DOCSLIB.ORG

Rome Threatens Sardinia in the First Punic

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Rome Threatens Sardinia in the First Punic First Punic War. Rome finally won the long war with a naval victory at the Aegates Islands in 241. In the Peace of Lutatius that ended the war Carthage lost Sicily and had to pay an enormous indemnity, but retained control of Sardinia and Corsica. The Rape of Sardinia The end of the First Punic War brought no relief to Carthage. Hard on the heels of this war came the revolt of the mercenaries, the Truceless War, 240-238 (featured in C3i Nr. 7). While this brutal war raged in Africa, the contagion of rebellion spread to Carthage's mercenary garrison on Sardinia in 239. These soldiers of fortune rose up, and slew their Carthaginian commander Bostar and his officers. In response, Carthage sent an expedition under (another) Hanno to punish the rebels, but his troops deserted and joined the mutineers. The rebels crucified Hanno, then ran rampant over the island, slaying all the Carthaginian settlers. Once the Rome Threatens Sardinia against Corsica and Sardinia .He had euphoria of the initial uprising had in the First Punic War some success against the garrisons, worn off, these mercenaries began to 'The First Punic War began in 264 as a before being driven off by a reinforc - dread retribution from Carthage. So contest between Rome, Syracuse and ing fleet Under H annibal, son of they sent an offer to Rome to surren- Carthage for control of eastern Sicily. Gisgo. In the following year, the der Sardinia to them. Rome defeated Syracuse early on, consul Gaius Sulpicious Palerculus and the war expanded as a clash campaigned with a Roman fleet in The Roman Senate refused the offer. between the Carthaginian and Roman Sardinian waters, defeating Hannibal The senators decided to honor the empires. However, as long as Rome and capturing or destroying all his terms of the Peace of Lutatius, which lacked a fleet, she could threaten only ships. Hannibal was crucified by his expressly forbid taking as an ally any Sicily. Sardinia, and Africa, were safe own officers for his repeated failures. ally of the other power. Meanwhile, behind the patrols of the Another Punic Fleet under Hanno on Sardinia the mutinous mercenaries Carthaginian navy. Punic raids were arrived to restore the situation, and turned on the local populace. Their launched from Sardinia against the the Romans departed. Italian coast, while the Punic navy depredations at length drove the native tribes to rise up and attack brought support to beleaguered cities As the long war dragged on, Roman them. The mercenaries were expelled on the Sicilian coast. Within the interest in Sardinia waned. The from the island in 238, and Sardinia Roman Senate, the realization came immediate objective of ending naval was briefly independent. Carthage, that this war could never be won raids on Italy had been accomplished. as soon as the rebel mercenaries in unless Carthage was challenged at Rome turned to a more direct Africa had been suppressed, began sea. So, in 260 Rome built her first strategy of invading Africa. When preparing an expedition to battle fleet, and with ingenious this effort was foiled by disaster on re-conquer the island. boarding ramps (the corvus) defeated land (the Battle of the Bagradas the Punic navy at Mvlae. featured in SPQR) and sea (256-55), In Rome, however, there was a Rome reverted to a strategy of change of heart. The senate reversed In 259 the consul Lucius Cornelius attrition on Sicily. Sardinia was itself and proclaimed the annexation Scipio led the first Roman expedition never again threatened during the of Sardinia and Corsica, in flagrant Finding the administration of Punic War Sardinia was a province disregard of the Treaty of Lutatius. overseas provinces a burden on the barely pacified. A generation of When Carthage complained, Rome limited officers of the Roman govern- Roman commanders and legionnaires threatened war and increased the ment, the number of praetors was had their chief battle experience from indemnity Carthage had to pay to expanded from two to four in 227. campaigns on this island. keep the peace. This aggression The first praetor of Sardinia in that became known as the Rape of Sardinia. year was Gains Flaminius, destined The Second Punic War Rome may have gained a valuable to meet his end at Hannibal's hands Sardinia did not figure prominently province, but she also earned the by Lake Trasimene. In 225 the consul in the opening campaigns of the undying hatred of Hamilcar Barca Gaius Atilius Regulus was dispatched Second Punic War. The island was and his sons (Hannibal, Hasdrubal with his arm' to quell another held for Rome only by a garrison of and Mago), a matter of no small