduced the idea of “transformational diplomacy” (Tieku 2012). According to Rice, the objective of transformational diplomacy was to “work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people -- and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” (Rice 2006). As part of the transformational diplomacy, U.S.-Africa relations began to be defined by the three D’s: Diplomacy, Development, and De- fense. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among the Africa scholars that the defense component held the most prominent place among the three D’s.

5.1 Foreign Policy Aspects of the U.S.- Djibouti Relations

5.1.1 Regional Developments For the most part of both Bush’ terms, Djibouti managed to avoid conflict and turmoil that was damaging its surroundings. The situation in Somalia was by far the gravest as the country faced numerous dire security and humanitarian problems. In 2002, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Walter H. Kan- steiner described the situation in the country as following: “civil war, external intervention, clan conflict and poverty have combined to turn Somalia into a "failed

49 50 BUSH ADMINISTRATION state." Where there should be a nation-state, there is a vacuum filled by warlords. What better place for the seeds of international terrorism and lawlessness to take root?“ (Kansteiner 2002).

Djibouti shared the U.S. concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Somalia. As Ambassador Schermerhorn pointed out Djibouti viewed the achievement of equilibrium in Somalia as an overriding goal for regional stability needed for Djibouti’s economic growth and development (Schermerhorn 2005, 83). For that reason it guided Somali peace process, sponsored by the Intergovern- mental Authority for Development (IGAD) – a regional organisation based in Dji- bouti that promotes cooperation among the Eastern African countries (Intergovernmental Authority on Development 2019). After previous unsuccessful attempts, in 2002 the talks sponsored by IGAD started again, and in 2004 produ- ced new Somali government, known as the Transitional Federal Govern- ment (TFG) (Janzen, Lewis 2019). However, the situation in the country was far from stable, the clan-based violence continued and in 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of Mogadishu and southern regions of Somalia (Janzen, Lewis 2019). The situation was made even more complicated due to the meddling of neighboring countries – both Eritrea and Ethiopia were backing opposing armed groups in Somalia as proxies in their continuing conflict (Mesfin 2008, 8a).

The hostilities continued throughout the year and when the ICU challenged the authority of the TFG, Ethiopia decided to respond by military intervention. In 2006, the ICU was ousted by the Ethiopian invasion and the TFG was installed in power (Kimunguyi 2015, 4). Similar to Djibouti, Washington also referred to Ethi- opia as its regional ally and shared its concerns about the Al-Shabaab‘s links to ICU. Nevertheless, the reports that the U.S. directly supported the invasion were denounced by the U.S. Central Command spokeswoman who stated that: „no Ame- rican troops were participating in the Ethiopian offensive or working as advisers

50 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 51 for it“(United Nations Security Council 2006). On the other hand, the U.S. State Department spokeswoman defended Ethiopia‘s actions by saying that: „Ethiopia was trying to stem the flow of outside arms shipments to the Islamists,“(United Nations Security Council 2006), which hinted Washington’s tacit blessing for the invasion.

America‘s stance on the issue was in line with the overall American security policy in Africa after 9/11, that was driven by concerns about the potential security threats for the U.S. national security as demonstrated by the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Jendayi E. Frazer: “failed states often become bree- ding grounds for terrorists, without an effective central government, nations are vulnerable to exploitation by violent extremists. The continued existence of a failed state in Somalia poses such a threat. For all these reasons, President Bush and Secretary Rice have made it a priority to confront the ongoing turmoil in Somalia“ (Frazer 2006, 4). Indeed, the U.S. eventually became more visibly engaged in So- malia and began air strikes in its southern parts where the Al-Shabaab leaders were allegedly hiding. This marked the first direct U.S. military intervention in Somalia since 1993. On the top of the American military efforts, the United Nations authorized an African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) in Somalia, which also received contribution from Djibouti (Janzen, Lewis 2019).

The dire situation in Somalia was further exacerbated by a surge in attacks on ships in the waters off the Somali coast, which posed a threat to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a danger to vessels, crews and passengers (United Nations Security Council 2008). In 2008, UN created a task force to deal with this issue and the U.S. contributed with several naval assets that used Djibouti’s ports. China was also a member of the UN task force, and as Ambassador Schermerhorn mentions this gave growing Chinese navy a platform for establishing their naval presence in the Horn of Africa (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019).

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Moreover, by the time Bush‘s second term in office was coming to an end, the desperate situation in Somalia forced approximately 1 500 000 people to flee their homes, many of them crossing Djibouti on their way to the Gulf States or deciding to stay in Djibouti itself (Hammond n.d., 2). Djibouti’s willingness to accept the Somali refugees, its help with counterpiracy efforts, its contribution to AMISOM and cooperation with Ethiopia, its proactive approach to the peace negotiations in Somalia and overall consensus with the U.S. on their idea of desirable settlement of the Somali conflict made Djibouti a dependable ally in the Horn of Africa.

5.1.2 Developments in Djibouti and the U.S.-Djibouti Relations When Bush took office in 2001, his Djiboutian counterpart was also a relative newcomer on his post. Ismail Omar Guelleh assumed the office of the president of Djibouti in 1999, when his uncle Hassan Gouled Aptidon, after 22 years of his rule, announced that he would not run in the next elections (Styan 2013, 3). Guelleh managed to keep his country out of conflict and turmoil for the most part of the Bush’s two presidencies and even though Djibouti was affected by the refugee flows, it tried to stay neutral in the conflicts happening in its surroundings and it even intended to play the role of mediator.

However, in 2008 the country itself became a battleground when its historically tense relations with Eritrea resulted in armed clashes. The two countries already nearly went to war in 1996 when Djibouti claimed that Eritrea shelled a Djiboutian village, luckily, the situation was defused after Eritrean forces re- treated and Djibouti retracted the allegations (Mesfin 2008, 2a). Unfortunately, in 2008 the situation escalated when Eritrea concentrated troops along the border of Djibouti which resulted in armed hostilities (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018). Eritrea’s actions were widely criticized by the international community, the UN imposed

52 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 53 sanctions on Eritrea and its troops eventually left Djibouti in 2010 (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018).

Even though, the U.S. did not get directly involved in the conflict, it was one of the reasons behind the Eritrean animosity against Djibouti. Eritrea lobbied to host the CJTF-HOA and was disappointed when Washington decided to pick its smaller neighbor (Mesfin, 2008a). However, this was just a minor issue and the main reasons behind Eritrea’s hostility towards Djibouti were connected to Eritrea’s conflict with Ethiopia. Eritrea accused Djibouti of siding with Ethiopia during the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and viewed the economic and political ties that evolved between its neighbors after the war with discontent.

Moreover, during Bush’s time in office, other foreign actors started to become more visible in Djibouti. Although, the French presence was nothing new, their forces inaugurated a new base in 2002 and the country confirmed its security guarantees for Djibouti (Maher 2004, 1461). That same year, Germany signed an agreement with Djiboutian government, granting German military personnel access to Djibouti’s port and airfield to conduct surveillance missions in the region (Maher 2004, 1461).

On top of the European presence, Chinese involvement in Djibouti was also steadily growing. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1979 and since then, their cooperation witnessed a steady increase with China being primarily involved in trade and construction activities. As Ambassador Schermerhorn pointed out it is important to keep in mind, that China has been present in Djibouti continuously since its independence and was enageged in a numerous infrastructure projects already in the 1990s (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). Moreover, the two countries maintained frequent exchanges of high level visits, such as the visit of President Guelleh in China in 2001 (Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti in

53 54 BUSH ADMINISTRATION

China 2012). By 2008 the Chinese presence in Djibouti was not as visible as the French or the U.S. influence, but it was continuous and growing.

Nevertheless, at the time, American officials were not perceiving the growing Chinese presence in Djibouti or elsewhere in Africa with suspicion or concern. In 2008, President Bush stated: “I don’t view Africa as zero-sum for China and the United States. I mean, I think we can pursue agendas … without creating a great sense of competition. I mean, inherent in your question is that I view China as a fierce competitor on the continent of Africa – no, I don’t” (Bush 2012, 247). That same year, James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African Af- fairs and Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs expressed a very similar view in their Joint Statement: “In general, we see China's growing activity on the continent as a potentially positive force for economic development there, which is a goal we share with China and many others. As President Bush has said, we do not see a ``zero-sum'' competition with China for influence in Africa. Nor do we see evidence that China's commercial or diplomatic activities in Africa are aimed at diminishing U.S. influence on the continent” (Swan, Christensen 2008).

Similar perception of China was applied to its activities in Djibouti, as Ambassador Schermerhorn stated: “the Chinese were involved in building infrastructure but we didn’t interact in a significant way” (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). She further elaborated that the Chinese were not a concern at the time since the “winning hearts and minds” aspect of the U.S. counter-terrorism activities was at the core of the U.S. interests in the region (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). As Ambassador Shinn noted, when it came to U.S. relations with other foreign actors in Djibouti – whether European or Chinese – U.S. perception of their activities was largely a reflection of their overall bilateral relations. For that reason, the relations with the European nations retained mostly cooperative

54 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 55 character throughout the course of all three administrations in question, while the relations with China underwent more changes (D. Shinn, Interview 2019).

5.2 Security Aspects of the U.S – Africa Relations

Upon taking office, President Bush inherited two ongoing security projects on the African continent - peacekeeping training program ACRI and a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone which was completed in 2002 (Bellamy 2009, 19). In the same year, ACRI was succeeded by the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) that was designed to improve the capabilities of African militaries by providing training and equipment necessary for peace support operations (United States Africa Command 2012). Moreover, in 2004 the United States launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with primary objective of training new peacekeeping forces and building regional capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations (United States Department of State, n.d.). Even though, ACOTA was subsumed by GPOI, it retained its separate iden- tity as the African component of the plan (Bellamy 2009, 20).

In contrast to the Clinton administration, when both the public and the Congress expressed negative attitudes towards the idea of peacekeeping, the Af- rican continent witnessed a rise in peacekeeping operations during the Bush administration (Bellamy 2009, 12). Support and funding for peacekeeping, remained strong even after 9/11 due to the conviction of the Bush administration that stabilization efforts are complementary to the overall strategy of combating terrorism which was the overarching theme of the U.S. military involvement on the continent. As the 2002 National Security Strategy mentioned: “weak states ... can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug

55 56 BUSH ADMINISTRATION cartels within their borders” (President of the United States 2002). The document also pointed out that: “in Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror” (President of the United States 2002). To confront these challenges, the document asserted that the U.S. strategy must focus not only on building local security and intelligence capabilities but also on encouraging development, which was in line with the broad understanding of the security threats that was articulated in the document.

The 2006 National Security Strategy retained the essential understanding and assessment of threats in Africa, however, it attributed the continent a larger strategic value by stating that: „Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration ... recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies“ (President of the United States 2006, 37). The document again connected its concern about fate of weak and failing states with possibility of terrorism emerging in such conditions, noting that: “these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists“ (President of the United States 2006, 15).

The concerns about destabilizing effects of volatile security situation in Af- rica combined with al-Qaeda attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya, and an Israeli commercial airliner in 2002, highlighted the dangerous reality of the terrorist threat in Africa (Pham 2014, 249). That led to increase in the U.S. military activities on the continent. Already in October 2002, the CJTF-HOA was created and Camp Lemonnier has been its headquarters since 2003, which was a former French Foreign Legion post in Djibouti (Pham 2014, 263). Camp Lemonnier was

56 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 57 located close to the Djibout airport and approximately 18 000 military personnel were deployed under CJTF-HOA between 2002 and 2009 (Tieku 2012c).

At the beginning, the creation of CJTF-HOA was driven by concerns that terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan would be attracted to the ungoverned spaces of the Horn of Africa, however, when such scenario failed to materialize, and the local terrorist threat proved to be relatively limited, CJTF-HOA began primarily emphasizing terrorism prevention (Lawson 2007). CJTF-HOA’s official goal was to de- tect, disrupt and defeat transnational terrorist groups; counter the resurgence of international terrorism; and enhance the long-term stability of the region (Kagwanja 2010, 82). For that reason, CJTF-HOA started to focus on establishing military-to-military relations, conducting joint training and exercises, assisting with military equipment procurement, providing humanitarian assistance and the troops also occasionally engaged in military campaigns on the continent (Tieku 2012).

Additionally, CJTF-HOA was enagaged in humanitarian activities that were a part of an effort to win hearts and minds across the region and included various activities ranging from digging wells and providing medical services to building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads (Ploch 2011, 21). Those activities were in large part a continuation of the way in which the U.S. was engaging in before. Ambassador Schermerhorn highlighted the importance of the winning hears and minds objective of CJTF-HOA, stating that at the beginning CJTF- HOA’s mission was centered around these efforts and the kinetic operations were not part of the its activities (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). It was only in 2006/2007 when Al-Shabaab was put on the terrorist list that more attention started to be placed on the actual physical counterterrorism activities (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). Such emphasis on improving the living conditionsfor the local population was meant to assure that the terrorism factor would not be as attractive

57 58 BUSH ADMINISTRATION and was therefore in line with the broad understanding of the African security challenges of the Bush administration.

CJTF-HOA’s first beneficiary states were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Bu- rundi, Tanzania, and Rwanda but it gradually evolved to include Eritrea, Sey- chelles, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean (Ploch 2011, 21). The establishment of the military presence represented a significant milestone for U.S. in Africa since the closure many years ago of an air force base in Libya and a communication station in Ethi- opia (Davis, Othieno 2007, 32).

Another Bush’s innovation in regard to the U.S. security activities on the continent was the establishment of the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) in 2003. The program was dedicated to improving counterterrorism capabilities in Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, and Ethiopia (United States Department of State 2005, 29). Moreover, U.S. established similar programs in other parts of Africa as well, for example, in 2003 the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) was established to enhance border security and counter-terrorism capabilities of the northern African countries (Nyang'oro, Walther 2013, 89), and in 2005, Trans- Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was established as a successor of the PSI initiative and expanded to include more countries (Lawson 2007).

In 2008, most of these activities were transferred to the new military command for Africa – AFRICOM (Walle 2010). President Bush directed the creation of AFRICOM in 2007 and it became a fully fledged command in October 2008 (United States Africa Command 2018, 3-4). The command’s area of responsibility included all African countries except for Egypt and its headquarters were located in Stuttgart, Germany. Establishment of AFRICOM ended the practice of divid- ing American military relations with Africa into three geographic commands:

58 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 59 the European Command (EUCOM), the Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Pacific Command (PACOM) (Ploch, 2009). Since prior to the establishment of AFRCIOM, all of these commands were located outside of the African continent the interactions they had with Africans nations were limited and mostly bilateral in nature (Tieku 2012d) and Africa therefore tended to receive less attention than other regional command priorities.

Map 2 - Area of Responsibility for Africa Command Source: United States Department of Defense, adapted by Congressional Research Ser- vice (2011)

Some of the reasons behind the command’s establishment evolved precisely out of the challenges posed by the division of responsibility for Africa among other commands and out of the overstrechment of EUCOM and CENTCOM in the mid 2000s due to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Ploch 2011, 2). However, the most important reason was the recognition that the United States had national interests in Africa that were important enough to justify sustaining a long-term commitment (Pham 2014, 248). However, unlike other geographical areas, AFRICOM’s goals and interests in Africa as articulated in official statements and documents extended

59 60 BUSH ADMINISTRATION beyond those traditionally considered strategic, which could be demonstrated by the statement that President Bush made in 2007: „Africa command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa“ (Bush 2007).

AFRICOM official mission was to “conduct sustained security engagement to promote a stable and secure political environment in Africa in support of U.S. foreign policy“(United States Africa Command 2018, 3). AFRICOM had all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic command, including the ability to facilitate and lead military operations but also gained a broader soft power mandate aimed at building a stable security environment (Ploch 2011, 4). Since at the time of creation of AFRICOM no African state was believed to pose a direct threat to the United States, its key goal was to strengthen the capabilities of African nations so that they could ensure the stability on the continent (Ploch 2011, 21). With that goal in mind, AFRICOM incorporated a large civilian component from other U.S. government agencies to address such complex challenges (Ploch 2011, 4) and had more civilian personnel in senior positions than any other command (Bellamy 2009, 24). Such a broad mandate was in line with the Bush administration’s overall view of the interconnectivity of developmental and security challenges on the continent.

Even though the establishment of AFRICOM was regarded as the Bush administration’s most notable innovation with regard to security policy towards Af- rica (Bellamy 2009, 24), it also turned out to be one of the most controversial. While the reactions in America were largely positive, in Africa, the views of the command were more mixed (Ploch 2011, 24). The sceptical voices in Africa feared that the command’s primary goals were not only to fight terrorists, but also to

60 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 61 secure U.S. access to African oil and some even believed that the command’s establishment represented a neocolonial attempt to militarize American policy towards Africa (Ploch 2011, 24). According to Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, due to a postcolonial history of selective engagement and support for dictatorships, Africans “don’t trust the military as a partner in development, and fear militarization and securitization of economic relations with the U.S.” (Zeleza 2013, 174). However, if there was something that both sides of the argument could agree on- it was the fact that AFRICOM represented a significant change in the U.S. – Africa relations.

5.3 Security Aspects of the U.S – Djibouti Relations

In line with the change of strategic direction after 9/11, new security assistance programs were launched, focusing initially on a handful of so called “front line states” in the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti (Bellamy 2009, 21). There are a number of reasons why the Horn of Africa has received such a significant portion of America’s attention in the War on Terror.

The movements of radical ideas and terrorists themselves from the Middle East to the Horn was made easier due to the geographical proximity and cultural ties between the two regions. Moreover, the countries in the region are either predominantly Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities, for example, in Dji- bouti Islam is being observed by 94% of its population (CIA n.d.). Additionally and paradoxically, the expansion of democratic practices in the region from the 1990s onwards emboldened activism inspired by radical Islamic ideas among dis- satisfied Muslim minorities (Kagwanja 2010, 75). Furthermore, the internal fighting, weakness and corruption of the regimes in the region provided the terrorist organizations with an environment to operate in (Rabasa 2009, 3). Lastly, a mix of widespread poverty, underdevelopment and a deep sense of marginalization,

61 62 BUSH ADMINISTRATION enabled Islamists to win allies among impoverished Muslims and desperate refugees (Kagwanja 2010, 75). As a result, the countries of the Horn witnessed hun- dreds of acts of terrorism since 1990s (Mesfin 2011, 20) and the region has gradually come to occupy a central place in the U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa as demonstrated by the statement of U.S. Deputy Coordinator for Counterterror- ism, William Pope in 2004: “Although we are concerned about attacks everywhere in Africa, we consider East Africa and the Horn … to be at particular risk.” (Pope 2004).

Although Djibouti was not completely free of the tensions typical of states in its surroundings, the country has remained comparatively stable throughout both of Bush’s presidencies. The French military presence provided a security guarantee and functioning internal security apparatus helped keep the country free of internal conflict (Kagwanja 2010, 14). The country’s stability combined with a history of previous military cooperation with the U.S. including the Gulf War and Somalia in the mid-1990s, were the main reasons why Djibouti became the center of the U.S. military presence in the region. Djibouti also showed cooperative attitude towards the War on Terror. Already in October 2001, it established committee to monitor security conditions in Djibouti and agreed to grant access to its port and airfields to the U.S. and other coalition members – Germany, France, United King- dom and Spain – from where to monitor developments in Somalia, Sudan and other countries in the region (Ofcansky 2003, 363).

In 2002, Djibouti became the headquarters of the CJTF-HOA. Both Dji- bouti’s military and navy received training provided by CJTF-HOA and the country had also benefited from the CJTF-HOA’s civil programs (Rabasa 2009, 72). However, the establishment of the CJTF-HOA was met with mixed responses in Djibouti. On the one hand, Djiboutian government, aware of its country’s resource shortages and limited economic possibilities had long been looking for a new way

62 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 63 how to capitalize its strategic location and worked to persuade the Americans to establish the base. In the past, Djibouti was exploring the possibility of renting its land to the militaries of Libya, the Arab League, Italy and Iraq but did not succeed (Bollee 2003, 483).

After the 9/11 attacks, Djibouti seized the opportunity and the first contracts with the U.S. were negotiated as early as 20th of September 2001 (Bollee 2003, 483). There were rumors about the presence of American Special Operations Forces on Djibouti’s soil as early as 2001 (Davis, Othieno 2007, 35) but the CJTF- HOA staff officially arrived off the coast of Djibouti onboard USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) in November 2002. In May 2003, CJTF-HOA transitioned from the Mount Whitney to Camp Lemonnier, moving all headquarters personnel and equipment (United States Navy n.d.). There were approximately 1 800 American soldiers and civilian personnel working at CJTF-HOA at that time (Kagwanja 2010, 82). In 2007, the U.S. and Djibouti signed a lease agreement to expand Camp Lemonnier from 88 acres to nearly 500 acres and the additional land was used for installation of containerized living units, concrete sidewalks and gravel roads (United States Navy n.d.). In October 2008, the responsibility for CJTF-HOA was transferred from CENTCOM to AFRICOM as it assumed authority over the Afri- can theater of operations (United States Navy n.d.).

