Rome Threatens Sardinia in the First Punic
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El Área Superficial De Los Oppida En La Hispania “Céltica”
Complutuin, 6, 1995: 209-233 EL ÁREA SUPERFICIAL DE LOS OPPIDA EN LA HISPANIA “CÉLTICA” Martin Almagro-Gorbea, Antonio E Dávila* RESUWEN.- El análisis del tamaño de unos ¡00 oppida de superficie conocida de la Hispania Céltica propor- ciona datos de indudable interés para conocer su estructura urbanística, socio-política y territoriaL El tama- ño medio es de unas 20 Ha aunque sólo 4 superan las 50 Ha; 14 ocupan de SO a 25 Ha; más deI SO%, entre 2Sy 10 Ha; 24, de lOa SHaymuypocos oppida ocupan menos deS Ha. El análisis de los tamaños permite señalar cuatro zonas, relacionadas con las distintas áreas elno- culturales: 19 el bordemeridional y oriental de la Ateseta, con poblaciones de tipo ibérico, Oretanos y Olca- des; 29 las llanuras sedimentadas ocupadas por Carpetanos y l’acceos cuyos grandes oppida alcanzan hasta 100 Ha; 39 la Hispania húmeda, de Galaicos, Astures, Cántabros, Vascones, etc. • con oppida tardíos y de es- caso tamaño; 49 las áreas marginales de zonas montañosas que no alcanzaron una estructura urbana en la Antigtaedad. ,Ansnucr-An ana¿vsis ofnearly 100 oppida w’iIlr known area in Celtic” Iberia has provided sorne verv in- leresting resulis about ¡ts urban setilemen; and socio-political structure. Tire aver-age area is about 20 Ha. but only 4 are biggerthan SOFIa; 14 are between 50 and 25 Ha; more tIzan 509/o, benveen 25and JO Ha; 24,from JO ro 5 Ifa and only afew are less tIran 5 Ha. This analysis allows to distingnish four cultural areas, related witlr different ethnics groups: 1, tIre sou- thern and eastern border of the Meseta occupied by “Iberian “peoples, as Oretaul and Olcades; 2, tIre Meseta plains where the oppida of tire Carpetaul mrd Vaccel were as large as 100 Ha; 3. -
Historical Background Italy, Due to the Threat There from Throw the Entire Balance Over in the Following the Defeat of Hasdrubal Barca Hannibal
• The numerical superiority they enjoyed with their new mercenaries; • The superior quality of their legions, probably the finest in the Roman army; and, • Overconfidence bred from seven years of campaigning without a serious defeat. Had the Scipios actually faced only 35,000 Carthaginians with over 50,000 legionnaires and mercenaries as they believed, their chances for success would have been good. But Hasdrubal Barca had two additional detachments: 3,000 Numidian cavalry under Masinissa and 7,500 warriors under Indibilis. And Hasdrubal Barca also were unable to obtain more troops from had a trick up his sleeve that was to Historical Background Italy, due to the threat there from throw the entire balance over in the Following the defeat of Hasdrubal Barca Hannibal. Instead, the Scipios hired on a favor of Carthage. at Dertosa (see issue Nr. 4 of C3i for large body of 20,000 Celt-Iberian Dertosa Battle Module) by the Scipio mercenaries. The Celt-Iberians were a While Hasdrubal Barca observed the brothers in 215 BC, Carthage responded mix of those two peoples, found mainly Romans from his position at Amtorgis, by sending reinforcements. Two armies in the wilds of central Spain. They had a he ordered the forces of Hasdrubal were dispatched, one under Hasdrubal's reputation for ferocity and fighting skill. Gisgo, Masinissa and Indibilis to younger brother Mago, and another Both sides confidently planned to take concentrate at Mago Barca's camp under a political rival of the Barca clan, the offensive in 211 BC. near Castulo. Once these forces were Hasdrubal Gisgo. For the next three united, it appears he intended to move years (214-212 BC), the three Publius and Gnaeus Scipio knew that north against the Romans with his Carthaginian armies battled the two Hasdrubal Barca was encamped north combined forces. -
Carthage and Rome; and the Regulations About Them Are Precise
Conditions and Terms of Use PREFACE Copyright © Heritage History 2010 It is difficult to tell the story of Carthage, Some rights reserved because one has to tell it without sympathy, and from the This text was produced and distributed by Heritage History, an standpoint of her enemies. It is a great advantage, on the organization dedicated to the preservation of classical juvenile history other hand, that the materials are of a manageable books, and to the promotion of the works of traditional history authors. amount, and that a fairly complete narrative may be The books which Heritage History republishes are in the public given within a moderate compass. domain and are no longer protected by the original copyright. They may therefore be