uprising on Sardinia. His colleague, allied troops, probably no more than consequence. Lucius Anielius Papus remained in 5,000 men. Hannibal's surprise Italy to guard against an expected crossing of the Alps, and his first The Roman Province Celtic invasion. Atilius Regulus major victory at Trebbia, convinced Victory in the First Punic War suppressed the Sardinian revolt and the Romans that this war would be brought Rome her first two overseas returned to Italy in tine to take part neither easy nor short. The Roman provinces, Sicily and Sardinia. The in the Battle of Telamon (featured in senators knew that Carthage would highly civilized island of Sicily C3i Nr. 6). On the eve of the Second attempt to regain Sardinia at the first became a profitable and peaceful opportunity. Therefore, early in 217 possession. Wild, untamed Sardinia the praetor Aulus Cornelius was another story. Carthage had Mammula was sent to reinforce the never conquered the entire island, island's garrison with Legion V, a content with coastal enclaves and full-strength double legion with some diplomatic, commercial and cultural 1),000 foot and 800 horse. Cornelius domination of the island. Roman Mammula maintained a tenuous ways were different. A series of control of Sardinia over the next two expeditions were sent to the island to years, as Hannibal's continuing string pacify it completely. Both consuls of victories over Rome excited the fought on the island in 238, and after anti-Roman passions of the native a brief interlude consular armies were tribes. The praetor had to exact ever dispatched every year for five years, increasing taxes and tribute from his from 235 -231. The first of these province to support the war, which expeditions was led by the consul contributed greatly to the rising Titus Manlius Torquatus, of whom discontent. more will be heard anon. The council in Carthage also took more direct action to break Sardinia away from Rome's grasp. A general, legions completely destroyed so far in Carthaginian horse. There was also Hanno, infiltrated onto the island as the war. The senate had reluctantly available a force of 13,850 Iberian an agent provocateur, to foment concluded in early 216 that no infantry and 1,200 cavalry from the rebellion. Hanno soon made conl additional forces could be raised, and Thersitae, Mastiani, Oretes and 111011 cause with Hallipsicora, tile that the Litani ambush must go un - Olcades tribes. ']'his unit had been leading Sardinian chieftain, to avenged for now. It was in this posted to Africa in 218 by Hannibal, prepare a massive island -wide situation that Cornelius Mammula in keeping with his policy of defend- insurrection. Cornelius Mammlula, made his plea for reinforcements. ing Spain with African troops and however, was a wary and circum - Despite their many difficulties, the Africa with Iberians. Probably about spect govern or. Even after the Battle senate ordered a levy to be raised. six thousand of these Iberian foot, of Cannae, when much of southern Somehow, the urban praetor, Quintus with supporting cavalry were Italy rebelled, Hanno and Fulvius Flaccus, managed to scrape assigned to the Sardinia bound army. Hampsicora bided their time. They up a reinforced Roman legion, the This Iberian contingent was by now awaited a more favorable moment to XIV. Its strength was 5,000 foot and well drilled, after three years of raise the cry of 'freedom from Rome!'. 400 horse. It was most likely com garrison duty in Africa. posed of teen-agers, old men and The opportunity they sought came those earlier rejected as unfit for The Commanders soon enough. At the end of 216, the service. But Legion XIV would have So both Carthage and Rome prepared propraetor Cornelius Mammula was to do. expeditions for Sardinia in the spring recalled to Rome, pending the arrival of 215. But these armies needed of his successor. The praetor Quintus Hanno's message met an entirely commanders, and this posed a Mucius Scaevola arrived early in 215, different response in Carthage, The problem for both empires. The and immediately came down with a way had been paved by Mago Barca's Roman Senate habitually turned to serious, incapacitating illness. mission to the council following experienced consulares (former Cannae in the autumn of 216. Mago consuls) to lead her armies in Cornelius Mammula, alarmed by the had poured a bushel basket of gold emergencies of this nature, however, turn of events, hurried back to Rome rings cut from the fingers of dead few were available. Fives consulares to make his report. Leaderless, the Roman nobles and knights onto the had already been slain in the first Roman garrison was unable to react council chamber floor. Mago's three years of this war: Gaius as Hanno and Hampsicora now request for 20,000 infantry and 4,000 Flaminius (Trasimene); Lucius unleashed the long simmering cavalry was readily approved. When Aemilius Paullus, Marcus Minucius rebellion. The insurrection quickly Hanno s emergency dispatch arrived, and Gnaeus Servilius Geminus spread across the island.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • El Área Superficial De Los Oppida En La Hispania “Céltica”