Even though, Djiboutian government received assistance in the area of health and education in exchange for allowing the U.S. to place a military presence on its soil (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019), the arrival of American forces was not welcomed by all Djiboutians. Despite serious problems affecting Djibouti at the time, including drought and food shortages, it was the presence of American military in the country that became the dominant campaign issue of 2003 National Assembly elections (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018). The opposition campaigned against the government’s decision to allow Americans in the country, arguing that it could

63 64 BUSH ADMINISTRATION provoke acts of terrorism against Djiboutians (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018). The opposition feared that the terrorists would not only target the U.S. personnel and facilities but that the establishment of the base would generate resentment against Djibouti itself, and therefore its people and major economic assets such as railways or ports could become targets as well (Davis, Othieno 2007, 35). Nevertheless, the supporters of the American presence in Djibouti won not only the argument about the base but also the elections in general. Still, this did not prevent the regime from occasionally distancing itself from the U.S. For example, President Guelleh was critical of Washington‘s role in the Iraq War, pointing out the lack of United Na- tions approval for the operation (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018) and in 2007, the Dji- butian government condemned the U.S. airstrikes launched from Camp Lemonnier to support Ethiopian troops entering Somalia (Guazzini 2013, 479).

Nevertheless, for the most part, the security cooperation between the two countries was going smoothly and their security relations largely revolved around CJTF-HOA and its counterterrorism initiatives. CJTF-HOA coordinated the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) that was unveiled in 2003 and focused not only on Djibouti but also on Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Bellamy 2009, 22) and aimed at bolstering the security of the East African countries in several key areas, including military training for border and coastal surveillance; strengthening the control of the movement of people and goods; aviation security capacity-building; countering terrorism financing; and police training (Rabasa 2009, 73). 14 million USD were also provided to support the „winning hearts and minds“ campaign, for example through support for education (Kagwanja 2010, 82) but also for veterinary activities and digging dwells (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). As ambassador Schermerhorn mentioned the initial focus of the CJTF-HOA centered on „winning hearts and minds“ campaign (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019), which was in line with the Bush administration’s

64 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 65 view of the security threats in Africa as closely connected to the issues of underdevelopment.

Moreover, EACTI was assisted by the U.S. interagency Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG) and the US State Department’s Terrorist Interdiction Pro- gram (TIP) in an effort to develop comprehensive anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing regimes in the Eastern African countries (Wyk 2006, 133). Djibouti was one of the program’s beneficiaries, and thanks to the TIP, more advanced computer systems were installed at the Djiboutian airport (Kagwanja 2010, 82). In 2005, Djibouti also signed an agreement joining the United States Safe Skies for Africa Program designed to improve safety, security and air navigation of African nations (Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti in Washington, D.C. 2019).

Additionally, International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) was focusing on training law enforcement officials in a variety of areas, including intelligence and operation to track and apprehend terrorist groups (Piombo 2007, 8). Even though, ILEA primarily operated in Southern African countries, Djibouti was among some selected Eastern African nations that received training in 2003 (Piombo 2007, 8). Furthermore, from 2006 onwards, the U.S. cooperated with the European Union’s Naval Task Force against piracy and the government of Djibouti to contrast piracy off the regional coasts (Guazzini 2013, 479).

As these initiatives demonstrate, piracy, training activities but most importantly counterterrorism efforts, largely focused in winning hearts and minds, were the centerpiece of U.S.-Djibouti Security relations at that time. This trend can be also traced in the official documents released by the United States since the Country Reports on Terrorism mentioned Djibouti each year and praised its anti-

65 66 BUSH ADMINISTRATION terrorism efforts. For example, the reports from 2006, 2007 and 2008 called Dji- bouti: „one of the most forward-leaning Arab League members supporting ongoing efforts against terrorism“ and the 2007 Country Report on Terrorism elaborated that: „President Ismail Omar Guelleh and many top leaders in Djibouti repeatedly expressed their country's full and unqualified support for the global war on terror. Djibouti was one of the very first Arab League nations to do so, even in the face of adversity and criticism from its neighbors. President Guelleh publicly expressed his support and was responsive to all U.S. requests“ (United States Department of State 2007). Praise for Djiboutian supportive attitudes toward the War on Terror was consistent theme of all the Country Reports on Terrorism and many other official documents published under the Bush administration.

5.3.1 Security Assistance and Arms Sales On the top of these initiatives, the intensity of U.S.-Djibouti security cooperation can also be demonstrated by the amounts of security assistance that Dji- bouti received in course of the two Bush administrations. Despite its small size, Djibouti even made it to the list of top African recipients of security assistance - even though, some other countries of the Horn received more assistance than Dji- bouti, the small desert nation was ranked number 10 on the list of the top recipients of security assistance.1 According to data provided by the Security Assistance Mo- nitor, the amount of money provided to Djibouti in the form of security assistance between the years 2001 and 2008 was 54,732,329 USD (Security Assistance Mo- nitor n.d.).

1 The amount of funding provided to „Sub-Saharan Africa Regional“ is not included in the country- level total allocations, although it may include funds for an individual country. This is a result of U.S. government reporting not identifying specific country recipients for aid.

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Similar to the category of security assistance, Djibouti also made it to the list of the top African arms recipients in the period between years 2001 and 2008. Djibouti even surpassed other countries in the Horn, ranking in 8th place (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.). The total value of arms trade between the U.S. and Dji- bouti in the years 2001 and 2008 was 20,812,000 USD (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.). The fact that Djibouti was ranking this high in both security assistance and arms trade and despite its small size it managed to surpass many other significantly larger African countries further demonstrates the importance of military ties between the countries.

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Security Assistance

Table 1 - Security aid from United States to Djibouti (2001-2008) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

Table 2 - Top recipients of security aid from the United States to Africa (2001-2008) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

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Arm sales

Table 3 - Arm sales from the United States to Djibouti (2001-2008) (deliveries only) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

Table 4 - Top recipients of arm sales between the United States and Africa (2001- 2008) (deliveries only) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

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5.4 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Africa Relations

5.4.1 Humanitarian and Developmental Policies Some of the Bush’s most celebrated Africa policy achievements were connected to his administration’s aid policies. During his time in office, Africa had to cope with multitude of humanitarian challenges ranging from political instability, conflicts and poverty to famine and diseases. In order to tackle these issues, the Bush administration increased the amount of economic aid to sub- Saharan Africa from 2.4 billion USD in 2001 to 7.7 billion USD in 2008 (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.).

Aid was distributed to the African continent through many initiatives. Combating diseases became one of the administration’s priorities. In 2002, the U.S. pledged 200 million USD towards the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and followed it up with a 500 million USD grant to International Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative (Tieku 2012). In 2003, the Bush administration introduced the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) which was overwhelmingly concentrating on Africa, with 12 of the 15 focus countries being on the African continent (Pham 2014, 254). From its creation until 2008, PEPFAR received total funding of more than 18 billion USD and became the largest commitment ever made by any nation to combat a single disease (Office of U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 2009). Moreover, PEP- FAR not only substantially increased U.S. aid for combating HIV/AIDS but it also encouraged other donors to contribute more (Lyman 2009, 111).

The health initiatives of the Bush government are generally believed to have had a substantial positive impact on Africa’s health sector (Tieku 2012). Other initiatives on the continent that addressed education, debt relief, and other

70 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 71 commitments to well-governed states were administered through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) established in 2004 (Lyman 2009, 111).

Despite the Bush administration’s apparent willingness to invest in aid, the long-term goal of the government was to reduce African dependence on economic assistance. This notion became the core of the transformational diplomacy approach to development. The development component of the three D’s of transformational diplomacy aimed at promoting changes in governance, institutions, human capacity, and economic structure, so that countries can sustain further economic and social progress without depending on foreign aid (Copson 2007, 29). Ho- wever, the prevalent opinion regarding Bush’s approach to development in the academic literature indicates that the emphasis on development was largely driven by security concerns.

The statements of the country’s top officials do not seem to contradict this view. For example, in 2006 Condoleeza Rice stated that: „the greatest threats now emerge more within states than between them. In this world it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts and our democratic ideals. American diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together“ (Rice 2006). That same year, Andrew Natsios, the Administrator of USAID, made a statement that was in line with the one previously made by Rice: „I don’t know how many times I have been engaged in coversation and debate by so-called development experts who say something like following: „I don’t do politics, I’m into development.“ This is a common mindset that artificially compar- tmentalizes „development“ to its detriment, while it largely removes it from any strategic context“ (Natsios 2006, 138).

Attributing strategic value to development efforts was also reflected in both the 2002 National Security Strategy and the 2006 National Security Strategy. For

71 72 BUSH ADMINISTRATION example, the 2002 document asserted that "America is now threatened less by con- quering states than we are by failing ones" and pledged to "help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists” (President of the United States 2002). According to Susan M. Roberts, these documents, along with the statements of the U.S. officials, show the discur- sive move to bring the three Ds (defense, diplomacy, development) close together, however with development tied to defense and diplomacy in a subsidiary, reinfor- cing role (Roberts 2016, 557).

This perception of the role of development was mirrored by organizational changes in the American bureaucracy. The development agenda had been traditionally administered by the Department of State, however, the Bush years marked the increase of development projects falling under the Department of Defense (Roberts 2016, 557). According to Oxfam America, in 2002 the Department of Defense was managing 6% of American overseas development assistance but 3 years later the percentage raised to 21% (Oxfam America 2008, 5).

In the course of the Bush’s years in office, Africa had to deal with many humanitarian challenges, both natural and manmade (Pham 2014, 253). During this period, the total foreign aid provided to Africa significantly increased and Wash- ington was praised for support of various efforts to tackle the challenges on the continent. While there is no doubt that the Bush administration rationale behind the support of these initiatives had a humanitarian aspect to it, the majority of Africa scholars seems to agree that the aid policies were influenced by security concerns.

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5.4.2 Trade Policies The perception that it was the defense component of the three Ds that mattered the most under President Bush was not limited to the the issue of developmental aid. There were critical voices claiming that Bush’s interest in promoting trade between Africa an the U.S. was also motivated by strategic interests. Presi- dent Bush repeatedly supported the expansion of US-Africa trade and investment ties, for example he stated that: „in the long run, the best way to lift lives in Africa is to tear down barriers to investment and trade“ (Bush 2008, 547). Such emphasis on trade was reflected in adoption of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000. AGOA enhanced market access to the U.S. for African countries that met the conditions such as human rights, respect for rule of law and core labor standards (African Growth and Opportunity Act 2019). The Act originally covered the 8-year period from 2000 to 2008 but in 2004 it was extended to 2015 (African Growth and Opportunity Act 2019).

The emphasis on the need to deepen the trade ties between the U.S. and Africa proved successful. While in 2001, the exports from the U.S. to Africa amounted only to 12,119.3 million USD and imports to 25,431.3 million USD; in 2008, the exports increased to 28,392.7 million USD and the imports surged to 113,495.6 million USD (United States Census Bureau 2018). However, throughout the Bush years, the U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa were concentrated in a few countries and in terms of exports to America, 4 countries, 3 of which were major crude oil exporters, accounted for more than 85% of U.S. purchases (Hesse 2007, 341). The U.S.-Africa trade therefore centered around oil, a commodity with in- disputably strategic value.

Already in May 2001, even before 9/11, the Cheney report warned that the United States would grow increasingly dependent on foreign oil supplies in the years to come and recommended the Bush Administration to increase imports of

73 74 BUSH ADMINISTRATION oil from regions other than the Middle East, mentioning that Africa was likely to be among the fastest growing sources of future U.S. oil supplies (Lawson 2007). The events of 9/11 further emphasized the notion that dependence on Middle East- ern oil could undermine American national security and Africa’s oil supplies provided the U.S. with an opportunity to reduce this dependence (Tieku 2012). 4 months after the attacks, Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for Af- rican Affairs declared that: “African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward” (Kansteiner 2002). Theresa Whelan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, affirmed such position and when asked whether African oil is strategically important to the U.S. she answered: „absolutely. I'm not going to stand here and tell you that we have no interest in oil, sure we do but it is in the larger context of simply being able as a nation to be able to access and to buy that oil on the free market, not to be able to control it“ (Whelan 2008).

The Bush administration indeed managed to access it on a larger scale. Ac- cording to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, in the last year of the Bush‘s presidency, African countries were the source of more of America’s oil imports than were the states of the Persian Gulf (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2008).With growing reliance of the U.S. on oil imports from Africa, the concerns in the White House about its continued flow grow as well, primarily because of the perception that Africa’s oil-rich states were among the least stable and poorly governed nations of the continent and for that reason, the oil exporting states started to receive more technical assistance and foreign aid (Walle 2010). While the Bush administration’s efforts to strengthen the trade ties between the U.S. and Africa undoubtedly translated into actual increases in trade exchanges, similar to the Bush aid policies, many Africa scholars share the view that the trade policies were heavily influenced by the U.S. security interests.

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5.5 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations

5.5.1 Developmental and Humanitarian Assistance Djibouti’s environmental characteristics generally limited its economic potential – its climate and soil, composed mainly of volcanic rock, is one of the least productive in Africa, and therefore very inhospitable to agriculture or large livestock raising (USA International Business Publications 2006, 163). For these reasons, the country’s agricultural production was not able to meet its demands and overwhelming majority of consumer products and food had to be imported from abroad which kept the cost very high for average Djiboutian citizens and prolonged country’s dependency on foreign assistance. Furthermore, the country had virtually no natural resources which limited the possibilities for domestic production and industry and contributed to high levels of unemployment. Moreover, due to scarce rainfall, the country had repeatedly faced damaging droughts that led to periods of famine.

When Bush became president, the country was faced with a period of drought and associated increase in malnutrition. In this regard, the U.S. worked with the World Food Program in order to develop various activities for different target groups - rural food-for-work activities were aimed primarily at vulnerable Djiboutians and urban institutional feeding and relief was targeted at refugees (USA International Business Publications 2006, 163). In 2003, the U.S. provided 4000 metric tons of commodities valued at 2.2 million USD, with two-thirds going to Djiboutians and one third to refugees (USA International Business Publications 2006, 163).

That same year president Guelleh came for an official visit of Washington, during which president Bush promised to reopen the USAID office in the country

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(The White House 2003). USAID office in Djibouti was opened later on that year and its programs were concentrating on improving education but also at expanding health services with special focus on improving local capacity to sustain health care facilities (USA International Business Publications 2006,163). USAID budg- eted more than 20 million USD for this direct assistance for Djibouti – 12 million USD for the health sector and 8 million USD for education (Davis, Othieno 2007).

Moreover, Secretary of State Powell lobbied for supplemental assistance for Djibouti in the form of two projects totaling 5 million USD. The first project called for the establishment of the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEW- SNET) office, which would help to asses the food security data (Davis, Othieno 2007). The second program aimed at developing a livestock holding and export facility in Djibouti that would enable the export of this commodity from the country to the Middle East (Davis, Othieno 2007).

However, when it comes the flagship humanitarian activities of the Bush Administration – PEPFAR and MCC – Djibouti did not profit from any of them during the Bush’s years in office. Djibouti did not receive any PEPFAR grants and neither did it pass the criteria for MCC eligibility – ruling justly, fostering economic freedom and investing in people. Even though, the overall levels of economic assistance that Djibouti received during the years 2001-2008 were only a bit lower than the total sum of security assistance it received during the same period, it did not qualify among the top recipients of the U.S. economic aid to Africa as demonstrated in the table number 52.

2 The amount of funding provided to „Sub-Saharan Africa Regional“ is not included in the country- level total allocations, although it may include funds for an individual country. This is a result of U.S. government reporting not identifying specific country recipients for aid.

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Nevertheless, according to Davis and Othieno, the Bush administration made a genuine attempt to “win hearts and minds” of the people of Djibouti (Davis, Othieno 2007). However, similar to other parts of Africa, there were concerns that American willingness to invest in humanitarian and development projects was fueled by its security interests. Many scholars expressed concerns that CJTF-HOA‘s humanitarian assistance projects and USAID activities were primarily intended as a way of appeasing Djiboutians who did not feel at ease with the headquarters (Guazzini 2013, 480).

Table 5 - Top recipients of economic aid from the United States to Africa (2001- 2008) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

5.5.2 Trade and Economic Relations Djibouti had been aware of its environmental disadvantages and from the late 19th century onwards, it started to center its economy primarily on the harbor

77 78 BUSH ADMINISTRATION activities (Guazzini 2013, 462). Djiboutian approach to economy remained the same during Bush’s years in office and the country’s economy continued to be concentrated around trade flowing through its port (President of the United States 2002, 86). From 2000 onwards, the Port of Djibouti has been operated by Dubai Ports International on a 20- year concession (Guazzini 2013, 475). As Ambassador Schermerhorn mentioned, this deal represented a catalyst for the country’s infrastructure development, leading to creation of new container holding area, a bulk port with an oil terminal at Doraleh and a creation of a “free zone” in the port area (Schermerhorn 2005, 81).

Another important source of income for the country were the rental fees for military bases and facilities. In order to attract this type of revenue, Djibouti generally tried to offer a welcoming environment, as Ambassador Schermerhorn mentioned president Guelleh once said that the Djiboutian nation is “African at heart, Arabist in culture, and universalist in thought” (Schermerhorn 2005, 53). Throu- ghout the Cold War and the following decade, Djibouti allowed the U.S. to use its facilities practically without conditions. However, Djibutians tended to view this relationship as a one that fulfilled the strategic objectives of the superpower, rather than one that concerned itself Djibouti’s national and economic interests (Davis, Othieno 2007). For that reason, when the Americans decided to establish their presence in Camp Lemonnier, the Djibutians were determined to negotiate more favorable conditions. Following extensive discussions in 2003 the Bush administration agreed to pay 31 million USD per year for stationing its forces in Djibouti (Davis, Othieno 2007).

On the top of the revenue Djibouti received from the rental fees, the trade between the countries started to increase over the course of Bush’s years in office. Despite the increases, the overall trade between the two countries was relatively insignificant as neither of them was among the other ones largest trading partners.

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It comes as a no surprise that in the course of this 8 year-long period, Djibouti was not among America‘s top export nor import destinations. Similarily, the U.S. was not a crucial trading partner for Djibouti either, as it was primarily exporting to Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and Kenya and importing from Saudi Arabia, India and the European Union (Observatory of Economic Complexity n.d.). However, throughout the period imports from both China and the U.S. started to gradually increase.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Exports 18.6 58.5 31.7 43.7 47.6 47.6 58.9 140.8 Imports 0.9 1.9 0.6 1.0 1.1 3.3 4.5 7.0 Total 17.7 56.6 31.1 42.7 46.5 44.3 54.4 133.8

Table 6 - Trade between the United States and Djibouti (2001-2008) Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

5.6 Conclusion

“Africa’s history and geography give it a pivotal role in the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, some Africans have expressed concerns that US attention and resources devoted to Africa will be shorted in favor of the Middle East and South Asia. This should not be the case under any circumstances. Africa is critical to our war on terrorism.”

National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice Washington for the African Growth and Opportunity Act Forum, October 2001

When George W. Bush became the president of the United States, the expectations for his administration’s approach to Africa were quite low. It was widely anticipated that Africa will be at the periphery of American interests. It therefore came as a surprise when the Bush’s White House approached Africa

79 80 BUSH ADMINISTRATION issues actively – starting with diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Sudan to promoting trade and offering aid in unprecedented amounts and ways. The substantial increases of foreign aid and various health initiatives earned praise for Bush, both from the left and more enthusiastically from his own camp, for which his Africa policy constituted one of his most brilliant successes (Walle 2010). These initiatives were welcomed positively not only in the U.S. but in Africa as well and helped to keep the popularity of the United States rather high, especially compared to other parts of the world (Cooke, Morrison 2009, 2). PEPFAR became widely regarded as one of the most positive Bush-era legacies and the praise was not unsubstantiated - only 8 months after the first U.S. money started flowing through the PEPFAR, 3-times as many Africans as before were receiving HIV/AIDS treatment (Hesse 2007, 340).

However, Bush’s humanitarian legacy on the continent tends to be overshadowed by the security dimension of his administration‘s approach to Africa. There is no denying that the terrorist attacks of September 11 led the Washington to view the national security differently, and that the U.S. policy makers consequently altered their conception of national interests in Africa (Walle 2010). Secu- rity interests that centered on the counterterrorism efforst became the core of the new American approach to the continent. However, the administration regarded the possible security threats as closely connected to the problems of underdevelopment, poverty, internal political instability and even diseases. In line with this understanding of national security, energy sources, developmental problems and even health emerged as new, near-strategic U.S. interests in Africa in which Afri- can issues gained a position much closer to mainstream foreign policy than before (Cooke, Morrison 2009, 1).

