Introduction
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1 INTRODUCTION China has attracted much attention in the last decades with its perceived rise as a potential successor to the United States as the global hegemon. As history shows us, seldom has there been a great power that rose without going to a major systemic war, like the rise of France and the Napoleonic Wars, or the rise of Germany and World Wars I and II. Because of this, China’s rise is perceived to potentially endanger international peace, too. Since the prevailing perspective is based particularly on Western-centric assumptions, International Relations Theories (IRTs) in these societies also assume that, in its process of ascendancy, China will inevitably clash against its immediate regional neighbors, as well as with other extra-regional great powers1. Besides, China can be said to have an ‘implanted gene’2 as a regional hegemon which comes from its long- ranging history as the central authority in Asia. This memory of past greatness, combined with a deep-seated trauma, which many refer to as the ‘Century of Humiliation’3, could justify a revengeful China, trying to climb back where it ‘rightfully’ belongs. These beliefs are compounded by mixed signals coming out of China over the last decade (namely from the 2008 global financial crisis onwards), that is, ‘incoherence’, or ‘contradiction’4 of its grand strategy: Even though, official pronouncements indicate a peaceful China, committed to its ‘Peaceful Development’5 (PD) grand strategy, yet, often deeds signal its desire to assert its leadership in its periphery and beyond. This contradiction has prompted a number of world politics experts to question whether this is a purposive, strategic ploy on the part of China in order to confuse other international actors6. Another contradiction discussed by international experts concern the abandonment of the ‘Keeping a Low Profile’ strategy7 (KLP), during Deng Xiaoping’s era, and the shift to the recent ‘Striving For Achievement’ (SFA) one – which led many of them 1 See, for example, Mearsheimer, John, University of Chicago, ‘Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully’, CIPS- University of Ottawa, October 17, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXov7MkgPB4 accessed on May 4, 2019; or Allison, Graham, ‘The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?’, The Atlantic, Sep 24, 2015 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/ accessed May 4, 2019 2 Danner, Lucas K., CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY, Contradictory Foreign Policy? Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p.16 3 See, for example, Wang, Zheng, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012 4 See, for example, Danner,2018; Roy, Denny, China’s Grand Strategy in not Absent, Just Contradictory, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 292, Washington, DC: East-West Center, December 3, 2014 https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/china%E2%80%99s-grand-strategy-not-absent-just-contradictory accessed on May 4, 2019; Buzan, Burry, The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 7, Issue 4, June 3, 2014, pp 381–420 https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou032, accessed on May 4, 2019 5 China, State Council of the People’s Republic of, China’s Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, Sep 6, 2011 http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm accessed on May 4, 2019 6 See, for example, Pillsbury, Michael, The Hundred Year Marathon, China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015 7 See, for example, Yan, Xuetong, From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, No. 2, April 22, 2014, pp 153-184 doi: 10.1093/cjip/pou027 2 to believe that the former was merely a ‘calculative strategy’8 during a period of weakness, intended to be followed by an ‘assertive’ strategy in the future. However, a main argument of this paper is that any conclusion about China’s inevitable violent or possible peaceful rise should be drawn from the fact that it is a civilization quite distinct from the mind-sets originating and shaping up on the basis of the Western Judeo-Christian tradition. Thucydides’ driving force of ‘honor’ – which, in China’s case, was seriously dramatized during a Century of Humiliation – has been the fundamental motive in Chinese tradition. This motive is an important factor in trying to explain the ambivalence in China’s behavior ranging from peaceful to assertive. The basic question here is what kind of great power China wants to be: one that claims its place in the international system mainly by assertive means or mainly by consensual, peaceful ones? The paper will examine, whether or not China is still committed to its Peaceful Development and how its recent assertiveness can be explained. Does