THE MANIPULATION OF FEAR IN JULIUS CAESAR'S BELLUM GALLICUM

by

Kristin Slonsky

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iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1

(i) Cicero and Roman Fear in 60 BC 1

(ii) changes in the Roman perception of the Gauls 4

CHAPTER 2. ROMAN FEAR OF THE GAULS IN POLYBIUS' HISTORIES 12

(i) the Gallic sack of Rome 12

(ii) Gallo-Roman interaction in Polybius' Histories 14

(iii) the Gallic ethnography of Polybius 20

(iv) Gallic desperation at the battle of Telamon 36

CHAPTER 3. CAESAR'S USE OF FEAR AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE GALLIC

CONQUEST 42

(i) the weakness of the Aedui 44

(ii) the justification in Caesar's internal thought processes 48

(iii) the dialogue between Caesar and Ariovistus 52

(iv) self-fulfilling justification after book one 58

CHAPTER 4. THE USE OF ROMAN FEAR AS A WEAPON IN THE BG 62

(i) Sabinus and the pretense of fear 62

(ii) Ambiorix and the pretense of weakness 73

(iii) the worst Roman defeat in the BG 80

CHAPTER 5. CAESAR THE GENERAL'S USE OF FEAR 88 (i) Caesar's decision to generate loyalty in his army 88

(ii) Caesar'spopularis methods 92

(iii) the effect of leniency on army performance and morale 104

(iv) Caesar's presence and the fear of disgrace 111

CHAPTER 6.CONCLUSION 115

BIBLIOGRAPHY 120

VI ABSTRACT

The Bellum Gallicum is Julius Caesar's story of how he transformed himself and his army into an unstoppable force capable of intimidating all political opposition and ultimately defeating Pompey. This study regards the BG as a subtle method of manipulation, which played upon Roman fear of the Gauls to justify Caesar's military campaigns and ultimate goals. The BG is Caesar's record of his manipulation of Roman fear not just of invasion, but also of rebellion and the ensuing destabilization it brought upon the Roman patronage system. It was designed to depict Caesar as the ideal general, whose possession of military knowledge, courage, prestige, and luck has enabled him to defend Roman territory against any threat of invasion and fearlessly put down Gallic insurrection in a manner that surpasses all his rivals.

vn LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

BG Bellum Gallicum

viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could never have been finished, or even begun, without the help and support of many people. I would like to show gratitude to my supervisor, Sarah Cohen, for consistently providing excellent direction and thoughtful guidance throughout this arduous process. Special thanks must be given to Peter O'Brien, who bears the most responsibility for transforming me not just into a graduate student, but a passionate Classicist. I am indebted to Michael Fournier, who was kind enough to take the time out of his busy summer to read the beast that had become my thesis. Most of all, I am grateful for my family. My parents, George and Deborah Slonsky, have always been never ending sources of strength, encouragement, and love. If it wasn't for their faith in me, I would never have accomplished half the things in my life. My wingman, Crystle Hug, to whom I owe so much, took me out for sushi, listened to my thesis angst, and never let me forget that there was a world outside my office. Most importantly, she never doubted that I would succeed. I am especially thankful to my brother and lifelong best friend, Mark, whose constant presence in my life has been an undeserved blessing. Thanks also to his wife, Tabitha, who generously offered her home as my soft place to fall. Most of all, thank you Miya Valkyrie Slonsky, my brother's first child, for bringing such joy into our family.

IX CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Atque in re publica nunc quidem maxime Gallici belli versatur metus. Nam Haedui fratres nostri pugnam nuper malam pugnarunt et sine dubio sunt in armis excursionesque in provinciam faciunt. Senatus decrevit ut consules duas Gallias sortirentur, dilectus haberetur, vacationes ne valerent, legati cum auctoritate mitterentur qui adirent Galliae civitates darentque operam ne eae se cum Helvetiis coniungerent.

Well then, in public affairs for the moment the chief subject of interest is the disturbance in Gaul. For the Aedui—"our brethren"—have recently fought a losing battle, and the Helvetii are undoubtedly in arms and making raids upon our province. The senate has decreed that the two consuls should draw lots for the Gauls, that a levy should be held, all exemptions from service be suspended, and legates with full powers be sent to visit the states in Gaul, and see that they do not join the Helvetii.

i) Cicero and Roman Fear in 60 BC

In 60 BC, Cicero tells us, the Romans were greatly alarmed with the events taking place within Gaul. The Aedui, Rome's oldest Gallic allies, had been unable to withstand the combined forces of Ariovistus, a Germanic mercenary acting on the instigation of another Gallic tribe called the Sequani, and were defeated at Magetobriga. As a result of this defeat, their preferential status over the other Gallic tribes was forfeited and Roman control over the economic situation in the region was unbalanced. While the Aedui were demonstrating their inadequacy, the Helvetii, a Gallic tribe known to have taken part in the Germanic invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones almost fifty years earlier, were testing the strength of the borders along the province of Gallia Narbonensis with frequent incursions. Although a full scale invasion had not yet taken place, the letter gives the impression that the Helvetii's prior history of invasion and the memory of Rome's sack in

Cicero, Letters to Atticus, 1.19.2. H. D. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 76.

1 387 BC, its greatest humiliation at the hands of Gallic barbarians, had combined to create a tension that was almost palpable.

The possibility of another barbarian invasion and the realization that their Gallic allies were incapable of even defending themselves, let alone acting as a protective buffer to Roman territory, apparently produced such a feeling of dread that the senate was compelled to issue a declaration that authorized the emergency mobilization of Rome's forces. The senators bestowed the jurisdiction of the two Gallic provinces on either side of the Alps to the two consuls and authorized immediate troop levies of every able bodied

Roman, refusing to apply the usual exemptions to priests and old men. Ambassadors were dispatched to Gallic communities with orders, not to reinforce the borders or attack the Helvetii, but to discourage their inhabitants from mimicking the behavior of the raiders. Several exceptional steps were taken to meet a situation which had not yet actualized as a great crisis.

Did the Romans regard the Gauls as the chief threat to their security at this time or was it the susceptibility of their Gallic allies to possible invasion that propelled them to take such extraordinary defensive measures? Granted, a lengthy history of hostile interaction between the two neighboring peoples existed long before the Helvetii ever became a cause for Roman concern. Rome first came in to contact with Gallic tribes in the fifth century when they began to migrate into the Po valley and displace the declining

Etruscan civilization, which had dominated the area for centuries. In the early fourth century, a horde of Gauls advanced upon Rome and defeated a Roman army at the river

3 D. O hOgain, The Celts, p. 32.

2 Allia. They then entered the city and sacked it in 387 BC, eventually abandoning it after the Romans handed over a large ransom of gold.

When they relate the events surrounding the sack, later Roman sources describe widespread loss of life, total moral collapse, and the physical destruction of the city. Yet both the lack of archaeological damage and the swiftness of the Roman recovery indicate that the disaster was only a momentary setback in Rome's military success and territorial expansion. Although the damage left by the Gauls was minimal, the sack was perceived as an event of such cardinal importance that later Greek and Roman historians, such as

Polybius and Livy, would regard it as the starting point for Rome's rise to world dominance because it had instilled within her citizens the determination to never suffer the same humiliation again. After the sack, the Romans would regard any act of Gallic hostility, whether it was an invasion or an insurrection, as a threat to the safety of Rome.

Likewise, the Roman general who eliminated the Gallic menace was regarded as its savior and entitled to the greatest accolades.

The Gauls continued to invade Italy sporadically for the next century and half, while also serving as mercenaries for a variety of foreign powers, including Dionysius of

Syracuse and Hannibal. In the early stages of their interaction, the Gauls inflicted Roman losses, but the defeat of several tribes at Telamon in 225 BC effectively curbed their power. Although further campaigns were temporarily interrupted by the second Punic

War (218-201 BC), the Romans spent the next ten years retaking the territory of

Cisalpine Gaul and reducing the number of Gallic peoples north and south of the river

4 T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, p. 318. 5 J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 140.

3 Po.6 Starting in the 150s, Rome, out of a desire to defend her allies and to further Roman expansion, became involved in a territorial conflict between Massilia and the Gallic communities of the lower Rhone valley. In 121 BC, Rome defeated the Arverni, the most powerful Gallic tribe in opposition to Massilia, and placed them within the confines of the Roman patronage system. This action drastically transformed the nature of the Gallo-

Roman relationship from that of a hostile rivalry to one of reciprocal obligation.

ii) changes in the Roman Perception of the Gallic Threat

When another invasion threatened Italy, it was not carried out by Gallic peoples, but by nomadic Germanic tribes from beyond the Rhine, the Cimbri and Teutoni, who in

109-101 BC invaded the Transalpine province, overwhelmed three Roman armies, and finally were defeated by Marius, Caesar's uncle and role model, at Aquae Sextiae. This was the last major disturbance in Gaul until the events detailed in the Bellum Gallicum.

Thus, there had been little real danger from the Gauls themselves since the early second century. In fact, their inability to withstand the Germanic invaders and the reality that they owed their freedom to Marius' victory highlighted the weakness of the Gauls. Yet in this private letter to his friend Atticus describing the heightened tension in the city,

Cicero has depicted an image of Rome that is being consumed by a tumultus Gallicus.

This term refers to the state of emergency mobilization that occurs at Rome in response to a possible Gallic invasion, where the normal exemptions regarding military service do not apply. But unlike in previous occurrences, this tumultus had less to do with the

H. D. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 117. 7 L. Raditsa, "Julius Caesar and his Writings," p. 421.

4 military threat of the Gauls themselves and more with the Roman mistrust towards Gallic weakness.

This excerpt of Cicero's letter is indicative of how the Roman perception of the

Gauls has both changed and remained the same. The state of affairs in Gaul is envisioned as dangerous to Rome, but not for the usual reasons; the Gauls are inspiring fear, but not because of their military capabilities. The Aedui do not exhibit the ferocity expected of

Gallic peoples. First of all, the label of nostrifratres, although translated favorably as

"our brethren", denotes a relationship of unequal status and obligation between this

Gallic tribe and Rome. The Aedui have become clients answerable to their Roman patrons and are thus unable to evoke a fearful response. In addition, the Aedui, despite receiving all the advantages of being Rome's favorite, have suffered a defeat which had the potential of upsetting Roman control in the region. The poor military display of the

Aedui, combined with their acknowledged dependency on Rome, has changed this Gallic tribe from an object of hereditary fear to a focus of contemporary scorn. The Aedui themselves do not contribute to Roman anxiety; rather it is their susceptibility to external threats that concerns their patrons.

At first glance, the letter makes it appear that the Romans regarded the Helvetii and their raids along the border as a great military threat to the province and their overall sense of security. It is true that the Helvetii took part in an earlier invasion that brought about numerous military defeats upon Roman consuls, but their involvement in the struggle against the Cimbri and Teutoni was minimal at best. According to Strabo, the

Helvetii were a rich and peaceful people who decided to participate in the Germanic

8 T. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians 100 BC-AD 400, p. 97.

5 invasion in order to acquire even greater wealth.9 They were not instrumental in any major victory nor did they formally surrender to the Romans after the Germans were defeated. If the Romans regarded these raids as an issue of paramount concern, they would have sent an army to put down the aggressors. Instead, Rome's first response was to send representatives to neighboring Gallic states, which were presumably subordinate to Rome in a manner similar to the Aedui, in order to guarantee that these peoples continue to abstain from hostilities. By themselves, the Helvetii do not pose a great threat to Rome; rather it is the perception that they possess the ability to inspire insurrection among Rome's Gallic dependents that has made them persons of interest in Roman eyes.

All of these ideas - particularly that the Romans could be alarmed by a Gallic insurrection while also viewing the Gauls as weak - are at work in Julius Caesar's narrative of his conquest of Gaul. The Bellum Gallicum is Caesar's record of his manipulation of Roman fear not just of invasion, but also of rebellion and the ensuing destabilization it brought upon the Roman patronage system. It was designed to depict

Caesar as the ideal general, whose possession of military knowledge, courage, prestige, and luck has enabled him to defend Roman territory against any threat of invasion and fearlessly put down Gallic insurrection in a manner that surpasses all his rivals.

At the beginning, the BG emphasizes the weakness of the Gauls, especially the

Aedui, towards external influences in order to justify Caesar's initial endeavors beyond the limits of his appointed province. When Caesar acts in defense of the Aedui, first against the Helvetii and then Ariovistus, he both emphasizes the perception of Gallic helplessness and increases Roman anxiety regarding Italy's defenses, all under the guise

9 Strabo, Geography, 7.2.2.

6 of eliminating a menace to Rome's security. After these foreign threats were removed,

Caesar, with his impositions of supplies on the Gallic peoples and the garrisoning of his legions in Gaul, intentionally incited a rebellion against Roman interference among various tribes. The reasons for their initial uprising, however, were not directly credited to Caesar's demands, but to the persuasive capabilities of certain nameless Gauls, who manipulated the Belgae into conspiring against Rome.10 Unlike before, in 60 BC, when the Romans were successfully able to prevent the Helvetii from spreading dissension to their Gallic dependents, Caesar's presence in Gaul has encouraged further dissent. As a result, the Belgae have succumbed to thoughts of rebellion and thus inspire the formation of conspiracies throughout Gaul, creating multiple opportunities for Caesar to demonstrate his outstanding generalship.

With the total suppression of Gaul, Caesar has achieved his purpose: he has quelled the invasive threats of the Helvetii and Ariovistus and ruthlessly quashed Gallic insurrection, circumstances which his own diplomatic choices had precipitated, and has become the savior of Rome. Like his uncle Marius, Caesar took advantage of a barbarian threat to exact a victory that would ensure his political position at Rome, achieving great wealth and distinction in the process. But unlike Marius, whose deeds are not described in an extant first hand account, Caesar possessed the skill and the drive to personally write the BG, a piece of literature that showcased his achievements to a largely senatorial audience. Using a third person narrative throughout the BG, Caesar distances the narrator from the character "Caesar" and produces a facade of objectivity that allows him to share privileged information with his audience and a glimpse of his internal thought

10 Caesar, Bellum Gdllicum, 2.1.

7 processes.11 As the narrator of the BG, Caesar chose to depict his adversaries in a way that suited his purposes at each given moment.

The true purpose of the BG is the subject of a vigorous critical debate. It has often been implied that it was political or at least concerned with his own advancement. In order to achieve a greater understanding of Caesar's motives, scholars have questioned the title, genre, and veracity of the BG, as well as the date of its composition and publication. In the middle of the twentieth century, analysts attempted to uncover the truth behind Caesar's motives by asking key questions of his writings. Are they an accurate historical account of his deeds in Gaul? If not, why has Caesar chosen to distort the record?12

The subsequent scholarship on the truthfulness of the BG has divided the critics into two opposed camps. Those who regard Caesar as a flagrant liar bent on embellishing his achievements adhere to the school of thought best expressed in Michael Rambaud's work, L 'art de la deformation historique dans les commentaires de Cesar, which

-I T painstakingly presents examples of what he regards as Caesar's many deceptions. Those who regard Caesar as a candid eye-witness of his Gallic campaigns are adherents of T.

Rice Holmes, who composed an all-encompassing 1899 commentary on the BG in order to prove that it was as "accurate today as when it was first penned."14 This analysis does not attempt to refute or prove the truthfulness of the circumstances that took place within

Caesar's narrative. This study will assume that the BG is a modified account of the Gallic campaigns, in which masses of information, acquired by first hand observation and from

11 A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 193. 12 A. Jervis, Gallia Scripta: Images of Gauls and Romans in Caesar's Bellum Gallicum, p. 6. M. Rambaud, L 'art de la deformation historique dans les commentaires de Cesar. T. Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, p. 213.

8 secondary sources, have been compiled in order to portray Caesar in the best possible light. Within the BG, this study will argue, Rome's preexisting fear of the Gauls is repeatedly manipulated by Caesar to serve his own ends.

Chapter 1 is devoted primarily to the Roman fear of the Gauls in The Histories of

Polybius, which is the most substantial source on the Gauls prior to Caesar. This text establishes the development and nature of the hostilities between Gauls and Romans that preceded Caesar's arrival in Gaul. An analysis of the narrative demonstrates the extent to which the Gauls were feared and the incomplete steps that the Romans took to meet this threat. The absence of total victory within the text illustrates the incomplete nature of the

Roman conquest over the Gauls, which in turn explains why politicians of the Late

Roman Republic would feel that the Romans retained a dormant right to vengeance against Gaul.

After analyzing the negative effect of Rome's policy of non-intervention in Gaul, as well as her favoritism towards the Aedui, Chapter 2 turns toward an analysis of a dialogue between Caesar and Ariovistus. In this dialogue, Caesar explains how the Gauls came to be in a position of subservience to Rome and how this decrease in power has transformed the Roman perception of the Gallic threat. In their weakened state, the Gauls are unable to defend themselves against foreign influences or govern themselves responsibly, and thus, by their own failings, have become a renewed source of Roman fear and a threat to Rome's security. Caesar uses this new perception of Gallic weakness to justify both his military actions against Ariovistus at the beginning of his command and his subsequent conquest of all Gaul.

9 Chapter 3 examines how Sabinus and Ambiorix brought about both a Roman victory and a defeat through the deceptive use of fear as a psychological weapon. In both cases, the success or failure of the subterfuge depended on each man's ability to effect his opponent's perception of fear and weakness. Sabinus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, employed the Gallic perception of Roman fear to compensate for the combined disadvantages of numerical inferiority and unfavorable terrain. Ambiorix, a leader of the

Eburones, used the pretense of exaggerated weakness to transform Roman unity into dissension. Also manipulating the Roman fear of the Germans, Ambiorix was able to diminish Sabinus' confidence and transform him into a type of commander who has abandoned his loyalty to Caesar and the will to fight.

Chapter 4 analyzes the BG's representation of Caesar as the great imperator of the

Roman army and the various steps that he took to mold untried recruits into an accomplished army that recognized allegiance to him as having more claim on them than their loyalty to Rome. It looks at hispopularis methods, such as allowing considerable leeway in troop behavior rather than inflicting the harsh punishment of flogging and execution for petty crimes, to show how Caesar earned the loyalty of his men rather than their fear. It suggests that Caesar's methods of encouraging loyalty instilled a fear of disgrace within his army, which then enabled the soldiers to fight harder and that this increase in troop motivation increased the level of fear in his target audience in Rome.

Chapter 5 offers concluding remarks on Caesar's manipulation of Roman fear and considers the effect of the BG's reception at Rome. It shows how the BG's depiction of

Caesar overcoming the Gauls did more to increase Roman fear than alleviate it. Before

Caesar began his campaigns, the Romans were afraid that a barbarian invasion might

10 overpower their borders or that insurrection might spread among their dependents. But with his overwhelming subjugation of Gaul, Caesar made his senatorial audience more afraid of him and what he could accomplish with his excessively loyal army than they were of the barbarians. Through various loyalty inducing methods and numerous experiences in the battlefield, Caesar created an army well suited to the task of civil war.

Perhaps that was his purpose from the beginning.

11 CHAPTER 2. ROMAN FEAR OF THE GAULS IN POLYBIUS' HISTORIES

i) the Gallic sack of Rome

The Celtic peoples who lived in the Po Valley (Cisalpine Gaul) in northern Italy, as well as across the Alps in modern day France (Transalpine Gaul), left a lasting impact on the Roman Republic. Gallic war-bands, attracted by the prospect of plunder, adventure, and excitement, had begun infiltrating Cisalpine Gaul as early as the sixth century BC. Gallic expansion in the late fifth and early fourth centuries brought the Gauls across the Alps with sufficient strength to overcome the declining Etruscan civilization and to establish their dominance over Cisalpine Gaul. The Latin writer Cornelius Nepos claims that a force of three separate Gallic tribes worked in conjunction to seize and destroy the Etruscan town of Melpum on the same day as the Romans captured the

Etruscan stronghold of Veii in 396 BC. Driven by a mutual desire to acquire the remnants of Etruscan land and power, scarcely a decade passed before both sides inevitably arrived at a decisive face to face confrontation.

Just when Rome's mastery of Latium seemed imminent, a war-band of marauding

Gauls captured and plundered the city in 387 BC; an accomplishment that would only occur again 600 years later when the barbarian invasions ended the western Roman

Empire. This humiliation embedded the specter of the Gauls in the consciousness of

15 D. 6 hOgain, The Celts: A History, p. 35. 16 T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 1000-264 AD, p. 313-318. Cornell argues that the Gauls who sacked Rome were not migrating tribes desiring land for settlement, as set forth in the traditional account of Livy, but a mercenary band in search of plunder and employment. To support this interpretation, he refers to a later report in which Dionysius of Syracuse enlisted Gauls as mercenaries against Caere, Rome's powerful Etruscan ally, only a few months after the sack. Cornell maintains that the view of the Gauls as mercenaries is further supported by a reference in Diodorus, which describes how the Gauls were caught and defeated by an Etruscan army from Caere on their way back from the south.