    Complutuin, 6, 1995: 209-233 EL ÁREA SUPERFICIAL DE LOS OPPIDA EN LA HISPANIA “CÉLTICA” Martin Almagro-Gorbea, Antonio E Dávila* RESUWEN.- El análisis del tamaño de unos ¡00 oppida de superficie conocida de la Hispania Céltica propor- ciona datos de indudable interés para conocer su estructura urbanística, socio-política y territoriaL El tama- ño medio es de unas 20 Ha aunque sólo 4 superan las 50 Ha; 14 ocupan de SO a 25 Ha; más deI SO%, entre 2Sy 10 Ha; 24, de lOa SHaymuypocos oppida ocupan menos deS Ha. El análisis de los tamaños permite señalar cuatro zonas, relacionadas con las distintas áreas elno- culturales: 19 el bordemeridional y oriental de la Ateseta, con poblaciones de tipo ibérico, Oretanos y Olca- des; 29 las llanuras sedimentadas ocupadas por Carpetanos y l’acceos cuyos grandes oppida alcanzan hasta 100 Ha; 39 la Hispania húmeda, de Galaicos, Astures, Cántabros, Vascones, etc. • con oppida tardíos y de es- caso tamaño; 49 las áreas marginales de zonas montañosas que no alcanzaron una estructura urbana en la Antigtaedad. ,Ansnucr-An ana¿vsis ofnearly 100 oppida w’iIlr known area in Celtic” Iberia has provided sorne verv in- leresting resulis about ¡ts urban setilemen; and socio-political structure. Tire aver-age area is about 20 Ha. but only 4 are biggerthan SOFIa; 14 are between 50 and 25 Ha; more tIzan 509/o, benveen 25and JO Ha; 24,from JO ro 5 Ifa and only afew are less tIran 5 Ha. This analysis allows to distingnish four cultural areas, related witlr different ethnics groups: 1, tIre sou- thern and eastern border of the Meseta occupied by “Iberian “peoples, as Oretaul and Olcades; 2, tIre Meseta plains where the oppida of tire Carpetaul mrd Vaccel were as large as 100 Ha; 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Historical Background Italy, Due to the Threat There from Throw the Entire Balance Over in the Following the Defeat of Hasdrubal Barca Hannibal
    • The numerical superiority they enjoyed with their new mercenaries; • The superior quality of their legions, probably the finest in the Roman army; and, • Overconfidence bred from seven years of campaigning without a serious defeat. Had the Scipios actually faced only 35,000 Carthaginians with over 50,000 legionnaires and mercenaries as they believed, their chances for success would have been good. But Hasdrubal Barca had two additional detachments: 3,000 Numidian cavalry under Masinissa and 7,500 warriors under Indibilis. And Hasdrubal Barca also were unable to obtain more troops from had a trick up his sleeve that was to Historical Background Italy, due to the threat there from throw the entire balance over in the Following the defeat of Hasdrubal Barca Hannibal. Instead, the Scipios hired on a favor of Carthage. at Dertosa (see issue Nr. 4 of C3i for large body of 20,000 Celt-Iberian Dertosa Battle Module) by the Scipio mercenaries. The Celt-Iberians were a While Hasdrubal Barca observed the brothers in 215 BC, Carthage responded mix of those two peoples, found mainly Romans from his position at Amtorgis, by sending reinforcements. Two armies in the wilds of central Spain. They had a he ordered the forces of Hasdrubal were dispatched, one under Hasdrubal's reputation for ferocity and fighting skill. Gisgo, Masinissa and Indibilis to younger brother Mago, and another Both sides confidently planned to take concentrate at Mago Barca's camp under a political rival of the Barca clan, the offensive in 211 BC. near Castulo. Once these forces were Hasdrubal Gisgo. For the next three united, it appears he intended to move years (214-212 BC), the three Publius and Gnaeus Scipio knew that north against the Romans with his Carthaginian armies battled the two Hasdrubal Barca was encamped north combined forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Carthage and Rome; and the Regulations About Them Are Precise