reproduced within the United States without paying a royalty I have made it a rule to go to the original to the author. authorities. At the same time I have to express my The text and pictures used to produce this version of the work, obligations to several modern works, to the geographical however, are the property of Heritage History and are subject to certain treatises of Heeren, the histories of Grote, Arnold and restrictions. These restrictions are imposed for the purpose of protecting the Mommsen, Mr. Bosworth Smith's admirable Carthage integrity of the work, for preventing plagiarism, and for helping to assure and the Carthaginians, and the learned and exhaustive that compromised versions of the work are not widely disseminated. History of Art in Phoenicia and its Dependencies, by In order to preserve information regarding the origin of this text, a Messieurs Georges Perrot and Charles Chipiez, as copyright by the author, and a Heritage History distribution date are translated and edited by Mr. -
Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength Through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress)
Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress) Richard Jordan August 7, 2014 Abstract Strong states can fight riskier battles in order to signal their strength and con- clude wars. I open with the broad question, why do some battles end wars, while others do not? I argue that Clausewitz' conception of decisive victory does not describe the majority of war-deciding engagements. The larger literature on bar- gaining and war proves equally unhelpful: while it predicts war termination should correlate with its duration (since fighting causes beliefs to converge), empirical tests have failed to corroborate this hypothesis. Focusing on the game theoretic litera- ture, I suggest this failing results from the assumption that generals cannot choose their battlefields. I argue that where and how a general fights conveys information: stronger states can (and will) fight on more difficult ground and for more difficult objectives than weak states. This decision conveys information to an enemy; this additional information increases our ability to predict war termination. In short, strategic risk is a costly signal in war. After developing this logic informally, I develop it further in a formal, game theoretic model of symbolic victory. Finally, I briefly illustrate the model with cases from the Second World War and the Second Punic War. 1 In 1800 Daniel Steibelt, a pianist of some renown, challenged the young Ludwig van Beethoven to an improvisational duel. Confident in his abilities, Steibelt played a quintet of his own composition and then|in an unmistakable insult|improvised on one of Beethoven's own themes. Furious, Beethoven strode to the piano, on his way snatching the cello part of Steibelt's quintet. -
“At the Sight of the City Utterly Perishing Amidst the Flames Scipio Burst Into
Aurelii are one of the three major Human subgroups within western Eramus, and the founders of the mighty (some say “Eternal”) “At the sight of the city utterly perishing Aurelian Empire. They are a sturdy, amidst the flames Scipio burst into tears, conservative group, prone to religious fervor and stood long reflecting on the inevitable and philosophical revelry in equal measure. change which awaits cities, nations, and Adding to this a taste for conquest, and is it dynasties, one and all, as it does every one any wonder the Aurelii spread their of us men. This, he thought, had befallen influence, like a mighty eagle spreading its Ilium, once a powerful city, and the once wings, across the known world? mighty empires of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and that of Macedonia lately so splendid. And unintentionally or purposely he quoted---the words perhaps escaping him Aurelii stand a head shorter than most unconsciously--- other humans, but their tightly packed "The day shall be when holy Troy shall forms hold enough muscle for a man twice fall their height. Their physical endurance is And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam's legendary amongst human and elf alike. folk." Only the Brutum are said to be hardier, And on my asking him boldly (for I had and even then most would place money on been his tutor) what he meant by these the immovable Aurelian. words, he did not name Rome distinctly, but Skin color among the Aurelii is quite was evidently fearing for her, from this sight fluid, running from pale to various shades of the mutability of human affairs. -
The Tyrannies in the Greek Cities of Sicily: 505-466 Bc
