DOCSLIB.ORG

India and the Strategic Salience of the Vanilla Islands

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
India and the Strategic Salience of the Vanilla Islands December 2014 19 January 2021 India and the Strategic Salience of The Vanilla Islands Raj Mittal FDI Associate Key Points To better mould the region’s strategic environment in its favour and as a resident power in the Indian Ocean region , India needs to engage with the island states of the south-western Indian Ocean: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Réunion and Seychelles . Known as the Vanilla Islands, the group abuts maritime chokepoints and busy Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), giving it enhanced strategic importance. For China, the importance of Brazil, South Africa and the rest of Africa as sources of commodities and oil is ris ing and vessels travelling to China transit the chokepoints and SLOCs around the Vanilla Islands. Consequently, those chokepoints and SLOCs gain prominence in India’s strategic calculus. India’s formal entry in the south-west ern Indian Ocean region has been facilitated by France. With France’s support, India joined the francophone Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in March 2020. In a setback to India, however, the newly-elected President of the Seychelles, Rev. Wavel Ramkalawan, indicated that the Seychelles-India agreement to develop a naval base on Assumption Island would not go ahead. India urgently needs to engage with the new government of Seychelles. Summary The group of islands in the south-western Indian Ocean, comprising the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Réunion and Seychelles, is known as the Vanilla Islands; ‘the term Vanilla is used because these countries are known for their export of the flavouring substance, vanilla.’ India perceives the Vanilla Islands to be in its sphere of influence. Vessels carrying commodities and oil from Africa and beyond to China transit the chokepoints and SLOCs around the Vanilla Islands, which makes these nodes and routes pressure points for China. The relationship between Beijing and New Delhi is currently prickly due to China’s activities in the Indian Ocean (IO) and along the Line of Actual Control, their common border in the Himalayas. As the resident IO power, it is in India’s strategic interests to ensure the continuation of the rules-based order in the chokepoints and SLOCs around the Vanilla Islands. Analysis The Vanilla Islands As commentator and analyst C. Raja Mohan has noted: Nothing has diminished India’s geopolitical thinking [more] than the idea of South Asia. The shrinking of India’s regional vision was also reinforced by India’s inward economic orientation and the sundering of historic commercial ties with the maritime neighbours. When he came to power in Page 2 of 8 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi seemed to go by the traditional South Asian framework. He invited all the leaders of the SAARC for his swearing in-ceremony to signal the commitment to putting the neighbourhood first. There was one exception though – it was the invitation to the political leadership of Mauritius to join the swearing-in. The invitation probably reflected Modi’s sensibility to India’s deep diasporic connection with the Indian Ocean island republic. Whatever the intent might have been, it set the stage for visualising a region that transcends South Asia and puts the maritime neighbourhood back into India’s strategic consciousness. Prime Minister Modi’s re-imagining of India’s neighbourhood ensured that its maritime neighbours, including the Vanilla Islands, were no longer below India’s radar. In the Vanilla Islands group, the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles are sovereign nations, while Mayotte and Réunion are départements of metropolitan France. The historical importance of France is the glue that binds these island nations. ‘India has long viewed the Indian Ocean as being in its region of influence. As an extension of that thinking, the island states in the ocean automatically fell under that same influence.’ As far back as 1945, K.M. Panikkar, an Indian strategist, said, ‘that in the west, India’s frontiers extend up to the Cape of Good Hope, Madagascar, Mauritius, Socotra, Aden and the Persian Gulf.’ Keshav Balkrishna Vaidya, an author and exponent of India’s sea power, advocated creating ’a whole ring of Indian naval bases, outside India, spanning the Ocean, to the south at the various island chains, notably the Maldives, Chagos Islands (including Diego Garcia), the Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar.’ India has close naval ties with Mauritius, having donated patrol vessels to that country. As part of its Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) expansion programme, the Indian Navy has also established a radio and radar monitoring station in Madagascar. It is significant that, in 2015, Prime Minister Modi chose Mauritius to put forward his “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (or SAGAR) vision. It seeks to create a climate of trust, transparency and peaceful resolution of maritime issues. To further cement India’s ties to the island states, in 2018, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind visited Madagascar. In 2019, Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu visited the Comoros. In November 2020, Dr S. Jaishankar, India’s Foreign Minister, visited the Seychelles. The minister spoke of ‘the centrality of the Seychelles to India’s vision of SAGAR.’ China’s disquieting presence in the region is the obvious catalyst. The Importance of Islands History demonstrates the importance of islands to maritime nations and of favourable relations with island nations in their maritime sphere. As Baruah observes, ‘… rising nations have [sought to control] strategic islands to project power across … the globe.’ That insight has a more contemporary analogue; as one report notes, ‘China has tipped the balance of power through an island-building campaign.’ ‘The islands afford China bases from which it can intimidate ASEAN states into abandoning their claims or acquiescing to Chinese demands. China’s paramilitary forces and fishing vessels use the island bases as hubs from which to harass and even sink commercial ships from ASEAN countries.’ India’s Maritime Security Strategy emphatically states, ‘India’s primary areas of maritime interest include Page 3 of 8 South-West Indian Ocean, including IOR island nations therein.’ India, however, seeks a climate of trust and transparency in the region. The China Factor ‘The Sino-Indian land border dispute, which manifested in the Galwan Valley clash of June 2020, has caused very strong anti-China sentiments in India. This adversely affected the relationship, including in the maritime domain.’ ‘China is seeking access and control of islands in the IOR to trump its less than favourable maritime geography.’ This has led to an increased Chinese footprint in the IO area, including in the south-west Indian Ocean and is a huge concern for India which considers the IO as its strategic backyard. Most of China’s energy and raw material supplies, however, pass through the IO, which is China’s great vulnerability. In the words of Admiral Arun Prakash, the eighteenth chief of the Indian Navy, ‘The Indian Navy is in “home waters” in the Indian Ocean and well positioned to threaten China’s shipping and hence its economy.’ The French Connection Due to an increasingly aggressive China and continuing uncertainty about the United States’ global commitment, the role of “middle powers” in the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific assumes greater relevance. ‘Burdened by its inherited Anglo-Saxon bias, Delhi could hardly appreciate the pivotal value of France and more broadly that of Europe, in transforming India’s international position.’ ‘In January 2020, the partnership was in evidence at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) when China sought to raise the subject of Kashmir in an informal, closed door session. France, supported by Russia and the US, led the move to block the Chinese initiative.’ ‘France backed India at the UN Security Council discussion on Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, an indication of France’s strategic commitment to India.’ During the 34th India-France Strategic Dialogue in January 2021, ‘the French envoy made it clear that it [France] would support India in the UN Security Council and ensure that Beijing’s move to put India in a dock either on cooked-up charges of terrorism or Kashmir are stymied.’ India kept its side of the bargain when it firmly backed President Macron against the Islamic world’s backlash for his speech, following the beheading of French teacher, Samuel Paty. The rise of China and the loosening of old alliances demand more co-ordinated action from middle powers like India and France. Nowhere are the possibilities greater than in the maritime domain. ‘France has its overseas territories Réunion, Mayotte and New Caledonia in the Indo-Pacific. France has more than 90 per cent of its large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (nine million km²) in the region and maintains a military presence of 7,000 personnel.’ ‘It has more than US$176 billion ($228 billion) in foreign direct investment across the Indo- Pacific.’ Although, through its huge diaspora in Mauritius, India has always maintained a presence in the south-west Indian Ocean, India’s formal entry in the larger region has been facilitated by France. India joined the select group known as the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in March 2020 with France’s support. Set up in 1982, the IOC comprises the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion and the Seychelles. The Commission has China, Malta, the European Union and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie as observers. Page 4 of 8 India’s observer status in the IOC institutionalises a larger engagement in the south-western Indian Ocean. Therefore, France may yet be the greatest enabler for enhancing India’s relations with the Vanilla Islands. In March 2018, India and France signed an agreement for reciprocal logistical support between their respective armed forces and issued a “Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Co-operation in the Indian Ocean Region”.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Download File (Pdf)
    2021 FORUM REPORT COVID-19 in Africa one year on: Impact and Prospects MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION 2021 FORUM REPORT COVID-19 in Africa one year on: Impact and Prospects MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION Foreword by Mo Ibrahim Notwithstanding these measures, on current projections Founder and Chair of the Mo Ibrahim Africa might not be adequately covered before 2023. Foundation (MIF) Vaccinating Africa is an urgent matter of global security and all the generous commitments made by Africa’s partners must now be delivered. Looking ahead - and inevitably there will be future pandemics - Africa needs to significantly enhance its Over a year ago, the emergence and the spread of COVID-19 homegrown vaccine manufacturing capacity. shook the world and changed life as we knew it. Planes were Africa’s progress towards its development agendas was off grounded, borders were closed, cities were shut down and course even before COVID-19 hit and recent events have people were told to stay at home. Other regions were hit created new setbacks for human development. With very earlier and harder, but Africa has not been spared from the limited access to remote learning, Africa’s youth missed out pandemic and its impact. on seven months of schooling. Women and girls especially The 2021 Ibrahim Forum Report provides a comprehensive are facing increased vulnerabilities, including rising gender- analysis of this impact from the perspectives of health, based violence. society, politics, and economics. Informed by the latest data, The strong economic and social impacts of the pandemic it sets out the challenges exposed by the pandemic and the are likely to create new triggers for instability and insecurity.