12 Roman society, which continued to associate them with the past and possible future annihilation of their city. Although the sack of Rome occurred in the early fourth century, the Gauls were frequently viewed as the agents of Rome's final demise during the Late

1 7

Republic and for some time after. The recognized voice of the contemporary situation in Late Republican Rome, Marcus Tullius Cicero, writing in 44 BC, made a special division between wars waged against foes who were engaged in a competition for power and glory and the wars against the Gauls where the issue at stake was not which side would win but which would survive.18 Cicero's contemporary, Gaius Sallustius Crispus, a man who served under Caesar and composed historical works after Gaul's subjugation, wrote that the Romans considered they could win wars against every people through their virtus except for the Gauls because war against them was still a struggle for survival

(salus), rather than for glory.19

But despite intermittent victories over the Romans during the early stages of their interactions, this distinction was not particularly warranted. Vast Gallic armies were soundly defeated at the battles of Telamon and Clastidium as early as 225 and 222 BC.

Following these defeats, the Gauls never again crossed the Apennine Mountains to threaten Rome, except as unreliable mercenaries serving under Hannibal the Great's

Punic army. The Romans subsequently campaigned into the Po River Valley and by 190

BC the remaining Gauls in the Italian peninsula had been effectively subdued with the combined tactics of military defeat, the seizure of their territory, and the foundation of

Roman colonies.

J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 175. Cicero, On Duties, 1.38. 19 Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 114.2.

13 If the Gallic threat was largely contained by the second century BC, how did the fear of Gallic warfare remain prevalent in Rome to such a degree that Julius Caesar was able to utilize it to justify his wholesale subjugation of Gaul? The Gauls were certainly not on the same tactical or technological level as the Romans. Moreover, despite the setback of the sack, Rome was not hindered from continuing its aggressive and expansionist policy, which had begun at the end of the fifth century. What were the recurring Gallic characterizations that compelled Rome to maintain such a high level of fear towards the Gauls and to validate several disproportionate military responses? The answers to these questions provide the key to understanding how Julius Caesar used

Roman stereotypes of the Gauls to further his own political agenda.

ii) Gallo-Roman interaction in Polybius' Histories

Any examination of Gallic characterization must include a cautionary note on the sources available. Since the Gauls themselves had a lasting prejudice against putting important matters in writing, their historical depictions come primarily from Greek and

Latin literary evidence.21 The modern reader is only able to view Rome's wars with the

Gauls through a Greek or Roman filter. There are many extant references to the Gauls in ancient literature, but all the surviving accounts of the initial Gallic attack on Rome were written in the imperial period, apart from The Origins of Cato, which exists only in fragments, and The Histories of Polybius. Although written by a Greek, The Histories are important to this study because they establish the development and nature of the relationship between Gauls and Romans that preceded Caesar's arrival in Gaul. The

0 T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, p. 318. 21 H. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 1.

14 absence of total victory within the text illustrates the incomplete nature of the Roman conquest over the Gauls, which in turn explains why politicians of the Late Roman

Republic would feel that the Romans retained a dormant right to vengeance against

Gaul.22

Polybius (203BC -120BC) was a Greek political hostage at Rome, who wrote an account called The Histories, narrating the events that took place during 220 to 146 BC where Rome rose to supremacy as a dominant power in the Mediterranean world. When

Polybius composed his Histories, the Romans had already completed their initial period of conquest in the north and were undertaking intensive colonization south of the Po in former Gallic territory. In the course of his analysis of Rome's constitution, politics, and laws, as well as through his account of Rome's conflicts with the Gauls between 396 BC and 146 BC, Polybius attempted to teach his fellow Greeks how to deal with barbarian threats with Roman experience as a guiding template. By increasing the differences between Romans and Gauls and highlighting Rome's opposition to Gallic incursion,

Polybius sought to distance the Romans from run-of-the mill barbarians in the Greek consciousness.23

The Histories of Polybius were designed to explain the character of the Roman constitution and to elucidate the development of Roman power to Greeks who were unaccustomed to Roman interference. Polybius, however, writes with both a Greek and

Roman public in mind; Roman readers are mentioned sporadically. For the most part, the work focuses the reader's attention on the Punic wars waged between Rome and

Carthage from 264 to 146 BC. The Histories are comprised of 40 books in total, but the

22 A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 187. 23 J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 164.

15 first two are regarded as introductory texts. Half way through the second book, Polybius interrupts his narrative of the intervening years between the first and second Punic Wars in order to provide a lengthy excursus on Rome's history of interaction with the Gauls.

Polybius, in a rare use of the first person singular, asserts that a summary account of the

Gauls is necessary because it will show the temperament of the men and the nature of the country which Hannibal would afterwards rely on in his invasion of Italy and in his attempt to destroy Roman dominion.

Polybius inserts his Gallic history at the point in the narrative when the Romans have just come to the realization that their negligence concerning the situation in Spain has put them in a disadvantageous position. The Carthaginians, under the direction of

Hasdrubal the Fair, the son in law of Hamilcar Barca, had strengthened their interests in

Spain with the foundation of a new colony and thus bolstered their empire to a condition more formidable than before the outcome of the First Punic War. Despite this sudden realization, the Romans did not dare to make war on Hasdrubal and instead made a treaty with the Carthaginians because they feared that a Gallic attack on Rome was imminent.

The Ebro treaty of 228 BC confined Hasdrubal's armies south of the Ebro River and gave the Romans time to deal with the Gauls on their frontier. Polybius placed his Gallic history at this juncture because he wanted his Greek audience to understand to what extent the Gauls had affected Roman actions.

The Gauls, unlike the Carthaginians, did not possess an organized empire, a naval fleet, or a professional army, but the Romans still perceived them as the greater threat to their personal security. The Romans believed that the presence of the Gauls in Italy and

24 Polybius, Histories, 2.14.2. Polybius, Histories, 2.13.5: epitattein epolemein ou katetolmon tois Karchedoniois.

16 their proximity to Rome were a menace to their sovereignty of Italy, but more importantly, to their peace of mind. The Gallic threat was such an influencing factor in the Roman decision making process that the Romans would postpone military action against their primary rival for the domination of the Mediterranean. With a brief introduction to his Gallic excursus, Polybius has imparted two major points to his Greek and Roman audience about the impact the Gauls have on Roman state of mind and policy: the possibility of a Gallic attack on Rome has the power to instill an ample amount of fear in the Romans, which is an uncommon statement of weakness not often attributed to them. Moreover, the Gauls not only threatened the Roman frontier, but they also served as mercenaries in the ranks of Hannibal, the Carthaginian general who was responsible for Cannae, often recognized as Rome's worst military defeat in its history.

Polybius provides the story of the Gallic invasion of Italy in order to explain how the Gauls came to be in Italy and eventually sack Rome. Unlike the Greek and Latin sources written in the imperial period, Polybius' depiction of the original Gallic foray into Italy is bereft of origin myths or foundation stories involving migration that would morally justify the presence of the Gauls in Italy. Since they lacked a famous Greek or

Trojan hero as their founder acting on divine direction, they did not possess the religious sanction that would make their arrival respectable. Moreover, since Polybius dated

Rome's sack as not long after the Gallic invasion, he supports the position that the Gauls are relative newcomers. The lack of an origin myth and the comparative newness of their arrival further distinguish the Gauls as outsiders from the other legitimate inhabitants of

Italy.26 This exclusion, whether it is the result of Polybius' general distaste for legendary

J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 100.

17 material of that nature or whether it was made for another literary purpose, accentuates an opposition between the divinely authorized Romans and their divinely rejected Gallic counterparts.

In his demythologized account of the Gallic invasion, Polybius supplies an external motivation that lures the Gauls into the Italian peninsula. The Gauls, through frequent trade associations with their neighbors in the south, had become covetous of the fertile territory of the Etruscans. In order to acquire the land for themselves, the Gauls used a pretext to attack them with a large army and expel them from their territory, which they then occupied themselves.27 The passage illustrates how the Gauls are motivated by envy and greed to acquire another's property and how they are able to exact their material desires through pure martial strength. In addition, unlike their Greek and Roman adversaries, the Gauls did not conquer Etruscan land to found cities or impose their political orders. The Gauls, driven by the spurs of land hunger and greed, did not invade

Italy in a way their Greek and Roman predecessors found acceptable. These base motivations, coupled with the absence of divine authorization, further differentiate the

Gauls from Italy's legitimate inhabitants and increase the negative attributes of their overall characterization.

In an extended section preceding his rationalized description of the initial Gallic invasion, Polybius provides a lengthy geographical excursus on the overabundant region of the Po River valley in northern Italy. Polybius claims that this plain surpasses all others that he has seen in its size and fertility; it yields such a great quantity of corn and other food-stuffs that the Romans are able to satisfy their domestic and military demands

Polybius, Histories, 2.17.3.

18 with the goods of this plain alone. Polybius' description of the Romans' current efficient exploitation of the Po Valley is markedly contrasted to the Gauls' previous unproductive occupation. The Gauls invaded the plain because they envied the landed wealth of the Etruscans, which they took and, by subtle implication, squandered. Since the Gauls seized this land but failed to take advantage of its natural resources, their presence in the north is a disruptive intrusion on both the region's fertility and its inhabitants. Unlike the Romans who improve and benefit from the fruitfulness of the region, the Gauls are considered unworthy occupants of the land whose resources they

29 had wasted.

Polybius depicts the original Gallic entry into Italy in a manner that is least favorable to the Gauls. His account does not attribute a mythical foundation story to the

Gauls which would give their presence in Italy a divine authorization. Rather than credit them with the traditional motivation of conquering territory in order to establish cities or impose political institutions, Polybius ascribes base motives to the Gauls which accentuate the difference between their origins and those of the other peoples of Italy.

When the lengthy description of the abundant productivity in the now Roman occupied

Po River valley is set in contrast with the visible omission of any Gallic harnessing of its natural resources, the wasteful and devouring conduct of the Gauls is underscored as harmful to the fertility of the land. Polybius' Gallic invasion story, with its negative emphasis on divine disapproval, shameful motives, and profligacy, distinguishes the

Gallic manner of entering Italy apart from the proper way to invade a new land. Polybius' characterization of the Gauls in their original invasion and settlement of the Po River

28 Polybius, Histories, 2.14.5-15.8. 29 J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 61.

19 valley represents the inversion of the Greek ideal regarding the importation of Greek political order into an unordered landscape. In effect, the Gauls are barbarous invaders with no legitimate purpose, who only bring disorder and destruction to the Greek and

Latin communities of the Italian peninsula.

iii) the Gallic ethnography of Polybius

After establishing the Gallic influx as the antithesis to a correct and purpose- driven invasion, Polybius presents an ethnographic passage which describes the social, economical, and political way of life of the Gauls. This excerpt exaggerates the fundamental differences between Hellenistic civilizations and the Gallic groups who were classified as barbarian. The ethnography adheres to the traditional tropes of Classical ethnic stereotyping and portrays the Gauls in conventional ways, as unsophisticated and nomadic children of nature, who exhibit customs and practices that seem bizarre to a

Greek and Roman audience.32 Polybius depicts the Gauls in a manner that highlights their otherness and exaggerates their crude simplicity and wild natures, but his efforts to typecast the Gauls into prescribed barbarian archetypes contradict the archaeological evidence.

"They lived in unwalled villages and had no knowledge of the refinements of civilization. As they slept on straw and leaves, ate meat and practiced no other pursuits but war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they were completely unacquainted with any art or science. Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, since these were the only objects they could easily take with them whatever their circumstances and transport wherever they chose. It was of the greatest importance to them to have a following (etaireias), and the man who was believed to have the greatest number of dependants and companions about him was the most feared and most powerful member of the tribe."

J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 111. P. Wells, The Barbarians Speak, p. 100. H. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 73. Polybius, Histories, 2.17.8.

20 The archaeology of northern Italy supports the premise that there was a general decline in the Etruscan settlements in the fifth and fourth centuries. Some analysts attribute the arrival of the Gauls, as described by Polybius and other sources, as primarily responsible for this decline. The literary evidence encourages this assumption, but there are other possible explanations as to why this urban decline occurred. Furthermore, recent excavations of the settlement sites at Monte Bibele and Bologna indicate that the population was of mixed origin, some Gallic, some Etruscan, which suggests that Gallic invaders coexisted with previous inhabitants in fixed communities and possibly intermarried.34 Contrary to Polybius' testimony, the Gauls did not completely Gallicize

or upper Italy or displace all the non-Gallic pockets of population. Many of the earlier inhabitants were either subjected or assimilated, while others retreated to upland areas, leaving the better land to the newcomers. The archaeological evidence and the continued existence of non-Gallic communities suggest that the Gauls interacted with the peoples they subjected and perhaps co-occupied their settlement sites.

The archaeology of northern Italy also contradicts Polybius' blanket statement that the Gauls did not possess any knowledge of artistry or scientific skill; his assertion that their possessions only consisted of cattle and gold is far from accurate. From the sixth century BC, the Gauls beyond the Alps were learning from other peoples and developing new aesthetic and functional designs in large iron working centers. The material culture of this period of development, known as the La Tene era, eventually spread into northern Italy; first, through a trade relationship with the Phocaean city of 34 J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 197-203. 35 E. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic, p. 35. 36 D. 6 hOgain, The Celts, p. 36. 37 D. 6 hOgain, The Celts, p. 6.

21 Massalia (Marseilles) around 630 BC and next through subsequent Gallic migrations and settlements. The existence of La Tene artifacts in Etruria and Etruscan pottery beyond the Alps reveal the evidence of wide ranging trade connections. A Gallic cemetery at

Marzabotto contained several grave-goods typical of the La Tene period, such as iron swords, armlets, and fibulae; the tombs of the Gauls who settled around Bologna contained pottery, bronzes, and even mirrors from central Etruria. In addition, the burial at Vix in the Cote d'Or, with its Greek krater measuring 1.63 meters and other luxurious contents, proves the existence of a flourishing and settled Gallic community, which not only engaged in trade with the Greek world, but also regarded Greek goods as prestige

.. 40 items.

Although Polybius' depiction of the Gauls as overly primitive is not consistent with archaeological assertions, it espouses the traditional Hellenistic perception of northern barbarian identity. Polybius' simplification of Gallic society and his disregard of

Gallic culture in its higher forms do not necessarily mean that he was completely unaware of the actual Gallic condition. Polybius states that he had even visited Gaul,

Libya, and Iberia in person in order to obtain a better knowledge of foreign localities and peoples for his unfamiliar audience.41 What is more, Polybius directs his attention towards the Gallic tribes who are on a war-footing with Rome and consequently less preoccupied with the finer arts of living. Polybius was primarily interested in Gauls as wagers of war and did not interest himself or his readers in any aspect of their customs

H. Scullard, The Etruscan Cities and Rome, p. 183; D. 6 hOgain, The Celts, p. 4. H. Scullard, The Etruscan Cities and Rome, p. 219. H. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 7; D. 6 hOgain, The Celts, p. 4. Polybius, Histories, 3.59.

22 which did not have some relevance to their military capacities. When he allowed his narrative to refer to the differences between settled and migratory Gallic peoples,

Polybius hinted at changes between the Gauls of his own day and those of the fourth century BC, but he refrained from expanding on these changes in his ethnography.

Among the Greeks, the institutional foundations and structures of a society determined in large part the formation of group characteristics. Polybius, as a historian drawing upon Greek intellectual traditions, centered his analysis of collective peoples on their different state constitutions (politeia), which he considered the greatest factor in a state's success or failure.44 According to the political theory of Polybius, logismos, a complex word meaning 'reasoning power' or 'rationality', which, for the Greeks, is the true mark of Hellenism, is not the product of ethnicity, but of the structure of the politeia.

To illustrate his opinion, Polybius devotes his sixth book to an analysis of the biological life cycles of various states where the health of a city's institutional structures, especially the growth, acme, and decline of its constitution, determines the level of Hellenism or barbarism within the citizen body. In Polybius' estimation, Rome, with its mixed constitution of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements, is the optimal form of state because it exercises rational reasoning power (logismos) over the irrational passion

(thumos) of barbarians to an advantageous effect.

Contrary to the ideal example set by the Roman state, the Gauls are bestowed the political structure of ochlocracy or irrational mob rule, which Polybius considers the most degenerate and farthest removed from Hellenism. Polybius interprets Gallic social

42 H. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 72-4. 43 C. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius' Histories, p. 82. 44 Polybius, Histories, 6.28-10. C. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius' Histories, p. 6.

23 organization as a system based on patron-client relationships and kinship, and does not provide any evidence of an organized political community.46 Polybius' Gauls are linked together by a system of clientage where the worth of a man is estimated by the number of his clients, a rudimentary form of patronage which is reminiscent of earlier Roman society. Polybius, however, either did not observe or chose to conceal any evidence of an organized political community in his Gallic ethnography. He does not describe any institutional foundations or constitutions that would have been responsible for the positive development of Gallic character. The absence of any references to a higher form of government within Gallic society is set in contrast with Polybius' in-depth analysis of the complex Roman constitution, which he feels is responsible for the overall success of the Roman people.

Since the Gauls in Polybius' narrative neither possess a constitution nor belong to an organized state at this time, they are presently incapable of exhibiting Hellenic virtues and therefore lack the ability to acquire reasoning power (logismos). Although Polybius describes the Gauls as menacing, greedy, and audacious barbarians, their lack of a constitution implies that they are incapable of ultimately succeeding over the Romans at this time. Hellenism and barbarism, however, are not innate and immutable in particular peoples. If given an adequate amount of time to develop, the Gallic tribal community will evolve to the next stage in its life cycle and eventually develop a constitution and an organized political community. The Gauls, with their semi-Roman system of clientage and near victories, have exhibited the potential to become possessors of logismos, and thus be capable of defeating the Romans.

46 Polybius, Histories, 2.17.12. 47 Polybius, Histories, 6.2-18. 48 C. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius' Histories, p. 6.

24 According to Polybius, the Gauls are nomadic and simple-minded creatures, who do not enjoy the civilizing benefits of a rational constitution. Unlike the Romans, the institutional structures that have molded the character of the Gauls are their two preoccupations with the primitive passions of battle and gold. The ethnographical passage upholds the Greek and Roman belief that acquisitive militarism and its fruits are fundamental to the mercenary nature of Gallic society, which regards war as a way of life designed to bring about the acquisition of material wealth. The implied contrast is with

Greek or Roman soldiers, who believed that they were defensive warriors fighting on behalf of their city because it was their duty as citizens of a fixed community. Since the

Gauls do not belong to a state, they have not been exposed to the guiding principles of law and order that would have redirected their individual desires towards the collective good of the city.

The purpose of Polybius' ethnography is to demonstrate how the Gauls are cultural contrasts and military threats to Romans. Polybius reduces Gallic society to a primitive level in order to accentuate the differences between these two opposing forces.

Polybius chooses to depict the Gauls in a way that works in conjunction with all the negative aspects of his Gallic invasion story. His Gauls envied Etruscan land enough to seize it by force, but in their desire to take possession of the Po Valley, they destroyed the

Etruscan cities, expelled the inhabitants, and then failed to understand how to recreate the very things which had drawn them there in the first place. Instead of reaping both the cultural and financial benefits of Etruscan civilization, the Gauls live apart from other

J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 91. J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 91. J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 109.

25 inhabitants in unwalled villages and continue to subsist in a rudimentary and uncultured lifestyle.

The Gauls in his ethnography demonstrate how their lack of cultural understanding prevents them from ever being able to justify their presence in Italy.

Polybius omits any examples of Gallic artistry because he wants to portray the Gauls as lacking the ability to absorb or display any aspect of Hellenistic culture. He does not acknowledge the existence of established Gallic settlements because he wants to exaggerate Gallic instability and capriciousness. Instead, he paints them as nomadic and lawless mercenaries, who display an allegiance not to a city or a communal code of conduct, but to their own individual needs. Taken as a whole, Polybius has created a

Gallic identity that is the antithesis to that of the Romans.

The impermanence and mercenary militarism of the Gauls, backed by their attested martial valor and the history of their involvement in Rome's sack, provides justification as to why the Romans would perceive the Gauls as a formidable menace to the Roman state. Despite the threatening nature of the Gallic characterization in both the invasion story and the ethnography, there is an underlying implication in Polybius' narrative that the Gauls, since they lack a city to defend and a constitution to uphold, were not capable of succeeding over the Romans and are thus undeserving of so much

Roman attention and fear. Furthermore, Polybius' description of the primitive and turbulent nature of Gallic social structures serves as the explanatory background to his narrative of their unsuccessful campaigns against the Romans, in which they were continually defeated because of essential weaknesses in their social and military

26 organization and because they were prone to making their decisions in a state of thumos, senseless passion, rather than logismos, cool calculation.

Since Polybius limits them to mob rule or ochlocracy, the most primitive form of political development, the Gauls should therefore be ineligible for Hellenic virtue and not exhibit reasoning power (logismos) in Polybius' narrative, but that is not the case. To be sure, in the first half of the narrative, Polybius does portray the Gauls in a way that adheres to stereotypical Greek perceptions of barbarism. The Gauls utilize their intimidating ferocity to plunder indiscriminately and confiscate territory, but then this same audacity is overpowered by passion (thumos) and eventually brings about destruction either at their own hands or by the Romans. Throughout this first half, it becomes clear that Polybius is establishing the conflict between Gauls and Romans as a dichotomous battle between barbarian thumos and Hellenic logismos, where Roman reasoning and foresight are depicted as rightly triumphing over Gallic passion and shortsightedness.