This led many scholars to the conclusion that the humanitarian, developmental and economic aspects of American policy on the continent were driven less

80 BUSH ADMINISTRATION 81 by altruistic desire to help the continent and more by the security concerns. Accor- ing to Tieku, it was the defense component of the three Ds of transformational diplomacy that mattered the most under President Bush (Tieku, 2012). Hentz shares this view and states that the attention the continent received from the Bush administration was largely framed by the American War on Terror (Hentz 2004, 38). Hesse points out that it must not be forgotten that Bush was first and foremost a national security president who understood that poverty provides fertile ground for fundamentalism, and that chaotic Africa could produce terrorists (Hesse 2007, 340). According to Lyons, during the Bush era, similar to the Cold War period, global concerns surpassed policies to engage the specific challenges on the continent and American engagement was primarily motivated by the goals of the Global War on Terror with lesser regard for the impact of U.S. actions on local politics or conflicts (Lyons 2015).

The security rationale behind the American aid allocations can be to a certain extend observable when assessing the list of the top recipients of the economic assistance. Out of the top recipients - Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia – only half was on the United Nations list of the least developed countries in the selected period, which could suggest that the aid allocations were influenced by the U.S. security interests. Kieh further points out that in terms of the trade relations, imports largely consisted of oil, which is a strategically important commodity (Kieh 2014, 170). Moreover, a distinctive feature of Bush’s approach to assistance programs in Africa was the transfer to the Department of Defense of authorities once vested in other agencies, such as De- partment of State and USAID (Bellamy 2009, 22). Furthermore, many new security initiatives were established and the administration also increased the amount of military training programs aimed for African countries.

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Such emphasis on the security issues in American approach towards Africa seemed to be a source for concern especially among African scholars. According to Adekeye Adebajo, following the embassy bombings of 1998, the U.S. started to replace the “red peril” of the Cold War with a “green menace” - the color of Islam (Adebajo 2003, 177). Adebajo further claims that Africans were concerned that Bush’s War on Terror provided a new justification to back autocrats who support the U.S. in its fight against terrorism, rather than supporting democratic allies (Adebajo 2003, 180). Bellamy was also critical about the militarization of overall U.S. policy towards Africa and mentioned that directing aid to counterterrorism initiatives did not reflect the true complexity of Africa’s security problems (Bellamy 2009, 23). Nevertheless, it is also important to note that not all the authors viewed the increased security cooperation between the U.S. and African countries as a sign of militarization of its policies. For example, Pham notes that the establishment of AFRICOM was an extension of ongoing U.S. security cooperation with the African states involved, and perhaps improved delivery of these efforts’ services, rather than the vanguard of a new militarized foreign policy (Pham 2014, 245). Ambassador Schermerhorn also pointed out that the establishment of the CJTF-HOA to a large extend simply increased the way in which the U.S. was engaging in the region before (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019).

In general, the U.S. engagement with Africa under President Bush was defined in terms of the increase in U.S. interests in the region as a result of international terrorism, increased dependence on African oil and humanitarian concerns (Lawson 2007). However, During Bush’s time in office, Africa became more competitive, both in political and economic terms, alliances on the continent became more broadly distributed and driven by new trade and investment relationships, an area where U.S. had lagged, primarily behind China (Cooke, Morrison 2009, 3). Even though, the Chinese activities on the continent were occasionally critized by the U.S., for example the case of Darfur, Washington generally did not perceive

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China in Africa as a threat, as pointed out by President Bush in 2008: “I don’t view Africa as zero-sum for China and the United States. I mean, I think we can pursue agendas … without creating a great sense of competition” (Bush 2012, 247).

U.S.-Djibouti relations under President Bush were in many ways reflecting the overall U.S. policy towards the continent and were therefore largely driven by Washington’s security interests. Following 9/11, Djibouti became an important component of American counterterrorism efforts on the continent. The small coastal country was located in a notoriously unstable region with close historical and cultural linkages to the Middle East that was viewed among the U.S. security establishment as a potential source of terrorism. In search for a secure location for the counterterrorism activities in the region, Djibouti appeared as an ideal candidate. Small but internaly stable country with welcoming political environment, provided an fitting place for the establishment of the U.S. military presence- first in the form of CJTF-HOA and later on in more encompassing form of AFRICOM.

The emphasis on the security aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti relations could be observable in the the trade and aid figures as well. Even though, both the economic and security aid were fluctuating during the Bush’s years in office, Djibouti received a larger share of the U.S. security aid – it even became the 10th largest recipient of this kind of aid on the continent, while it did not qualify to the top recipients of the economic aid. Moreover, similar to the other parts of Africa, there were concerns among scholars that the economic aid provided to Djibouti largely served as a form of appeasement of the local population disagreeing with the U.S. military presence. It is noteworthy, that aid increased after the CJTF-HOA was established and that the creation of the USAID office also followed the establishment of the CJTF-HOA.

Moreover, despite the increase of trade between the two countries, for majority of the Bush’s years in office, the total amount of the trade between the two

83 84 BUSH ADMINISTRATION countries was not much higher than the amount of money Djibouti received in the rental fees for the Camp Lemonnier. Additionally, neither of the two countries was among the other ones largest trading partners.

In conclusion, the significance of Djibouti within the broader U.S. approach towards the region and the continent as a whole was vested in its location, favorable political climate and internal stability. The relations between the two countries were closely connected to the developments in the surrounding region and largely determined by external factors - such as the presence of terrorist groups and pirates in Djibouti’s neighborhood. Despite the presence of various foreign state actors in Djibouti during Bush’s years in office, including major powers like China, the U.S. did not perceive their activities in the country as a source of concern and its interests revolved primarily around the counterterrorism activities, that largely centered on the “winning hearts and minds” campaing.

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6 Obama administration

„Africa responded with joy when Barack Obama was elected. There was dancing in the streets of Liberia. Kenya declared his inauguration a public holiday“

John Norris Foreign Policy, 2012

When Barack Obama, a son of a Kenyan father, became the president of the United States, the news were greeted with excitement and optimism all across Africa. The collective hope was premised on the notion that as a person of African descent, Obama would not only understand the continent better than his predecessors but he would also treat it as a priority and direct more resources in its way (Walle 2015, 54). When Obama visited Africa in July 2009, far earlier in his term than the handful of other U.S. presidents that had actually traveled to Africa while in office, expectations only continued to rise (Norris 2012). The speech he gave in Ghana during the visit only increased the optimisms when he stated that: “I do not see the countries and peoples of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world as partners with America on behalf of the future we want for all of our children” (Obama 2009).

Nevertheless, the hopes remained largely unfulfilled. Between the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Great Recession, the first fours years of his presidency proved unfavorable to ambitious new foreign policy initiatives, particularly in regions of the world viewed as secondary to the U.S. interests (Walle 2015, 54). What’s more, Obama’s personal ties to the continent made him less likely to focus on Africa, not more so, since he and his advisers viewed it as a lia-

85 86 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION bility (Walle 2015, 54). Some analysts believe that Obama was sensitive to cri- tiques that he might be too focused on the continent of his ancestors especially since the birther conspiracy, which alleged that he was born outside the U.S. and therefore ineligible to serve as president, garnered a lot of media attention (Living- ston 2016).

Throughout the course of his first term in office, little innovation in the U.S. approach toward the continent was visible. As M'cormack and Kaba pointed out while Obama’s Ghana speech sounded “promising and was rich in rhetoric, in substance however, it appeared to indicate a continuation of the policies of previous leaders, echoing many of their central themes” (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 244). Moreover, even though the contours of the Obama administration’s policy towards Africa were briefly outlined in 2011 by the Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson who identified five Africa policy priorities: „strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law; encouraging long-term development and growth, including food security; enhancing access to quality health care and education; assisting in the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of conflicts; and working with Africans to address transnational challenges, including terrorism, maritime security, climate change, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons“ (Carson 2011), Obama’s Africa strategy remained unarticulated until shortly before the second-term presidential elections.

The 2012 United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa had a very similar tone to the outline presented by Carson, identifying 4 main objectives of the U.S.-Africa policy: „strengthening democratic institutions; spurring economic growth, trade, and investment; advancing peace and security; and promoting opportunity and development” (President of the United States 2012, 2). The strategy was based on a belief that “Africa needs strong institutions not strong men” (Obama 2009) and emphasized the need for good governance. The document was

86 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 87 also centered on a premise that “Africa’s future is up to Africans” (Obama 2009) and stressed the need for finding African solutions to African problems.

Obama’s second term in the office became the period when his key Africa initiatives took off. The administration tried to re-orientate the American Africa policy towards trade, introducing initiatives such as the U.S.-Africa Business Fo- rum, Power Africa, Trade Africa and Young African Leaders initiative, which became widely regarded as the key Africa legacy of the Obama administration (Vines 2016).

6.1 Foreign Policy Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations

6.1.1 Regional Developments

Similar to the Bush era, Djibouti’s surroundings, especially Somalia, remained turbulent under Obama’s watch. The political, humanitarian and security conditions in Somalia have not significantly changed and the government continued struggling with enforcement of control over its territory, providing humanitarian services and preventing corruption and inter-clan warfare (Mohamud 2014). Moreover, the country kept facing attacks by Al-Shabaab. Although by late 2012, the group had been forced out of Somalia’s major cities, it remained active and involved in bombings, suicide attacks, and assassinations (Janzen, Lewis 2019). Nevertheless, there were some positive developments as well. The most visible progress seemed to be achieved in the area of piracy, which started to decline around 2012. This improvement could be attributed in part to the political changes in Somalia but also to international naval presence in the region (Janzen, Lewis 2019).

Djibouti and the United States continued sharing their interests in stabilization of Somalia. In support of those aims, AMISOM, including Djiboutian forces,

87 88 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION increased the size of its force in 2014 (Janzen, Lewis 2019). Djibouti’s proactive approach in this matter was appreciated by the U.S. as demonstrated by statement made by President Obama in 2014: “we’re extremely interested in regional issues and we want to say how much we appreciate the work that Djibouti has done through AMISOM in Somalia … there’s a significant presence of soldiers from Djibouti who are participating in the multinational force that has been able to push back al-Shabaab’s control over large portions of Somalia” (Obama 2014).

The strong interest in regional issues that Obama mentioned was demonstrated that same year when the U.S. announced new U.S. policy toward Somalia that was meant to shift to what Mohamud described as full engagement (Mohamud 2014). The plan included the intention to nominate an ambassador to Somalia for the first time in more than 20 years; providing aid and U.S support for enlarging AMISOM that would allow it to resume offensive operations (Gienger 2014). Nevertheless, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman also mentioned that strengthened AMISOM would not „altogether eliminate the need for direct action to protect American lives” and acknowledged that “from time to time, the U.S. military has conducted such action in Somalia against a limited number of targets who, based on information about their current and historical activities, have been determined to be part of al-Qaida,” Sherman also noted that: „in the future, we may take action against threats that pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons“ (Sherman 2014).

Additionally, the Obama era in the White House marked the beginning of yet another dimension of the U.S.-Djibouti relations – Yemen. When Saudi Arabia assembled international coalition and launched a military offensive, the U.S. announced its support for the Saudi coalition in a press statement issued in 2015: “while U.S. forces are not taking direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort, we are establishing a Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coor-

88 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 89 dinate U.S. military and intelligence support” (Meehan 2015). Despite the ongoing efforts of the Saudi-led coalition, the conflict remained unresolved during Obama’s terms in office.

Moreover, the conflict resulted in a humanitarian crisis and forced many people to flee their homes. Due to its geographical proximity, Djibouti became one of their main destinations. By the time Obama was leaving office, Djibouti was hosting 40% of all Yemeni refugees arriving to the Horn of Africa, which represented the largest share among the Horn states (UNHCR, 2016). The U.S. assisted Djibouti to accommodate the refugees and the American officials repeatedly pointed out their appreciations of Djiboutian cooperative attitudes on this issue. For example, the U.S. Secretary of State Kerry mentioned that: “we’re also working with Djibouti to assist many thousands of refugees who have fled violence in the region. Djibouti has provided safe haven for many years to Somali refugees, and now, it is providing it to those seeking refuge from Yemen ... In addition to welcoming Yemeni refugees, Djibouti has also helped to ensure the safe passage of thousands of evacuees from more than 60 nations, including American citizens“ (Kerry 2015).

6.1.2 Developments in Djibouti and the U.S.-Djibouti Relations During Obama’s two terms in the White House, Djibouti managed to stay away from external troubles that were plaguing its neighborhood. However, the internal situation was consistently turbulent. Unresolved grievances among the Afar minority led to a revival of the FRUD insurgency, with occasional violence in 2010 (Freedom House 2018). Moreover, that same year, Guelleh, a member of the Issa majority, pressured the parliament into passing a constitutional amendment that abolished two term limits for presidents, a change that cleared the way for him to run for a third term in 2011 (Freedom House 2018).

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The passing of the constitutional amendment combined with general dis- satisfaction and high levels of unemployment resulted in a series of protests. In the largest protest that took place in 2011, two people were killed, and many more were injured. The protest was followed by a security crackdown, numerous arrests, detentions, and proceedings against demonstrators, including the leaders of political parties (United States Department of State 2011, 1). The campaign for the 2011 presidential elections was therefore marred by various restriction and opposition argued that those restrictions made the fair contest impossible (Freedom House 2018). As a result, the elections were for the most part boycotted by the opposition, Guelleh was challenged by only one opponent, and ultimately won a decisive vic- tory, garnering 81% of the vote (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018).

The political climate remained tense in the following years, and large scale protests appeared again following the 2013 parliamentary elections in which Guelleh’s coalition won two-thirds of the seats (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018). How- ever, even though the observers from the African Union, IGAD, and the Arab League characterizing the elections as “free and fair”, their assessment was disputed domestically and by some other international observers (United States Department of State 2016, 1). The internal stability in the country continued to be fragile and as the 2016 election approached, the country’s opposition coalition was in discord, with some of the parties boycotting the election. Guelleh was declared the winner, receiving 87% of the vote (Cutbill, Schraeder 2018). Even though, the international observers characterized the election as “peaceful” and “sufficiently free and transparent”, most opposition groups again did not agree with this assessment and declared the election results as fraudulent (United States Department of State 2016, 1).

Despite Obama’s general emphasis on the importance of good governance and democratic principles in his approach to Africa, when it came to Djibouti, those

90 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 91 issues were mostly left unaddressed. During a meeting with President Guelleh in 2014, Obama did not address the issue of elections and human rights abuses, on the contrary Obama noted his „strong support for President Guelleh's leadership in the Horn of Africa,“ and pledged to work closely together to „strengthen and deepen the strategic partnership between our two countries“ (Obama 2014, 1). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the U.S. administration urged the government of Djibouti to respect its citizens’ human rights and prevent violence on a number of occasions, including the public condemmenation of the excessive use of force against protesters during an incident in 2015, during which 19 people were reportedly killed after the Djiboutian police opened fire (Smith 2016). Regarding this tragic event, the Department of State spokesperson John Kirby stated that: “the United States condemns recent acts of violence in the capital of Djibouti and calls for the immediate release of opposition leaders who have been detained. We urge the Government of Djibouti to respect its citizens’ rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and association, and to exercise restraint” (Kirby 2015).

Nonetheless, academic literature generally assessed Obama’s stance on human rights violations in Djibouti as mostly rhetorical and not sufficiently resolute. According to Sun and Zoubir, U.S. failure to resolutely condemn the Guelleh’s regime human rights abuses was “a reminiscent of US policy during the Cold War and its aftermath, when it supported authoritarian regimes that provided it with strategic military facilities” (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 119). Ambassador Shinn noted that when it comes to issues of good governance, the U.S. has never been totally consistent since there are always countries, in which the U.S. has a major interest – whether it is a major oil exporter or in the case of Djibouti, a country that hosts its only military base on the continent – which means that compromises are being made (D. Shinn, Interview 2019). Moreover, as Metelits and Matti pointed out due to diversifying range of state actors involved in Djibouti, the regime reduced its

91 92 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION dependance on a single source of revenue and military assistance which weakened the ability of the U.S. to push for a reform (Metelits, Matti 2015, 117).

Indeed, the involvement of foreign actors in Djibouti intensified in the course of Obama’s two presidencies. In addition to France, United States and Germany- Italian, Spanish and Japanese forces also established their military presence in the country. Their interest in Djibouti was largely connected to the problem of piracy. In 2008, European Union began its antipiracy mission called European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), Operation Atalanta with Djibouti as its logistical base, which was the first ever deployment by the EU naval forces conducted under the European Security and Defense Policy (Daniels 2012, 79). In support of this operation, Spain and Italy established small military presence in Djibouti.

The antipiracy efforts were the driving force behind establishment of Japa- nese military base as well. Following the initial dispatch in 2009 of a small number of Japanese officers to temporary facilities operating cooperatively with U.S. and French forces, in 2010 the Japanese government approved the leasing of land for its own facility and the Japanese Self-Defense Force Base was opened in 2011 (Mason 2018, 346). The facility in Djibouti became Japan’s first postwar overseas military base and the purpose of its establishment became a source of discussions due to passing of so called „war bill“ that for the first time allowed the engagement of Japan in combat overseas (Mason 2018, 339).

While most analysts believe that Djibouti’s interest in hosting multiple militaries was motivated primarily by economic reasons, Ambassador Schermerhorn believes that on top of the financial profit, President Guelleh might be motivated by security calculations as well. As she further elaborated: “President wants a lot of fortification – the more countries will come in, the more protection he could claim for himself. If there are other militaries, they will be so busy watching each

92 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 93 other that they will not let him be taken over by any one of them” (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019).

In terms of non-military cooperation, Djibouti embraced significant investments from India, and welcomed economic and educational aid from the Gulf States (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 118). Qatar also used to play an important role in the Djibouti’s foreign affairs since it acted as a mediator in the Eritrea-Djibouti border conflict before withdrawing its peacekeepers from the Eritrean-Djiboutian border in protest of both countries’ decision to side with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the Gulf crisis (Lilley 2018). The role of the mediator in the Horn of Africa afterwards largely passed to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their presence intensified with the start of the war in Yemen. The UAE, and to a lesser extend also Bahrain, invested in development projects, while Saudi Arabia was a prominent donor for the absorption of Yemenite refugees, and a source of financing for housing, schools, and mosques for underprivileged Djiboutians (Bassist 2017). Moreover, Saudis and Djiboutians also started talks about the possibility of military cooperation.

However, the most troubling foreign actor involved in Djibouti for the U.S. turned out to be China. Initially the Obama administration emphasized the possibility for cooperation between the two countries. In 2008, Witney Schneid- man, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, spoke of the need to “engage the Chinese to establish the rules of the road and to ensure that we are working at common purpose to enhance economic development on the continent” (Schneidman 2008). According to Ambassador Shinn, Obama himself also believed that the two countries should seek to find common ground upon which they can better contribute to Africa's development (Shinn 2009, 38). Similar to Bush, Obama was trying to find opportunities for a possible cooperation with China in

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Africa – according to Ambassador Shinn, there was cooperation on the UN peacekeeping operations, counterpiracy activities and even attempts on cooperation on developmental projects. However, he also noted that most of those efforts did not succeed partly due to different approach to the developmental cooperation – with China disagreeing with the U.S. principle of imposing political conditionality on countries with serious governance and human rights deficiencies (Shinn, Interview 2019).

However, the tone of the administration’s statements about the Chinese involvement in Djibouti started to change over time. Beijing maintained economic relations with Djibouti long before Obama came to power, nevertheless, China’s economic and military engagement with the small coastal country started to increase since 2009. In order to turn Djibouti into a regional commercial hub, China provided funding for the major infrastructure projects such as the Doraleh Multi- purpose Port, the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway, and the Ethiopia-Djibouti water pipeline (Downs, Becker, deGategno 2017, 5).

Yet, it was the military aspect of the Sino-Djiboutian relations that seemed to be a major source of concern for Washington. Starting in 2008, the Chinese Navy had been involved in anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and since then its military presence in Djibouti started to slowly increase (Pant, Haidar 2017, 2). For example, Beijing deployed a medical ship that provided free healthcare to Dji- boutian population (Pant, Haidar 2017, 6), and used sea and air routes via Djibouti for evacuation of Chinese nationals during the Libyan and Yemen crises (Krupakar 2017, 208). Beginning around 2013, the security ties between the two countries further strengthened and began to include discussions about the establishment of a permanent Chinese support facility on Djiboutian soil (Downs, Becker, deGategno 2017, V).