    [Show full text]
  • History of Djibouti
    History of Djibouti Nomadic herds people have inhabited the territory now belonging to Djibouti for millennia. The Issas and the Afars, the nation’s two major ethnic groups today, lived there when Arab traders introduced Islam to the area in the ninth century AD. Arabs at the port of Adal at Zeila (in modern-day Somalia) controlled the region until Adal’s collapse in 1543.Small Afar sultanates at Obock, Tadjoura, and elsewhere then emerged as the dominant powers. Frenchman Rochet d’Hericourt’s 1839 to 1842 exploration into Shoa marked the beginning of French interest in the region. Hoping to counter British influence on the other side of the Gulf of Aden, the French signed a treaty with the Afar sultan of Obock to establish a port in 1862. This led to the formation of French Somaliland in 1888. The construction of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway from Djibouti City to Ethiopia began in 1897 and finally reached Addis Ababa in 1917. The railroad opened up the interior of French Somaliland, which in1946 was given the status of an overseas French territory. By the 1950s, the Issas (a Somali clan) began to support the movement for the independence and unification of the region’s three Somali-populated colonies: French, British, and Italian Somaliland. In 1960, British and Italian Somaliland were granted independence and united to form the nation of Somalia, but France retained its hold on French Somaliland. When French president Charles de Gaulle visited French Somaliland in August 1966, he was met with two days of protests. The French announced that a referendum on independence would be held but also arrested independence leaders and expelled their supporters.
    [Show full text]
  • Ecosystem Profile Madagascar and Indian
    ECOSYSTEM PROFILE MADAGASCAR AND INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS FINAL VERSION DECEMBER 2014 This version of the Ecosystem Profile, based on the draft approved by the Donor Council of CEPF was finalized in December 2014 to include clearer maps and correct minor errors in Chapter 12 and Annexes Page i Prepared by: Conservation International - Madagascar Under the supervision of: Pierre Carret (CEPF) With technical support from: Moore Center for Science and Oceans - Conservation International Missouri Botanical Garden And support from the Regional Advisory Committee Léon Rajaobelina, Conservation International - Madagascar Richard Hughes, WWF – Western Indian Ocean Edmond Roger, Université d‘Antananarivo, Département de Biologie et Ecologie Végétales Christopher Holmes, WCS – Wildlife Conservation Society Steve Goodman, Vahatra Will Turner, Moore Center for Science and Oceans, Conservation International Ali Mohamed Soilihi, Point focal du FEM, Comores Xavier Luc Duval, Point focal du FEM, Maurice Maurice Loustau-Lalanne, Point focal du FEM, Seychelles Edmée Ralalaharisoa, Point focal du FEM, Madagascar Vikash Tatayah, Mauritian Wildlife Foundation Nirmal Jivan Shah, Nature Seychelles Andry Ralamboson Andriamanga, Alliance Voahary Gasy Idaroussi Hamadi, CNDD- Comores Luc Gigord - Conservatoire botanique du Mascarin, Réunion Claude-Anne Gauthier, Muséum National d‘Histoire Naturelle, Paris Jean-Paul Gaudechoux, Commission de l‘Océan Indien Drafted by the Ecosystem Profiling Team: Pierre Carret (CEPF) Harison Rabarison, Nirhy Rabibisoa, Setra Andriamanaitra,
    [Show full text]
  • Press Release
    Press release 21/04/2021 Club Med officially opens its brand-new ecochic resort Club Med Exclusive Collection in one of most exceptional destinations in the Indian Ocean: the Seychelles. From right to left: Wavel Ramkalawan, President of Seychelles, Henri Giscard d'Estaing, Dominique Mas, Ambassador of France to Seychelles. Henri Giscard d'Estaing, President of Club Med, officially inaugurated today the brand new Club Med Exclusive Collection Resort in the Seychelles in the presence of: - Mr. Wavel Ramkalawan, President of the Republic of Seychelles and his wife - Mr. Ahmed Afif, Vice-President of the Republic of Seychelles - Mr. Sylvestre Radegonde, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Tourism - Mr. Roger Mancienne, Speaker of the National Assembly of Seychelles - Mr. Dominique Mas, Ambassador of France to Seychelles and many elected officials, members of the diplomatic corps, decision makers, partners, investors, personalities and local media who were also able to attend the event. ’’ On this occasion, Sylvestre Radegonde, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of Seychelles, said: The arrival of this prestigious French company in our country also marks the revival of our tourism industry after months of inactivity due to the Covid-19 pandemic which paralyzed the tourism sector, on which our economy depends very largely. The opening of Club Med Seychelles couldn't be more in line with our country's economic calendar. Club Med's international dimension fits in perfectly with the upscale approach you have promoted and which we are reaping the benefits of today with this resort. It is entirely consistent with our destination and the image it enjoys in the global market.