THE TYRANNIES IN THE GREEK CITIES OF SICILY: 505-466 BC MICHAEL JOHN GRIFFIN Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Leeds School of Classics September 2005 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I would like to thank the Thomas and Elizabeth Williams Scholarship Fund (Loughor Schools District) for their financial assistance over the course of my studies. Their support has been crucial to my being able to complete this degree course. As for academic support, grateful thanks must go above all to my supervisor at the School of Classics, Dr. Roger Brock, whose vast knowledge has made a massive contribution not only to this thesis, but also towards my own development as an academic. I would also like to thank all other staff, both academic and clerical, during my time in the School of Classics for their help and support. Other individuals I would like to thank are Dr. Liam Dalton, Mr. Adrian Furse and Dr. Eleanor OKell, for all their input and assistance with my thesis throughout my four years in Leeds. Thanks also go to all the other various friends and acquaintances, both in Leeds and elsewhere, in particular the many postgraduate students who have given their support on a personal level as well as academically. -
Fig. 295. Suni, Domus Di Chirisconis. Interno Della Tomba 6. Fig. 296
Fig. 295. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 6. Fig. 296. Suni, domus 10 di Chirisconis. Portello che introduce nella cella D. 268 Fig. 297. Suni, domus 5 di Chirisconis. Particolare del portello che introduce nella cella E. Fig. 298. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello. 269 Fig. 299. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. Fig. 300. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. Fig. 301. Suni, domus 10 di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. 270 Fig. 302. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 5. Fig. 303. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 10. 271 Fig. 304. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 4. Fig. 305. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 5. 272 12 – NURAGHE CHIRISCONIS 12/13 filari, nel quadrante settentrionale, mentre per il resto non è in alcun modo leggibile il pro- filo di pianta che comunque si può ipotizzare di Provincia -Nuoro forma circolare con una circonferenza di circa 36 Comune - Suni metri. Località - Chirisconis o Pedrasenta Sul piano di crollo è visibile un tratto della camera per una altezza di circa 3 metri con7/8 Posizione - IGM Foglio 206 IV NE Sindia filari di pietre di piccole e medie dimensioni 40°19’49” – 3°51’27” disposte a file orizzontali con numerose zeppe di Quota - m 288 s.l.m. rincalzo. Purtroppo, lo stato di notevole rovina del monumento non consente di valutare l’artico- lazione interna dei vani. Il monumento è arroccato su un’altura basal- Nell’area circostante laterizi e ceramiche di tica a meno di 200 metri dalla necropoli ipogeica età romana. -
Alicante's Cultural Guide
Table of Contents Country Profile: Spain ..................................................................................................................................1-6 Country Overview: History, Quick Facts, Government, Educational System…………………..........................................2-4 Alicante Overview: History, Quick Facts, Economy....................................................................................................4-6 Practical Information ...................................................................................................................................6-9 Making Phone Calls .......................................................................................................................................................6 Emergency Numbers .....................................................................................................................................................7 Handling Money...........................................................................................................................................................7-8 Weather........................................................................................................................................................................8-9 Being a North American Abroad .................................................................................................................9-12 Culture Shock..................................................................................................................................................................9 -
The Manipulation of Fear in Julius Caesar's" Bellum Gallicum."