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These talks did not go unnoticed in Washington. In 2015, a senior U.S. official told The Telegraph that: “there are fears that if President Guelleh gets too close to China then he may be tempted to impose restrictions on U.S. access to the base, which would seriously affect the West’s attempts to collect intelligence on Islamic State and al-Qaeda” (Coughlin 2015). That same year, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry came on an official visit of Djibouti. Even though, various outlets reported that one of the reasons behind his visit was to discourage Djibouti from leasing space for a military base for the Chinese, the official reports from his visit mention no such information.

Soon after Kerry’s visit, China officially announced that it was establishing its first overseas support facility in Djibouti close to the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port (Downs, Becker, deGategno 2017, vi). Beijing’s decision reflected a fundamental change in China’s security policy since Chinese leaders had long denied the idea of establishing a military facility overseas and often equated American overseas military presence with attempts on hegemony and neo-colonialism (Downs, Becker, deGategno 2017, 1). In January 2016, the 10-year agreement (ex- tendable by another 10 years) between the governments of China and Djibouti for building a support facility was officially concluded (Krupakar 2017, 207).

Referred to strictly as a logistics support base by the Chinese Defense Min- istry, the facility was designed to: “carry out cooperation with and provide assistance to Djibouti in the areas of international peacekeeping, personnel training, medical service, equipment China’s maintenance, and emergency rescue and disaster relief” (Pant, Haidar 2017, 1-2). However, the uncertainties surrounding the intentions behind the establishment of the base emerged immediately. According to Krupakar, the Djiboutian government assured China that the terms and conditions of basing contracts are the same for all foreign powers, implying that Beijing is legally entitled to use its base for kinetic operations (Krupakar 2017, 209). The

95 96 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION contract was accompanied by visible benefits for Djibouti, with China undertaking several infrastructural projects in Djibouti, including improvements of railroad connectivity and the supply of military aircraft (Krupakar 2017, 209). Even though the Chinese plans to construct the base were announced during the Obama administration, it became operational during the Trump administration.

The rising concerns of the Obama administration regarding the Chinese activities in Djibouti can be observed when assessing the AFRICOM’s annual Pos- ture Statements. Until 2013, China was not mentioned in the section devoted to the security environment. While in 2013, the statement just briefly mentioned that: “Chinese engagement in pursuit of economic development is deepening China’s political and economic influence and increasing its access in the region“ (Ham 2013, 5), in the last AFRICOM’s Posture Statement of the Obama administration, China was already included in the section devoted to strategic risks and its involvement in Africa was described in more than purely economic terms: „China and Russia sell weapon systems and seek to establish trade and defense agreements in Africa. As China and Russia expand their influence in Africa, both countries are striving to gain “soft power” in Africa“ (Rodriguez 2016, 12).

6.2 Security Aspects of the U.S – Africa Relations

The Africa policy that Obama has inherited from Bush was considered to be shaped primarily by the U.S. strategic interests, particularly counterterrorism (Kieh 2014, 174). Given the various statements that Obama made during the 2008 election campaign criticizing Bush for the militarization of foreign policy as a whole, the expectation was that there would be a shift (Kieh 2014, 174). However, the academic literature seems to share the opinion that the Obama’s approach to the security on the continent did not significantly differ from the one of the Bush administration. According to M'cormack and Kaba, Obama “appeared to echo the

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Bush Administration’s emphasis on peace and security for the U.S.“ (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 244). Some scholars even suggest that Obama emphasized military even more than Bush, as Daniel Volman notes: “it is clear that the Obama administration is following essentially the same policy that has guided US policy toward Africa for more than a decade. Indeed, the Obama administration is seeking to expand US military activities on the continent further” (Volman 2010). On the other hand, Ambassador Shinn believes that Obama’s response to counterterrorism was more nuanced and that this small de-emphasis on the counterrorism was in part due to the fact that the Obama administration was several year beyond 9/11 and the attacks on the American embassies, which was fresher in the minds of the Bush administration (Shinn, Interview 2019).

Certain similarities between the approaches of the two administrations are observable when assessing Obama government’s official documents. The Bush administration’s broad understanding of the security challenges on the continent emphasized the interconnectivity of the security threats on the both sides of the Atlantic. President Obama also repeatedly stressed the theme of the interconnectivity in regards to Africa. For example, as early as 2009, during his first official visit of Africa he stated: “when there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems, they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.... And let me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold on the continent, but on con- fronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world” (Obama 2009).

Moreover, the 2015 National Security Strategy, similar to the Bush era strategic documents, pointed out the connection between the threats to American national security and problems stemming from Africa’s underdevelopment, poverty and political instability. According to the document: “the threat of catastrophic

97 98 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION attacks against our homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists. An array of terrorist threats has gained traction in areas of instability, limited opportunity, and broken governance. Our adversaries are not confined to a distinct country or region. Instead, they range from South Asia through the Middle East and into Africa“(President of the United States 2015, 9).

However, unlike the Bush 2006 National Security Strategy that stated that: „Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Ad- ministration“(President of the United States 2006, 37), none of the Obama’s National Security Strategies had put Africa on such a prominent place and the highest remark that the continent received was when the United States Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa mentioned “the growing strategic importance of sub- Saharan Africa to the United States” (President of the United States 2012, 2).

Another difference was a general change of tone of the Obama’s strategic documents that put a bigger emphasis on non-military means to solve problems and conflicts. In line with this change, the 2010 National Security Strategy included a continuing emphasis on the role of good governance and economic growth as ways to ensure African security. The 2012 United States Strategy toward Sub- Saharan Africa further stressed this view and declared that: „stronger democratic institutions lead countries to achieve greater prosperity and stability; are more successful in mitigating conflict and countering transnational threats“(President of the United States 2012, 2).

Despite the rhetorical emphasis on the good governance and reduction of military engagement, the actual American military presence on the continent continued to rise under Obama’s watch. Arms sales had increased as had military training programs designed to enhance African capabilities for counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 246). Moreover, the overall

98 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 99 amounts of security assistance provided to the continent roughly doubled from 1,929,563,511 USD in fiscal year 2009 to 2,944,319,000 USD in fiscal year 2016 (Security Assistance Monitor 2019).

In addition to the increases in the security assistance and arms trade, the military activities of the U.S. on the continent intensified as well. For example according to United States Africa Command Posture Statement 2016, in 2014 AF- RICOM conducted 68 operations, 11 major joint exercises, and 363 security cooperation activities, while in 2015 the numbers increased to 75 joint operations, 12 major joint exercises, and 400 security cooperation activities (Rodriguez 2016, 4). The scope of activities that AFRICOM was involved in was also enlarged as the U.S. increasingly started using drones for surveillance and elimination of high profile terrorist threats.

Furthermore, the flagship security activities of the Bush administration – such as CJTF-HOA, GPOI and TSCTI continued to function under Obama and new security-related initiatives announced. In 2014, the Security Governance Ini- tiative (SGI) was launched and aimed at improving security sector governance and capacity to address threats (United States Department of State 2015, 2). That same year, Obama introduced another new initiative- African Peacekeeping Rapid Re- sponse Partnership (APRRP or “A-Prep”) created to build the capacity of African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers in response to emerging conflict (White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014).

AFRICOM’s base at Camp Lemonier also started to play an increasingly significant role not only as a regional center supporting operations on the continent but also as a staging ground for counterterrorism operations in the Arabian Penin- sula - specifically Yemen - and the Indian Ocean (Pham 2014, 263). Moreover, under Obama’s watch, AFRICOM was engaged in its first major military operation

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- Operation Odyssey Dawn of 2011 - that was established to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya. In course of the operation, AFRICOM lost only one aircraft and suffered no fatalities (Stevenson 2011).

Even though the mission succeeded in overthrowing Muammar al-Qaddafi, it did not help Libya to achieve peace as the country soon descended into internal conflict that also destabilized the surrounding region. The volatile internal situation was evident in 2012, when the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi was attacked. After the attack, AFRICOM positioned additional personnel in Europe and Dji- bouti to respond to future crises (United States Africa Command n.d.). The East African Response Force and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response –were specifically trained for this kind of rescue operations in order to be deployed in times of crisis to enhance the security of U.S. embassies and to assist with the departure of citizens and staff (United States Africa Command n.d.).

Moreover, as Boko Haram gained a foothold in Nigeria, Washington increased its military assistance to and cooperation with the Nigerian government. After 276 schoolgirls were kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2014, the Obama administration fielded a task force to help the Nigerian government find them by providing intelligence from drone and satellite imagery, however the U.S. officials complained that the Nigerians failed to act on the information (Walle 2015, 57). The tensions between the two countries culminated in 2014, when Nigeria cancelled the cooperation (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 246).

That same year, AFRICOM was also involved in humanitarian activities. In the largest contingency operation it has led, AFRICOM assisted USAID in re- sponding to an Ebola outbreak in West Africa (United States Africa Command n.d.). AFRICOM provided logistics and engineering support, trained health care

100 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 101 workers and assisted countries in the region to improve their capacity to respond to future epidemics (United States Africa Command n.d.).

In general, the Obama administration similar to its predecesor emphasized the idea that American military presence on the continent was intended to strengthen the local capacity to respond to threats, and therefore help to protect the U.S. interests without the need for direct intervention of the U.S. However, despite Obama’s rhetorical focus on the reduction of the U.S. military engagement abroad, the U.S. military presence, security assistance and arms trade with Africa increased in course of the years he spent in the White House.

Map 3 - Threats in Africa during Obama's Administration Source: United States Africa Command, Command Brief 2014

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6.3 Security Aspects of the U.S – Djibouti Relations

The security aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti relations remained the most important component of the U.S.-Djibouti relations all throughout the Obama administrations. As President Obama pointed out: “(I) saw firsthand the importance of U.S. cooperation with Djibouti. Obviously, Camp Lemonnier is extraordinar- ily important not only to our work throughout the Horn of Africa but throughout the region“(Obama 2014). Indeed, Camp Lemonnier remained busy during Obama’s years in office. The Obama administration seeked to utilize Camp Lem- onnier as a model of cooperation with its European allies, especially in the area of counterpiracy efforts (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 115). Camp Lemonnier was also involved in rescue operations – the 2012 rescue operation of American and Danish aid workers held hostage in Somalia. The hostages were rescued by Navy SEALs that par- achuted in from Camp Lemonnier, killed 9 of the hostage-takers, suffered no casualties on their side and safely transported both of the hostages back to Camp Lem- onnier for medical treatment (Sheikh 2012).

The base in Djibouti also remained an important staging ground for counterterrorism operations, primarily in Somalia. When it comes to Somalia, Obama was the fourth American president to try to address the consequences of the government’s collapse, and the fourth to witness little change (Walle 2015, 56). On the bright side, Al-Shabaab, that controlled vast sections of Somali territory when Obama took office, had grown weaker by the end of Obama’s second term after losing a number of its key leaders in U.S. drone attacks (Walle 2015, 56). Al-Sha- baab territorial control of Somalia peaked between 2009 and 2010, and the terrorist threat that was expanding beyond Somali border was one of the reasons behind Kenyan intervention of Somalia in 2011. Kenyan troops were accompanied by AMISOM and Ethiopian forces and made a major push to drive Al-Shabaab out of their strongholds (Throup 2012).

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Multiple sources stated that Kenya coordinated its invasion with Wash- ington, in a similar fashion as Ethiopia in 2006, when the U.S. provided intelligence, training, and naval support (Zenko 2011). However, the U.S. denied coordination with Kenya and according to Throup, American officials had even discouraged the Kenyan government from intervening, arguing that more responsibility in this regard should be given to AMISOM and to the TFG (Throup 2012). Such emphasis on the multilateral approach reflected the administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy that stated that the U.S. would: “draw on diplomacy, development, and international norms and institutions to help resolve disagreements“(President of the United States 2010, 22).

Moreover, in 2012, the U.S. supported the expansion of the AMISOM’s mission and Djibouti was one of the countries that contributed by deploying additional forces, boosting AMISOM’s force level to approximately 17 000 military personnel (Jones, Liepman, Chandler 2016, 23). Moreover, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces were integrated into the mission in 2012 and 2014 respectively (Anderson 2016, 52). In order to contribute to AMISOM’s fight against Al-Shabaab, Ameri- cans were engaged in drone strikes; targeted killings of terrorist leaders in Somalia; and provision of arms, equipment and training for TFG troops at the base in Dji- bouti (Volman 2010).

The importance of the ongoing cooperation between Djibouti and the U.S. was demonstrated in the official U.S. documents. For example, similar to the Bush period, all the Country Reports on Terrorism issued by the Obama administration described Djibouti as „active and cooperative counterterrorism partner“(United States Department of State 2013) and mentioned Djibouti’s contribution to the counterterrorism efforts in Somalia. Each year, the reports also mention, that „Dji-

103 104 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION bouti received significant capacity building assistance in the way of counterterrorism training and equipment provided by the United States through a variety of courses and programs“(United States Department of State 2013).

Although Djibouti did not participate in SGI or APRRP, it remained a part of ACOTA and it also benefited from another Obama’s signature initiative – Part- nership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), established in 2009. This initiative’s aim was to build the capacity of the military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. Djibouti received training and equipment in order to improve the process of monitoring its borders with Somalia and to support professional units in operations against Al-Shabaab (United States Department of State 2013). Moreover, in 2014, a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and the Djiboutian Armed Forces was announced. Under the program, the Kentucky National Guard partnered with the Djiboutian Armed Forces to strengthen cooperation between the two militaries (Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti 2015).

Djibouti therefore continued to be an important partner for the American counterpiracy and counterterrorism activities, rescue operations, intelligence gath- ering and military trainings in Africa. In order to tackle all these issues, the number of troops stationed in Djibouti steadily increased and during the final year of the Obama administration Camp Lemonier hosted approximately 4 000 U.S. military and civilian personnel (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 115). Obama’s also decided to extend Camp Lemonier’s lease for additional 20 years in 2014. Terms of the new lease agreement were not disclosed, but according to the media reports the U.S. agreed to pay a total of about 70 million UDS per year - 63 million USD in rental fees and the rest in development aid (Schmitt 2014). The new terms meant a steep increase in lease payment for the U.S., as it had to pay almost double the amount it paid previously. However, Djiboutian officials argued that the increase reflected the

104 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 105 base’s expanded operations (Schmitt 2014). On the top of the rental fees, from 2010 onwards the U.S. had spent between 300 million and 500 million USD annually on the base providing employment for approximately 1 200 local employees, allowing for procurement (such as construction material and food supplies), and providing social services and health care for the local population (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 117).

The American military presence therefore an increasingly large source of revenue for the country’s economy and combined with the revenue from other foreign powers, it accounted for much of the country’s economic growth (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 117). Even though the Djiboutian government’s official reason for hosting the American forces according to the President Guelleh was to show: “support for international peace and for peace in our region as well. … We do that all for peace in the world and for peace in Africa” (Guelleh 2014), the substantial financial gains remained largely undistributed to the general public and some citizens were openly critical of the U.S. presence and activities. Since the establishment of the base, the skeptical voices had been pointing out that the American base could increase the chances of Djibouti becoming a target for terrorists. Even though the country was spared of such tragic scenarios during the Bush era, those fears came true under the Obama’s watch. In May 2014, two Al-Shabaab suicide bombers targeted a restaurant in the Djibouti’s capital known for frequently hosting Western military officials, killing 3 people and injuring more than 15 others. According to the Radio France Internationale, Al-Shabaab spokesperson claimed that they would not stop their attacks until the Djiboutian government shuts the United States' base and expels from its territory key Western allies (Nor 2014).

On top of the fears of a possible terrorist attack, Djibouti was worried about another safety concern. Usage of drones targeting primarily terrorist groups in So- malia and Yemen expanded during the Obama administration, which was viewed

105 106 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION with resentment in Djibouti. The primary reason for the antipathy were their frequent drone crashes, often in populated areas. For example, in 2013 alone, 5 Amer- ican drones crashed in Djibouti (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 119). Even before those acci- dents, Djiboutian officials had complained that the U.S. had not requested author- ization for its flights, nor informed them of their schedules (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2013). In 2013, following a request by Djibouti's government, which voiced safety concerns connected to frequent crashes, the Pentagon announced that it would not be carrying out drone operations from Camp Lemonnier (Ramirez 2013). The U.S. proposed to move such operations to a more remote location, nevertheless, according to Ramirez the officials also claimed that the U.S. would not reduce operations in any way (Ramirez 2013).

Despite many humanitarian and economic activities that will be described in more details in the following chapter, the American presence in Djibouti remained a militarized character all throughout the two Obama’s administrations. In an interview with Sun and Zoubir, an officer from AFRICOM who served at the Djibouti base described the situation on the ground as following: “the U.S. faces similar challenges as in Iraq and Afghanistan: a highly militarized presence that for many Djiboutians is the first encounter they have had with Americans. Rather than being introduced to Americans through the Peace Corps or USAID, Djibou- tians’ first encounter is often with an aggressive U.S. posture that is often very ignorant of their society and culture” (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 118).

6.3.1 Security assistance and arms sales In line with Obama’s promises of reduction of the U.S. military presence abroad, the amount of the security assistance that Djibouti received between the years 2009 and 2016 was 44,474,915 USD, which was approximately 10,000,000 USD less than what Djibouti received under Bush. Additionally, in the course of Obama’s years in the White House, Djibouti was not ranking on the list of top 10

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African recipients of security assistance which represented a drop compared to the 10th place it held when President Bush was in power3.

When it comes to the arms trade, the total value of arms sales from the U.S. to Djibouti in the period between the years 2009 and 2016 was 24,358,920 USD, which was approximately 4,000,000 USD increase compared to the Bush years in office. However, it should be noted that those figure includes deliveries only, and therefore the high levels of deliveries at the beginning of Obama’s term could be caused by the visible spike in arms deal authorizations at the end of the Bush’s second term. Besides, unlike during the Bush years, Djibouti was not on the list of the top 10 recipients of American weapons in the period between the years 2009 and 2016 (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.).

3 The amount of funding provided to „Sub-Saharan Africa Regional“, „East Africa Regional“ and „West and North Africa Regional“ are not included in the country-level total allocations, although it may include funds for an individual country. This is a result of U.S. government reporting not identifying specific country recipients for aid.

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Security Aid

Table 7- Security aid from the United States to Djibouti (2009-2016) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

Table 8 - Top recipients of security aid from the United States to Africa (2009-2016) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

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Arm sales

Table 9 - Arm sales from the United States to Djibouti (2009-2016) (deliveries only) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

Table 10 - Top recipients of arm sales from the United States to Africa (2009-2016) (deliveries only) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

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6.4 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Africa Relations

6.4.1 Humanitarian and developmental policies Even the Obama’s administration was primarily focusing on trade, aid was not neglected either and during Obama’s first term in office, the amount of aid has experienced modest increases. However, Obama faced similar criticism as Bush. As Kieh pointed out, the top two aid recipients were Ethiopia and Kenya were important U.S. allied in its counterterrorism efforts, which could suggest that the criteria for aid allocation were not based on country’s level of socioeconomic development but on American strategic interests (Kieh 2014, 172). However, the fact remains that Ethiopia was also on the United Nations list of the Least Developed Countries all though out the two Obama administrations and so were 5 other top recipients of the U.S. economic assistance - Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Zam- bia and South Sudan. It therefore seems, that the assistance allocations were motivated by a combination of strategic, economic and humanitarian factors.

Nevertheless, Obama’s developmental and humanitarian initiatives were in general well received by academic literature and public alike. Similar to the Bush administration, health continued being the central plank of the social dimension of the Obama’s policy toward Africa (Kieh 2014, 176). Obama continued with Bush’s acclaimed PEPFAR initiative and malaria and tuberculosis prevention programs. Furthermore, in 2009 the administration launched a Global Health Initiative to increase the coherence of U.S. programs tackling these health challenges (Lundsgaarde 2013). The initiative was designed to foster sustainable and efficient and country-led public health programs that deliver essential health care (Kieh 2014, 176).

President’s remarks that „in the 21st century, disease flows freely across borders and oceans“ and that „we (United States) cannot wall ourselves off from

110 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 111 the world and hope for the best“(Obama 2009) turned out to be especially on point in connection to the Ebola outbreak in 2014. It underscored the emphasis Obama’s administration put on integrated approach to global health and the need for improvement of health systems around the world. As the 2015 National Security Strategy mentioned: „American leadership has proven essential to bringing to bear the international community to contain recent crises while building public health capacity to prevent future ones“(President of the United States 2015, 27).