    [Show full text]
  • RECORDS CODIFICATION MANUAL Prepared by the Office Of
    RECORDS CODIFICATION MANUAL Prepared by The Office of Communications and Records Department of State (Adopted January 1, 1950—Revised January 1, 1955) I I CLASSES OF RECORDS Glass 0 Miscellaneous. I Class 1 Administration of the United States Government. Class 2 Protection of Interests (Persons and Property). I Class 3 International Conferences, Congresses, Meetings and Organizations. United Nations. Organization of American States. Multilateral Treaties. I Class 4 International Trade and Commerce. Trade Relations, Treaties, Agreements. Customs Administration. Class 5 International Informational and Educational Relations. Cultural I Affairs and Programs. Class 6 International Political Relations. Other International Relations. I Class 7 Internal Political and National Defense Affairs. Class 8 Internal Economic, Industrial and Social Affairs. 1 Class 9 Other Internal Affairs. Communications, Transportation, Science. - 0 - I Note: - Classes 0 thru 2 - Miscellaneous; Administrative. Classes 3 thru 6 - International relations; relations of one country with another, or of a group of countries with I other countries. Classes 7 thru 9 - Internal affairs; domestic problems, conditions, etc., and only rarely concerns more than one I country or area. ' \ \T^^E^ CLASS 0 MISCELLANEOUS 000 GENERAL. Unclassifiable correspondence. Crsnk letters. Begging letters. Popular comment. Public opinion polls. Matters not pertaining to business of the Department. Requests for interviews with officials of the Department. (Classify subjectively when possible). Requests for names and/or addresses of Foreign Service Officers and personnel. Requests for copies of treaties and other publications. (This number should never be used for communications from important persons, organizations, etc.). 006 Precedent Index. 010 Matters transmitted through facilities of the Department, .1 Telegrams, letters, documents.
    [Show full text]
  • II to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 251 Visits by Prime Minister
    Annexure- II to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 251 Visits by Prime Minister -Nil- Visits by External Affairs Minister S. Countries Period of Details of discussions held and outcome thereof No. visited visit 1 Russia September EAM attended the meeting of Council of SCO Foreign Ministers. 09-10, 2020 Following the meeting, SCO Foreign Ministers adopted an Information Statement. On the sidelines of the SCO meeting, EAM participated in the meeting of Russia-India-China Foreign Ministers. A joint Press Release was issued after the conclusion of Russia-India-China Foreign Ministers Meeting. EAM also held a separate bilateral meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister Mr. Sergey Lavrov. EAM had meetings with the Foreign Ministers of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Issues of bilateral, regional and international importance were discussed. 2 Japan October 06- EAM participated in the Second India-Australia-Japan-USA 07, 2020 Ministerial Meeting on 6 October 2020. He along with the Foreign Ministers called on Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Suga Yoshihide. EAM held separate bilateral meetings with the US Secretary of State and Australian Foreign Minister. EAM participated in the 13th India-Japan Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue. The two ministers reviewed the progress made in the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership and in this context discussed cooperation in various areas, including maritime security, trade and investment, manufacturing and skill development, connectivity and infrastructure, cybersecurity etc. Japan also conveyed its agreement to be the lead partner in the connectivity pillar of the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI), which was announced by PM Modi in November 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region