THE MANIPULATION OF FEAR IN JULIUS CAESAR'S BELLUM GALLICUM by Kristin Slonsky Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2008 © Copyright by Kristin Slonsky, 2008 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-43525-0 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-43525-0 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. -
The Fleets of the First Punic War Author(S): W
The Fleets of the First Punic War Author(s): W. W. Tarn Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 27 (1907), pp. 48-60 Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/624404 . Accessed: 24/02/2013 08:32 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Hellenic Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 24 Feb 2013 08:32:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE FLEETS OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. ACCORDINGto Polybius, there took part in the battle of Ecnomus 680 quinqueremes and 290,000 men, i.e. crews 204,000 and troops 86,000; while in the next year, at the battle of the Hermaean promontory, 550 quiuqueremes were engaged. The only figures comparable to these in Roman history, manifest absurdities apart, are those given by Appian for the battle of Naulochus, and perhaps those for Actiumrn. At Naulochus 300 ships of all sizes are said to have been in action on either side, and no doubt Agrippa's fleet, at any rate, did amount to this large number1; while at Actium Octavian may have had anything up to 400.2 But in Octavian's time the population of all Italy may have been 7 to 8 millions 3; the Mediterranean was almost a Roman lake, and its entire resources went to furnish the fleets for the civil wars. -
Quaestiones Onomatologae
929.4 N397q Digitized by tlie Internet Arcliive in 2014 https://archive.org/details/quaestionesonomaOOneum UINIV|R§ITY OF UReANA<$HAMPAlG.M CCASSICS DISSEETATIO INAVGVRALIS QVAM AVCTORITATE ET CONSENSV AMPLISSIMI PHILOSOPHORVM IN ACADEMIA PHILIPPINA MARPVRGENSI ORDINIS AD SVMMOS IN PHILOSOPHIA HONORES RITE CAPESSENDOS SCRIPSIT RVDOLF NEVMANN COLBERGENsfs (BORVSSVS) MARPURGI CATTORUM TYPIS CAROLI GEORGI TYPOGRAPHI ACADEMICI MCMXV Dissertatio ab aniplissimo pbilosoplionim ordiue referente ERNESTO MAASS probata est a. d. lil. ID. DEC. anni hr/nied in Germany Patri optimo THEODORO NEVMANN Colbergensi has studiorum primitias d. d. d. (lie natali sexagesimo sexto a. d. X. Kal. Quint. anni 1914 gratissimus filius Capitiim elenchiis I Nomina Graecorum propria a flnminibus dcrivata 1 Hominum nomina 2 Gentilicia apud IUyrios in Magna Graecia apud Romanos Gallos Hispanos Graecos Thraces Scythas in Asia Minore apud Orientales II 1 Nomina propria a fluviis ducta in Aeneide a fluviis Ita- liae Mag-nae Graeciae Siciliae Galliae Graeciae Asiae Minoris Thraciae Orientis 2 Nomina propria a fluminibus sumpta in SiH Italici Punicis a) Poenorum eorumque auxiliorum a fluviis Africae Asiae Minoris Hispaniae Italiae et Siciliae Susianae Sarmatiae b) Hispanorum a fluviis Hispaniae Asiae Minoris c) Celtarum ab amnibus Gallieis d) Saguntinorum a fluviis Hispaniae Mag-nae Graeciae Aetoliae .Asiae Minoris e) Romanorum a fluviis Galliae Italiae Asiae Minoris . III 1 Graecorum nomina in Aeneide 2 Lyciorum 3 Phrygum Mysorum Lydorum Bithynorum 4 Troianorum a) Graeca b) -
Historical Background
Historical background Carthage and Rome were both emerging superpowers of the Mediterranean. Rome built its power upon the infantry and conscription system. No matter how many defeats the Romans suffered, they were always able to overcome the enemy by recruiting new troops. Carthage’s wealth came from trade and the strength of its navy. Both superpowers had been allies fighting against their common enemy - the mighty Pyrrhus, King of Epir. But it took them only 12 years to be turned into enemies. The casus belli was the Carthaginian attempt to gain control over Sicily. Rome considered this a major threat towards its control over the entire Italian peninsula. he First Punic War lasted 23 years. In 264 BC, the Romans laid laid siege to Saguntum, the Romans objected, making it another ca- T siege to Syracuse and forced this small kingdom to break its al- sus belli. In 218 BC Hannibal raised an army and crossed the Alps, liance with Carthage and become yet another ally of Rome. The Car- defeating Publius Scipio at the Ticinus River. Right after, Hannibal thaginians thought that they could overcome the Romans just as they invaded Italy, achieving his most significant victory in the Battle of did Pyrrhus – by fortifying important cities and keeping their naval Cannae in 216 BC annihilating entire Roman army in the process. superiority. Rome had no navy, thus it was supposed to lose the war in However, Hannibal refrained from besieging the Rome itself and in- the long term anyway. stead decided to cut off the Romans from their allies, who – just as However, in 262 BC the Romans successfully besieged the fortress Capua and Tarentum – begun to switch sides.