On the top of the healt initiatives, there were other humanitarian and developmental programs that were well received. Administration’s goals to reduce hunger and improve agricultural capacity were translated into the Feed the Future initiative (FTF). Launched in 2010, FTF invested in food security and agricultural development activities in an effort to reduce hunger, malnutrition, poverty, and food insecurity (Lawson, Schnepf, Cook 2016). Another program that was not tailored specifically for Africa but targeted the most vulnerable African countries was the Global Climate Change Initiative that provided almost a 1 billion USD annually, including funding for clean energy development and forest protection in Africa (Lundsgaarde 2013). Focus on climate change was absent during the Bush administration but it was in line with the Obama administration’s focus on tackling the global warming.

When it comes to the support of democracy, good governance and anticor- ruption efforts, the Obama administration continued working with some of the Bush’s programs. Although, in response to the budgetary pressures imposed by the recession, Obama had to cut funding by several hundred million USD for Bush’s signature initiative – the MCC (Walle 2015, 54), the administration introduced another initiative focused on making governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens. However, the Open Government Partnership that was

111 112 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION launched in 2011, failed to attract most of the African countries and only 11 of them decided to participate (Open Government Partnership 2019).

6.4.2 Trade policies As was mentioned already, Obama’s approach to the African continent shared many features with the one of his predecessor. However, it was the economic aspect of the U.S.-Africa relations that displayed the most visible differences and according to many Africa scholars represented the Obama’s key Africa legacy. Walle believes that the economic diplomacy was the area “where the Obama administration has made a sharp break from its predecessors. Bush’s major initiatives in Africa involved foreign aid, the traditional instrument of U.S. policy there throughout the postcolonial period. Obama, for his part, can be considered the first post-foreign-aid president. Appreciating Africa’s economic potential, his administration has sought to replace the asymmetrical relationship implied by foreign aid with more equal economic partnerships with governments” (Walle 2015, 60). Vines shared this view and stated that “emphasizing the business opportunities that Africa offers could be Barack Obama’s key Africa legacy, equiva- lent to the President’s Emergency Program on AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) or the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) for George W Bush” (Vines 2016).

Indeed, the Obama administration had been repeatedly stressing the importance of free trade and improved investment opportunities. For example, the 2015 National Security Strategy mentioned that: “for decades, American engagement with Africa was defined by aid to help Africans reduce insecurity, famine, and disease. In contrast, the partnerships we are forging today, and will expand in the coming years, aim to build upon the aspirations of Africans. We will increase trade and business ties, generating export-driven growth” (President of the United States 2015, 27).

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The Obama administration introduced various new initiatives in this regard. Noting that “electricity is fundamental to opportunity” in 2013, Obama launched the Power Africa Initiative (Obama 2013). The aim of the initiative was to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa (The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2013) and it marked the entry of the U.S. into the African infrastructure sector at economically significant levels (Hanauer, Morris 2014, 101). Moreover, the Obama administration renewed the AGOA program until 2025 and introduced new Trade Africa initiative. Announced in 2013, Trade Africa was aimed at expanding U.S.–African private and public sector collaboration to increase trade with and within Africa (USAID 2017). The initiative was meant to enhance the Com- merce Department’s “Doing Business in Africa” campaign, concentrating on supporting investments by American businesses and launching U.S. Trade and Invest- ment Centers to facilitate links between investors and exporters from both sides of the Atlantic (Hanauer, Morris 2014, 101-102).

Washington also started to put more emphasis on creating platforms for African and American officials and businesses to meet and network. For that reason, the U.S.-Africa Business Forum (USABF) was held in 2014 for the first time and provided a platform to deepen business and financial ties between the U.S. and Africa (Vines 2016). The first USABF was a part of the 2014 U.S.−Africa Leaders’ Summit - the largest meeting of African heads of state ever organized by an Amer- ican president, which resulted in announcements of billions of dollars of investment in Africa (Vines 2016). According to Kelsey Lilley, it was a very important benchmark to show that America wants to be more than just an aid donor - that it wants to be a partner (Lilley, Interview 2019). Furthermore, in accordance with the National Security Strategy 2015, the U.S worked on „investing in tomorrow’s leaders—the young entrepreneurs, innovators, civic leaders, and public servants who will shape the continent’s future“(President of the United States 2015, 27) by launching the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) in 2010.

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However, all these initiatives incentivizing the trade did not translate into increases in the trade flows between the two regions. On the contrary, the trade visibly decreased. While during Bush’s last fiscal year in office, the exports from the U.S. to Africa amounted to 28,392.7 million USD and imports to 113,495.6 million USD, the figures were gradually decreasing in the course of Obama’s administration and in the fiscal year 2016, the exports amounted only to 22,270.2 million USD and imports dropped to 26,536.9 million USD (United States Census Bureau 2018). However, this dramatic shift could be largely attributed to to increased U.S. shale gas production which has reduced oil imports from the continent (Firsing 2015). Even though the trade balances were lower, the de-emphasis on oil imports from Africa spared the Obama administration some of the criticism that its predecessors had to deal with. As Ambassador Shinn admitted that “for a period of time, oil dictated to some extent the relationship with some African countries” referring primarily to the presidency of George W. Bush (Shinn, Interview 2019).

Moreover, the trade decreases could also be attributed to the fact that Africa continued to cultivate closer economic ties with other external actors - China having the most prominent place among them. In 2009 China surpassed the U.S. and became Africa’s largest trading partner. China’s spending in Africa was dominated by investment and infrastructure construction, while American companies were more active in technology (Hanauer, Morris 2014, 97). Given the differences between their economic objectives in Africa, Obama’s administration similar to the Bush’s, was not describing the Sino-American economic interests in Africa as competing (Hanauer, Morris 2014, 102). When asked about Chinese involvement in Africa in 2013, Obama stated that: “I think it’s a good thing that China and India and Turkey and some of these other countries -- Brazil -- are paying a lot of attention to Africa. This is not a zero-sum game. This is not the

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Cold War. ... We shouldn’t view the participation of a country like China or Bra- zil in Africa as a bad thing. It should be a signal to us, though, that there’s great opportunity there“(Obama 2013). Similar view, asserting that the Chinese and American activities in Africa were not antagonistic, was asserted by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson in 2011 as reported by Ha- nauer and Morris: “we in Washington do not see China as an adversary in Africa, but as a country trying to expand its trade and investment across the continent just as we and others are also doing” (Hanauer, Morris 2014, 103).

Even though China was not described as a competitor, the U.S. officials were expressing critical views of certain Beijing’s practices on the continent. In 2013, Obama stated that: “China’s primary interest is being able to obtain access for natural resources in Africa to feed the manufacturers in export-driven policies of the Chinese economy. And oftentimes that leaves Africa as simply an exporter of raw goods, not a lot of value added -- as a consequence, it does not become the basis for long-term development” (Obama 2013). The official statements retained similar tone thoughout both of the Obama’s terms. When bilancing Obama’s Africa policy in 2017, United States Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Princeton Lyman summarized the U.S. view of the Chinese activies as following: „it is good to have other countries con- tributing to the development of Africa. China has done a lot in terms of infrastructure and other kinds of investments. But China is not interested in good governance and it is not interested in fighting corruption. And it is not necessarily always play- ing by the same set of commercial rules“ (Lyman 2017, 12).

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6.5 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations

6.5.1 Developmental and Humanitarian Assistance When president Obama and president Guelleh met in the White House in 2014, Obama started his speech by emphasizing the strategic importance of Dji- bouti. On the contrary, the first thing president Guelleh mentioned was his gratitude for the U.S. developmental assistance and aid: „Djibouti is very much helped by the President in terms of, as he said himself, health care education -- and especially, in our case, food security“ (Guelleh 2014). Indeed, the U.S. remained a generous donor of economic assistance to Djibouti. Djibouti received in total 77,691,353 USD in economic aid in the period between the years 2009 and 2016 which marked an increase by approximately 20,000,000 USD compared to the previous administration (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.). Nevertheless, similar to the Bush period, Djibouti did not make it to the list of top recipients of economic aid in the period between fiscal years 2009 and 2016.4

Djibouti received the assistance thought various programs. To improve the health of Djiboutian population, USAID supported tuberculosis, polio, HIV/AIDS, and nutrition activities (USAID 2014). By widening the distribution of food aid, U.S. contributed considerably to reducing infant and child deaths related to malnutrition (USAID 2014).

4 The funding provided to „Sub-Saharan Africa Regional“ is not included in the country-level total allocations, although it may include funds for an individual country. This is a result of U.S. government reporting not identifying specific country recipients for aid.

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Table 11 - Top recipients of economic aid from the United States to Africa (2009-2016) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

Moreover, in fiscal year 2012, Djibouti received its first PEPFAR funds that were used for HIV/AIDS prevention. On the top of the health-related programs, aid provided for Djibouti also covered other areas. Mitigating the negative effects of climate change was one of the priority areas for the Obama administration. In order to achieve this goal, Djibouti was granted funding to build the resil- ience of local communities against increased drought conditions, mainly by facili- tating the construction of water reservoirs, and through assisting pastoral communities to diversify their sources of household income (United States Department of State 2014, 19). However, Djibouti did become not a target country of another Obama’s signature program - Feed the Future.However, when it comes to Obama’s primary precondition for successful development according to the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa – strong democratic institutions and good governance – Djibouti lacked U.S. funding to achieve improvements in this regard. It was not a participating country of the Open Government Partnership and it remained a MCC candidate country all throughout Obama’s two presidencies.

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6.5.2 Trade and Economic Relations Incentivizing trade between the U.S. and African countries was Obama’s Africa policy priority and Djibouti benefitted from the many initiatives Obama established in order to achieve that goal. Obama’s signature initiative - Power Africa was launched in Djibouti in 2015 following a direct request from the President Guelleh (USAID 2018). Guelleh was fully aware of its country’s shortcomings in the area given that Djibouti’s electricity costs were double the African average and only half of the population had access to electricity at the time (USAID 2018). Power Africa provided Djibouti with legal advice, technical assistance, and training and helped to establish new geothermal sites (USAID 2018). Moreover, Dji- bouti continued being eligible for AGOA program. However, it remained outside of another Obama’s key initiative - Trade Africa - mostly due to the fact that its geographical focus was on a different part of the continent.

On the top of these programs, the regular meetings between the representatives of the two countries intensified and gained a more structured form. Djibouti participated in 2014 United States-Africa Leaders’ Summit that was accompanied by U.S.-Africa Business Forum. Additionally, Djiboutian youth was offered the opportunity to participate in the Young African Leaders Initiative. The two countries also established a platform for meeting outside of these multilateral forums. In 2014, the governments of Djibouti and the United States launched the U.S.-Djibouti Binational Forum that addressed a wide range of issues including economic development, energy exploration, education and security cooperation (Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti 2015). Furthermore, to strengthen the economic partnership, the two countries pledged to work together to implement a piece of legislation called “Djibouti First” that gave preference to Djiboutian companies to win goods and services contracts at Camp Lemonnier (Embassy of the Republic of Djibouti 2015).

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Indeed, Camp Lemonnier remained an important source of revenue for Dji- bouti and a significant aspect of the U.S-Djibouti economic relations. As was mentioned previously, in 2014, an agreement was reached between the two governments to extend the lease of the base and the rental fees approximately doubled. Furthermore, it was not just the rental fees that increased significantly under Obama’s watch. The trade flows between the countries had risen steeply compared to Bush era standards. In the period between the years 2009 and 2016, the exports were fluctuating between 196, 5 and 132, 5 million USD and the imports had risen from 2, 9 to 28, 0 million USD, which represented an increase compared to the Bush era (U.S. Department of Commerce n.d.). However, it is also important to note that the trade between the countries was on the rise already at the end of the Bush administration.

Despite the visible increase in trade flows and establishment of various new trade initiatives, the levels of trade between the U.S. and Djibouti remained out- shined by its other trade partners. Unsurprisingly, Djibouti was down on the list of the top export or import destinations for the U.S. and the U.S. did not held a prominent position among Djibouti’s trade partners either. Djibouti exported primarily to African countries and to the Middle East, while its imports predominantly came from African countries, the European Union and most notably from China (Observatory of Economic Complexity n.d.).

Djibouti was aware of its persisting reliance on revenue from military and port facilities and for that reason worked on improving its infrastructure that would help to diversify its economy and eventually secure its position as a maritime hub in the Horn of Africa. As was mentioned previously, Djibouti had relied on Chinese funding for the main infrastructure projects. Even though the construction of these projects had an undoubtedly positive effects, the International Monetary Fund debt

119 120 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION sustainability analysis pointed out that those projects contributed to significant increase of Djibouti’s external debt that had risen from 50% in 2014 to 85% in 2016 (International Monetary Fund 2017, 1). At the end of the Obama’s second term, IMF concluded that Djibouti was facing a high risk of debt distress (International Monetary Fund 2017, 1). Even though, the levels of Djibouti’s external debt were alarmingly high at the end of Obama’s second term, and the U.S. officials were concerned by that, Washington started to loudly voice its concerns about this development more visibly after Trump came to power.

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Export 196.5 122.8 129.2 118.8 164.5 110.9 144.7 132.5 Import 2.9 3.0 4.1 11.8 3.9 11.9 35.5 28.0 Balance 193.6 119.8 125.1 107.0 160.5 99.0 109.2 104.5

Table 12 - Trade between the United States and Djibouti (2009-2016) Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

6.6 Conclusion

The expectations that Africa would gain a more prominent place within the U.S. foreign policy framework that followed the elections of Barack Obama remained largely unfulfilled. Most Africa scholars share the view, that the Obama’s Africa policy was for the most part a continuation of the policy direction set by the previous administration. Kieh argues that: “the high expectations that the Obama administration would have changed the direction of the US policy toward Africa remained unfulfilled. This includes the continual use of the realist prism as the framework for the formulation and implementation of US policy toward Africa” (Kieh 2014, 181). Sethi agrees and mentions that: “the steps taken by the Obama administration towards the African continent have been

120 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 121 limited and disappointing in contrast to the initial expectations from him when he took over the White House” (Sethi 2014).

Indeed, there were many similarities between the approaches of the Bush and the Obama administrations. Despite Obama’s intentions to reduce the Ameri- can military engagement overseas, the U.S. military presence on the continent not only continued but even grew under his watch. AFRICOM’s activities have expanded from their humble beginnings and have witnessed an expansion of engagement on the continent through drone operations, covert military actions and the training programs (Sethi 2014). Furthermore, the levels of security assistance have increased and the Pentagon has expanded drone bases in Djibouti and Ethiopia and build a new one in Niger (Walle 2015, 56). Similar to the previous administration, most of these activities were aimed at supporting U.S. counterterrorism goals and stabilization efforts.

Moreover, in some cases, the Obama administration has even gone further than Bush when it comes to the use of force on the continent. For example, the U.S. directly intervened in Libyan civil war, which was unprecedented in the history of the U.S. engagement with the continent (Kieh 2014, 177). Accent on the security aspects of the U.S.-Africa relations that often led to alignment of Wash- ington with repressive and undemocratic regimes was viewed by many Africa scholars, including Tieku, Volman, M'cormack and Kaba as one of the dowsides of Obama’s Africa policy, especially taking into consideration Obama’s promises of emphasis on democracy, good governance and human rights promotion.

Even though certain degree of emphasis on democracy and good governance could be already observable in the Bush’s approach - for example, the MCC prioritized aid to countries with good governance policies - the Obama administra-

121 122 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION tion placed it at the core of its National Security Strategy by stating that: “defend- ing democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest“(President of the Unite States 2015, 19). In Obama’s understanding, democracy and good governance preceded development as he clearly articulated during his first speech on the continent: “development depends on good governance. That is the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That’s the change that can unlock Africa’s potential” (Obama 2009). Despite those statements, Obama’s administration accepted the results of various fraudulent elections, invited some of the Africa’s authoritarians to the White House, or sent its officials on visits of African countries with highly questionable human rights records (Kieh 2014, 174). Such actions were not only in contradiction of the administration’s articulated goals but they also undermined the developmental efforts on the continent as interpreted by the Obama administration.

Nevertheless, Margon argued at the discussion hosted by Brookings that the strong messaging of principles of good governance and human rights in official documents and president’s speeches was in itself an improvement (Livingston 2016). Furthermore, as M'cormack and Kaba pointed out, Obama as a president of African background, could get away with this tough tone on the need of governance reforms and accountability that from anyone else might have appeared to be paternalistic, or neo-colonial. (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 243).

Various authors also argue that the allocations of the economic and developmental assistance continued to be determined primarily by strategic and economic interests. While it is true that the two largest recipients of aid – Ethiopia and Kenya – were both strategically important for the U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the third largest aid recipient – Nigeria – was not only a counterterrorism partner but also one of the most prominent African oil exporters; the fact remains that Ethiopia was also on the United Nations list of the Least Developed Countries and

122 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 123 so were 5 other top recipients of the U.S. economic assistance, which suggests that the assistance allocations were motivated by a combination of strategic, economic and humanitarian factors.

Moreover, many Africa scholars also pointed out Obama’s achievements on the continent, most of them connected to the policies he introduced during his second term. According to M'cormack and Kaba, Obama pushed a more comprehensive agenda in Africa, one that was focusing not just on aid delivery, but on development and strengthening African domestic capacities to “help themselves” (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 244). Along those lines, the Obama administration stressed the need for increased self-reliance, the importance of “trade not aid,” and expressed a desire to help African countries to better integrate into the global economy (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 244).

It was Obama’s trade initiatives that became widely regarded as his key contribution to the U.S.-Africa policy. As Vines pointed out: “Obama recognized that in addition to good governance and aid, Africa can only flourish if there is more trade and investment into the continent. Reorienting US−Africa policy towards trade will be the key Africa legacy of the Obama administration” (Vines 2016). According to Sethi, the emphasis on bolstering economic and commercial engagement could be described as one of the “most significant shifts in the USA’s Africa policy during the Obama administration” (Sethi 2014). Walle stated that: “Obama deserves credit for broadening U.S. engagement with Africa beyond the frames of security and humanitarian relief” (Walle 2015, 60), and that “Obama’s economic diplomacy with the region has been a clear win-win” (Walle 2015, 61).

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However, the results of Obama’s economic policies on the continent seem more complicated than that. Obama’s administration launched multiple new initiatives, such as Trade Africa, Power Africa, U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, Young African Leaders initiative or Feed the Future that were all supposed to boost Af- rica’s competitiveness and trade between the two regions in the long run. Although in theory, Obama’s initiatives seemed promising, in practice they have fallen short of expectations (M'cormack, Kaba 2015, 244) and the U.S.-Africa trade has in fact decreased during Obama’s years in the White House. There therefore seems to be a wide discrepancy between the Obama administration’s promises and intentions and its actual outcomes.

Similar to the Obama’s Africa policy overall, the policy towards Djbouti largely retained the features it had under Bush. The motivation behind American interest in and cooperation with Djibouti continued having primarily security characteristics. Djibouti remained relatively stable, its surroundings continued being quite turbulent and concentrated many of the security threats the U.S seeked to counter in Africa – such as terrorism or piracy. Moreover, Djibouti showed a cooperative attitude during the conflict in Yemen, welcoming many refugees fleeing the violence.

In line with increase of the overall American military presence on the continent, the American base in Djibouti has also undergone a significant expansion. The base enlargement demonstrated that the U.S. viewed Djibouti as a stable and reliable partner. The expansion was also accompanied by a steep raise in rental fees and visible expansion of the assistance, which again led various authors to conclude that the aid provided to Djibouti largely served as a compensation for the U.S. military presence.

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Even though, Djibouti also remained on the United Nations List of the Least Developed Nations during both Obama administrations, and therefore the assistance it received could be interpreted by Washington’s altruistic desire to help the country overcome its challenges and accelerate its developments, it is noteworthy that the amount of resources Djibouti received in security assistance and Camp Lemonnier lease fees exceeded the economic assistance. Moreover, Djibouti kept receiving assistance and attending high ranking visits even despite its stained human rights and good governance records, which was in the opposition to Obama’s goals and helps to demonstrate that Djibouti’s strategic value overshadowed other principles. As Kelsey Lilley pointed out: “lots of analysist were disappointed about the difference between the rhetoric of the Obama administration and its actual actions and Djibouti is good example of that - of continuing to work with countries with questionable human rights records due to the security and stability concerns” (Lilley, Interview 2019).

Nevertheless, in case of Djibouti, unlike the continent as a whole, Obama succeeded in achieving his primary goal in Africa – acceleration of trade. Both exports from and imports to Djibouti increase steeply in the years 2009-2016, to certain extend due to the overall increase in Djibouti’s commercial competitiveness resulting from infrastructure building. Even though the U.S.-Djibouti trade was gradually growing, China was far ahead Washington in this regard. Not only was the trade between the countries growing and reaching higher values compared to the U.S., Beijing also invested in major infrastructural projects and at the end of Obama’s second term, even announced its plan to build a support base on the soil of this small Red Sea nation.