    SIPRI Background Paper April 2019 THE FOREIGN MILITARY SUMMARY w The Horn of Africa is PRESENCE IN THE HORN OF undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security AFRICA REGION environment. A wide variety of international security actors— from Europe, the United States, neil melvin the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia—are currently operating I. Introduction in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has experienced The Horn of Africa region has experienced a substantial increase in the a proliferation of foreign number and size of foreign military deployments since 2001, especially in the military bases and a build-up of 1 past decade (see annexes 1 and 2 for an overview). A wide range of regional naval forces. The external and international security actors are currently operating in the Horn and the militarization of the Horn poses foreign military installations include land-based facilities (e.g. bases, ports, major questions for the future airstrips, training camps, semi-permanent facilities and logistics hubs) and security and stability of the naval forces on permanent or regular deployment.2 The most visible aspect region. of this presence is the proliferation of military facilities in littoral areas along This SIPRI Background the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.3 However, there has also been a build-up Paper is the first of three papers of naval forces, notably around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the entrance to devoted to the new external the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden. security politics of the Horn of This SIPRI Background Paper maps the foreign military presence in the Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Seychelles Pilot Notes
    DC Sailing Community Seychelles 2021 Flotilla Pilot Notes Adapted from: Admiralty Sailing Directions, South Indian Ocean Pilot, NP39 16th Edition 2020 UK Hydrographic Office Protected by Crown Copyright 2020. DC Sailing Community use only. Not for resale. 1 Observations of the Southern Indian Ocean Piracy and Armed Robbery General information The British Maritime and Coastguard Agency has brought to the attention of shipowners, masters and crews, the risk of acts of piracy on the high seas or armed robbery against ships at anchor, off ports or when underway through the territorial waters of certain coastal states. The UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations) has established a designated Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) covering all the waters of Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean S of Suez and Straits of Hormuz to 10°S and 78°E. The High Risk Area (HRA) is an area within the UKMTO VRA where it is considered there is a higher risk of piracy and within which self-protective measures are most likely to be required. The high risk area is bounded by: ● Parallel 15°N in the Red Sea. ● The territorial waters off the coast of E Africa at latitude 05°S. Then to positions: ○ 10°00.OON 60°00.00E. ○ 00°00.OON 55°00.00E. ○ 14°00.OON 60°00.00E. ● Then a bearing 310° to the territorial waters of the Arabian Peninsula. Note that our sailing grounds within the Inner Seychelles Island Group do not fall within the above boundary coordinates and are not considered at risk from piracy.
    [Show full text]
  • Your Cruise Pearls of the Indian Ocean
    Pearls of the Indian Ocean From 14/02/2021 From Victoria, Mahé Ship: LE BOUGAINVILLE to 23/02/2021 to Nosy Be Embark with PONANT on a brand-new expedition cruise to the “Vanilla Islands”, from the Seychelles to Madagascar. This 10-day itinerary aboard Le Bougainville will be an opportunity to discover little-known places of breathtaking natural beauty, an original fauna and flora, as well as meet the locals. Thanks to the on-board presence of a diving instructor, you will be able to enjoy unforgettable dives in an exceptional underwater environment. From Victoria on the island of Mahé, you will first sailPraslin. to Don’t miss the chance to visit the Vallée de Mai Nature Reserve. There you will find sea coconuts, gigantic endemic fruits with a very evocative shape, nicknamed the “love nut”. Further on, the small islands of Alphonse and Astove will be an opportunity to snorkel and dive among brightly- Transfer + flight Nosy Be/Mauritius coloured sea life. You will then reach the Glorioso Islands, part of the Scattered Islands. This beautiful archipelago with very few inhabitants is home exceptionalto fauna and flora including, in particular, marine turtles. Finally, you will reach Madagascar, the island continent, and disembark in Nosy Be, known for its beautiful old-growth forests where rosewood, camphor and ylang-ylang trees thrive. The encounters with the wildlife described above illustrate possible experiences only and cannot be guaranteed. The information in this document is valid as of 11/08/2020 Pearls of the Indian Ocean YOUR STOPOVERS : VICTORIA, MAHÉ Embarkation 14/02/2021 from 16h00 to 17h00 Departure 14/02/2021 at 22h00 Discover Mahé, the main island of the Seychelles and also the largest of the archipelago, home to the capital, Victoria.