Before circumstances inspire a change in their motivation, the Gauls exhibit many negative characteristics of barbarism. For example, after sacking and evacuating Rome, the Gauls returned home safely only to become embroiled in internecine strife, presumably over the division of Roman plunder. In addition, neighboring Alpine tribes attacked them after they observed and became jealous of the prosperity of their newly acquired land.53 The Gauls used their attested audacity to obtain land and plunder from more cautious peoples, but these new acquisitions only encouraged their baser instincts of greed and jealousy. The fact that the Gauls were later attacked by Alpine tribes, who can

52 J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 84. 53 Polybius, Histories, 2.18.1-5.

27 be identified as their cultural kinsmen, demonstrates how their greed transcends the bounds of collective identity.

The presence of a similar story of greed and covetousness only a passage later encourages the perception that the Gauls are locked in a perpetual cycle of envy, audacity, and violent acquisitiveness. In this instance, the Cisalpine Gauls were able to cunningly persuade their rapacious Transalpine counterparts not to plunder their territory with bribery and ties of kinship. The combined force-of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gauls, together with a contingent of Etruscans, then pillaged the Roman territory and acquired an incredible amount of loot. Just as before, the Gauls returned home safely, but their overindulgence with stolen Roman wine and their inability to distribute the spoils led to a skirmish where the majority of the plunder and their own forces were destroyed.54 The

Gauls are unable to control their covetous impulses and eventually succumb to self destructive tendencies. In the end, their audacity only serves to exacerbate their innate covetousness and bring about their destruction.

Polybius highlights the other detestable actions of the Gauls because he wants to demonstrate how Gallic conduct created the Roman opinion that the Gauls had to be completely subdued and expelled, not just temporarily pacified. For example, the Gauls have demonstrated their willingness to fight alongside longstanding enemies of Rome; first with the Etruscans in 299 BC and then with the Samnites in 282 BC.55 With the collaboration of the Etruscans, both the Transalpine and Cisalpine Gauls were able to overrun central Italy and acquire an exorbitant amount of Roman plunder; a Gallic alliance with the Samnites brought about a considerable victory over the Romans at

54 Polybius, Histories, 2.19.3. 55 Polybius, Histories, 2.19.3-7.

28 Camerinum. These two examples illustrate how the presence of countless Gauls on the borders of Roman territory would be particularly disturbing to the Roman state of mind.

First, given their characteristic belligerence and desire for plunder, Romans justifiably imagined that the Gauls longed to lay violent hands on their wealth, as they had done since 387 BC. Secondly, given the readiness of the Gauls to ally with the Etruscans and

Samnites, the Romans feared that the Gauls would always serve as a potential military resource for the enemies of Rome, an opinion further encouraged by their experiences during the Hannibalic War.56

In addition to their innate cupidity and belligerence, the Gauls demonstrate a degree of faithlessness in their conduct that only reinforces the Roman belief that the

Gauls were a threat that required a more permanent solution rather than the occasional military victory. In their dealings with the Romans, the Gauls do not abide by their treaties. They made a treaty with the Romans after Rome's sack, but they then broke it when an opportunity for more plunder arose thirty years later. After they had observed the growing strength of Roman power and become frightened, the Gauls concluded another treaty with the Romans, which they again cast aside after thirty years when they were enticed by another pillaging expedition into Roman territory. The Gallic inability to abide by the terms of treaties reveals the unreliability of the Gallic temperament and foments suspicion among the Romans. Polybius depicts the Gauls as opportunists, who prey upon the Romans whenever they see a potential weakness and then request a treaty only after this assumption has been proven false. Since the actions of the Gauls demonstrate that they are not ethically or religiously bound by treaties, the Romans

56 J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 92. 57 Polybius, Histories, 2.18.3.

29 themselves do not feel obligated to restrain their military responses to Gallic noncompliance.

Faithlessness is a negative attribute to the overall Gallic character, but it is a mild incrimination in comparison to the greater transgression of irreverence. When the Gauls were victorious at Arretium in 285 BC, the Roman praetor, Manius Curius, sent an embassy to the Gallic leaders to negotiate for the return of Roman prisoners of war.

Contrary to the laws of Hellenistic military custom, the Gauls slaughtered the ambassadors for no apparent reason. They did not respect the sanctity of Roman ambassadors under a parley agreement because they, as barbarous Gauls, were either unaware of the exceptional significance of their role in Hellenistic warfare or because they perceived the Roman ambassadors as spies sent to gather intelligence on the strength and movement of their forces. Polybius does not provide a specific explanation because he wants to depict the Gauls as ignorant of a practice that would have been common to the ancient world. The Gallic ignorance of an unwritten code of conduct amplifies their barbarity and further distances their type of uncivilized warfare from that of their Roman adversaries. The exhibition of these negative characteristics attributes a typical barbarian identity to the Gauls, which commonly depicts them as controlled by passion (thumos).

This shocking crime solidified the unreasonable nature of Gallic barbarity in the

Roman consciousness and compelled them to drastically punish the Gauls. It led to a sequence of battles, which established Rome as the dominating power in the region and further curbed Gallic audacity and manpower. For the first time, the Romans marched into Cisalpine Gaul and decimated the tribe of Senones in their own territory. After

58 Polybius, Histories, 2.19.9. N. Austin, Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople, p. 92.

30 expelling the survivors, the Romans occupied and established the colony of Sena Gallica near the mouth of the Po River in 280 BC. The chief purpose of a colony was strategic, either to maintain the subjection of the earlier inhabitants or to secure control of a district from enemy incursion.

Besides teaching the Gauls a lesson, the establishment of Sena Gallica represented a psychological step towards the gradual diminishment of Roman fear of the Gauls. But in this instance, the extensive punishment of the Senones brought about an aggravation of hostilities between Rome and the Boii tribe, who feared a similar outcome in regards to their own territory. The Boii made two unsuccessful attempts against the Romans, but were soundly defeated near Lake Vadimon despite an alliance with Rome's enemy, the

Etruscans. Their defeat was so profound that they even concluded a treaty with the

Romans, which lasted for fifty years.

Polybius primarily depicts the first phase in Rome's campaigns with the Gauls, which had been drawn out for over century, as a didactic exercise for the Romans, but it was instructive for the Gauls as well. Through incessant interactions with the Gauls, the

Romans had become perfectly trained athletes in war, who were successfully able to rein in the tolma (audacity) of the Gauls before it was too late. The Gauls, in turn, have slowly learned to play to their strength in numbers and to establish alliances that further their aims. Upon closer inspection, the reader gets the impression that the motivations of the Gauls are different depending on their distance to Rome, despite Polybius' efforts to depict them all as equally invested in the same monetary compulsion.

60 Polybius, Histories, 2.19.13. 61 E. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic, p. 15. 62 Polybius, Histories, 2.20.6. 6 Polybius, Histories, 2.20.10: ten.. .tolman...kataplexamenoi; 2.18.1: te tolme katapeplnymenoi

31 As revealed at the beginning of his narrative, the first wave of Gallic tribes, consisting of the Laevi, Lebecii, Insubres, Cenomani, Anares, Boii, Lingones, and

Senones, entered Italy because of its fertile land and established rural settlements in the northern peninsula. But in the ensuing passages where Rome is sacked and Roman territory is invaded twice, Polybius does not mention any specific tribe by name; he only provides the blanket term of 'Gauls'. Polybius does acknowledge a distinction between

Gauls and Transalpine Gauls, who are more migratory and avaricious than their settled

Cisalpine cousins, supporting the notion that they are a raiding party driven by the acquisition of plunder and not land for settlement; they are even perceived as a territorial threat to Cisalpine Gallic communities. In his description of their collaboration with the

Samnites, Polybius again does not classify which Gallic tribe was partly responsible for the Roman defeat at Camerinum. Their lack of tribal affiliation and their service with a longstanding Roman enemy suggests that they are an assortment of Gallic mercenaries fighting for the Samnite cause and are not interested in the acquisition of land.

Only after the Romans have decided to punish the Gauls by invading Gallic territory does Polybius begin to make a change in his narrative and first mention a Gallic tribe by its specific name. Other sources have held this tribe, identified as the Senones, responsible for the sack of Rome, but Polybius does not accredit that distinction to them.67 After the Romans had invaded and defeated the Senones in battle, they expelled them from their territory and founded a colony on the site of their former center of

Polybius, Histories, 2.17 .4. Polybius, Histories, 2.18.7. Polybius, Histories, 2.19.1. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 14.113-117; Livy, History of Rome, 5.34-49.

32 influence. Their placement in the initial list of first wave Gallic migrations and the dispossession of their territory by the Romans suggests that the Senones were not mere itinerant mercenaries, but landed agriculturists defending the territory they had occupied and farmed for over a hundred years.

The Romans targeted the Senones not because they held them responsible for the slaughter of Roman ambassadors, but because the Romans were overcome by passion

(thumos), which is in a manner more akin to barbarians throughout Polybius' narrative.69

When Polybius uses thumos in correlation with the Romans, he is changing Gallic and

Roman roles and attributing the barbarian characteristic of impulsive anger to Roman action; he is reprimanding what he interprets as a hasty Roman decision and scolding them for not considering the consequences. In their desire for swift satisfaction, the

Romans acted hastily and punished excessively, decisions which eventually fomented a stronger sense of purpose among other Gallic tribes, such as the Boii.

When the Boii saw how the Romans expelled the Senones from their land, they were overcome with fear for their own territory, despite the fact that they did not directly have a part in the recent altercation between the Romans and Senones. This fear compelled the Boii to reevaluate the threat of Roman power and to take greater steps to protect their territory. In effect, Roman hastiness brought about a full scale war; their adversaries were no longer raiding parties, but the combined armies of the Boii and their recurring enemies, the Etruscans. Polybius does not provide specific details of the battle that took place at Lake Vadimon, but it is clear that he regards the outcome as an undisputed victory for the Romans.

68 Polybius, Histories, 2.19.10-12. 69 C. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius' Histories, p. 73.

33 Despite this defeat, the Boii would again engage the Romans in battle only a year later with a force that Polybius describes as consisting of every warrior of the Boii, even

70 the very young. Their willingness to sacrifice everything to maintain the possession of their land is a testament to its value. The importance they place on land groups them with the landed community of the Senones and further distinguishes the Boii from the itinerant mercenary and raiding parties Polybius only classifies as 'Gauls'. Despite the protective nature of their motives, the Boii were unable to defeat the Romans in a pitched battle and so they concluded a treaty in 282 BC, which both sides kept for fifty years.

During the interim, the Roman struggle with Pyrrhus over the control of Italy and with Carthage over Sicily allowed the Boii enough time to recover from their military setbacks. This does not mean, however, that the Boii were busying themselves in military preparations or plotting Rome's demise. If anything, the actions of the Boii in 236 BC demonstrate their desire to uphold the terms of the treaty and to maintain peace with

Rome. By this time, the economic life of the Gauls had begun to revive, as evidenced by the development of new coinage, and a new generation of Boii had grown up during the 71 peace, who were unfamiliar with the suffering involved in a defeat. The young chiefs of the Boii invited some Alpine Gauls to enter their land with the intent of resuming hostilities with Rome. But when the populace discovered the plot, they killed their own kings and then waged an intense battle with the Alpines where both sides suffered many losses. The intensity of their response demonstrates just how far the people were willing to go in order to prevent Rome from believing that they were purposefully breaking the terms of their treaty. 70 Polybius, Histories, 2.20.4. 71 D. 6 hOgain, The Celts, p. 83; Polybius, Histories, 2.21.4-7.

34 The drastic efforts of the Boii to maintain the peace, and by extension their economic recovery, were in vain. The advance of an Alpine force hostile to Rome and the knowledge that a pitched battle had occurred not far from the newly established Roman colonies of Sena Gallica and Ariminum was more than enough to reinvigorate Rome's protracted fear of a Gallic invasion. The Roman response to these events is, however, not a military expedition, which would only be a temporary solution in relation to the Gauls in general, but a more drastic land measure designed to permanently divide the former territory of the Senones among Roman citizens.

From the Roman perspective, this land bill was designed to restore the firm link between the Roman proletariat and the land through measured allotments, in a manner foreshadowing the work of the Gracchi. With the distribution of land, it removed the indigent from Rome and made them eligible for military service. Most importantly,

Roman settlement in former hostile territory acted as an advance warning system for

Gallic or foreign invasion, which made the Roman state and people feel more secure.

Despite the eventual benefits of this land bill, Polybius regarded it as the first step in the demoralization of the populace and credited it as the cause of the subsequent war with the

Boii. Polybius condemned Flaminius, the author of the bill, as a rash demagogue whose actions precipitated the Gallic tumultus of 225 BC. Polybius' hostile attitude towards

Flaminius reflected the resentment of the senators who had profited from the occupation of public land and were opposed to its distribution.75 Although Flaminius did not pass the land measure until five years after the battle between the Boii people and the Alpine force

F. Walbank, Commentaries on Polybius, p. 192. 73 E. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic, p. 15. 74 C. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius' Histories, p. 188. 75 F. Walbank, Commentaries on Polybius, p. 193.

35 stirred up a panic, it nevertheless serves as the consequence of these events, given its placement within the narrative and the omission of any other Roman response.76

The Gallic response to this land bill was less than understanding. From the perspective of the Boii, the land bill brought home the bitter realization that the ultimate aim of the Romans was the complete expulsion and extermination of every Gaul in order to make way for Rome's incoming colonists. The hostile response of the Boii people to the crimes of their chiefs was not enough to assuage the fear of the Gauls in Roman minds. The Romans were either incapable of differentiating between a Boii and an Alpine or did not care to do so out of fear; a Gaul was a Gaul and every Gaul was a threat to

Rome's security and wealth. Despite their lengthy habitation and agricultural development of their territory and their eagerness to maintain their treaty with Rome, the

Boii were still Gauls and therefore could not be absolved of their earlier involvement with Rome's humiliating sack. Although it is not explicitly stated, Polybius' condemnation of the land bill and its negative effects, despite his evident political bias, alludes to his veiled opinion that their fear of the Gauls has compelled the Romans to become engaged in a largely unnecessary war.

iv) Gallic desperation at the battle of Telamon

Rome's decision to divide the territory of the Senones among their citizens in 282

BC creates a turning point in the narrative. According to Polybius, the land bill had a demoralizing effect on the Roman people, but he does not provide any specific examples of Roman deterioration. The land bill, however, had a rousing effect on the Boii, whom

Polybius, Histories, 2.21.3-9.

36 Polybius later describes as demonstrating Hellenic virtues in their struggle with the

Romans. When the Boii witnessed these land divisions, they realized that the Roman military response had escalated beyond punitive action to a war of conquest. This insight into their situation brought about a change in Gallic motivation, which elevated them away from their typical pursuits of plunder to the loftier purpose of territorial defense and survival.

Instead of rashly attacking their enemies as they were accustomed, the Boii and

Insubres, whom Polybius no longer identifies with the general classification of 'Gauls,' first demonstrate the Hellenic virtue of collective planning. Playing upon their strength in numbers, they formed an alliance together and then sent messengers to the kings of a fierce tribe of Alpine Gauls, called the Gaesatae. These messengers then used their rhetorical skill and promises of financial reward to enlist the mercenary Gaesatae into their service.77 After winning a substantial victory over the Romans by stratagem and obtaining an enormous amount of plunder, the leaders of the Gauls conducted a war council, during which they decided to follow the recommendation of King Aneroestes of

78 the Gaesatae and return home to deposit their spoils. Unlike previously when they argued over their loot and succumbed to their self destructive impulses, the Gauls now display the Hellenic virtue of temperance and control their individual urges for the sake of the greater collective good.

As they were withdrawing north near Telamon, the Gauls, through the gathering of tactical intelligence and detailed observation, realized that they were in a disadvantageous position, with a Roman army blocking their retreat and another one

Polybius, Histories, 2.22.1. 78 Polybius, Histories, 2.26.5.

37 threatening their rear. Instead of acting impulsively and recklessly attacking the Romans at once with their attested thumos, as often depicted in Polybius' narrative, the Gauls displayed an unexpected amount of Hellenic foresight and arranged their forces in a well calculated manner which even Polybius considers "well adapted to the exigencies of the situation."79

Although the sight and sound of countless Gallic warriors in ordered formation had a terrifying affect on the Roman armies, the Gauls were still unable to create a panicked rout in the Roman forces. But through the course of the battle at Telamon, a majority of the Gauls, holding their ground despite substantial losses, demonstrated a steadfast commitment to duty and did not flee after the first charge. This resiliency is typically a Hellenic virtue ascribed to the Romans and its placement with the Gauls contradicts the stereotypical accusation of Gallic inconstancy reported throughout

Polybius and in other sources.

In the end, the victory of the Romans over the Gauls is attributed not to their

Hellenic virtue or courage, but to their superior military weaponry and unscrupulous tactics. The Roman forces, led by the consul Lucius Aemilius, had repeatedly hurled their javelins from a safe distance against the front lines of Gaesatae, whose shields were not large enough to provide adequate protection. When they realized that there was no way of resisting the volley of javelins or reaching the javelin throwers, the Gaesatae reverted back to typical barbarian behavior and either rushed to their deaths consumed by passion {thumos) or displayed typical Gallic inconstancy and fled the field. Despite this vital setback, the main body of Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci resolutely held their

79 Polybius, Histories, 2.28.6. 80 Polybius, Histories, 2.30.7.

38 positions, but they were eventually slaughtered to a man due to the inadequacy of their shields, as well as to the poor quality of their Gallic swords, which, Polybius claims, were only good for cutting and not thrusting.

In the conclusion to his account of Rome's Gallic wars, Polybius declares that the planning of the Gallic campaigns and their judgment shown in executing them was contemptible because in every instance the Gauls were driven by irrational passion

(thumos) rather than by calculated reasoning power (logismos). ! Polybius concludes his narrative with a statement that not only contradicts himself, but also negates the commendable actions carried out by the various Gallic tribes at Telamon. Although the

Gauls do not belong to a state or uphold a constitution and are therefore not entitled to logismos, Polybius depicts the Gauls at Telamon as demonstrating the Hellenic virtues of collective planning, temperance, foresight, and commitment to duty and then conveniently disregards this characterization.

Polybius allows the Gauls to display a share of Hellenic virtue in a way that makes them similar to the Romans, but ignores the implications of his comparison.

Polybius' Gauls are capable of rising above their own natures and demonstrating Hellenic and by extension, Roman, virtues, but only when certain circumstances, such as territory confiscation and possible annihilation, occur. Since the Gauls exhibit virtuous behavior only out of desperation, Polybius does not credit them with any great distinction.

Nevertheless, their display of Roman virtues, albeit rudimentary, as well as their semi-

Roman system of clientage, combine to create an image of the Gauls that highlights their potential Roman-ness.

Polybius, Histories, 2.35.3.

39 The victory over the Gauls at Telamon, although significant and dramatic in

Polybius' narrative, did not completely defeat Gallic opposition to Roman dominion nor did it eliminate the Roman fear of a Gallic invasion. After Telamon, the Romans advanced over the Po River and undertook a series of successful campaigns against the

Liguriams and Insubres, eventually founding the Latin colonies of Cremona and Placentia in 218 BC. In the next two decades the Romans had constant battles with various Gallic tribes, who were fighting on their own account in the north and as contingents in

Hannibal's Carthaginian army on his campaigns throughout Italy. Their service under

Hannibal reaffirmed the Roman perception of the Gauls as a constant threat and a ready military resource for Rome's enemies.

After the end of the second Punic war, the Romans spent the years 203-190 BC subjecting and displacing all the Gauls north and south of the Po in a series of campaigns, which eventually produced a continuous military presence in the region, along with

or settlements and infrastructure. Despite the victories they achieved and the colonies they founded, the Romans were never able to attain a complete sense of security because incidents involving Gallic aggression towards the Roman military presence, insurrection in the northern peninsula, and invasion from across the Alps kept occurring well into the first century BC, thus ensuring the continuous existence of at least a fraction of the Gallic specter. By this time, the act of fearing the Gauls had become a matter of Roman tradition, which was expected rather than deserved.

J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 15. H. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 115. J. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon, p. 96. H. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 114.

40 Before Caesar, victory over the Gauls was a fleeting accomplishment, one which politicians used as a means of obtaining a triumph, enriching themselves with plunder, and earning prestige to accelerate their political careers, but it was never regarded as a permanent end to Gallic hostilities. The fear of Gallic warfare remained prevalent in the state for so long because Rome did not possess a general who was willing to take the fight directly to the source of its strength and engage in a protracted war of conquest rather than just the suppression of rebellion or punitive action. Julius Caesar, utilizing centuries' worth of fear and unresolved tension as his basis for action, brought about the wholesale subjugation of Gaul in Rome's name because he wanted to be the man responsible for delivering the state from an old enemy and avenging an ancient defeat, thus guaranteeing his position for posterity.

41 CHAPTER 3. CAESAR'S USE OF FEAR AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE GALLIC CONQUEST

When Julius Caesar was appointed governor of Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum, and

Transalpine Gaul in 58 BC, the senate instructed him to take measures appropriate to the defense of Roman jurisdiction. Although these instructions gave him a certain measure of leeway in Gaul, Caesar nevertheless had to justify his military campaigns and involvement in Gallic affairs beyond Rome's sphere of influence. Caesar, like Marius, his uncle and legendary predecessor, wanted to achieve victories over worthy enemies in order to hone the skills of his army and to further his own reputation as a general. The victories that he needed, however, were unlikely to come directly from the Gauls nearest to the Roman province. The Gauls, although traditionally regarded as a potential threat to

Rome, had offered little in the way of aggression since the early second century. In addition, the lackluster response of the Gallic resistance to the Germanic invasions of the

Cimbri and Teutones in 109 BC revealed the extent to which the majority of the Gauls had lost their previous martial capabilities and become dependent on Rome for protection.