Despite occasional criticism of the Chinese practices on the continent, Obama tended to perceive Chinese and American activities on the continent as a non-zero sum game as described by Ted Moss, former Deputy Assistant Secretary

125 126 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION of State for African Affairs, who according to Okonjo-Iweala stated: “I think in private there is very little U.S. concern about what China is doing in Africa. … The U.S. is not going to build highways and bridges and airports, and that is something Africa needs, so we should be grateful that the Chinese are doing this” (Okonjo- Iweala 2012).

Even though the Obama administration’s views of the Chinese activities in Africa never reached an openly confrontational character, they did evolve as the Chinese engagement on the continent intensified as can be observed when assessing the AFRICOM’s annual Posture Statements. The changes of tone signalled rising concerns in Washington, which were also reflected in the Obama administration’s approach to Chinese activities in Djibouti. As was already mentioned in 2015, a senior U.S. official told The Telegraph that: “there are fears that if Presi- dent Guelleh gets too close to China then he may be tempted to impose restrictions on U.S. access to the base, which would seriously affect the West’s attempts to collect intelligence on Islamic State and al-Qaeda” (Coughlin 2015). Even though, the concerns about the Chinese activities in Djibouti began to be more visibly expressed by the U.S. officials only once Trump took power, as Kelsey Lilley points out: “Obama was certainly concerned as well but the Trump administration has oriented its National Security Strategy globally much more around China as an adversary and countering China everywhere in the world, including Djibouti” (Lilley, Interview 2019).

In conclusion, the place of Djibouti within the broader U.S. approach toward the region and the continent as a whole remained vested in importance of its location, welcoming political climate and internal stability. Similar to the Bush era, the U.S.-Djibouti relations were largely influenced by the regional developments and external factors – such as the terrorist organizations and pirates operating in Djibouti’s neighborhood. In contrast to the Bush administration, the conflict in

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Yemen provided another area for the U.S.-Djibouti cooperation, especially in regard to providing assistance to refugees. Even though the U.S. started to express concerns about the deepening of economic and even military ties between Djibouti and China, Washington’s approach to the Chinese activities in Djibouti gained a visibly more confrontational character only after Trump replaced Obama in the White House.

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7 Trump administration

When Trump was elected president, many Africa analysts predicted that U.S.-Africa policy would recede even further from the attention of the U.S. policymakers (Gass 2019). The fact that he has never visited the continent, he has very rarely mentioned it and when he did, it was often in an impolite way all suggested that he would not be interested in African affairs. In fact, his controversy from 2018, when he allegedly described a number of African countries in a very derogatory way, prompted the African Union to demand an apology and issue a statement saying that: “there is a huge misunderstanding of the African continent and its people by the current Administration“(African Union 2018). Whether or not the president said those offensive offensive remarks remains unverifiable, it seemed that Trump’s Africa policy would be off to a bad start.

It therefore came as a big surprise to many when the Trump administration introduced its Africa strategy already in 2018. As the National Security Advisor John R. Bolton pointed out, finalizing the document during the second year of President Trump’s first term was much earlier than the previous administrations’ releases of their Africa strategies (Bolton 2018). Even though the document was originally meant to be publicly available, it has subsequently been classified, mean- ing that many details of the strategy remain hidden from public view (Gass 2019). Nevertheless, Bolton’s comments and the factsheet published on the White House’s website provide some insight into the Trump administration’s approach to the continent and establish several benchmarks against which the administration’s actions can be assessed (Gass 2019). According to the publicly available information, the Trump administration’s Africa strategy focuses on 3 main areas: advancing trade and commercial ties; countering the threat from radical Islamic terrorism and violent conflict; targeting U.S. assistance funding toward key countries and particular strategic objectives (Trump 2018). These priorities are largely

128 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 129 a reflection of the approaches of the two previous administrations that both emphasised the counterterrorism, assistance and trade policies.

Nevertheless, Trump has also introduced some changes. Even though, as the previous chapters showed the U.S. assistance funding has been influenced by Washington’s strategic priorities even under Bush and Obama, the Trump administration explicitly mentioned its intention to calculate the aid and peacekeeping allocation based on country’s strategic value for the U.S. which challenged the norms of peacekeeping, developmental and humanitarian assistance set by the Obama administration. As Kelsey Lilley points out, the strategy has a more transactional character, prioritizing assistance that produces gains for the U.S. taxpayer (Lilley, Interview 2019).

Moreover, as Bolton mentioned the “strategy reflects the core tenets of President Trump’s foreign policy doctrine” which he proved by devoting a significant part of his speech to the “great power competitors, namely China and Rus- sia” that are in the administrations’ view “rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa” and “deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States” (Bolton 2018). Trump’s Africa strategy therefore truly echoes the 2017 National Security Strategy and the America first approach. It views the continent largely in terms of the U.S. strategic and economic interests and emphasizes the great power competition with less regard to developmental and humanitarian issues.

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7.1 Foreign Policy Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations

7.1.1 Regional Developments Even though, Djibouti’s internal situation remained similar to the one the previous administration dealt with, there were important developments in the country’s immediate surroundings. In September 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement, ending a long conflict between the two countries (Lons 2018). Even though this development was supported by intense UAE and U.S. diplomacy, and Djibouti’s president officially welcomed the agreement in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat by stating that his nation: “welcomed this agreement, which constitutes an appropriate basis for the establishment of a comprehensive and lasting peace between the two countries and turns the page of long hostility between them” (Asharq Al-Awsat 2018), various Africa analysists pointed out that reaching the agreement was not in Djibouti’s interest.

Kelsey Lilley believes that: “for decades, Djibouti was the undisputed winner of Ethiopian-Eritrean hostility and the latter’s international isolation. Assum- ing normalization efforts continue, Ethiopia could soon have the option to use Er- itrea’s ports, which are closer and more convenient than Djibouti. While it is un- likely that Ethiopia will cease using Djiboutian ports altogether, it will have options—and thus will be less inclined to settle for usurious port usage rates” (Lilley 2018). Lons shares this view and provides some statistical data for illustration: “Djibouti, which currently provides Ethiopia’s only access to the sea and whose port manages over 95 percent of Ethiopia’s trade, appears to be a loser in the Er- itrea–Ethiopia rapprochement” (Lons 2018). On the other hand, Ambassador Schermerhorn does not believe that there is reason to be concerned. She thinks that given Ethiopia’s demographics, its demand will likely continue to grow and as long as the country does not fragment, there should be “enough for everybody” (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019).

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Following the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement, Saudi Arabia also hosted the first face-to-face talks between Eritrea and Djibouti after more than a decade of border dispute (Lons 2018). The talks were fruitful and the two countries signed a peace agreement in September 2018. Hailing the rapprochements in the Horn of Africa, two months later, the UN decided to lift the arms embargo that has been imposed on Eritrea since 2009 and contributed to its international isolation (United Nations Security Council 2018).

Saudi mediation was welcomed by Guelleh, who stated in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that Saudi Arabia assumed a vital role to normalize the relations between his country and Eritrea (Asharq Al-Awsat 2018). According to Lons, the role Saudi Arabia and the UAE played in the peace processes showed their increased willingness to appear as regional stabilizing actors and peace-bro- kers, which helps them with their efforts to keep Iran’s influence away from their immediate neighborhood and project power in the region (Lons 2018).

As Guelleh’s statement suggests, Saudi Arabia was successful in winning Djibouti’s sympathies. The close ties between the two countries were demonstrated already a year before when the Djiboutian government signed a military agreement with Saudi Arabia. When asked about the possibility of a Saudi military base in Djibouti in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Djibouti’s defense minister, Ali Bahdon replied: “as you know, in terms of cooperation, there is a military agreement signed between the two sides. This agreement has many aspects, including the Joint Military Commission,” he also noted in that the military base was part of comprehensive cooperation and the “relationship between the two countries is not limited to the base, but it is even greater” (Asharq Al-Awsat 2017). According to Ambassador Shinn, at the end of last year, the talks between Saudi Arabia and Djibouti about establishment of the base were most likely still ongoing (Shinn 2018). Yet, Saudi military plans in Djibouti received much less coverage among

131 132 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION the Africa scholar and the U.S. government those of Beijing. Chinese military presence turned out to be source of great interest and concern in Washington and the chapter devoted to U.S.-Djibouti security relations will cover this topic in more detail.

On the other hand, a close of ally of Saudi Arabia – the UAE – did not manage to maintain such close ties with Djibouti. The relations between these two countries have been tense since 2018 when Djibouti cancelled the contract of the Emirati firm Dubai Ports World (DP World) to operate Djibouti’s main shipping terminal - Doraleh Container Terminal (Lilley 2018). Even though, Djibouti defended the contract cancellation by saying that its national sovereignty was being compromised, this move was viewed with concerns and disapproval in not only in UAE but in Washington as well. Ambassador Schermerhorn noted that the reason behind this decision could be connected to personal disagreements between the President Guelleh and Abdulrahman Boreh, former close associate of the president a person that brought the DP World’s to Djibouti (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). As Ambassador also noted, Abdulrahman Boreh played an important part in Dji- bouti’s development that was accelerated by the DP World’s activites (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). The DP World called the move illegal and started a proceeding before the London Court of International Arbitration (Arteh, Cornwell 2018) and in March this year, the court ordered Djibouti to pay 385 million USD in compensation to the DP World over a breach of contract (Africa News 2019).

Furthermore, there was another nation that did not suceed in deepining its relations with Djibouti. Various media outlets reported that Russia may be another country planning to establish a military bases in Djibouti. However, those claims remain unsubstanciated since Djibouti’s foreign minister Youssouf, stated in an interview with the Financial Times that Russia would not be allowed to build a base

132 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 133 in the country because Djibouti did not want to “become the terrain for a proxy war” (Aglionby, Kerr 2017). Youssouf elaborated by stating that Djibouti’s government believes that: “having a Russian presence in Djibouti was not appropriate because of what was going on in Syria and Ukraine and other places. … We felt that conflicting interests could really rise up here in Djibouti and we said, ‘OK, we don’t want to have two superpowers in this country that could be face to face in a conflicting situation” (Aglionby, Kerr 2017). Nevertheless, some analysts believe that Djibouti has already become a terrain for a proxy conflict between two major powers, even though Russia is not one of them. While such claims remain an exaggeration at the moment, the Trump’s National Security Strategy describes the African continent, including Djibouti as a place of great power competition – with the United States and China being the main competing parties.

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Map 4 - Foreign Military Bases in Djibouti Source: Sameer Patil, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations

7.1.2 Developments in Djibouti and the U.S.-Djibouti Relations Despite the important changes in the country’s external relations, the internal situation in Djibouti remained similar to the situation Obama had been confronted with. When Trump became president, Guelleh had been in office for nearly two decades, making him one of Africa’s longest-serving leaders (CIVICUS 2018). Even though he managed to keep his country at relative peace, his record as a president was stained by various human rights issues such as harsh and life- threatening prison conditions; restrictions on free assembly and association; child labor and abuse and detainment of government critics (United States Department of State 2018, 1).

All those issues remained present both under Obama and Trump, and it was not shocking that the 2018 parliamentary elections were again boycotted by the

134 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 135 opposition. Unsurprisingly, Guelleh’s coalition won an overwhelming majority of the seats which further consolidated his grip over the small nation. Similar to the Obama administration, the U.S. government have not been loudly voicing its disapproval with such practices. When Tillerson visited Djibouti ahead of the elections, he expressed the U.S. commitment to “continuing this very strong partnership with Djibouti” (Tillerson 2018). Even though he mentioned many issues, human rights were not among them. Nevertheless, the U.S. was not completely neglecting these issues. For example, one of the objectives of the 2018 Integrated Country Strategy for Djibouti called for “promoting accountable, transparent, and responsive governance. Our engagement focuses on amplifying the voices of civil society to hold government of Djibouti accountable to these recommendations” (United States Department of State 2018).

7.2 Security Aspects of the U.S – Africa Relations

“After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence region- ally and globally ... they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor“(President of the United States 2017, 27). This was the central premise of the 2017 National Security Strategy that put countering China and Russia at its center, signaling shifting priorities after more than a decade and a half of primal focus on the fight against radical Islam (Ali 2018). As Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis stated in a speech presenting the 2018 National Defense Strategy: „though we will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorists that we are engaged in today, but Great Power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security“ (Mattis 2018). This shift was reflected in American approach to Africa as well.

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The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy was critical of the Chinese activities in Africa in an unprecedented way compared to strategic documents of both Obama and Bush. According to the Trump’s National Security Strat- egy: „China is expanding its economic and military presence in Africa, growing from a small investor in the continent two decades ago into Africa’s largest trading partner today. Some Chinese practices undermine Africa’s long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments“(President of the United States 2017, 52). The document described the threat China posed in Africa largely in connection to its economic policies and many U.S. official elaborated on how Chinese economic activities – such as the so called debt trap diplomacy in which countries end up giving up control of major infrastructure assets when they fund those projects with Chinese loans that they cannot pay back - could be threatening not only African states but also to the United States (Zengerle 2018). Even though the document was largely focusing on Chinese predatory economic policies, the establishment of the first Chinese overseas base also generated great concern among Amer- ican policy makers. Both of these issues were very closely connected to the developments in Djibouti and for that reason will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

However, in accordance with the 2017 National Security Strategy that notes that: „competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict“(President of the United States 2017, 27); the U.S had also shown cooperative attitudes toward China in Africa. Fabricius notes that in 2018, Acting As- sistant Secretary of State for Africa Donald Yamamoto stated that Washington had invited Beijing to a meeting to discuss China’s role in Africa and possible cooperation there between the United States and China (Fabricius 2018). Nevertheless, so far there has been no report of such meeting taking place. However, this was not a

136 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 137 lone display of cooperative attitude toward China in Africa that the Trump administration had shown. When asked about Sino-American security cooperation in Af- rica, General Thomas Waldhauser, commander of AFRICOM, stated that: “the base in Djibouti is roughly a several miles from our base and our commander down there, who we have a two star general who commands the -- the task force for East Africa, routinely has the Chinese on the base as an engagement piece... I think to -- to establish a relationship with them and try to work with them where we can is something -- is a positive we should try to keep doing“(Waldhauser 2017).

Table 23 – U.S. Drone Strikes in Somalia (2007-2018) Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, adapted by BBC

Despite the emphasis on the great power competition, American military activities on the African continent remained centered on counterterrorism activities even under Trump’s watch. Given what seemed to be Trump’s lack of interest in Africa, many Africa analysts expected a reduction American military involvement

137 138 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION on the continent (Griffin 2018). Instead, the first two years of the Trump’s presidency have been characterized by a surge in kinetic engagements, especially in Somalia, where according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism American military carried out at least 46 confirmed airstrikes, following the previous record of 38 in 2017 (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism n.d.)

Moreover, the White House also decided to ease the rules of combat strikes in Somalia. Previously, to carry out a strike in Somalia, Africa Command was required to follow the 2013 standards for counterterrorism strikes away from conventional war zones, which required high-level, interagency vetting of proposed strikes (Savage, Schmitt 2017). They previously also required that the target posed a threat to Americans and that there was a near-certainty that no civilian casualties would occur (Savage, Schmitt 2017). Under the new guidelines, the U.S. military may skip the interagency vetting and people thought to be Al-Shabaab fighters might be targeted based only on that status, without the need to pose a specific threat to Americans (Savage, Schmitt 2017). The administration also emboldened CIA’s powers on the continent, allowing the Agency to conduct drone strikes against suspected terrorists - authorities Obama tried to limit (Gass 2019). These changes reflect the 2018 National Defense Strategy that states that: “the global strategic environment demands increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action“(United States Secretary of Defense 2018, 7).

Griffin also points out that Trump seemed to be abandoning the limited approach of his predecessors and points out that the comment made in the 2017 AFRICOM Posture Statement, “our approach assumes the continuation of limited available resources, both financial and personnel, to accomplish US objectives,” was removed from the 2018 Posture Statement (Griffin 2018). President Trump is indeed accelerating the fight against radical Islam in Africa but this trend was al-

138 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 139 ready visible at the end of Obama’s administration, when the presence of U.S. special operations forces in Africa was boosted and the tempo of airstrikes against suspected terrorists increased (Gass 2019).

In contrast to the two previous administrations that applied a more holistic approach to security relations with Africa, combining support for developmental aid with direct military engagement and military-to-military support, Trump initially appeared to be very skeptical about humanitarian and development efforts and has threatened to shrink funding for them (Gass 2019). As stated by National Security Advisor Bolton during his introduction of the Trump Administration’s Africa Strategy: „the United States will no longer provide indiscriminate assistance across the entire continent, without focus or prioritization. And, we will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful, and unaccountable U.N. peacekeeping missions. Under our new Africa strategy, we will target U.S. funding toward key countries and particular strategic objectives“ (Bolton 2018). Peacekeeping missions were an important component of the Obama’s approach to African conflicts, embodied in his “African solutions to African problems” slogan, so such statements constituted a visible change (Gass 2019). However, the proposals for dras- tic cuts in the budgets of the USAID and UN humanitarian agencies were re- jected by Congress; and appropriations remained at about the same level as during the Obama administration (Campbell 2018).

7.3 Security Aspects of the U.S – Djibouti Relations

In July 2017, when two vessels - an amphibious transport vessel, able to load helicopters, special troops and serve in protective convoys, and a vessel capable of rescue missions and assistance in ship repair – left China with military troops onboard and sailed to Djibouti to help set up the first Chinese overseas naval base,

139 140 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION it marked a watershed moment in the Sino-American military relations in Africa (Pant, Haidar 2017). China formally opened its base, officially referred to as logistics facility in August 2017, on the same day as the People’s Liberation Army celebrated its 90th birthday (Blanchard 2017). The Chinese will reportedly pay 20 million USD a year for the base (Lilley 2018) that is spread across 90 acres and built in conjunction with the Doraleh Multipurpose Port near the capital Djibouti City and only a few miles away from the Camp Lemonnier (Krupakar 2017, 208). China has heavily invested in the construction of the nearby port and in return has obtained permanent docking for its warships (Krupakar 2017, 208).

The construction of the base in Djibouti underscored Chinese growing security profile in Africa and created concerns in Washington that its activities would now be open to Chinese surveillance due to the very close proximity of both camps (Pant, Haidar 2017). Even though the Pentagon spokesperson Dana White claimed that the U.S. expressed no objections to Djibouti’s decision to welcome the Chi- nese troops and stated that such decision is Djibouti’s sovereign right (White 2018), the commander of AFRICOM General Waldhauser expressed some concerns in an interview with Clark in 2017: “we’ve never had a base of, let’s just say a peer competitor, as close as this one happens to be. So there’s a lot of learning going on, a lot of growing going on. Yes, there are some very significant operational security concerns“ (Clark 2017). Waldhauser also mentioned that Washing- ton “has spoken to the Djiboutian government about it and they know what our concerns are” (Clark 2017). He reaffirmed this view in 2018, when he stated that: „our relationship with Djibouti is strong, though we are carefully monitoring Chinese encroachment and emergent military presence ... to ensure U.S. interests are not deterred“(Waldhauser 2018, 12b).

The relatively stable coexistence of the two bases was interrupted in May 2018, when the U.S. accused China of harrasing its pilots at Camp Lemonnier.

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Pentagon spokesperson stated that in at least two and perhaps as many as 10 incidents, U.S. aircraft landing at the base were hit by laser beams coming from a military grade laser, and that they are confident Beijing is behind the incidents (Garamone 2018). Pentagon spokesperson also confirmed that two pilots suffered minor injured and stressed that “they are very serious incidents,” and that „this activity poses a true … threat to our airmen” (Garamone 2018). Following the incident, Washington formally demarched the Chinese government, and requested that the Chinese investigate the incidents (White 2018). The accusations came at a time of heightened tensions, with the two countries clashing over trade and South China Sea. Soon after the official U.S. complaint, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by stating that: „we have explicitly told the US side that their so-called accusations are completely at odds with facts“(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2018). The Chinese have vehemently denied all the accusations and since there was no neutral investigation, possibilities of finding out who was behind the attack are more than limited. Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the Pentagon has not reported any similar attacks after the incident was publicly condemned.