    [Show full text]
  • Moving Forward EU-India Relations. the Significance of the Security
    Moving Forward EU-India Relations The Significance of the Security Dialogues edited by Nicola Casarini, Stefania Benaglia and Sameer Patil Edizioni Nuova Cultura Output of the project “Moving Forward the EU-India Security Dialogue: Traditional and Emerging Issues” led by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in partnership with Gate- way House: Indian Council on Global Relations (GH). The project is part of the EU-India Think Tank Twinning Initiative funded by the European Union. First published 2017 by Edizioni Nuova Cultura for Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Via Angelo Brunetti 9 – I-00186 Rome – Italy www.iai.it and Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations Colaba, Mumbai – 400 005 India Cecil Court, 3rd floor Copyright © 2017 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations (ch. 2-3, 6-7) and Istituto Affari Internazionali (ch. 1, 4-5, 8-9) ISBN: 9788868128531 Cover: by Luca Mozzicarelli Graphic composition: by Luca Mozzicarelli The unauthorized reproduction of this book, even partial, carried out by any means, including photocopying, even for internal or didactic use, is prohibited by copyright. Table of Contents Abstracts .......................................................................................................................................... 9 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 15 1. Maritime Security and Freedom of Navigation from the South China Sea and Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean:
    [Show full text]
  • Abdallahi Ibn Muhammad, 139 Abdelhafid, Sultan of Morocco, 416
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-48382-7 — Learning Empire Erik Grimmer-Solem Index More Information INDEX Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, 139 extension services, 395 Abdelhafid, sultan of Morocco, 416 horticulture, 47 Abdul Hamid II, sultan of the Ottoman Landflucht, 43 Empire, 299 livestock, 43, 55, 72, 229, 523, 564 Abyssinia, 547 maize, 155, 229 acclimatization question. See tropics milling, 70, 240 Achenbach, Heinrich, 80–81 oil seeds, 55 Adams, Henry, 32, 316 peasants, 55–56, 184, 272–73, 275, Adana, 363, 365 427, 429, 433, 559–60 Addams, Jane, 70 reforms of, 429 Addis Ababa, 547 rice, 88, 105, 529 Aden, 87, 139, 245, 546 rubber, 408–9, 412, 414, 416, 421, Adenauer, Konrad, 602 426, 445 Adrianople, 486, 491 rye, 55, 273, 279, 522, 525 Afghanistan, 120, 176, 324 sugar, 55, 78, 155, 204, 380, 385, Africa, German 411–12, 416, 423, 445 See also Cameroon, East Africa; tea, 412 Herero and Nama wars; Maji tobacco, 76, 152, 204, 379–80, Maji rebellion; Southwest 412–14, 416, 423, 445 Africa; Togo wheat, 43, 46–47, 49–50, 53, 55, 59, Agadir Crisis (1911), 376, 406, 416–17, 69, 71, 229, 520, 522, 525, 528, 437, 456–57, 479, 486, 500 561, 579 Agrarian League (Bund der Landwirte), See also colonial science; cotton 469, 471, 473, 477 industry; inner colonization; agriculture rubber industry; sugar industry; barley, 47, 55, 523 tobacco industry cacao, 152, 155 Ahmad bin Abd Allah, Muhammad, 139 coconuts, 218 Alabama, 378 coffee, 145, 152, 155, 204, 273, 412 See also Calhoun Colored School; copra, 218 Tuskegee Institute cotton, 67, 74–75, 151, 158, 204,
    [Show full text]
  • Leaders' Dialogue on Africa COVID-Climate Emergency
    LEADERS’ DIALOGUE ON THE AFRICA COVID-CLIMATE EMERGENCY Agenda Tuesday, 6 April, 2021 – 1 – 3 p.m. (GMT) CONTEXT The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have combined to create compound crises for the world. For Africa, besides fighting the pandemic, this also amplifies the need to rapidly adapt to climate change. Although Africa did relatively well to shield itself from the worst of the health crisis in 2020, the impact of the pandemic on Africa’s development is already clear: the first recession in 25 years, with economic activity expected to have dropped by more than 3% in 2020, and as many as 40 million people falling into extreme poverty. African countries will need a comprehensive support package that drives growth and investments, and reaps the full benefits of healthy and decent jobs to re-start their economies and embark on a low carbon, resilient and inclusive recovery. Improved access to finance, at scale, will be key to simultaneously address urgent development needs including renewable energy access for all and to implement climate action plans. To keep the 1.5°C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement within reach all countries, including the G20 and other major emitters, will need to do their part by setting and translating net zero by mid-century commitments as stipulated in the Paris AGreement into ambitious and credible 2030 tarGets. This will be critical to limit the most extreme impacts of climate change on the African continent and its people. The African Development Bank and the Global Center on Adaptation (GCA) have responded to the urgent call by African leaders for a new and expanded effort to shore up momentum on Africa’s climate adaptation efforts.
    [Show full text]