Faced with this decrease in Gallic ferocity, Caesar chose to emphasize the weaknesses of Rome's longstanding Gallic allies, the Aedui, in order to initiate and justify his first military campaigns in Gaul in the first book of the Bellum Gallicum.

Caesar represents the danger to Rome from the Gauls as arising in part from the pressure they were experiencing from Germanic peoples and in part from the nature of the Gauls

L. Raditsa, "Julius Caesar and his Writings," p. 421.

42 themselves. The weak actions of the Aedui in response to both the invasion of the

Helvetii and the takeover of Ariovistus demonstrate that the Gauls by themselves are not a military threat to Rome; rather it is their easy submission to foreign influences that causes the most anxiety among the Romans. This anxiety centered upon the fear that another invasion, similar to that of the Cimbri and Teutones, would arise to threaten

Rome, particularly because the Aedui lacked the capabilities of adequately defending the

Roman province. When Caesar draws attention to Gallic weakness, he shifts the attention of his Roman audience away from their original fear of the Gauls in general to the fear of an invasion that Gallic weakness might bring upon Rome.

Book one, out of the entire BG, contains the most explicit references to themes of justification. Caesar mentions the upholding or redeeming of Rome's honor, the defense of deserving allies, and the need to defend the province and Italy from invasion before he engages the Helvetii.88 In addition to these more blatant statements, Caesar employs three subtle literary devices in order to present his justification in a manner that increases the audience's perception of theBG's overall objectivity. First, Caesar refers to himself in the third person, which creates a distance between the character of Caesar and the impersonal narrator in the BG. Next, when Caesar was contemplating the problem posed by Ariovistus, the narrator offers a glimpse of Caesar's internal narrative in order to

on generate a greater rapport with the audience with the use of privileged information.

Thirdly, the narrator depicts a dialogue between Caesar and Ariovistus where Caesar is given the opportunity not only to make his case for an aggressive response against

Ariovistus, but also to rebut any and all accusations of self-serving motivations. Caesar's

87 J. Gardner, "The Gallic Menace in Caesar's Propaganda," p. 182. 88 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.10.2; 1.11.2; 1.12.6. 89 A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 193. 43 use of blatant justifications and subtle literary devices, in combination with the exaggerated depictions of Aeduan weakness, work together to create the perception that

Caesar's actions are legitimate.

i) the weakness of the Aedui

Caesar's assertions about the importance of Rome's relationship with the Aedui, the most Romanized tribe of the Gauls, are supported by ancient evidence. By 121 BC, the Aedui had been given the unique title offratres consanguinesque by the senate, and they participated in Rome's victory over the Arverni in that year. Their involvement in that victory led to the development of close economic ties with Rome, which in turn enabled them to acquire a dominant political and economic position over the other tribes in Gaul.90 The Aeduan leader Diviciacus came before the senate in 61 BC to ask for assistance against the invading Germans. x In a letter to Atticus in 61 BC concerning the state of affairs in Rome, Cicero comments on the recent defeat of the Aedui, whom he calls fratres nostri, which, although translated favorably as "our brethren", denotes a relationship of unequal status and obligation between this Gallic tribe and Rome.

Caesar's contention that the unique position of the Aedui compels his involvement in

no

Gaul is rooted in the historical record.

According to the narrative of the Bellum Gallicum, the war in Gaul began mostly as a desperately needed attempt to protect an ally. The two conflicts described in book 1, first against the Helvetii and later against Ariovistus and the Germans were set in motion

90 C. Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, p. 66. 91 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 204. 92 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, 1.19. T. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians, p. 109.

44 by attacks upon the Aedui. When the Helvetii were ravaging their lands, the Aedui sent deputies to Caesar, begging him to defend their people and property from the invaders because they could not do it themselves (se suaque ab eis defendere non possent).

Caesar later tells the commander of the Helvetii that appropriate compensation to the

Aedui and their allies will avert the Roman attack (si Aeduis de iniuriis quas ipsis sociisque eorumintulerint, item si Allobrogibus satisfaciant). Caesar's insistence on the

Aedui's need for his help allows him to present this attack as purely defensive and justified. What is more, it encourages his audience to regard the Gauls as helpless in the face of danger. Since they lack the ability to defend themselves against external threats, the Aedui are a hindrance rather then a help to Rome's security. Their weak military performance makes them a liability to Italy's territorial defense against invasion.

After successfully repelling the Helvetian invasion, another opportunity for a military campaign in defense of the Aedui soon presented itself to Caesar. After many

Gallic chieftains came from all parts of central Gaul to congratulate him for his recent success, Caesar learned that the Germans, led by Ariovistus, had overrun Gallic territory and taken hostages from the Gauls. The Aedui and other Gallic tribes, as before with the

Helvetii, are helpless and in tears. Behind closed doors and with much effeminate weeping at Caesar's feet, the Gauls, through their Aeduan spokesman Diviciacus, beg him to protect them from the German king (sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt).96 The weaker his allies appear, the more important it is that Caesar protect them.

Caesar, Gallic War, 1.11. Caesar, Gallic War, 1.14. Caesar, Gallic War, 1.31.

45 Diviciacus was a chief and priest of the Aedui, whom Caesar had restored to his former place of influence and honor out of great affection. Despite the seditious behavior of Dumnorix, his rebellious brother, Diviciacus is always pictured as loyal to Caesar and working for Rome's best interests. But Diviciacus, like the Aedui as a whole, is portrayed as relatively powerless and emotional. He is unable to compel his people to provide grain supplies for Caesar's army. He weeps and begs for Caesar to spare Dumnorix, but he cannot compel his good behavior (multis cum lacrimis.. .cumpluribus verbis flens a

Caesarepeteret). Caesar's affection earns Diviciacus forgiveness and protection, but he cannot escape being depicted as weak.

Caesar's depiction of his interactions with the Aedui, and especially Diviciacus, highlights the audience's perception that they are helpless. The Aedui are frequently shown weeping and begging for mercy. After Caesar defeated the Helvetii, they begged him to spare their lives (seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent), using language, particularly the forms of petere,flere, and ad pedes proicere, which is similarly found in the earlier plea of Diviciacus on behalf of his brother and in

no his later plea for Roman aid against Ariovistus. The Aedui, allegedly an honored

Roman ally, are described in a way that puts them on equal footing with a conquered enemy. The portrayal of the Aedui as weak and helpless increases the audience's perception of Caesar's power, while simultaneously providing a justification for further military action.

Through the speech of Diviciacus, Caesar reveals how strife between two Gallic political parties led to a destabilization of the balance of power in Gaul that ultimately put

97 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.16-20. Caesar, Gallic War, 1.27.

46 Rome's security and trade relations in jeopardy. The Sequani, in order to gain an advantage over their rivals the Aedui, asked Ariovistus to bring his warriors to their aid in

71 BC." About ten years later, he inflicted a severe defeat on the Aedui and their allies at

Magetobriga, which overthrew the political and economical arrangements Rome had centered on the Aedui since the defeat of the Arverni in 121 BC. Although his assistance had enabled them to defeat their rivals, Ariovistus eventually crushed the

Sequani, depriving them of two-thirds of their territory and reducing them to a state of near slavery. Diviciacus informed Caesar that the German mercenaries had settled after their victory and that there were a 120,000 Germans presently in Gaul.

Diviciacus warned Caesar that if he failed to intervene, the Gauls would have no other option except to flee from German oppression. If Caesar did not stop the crossing of the Germans over the Rhine, a tidal wave of further German migration would wash away the Gallic border and eventually overwhelm the Roman province in a manner similar to the massive invasions of the Cimbri and Teutones, who, with their victories over the

Romans at the end of the second century, had effectively replaced the Gauls as symbols of invasive destruction. When Caesar is asked to defend the whole of Gaul from the onslaught of Ariovistus {Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniuria posse defendere), he is

1 AT actually given the task of protecting Rome from the threat of another great invasion.

The current predicament in Gaul is a crisis that the Sequani, in their desire to tip the scales of Gallic power in their favor, have brought upon themselves and in turn inflicted upon Rome. Since they were too weak to defeat the Aedui on their own, they

99 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 204. 100 L. Raditsa, "Julius Caesar and his Writings," p. 421. 101 P. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 180; P. Wells, The Barbarians Speak, p. 73. 102 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.32.

47 appealed to outside German help. As a result, they overcame the Aedui, only to later be subjected by their mercenaries. The weakness of the Gallic character brought a German presence into Gaul, and their inability to remove this threat with military force led to an even greater migration of Germanic peoples. The actions of the Sequani towards the

Aedui brought about a situation in Gaul that inspired fear among the Roman audience because it reminded them of the early Germanic invasions of the Cimbri and Teutones.

Caesar has incited fear in his Roman audience, not of the Gauls, but of the dangers that

Rome might have to endure because of Gallic irresponsibility and weakness.

ii) the justification in Caesar's internal thought processes

After assuring the Gauls that he would use his authority to resolve the situation with Ariovistus (auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniuriis facturum), Caesar dismisses the chieftains and gives the matter serious deliberation.103 The impersonal narrator of the BG, whose voice is different from that of Caesar's character in the narrative, presents Caesar's three internal reasons for interfering with the Germans to his assumed senatorial audience. This information about Caesar's thoughts conveyed via the narrator is available to the audience, but not to the other characters and is designed to generate rapport with the audience by openly reporting how Caesar considered the best resolution to his current problem.

First, Caesar reaffirmed the singular status of Rome's allies the Aedui as brothers and kinsmen (fratres consanguineosque) and exaggerated their plight, depicting them as being kept in servitude by the Germans. Caesar regarded their current condition of

Caesar, Gallic War, 1.33. 104 Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 193-4.

48 subjection as a source of profound disgrace. He represents Anovistus assault on the

Aedui as a blow to himself and to the Roman state (in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et reipublicae esse). 05 Yet their situation must have been well known to him when he procured Ariovistus' recognition as king and friend of Rome.

The act of bringing succor to the Aedui had less to do with the defense of allies and more with the act of upholding the honor of Rome, which was significantly dependent on her ability to prove that she was capable of defending her allies when they needed it. Regardless of Caesar's previous association with Ariovistus, the text, while not acknowledging any fault from Caesar, implies that Rome's honor had been reduced because of the lack of intervention on the Aedui's behalf and that Caesar planned to rectify the blight on Rome. Caesar's attack on the Germans is represented as necessary, not just for peace in Gaul, but for Roman dignity as well.

The situation, however, was further complicated because one Roman friend was attacking another. Although Ariovistus had inflicted a critical defeat on Rome s long standing allies the Aedui, who then appealed to Rome for aid, the Senate concluded a treaty with him because they wanted to use his forces as a bulwark against a possible invasion or attack from the Dacian king Bourebista and his massive army near the

1 07

Danube. Both the Senate and Caesar, the consul of 59 BC, recognized Ariovistus as a

'king and friend of the Roman people' {rex atque amicus) and refrained from marching 10R against him. By this act, Caesar was both playing for time until he should arrive in

Gaul with enough strength to suppress Rome's new 'friend' and deliberately arranging 105 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.33 106 R. Seager, "Caesar and Gaul: Some Perspectives on the Bellum Gallicum," p. 19. 107 D. 6 hOgain, The Celts, p. 145. 108 Caesar, Gallic War, 135. conditions for a more extensive Roman military intervention in Gaul. Even though

Rome bestowed this honor on Ariovistus, the ties of friendship formed outside the province with the Aedui gave the Romans what they could regard as a just cause for intervention in Gaul whenever it suited them.

Since Ariovistus was a friend of Rome, the justification for a campaign against him needed more than the official policy of defense of Roman allies. In the end, Caesar laid the most stress on the German menace and the need to protect the province of Gallia

Narbonensis and eventually Italy itself from any threat of invasion. The Gauls by themselves are not a threat to Rome; it is their passive compliance to foreign forces that causes the most fear and anxiety among the Romans. Caesar had to suppress Ariovistus, who had steadily increased the number of his forces in Gaul since the battle at

Magetobriga to 120,000, in order to prevent him from gathering more Germans from

11? across the Rhine. If not, the Germans would become too powerful for the Gauls to oppose or endure and they would force the Gallic tribes to mass migrate, leaving the

Roman borders without a protective buffer. In their desire to achieve safety, the Gauls, with their reacquired mobility and quest for land, would then revert back to being a threat to Roman territory.

If Caesar followed Rome's ineffective policy of non-intervention and allowed

Ariovistus to increase his hold over the Gauls, the German forces would continue to grow unopposed in Gaul and eventually pour across the Gallic borders. Using the strength of their overwhelming numbers, the Germans, like the Cimbri and Teutones before them,

109 H. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 126. 110 P. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 180. 111 J. Gardner, "The 'Gallic Menace' in Caesar's Propaganda," p. 184. 1'2 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.31.

50 would then be able to cross the frontier into the province because, aside from the Rhone

River, a sufficient buffer state still did not exist between it and the Sequani {cum

Sequanos aprovincia nostra Rhodanus divideret). Although he has no intention of allowing such an action to take place, the narrator presents this unfavorable oiitcome in order to persuade his audience into believing that Caesar's measures against Ariovistus are preventative rather than provocative. The implication is that Caesar, unlike his predecessor Marius, has decided to defeat these northern barbarians before they have reached their potential and become a real threat to Rome's security like the Cimbri and

Teutones.

The Cimbri and Teutones were Germanic tribes from beyond the Rhine who first invaded the Roman province and defeated the consular army of M. Junius Silanus in 109

BC. The Tigurini, the allies of the Cimbri, killed the consul C. Cassius Longinus in 107

BC and forced the survivors of his army to give hostages, surrender their possessions, and walk humiliatingly under the yoke.114 In 105 BC, the Cimbri and Teutones inflicted the worst defeat in Rome's history at Arausio, where they routed and killed 80,000 Roman soldiers, as well as 40,000 auxiliaries. By the time Marius defeated them at Aquae

Sextiae in 102 BC, the Cimbri and Teutones, on account of the level of devastation they had inflicted in Gaul and on several Roman armies, had produced enough Roman fear to effectively replace the Gauls as the most terrifying symbol of invasive destruction.

Caesar capitalized on Roman fear of outsiders invading and destroying their world in order to justify his actions against Ariovistus. When Caesar mentions the Cimbri and Teutones, he evokes a complex but predictable response, not of fear, but of the cost

113 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.33. 114 Livy, Periochae, 65.5-6.

51 of unpreparedness.115 The Cimbri and Teutones were able to accomplish what they did against the Roman people partly because Rome's unwillingness to govern directly had led to a neglect in border security. Ariovistus and his forces, whose occupation of Gaul occurred in part because Roman favoritism had created an unrest among the Gauls, had the potential to threaten Rome, but only if Caesar displayed a similar reluctance to act.

The text both suggests that the Roman people are at risk and claims that they have nothing to fear, provided that they are prepared and well led by Caesar, who has bestowed upon himself the difficult tasks of solidifying border security and curbing

Gallic freedom.116 War with Ariovistus occurred, not as a result of Aeduan appeals, which had up till then been disregarded, but because of Caesar's decision to destroy a

117 potential menace to Rome at an opportune time of his choosing. Ariovistus' downfall, however, did not take place until after the narrator had displayed his egregious arrogance to the readers in a dramatic dialogue between him and Caesar. iii) the dialogue between Caesar and Ariovistus

In order to best illustrate Caesar's argument for immediate and decisive action against the Germans, the narrator depicts a dialogue between the two opponents, where

Caesar is represented as a good patron acting in the service of his clients and Ariovistus is portrayed as a barbarian, who ungratefully rejects Roman 'friendship' and arrogantly assumes a status comparable to that of Caesar. Given the context of the dialogue, the passage is worth consideration because it establishes Caesar's justification for his current

115 T. Burns, "Imperial Propaganda and the Barbarians: Marius, Caesar, and Augustus," p. 70. 116 R. Seager, "Caesar and Gaul: Some Perspectives in the Bellum Gallicum," p. 70. 117 P. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 181.

52 military exploits and offers his opinion as to why Rome's involvement in Gaul was completely legitimate.

Caesar, as governor of the Roman province, was charged with maintaining the

1 1 Q fragile balance of forces in the surrounding areas. He was at pains to depict himself as acting defensively in the best interests of the Roman people and as protecting friends and allies against injury rather than as a general seeking a war with Ariovistus out of a desire to enhance his own prestige and further Roman dominion.119 The purpose of this dialogue is to provide an image of Ariovistus exhibiting such a degree of arrogance and irreverence that the Roman audience would not only regard Caesar's later actions against him as justified, but also appreciated.

When they entered upon their dialogue at the mutually agreed time and place,

Caesar began his speech with a reference to the benefits that he and the senate had bestowed upon Ariovistus, such as the title of "king and friend of the Roman people" and other financial rewards, in order to remind him of his obligations that this distinction of

Rome's "friend" implied (swa senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit). Since

Ariovistus had accepted these gifts, he has become a Roman instrument, required to subordinate his interests for the sake of Rome's. After establishing himself as Ariovistus' patron, Caesar next proceeded to recount the long standing relationship between Rome and the Aedui, highlighting the fact that it was a Roman tradition to protect the property and influence of their allies (veteres quamque iustae causae necessitudinis ipsis cum

Haedui intercederent) }n Caesar then issued the same demands before: Ariovistus must

T. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians, p. 112. 119 P. A. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 175. 120 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 228. 121 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.43.

53 return his hostages to the Aedui and not make war on them; he must halt all further

German migration across the Rhine.

Ariovistus refused Caesar's demands and refuted his claims in a very candid and lengthy explanation. Speeches, however, were fictional parts of Roman literary genre or tools of the rhetorician's trade, and so Ariovistus does not truly speak to his audience, but rather Caesar does through another voice. Ariovistus declared that the Aedui had made war against him and lost, stating that it would be unjust of them to renege on the terms of their peace treaty, regardless of their status as Rome's allies (stipendium capere iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint). Moreover, Ariovistus proclaimed that he would renounce his status as Rome's friend if he had to choose between it and his control over the Aedui. Ariovistus, who has failed to realize that his acceptance of Roman friendship has already made him tributary to Rome and his easy dismissal of it (non minus libenter sese recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam), exhibits an insolence that further justified military action against him.124

In his speech, the narrator had Ariovistus pose the question which might have been asked in Rome by Caesar's detractors and challenged both Caesar's and Rome's locus standi to interfere in a territory of Gaul that was positioned much further north than the uncontested Roman province of Gallia Narbonensis. But since the question is spoken through the voice of Ariovistus, the arrogant and irreverent archetype of barbarianism, the narrator has intentionally demeaned its importance.

Caesar, Gallic War, 1.43. T. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians, p. 113. Caesar, Gallic War, 1.44. C. Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, p. 79.

54 Ariovistus defended his own presence in Gaul, asserting his right to occupy a region which he had acquired by force of arms before the Roman army had ever arrived

{seprius in Galliam venisse quampopulum Romanum). Throughout his speech,

Ariovistus presumed to regard Caesar as an equal, reminding him that they were both conquerors and suggesting that they carve up the different regions of Gaul between them.

Moreover, Ariovistus called in to question Rome's obligation towards the Aedui, who neither gave assistance to the Romans during a recent campaign against the rebellious

Allobroges nor received any aid from the Roman people against him and the Sequani. He accused Caesar of feigning a friendship with the Aedui as an excuse to keep an army in his territory in order to crush him (simulata Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui opprimendi causa habere).

In reply to Ariovistus' challenge of prior right and his accusation of false motivations, Caesar mentions Rome's duty to her allies, but does not depend on the requests of the Aedui to disguise his purpose. Using the events of 121 BC as a defining moment in both Gallic and Roman history, Caesar uncompromisingly proves that Rome's

1 9-7 right to be in Gaul is an absolute right, not just a better right than that of Ariovistus.

Multa ab Caesare in earn sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset: Neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati uti optime merentes socios desereret, neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani. Bello superatos esse Avernos et Rutenos ab Quinto Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium imposuisset. Quod si antiquissmum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello legibus uti voluisset.

Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]: "why he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman people's practice would suffer him to

126 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.44.10. 127 R. Seager, "Caesar and Gaul: Some Perspectives in the Bellum Gallicum," p. 21.

55 abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And if the most ancient period was to be regarded—then was the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the Senate was to be observed/then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws.

Caesar's reply asserts that, on the basis of the great victory of Fabius over the Arverni

1 ?Q and Ruteni in 121 BC, the Romans had acquired the right to virtually all of Gaul. This would follow from the fact that the Arverni, at the time of their defeat, had previously forced many Gallic tribes to pay them tribute. Since the Arverni, and all the former clients of the Arverni, had become dependents of the Roman people, public opinion had exaggerated the numbers of subdued regions to include all Gaul. Furthermore, if the age of the claim was to be the criterion that proved who deserved Gaul, Rome's imperium in

Gaul surpassed that of Ariovistus because it had existed before the arrival of the Germans by fifty years.

As dependents under the conditions of the Roman patronage system, the Gauls were both entitled to Roman protection and deprived of their right to refuse Roman interference.130 The act of protecting the Gauls would later serve the Romans as a reasonable pretext for involvement in wars with peoples who had hitherto lain beyond

Rome's sphere of influence. Likewise, any act of rebellion committed by the Gauls would be regarded as a breach of faith and sufficient grounds for a punitive expedition against them. Thus, the original subjugation of the Gallic tribes and their inclusion within

1ZS Caesar, Gallic War, 1.45.2-3. 129 C. Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, p. 79. E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p.7. 131 P. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 170.