Another piece of evidence hinting that the Chinese support facility might have a clear military purpose were the live fire excercises that the Chinese conducted in Djibouti in the fall of 2018. Excercises included employing armored fighting vehicles and heavy artillery and it was the first time China had conducted exercises on such a scale on foreign soil (Nantulya 2019). Moreover, PLA helicopters conducted a training exercise to evacuate war casualties from a guided missile frigate off Djibouti’s coast, demonstrating China’s ground and aerial capabilities in the region, in addition to its naval assets (Nantulya 2019). Ambassador Shinn noted his surprise about such open demonstrations of the military purpose of the base by stating that: “I though that they would try to do something that would look more like a true support facility rather than a true military facility but it clearly is the

141 142 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION latter not the former. With live fire exercise in the desert, with ground personnel, with helicopter pad with the possibility of housing up to 10 000 personnel” (Shinn, Interview 2019). AFRICOM’s Robin Cromer also noted: “there are concerns that the Chinese are doing a lot more on their base than they made publicly avaliable and that it might have an underground area - there might be weapons stored there, there could be surveillance or it could be part of the Chinese intentions to deny access” (Cromer, Interview 2019).

Djibouti therefore found itself at the forefront of the Sino-American military interaction on the continent. Both China and the U.S. were trying to maintain the best possible relations with their small host nation. Underscoring the country’s strategic importance to the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Mattis visited Djibouti in 2017 (Lilley 2018). According to the article published by the U.S. Department of Defense, Mattis expressed his gratitude to Guelleh for his consistent cooperation by saying: „you'll remember, those who go back to those hectic days after 9/11, this was a country that stepped forward at the end of 2001, early 2002, and said, ‘We're with you,’ and they've been with us every day, and every month and every year since” (Cronk 2017). That same year, Camp Lemonnier hosted a commemo- rative event celebrating the Djibouti First Initiative, which President Guelleh at- tended as the honorary guest (Waldhauser 2018, 12).

Moreover, in 2018, Djibouti received another high level visit from Wash- ington. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited the country during his Africa tour and stressed that: „the United States is committed to continuing this very strong partnership with Djibouti. ... One of our most important areas of cooperation and mutual interest, I think is well understood, is security. And we are grateful to Dji- bouti for hosting thousands of United States troops here in Djibouti. U.S. military presence here does facilitate a very quick response to terrorism and violent extremism that threatens both of our countries“(Tillerson 2018). Tillerson also did

142 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 143 not forget to express his gratitude for Djibouti’s help combating terrorism in So- malia by saying: „in terms of the joint effort to fight terrorism and al-Shabaab in Somalia, this is – obviously, Djibouti has an important role because of the number of troop contributions that they make to AMISOM. And we coordinate with AMISOM, with the African Union, our own efforts in the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia“(Tillerson 2018). Djiboutian government appreciated the high level attention and stated that Tillerson’s visit was “a testament to the excellent relations that exist between Djibouti and the United States;“ and stressed that „Djibouti remains a true, loyal and reliable partner to the United States“ (The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United States 2018).

As Secretary of State Tillerson mentioned, despite the Chinese presence, the U.S.-Djibouti security cooperation continued largely unchanged as the U.S. continued with its counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and Yemen. However, when it comes to counterpiracy activities, the role of the U.S. decreased as it no longer has a heavy presence (DeGilio, Interview 2019). Nevertheless, as both Captain DeGilio and Robin Cromer mentioned, Camp Lemonnier has recently played an important role in distribution of food and humanitarian aid to Mozambique. Robin Cromer especially highlighted Camp Lemonnier’s importance as a logistical hub on a continent that sizable, where “the logistics is everything” (Cromer, Interview 2019).

7.3.1 Security assistance and arms sales America’s „true, loyal and reliable partner” was receiving military aid not quite worthy of that title. In 2017, the amount of military assistance reached one of its lowest points in the course of the entire research period, amounting to approximately 1 million USD but it has risen sharply during the Trump’s second year in office and amounted to 6,038,000 USD, which represents an amount similar to the

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Obama’s yearly average (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.). However, those figures are far from the Bush’s and Obama’s record levels. Additionally, in the course of the fiscal years 2017 and 2018, Djibouti did not make it to the list of top 10 African recipients of security assistance, similar to the Obama period.5

Similar trend can be observed in the area of arms trade. During Trump’s first year in the office, the total value of arms sales from the U.S. to Djibouti amounted to 1,016,653 USD, which marked a decline compared the Obama’s yearly average. Moreover, similar to Obama period, Djibouti did not make it to the list of the top recipients of American weapons (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.). However, the Security Assistance Monitor did not yet include data for the year 2018. Moreover, when it comes to assessment of security assistance and arms trade, comparing Trump to his predecessors remains complicated due to limited time period of the Trump’s presidency since the flows of security assistance and arms trade displayed significant variations though out both Bush and Obama presidencies.

5 The amount of funding provided to „East Africa Regional“ is not included in the country- level total allocations, although it may include funds for an individual country. This is a result of U.S. government reporting not identifying specific country recipients for aid.

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Security Assistance

Table 14 - Security aid from United States to Djibouti (2017-2018) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

Table 15 - Top recipients of security aid from the United States to Africa (2017- 2018) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

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Arm sales

Table 16 - Arm sales from the United States to Djibouti (2017-2018) (deliveries only) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

Table 17 - Top recipients of arm sales between the United States and Africa (2017-2018) (deliveries only) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

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7.4 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Africa Relations

7.4.1 Humanitarian and developmental policies

President Trump, in contrast to his predecessors, showed very little support for the humanitarian and developmental assistance. From the beginning of his term, Trump’s rhetoric was hostile to the idea of funding overseas economic development programs and skeptical of the benefits of soft power (Campbell 2017). As President Trump’s National Security Advisor, Bolton indicated in 2018: „under our new Africa strategy, we will target U.S. funding toward key countries and particular strategic objectives. All U.S. aid on the continent will advance U.S. interests“ (Bolton 2018). The official Trump’s Africa Strategy mirrored this approach despite being a bit more nuanced: „foreign assistance from the United States will concentrate on states that promote democratic ideals, support fiscal transparency, and undertake economic reforms. The Trump Administration does not tolerate ineffective governance and will not spend hard-earned taxpayer dollars to subsidize corrupt leaders and violators of human rights“(Trump 2018). Nevertheless, the Trump administration clearly showed its intention to reduce the amount of resources devoted to foreign assistance.

Not surprisingly, the Trump administration’s Fiscal Year 2019 budget proposed cutting diplomatic and development spending by one-quarter (Signé, Allen 2018), including funding for the diplomacy, international organizations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and funding for development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion (Congressional Research Ser- vice 2019). However, both the House and the Senate approved Fiscal Year 2019 budget that included humanitarian and developmental funding at higher levels than the administration requested, and the amount of resources therefore remained on a level similar to the Obama administration (Congressional Research Service

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2019). This allowed the humanitarian and developmental programs launched by the previous administrations to remain in place. President Obama's signature programs- Power Africa and Feed the Future retained their funding and so did Bush’s key programs - MCC, PEPFAR and AGOA (Cohen 2019).

Additionally, in 2018, Secretary of State Tillerson pledged more than 533 million USD in humanitarian aid for victims of conflicts and drought in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the African countries bordering Lake Chad (Ali, Stewart 2018). Nevertheless, the critics pointed out that Washington’s choice to provide aid to conflict zones, even as it contemplates cuts to aid elsewhere, signalizes militarization of U.S. foreign policy towards the continent (Signé, Allen 2018).

Furthermore, in April this year, Ivanka Trump, the president’s daughter and senior adviser completed a tour of Africa, during which she introduced the Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative (W-GDP). The initiative aims to economically empower 50 million women in developing countries by 2025 by providing assistance with job training, financial support and legal or regulatory reforms (Associated Press 2019). President Trump has already directed USAID to allocate an initial 50 million USD to the fund (Gemechu 2019) and the 2020 budget proposal requests additional 100 million USD that should be accompanied by private investment (Associated Press 2019).

7.4.2 Trade policies At the beginning of last year, hours before his departure for an official tour of Africa, Tillerson called Africa “a significant part of the future;“ due to its „ex- pansive opportunities for economic growth and influence“(Tillerson 2018). It should therefore come as a no surprise, that the countries he visited during his trip had close economic ties to the U.S. Three of the five countries on his list - Nigeria,

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Ethiopia and Kenya - were among the top five markets for American goods in Af- rica and Nigeria and Chad were among the top five Sub-Saharan exporters to the United States (Signé, Allen 2018). President Trump himself stressed Africa’s economic potential at the meeting with African leaders in 2017: „Africa has tremendous business potential. I have so many friends going to your countries, trying to get rich. They’re spending a lot of money. But it does — it has a tremendous business potential and representing huge amounts of different markets“(Trump 2017). Trump’s emphasis on trade rather than aid represents a continuation of Obama’s policies.

The accent on trade was also reflected in Trump’s Africa strategy. The goal of advancing “trade and commercial ties to increase prosperity in the United States and Africa“(Trump 2018) is listed as the first priority surpassing security goals. In order to achieve this goal, the Trump administration introduced some new initiatives. For example, in 2018, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross announced over 1 billion USD in private-sector deals, and signed various memorandums of understanding to promote public-private partnerships (United States Department of Commerce 2018). Additionally, the Trump administration has announced creation of a new initiative called Prosper Africa, which is not yet operational but plans to: „support open markets for American businesses, grow Africa’s middle class, promote youth employment opportunities, and improve the business climate“(Trump 2018). Finally, the Trump administration has also expressed desire to negotiate a free trade agreement with various African countries (Gass 2019).

Finally, in 2018, President Trump signed the Better Utilization of Invest- ments Leading to Development Act (BUILD). The BUILD act proposes creation of the International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) that would support investments in developing countries to drive economic growth, create stability, and improve livelihoods. At first glance, it may seem that the USDFC was

149 150 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION created mainly with the interests of developing countries in mind, however, upon further examination, it appears that the act was influenced by the idea of great power competition. The official description of the reasons behind the creation of the USDFC was to „make America a stronger and more competitive leader on the global development stage, with greater ability to partner with allies on transform- ative projects and provide financially-sound alternatives to state-directed initiatives that can leave developing countries worse off“(Overseas Private Investment Corporation n.d.), which clearly refers to Chinese economic practices on the continent.

In fact, when describing Chinese economic practices in Africa, Bolton even used the exact same wording, mentioning that „China has devoted considerable state-directed and state-supported financing to projects in the region;“ and that „great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa. They are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States“ (Bolton 2018). He went even further by stating that: „the predatory practices pursued by China and Russia pose a significant threat to U.S. national security interests“ (Bolton 2018), which shows that the Trump administration views not only the military but also the economic aspects of the Chinese and Russian engagement on the continent as having security implications for the U.S.

Even when the American officials acknowledge the positive aspects of the Chinese activities on the continent, it tends to be accompanied with condemnation. The criticism of Chinese practices such as providing low-interest loans that lead to high levels of indebtedness, expropriating natural resources and creating very few local job opportunities – undoubtedly intensified under Trump. For example, during his speech at African Union in 2018 Tillerson noted that: “we are not in any

150 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 151 way attempting to keep Chinese investment dollars out of Africa. However, we think it’s important that African countries carefully consider the terms of those investments“(Tillerson 2018). According to Fabricius, while Yamamoto praised China for building infrastructure in a 2008 speech, he did not forget to express concerns about Chinese extraction of Africa’s natural resources without benefiting citizens; and about Beijing’s loans (Fabricius 2018).

Indeed, competing with China seemed to be at the core of the Trump’s economic approach to the continent. However, the Trump administration is operating in a trade environment that is different from that faced by its predecessors and the changes do not seem to favoring the U.S. (Gass 2019). While other powers –such as China Russia, India, Turkey, and the Gulf States - have increased their trade, and investment, this development further undermined U.S. competitiveness (Gass 2019). While the trade between the U.S. and Africa was gradually decreasing all throughout the previous administration, Trump’s push on trade has so far proved to be more successful, with imports reaching 35,821.8 million USD and exports amounting to 25,956.1 million USD in 2018 (United States Census Bureau 2018). That represents an increase in both categories, since during Obama’s last year in office, the exports reached 22,270.2 million USD and imports amounted to 26,536.9 million USD (United States Census Bureau 2018). However, Trump era import figures still represent a significant drop compared to the Bush level imports that amounted to 113,495.6 million USD in 2008 (United States Census Bureau 2018).

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7.5 Economic and Humanitarian Aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti Relations

7.5.1 Developmental and Humanitarian Assistance Trump’s hostile rhetoric on assistance did not translate into cuts of Dji- bouti’s economic aid. In the fiscal year 2017, Djibouti received 15,064,000 USD in economic assistance, which is an amount comparable to Obama’s yearly average and a sum far greater than average donations during Bush’s era (Security Assistance Monitor n.d.). Djibouti kept receiving funding from the Bush and Obama era programs since the Trump administration’s only new initiative W- GDP is not fully operational yet. Nevertheless, similar to both Bush and Obama period, Djibouti did not qualify as one of top African recipients of economic aid in the period between the years 2017 and 2018.6

6 The amount of funding provided to „Sub-Saharan Africa Regional“ is not included in the country-level total allocations, although it may include funds for an individual country. This is a result of U.S. government reporting not identifying specific country recipients for aid

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Table 18 - Top recipients of economic aid from the United States to Africa (2017-2018) Source: Security Assistance Monitor

7.5.2 Trade and Economic Relations Compared to developmental and humanitarian assistance, the U.S.-Djibouti trade and economic relations attracted a lot of media attention. However, it was not the trade aspect that was the source of interest for the media since the trade flows did not experience significant changes. Export levels remained very similar to the Obama administration’s levels and the trend of gradual increase of imports from Djibouti also remained observable. In 2018, the imports from Djibouti reached a new record, amounting to 48, 2 million USD which is a sharp increase from 28 million USD in last year of the Obama administration and from 7 million USD during Bush’s last year in office (United States Census Bureau 2018). Increases in trade between the countries certainly reflected the overall goals of the Trump administration toward Africa. However, similar to the two previous administrations,

153 154 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION the trade flows between the U.S. and Djibouti remained lower than the levels of trade with their other trade partners. Djibouti was far from the top export or import destinations for the U.S. and the U.S. did not held a prominent position among Djibouti’s trade partners either. Djibouti exported primarily to African countries and to the Middle East, while its imports predominantly came from African countries, the European Union and most notably from China (Observatory of Economic Complexity n.d.).

2017 2018 Export 157.5 109.5 Import 34.2 48.2 Balance 123.3 61.3 Table 19 - Trade between the United States and Djibouti (2017-2018 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

In 2018, Djibouti commissioned a Chinese-built free trade zone connected to Djibouti's main ports that aims at diversifying the economy, creating new jobs and luring foreign investment through tax-free incentives and full logistical support (France 24, 2018). On the top that, China has also invested heavily in infrastructure projects in Djibouti as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (Kennard, Einashe 2019). In 2016, China completed the reconstruction of the railway linking Addis Ababa and the capital of Djibouti (Todd 2016). The 750-km line, which follows the route of the long-defunct French colonial railway, reduced travel time between the two cities to 10 hours from the 2 to 3 days it takes by car (Todd 2016). Moreover, the first phase of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port opened in spring 2017. The port adds 9 million metric tons of annual service capacity to Djibouti’s port infrastructure, which more than doubles the amount of cargo it can handle (Downs, Becker, deGategno 2017, iv). Furthermore, another big infrastructural project was completed that year -Djibouti-Ethiopia transnational water supply project. The project

154 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 155 was design to solve the water shortage problems in Djibouti and included the construction of water wells, reservoirs and distribution pipelines (CGCOC 2015). On the top of the finished projects, China and Djibouti are planning to cooperate further. In February this year, Djibouti and Ethiopia signed a deal to build a pipeline to transport Ethiopian gas to an export terminal in Djibouti. Unsurprisingly, the construction contract was awarded to a Chinese company that also signed a separate agreement with Djibouti to build a liquefaction plant and an export terminal near the country’s border with Somalia (Arteh, Maasho 2019).

Such a sharp increase in building costly infrastructural projects proved to be a burden for the small Djiboutian economy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the end of the Obama’s second term, Djibouti was facing a high risk of debt distress, mostly as a consequence of the Chinese infrastructural projects (International Monetary Fund 2017, 1). Even though, many Africa analysts and U.S. officials expressed their concerns that Djibouti might fall into the so called debt-trap, Ambassador Schermerhorn does not believe that such development is likely to occur: “one can only hope that Djibouti will not fall into Sri Lanka trap but I don’t think that is the case because there are a lot of actors and everyone is watching everyone. It’s like a perfect symbiosis” (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019). However, the U.S. officials expressed a lot of concerns especially after Djibouti ended its contract with the DP World to run the Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018. The fears centered on the idea that Djibouti, heavily indebted to Beijing, could cede the port’s operations to a Chinese state-owned enterprise (Zengerle 2018).

General Waldhauser said that “if the Chinese took over that port, then the consequences could be significant,” especially if that would result in “restrictions in our ability to use it” (Waldhauser 2018). Former senior director for Africa at the

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White House Grant Harris stated that: “if Djibouti were to default and relin- quish the port that resupplies the U.S. base, American military capability in Africa and the Middle East could be seriously threatened” (Harris 2018). Senators Marco Rubio and Christopher Coons stressed the possible strategic consequences: “these developments provide major strategic benefits to China and risk undermining the balance of power in East Africa. … China’s control of Doraleh could allow it to impede U.S. military operations in the Horn of Africa” (Coons, Rubio 2018). The fears that such event could result in a shift of balance of power were also voiced at the highest levels by the National Security Advisor Bolton who said that: “should this occur, the balance of power in the Horn of Africa—astride major arteries of maritime trade between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia—would shift in favor of China“ (Bolton 2018).

Nevertheless, until now such scenario failed to materialize. Soon after ter- mination of the DP World port contract, Djibouti published a statement saying that: “the Société de Gestion du Terminal à Conteneurs de Doraleh, an entity created to take over the activities of Doraleh Container Terminal, is a public company whose sole shareholder is the State of Djibouti“(Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations 2018). Moreover, Waldhauser affirmed this information and stated that the Djibouti government assured the U.S. diplo- mats that they have no intention to turn over control to China (Waldhauser 2018). Nevertheless, the mere tone and the quantity of the U.S. officials’ reactions to a possibility of such event underscores the Trump’s administration’s view of China as a main competitor in Africa. Even though, it is still not clear what means does the U.S. plans to use in its strategic competition with China in Africa, it is quite clear that for the time being Djibouti is at the forefront of it. Djibouti for its part, seems to have adopted a pragmatic approach and tries to stay away from the Sino- American disputes. As President Guelleh stated in an interview for the Afrique

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Magazine: “Once again, we are realists. What is important to us is not the strategic play between the big countries. What is important to us is what they can contribute to the development of our country“ (Limam 2018).

7.6 Conclusion

“Africa, I have to say, is a continent of tremendous, tremendous potential. The outlook is bright. And I really want to congratulate you - growing very fast economically and in every other way. You’ve done a terrific job, you’ve had some tremendous obstacles placed in your path, but you have done, really, an absolutely incredible job”

Donald Trump Working Lunch with African Leaders, 2017

When Donald Trump was elected president, the expectations that Africa would be elevated into a higher policy priority were virtually absent from the academic discourse and the assessments of his early engagement with the continent seemed to corroborate those estimations. According to John J. Stremlau who conducted a study of Trump’s Impact on U.S.-Africa Relations, after his first eight months in office; Trump had issued no policies specifically dealing with Africa, made no senior appointments for African affairs, and showed little interest in, knowledge of, or sympathy with Africa or the future of US–Africa relations (Stremlau 2017, 3). However, putting aside the alleged derogatory comments about certain African nations, the lack of proactivity regarding Africa policies in the early stages of presidency was something Trump shared with Bush and Obama alike.

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Even though, Trump often tends to overturn his predecessor's policies, due to Africa’s low ranking on the list of the president’s priorities, the U.S.-Africa relationship has so far been defined by policy continuity. Cohen even referred to that as “a rare bipartisan bright spot among domestic and foreign turmoil” (Cohen 2019), and Gass added that: “in practice, the difference between Trump and Obama on human rights in Africa may prove to be largely rhetorical—subordinate, in both cases, to US security interests on the continent” (Gass 2019). As Gass pointed out, Trump did not advocate for human rights the way Obama used to, however, similar to his predecessors emphasized trade, investment and security cooperation.

Security cooperation indeed seems to be among this administration’s priorities. In 2017, President Trump stressed that: „prosperity depends, above all, on peace. The United States will partner with the countries and organizations, like the African Union, that lead successful efforts to end violence, to prevent the spread of terrorism, and to respond to humanitarian crises“(Trump 2017). Similar to Obama and Bush, the American military activities on the continent concentrated on counterterrorism, stabilization efforts and training, and counterpiracy. Various authors agreed that counterterrorism retained a prominent place among them, for example, according to Signé and Allen: “there is little doubt that combating the spread of extremist groups remains of utmost importance to the United States’ Af- rica policy” (Signé, Allen 2018). Not surprisingly, the overall levels of security assistance for the continent also remained on a level similar to the Obama administration. Such accent on the U.S. military presence on the continent not only represents a continuation of the previous approaches to Africa but also reflects the administration’s National Security Strategy.