    Conditions and Terms of Use PREFACE Copyright © Heritage History 2010 It is difficult to tell the story of Carthage, Some rights reserved because one has to tell it without sympathy, and from the This text was produced and distributed by Heritage History, an standpoint of her enemies. It is a great advantage, on the organization dedicated to the preservation of classical juvenile history other hand, that the materials are of a manageable books, and to the promotion of the works of traditional history authors. amount, and that a fairly complete narrative may be The books which Heritage History republishes are in the public given within a moderate compass. domain and are no longer protected by the original copyright. They may therefore be reproduced within the United States without paying a royalty I have made it a rule to go to the original to the author. authorities. At the same time I have to express my The text and pictures used to produce this version of the work, obligations to several modern works, to the geographical however, are the property of Heritage History and are subject to certain treatises of Heeren, the histories of Grote, Arnold and restrictions. These restrictions are imposed for the purpose of protecting the Mommsen, Mr. Bosworth Smith's admirable Carthage integrity of the work, for preventing plagiarism, and for helping to assure and the Carthaginians, and the learned and exhaustive that compromised versions of the work are not widely disseminated. History of Art in Phoenicia and its Dependencies, by In order to preserve information regarding the origin of this text, a Messieurs Georges Perrot and Charles Chipiez, as copyright by the author, and a Heritage History distribution date are translated and edited by Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength Through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress)
    Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress) Richard Jordan August 7, 2014 Abstract Strong states can fight riskier battles in order to signal their strength and con- clude wars. I open with the broad question, why do some battles end wars, while others do not? I argue that Clausewitz' conception of decisive victory does not describe the majority of war-deciding engagements. The larger literature on bar- gaining and war proves equally unhelpful: while it predicts war termination should correlate with its duration (since fighting causes beliefs to converge), empirical tests have failed to corroborate this hypothesis. Focusing on the game theoretic litera- ture, I suggest this failing results from the assumption that generals cannot choose their battlefields. I argue that where and how a general fights conveys information: stronger states can (and will) fight on more difficult ground and for more difficult objectives than weak states. This decision conveys information to an enemy; this additional information increases our ability to predict war termination. In short, strategic risk is a costly signal in war. After developing this logic informally, I develop it further in a formal, game theoretic model of symbolic victory. Finally, I briefly illustrate the model with cases from the Second World War and the Second Punic War. 1 In 1800 Daniel Steibelt, a pianist of some renown, challenged the young Ludwig van Beethoven to an improvisational duel. Confident in his abilities, Steibelt played a quintet of his own composition and then|in an unmistakable insult|improvised on one of Beethoven's own themes. Furious, Beethoven strode to the piano, on his way snatching the cello part of Steibelt's quintet.
    [Show full text]
  • “At the Sight of the City Utterly Perishing Amidst the Flames Scipio Burst Into
    Aurelii are one of the three major Human subgroups within western Eramus, and the founders of the mighty (some say “Eternal”) “At the sight of the city utterly perishing Aurelian Empire. They are a sturdy, amidst the flames Scipio burst into tears, conservative group, prone to religious fervor and stood long reflecting on the inevitable and philosophical revelry in equal measure. change which awaits cities, nations, and Adding to this a taste for conquest, and is it dynasties, one and all, as it does every one any wonder the Aurelii spread their of us men. This, he thought, had befallen influence, like a mighty eagle spreading its Ilium, once a powerful city, and the once wings, across the known world? mighty empires of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and that of Macedonia lately so splendid. And unintentionally or purposely he quoted---the words perhaps escaping him Aurelii stand a head shorter than most unconsciously--- other humans, but their tightly packed "The day shall be when holy Troy shall forms hold enough muscle for a man twice fall their height. Their physical endurance is And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam's legendary amongst human and elf alike. folk." Only the Brutum are said to be hardier, And on my asking him boldly (for I had and even then most would place money on been his tutor) what he meant by these the immovable Aurelian. words, he did not name Rome distinctly, but Skin color among the Aurelii is quite was evidently fearing for her, from this sight fluid, running from pale to various shades of the mutability of human affairs.