56 the patronage system in 121 BC created a pretext for repeated Roman campaigning and later expansion in Gaul.

According to Caesar, Fabius Maximus had conquered the Arverni and Ruteni, but the Roman people had afterwards pardoned them, deciding not to provincialize them nor impose tribute. Rome's generous treatment to the Gauls from the onset, which brought about the partial restoration of legal rights to the recently conquered, was not an abnormal aspect of Roman foreign policy, but its leniency would contribute to the rebellious attitude of the Allobroges in the seventies and sixties.132 When Caesar pointed out that the Ruteni and Arverni were not reduced to provincial status, the implication is that they should have been, but the Senate had been unwilling to take up the burden of direct administration. If that had been the case, Rome would have developed a stronger buffer state in Gaul, which might have been able to prevent the Germanic incursions of the Cimbri and Teutones.

In addition to issuing their pardon, Caesar maintains that the Senate had wished that the Gauls would have the freedom to observe their own laws. This allowance of freedom was a standard instrument of Roman foreign policy and was designed to minimize Rome's responsibilities to the Gauls while reinforcing her right to interfere.

The conferral of freedom was an act of grace and self-interest on Rome's part, which also debarred anyone else from taking it away from them.134 Under the privileged title of a

'free state', Gaul was free from tribute, foreign garrisons, and treaties with overpowering non-Roman 'allies'.135 The current predicament with Ariovistus and the Sequani,

132 D. 6 hOgain, The Celts, p. 139. 133 C. Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, p. 79. 134 P. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 181. 1 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 40.

57 however, proved that the Senate had accorded a level of freedom to the Gauls which did not do enough to reduce their strength and curb their competitive rivalry. It also confirmed that greater restrictions were necessary in order to temper the instability of

Gallic character and ensure Roman security.

Caesar asserted that the Senate had long ago decided that Gaul would remain free, thereby serving as a buffer to the Roman province to the south, but the Gallic buffer between Rome and barbarism had proven inadequate due to a scarcity of Roman interference and an overabundance of Gallic freedom (libertas). Caesar would improve upon it by establishing tighter controls, thereby reducing personal freedom in exchange for greater stability. What Caesar meant by "control," however, was the extension and reaffirmation of patronage networks, which would be brought about by fresh subjugation, and not bureaucratic systems or political accountability. But unlike his predecessors,

Caesar would go beyond the limits of his province and seize any pretext to deprive all the

Gallic tribes of their liberty, a privilege which their previous actions had proven them unworthy.

iv) self-fulfilling justification after book one

Following the defeat of Ariovistus, there is little allusion to book one's predominant themes of justification, which were the upholding of Rome's honor, the defense of deserving allies, and the need to defend the province and Italy from

1 ^8 invasion. Likewise, there are few glimpses into Caesar's thought processes and no other depictions of a dialogue between Caesar and another character. The narrator no

136 C. Ebel, Transalpine Gaul, p. 80. T. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians, p. 113. 138 R. Seager, "Caesar and Gaul: Some Perspectives on the Bellum Gallicum" p. 20. longer considers such justifications, blatant or otherwise, as necessary. The rebellious behavior of the Gauls, beginning in the second book, is all the justification Caesar needs for continued campaigning.

After the pressure from the Germanic peoples was removed, the danger to Rome's security now arose from the Gallic display of treachery and ingratitude, which was precipitated by Caesar's presence in Gaul and his demands on the Gallic tribes.139 When

Caesar subdued the Belgae and the Nervii and first deemed that all Gaul was pacified

(omni Galliapacata), he meant that its peoples had become subjects to the Romans

(subiecti atque obnoxii) and deprived of their libertas. As a result, they were required to obey Caesar's instructions without question, supply military contingents and foodstuffs, and accept the quartering of the legions in their territories and the burden of tribute.1 l The severity of the demands, which were customary for conquered peoples but new to the Gallic tribes, repeatedly provoked the Gauls into rebelling against their Roman patrons. Caesar's treatment of the Gauls, which was harsher than Rome's previous foreign policy, created a cycle of rebellion and suppression that justified his continued presence in the region.

When other tribes, such as the Veneti, observed Caesar's impositions, they chose to attack his forces rather than comply. From their perspective, they were defending their liberty and refusing to submit to Roman slavery. Caesar, however, regarded their actions as a treacherous rebellion (rebellio facta post dediditionem) and an ungrateful breach of faith to the terms of their surrender, which required the utmost punishment.142 Caesar was

139 A. Kahn, "Vercingetorix—A New Play," p. 254. 140 P. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 181. 141 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.22. 142 Caesar, Gallic War, 3.10.

59 not surprised that the Gauls should decide on this course of action because he knew that all men had a natural love of liberty and a hatred of slavery {libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse). Caesar acknowledged that his opponents were fighting for liberty, but he did not concede that his subjects had any right to be free of Roman rule.143

Caesar chose to emphasize Gallic motivation in order to elevate his campaign, but he accomplished it in a manner which did not demean the Roman cause. For Caesar, freedom was a privilege only for those equipped to enjoy it, such as the Roman people, and he never acknowledged the Gallic insistence that freedom was their natural right.

From a Roman perspective, the Gauls had been defeated, ties of friendship

(amicitia) had been established, and the gift (beneficium) of freedom had been conferred, which created the obligation (officium) of obedience in the recipients.145 After their defeat in 121 BC, the Gauls had forfeited their libertas and entered into a patronage relationship with Rome, losing their previous status of intimidating enemies in the process. They became Roman dependents, who must be protected or punished like children, and much of their ability to inspire fear was reduced. Rome may have bestowed a measure of freedom on the Gallic peoples out of self interest, but the lackluster response of the Gauls towards the Cimbri and Teutones and their lack of foresight regarding the machinations of Ariovistus proved that they were unable to handle the burden of even partial freedom.

Caesar played upon the Roman fear of an invasion, and not the Gauls in general, to initiate his first campaigns against Ariovistus. When that threat was removed, Caesar's initial subjugation of different Gallic tribes and his rejection of Rome's lenient policy of non-intervention and freedom led to a large scale uprising throughout Gaul. Caesar's

143 P. Brunt, "Laus Imperii," p. 183. 144 A. Kahn, "Vercingetorix—A New Play," p. 253. 145 R. Seager, "Caesar and Gaul: Some Perspectives on the Bellum Gallicum," p. 23-4.

60 severity and the constant pressure of the Roman army on their territory unified the Gauls and inspired such a unanimous desire to seize freedom that the benefits and the memory of friendship were not enough to keep them loyal to their patrons (neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria).146 As a result of this unification, Caesar was able to crush the Gauls in an overwhelming victory at Alesia and achieve such heights of military glory that no one could surpass him.

Caesar, Gallic War, 7.76.2

61 CHAPTER 4. THE USE OF ROMAN FEAR AS A WEAPON IN THE BG

i) Sabinus and the pretense of fear

But to Caesar the conduct of war was, above all, an exercise of the mind—what he calls ratio belli147—which must not be clouded by over-confidence or by under-confidence.148

Within the narrative of the Bellum Gallicum, Julius Caesar and his subordinates,

Q. Titurius Sabinus and T. Atius Labienus, striving to compensate for the combined disadvantages of numerical inferiority and unfavorable terrain, each executed a similar stratagem to increase Gallic confidence to a level of self-destructive arrogance. Hoping to promote this deception, Caesar and his legates deployed their forces and fortified their camps in a way that earned the enemy's greatest contempt and incited Gallic temerity.

Affecting an exaggerated version of their fear of the Gauls, who readily believed in their established ability to inspire terror, the Romans were able to exploit the careless overconfidence of the Gallic response. The Gauls, given their numerical superiority, martial reputation, and history of victories over Rome, regarded expressions of Roman fear as contemptible yet justified, and were thus easily deceived.

When Caesar and his subordinates exaggerated this impression of Roman fearfulness, they were both acknowledging the preexisting nature of the Gallo-Roman relationship, which centered on the fear of a Gallic invasion of Italy and the destruction of Rome, and implying that the Roman perception of the Gallic threat had undergone a vital alteration. Although the Romans still regarded the Gauls as a potential threat to their city, the exposure they had acquired through repeated conflicts with northern barbarians

Caesar. Gallic War, 4.1; 8.6. F. Adcock, Caesar as Man of Letters, p. 52.

62 had diminished the intimidation of the Gallic specter and endowed the Romans with a greater level of confidence.149 Moreover, the damage inflicted by the Germanic invasions of the Cimbri and Teutones in the first century BC and the subsequent manipulation of the historical record by Marius' adherents had removed the Gauls from their original role as Rome's chief barbarian threat. In their place were the Germans, whom the Romans had come to associate with invasion and Rome's fourth century sack more than the Gauls.

Since the BG was written after these changes had taken place, the narrator justifiably begins his narrative with an unimposing depiction of the Gauls, who are considered less of a menace than the Germans. For a majority of the narrative, various

Gallic tribes labor under the misguided belief that they are still able to intimidate the

Romans into cowering in fear. Initially, the Gallic tribes more distant from Rome are not yet aware that the Roman perception of the Gauls has changed. Only through the progressive deceptions of Sabinus, Caesar, and Labienus and their disastrous outcomes do all the Gauls come to the realization that their martial confidence is unfounded and that the fear-evoking capabilities of their forces have considerably diminished. After suffering such losses, the Gauls in the eighth and final book of the BG could not be tempted into a reckless engagement, despite Caesar's pains to create the fa§ade of a fearful and undersized Roman army. The Gallic tribes in the final book also employ a higher degree of cunning in their dealings with the Romans, as illustrated by the multiple attempts to plot ambushes (insidiae).150 Their experiences with the Romans have tempered their confidence to a more cautious level, taught the Gauls to be suspicious of

See the previous chapter for an in depth explanation as to how and why the Roman perception of the Gauls changed due to events preceding the BG. 150 Caesar, Gallic War, 8.7; 8,12; 8.16-20; 8.23; 8.48.

63 any semblance of timorousness, and instilled in them a greater sense of regard toward their Roman adversaries.

According to Strabo, it was the custom of the Gauls to come together openly and without circumspection, so that for those who wish to defeat them by stratagem, they become easy to deal with and can be defeated all at once.151 Strategic maneuvering may be the most effective way of handling the Gallic threat, but the use of such trickery in a campaign has negative connotations within the narrative. When the Helvetian leader

Divico diminished Caesar's victory over the single canton attempting to cross the Arar, he remarked that the Helvetii had learned from their fathers and all their ancestors to fight with courage (virtus), rather than by trickery (dolo) or relying on ambushes (insidiis).

The narrator of the Gallic War has created an underlying opposition between courage and trickery, which at first suggests that traps and other deceptive tactics, including those carried out by Caesar and his legates, are contrary to acceptable methods of conducting warfare.

Trickery, however, is not limited to false impressions, but also encapsulates the technical skills involved in siege warfare and premeditated planning. For example, after the Romans successfully assaulted Avaricum, Vercingetorix tried to reassure his men by undervaluing the Roman success and said that the Romans were not victorious because of their courage on the battlefield, but because they had employed artifice (artificio) and skill in taking towns (scientia oppugnationis). Caesar, for his part, also belittled the victory of Ariovistus over the Helvetii and said that he had conquered them more by

Strabo, Geography, 4.4.2. Caesar, Gallic War, 1.13.6. Caesar, Gallic War, 7.29.2. planning (ratione) and calculation (consilio) than by courage.154 Victories that are accomplished more through martial courage than strategy or technology are considered worthier on both sides, but the use of stratagem, technical skill, and preparation by both the Romans and the Gauls suggests that these tactics are better described as levels in a hierarchy of methods than as fundamental opposites.155 Nevertheless, the narrator of the

BG is determined to make a distinction between legitimate strategy and illegitimate trickery in an effort to remove any allegation of impropriety from Roman victories. In order to best illustrate this difference, the narrator relates two instances where Caesar's legate, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, manages both to deceive the Venelli through the pretense of fear and in turn to be deceived by Ambiorix and the Eburones through their pretense of weakness, which involved the vital element of Roman fear of the Germans. In both instances, the narrator stresses the usefulness of fear as a psychological weapon, which determines the success or failure of Roman and Gallic subterfuge.

After the defeat of the Veneti in Book 3, the narrator of the BG describes how the

Romans first employed the impression of cowardice to bring about a Gallic defeat.

Sabinus was encamped in the territory of the Venelli, who were allies of the Veneti, with a force of three legions, probably about 12000 men. The chief of the Venelli, Viridovix, was the leader of all the revolting states in that region, who had raised a considerable army and levies for his rebellion. In addition to these forces, neighboring tribes, called the Aulerci, Eburovices, and the Lexovii had overthrown their aristocratic governments and joined their forces with Viridovix. A throng of bandits and vagrants iperditorum hominum latronumque) had also arrived from all Gaul, wishing to rebel for the sake of

154 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.40.8. 155 A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 101.

65 acquiring plunder. The language employed and the course of events reported evoke imagery of a Gallic army that is a dissolute and rebellious rabble of intemperate thieves, who are barely controlled by their brigand leader, Viridovix. This imagery presents the

Gauls in a manner that alludes to the traditional account of the sack of Rome and the origins of Roman fear. Faced with the vast number of the opposing forces, Sabinus was reluctant to engage in an actual confrontation despite the fact that Viridovix led his army before the Roman camp on a daily basis.157

Although Sabinus' reluctance was suitable to his circumstances, his actions did not display the typical Roman reaction to insurrection, which was to seize the initiative and mount an immediate offensive to create an impression of overwhelming force far greater than the reality of Roman military strength available at that time.158 The narrator repeatedly attributes such a bold response to Caesar, who often gathered whatever troops were available, struck as fast as possible, and crushed rebellions before they could gain momentum. His legates, however, do not demonstrate a similar freedom of action towards the enemy, but are esteemed for their display of caution and methodical preparation concerning the sufficient accumulation and transportation of supplies for a protracted campaign.1 In the later Civil War commentaries, Caesar states explicitly that the role of a legate is to do everything according to orders (omnia agere ad praescriptum), while a general should take measures freely to the greatest advantage

(libere ad summam rerum consulere). But since the Gauls associate a swift offensive

156 J. Barlow, "Noble Gauls and their other in Caesar's Propaganda," p. 146. 157 Caesar, Gallic War, 3.17. 158 A. Goldsworthy, '"Instinctive Genius': The Depiction of Caesar the General," p. 197-9. 159 Caesar, Gallic War, 7.6-13; 8.3-13. 160 A. Goldsworthy, '"Instinctive Genius': The Depiction of Caesar the General," p. 200. 161 Caesar, Civil War, 3.51.

66 with confidence and victory, the inactivity on the part of Sabinus, although commendable and appropriate to his rank, was interpreted as weakness and uncertainty, which encouraged the number and temerity of the rebels to grow.

Sabinus confined his army within a well placed camp not out of cowardice, but because he believed that a legate should not engage (legato non dimicandum) such a large hostile force in Caesar's absence.162 Sabinus had been initially instructed by Caesar to keep Viridovix's motley force away from the Veneti (manum distinendam curet) and in his obedience to that directive, he is acknowledging his subordinate place and relationship with his general at all times.163 Unless the Romans occupied favorable ground or an exceptional opportunity arose, Sabinus was unwilling to overstep his authority as a legate and risk the safety of Caesar's army in a bold manner akin to that of a general. As a result of his cautious decision to postpone an offensive in favor of a stratagem, Sabinus gave the impression that the Romans did not have the confidence to defeat the Gallic rebellion and thus increased enemy morale. At some point, Sabinus must have become aware of the effect his caution was having on the confidence of the enemy and decided to use it to his advantage.

While still demonstrating the most important attributes of a legate, caution and obedience, Sabinus brought about the conditions necessary for him to act.164 First,

Sabinus' unwillingness to depart from his camp earned him the contempt of the enemy

(hostibus in contemptionem). Secondly, his cautious hesitation created such an impression of cowardice {opinionem timoris) that the enemy was now daring (auderent) to come all the way up to the rampart of the camp. His showing of fear may have

Caesar, Gallic War, see 3.11 for Sabinus' orders and 3.17 for Sabinus' reasons. 163 K. Welch, "Caesar and His Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries," p. 93. 164 K. Welch, "Caesar and His Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries," p. 93.

67 exceeded his expectations because even his own troops began to reproach his behavior and think that he actually was afraid.165 Thirdly and most importantly, Sabinus solicited a

Gaul with rewards and promises to go over to the enemy in the guise of a deserter and instructed him to play the part of agent provocateur through the spread of disinformation.

The Gaul's task was to divulge all sorts of misleading intelligence about the dire psychological and physical straits which the Roman soldiers were experiencing in order to incite Gallic temerity.1 6 The persuasiveness of his speech was the critical element upon which the success of the whole ruse depended. The pretend deserter related to them the timorem Romanorum, mentioned that Caesar was experiencing difficulties in subduing the Veneti, and revealed that Sabinus was planning to withdraw his army and go to Caesar's assistance.

When the Gauls heard this speech, their entire contingent shouted that they should march immediately upon the camp. The Gauls readily believed the story partly because they knew that the Gallic provisions would not last much longer, but mostly because the information fitted to their perceptions of the situation and catered to what they wanted to hear {quod volunt, credunt): the Veneti were proving too much for Caesar, who needed

Sabinus to retreat from Venelli territory and rescue him from his present difficulties, and the Romans, as was their usual response, were terrified of Gallic numbers and strength.

Although the pretend deserter provided information which inspired the Gauls to act rashly, he never said anything that was strictly false to the opposition. The Gaul's speech, although clearly part of a larger stratagem that manipulated Gallic weaknesses and hopes,

165 Caesar, Gallic War, 3.17. N. Austin and N. Rankov, Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople, p. 79. 167 Caesar, Gallic War, 3.18.

68 was not a complete fabrication and thus still remains within the bounds of legitimate strategy from a Roman perspective.

The testimony of the deserter, combined with the seemingly fearful hesitation

(cunctatio) of Sabinus, encouraged the Gallic tendency to join battle on unfavorable terms and further provoked the already negligible discipline of the Viridovix's ragtag

1 AS multitude. The persuaded soldiers took control of the council proceedings and would not allow Viridovix or the other leaders to leave until they had given their approval to attack Sabinus' camp (Viridovicem reliquosque duces ex concilia). The existence of an argumentative council suggests that the Gallic leaders were not providing a model of authoritative leadership. 9 Viridovix's inability to control his soldiers and the outcome of the council constituted a significant crisis of authority. When the rank and file, who were driven by individual desire for plunder, challenged Viridovix's authority, the Gallic army lost any semblance of order.170 Therefore, Sabinus' trickery is simply an exploitation of the fact that Viridovix does not have enough influence to master his Gallic army, which 1 71 lacks the skills and discipline of his own troops.

When the leading men finally gave their consent to attack, the Gauls revealed their uncivilized temperament and quickly rushed upon the well situated Roman camp, to be met with a perfectly timed sortie. The use of this tactic, which employs the advantage of surprise to its greatest effect, is reminiscent of an earlier episode with Ariovistus, where he attacked the Helvetii only after they had given up on an actual battle and were in the confused process of departing for home. Since Ariovistus had delayed his attack as

168 A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 102. 169 Caesar, Gallic War, 3.18. 170 J. Barlow, "Noble Gauls and their other in Caesar's Propaganda," p. 146. 171 A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 102.

69 long as possible, the Gauls must have regarded him with contempt similar to that of

1 -TO

Sabinus and displayed a comparable amount of overconfidence, given the end result. In both instances, Ariovistus and Sabinus surprised the Gauls, who immediately lost the will to fight and fled without even withstanding the first attack.

At this point in the narrative, Sabinus is a resourceful, courageous officer who saves his troops and puts down a massed revolt of the Venelli and their allies using a mixture of subterfuge and armed force. Sabinus' trickery, which relied heavily on a heightened display of fear, manipulated the weaknesses of Gallic character in order to create a situation that satisfied Sabinus' individual requirements for action without

Caesar's presence: the advantage of favorable ground {opportunitate loci) and a strategic opening too fortunate to pass up. This stratagem was effective because it used the pretense of fear to deform Gallic confidence into arrogance and deteriorate the partial discipline of the Gauls into absolute chaos, while still adhering to the restrictive parameters of a cautious and obedient Caesarian legate. Although this victory was won by tactics that rank lower than courage on Caesar's hierarchy of methods, it nevertheless establishes Sabinus' strategy as a perfectly acceptable and proven response for a conscientious legate facing difficult circumstances. The character of Sabinus, moreover, is not just an exemplum of a Roman legate practicing legitimate strategy over the enemy, but also an exemplum of the ideal Caesarian legate, who is constantly aware of Caesar's presence, regardless of distance, and acts or refrains from acting according to his perception of Caesar's preferences.

Caesar, Gallic War, 1.40.