China intend to behave like the past rising powers and verify what history or prevailing International Relations Theories predict? Or, should its priorities and interests be examined through its own system of values, socio-cultural drivers and history, instead of western-centric assumptions? Is China using its rising power to look backward, seeking revenge for the ‘Century of Humiliation’ and restoration of a Sino-centric system in Asia? Or, look forward, helping create a more pluralistic, just, and harmonious international society as it has promised? The notion of Grand Strategy is at the core of argumentation. Thus, Part I of this paper will present in three chapters, the three main arguments that support a Chinese assertiveness: Chapter 1 will present a summary of Chinese ancient and modern history in order to provide the background to China’s understanding of honor and its historical memory with a special focus on, the so-called, ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1839-1945). Chapter 2 argues that historical record can give an important insight into the future of the international system. As it suggests: rising powers, inevitably, turn out to be assertive in a way that often leads to war. Chapter 3 will discuss the recent debate among international relations theorists about China’s rise, with an emphasis on the Realist School of Thought, which suggests that assertiveness could arise as a result of the ‘normal competition’ in world politics and, thus, ‘China cannot rise peacefully’. Part II will focus on China’s Grand Strategy, in an effort to identify and analyze its intentions. Chapter 4 will introduce China’s specific Peaceful Development Grand Strategy, which will be explained, tracing how it came into existence and what it entails (which are China’s core interests and relevant threats to those interests?). Chapter 5 will go into further analysis on how this strategy has been evolved from a ‘Keeping a Low Profile’ to a more proactive, ‘Striving for Achievement’ one. It will also discuss how this shift was interpreted by the ‘other’ side: as a move based on strategic calculations. In Chapter 6 & 7, the most salient policies (economic-diplomatic-military) of China’s Grand Strategy in the last decade, will be used for analysis: each of these policy-cases 8 Swain, Michael D. & Tellis, Ashley J., Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000 3 will be described in depth, using historical evidence, and they will also be analyzed for convergence with or divergence from PD grand strategy in Chapter 8. The final Conclusions will summarize the findings of the research, presenting additionally some possible alternatives of China’s future behavior. PART I – WHY CHINA CAN BECOME ASSERTIVE CHAPTER 1: A HISTORY OF CHINA Table 1: Chronology of Chinese History Xia Dynasty 2070 BCE 1600 BCE Shang Dynasty 1600 BCE 1046 BCE Zhou Dynasty 1046 BCE 256 BCE Western Zhou 1046 BCE 771 BCE Eastern Zhou 770 BCE 256 BCE Spring and Autumn Period 770 BCE 476 BCE Warring States Period 475 BCE 221 BCE Qin Dynasty 221 BCE 206 BCE Han Dynasty 206 BCE 220 Western Han 206 BCE 24 Eastern Han 25 220 Three Kingdoms era 220 280 Wei Dynasty 220 265 Shu Han Dynasty 221 263 Wu Dynasty 222 280 Western Jin Dynasty 265 316 Eastern Jin Dynasty 317 420 Era of North-South Division 316 589 Sui Dynasty 581 618 Tang Dynasty 618 907 Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms era 907 960 Song Dynasty 960 1127 Northern Song 960 1127 Southern Song 1127 1279 Liao Dynasty 916 1125 Jin Dynasty 1115 1234 Yuan Dynasty (Mongols) 1271 1368 Ming Dynasty 1368 1644 Qing Dynasty (Manchus) 1644 1911 Republic of China 1912 1949 People's Republic of China 1949 to present (Source: Swaine and Tellis, 2000, p.xix-xx) 4 1.1 Ancient China The first Chinese community with a centralized government was the prehistoric Xia Dynasty during which the hereditary system of succession -and thus, the concept or dynasty- was established9. ‘The Mandate of Heaven’ – the right of a dynasty to rule based on ethical justification – is mentioned, for the first time, in relation to the establishment of the Zhou Dynasty10. According to the Book of Documents, one of the earliest Chinese historical resources, the fall of the Shang Dynasty came about because of shortcomings of its last ruler. As a result, the protection of the Mandate of Heaven was taken from him and awarded to the rulers of Zhou who were “paragons of virtue” and “outstanding warriors”11. This was a period of rapid development which was reflected in its intellectual activity. Confucius lived during this period (551-479 BC)12. His teachings were influenced by the fact that he lived in troubled times (one calculation suggests that throughout the Spring and Autumn Period only 38 years were peaceful13) and his belief that, in the early Zhou period, China had experienced a golden age.