    [Show full text]
  • The Tyrannies in the Greek Cities of Sicily: 505-466 Bc
    THE TYRANNIES IN THE GREEK CITIES OF SICILY: 505-466 BC MICHAEL JOHN GRIFFIN Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Leeds School of Classics September 2005 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I would like to thank the Thomas and Elizabeth Williams Scholarship Fund (Loughor Schools District) for their financial assistance over the course of my studies. Their support has been crucial to my being able to complete this degree course. As for academic support, grateful thanks must go above all to my supervisor at the School of Classics, Dr. Roger Brock, whose vast knowledge has made a massive contribution not only to this thesis, but also towards my own development as an academic. I would also like to thank all other staff, both academic and clerical, during my time in the School of Classics for their help and support. Other individuals I would like to thank are Dr. Liam Dalton, Mr. Adrian Furse and Dr. Eleanor OKell, for all their input and assistance with my thesis throughout my four years in Leeds. Thanks also go to all the other various friends and acquaintances, both in Leeds and elsewhere, in particular the many postgraduate students who have given their support on a personal level as well as academically.
    [Show full text]
  • Fig. 295. Suni, Domus Di Chirisconis. Interno Della Tomba 6. Fig. 296
    Fig. 295. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 6. Fig. 296. Suni, domus 10 di Chirisconis. Portello che introduce nella cella D. 268 Fig. 297. Suni, domus 5 di Chirisconis. Particolare del portello che introduce nella cella E. Fig. 298. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello. 269 Fig. 299. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. Fig. 300. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. Fig. 301. Suni, domus 10 di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. 270 Fig. 302. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 5. Fig. 303. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 10. 271 Fig. 304. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 4. Fig. 305. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 5. 272 12 – NURAGHE CHIRISCONIS 12/13 filari, nel quadrante settentrionale, mentre per il resto non è in alcun modo leggibile il pro- filo di pianta che comunque si può ipotizzare di Provincia -Nuoro forma circolare con una circonferenza di circa 36 Comune - Suni metri. Località - Chirisconis o Pedrasenta Sul piano di crollo è visibile un tratto della camera per una altezza di circa 3 metri con7/8 Posizione - IGM Foglio 206 IV NE Sindia filari di pietre di piccole e medie dimensioni 40°19’49” – 3°51’27” disposte a file orizzontali con numerose zeppe di Quota - m 288 s.l.m. rincalzo. Purtroppo, lo stato di notevole rovina del monumento non consente di valutare l’artico- lazione interna dei vani. Il monumento è arroccato su un’altura basal- Nell’area circostante laterizi e ceramiche di tica a meno di 200 metri dalla necropoli ipogeica età romana.
    [Show full text]
  • Alicante's Cultural Guide
    Table of Contents Country Profile: Spain ..................................................................................................................................1-6 Country Overview: History, Quick Facts, Government, Educational System…………………..........................................2-4 Alicante Overview: History, Quick Facts, Economy....................................................................................................4-6 Practical Information ...................................................................................................................................6-9 Making Phone Calls .......................................................................................................................................................6 Emergency Numbers .....................................................................................................................................................7 Handling Money...........................................................................................................................................................7-8 Weather........................................................................................................................................................................8-9 Being a North American Abroad .................................................................................................................9-12 Culture Shock..................................................................................................................................................................9
    [Show full text]
  • The Manipulation of Fear in Julius Caesar's" Bellum Gallicum."
    THE MANIPULATION OF FEAR IN JULIUS CAESAR'S BELLUM GALLICUM by Kristin Slonsky Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2008 © Copyright by Kristin Slonsky, 2008 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-43525-0 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-43525-0 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Fleets of the First Punic War Author(S): W
    The Fleets of the First Punic War Author(s): W. W. Tarn Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 27 (1907), pp. 48-60 Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/624404 . Accessed: 24/02/2013 08:32 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Hellenic Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 24 Feb 2013 08:32:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE FLEETS OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. ACCORDINGto Polybius, there took part in the battle of Ecnomus 680 quinqueremes and 290,000 men, i.e. crews 204,000 and troops 86,000; while in the next year, at the battle of the Hermaean promontory, 550 quiuqueremes were engaged. The only figures comparable to these in Roman history, manifest absurdities apart, are those given by Appian for the battle of Naulochus, and perhaps those for Actiumrn. At Naulochus 300 ships of all sizes are said to have been in action on either side, and no doubt Agrippa's fleet, at any rate, did amount to this large number1; while at Actium Octavian may have had anything up to 400.2 But in Octavian's time the population of all Italy may have been 7 to 8 millions 3; the Mediterranean was almost a Roman lake, and its entire resources went to furnish the fleets for the civil wars.