70 Caesar described the action against the Venelli as a Sabina victoria, but the notice given to the whole episode is not substantial in contrast to the debacle of 54-53 BC where

Sabinus receives notorious limelight as the foolish dupe of Ambiorix's illegitimate Gallic trickery.173 Since the commendable portrait of Sabinus in the third book is so radically different from the rash fool of the fifth, the double representation of Sabinus is considered one of the clearest signs that each book was written close to the events it described and not substantially revised.174 Moreover, the portrait of Ambiorix, the cool headed and duplicitous general in the fifth book, also bears little resemblance to the

Ambiorix of later books, who wandered the countryside and hid in swamps like a vagabond, somehow avoiding Caesar's punishment. In a manner akin to Sabinus, the narrator allows Ambiorix to use a pretense, but in this case, of weakness, to create dissension among the commanding officers and bring about a deterioration of morale in the Roman army. In addition to his display of alleged weakness, Ambiorix also plays upon the Roman fear of the Germans to diminish Sabinus' confidence and bring about a

Gallic victory. But unlike that of Sabinus, the trickery of Ambiorix is excessive in its level of duplicity, which in turn devalues the Gallic success and their aspirations to recover their common liberty.

Pragmatically motivated to explain the loss of a legion and four cohorts, Caesar has created a narrative that is an extreme enactment of barbarian perfidy, complete with the stock characters of Sabinus the scapegoat and Ambiorix the villain, who have been either diminished or elevated to fit the demands of narrative. The double portraits of both Sabinus and Ambiorix indicate the ways in which Caesar's narrative suits the needs

173 Caesar, Gallic War, 3.19. 174 K. Welch, "Caesar and His Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries," p. 94. 175 J. Barlow, "Noble Gauls and their other in Caesar's Propaganda," p. 149.

71 of the moment and is not always internally consistent. Regardless of the parallels or dissimilarities between Sabinus and Ambiorix, their contradictory portraits and the account of the disaster were ultimately designed to explain the worst Roman defeat for which Caesar could be held responsible, in a way that deflects any damaging criticism of him personally.

The chapters preceding the disaster cover Caesar's campaign in Britain, which left little time to put the troops in suitable winter quarters. A drought, as well as recent campaigns, had disrupted corn production in Gaul and as a result, Caesar was forced to quarter his legions over the winter among many Gallic communities in smaller, more vulnerable units in order to provide them with enough grain from local tribes. In addition to this inconvenience, Caesar's involvement in a power struggle between Cingetorix and

Indutiomarus, two rival leaders of the Treveri, had roused tensions among neighboring tribes, creating an environment ripe for revolt. The situation would culminate in the worst defeat of the entire Gallic War and so the resulting apologia is longer than the description of Caesar's entire campaign in Britain.

Legio XIV, which had been most recently enlisted, was stationed in the country of the Eburones, a tribe which was under the joint rule of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus.

Sabinus, the same man responsible for the ruse that defeated the Venelli and their allies, and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, were ordered to command this detachment of fifteen

1 78 cohorts. Caesar neither explained the unexpected nature of the double command nor did he say whether one of the men held overall authority, but Sabinus usually came first when their names were paired, suggesting a higher rank and a greater share in the

176 K. Welch, "Caesar and His Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries," p. 93. 177 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.1-25. 178 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.24. 72 responsibility of the disaster. A few days after winter quarters were established, the

Eburones, who had been induced to rebel by messages from Indutiomarus, the slighted party in the Treveri dispute, overwhelmed a foraging party and assaulted the Roman camp. When their attempt was quickly repulsed, the Gallic leaders arranged a parley with the Romans, where Ambiorix, a man admittedly indebted to Caesar for past favors (ei confiteri debere), put forth his people's case.

ii) Ambiorix and the pretense of weakness

Hoping to convince the Romans that he was not a great threat, Ambiorix provided an argument that highlighted the weaknesses of his political position and exaggerated the meager resources of the Eburonian state. First, Ambiorix declared that he did hot attack the camp of his own free will, but because he could not resist the pressure put upon him by his state (coactu civitatis). The statement insinuates that Ambiorix is unable to control the leading men of his tribe and thus lacks any real governing power. What is more,

Ambiorix disclosed that, in regards to his own sovereignty, the people had as much authority over him as he himself had over the people (non minus haberet iuris in se multitude quam ipse in multitudinem). The statement implies that, not only is Ambiorix incapable of controlling the leading men of the state, but he also has no overriding power over the demands of the masses. Secondly, Ambiorix pointed out the small quantity of his forces and the humble nature of his position {ex humilitate sua), saying that he was not so ignorant of affairs as to believe that he could overcome the Roman people (superari posse confidat).

Caesar, Gallic War, 5.27.

73 After presenting his own power and that of his state as mediocre, Ambiorix revealed the circumstances which brought about this futile attack: the Eburones had assaulted the Romans because they were too weak to resist the sudden conspiracy of the

Gauls (coniurationi resistere non potuerit). According to Ambiorix, all the Gallic tribes had decided to attack every isolated Roman camp on this day in order to recover their common freedom (de recuperanda communi libertate) and the Eburones lacked sufficient strength necessary to refuse. Since he had carried out the attack and yet revealed the conspiracy to Sabinus, Ambiorix considered his duty to his fellow Gauls satisfied.

In addition to the threat of a Gallic conspiracy, Ambiorix directed Roman attention to another greater menace and warned them that German mercenaries had already crossed the Rhine and would arrive at their camp in two days. When the Germans were first mentioned in book one, reports of their strength and courage had demoralized the Romans so drastically that Caesar's entire army, from the tribunes to the seasoned veterans, were refusing to engage the Germans out of fear (propter timorem signa laturos). If Caesar had not been physically present to immediately rally his troops' will to fight, the Germans would have completely undermined the morale of the Roman army by reputation alone. When Ambiorix brought up the Germans, he inadvertently rehashed the memory of that near mutiny and suggested the possibility of it happening again, but this time without Caesar being physically present to intervene and temper the potential panic.

Interwoven among his exaggerations, Ambiorix employs terms associated with

Gallo-Roman patronage relationships, which, according to Caesar's own admission, had

Caesar, Gallic War, 1.39.

74 been in effect since the defeat of the Arverni in 121 BC. Ambiorix uses the language of social subordination between a Roman patron and a Gallic client in order to heighten the pretense of weakness which he has already conveyed through repeated references to the inferiority of his forces, authority, and state. Ambiorix employs the term beneficium, which is loosely translated as 'favor' and, depending on whether the client was attempting to compete for honor as an equal or not, usually creates the expectation of a return {officium) from the subordinate recipient.

The concept of beneficium is present at the beginning, middle, and end of

Ambiorix's speech: first, Ambiorix states that he is very much indebted to Caesar for the favors {beneficiis) that he has bestowed upon him. For example, Caesar had set him free from the tribute {stipendio liberatus esset) he was paying to the Atuatuci and had arranged for the return of his son and nephew, who had been sent as hostages also to the

Atuatuci. When Ambiorix publicizes Caesar's beneficia, he appears to place Caesar in the role of patron and himself in the role of client, thus advertising his own inferiority and the strength of Caesar's position.

But since he has attacked the Roman camp and satisfied his duty to his fellow

Gauls, Ambiorix now claims a desire to absolve himself of any obligation to Caesar

{officipro beneficiis Caesaris). In order to do so, he warns them of the German advance and he promises to escort them safely out of his territory, deeds which he believed would repay his thanks to Caesar (Caesaripro eius meritis gratiam referre).lS3 If that is not enough, Ambiorix reminded Sabinus of his status as a guest friend (pro hospitio), promised, and swore under oath (polliceri et iureiurando) that he would guarantee their

R. Sailer, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire, p. 18-19. 182 R. Sailer, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire, p. 127. 183 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.27.

75 safe passage through his borders should they decide to march to the neighboring camp of

Cicero or Labienus.

Ambiorix's use otbeneficia makes this speech particularly persuasive to Sabinus and Cotta because it appeals to the Roman idea of reciprocal exchange relationships. Its level of persuasiveness, however, is dependent on the assumption that Ambiorix considers himself a subordinate client to Caesar, an opinion which he encourages the

Romans to believe with his public acknowledgement and display of gratitude towards

Caesar's beneficia. The deception is successful because Ambiorix has managed to convince Sabinus and Cotta that he is Caesar's client and not a rival competing for honor as an equal with Caesar. Sabinus and Cotta consider Ambiorix a social inferior carrying out his officium to Caesar and not an aristocrat rejecting gifts from a man whose superiority he refused to concede. Sabinus and Cotta both underestimate Ambiorix and the level of deception at work, but Sabinus alone is shown as the author of the disaster because he would eventually make a choice that he had rejected when fighting the

Venelli.

Ambiorix's duplicitous speech, using the exaggerated facade of weakness and the feigned language of social subordination, effectively divided the leadership of the Roman army and brought about one of the only three serious defeats Caesar's army ever suffered. At first, his deception immediately alarmed (perturbati) Sabinus and Cotta and created dissension between the two legates. Their main contention was why the

Eburones, a state which they considered undistinguished and insignificant {ignobilem atque humilem), would dare to make war on Rome. This is the only instance in the BG

1 4 R. Sailer, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire, p. 127.

76 where the narrator employs the use of ignobilis. The perception of the Eburones as ignoble and lowly demonstrates the effectiveness of Ambiorix's persuasive argument for

Eburonian weakness on the mindset of the Roman leaders.

The dissension then spread among the Roman senior officers, resulting in a great dispute (magna.. .controversial during their council of war. This is the only instance where controversia, a noun which is used commonly in the Gallic War to describe

Rome's fractious enemies, is applied to describe a disagreement between senior Roman officers. Its placement here implies that Sabinus and Cotta, with their prolonged arguing, are acting more like Gauls than Romans. They are both guilty of failing to provide a

Roman model of authoritative leadership because instead of giving orders, they held a debate, which harmed the army's morale and illustrated their failure to command in a manner reminiscent of Viridovix over the Venelli.

Cotta and the senior centurions advised Sabinus to do nothing rashly {nihil temere agendum) and argued in favor of adherence to Caesar's commands. Regardless of the alleged arrival of the German threat, the army should not depart from the camp without

Caesar's order {iniussu Caesaris)} Even in the event of a protracted siege, Cotta was confident that his soldiers could withstand the Germans in the safety of the camp and had faith that Caesar would send reinforcements if the need arose. Cotta argued in favor of patient inaction, obedience, and endurance to hardship. Despite the physical absence of

Caesar, Cotta continued to act as if the power and authority of Caesar were present.

Moreover, Cotta considered no decision more senseless or discreditable (levius aut turpius) than one decided on the advice of an enemy.

Caesar, Gallic War, 5.28.

77 Sabinus, on the other hand, vociferously argued (clamitabat) in favor of departing from the camp and heading to the nearest legion. In contrast to the patient confidence of

Cotta, Sabinus' argument is characterized by fear and hasty action, which is motivated by a desire to achieve safety from the perceived German threat. Sabinus declared that it would be too late for them to act ($ero facturos) when the combined forces of the Gauls and Germans arrived and that there was short time (brevem.. .occasionem) for deliberation. Furthermore, Sabinus declared that if all Gaul was plotting with the

Germans, the only chance of safety lay in speedy action (in celeritatepositam salutem).186 The feigned weakness of the Eburones may have made Ambiorix's speech convincing to Sabinus, but fear of the Germans is what inspired him to act incompetently.

Sabinus regarded the absence of Caesar, who had just departed for Italy, as the reason why the Eburones had been willing to attack his camp. He insisted he was basing his decision to evacuate not on the advice of Ambiorix, but on the present state of affairs in

Gaul. Unlike Cotta, Sabinus considered Caesar's power as limited by his physical presence, which is contrary to the opinion his actions expressed in the assault on the

Venelli.

When Cotta and his party continued to resist, Sabinus raised his voice loud enough that the soldiers could hear and rebuked Cotta, saying that the men would hold him responsible (rationem reposcent) for any adverse outcome because of his refusal to evacuate. In doing so, Sabinus is inciting the common soldiers to act against their other legate and ultimately against the orders and reputation of Caesar in the near mutinous

Caesar, Gallic War, 5.29.

78 rhetoric of a demagogue. Moreover, when Sabinus appeals to the ordinary soldiers to overcome the counsel of Cotta and the leading centurions, he is acting in a manner more accustomed to Gallic leaders, who are often depicted seeking influence and currying favor among the rank and file.

On account of Cotta's failure to take immediate action, Sabinus also declared that the soldiers would perish by sword or famine (ferro autfame intereant). Sabinus' pessimism violated the aristocratic ethos of Roman commanders, which demanded that a general always feel sure of eventual victory and never accept defeat, even if it meant sacrificing the lives of their soldiers.190 Although Sabinus insists that joining forces with a neighboring camp would allow them to better sustain the impending war {belli casum sustineant), there nevertheless exists an implication that he is leaving the field to the enemy because he is more concerned for the safety of his own life rather than victory.

Sabinus is so convinced by the subterfuge of Ambiorix and intimidated by the possible appearance of Germanic force that he gives every indication of having lost both the will to fight and faith in Caesar.191 His hostile rhetoric, marked by his negativity and preoccupation with reaching safety, coalesces to create an image of Sabinus that fails to project any of the qualities or behaviors expected of a Roman general or a Caesarian legate.

After an argument lasting late into the night, Sabinus' views prevailed, and it was decided to leave the camp at dawn. Sabinus marched the army out of camp in ah

187 A. Powell, "Julius Caesar and the Presentation of Massacre," p. 118-9. 188 J. Barlow, "Noble Gauls and their other in Caesar's Propaganda," p. 150. 189 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.30. N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic, p. 133-40. 191 A. Goldsworthy, '"Instinctive Genius': The Depiction of Caesar the General," p. 201.

79 extended column encumbered by a heavy baggage train. This formation, which is employed only when the local circumstances are considered friendly, proves that Sabinus had either implicit confidence in the good faith of Ambiorix or arrogance in his army's capabilities to defeat any attack from the 'weak' Eburones. Since Sabinus had withdrawn his men from camp because of an encroaching German threat, he should have arranged his forces in a manner more suitable to face a hostile enemy. Therefore, the withdrawal itself and the manner in which it was undertaken both indicate how thoroughly Sabinus had been fooled by Ambiorix's double deception, while emphasizing his negligence as a commander.

(iii) the worst Roman defeat in the BG

When the Gauls realized that the Romans were planning to march out, they had the foresight to arrange a double ambush two miles away. When the majority of the

Roman column had advanced into a ravine, the Eburones attacked the army from every direction, preventing it from relocating to more favorable ground. Sabinus had failed to foresee this possibility (nihil anteprovidisset) and descended into panic (frepidare), running around chaotically and posting cohorts. The suddenness of the attack reminds the reader of an earlier episode in which Caesar's camp was attacked by the Belgae while it was in the process of being constructed. In that instance, Caesar managed to provide a model of leadership, giving the necessary commands and encouraging the troops to fight courageously, despite the stress of the moment.

Caesar, Gallic War, 2.20-7.

80 Sabinus endeavored to respond to the exigencies of the situation in a Caesarian manner, but his attempts fell short because he conducted himself in such a timid way

(timide) that every resource seemed to fail him. According to the narrator, this loss of nerve is what happens when men, with the exception of Caesar, are forced to take council in the heat of the moment. In contrast to this impression of general failure, the narrator describes Cotta, the co-legate who had foreseen the attack on the column and done his best to prepare for that eventuality, as a man who performed the duties of an imperator and a soldier.

When the column became unmanageable, the legates ordered the men to abandon the baggage and to form in a hollow square. Although this was perhaps the only option left available to the Romans, the Gauls interpreted this action as one based on fear and desperation ($ummo timore et desperatione) and were emboldened to fight harder.

According to the narrator, the negligence of Sabinus, combined with the decision to employ this formation, lessened the morale of the Roman troops and quickly reduced

Roman discipline. As a result, some soldiers were deserting their standards and rushing to the baggage-train to seize their valuables, placing individual needs over the collective good. Everything was a confusion of shouting and weeping (clamore etfletu).

The abandonment of the lines and the flight to the baggage train is set in marked contrast with the discipline of the Gallic ranks, which showed temperance and extraordinary steadfastness. The Gallic rank and file uncharacteristically obeyed their leaders, who had ordered them not to leave their positions for the sake of acquiring plunder, and focused all their energies on achieving victory. At this moment, the narrator

Caesar, Gallic War, 5.33.

81 declares that the Eburones were equal to the Romans in valor and in fighting zeal {virtute et studio pugnandi pares). Despite suffering from the twin disadvantages of an incompetent commander and unfavorable ground, some of the Romans continued to inflict Gallic fatalities, hoping that their virtus would somehow bring about safety

(omnem spem salutis in virtute)}94 Even at this moment, the Gauls, who have ,been elevated to a higher level of discipline and obedience under the skilled leadership of

Ambiorix, do not surpass the Romans, who have been diminished to desperation by the carelessness and fear of Sabinus. Despite the Roman disadvantages of bad generalship and unfavorable ground, they are still on par with the Gauls.

When Ambiorix realized that the Romans were still inflicting losses on his forces, he decided to employ unscrupulous tactics, which would eventually tip the scales of the battle in the Gauls' favor. Ambiorix first ordered his men to fall back and hurl their missiles from a safe distance. Furthermore, he commanded his forces to retreat when the

Romans charged and pursue when they retreated. Whenever a Roman cohort attempted an unsuccessful charge and then tried to retire back to the square, the Gauls would hurl their javelins at its exposed flank and then swarm the injured. Ambiorix's strategy and the events surrounding it contain many similarities to an episode in Polybius, where the

Romans utilized their javelins from a safe distance to destroy the discipline and the will to fight of a Gallic tribe called the Gaesatae. But unlike the Gaesatae, who either rushed to their deaths in frustration or fled the battlefield in fear, the Romans remained steadfast and were praised for doing nothing unworthy of themselves {nihil quod ipsis

Caesar, Gallic War, 5.34. Polybius, Histories, 3.30.

82 esset indignum)}96 The key difference between Gauls and Romans is that the strength of

Roman discipline remains despite the absence of competent leadership. Since they continued to fight with discipline and courage, the Roman army is cleared from any responsibility in the disaster.

Three chapters are devoted to the graphic description of the fight, which emphasizes Ambiorix's shrewd tactics, as well as the difficulties of the Roman struggle, by highlighting the suffering of three individuals including Cotta, who was injured while cheering on his men. Although it is unlikely that Sabinus would have remained inactive throughout the fight's duration of six to eight hours, the narrator does not provide any description of how Sabinus later responded after the initial surprise ambush. Aside from one derogatory reference mentioned of him in passing, (ab duce.. .deserebantur), Sabinus is not brought up; he has figuratively disappeared from the battle and literally

1 Q7 disappeared from the narrative. Instead, the narrator focuses on the impressive strengths of Ambiorix, depicting him as a shrewd and duplicitous general, who surpasses

Sabinus as a tactician and as a commander. Under his leadership, the Eburones managed to execute a well planned ambush on the Roman column and to maintain enough discipline to resist the pull of ready plunder. Ambiorix's utilization of javelins and appropriate tactics credit him with a greater degree of Roman character than Sabinus, who is not mentioned again until it is time to relate his ultimate disgrace: his un-Roman surrender and unresisting massacre.

After the battle had been underway for some time, Sabinus sent an interpreter to

Ambiorix, asking him to spare himself and his troops (sibi militibusparcat). In response,

196 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.35. 197 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.34.2.

83 Ambiorix invited him to a parley and promised under oath (fidem) that Sabinus would not be harmed {ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri) upon his surrender. In regards to Sabinus' men, however, Ambiorix hoped that he could bring about the safety of the soldiers from his own people (sperare a multitudine impetrari posse). It is doubtful whether a treacherous enemy would have said something so unusually honest in the middle of a battle, but the inclusion of this deceitful offer reveals the extreme lengths Ambiorix would employ to dupe his enemy. Surpassing the offense of mere lying, Ambiorix broke sworn promises and plotted ambushes; he gave his word as a guarantee for Sabinus' safety and then allowed him and his senior officers to be killed during a parley. He used every trick at his disposal to win; nothing was off limits. His duplicity, however, exceeded Caesar's opinion of the limits of legitimate strategy and became illegitimate trickery. His overly duplicitous methods cast a pall on the Gallic victory, which devalued the aspiration of the

Gauls to recover their common freedom.

Caesar's additional purpose in describing Ambiorix's conniving offer, which

Sabinus accepts, is to portray Sabinus as a commander who will jeopardize the lives of

1 go his soldiers to save his own. Although it is only made implicitly and not dwelt upon, the treachery that this Roman commander displayed towards his own men assassinates his character. When Ambiorix and Sabinus met under a parley, Sabinus obeyed

Ambiorix's conditions and cast away his arms, as well as ordering his men to do the same. The handing over of his weapons, an act rarely performed and yet largely condemned by Romans, clearly symbolized his acceptance of the enemy victory and his

A. Powell, "Julius Caesar and the Presentation of Massacre," p. 120.

84 own refusal to fight on. While Ambiorix was discussing the terms of the Roman surrender in a protracted speech, Sabinus was surrounded and slain, dying as one would expect of a coward and a fool, without being given any opportunity to offer resistance in the narrative.

After Sabinus was killed, the Gauls charged the Romans and threw their ranks into confusion. Cotta, who had rejected Sabinus' earlier suggestion to surrender and had refused to go to an armed enemy under parley, was killed fighting along with the majority of his troops. Unlike Sabinus who was led to his fate by his fears, Cotta displayed the quality that Caesar and Rome most valued in men: the courage to die fighting. Cotta deliberately put himself in repeated danger during battle and refused to surrender or even survive when all was lost; he displayed a superior form of courage and self-discipline than that of his men because his was the product of an individual decision, not something expected of him because he was part of a group. Although Cotta is shown to have acted unwisely, his willingness to keep fighting and the honorable death he earned with his men absolve him from blame.