The accent on security aspects of the U.S.-Africa can be observable when looking at the itinerary of Tillerson’s visit of Africa. Even though, the official goals

158 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 159 of the visit were described in broad terms, all of the countries Tillerson visited - Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Chad and Nigeria – were very closely connected to American security interests on the continent. Ethiopia and Kenya contribute troops for the AMISOM mission in Somalia that is essential in combating Al-Shabaab (Signé, Allen 2018), Nigeria and Chad are both fighting Boko Haram (Fabricius 2018); and Djibouti not only hosts the sole enduring U.S. military instalation in Africa, it also contributes troops to the AMISOM mission and hosts large number of Yemeni refugees.

Moreover, Trump administration’s decisions regarding the military aspects of the U.S.-Africa relations certainly demonstrate that for now Washington is not planning to reduce its military presence on the continent. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the first two years of the Trump’s presidency have witnessed a surge in kinetic engagements in Africa and reduction of rules surrounding combat strikes. However, as AFRICOM spokesman Colonel Mark Cheadle mentioned in his interview with Fabricius: “there has been no overall change in strategy for Africa towards greater militarization” and pointed out that: “although AFRICOM activity is increasing, this is proportional to the increased threats posed by the various terror groups in Africa – not only Al-Shabaab in the east and the Islamic State in the north, but also al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram in the west, to name just the main ones” (Fabricius, n.d.).

Despite their shared accent on security engagement, there were also differences between the Trump administration’s approach to Africa and those of Bush and Obama. Trump introduced his Africa Strategy earlier in his term than his predecessors. Moreover, even though his Africa strategy accented counterterrorism, development and trade incentives, unlike his predecessors he strongly emphasized the competing interests of China and Russia on the continent. This approach mir- rors the 2017 National Security Strategy and the overall Trump administration’s

159 160 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION view of the national security that stresses the great power competition as the primary focus of U.S. national security.

Even though, Russia rapidly expanded its financial and political influence across the continent, it still accounts for less than 1% of Africa’s total trade (Schneidman, Signé 2018). Chinese engagement, on the other hand, is undoubtedly substantial and the Trump administration, aware of this fact, concentrates its efforts on this competitor. However, the specific means and the strategy the U.S. plans to deploy to compete with China remain unclear and most of the U.S. actions in this regard so far have had a form of public accusations of China’s predatory practices, corruption, resource extraction and debt diplomacy. Despite the lack of clarity about the means the U.S. indents to use to compete with China in Africa, such a strong emphasis on the great power competition can serve as another piece of evidence that Trump’s approach to the continent is heavily influenced by the U.S. security calculations.

Another sign that the Trump’s administration’s main focus in Africa will not be the humanitarian and developmental efforts are the attempts of the administration to cut the funding for these activities. Many Africa scholars expressed their concerns about the possible consequences of such actions, as Signé and Allen pointed out: “cutting back on aid, the United States may weaken its long-term strategic position on the continent” (Signé, Allen 2018). The U.S. Congress clearly shared these concerns and the aid allocations remained basically unchanged.

Nevertheless, when it comes to another non-military aspect of the U.S.- Africa policy, Trump follows the path of his predecessors and stresses the importance of deepening the trade connections and stimulation of private investment. According to Schneidman and Signé, by launching new initiatives such as Prosper

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Africa, the BUILD act or the USDFC, the Trump administration could create an “impact on par with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and initiatives such as PEPFAR, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Young Africa Leaders Ini- tiative, and Power Africa“(Schneidman, Signé 2018). Since the BUILD initiative is rather new, assessing its impacts remains complicated. In fact during Trump’s first two years in office, the trade between the two regions, witnessed small increases compared to the Obama administration but remained below the Bush era standards. Overall, similar to the Obama administration, the strong emphasis on trade and investment remained largely untranslated into increases in trade.

The U.S. relations with Djbouti largely reflect the administration’s approach to the entire continent. While in most aspects, Washington’s approach to Djibouti retained the characteristics it had under Obama and Bush, the most distinguising aspect of Trump’s Africa policy – competition with China – manisfested itself in Djibouti in ways unprecedented anywhere else on the continent and the small Red Sea nation received unparalled levels of attention from the U.S. media and officials.

Strong economic ties between China and Djibouti, Beijing’s extensive investment in Djiboutian infrastructure and most importantly, Djibouti’s high levels of external debt and the establishment of Chinese military base close to the Camp Lemonnier were the texbook examples of Trump’s National Security Strategy description of Chinese threats facing the U.S. in Africa. Moreover, those troubling aspects of the Sino-Djiboutian relations translated themselves into developments that were a source of an actual danger to the U.S. in Djibouti – such as the laser incident or the Djiboutian nationalization of the DP Worlds port and the possibility of its transfer under Chinese control. Even though, the port still is still being operated by Djiboutian government and the laser

161 162 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION incidents stopped following Pentagon’s public accusation of China, Chinese presence in Djibouti is significant and growing.

Compared to Bush, and to a lesser extent to the Obama administrations, during which Djibouti was viewed as an “island of piece”, and served largely as a stable base for U.S. missions and operations in its surroundings where the U.S. interests concentrated, the Trump administration is increasingly viewing the tiny Red Sea nation as a source of security interest in itself.

Nevertheless, in course of the Trump’s years in office, Djibouti also retained the importance as a stable base for U.S. military activities in the region since its neighborhood remained volatile and the American security interests in the region largely unchanged. Washington continued its counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, which has been the top priority since the Bush administration (Griffin 2018). Furthermore, Djibouti continued to show cooperative attitude on the issue of Yemen, welcoming refugees fleeing the violence. However, in those instances, similar to the two previous presidents, Djibouti’s significance was vested in the U.S. interests outside of its borders.

Nonetheless, the U.S.-Djibouti relations continued being influenced by other than security interests. During Trump’s first two years in office, the levels of security assistance reached their lowest points since 2001, while the levels of economic assistance reached a high point in 2017, suprassing any economic contribution provided by the Obama administration and being second only to Bush’s contribution in 2003. Increases in aid contradicted Trump’s dissaproval of aid provisions, which led to speculations that the increased aid may serve as a way to counter Chinese engagement in the country. However, Djibouti also remained on the United Nations list of the Least

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Developed Nations during the Trump administration, and therefore the assistance could be interpreted by Washington’s altruistic desire to help the country overcome its humanitarian challenges and accelerate its development.

Moreover, the trend of intensified trade exchanged between Djibouti and the U.S. that has accelerated under Obama continued and even increased under Trump. While neither Obama’s nor Trump’s efforts to accelerate trade with Africa proved visibly fruitful, they were successful in case of Djibouti. Both exports from and imports to Djibouti continued reaching high levels in the years 2017 and 2018 with imports reaching a new record in 2018. Nevertheless, neither of the countries was among the other ones largest trading partners and Sino-Djiboutian trade statistics remained much more impressive.

In conclusion, the U.S. approach to Djibouti retained many characteristics of the Obama and Bush eras, with the U.S. security interests concentrated primarily in its neighborhood and connected to external factors – such as terrorist organizations, the conflict in Yemen, and the piracy off the Somali coast. Nevertheless, another external actor – China – has risen to prominence. Since the some of the most worrisome Chinese activities in Africa were concentrated in Djibouti, the U.S. interest to Djibouti during the Trump’s administration has become more connected to the developments in the country itself.

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8 Conclusion

The U.S. approach towards Africa has been very consistent over the years. As Kelsey Lilley pointed out: “Africa policy is remarkably bipartisan” (Lilley, Interview 2019), which according to Ambassador Shinn “may be due to the relatively low priority accorded Africa by both Republican and Democratic administrations over the years” (Shinn 2009, 41). Walle shares this view and argues that: “in all administrations, the president and his top advisers are simply disinclined to focus on African issues, which get pushed off the agenda by more pressing crises elsewhere” (Walle 2015, 55).

Indeed, Africa issues have tended to be low on the list of the U.S. foreign policy priorities. From the 1950s until the end of the Cold War, the U.S. relations with Africa were primarily defined by the logic of the East-West rivalry and disappearance of this clear enemy made Africa visibly less relevant to American foreign policy. The immediate post-Cold War era thus represented a low point in the U.S.- Africa relations. It was not until the 1998 embassy bombings and 9/11 terrorist attacks that the U.S. policymakers found another overriding concern that drew their attention to the continent – terrorism. Moreover, the current adminstration increasingly focuses its attention on China’s role in Africa (Ploch 2011, 25).

On the top of the strategic concerns, humanitarian issues have consistently remained an important theme of U.S. policy towards Africa (Shinn 2009, 41). Am- bassador Shinn also mentioned other issues of concern such as: “support for sustainable development, increased trade and investment, democratization and human rights, debt relief and improvement of the environment” but he also pointed out that those gols have been “more episodic” (Shinn 2009, 41) and have not been consistently emphasized by all administrations. Nevertheless, the administrations

164 CONCLUSION 165 in question - Bush, Obama and Trump - all address them in certain way and in general share a similar approach to the continent.

Overall, the U.S. engagement with Africa under President Bush was defined in terms of the increase in U.S. interests in the region as a result of international terrorism, growing dependence on African oil, and humanitarian concerns (Lawson 2007). The humanitarian concerns led to the substantial intensification of foreign aid and establishment of various health initiatives that earned praise for President Bush. On the top of the increased attention to the humanitarian issues, the security concerns on the continent began to gain more attention as well. Bush’s White House viewed the weak and failing states of Africa as a fertile ground for radical Islam, and the concerns about this potential threat led to surge in the U.S. military activities in the region – with CJTF-HOA established in 2002 and AFRI- COM in 2007. Although during Bush’s time in office Africa became more competitive and the Chinese involvement on the continent was becoming more visible, Washington generally did not perceive Beijing’s activities in Africa as a competition or a threat.

When Barack Obama was elected President, many thought it would mark the beginning of a new era in the U.S.-Africa relations and even though he put more emphasis on issues such as good governance, human rights and trade than his predecessor, in terms of substance, the African policies of the two administrations remained fairly similar (Kieh 2014, 176). Despite Obama’s intentions to reduce the American military engagement overseas, the U.S. military presence in Africa not only continued but even grown under his watch - AFRICOM’s activities have expanded and the levels of security assistance have increased. Similar to the previous administration, most of these activities were aimed at supporting U.S. counterterrorism goals and stabilization efforts. Nevertheless, both Ambassador Shinn and Kelsey Lilly believe that Obama’s approach to military

165 166 CONCLUSION involvement on the continent was more nuanced and security aspects were less emphasized in the official documents. It was only in his second term that Obama introduced his key Africa initiatives. Despite the fact that they were mostly aimed at acceleration of trade, they did not produce the desired effect and the U.S. was surpassed by China as the Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009. Although the Obama administration was occasionally critical of certain Chi- nese practices on the continent, similar his predecessor, it generally did not perceive Beijing’s activities in Africa as a competition or a threat.

Since Trump’s presidency is still ongoing, the outcomes of his Africa policy cannot be accurately compared to his predecessors, especially taking into consideration that he is no stranger to rapid policy changes. Nevertheless, when assessing the first years of his presidency, it can be concluded that the current president’s Africa policy retains many of the characteristics of the two previous administrations. Trump’s Africa strategy focuses on advancing trade, targeted U.S. assistance, and on countering radical Islamic terrorism. The last issue seems to be particularly accented since the first two years of the Trump’s presidency witnessed a surge in kinetic engagements in Africa and reduction of rules surrounding combat strikes. As Ambassador Shinn noted giving the military more latitude represents a return to the policy pursued by the Bush administration (Shinn, Interview 2019). Moreover, the current administration also displays some visible differences. In contrast to the previous administrations, it emphasizes great power competition with lesser regard to developmental and humanitarian issues. In line with this thinking, China is perceived as a competitor that is “deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States” (Bolton 2018). Ambassador Shinn points out that such an accent on the great power competition is quite new as it was not part of the Obama or the Bush administration and it is still unclear what it means and how will it be impel- emented (Shinn, Interview 2019).

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The U.S. approach to Djibouti has reflected many of the characteristics of the overall American approach to the continent and in certain aspects, the small country in the Horn even became an important center for the fulfillment of the U.S. interests in the wider region. Largely omitted by the United States throughout the Cold War, the terrorist attacks of September 11 marked a key milestone in the U.S.-Djibouti relations and the small city-state has gained pivotal importance in Washington’s military strategy in Africa and the Persian Gulf region (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 112). The security interests were at the beginning of the intensified U.S.-Djibouti relations and have remained at their core until today. As Peter Woodward has put it, in comparison with the country’s strategic significance “other issues such as economic possibilities and humanitarian concerns seemed less significant, but still far from irrelevant” (Woodward 2006, 9).

The emphasis on security aspects has largely been connected to the country’s strategic location, as Woodward further elaborates from the U.S. perspective “the Horn has been as much as a strategic concern with regard to the Red Sea shipping lanes, as it has been a concern in relation to the rest of Africa” (Woodward 2006, 2). Moreover, Djibouti is surrounded by countries that are either a matter of U.S. security policy concerns such as Somalia and Yemen or by those that are important U.S. counter-terrorism allies, such as Ethiopia and Kenya (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 112). Djibouti therefore offered an excellent location to counter the threats that emerged after 9/11. On the top of the ideal location, Djibouti also pos- sessed another important quality needed for the establishment of a military presence – stable and secure internal environment. As Robin Cromer pointed out: “one of the reasons, we like to be located in Djibouti is the fact that is it a stable country that we have a good relations with” (Cromer, Interview 2019). Compared to its immediate neighborhood, Djibouti enjoyed unparalleled levels of internal stability all throughout the Bush, Obama and the Trump administrations as Djiboutian Min-

167 168 CONCLUSION ister of Foreign Affairs Mahamoud Ali Youssouf stated in an interview for Finan- cial Times: “no pirates, no terrorists, no ambitious countries coming to attack us, a small country” (Aglionby, Kerr 2017).

Those qualities have certainly been appreciated in Washington and Camp Lemonnier holds a special place among the U.S. military bases in Africa - as it remains the only enduring U.S. military installation on the continent. The range of activities the Camp Lemonnier covers, expanded over the years and include various non-military activities and counterterrorism operations, using both troops and drones to eliminate specific targets. According to Sun and Zoubir, the Lemon- nier base has essentially become a facility that serves as a substitute for an African- based headquarters for the AFRICOM (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 112).

As this thesis demonstrates, U.S. foreign policy towards Djibouti from 2001 onwards, has been largely driven by geopolitical considerations: securing the flow of commercial cargo and energy supplies in the Red Sea; maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa by carrying out counterterrorism activities, anti-piracy measures, military trainings and by providing economic assistance and ensuring support for the war in Yemen (Sun, Zoubir 2016, 112). Since the region is very closely interconnected – culturally, economically, historically, and ethnically – the developments in the country’s surroundings and the Djiboutian and the U.S. interests there continued to shape their relations in the course of all three administrations in question. As Robin Cromer points out Djibouti cannot be considered in isolation since the security across the East Africa depends on the developments in and relations among the nations in the region (Cromer, Interview 2019). All the administrations in question had to cope with the regional factors, out of which the conflict in Somalia has been the most pressing and until today remains one of the highest regional priorities (Cromer, Interview 2019). Nevertheless, there were also

168 CONCLUSION 169 dissimilarities between the approaches of these three administrations that often reflected the differences among their overall Africa strategies. This is particularly true when assessing U.S. relations with other foreign actors in Djibouti. As Am- bassador Shinn noted U.S. perception of their activities in Djibouti has reflected of their overall bilateral relations and for that reason, the relations with the European nations retained mostly cooperative character throughout the course of all three administrations, while the relations with China underwent the most visible changes (Shinn, Interview 2019).

The intensified military cooperation that followed the elections of George W. Bush transformed Djibouti into an important component of American counterterrorism efforts on the continent - first in the form of CJTF-HOA and later on in more encompassing form of AFRICOM. As Ambassador Schermerhorn notes the CJTF-HOA’s activities in Djibouti initially revolved around winning “hearts and minds” campaing (Schermerhorn, Interview 2019), which was in line with the overall Bush administration’s perception of the security threats on the continent – that were viewed as closely connected to the issue of underdevelopment. Never- theless, Djibouti itself was not the primary source of the U.S. security concerns in the region, and therefore a large part of the U.S. counterterrorism efforts was concentrated outside the Djiboutain borders. Thus, the relations between the two countries were largely shaped by regional developments and external factors – in course of the Bush administration those consisted mostly of instability, terrorism and piracy in the country’s neighborhood. When it comes to the presence of other foreign state actors in Djibouti, including major powers such as China and France, the Bush administration generally expressed cooperative attitudes.

According to Robin Cromer, during the Obama administration the set of reasons that motivated good relations with Djibouti under Bush remained virtually the same and included security, humanitarian and economic interests (Cromer,

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Interview 2019). The emphasis that Obama placed on the acceleration of trade between the U.S. and Africa bore fruit in Djibouti, however another one of the central premises of his Africa strategy– support of good governance and human rights – seem to have been overshadowed by Djibouti’s strategic importance as the country started to receive higher levels of assistance and kept attending high ranking visits even despite its stained human rights and good governance records. However, as the Ambassador Shinn noted the U.S. has never been entirely consistent on the issue of good governance and there have always been countries, in which the U.S. has a major interest, which means that compromises are made (Shinn, Interview 2019).

In case of Djibouti the major interest is vested in its location that provides a suitable space for hosting the only enduring U.S. military presence on the continent. The U.S. military remained present in Djibouti even under the Obama administration since the American security interests in the area persisted. Similar to the Bush era, those interests were largely located outside the Djiboutian borders – whether those were the terrorist organizations in Djibouti’s neighborhood, the war in Yemen or the pirates off the Somali coast. Moreover, the Chinese presence in Djibouti became more apparent and its character extended from purely economic to military. When the Chinese plans to build a support base became public, it raised concerns in Washington, as Kelsey Lilley mentioned: “Obama was certainly concerned as well but the Trump administration has oriented its National Security Strategy globally much more around China as an adversary and countering China everywhere in the world, including Djibouti” (Lilley, Interview 2019).

Indeed, when Trump took power those concerns began to be repeatedly expressed by the U.S. officials and it is the approach to the Chinese involvement in Djibouti that distinguishes the Trump administration from its predecessors. The high levels of Djiboutian indebteness, opening of the support base and the laser

170 CONCLUSION 171 incident all raised visible concerns in Washington that were articulated by high raking officials. As Robin Cromer pointed out: “the establishment of the Chi- nese base is a big concern and it has caused some problems because we are not sure about the Chinese intentions. Moreover, there were the incidents when lasers have been pointed at the U.S. pilots, which poses a real security risk” (Cromer, Interview 2019). Not surprisingly, the tone of the official U.S. statements about the Chinese presence in Djibouti gained a much more confrontational character. Compared to the Bush, and to a lesser extend to the Obama administration, during which Djibouti served primarily as a stable base for U.S. activities in its surroundings where the U.S. interests had been concentrated, the Trump administration increasingly views the tiny Red Sea nation as a source of security interest in itself.

Nevertheless, when asked whether the increased Chinese involvement in Djibouti has an effect on the U.S.-Djibouti relations, Captain DeGilio responded with resolute: “not at all” (DeGilio, Interview 2019). Indeed, with regard to most aspects of the U.S.-Djibouti relations, Trump’s approach retained the characteristics it had under Obama and Bush. Since the U.S. interests in the wider region have not changed significantly, the relations between the two countries continued being linked to the regional developments and external factors – such as terrorist organizations operating in the region, the war in Yemen and to a lesser extent the pirates off the Somali coast. Moreover, similar to the Obama administration, Trump has continued to advocate for acceleration of trade, which again led to actual intensification of trade exchanges.

It could therefore be concluded that Djibouti has become a laboratory of U.S. strategic interests in Africa – starting as a base for counterterrorism activities and becoming an area of intensified Sino-American interactions and competition. According to the Bloomberg’s reporter Monte Reel, the American ambassador in

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Djibouti often claims that „Djibouti today feels like what Casablanca must have felt like in 1940. All the different nationalities elbowing into each other. All the intrigue” (Reel 2016). Indeed, the proximity of the military bases of the world’s major powers, along with provocative actions and rising tensions, led some authors to the conclusion that the tiny Red Sea nation could become battleground for a future conflict. Politico’s reporter Bruno Maçães went as far as claiming that Dji- bouti is where the “World War III will start” (Maçães 2018). Even though, such predictions seem far-fetched at the moment, Djibouti is undoubtedly becoming a testing ground for coexistence between the U.S. and Chinese militaries in Africa, and for that reason it is certainly a place to keep an eye on.

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