    [Show full text]
  • Quaestiones Onomatologae
    929.4 N397q Digitized by tlie Internet Arcliive in 2014 https://archive.org/details/quaestionesonomaOOneum UINIV|R§ITY OF UReANA<$HAMPAlG.M CCASSICS DISSEETATIO INAVGVRALIS QVAM AVCTORITATE ET CONSENSV AMPLISSIMI PHILOSOPHORVM IN ACADEMIA PHILIPPINA MARPVRGENSI ORDINIS AD SVMMOS IN PHILOSOPHIA HONORES RITE CAPESSENDOS SCRIPSIT RVDOLF NEVMANN COLBERGENsfs (BORVSSVS) MARPURGI CATTORUM TYPIS CAROLI GEORGI TYPOGRAPHI ACADEMICI MCMXV Dissertatio ab aniplissimo pbilosoplionim ordiue referente ERNESTO MAASS probata est a. d. lil. ID. DEC. anni hr/nied in Germany Patri optimo THEODORO NEVMANN Colbergensi has studiorum primitias d. d. d. (lie natali sexagesimo sexto a. d. X. Kal. Quint. anni 1914 gratissimus filius Capitiim elenchiis I Nomina Graecorum propria a flnminibus dcrivata 1 Hominum nomina 2 Gentilicia apud IUyrios in Magna Graecia apud Romanos Gallos Hispanos Graecos Thraces Scythas in Asia Minore apud Orientales II 1 Nomina propria a fluviis ducta in Aeneide a fluviis Ita- liae Mag-nae Graeciae Siciliae Galliae Graeciae Asiae Minoris Thraciae Orientis 2 Nomina propria a fluminibus sumpta in SiH Italici Punicis a) Poenorum eorumque auxiliorum a fluviis Africae Asiae Minoris Hispaniae Italiae et Siciliae Susianae Sarmatiae b) Hispanorum a fluviis Hispaniae Asiae Minoris c) Celtarum ab amnibus Gallieis d) Saguntinorum a fluviis Hispaniae Mag-nae Graeciae Aetoliae .Asiae Minoris e) Romanorum a fluviis Galliae Italiae Asiae Minoris . III 1 Graecorum nomina in Aeneide 2 Lyciorum 3 Phrygum Mysorum Lydorum Bithynorum 4 Troianorum a) Graeca b)
    [Show full text]
  • Historical Background
    Historical background Carthage and Rome were both emerging superpowers of the Mediterranean. Rome built its power upon the infantry and conscription system. No matter how many defeats the Romans suffered, they were always able to overcome the enemy by recruiting new troops. Carthage’s wealth came from trade and the strength of its navy. Both superpowers had been allies fighting against their common enemy - the mighty Pyrrhus, King of Epir. But it took them only 12 years to be turned into enemies. The casus belli was the Carthaginian attempt to gain control over Sicily. Rome considered this a major threat towards its control over the entire Italian peninsula. he First Punic War lasted 23 years. In 264 BC, the Romans laid laid siege to Saguntum, the Romans objected, making it another ca- T siege to Syracuse and forced this small kingdom to break its al- sus belli. In 218 BC Hannibal raised an army and crossed the Alps, liance with Carthage and become yet another ally of Rome. The Car- defeating Publius Scipio at the Ticinus River. Right after, Hannibal thaginians thought that they could overcome the Romans just as they invaded Italy, achieving his most significant victory in the Battle of did Pyrrhus – by fortifying important cities and keeping their naval Cannae in 216 BC annihilating entire Roman army in the process. superiority. Rome had no navy, thus it was supposed to lose the war in However, Hannibal refrained from besieging the Rome itself and in- the long term anyway. stead decided to cut off the Romans from their allies, who – just as However, in 262 BC the Romans successfully besieged the fortress Capua and Tarentum – begun to switch sides.
    [Show full text]