Sabinus, on the other hand, is blamed completely for the disaster by Caesar and is assigned qualities in book five that are precisely not displayed in book three. Instead of caution controlling his actions, Sabinus is compelled by his temeritas, a term more characteristic of Gauls than Romans, to act impatiently and ignore the advice of his senior officers. In book three, Sabinus utilized the pretense of fear in a larger deception designed to incite Gallic overconfidence, but in book five he is so persuaded by

Ambiorix's pretense of weakness that he believed the Germans were coming and lost his

199 N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Vied, p. 138. 200 J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumptions in Caesar's Writings, p. 100. 201 N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi, p. 131.

85 confidence to act without Caesar. His fear of the German threat drove Sabinus, who at this point was more preoccupied with reaching safety than enduring hardship, to withdraw his men from camp and move his forces, a decision which he had refused to make in book three.

Sabinus, the cautious and conservative officer of book three, has nothing in common with his later self except his name. He has become the complete victim of

Ambiorix's illegitimate trickery and has lost his Roman self in the process. Sabinus is characterized by stupidity because he believed Ambiorix's speech and promises of safe passage, did not have the foresight to expect an ambush, and actually trusted Ambiorix a second time despite all evidence to the contrary. His portrayal is endowed with negativity because he regarded the German threat as too much for the capabilities of his army, withdrew his forces into an ambush out of fear, and was quick to surrender even though his men were willing to fight on. He is depicted as displaying disloyalty because he abandoned his soldiers and approached an armed enemy in the hope of saving his own life. Not one of his actions could have been worse thought out or executed.202

The narrator's treatment of Sabinus in books three and five of the Gallic War represents Roman fear of northern barbarians as a double-edged sword. Both episodes involve a strategy which relied on fear as a predominant factor of its success. Sabinus used the pretense of fear to deform Gallic confidence into arrogance and deteriorate partial Gallic discipline into chaos. His strategy played upon the expectation of Roman fear of the Gauls and used it to increase Gallic rashness. Sabinus employed fear as a psychological weapon against the Gauls, which ultimately brought about a victory

202 K. Welch, "Caesar and His Officers in the Gallic War Commentaries," p. 95.

86 appropriate to a Caesarian legate. Ambiorix used the pretense of weakness to transform

Roman unity into dissension, which so weakened Roman morale that the Eburones were considered on par with their courage and tenacity. The subterfuge of Sabinus was moderate while the trickery of Ambiorix was excessive because of its blatant utilization of falsehoods and sworn oaths of good faith, which depicted Ambiorix as not adhering to any ethical code. His strategy played upon the new Roman fear of the Germans to diminish Sabinus' confidence and transform him into a type of commander who lacked both the ability to endure hardship and the will to fight. In reaction to the scope of the

Eburonian debacle, the narrator had to portray Sabinus' ultimate downfall as a moral collapse in the face of duplicitous enemies in order to deflect any damaging criticism regarding Caesar's own leadership capabilities. Yet in less troublesome times, he showed

Sabinus using historic Roman fears as the lynchpin of a brilliantly successful ruse—one

OAT which Labienus and Caesar also adopted in later confrontations. Regardless of the disaster and Sabinus' subsequent character assassination, the fact that Caesar considered the tactics, which Sabinus had first engineered, as worthy of his own personal use demonstrates a small measure of absolution.

Caesar, Gallic War, 5.50; 5.57; 8.10.

87 CHAPTER 5. CAESAR THE GENERAL'S USE OF FEAR

i) Caesar's decision to generate loyalty in his army

Ego enim sic existimo, in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse opportere,— scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem. Quis igitur hoc homine scientior umquam aut fuit esse debuit?

For I think that these four qualities are indispensable in a great general,—knowledge of military affairs, valor, authority and good fortune. Who, then, ever was, or ought to have been, better acquainted with military affairs than this man?

In this famous oration of 66 BC, Cicero declared that the ideal general, personified in the figure of Pompey, must possess four qualities: military knowledge, courage, prestige, and luck. When Cicero praised Pompey for the different facets of his generalship and described him as surpassing every Roman general in the past and present, he inadvertently issued a direct challenge to the members of the senatorial class to prove him wrong. The Bellum Gallicum, with its focus on exceptional leadership, was Caesar's response to Cicero's wish that Rome would have more honest and brave generals besides

Pompey to put in charge of military operations. The BG's representation of Caesar as the great imperator of the Roman army was his answer to the popularity and reputation of

Pompey, which was at its zenith at the outset of Caesar's provincial command in 58BC.

Striving to outshine the military achievements of Pompey, Caesar followed in the tradition of his uncle Marius and usedpopularis methods, such as allowing considerable leeway in troop behavior rather than inflicting the harsh punishment of petty crimes, in order to induce his soldiers to act out of loyalty to him rather than out of fear of being flogged or executed. Caesar's lack of severity, in addition to other characteristics of his

4 Cicero, On Pompey's Command, 28. Cicero, On Pompey's Command, 27.

88 leadership, fostered a fear of disgrace within each soldier, which compelled them to fight more aggressively in Caesar's name. Paradoxically, Caesar's unwillingness to make his soldiers fear him in turn makes him an object of fear for his senatorial audience in Rome, who regarded his acts of leniency as highly suspicious and typical of apopularis commander, The Bellum Gallicum, with its portrayal of Caesar as the generous be-all and end-all of his soldiers, served as a literary form of intimidation to every senator who stood in opposition to Caesar,

Within the narrative of the BG, Julius Caesar, desiring to present an image of generalship that would be equal to the reputation of Pompey, emphasized the methods which he had employed to cultivate a high level of morale within his army. Caesar's particular brand of leadership, training, and discipline, combined with an esprit de corps or pride of belonging to a unit, strove to so bolster the morale of the individual soldier in his army that material factors such as food and shelter were matters of secondary importance.207 The existence of this exceptional level of morale, as well as the personal dedication to Caesar it inspired, generated a fear of disgrace within each individual soldier, which in turn enabled the whole Roman army to persevere in the face of adversity, even when he was physically absent. Once again, Caesar capitalizes on fear, which he inspired, to generate an internal motivation to act in particular circumstances.

But unlike before, when the pretense of fear was a method of strategy used to overcome

Gallic numerical superiority that bordered on illegitimate trickery, the fear of disgrace

A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War 100 BC—AD 200, p. 248. J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 111.

89 often brings about the achievement of victories through martial courage (virtus), which

208 were considered worthier accomplishments by both sides.

Caesar did not leave a very explicit description of the methods he used to maintain the loyalty and morale of his army, but various passages in his Commentaries, as well as supplementary material from secondary sources, shed enough light on the matter to reveal the importance Caesar placed on morale and the assiduousness with which he fostered personal loyalty. An examination of the steps by which Caesar created and consolidated the bonds of loyalty between himself and his legions reveals how

Caesar perfected the Roman legion to a general's own use and cemented his relationship with an armed force over a period of ten years.209 As a result of his skillful handling of loyalty and morale, Caesar was able to mold his new soldiers into an army which recognized allegiance to him as having more claim on them than their loyalty to Rome.

The narrator of the BG, a text which is regarded as a manual for effective generalship and leadership, has created an image of Caesar as a leader who has achieved a mastery over his men through a cultivated fear of disgrace and as a commander who has surpassed the generalship exhibited by Pompey in Cicero's speech, Pro Lege Manilia de imperio Cn.

Pompeii.

Generalship has been defined as the way in which a commander sought to direct his army as units of troops to achieve victory over the enemy through tactics and the means by which these tactics were put into practice. The narrator does not neglect to mention the many instances where Caesar demonstrated his capable management of his

208 See the previous chapter for an analysis of two instances where trickery and strategy, which centered around the pretenses of fear and weakness, were used to bring about a Roman victory and a defeat. 209 P. J. Cuff, "Caesar the Soldier," p. 30. 210 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 119.

90 army's res frumentaria, gathered and interpreted intelligence of the enemy and ground, and decided where and when to fight a battle. Caesar's victories, however, were often the result not of sweeping moves of grand tactics, but of playing close attention to the conditions and morale of smaller groups of men, whom Caesar directed in response to the changing situation on the battlefield.211 But the military performance of the individuals in these smaller units was dependent upon the strength of their bond with Caesar and their perception of him as a worthy leader.

Leadership, although closely connected to generalship, has been separately defined as the way a commander sought to exploit the moral and psychological factors which governed the behavior of his men. It is how a commander sought to inspire his men to fight harder or endure worse privations for the sake of victory. ' In assessing

Caesar's leadership capabilities, it is necessary to assess the extent of influence on his soldiers by analyzing the means he employed to gain their loyalty, such as practicing the principles of recognition and reward, equality of sacrifice, and leading by example.

Through all of these devices, the strength of Caesar's charisma and the power of his unique personality so successfully influenced the minds of the army that individual soldiers regarded their fatherland as Caesar's camp and their patriotism as loyalty to

Caesar. With his facilitation of high morale, Caesar was able to imprint a symbolic representation of himself upon his men, whose fear of disgrace enabled them to overcome difficult obstacles and achieve victory without relying on lesser strategies.

The narrator of the Commentaries has Caesar demonstrating several methods to incite such feelings of loyalty, inspiration, and endurance among his men, which then

A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 169. 212 A. Goldsworthy, TheRomanArmy at War, p. 119. M. Grant, The Army of the Caesars, p. 19.

91 facilitated the creation of a close personal rapport. Aside from the mild reproach after the setback at Gergovia, the narrator of the BG does not include a description of an outcome where Caesar had to punish his army. Unlike the stern generals of Roman tradition who flogged and executed their men to instill rigid discipline, Caesar rarely employed either punishment and considered only desertion and mutiny as serious crimes. The overall mildness Caesar displayed towards his soldiers encourages the general impression that the relationship between Caesar and the men of the lower ranks was paternal and lenient. In addition, many passages of the Commentaries, from as early as the first book with the battle against the Helvetii, encourage the perception that Caesar's success was largely due to his personal relations with his men. Caesar's legions were the

'instruments of his purposes, on whom he played with easy mastery and a kind of

7\ 7 affection'.

ii) Caesar'spopularis methods

Caesar recognized the effect of this relationship on morale and employed many means to maintain it, including the very valuable method of calling individuals by name.

At the battle of the Sambre, when the Nervii suddenly attacked the Roman camp, Caesar called out to the centurions by name and cheered on the rank and file (centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos cohortatus), and together they eventually repulsed the

Nervian attack. Moreover, whenever Caesar spoke to his men in the assembly, he did not address them as "soldiers" (milites), but by the more pleasing term "comrades"

214 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 234. J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 108. 16 M. Grant, The Army of the Caesars, p. 16. F. Adcock, Caesar as Man of Letters, p. 57. 218 Caesar, Gallic War, 2.25.

92 {commilitones), a practice which his successor, Augustus, would later reject because he considered it too flattering for the requirements of army discipline, the present peace, and the maiestas of the imperial household. The emperor's refusal to call soldiers commilitones put the soldiers in their place, not raising them, as Caesar had done, to undeserved equality.220

The act of calling out to the men by name and addressing them with a higher degree of respect were considered exceptional behaviors for all Roman generals aside from Marius, Caesar's uncle and the man responsible for several previous victories over northern barbarians. Caesar may have deliberately copied his famous relative in the hope of achieving similar victories, or perhaps he felt that this style of command was an appropriately/w/w/ara1 way of doing things.221 In either case, Caesar's use of these particular methods set him apart from his contemporaries and increased feelings of worthiness among his army, which.greatly endeared him to the common soldier.

Caesar understood the effectiveness of carefully calibrated praise on the morale of his army and occasionally mentioned men by name that deserved his personal notice. Out of seven books, the 5(3 contains limited references to centurions, legionaries, and two anonymous standard bearers, who received personal recognition by their imperator and were commended for their bravery with rewards and fame. For example, when the soldiers were hesitating to attempt an amphibious assault of Britain because they were intimidated by the deep water and enemy fire, the speech and actions of an anonymous

Suetonius, Divine Julius 67; Divine Augustus, 25. :o S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 87. :l A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 234.

93 standard bearer of the tenth legion was credited by Caesar for setting in motion a train of

222 events that resulted in wholesale disembarkation.

The standard bearer shouted, "Desilite, milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere: ego eerie meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero " and then 223 rushed from the ship towards the enemy with the others following after him. This brief speech invoked Roman competitiveness and patriotism, but more importantly, it appealed to the individual loyalty of each soldier to Caesar, making him a symbolical presence of inspiration for every man on that ship to do his duty. In this instance, the appeal of the anonymous standard bearer to Caesar's presence brought each man's fear of disgrace to the forefront, which then propelled them to act as if their commander was physically observing their behavior. Caesar recorded the conspicuous display of the standard bearer's individual courage because it did not conform to the traditional view of the disciplined Roman soldier, whose strength lay in his ability to act as part of a group.224

But Caesar praised the standard bearer's exceptional behavior because he sacrificed his individual safety for the sake of overall victory and in doing so, the narrator showed the readers of the BG just what was necessary to be worthy of his praise.

The need for a successful Roman general to communicate with his soldiers by word of mouth is abundantly illustrated by Caesar, whose words have the power to transform the morale of the troops. When the Roman army was in a panic over facing

Ariovistus and was threatening mutiny at Vesontio, Caesar, whose current experience as a commander of this army was limited to less than one year, addressed the men and stated D. Conley, "Causes of Roman Victory in the Bellum Gallicum," p. 180. 223 Caesar, Gallic War, 4.25. 224 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War 100 BC to 200AD, p. 264-5. 225 M. Grant, The Army of the Caesars, p. 17.

94 that he would rather march against the Germans with the tenth legion alone, since he had such complete confidence in its abilities, than allow their threat of mutiny to dictate the course of his actions.

When he bestowed this special distinction to the tenth legion, Caesar motivated the competitive virtus of the other troops and reminded them that mutiny was more disgraceful than defeat. The shamed men of the other legions were then overcome by the spirited desire to dispute the superiority of the tenth legion in battle, hoping that the act of acquiring renown would remove their present disgrace. As a result of Caesar's psychological manipulation, he was able to change the spirit of all the ranks (minim in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes) and shame them into replacing their feelings of panic towards the Germans with a fear of disgrace, thus inspiring an eagerness for war which quickly brought about Ariovistus' defeat. Caesar used the near mutiny of Vesontio to consolidate his psychological hold over his legions and it is a tribute to Caesar's control that their loyalty stayed undisturbed throughout the rest of the Gallic

228 campaigns.

In another instance, when the army was facing potential famine due to the scarcity of corn during the siege of Avaricum, Caesar addressed individual soldiers at work and offered to raise the siege if the strain was too much for them to bear (in opere singulas legiones appellaret), but they specifically entreated him not to or sent messages to him via centurions and tribunes to that effect. In fact, the simple act of asking the question, even if Caesar did not intend to change his plans, was enough to arouse the tenacity of the

6 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.41. 227 S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 47. 228 P.J. Cuff, "Caesar the Soldier," p. 34. 9 Caesar, Gallic War, 7.17.

95 men to endure further hardship. Caesar's willingness to communicate with the soldiery regarding their welfare and the semblance of placing their needs before his own show him as the shrewd handler of his legions' emotions, molding their restiveness to suit his purposes and those of Rome.

Caesar, although more widely known for his ruthless treatment of foreign enemies, should be equally commended by his critics for the lengths he would go to care for the well being of his army. Caesar frequently demonstrated patience and avoided exposing his men to substantial risks, often choosing to delay an engagement for the sake of acquiring more favorable ground that was high in elevation (locus aequus), where the

Romans could rush down with greater force (impetus). Although Caesar demanded the utmost obedience from every man and pushed their bodies to the physical limits, his soldiers were aware of the fact that he never wasted their lives. Caesar refrained from engaging on unfavorable ground that was lower in elevation than the enemy (locus iniquus) because his army would have been forced to attack uphill with less force and with greater losses.231 In fact, the words omnes incolumes frequently occur within the BG whenever Caesar expresses satisfaction at a victory where Roman losses were negligible and thus demonstrate the scale on which Caesar estimated the value of each victory.232

Regardless of whether or not this carefulness was motivated by a political expediency, its frequent practice only increased the faith and trust of the army in Caesar's competence as an able commander.

230 F. Adcock, Caesar as Man of Letters, p. 59. 231 S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 54. 232 Caesar, Gallic War, 4.15, 36; 5.23; 6.40; 7.12.

96 On one occasion, Caesar actually had to defend himself to his army for his avoidance of useless slaughter.233 At that time, the legions were frustrated because of the hard work and short rations caused by the protracted siege of Avaricum and the relieving force of Gauls, hoping to entice the Romans away from that stronghold, had moved their encampment closer to a nearby hill with a favorable position. Although the men were demanding the signal to fight (signum proeli exposcentes), Caesar would not allow them to attack because he knew that the price of victory would be the lives of many brave men.

Caesar told them that he would be called unjust if he should count their lives dearer than his own welfare (nisi eorum vitam sua salute habeat cariorem), and so the soldiers relented. Caesar's carefulness with Roman lives is an essential quality in a commander who would retain the loyalty of his troops.234 When Caesar does everything in his power to conserve the lives of his men, he wins their confidence and trust; they, in turn, are motivated to fight tenaciously and sacrifice their lives for the sake of his cause.

Caesar was able to capture and hold the loyalty of his men because he practiced the doctrine of "equality of sacrifice", which ensured that hardships were endured and dangers were shared on a mutual footing.235 In his first battle in Gaul against the Helvetii, when he was just becoming familiar with his army of mostly raw recruits, Caesar had all the horses removed from the battle scene, starting with his own, so that the danger would be equal to everyone and to remove the hope of flight (ut aequato omniumpericulo spem fugae tolleret). Although this action gave the impression that Caesar did not trust the steadfastness of his officers, it was a necessary sacrifice in light of its impact on the

233 Caesar, Gallic War, 7.19. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 117. 35 Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 112. 236 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.25.

97 morale of the rank and file. Caesar, like the Roman generals who had utilized this tactic before him, knew that the soldiers would be more willing to risk their lives for a general who was willing to risk his life for them.

In addition to practicing a policy of sharing hardships, Caesar generously distributed the spoils and loot of his campaign among his men, demonstrating that he was not using their sacrifices for the sake of his own personal luxury. Although Caesar allowed his favorite officers, such as Mamurra and Labienus, to accumulate immense fortunes in Gaul, he saw to it that the men were rewarded as well, especially those who accomplished outstanding feats of valor. At the siege of Avaricum, Caesar promised prizes to the men who earned the distinction of first mounting the wall. After the stronghold of Alesia was successfully taken and Vercingetorix had surrendered, Caesar distributed one captive to each man in his whole army (ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui capita singula). Caesar knew that booty was a major incentive for enlistment at Rome and one of the determining factors in the quality of a soldier's overall performance in war, so he made sure that his men had no cause to transfer their loyalty to another commander in the hope of acquiring a greater amount of plunder.240 In fact, Caesar's generosity earned him the accusation of using promises of gain and gifts to effectively persuade Pompey's soldiers to fight under his command, thus undermining Pompey's authority over his own men. Caesar may have anticipated this outcome when he chronicled his own largesse in the BG.

Plutarch, Caesar, 17. Caesar, Gallic War, 7.27. Caesar, Gallic War, 7.89. M. McDonnell, "Borrowing to Bribe Soldiers: BC 1.39," p. 60. Cassius Dio, Roman History, 41.23.

98 Caesar pursued various avenues in attaching his soldiers to his personal cause, but he never forgot that financial considerations were usually foremost among most soldiers.

According to Suetonius, Caesar doubled the pay of the legions from 112.5 silver denarii minus food and clothing per year to 225, presumably paid for by the abundant Gallic plunder.242 In reward for hard work during an unusually busy winter campaign, Hirtius, the author of the eighth book of the BG, reports a single occasion where Caesar allotted supplementary bonuses (donativa) of 200 sesterces to each soldier and a 1000 to each centurion as a free gift in lieu of booty. Caesar may have provided other bonuses on occasions which, in his Commentaries, he chose not to mention because he did not want his soldiers to appear too mercenary. Suetonius, however, was more forthcoming and recorded that Caesar gave every veteran soldier 2000 sesterces at the beginning of the civil war and assigned them lands for farming and settlement after it was completed, including a sizeable bonus upon discharge. Caesar was even known to have distributed the contested honor of Roman citizenship to a legion composed entirely of men from

Transalpine Gaul, whom he had recruited, trained, and equipped with Roman arms.246

Caesar was so generous with his patronage of the soldiers that his critics often accused him of buying the loyalty of his men with plunder, gifts, and pay. Caesar admitted his troops were handsomely rewarded for their service, but defended'himself by providing other evidence as to why his soldiers loved him for many reasons besides his generosity.247 Throughout his Gallic campaigns, Caesar conducted himself in a manner

Suetonius, Divine Julius, 26. 243 Caesar, Gallic War, 8.4. 244 M. Grant, The Army of the Caesars, p. 15. Suetonius, Divine Julius, 38. 246 Suetonius, Divine Julius, 25. 247 M. Mcdonnell, "Borrowing to Bribe Soldiers: BC 1.39," p. 61.

99 which personally demonstrated the level of virtus he demanded of his army. Caesar's men observed him marching at the head of the column, sometimes on a horse but more often on foot, through a variety of environmental conditions and covering great distances at an incredible speed, just as ordinary legionaries were accustomed to do. The army was a witness to Caesar's willingness to undergo a variety of toils, which, to their

250 amazement, seemed beyond his body's level of physical endurance. The commander's endurance of the hardships he imposed induced the soldiers to accept him as one of them and shamed them into obedience.251 Caesar's actions were a gesture designed to show his soldiers that he could be as hard on himself as he was on others and that he was not 252 expecting them to do anything that he would not do himself. When Caesar shared in their labors, he demonstrated his legitimate authority and achieved acceptance by the soldiers, bridging the social distance between himself and his men.253

Caesar's readiness to share the risks of his men is best illustrated by the battle at the Sambre, where, had Caesar not decided to put his own person at risk, the Nervian assault would have successfully overcome an entire Roman army. The sudden attack of the Nervii caught Caesar and the Romans, who were in the process of fortifying their camp, unprepared. The resulting disorder was such that the cavalry was routed. Despite the difficulties of the situation, Caesar was able to accomplish everything necessary, such as raise the flag and sound the trumpets, because the majority of the Roman army had the willpower to withstand the first shock of the enemy's surprise assault. The narrator

J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 113. 249 Suetonius, Divine Julius, 57. 250 Plutarch, Caesar, 17. 251 S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 33. 252 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 235. 253 S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 240.

100 attributes the Roman ability to hold the line to the knowledge and experience of the troops (scientia atque usus militum), whose training during the off season and exposure to previous battles had enabled them to determine for themselves what should be done as rapidly as others could have shown them.

Since Caesar was responsible for the training of his army, the narrator is implying that the credit for the army's ability to endure should be attributed to Caesar's effective leadership. Training, although often overlooked, was an important element in the morale of every army on campaign, partly because it taught the soldiers to obey orders and not to shirk work, but mostly because it exposed each soldier to what could arise in a battle and taught them how to meet it.255 Training, with its exposure to difficulties, made the soldiers more confident in their abilities and thus fostered courage and endurance, which were vital to every campaign because they helped to banish fear and panic.

Caesar carefully prepared his army for battle through rigorous training during the winter months and often called his men into formation, even when there was no cause for it and especially on festival days or when it was raining. Sometimes he would lead them on an especially long march, which was designed to wear out those who failed to keep

yen up. Caesar, like other aristocratic generals, trained his army hard in order to ensure that he received taut discipline, instant obedience, and proficient maneuvers during actual operations. This extensive training in combat techniques was ongoing and persisted until each soldier left the army. Moreover, it was one of the most important features of the ideal Roman commander that even in peacetime he imposed on his men a hard 254 Caesar, Gallic War, 2.20. 255 S.E. Stout, "Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion," p. 425. 256 S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 39-44. Suetonius, Divine Julius, 65. 258 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 234.

101 program of fitness and drill.259 The effectiveness of Caesar's training was demonstrated at the Sambre, where the legionaries and centurions, instead of panicking, began to form up in makeshift units and resist while awaiting further instructions. The celerity and steadiness of Caesar's officers and men in this emergency demonstrates the excellence of their tactical training.

While the army resisted the Nervii, Caesar rode from legion to legion, issuing orders, haranguing his troops, and doing what he could to form a fixed battle line. Under

Caesar's guidance, the four legions of the left wing managed to gain the advantage over the enemy, but the bulk of the Nervii had fallen upon and nearly routed the Roman right.

When he observed that almost all the centurions of the right wing were either wounded or killed and that many soldiers were yielding to fatigue, Caesar grabbed a shield, advanced to the front line, and then fought hand-to-hand like a soldier in the ranks, bringing hope to the men with his presence and a change in formation with his encouraging orders.261 This willingness to stand and fight, if necessary to die, with his men was the confirmation of the growing trust that had developed between Caesar and his troops. It proved to his men that Caesar was confident enough of victory to stake his own life on it, and in this way Caesar sought to inspire them to renew the fight.263

Caesar's presence at the front line and his willingness to risk his personal safety for the sake of victory also had the effect of shaming the less zealous men out of their inaction. The cavalry, which had been repulsed both in the initial assault and again when they had attempted to reach the camp, were driven by a desire to obliterate their previous

259 A. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, p. 93. 260 S.E. Stout, "Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion," p. 427. 261 Caesar, Gallic War, 2.25. 262 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 249. 263 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 155.

102 disgraces by surpassing the rest of the army in valor (turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent). The fear and shame of being regarded as cowardly and the need for redemption motivated the cavalry to display a level of virtus which had been previously lacking in their actions during the ambush. Caesar, by his presence and the demonstration of virtus, was able to reawaken the public honor of his cavalry, which desired the approval of their peers and superiors, and to inspire them not to succumb to cowardice in his sight.265

Caesar's intervention, although not the only factor that contributed to the repulse of the ambush, was an impressive indication of the strong bond between a general and his legions. With the strength of his personal example, Caesar was able to check the onslaught of the enemy (hostium impetus tardatus est) and change the Roman formation from closed to open (manipulos laxare), allowing the soldiers to fight the enemy more easily. Caesar's timely arrival and appropriate orders stabilized the situation and provided enough time for Labienus to send the esteemed tenth legion in support, while stimulating his men to fight "beyond their powers" in the process. Despite all these circumstances, the Nervii could not be forced to retreat and kept fighting until their warriors were largely wiped out and the surviving non-combatants were forced to surrender to Caesar.

The narrator inflates the number of casualties inflicted on the tribe, stating that some 500 men out of 60,000 survived, but is silent regarding the extent of Roman losses, which were considerable given the manner of resistance, duration of the fight, and the

264 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.11. S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 47. 266 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.11. 267 Plutarch, Caesar, 20.

103 absence of omnes incolumes at the conclusion. Moreover, the narrator does not mention how Caesar dealt with the overall conduct of his forces after the matter was resolved and swiftly moves on to a subsequent engagement with another Gallic tribe.

Although the majority of the infantrymen carried out their duty admirably and inflicted heavy losses on different sections of the Nervian forces, the cavalry had been initially routed twice, the Gallic auxiliary forces had abandoned the Romans for home, and the standards of the twelfth legion had been lost along with the lives of the standard bearer and many centurions. The ultimate destruction of Nervian manpower, despite its scope, does not fully obscure the fact that the ambush was a costly and potentially disastrous reversal for the Romans. Some form of punishment upon his forces would have been an appropriate response to the outcome of events, but the narrator does not include Caesar delivering as much as a word of reproof against the men. This absence of punishment, whether it portrayed real circumstances or was purposely omitted for literary effect, is exceptional behavior for a Roman general and indicative of Caesar's distinct relationship with his men.

iii) the effect of leniency on army performance and morale

Caesar's understanding of discipline was unconventional in comparison to Roman standards, which favored corporal, and often capital, punishments for every manner of offense, including an act as simple as a soldier selling his rations at an inflated price to the more serious crimes of desertion, flight, and mutiny.269 Caesar, however, only regarded desertion and mutiny as capital crimes and closed his eyes to all the other faults

268 Caesar, Gallic War, 2.28. 269 S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 116. of his army, a policy reflected in the infrequent examples of punishment within the narrative of the Commentaries. The Roman aristocracy, however, preferred severity and often praised exempla that demonstrated a lack of dementia towards the army and regarded severe punishments, such as flogging and decimation, a collective punishment where one-tenth of a unit was selected by lot and clubbed to death by their comrades, as restoring the ancestral ways (mos maiorum) and as a guarantee that a soldier would fulfill his patriotic obligations to his commander and state.270

Caesar, on the other hand, led by example rather than by fear of punishment and

271 motivated the soldiers to do their duty through the means of honor and shame. For example, after Caesar's army suffered a reverse at Dyrrachium, his troops out of shame demanded to be decimated, but Caesar refused to do this and merely demoted a few 77? standard bearers. As a result, his men fought even harder against Pompey in order to wipe out the shame of their previous disgrace. With his actions, Caesar demonstrated his assumption that every soldier in his army was motivated by public esteem and implied that each man had an honorable status to lose. In doing so, Caesar solidified a sense of pride that he had fostered among them, which corporal punishment would have diminished.

Caesar's response was quite different at Placentia in 49 BC, when the ninth legion mutinied because they wanted to be discharged, were impatient for a donative, or resented their commander's policy of clemency for depriving them of plunder. In response, Caesar immediately threatened to decimate the legion and discharge the rest in

S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 111. S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 113. Caesar, Civil War, 3.74. disgrace. This threat had a profound impact on the mental state of his soldiers, who were not accustomed to that much severity from Caesar. The punishment seemed so out of character with Caesar's reputation for mercy (misericordia) and indulgence (licentia) that the men quickly realized the scope of their mistake and begged for forgiveness.

Caesar still discharged them all in disgrace, but eventually he compromised and reinstated them after hearing their earnest entreaties and negotiating for the capital punishment of 120 ringleaders.274 Despite the outcome of this mutiny, Caesar, with his compromises and acts of forgiveness, manages to both avoid the charge of cruelty

(saevitia) and sustain the loyalty and sense of pride among his men. As a result of his psychological maneuvering, the ninth legion would go on to fight with great distinction for Caesar in the forthcoming campaign against Pompey.

Although capable of severity, Caesar showed a preference for inflicting the punishment of shame upon his favorite soldiers rather than corporal punishment. After the battle of Pharsalus, on returning to Rome in 47BC, the tenth legion mutinied because

Caesar had not given them their long awaited discharge. Caesar merely said that he would triumph with other soldiers and addressed his men as citizens (Quirites) rather than soldiers (milites), thus dismissing them from his army. With a single word, Caesar bent them to his will {circumegit etflexit), with the result that they immediately replied that they were his soldiers and insisted on accompanying him to Africa. Their instant remorse prevented the disbandment from taking place, but the most insubordinate were punished by the loss of a third part of the land and booty reserved for them.276 Caesar was

273 Suetonius, Divine Julius, 69. G. Watson, The Roman Soldier, p. 122. Suetonius, Divine Julius, 70. G. Watson, The Roman Soldier, p. 122. able to settle this mutiny by shaming his soldiers with the title of citizens, but the dramatic effect of this word was possible only because a lengthy history of comradeship

777 and fair dealing had preceded it. In this instance, the punishment of shame was more effective than severity because it acknowledged the legion's long standing relationship with Caesar and the high degree of self conscious honor the soldiers had acquired in his service. Caesar's decision not to threaten the tenth with decimation and his use of shame renewed the strength of the soldiers to continue the fight.

For the most part, Caesar understood and practiced a principle of morale maintenance which allowed for a certain looseness of discipline, where sexual indulgence, intoxication, and diverting spectacles are the means through which tensions may be released. Although no indication of it appears in the Commentaries, perhaps in deference to Roman bigotry, Suetonius mentions how Caesar, after a great victory, sometimes relieved his soldiers of all their duties and gave them full license to plunder

{licentiam omnempassim lasciviendi). Unlike other more traditional Roman generals,

Caesar did not attempt to impose a lifestyle of austerity on his men. He boasted that his soldiers could fight well even when reeking of perfume, implying that their virtus was so great that it was unaffected by effeminate self-fashioning.281 Suetonius' Caesar imposes an instrumental, combat oriented discipline that makes his soldiers effective fighters, but ignores social and moral discipline that regulated the army's relation to civilian

J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 119. S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 146. J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 115. 0 Suetonius, Divine Julius, 67. S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 96. society. The soldiers in Caesar's BG, with their exemplary virtus and general self control, are depicted as deserving of licentia, but are not harmed by its side effects.

In addition to practicing an atypical form of discipline, Caesar also cultivated one of the most powerful components of morale in his army, an esprit de corps or pride of belonging to a crack unit. This pride was essential because it gave a man more self- confidence and a greater sense of his own importance, inspiring him to demonstrate acts of valor for the sake of his unit's prestige. 84 Moreover, it created a bond between soldiers, where the desire not to lose face and the fear of not showing as much endurance in the face of danger as his comrades, helped, more than anything else, a soldier to cope with the stress of battle and prevent him from running away.

Since unit esprit de corps was a key element in a soldier's performance on the battlefield, Caesar fostered it in many ways. When Caesar closed his speech at Vesontio with the boast that he would face Ariovistus with the tenth legion alone {cum sola decim legione ibo), his flattery and special treatment of the tenth legion not only ensured its loyalty to him, but also made it one of the most effective units under his command.

When Caesar had to parley with Ariovistus and needed an armed escort, he decided to mount infantrymen from this legion onto horses, and thus the tenth earned the nickname,

Legio XEquestris. The name and title of a unit emphasized its distinct identity and showcased its achievements in the same way that individual soldiers might be decorated

282 S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 71. 283 J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 119. 284 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 252. 285 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 257. 286 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 253. 287 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.42. for gallantry. One year later, in the emergency battle with the Nervii, it was the martial reputation ipristinae virtutis memoria) of this 'mounted' legion that turned the tide back

289 in the Romans' favor when the situation was at its bleakest.

The cultivation of esprit de corps is a necessity for any military unit, and for this purpose the cult of the standards was ideal, because they formed the very identity of the unit to which they belonged.290 The standards (signa militaria), as the symbols of the unit, were the strongest focus for this pride, and consequently their loss was a great 291 disgrace, while the capture of enemy standards was a clear sign of success. The eagle

(aquila) was the legionary emblem, but each cohort had its own ensign of a serpent or a dragon, to which the men strove to demonstrate their courage. After Caesar created, trained, and equipped the fifth legion, which was composed of men from Transalpine

Gaul, he gave it the Gallic name of Alaudae, meaning 'Larks' from its distinctive feathered crest, in order to establish the beginnings of this new legion's own esprit de corps. Caesar knew and appreciated the driving power of esprit de corps and sought to enhance it as a way of ensuring that each man's loyalty to the legion was stronger than 792 any possible political considerations.

With every means at his disposal, Caesar demonstrated a particular brand of leadership, which was intrinsic to the creation of a high morale within his army. As a result of his literary efforts, Caesar the narrator has created a representation of Caesar the commander that deservedly earned the unprecedented loyalty of his troops. In his efforts to be depicted as a model of effective leadership, Caesar employed the principles of 288 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 254-5. Caesar, Gallic War, 221. 290 G. Watson, The Roman Soldier, p. 128. 291 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 253. 292 A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, p. 253. reward and recognition, equality of sacrifice, and leading by example in order to gain the trust and respect of his men. Using these principles as a guideline, Caesar learned their names and occasionally bestowed praise for individual merit, and thus developed a strong sense of rapport with his army.

When Caesar communicated with them and demonstrated a profound care towards their wellbeing, he gave the impression that their welfare was his greatest concern. When Caesar favored a policy which ensured that dangers and rewards were shared by all, each man felt more motivated to fight for Caesar's cause and not just for their own personal interests. When he actively displayed the level of virtus he required of the army throughout his many campaigns, Caesar proved to his men that there was nothing they had to do, which he could and would not do himself, thus earning their respect and trust. With each demonstration of his leadership capabilities, Caesar grew in the minds of his men as a symbolic presence, inspiring virtus and encouraging obedience to a greater authority.

Caesar's methods of training and discipline, as well as his fostering of unit esprit de corps, were unconventional according to Roman standards because they were designed to elevate his men above the behaviors of a stereotypical Roman soldier fighting for personal gain to a professional soldier fighting for the honor of his commander, legion, cohort, and person. Although Caesar trained his men hard during the winter season like an ideal Roman commander, he did so not just because it was necessary for him to display this characteristic, but because he wanted his army to possess enough confidence and virtus to endure anything.

110 Unlike his contemporaries, Caesar chose to lead by example rather than by fear of punishment and often favored an atypical brand of discipline because he did not want to diminish the confidence and esprit de corps that he had taken such pains to foster among his men. Caesar was eager to heighten each man's perception of unit esprit de corps because he knew that enhancing a soldier's loyalty to his legion, and by extension the commander of that legion, meant reducing his bond with other political allegiances or patronage ties at Rome. When Caesar behaved as if each man was motivated by a high degree of self conscious honor, he either initiated this honor in his men or spurred it on to a greater degree, thus making himself responsible for the origin and maintenance of such honor within each individual. Caesar, with his unusual approach to training, discipline, and esprit de corps, became the type of commander who was capable of winning and keeping the loyalty of his men.

iv) Caesar's presence and the fear of disgrace

This loyalty generated a keen fear of disgrace within each soldier, which served as an incentive to acts of individual valor and as a method of keeping the rank and file to their duty. Although the physical presence and observant eyes of Caesar's officers and centurions increased the effectiveness of this mentality, Caesar's physical presence was not strictly necessary for this fear to produce its necessary result. Caesar had engendered such a degree of loyalty from the high morale of his men that the symbolic presence of

Caesar, Civil War, 1.67.

Ill the summus imperator was sufficient inspiration for his legions to overcome obstacles

and achieve victory on numerous occasions.

Caesar's presence, whether material or only spiritual, was an inspiration to his

legions, which his subordinates successfully exploited. For example, while Labienus,

Caesar's second in command, was awaiting an attack from the Treveri, he exhorted his

troops to think that Caesar was present and viewing their deeds with his own eyes in

order to compel them to display the same valor they had previously demonstrated on

behalf of their commander {ilium adesse et haec coram cernere existimate). This

exhortation, which was repeated in book seven with similar wording (praesentem adesse existimarent), effectively established Caesar's presence at the engagement, transforming

the battle into a contest where the men were fighting not for survival or gain, but to prove

their loyalty to Caesar. In these circumstances where Caesar was not clearly exercising

his real control, the soldiers' dependence on the symbolic presence of their commander

was depicted as vital to achieving victory.298

Of the two isolated instances where the Roman army suffered a reverse in the BG,

the fault lies with individuals, who, out of recklessness (temeritas) and lack of restraint

(cupiditas), either failed to perceive the considerable extent of Caesar's symbolic

presence or were compelled by it to dare exploits of valor that exceeded the orders of

their tribunes and legates. The disaster at Atuatuca occurred because the fear of disgrace

within Sabinus, the commander of the legion, was replaced by fear of a German invasion,

which was only possible because Sabinus had regarded Caesar's power as dirriinished by

294 A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 93. 295 L. Born, "Caesar: The Art of Command," p. 95. 296 Caesar, Gallic War, 6.8. 297 Caesar, Gallic War, 7.62. A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 93.

112 his physical absence (neque Eburones, si Me adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse).29 Sabinus disobeyed Caesar's orders and acted recklessly because his loyalty to Caesar had been decreased by adverse conditions, distance, and fear. Caesar's absence during a critical situation had reduced Sabinus' confidence to such an abysmal degree that he is depicted as an officer who has lost both his virtus to fight and endure hardship, making his defeat inevitable.

The setback at Gergovia took place because the men were so confident in the certainty of victory, a belief heightened by Caesar's physical presence at the battle, that they were heedless in the face of Gallic resistance. After Caesar implemented a plan that brought about the rapid seizure of three Gallic camps, his men thought that nothing was unattainable by their valor (non virtute consequi possent) and ignored the orders of their tribunes and legati to hold back from further attack. The soldiers, driven by a fear of disgrace and a desire to earn and obtain rewards from Caesar and plunder in Gergovia, pursued the Gauls onto unfavorable ground, where they were eventually outnumbered and routed, suffering the loss of 64 centurions. The soldiers disobeyed orders and acted recklessly because their loyalty to their commander had been increased by his morale boosting leadership, effective training, unusual discipline, and enhancement of esprit de corps. Caesar's presence during the initial attack had increased his soldiers' confidence to such an unparalleled scale that they are represented as men who have become consumed by virtus and thus immune to adversity, making their defeat that much harder to bear.

These two reverses are exceptional cases, where the determining factor in the outcome is not so much Caesar's absence or presence, but its psychological effect on the

299 Caesar, Gallic War, 5.29. 300 Caesar, Gallic War, 7.47. 301 Caesar, Gallic War, 7.52.

113 confidence of each soldier taking part in the action. In doing so, the narrator of the BG has stressed the extent of each soldier's dependence on Caesar's more or less direct command for their success. This dependence, however, was not limited to the battlefield, but carried over to Caesar's personal relationship with his soldiers as a material patron, whom the men were dependent on for pay, distribution of booty, and pensions.303 With the patronage of his troops, Caesar demonstrated the underlying power at his disposal to potentially start a civil war and usurp control of Rome.

Caesar ultimately surpassed Pompey as a general, not simply because he practiced a morale buoying brand of leadership, training, discipline, and esprit de corps, all of which were unconventional, but because he had the strength of personality to use the effect of these guiding principles, such as high morale, outstanding loyalty, and increased confidence, to establish his near inescapable presence in the hearts and minds of his soldiers, thus mastering them almost completely. Through various loyalty and morale increasing devices, Caesar was able to mold his new soldiers into an army which recognized allegiance to him as having a greater claim on them than their loyalty to

Rome. Unlike Pompey, Caesar was able to complete the process begun under Marius, by which the patriotic and politically conscious Roman army of the old days became converted into a personal army. The Bellum Gallicum, with its depiction of a professional Roman army dependent upon Caesar for material, confidence, and victory, is a direct threat to the authority of the Roman senate and a fear evoking method of intimidation aimed at every senator.

A. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome, p. 93. S. Phang, Roman Military Service, p. 28. J. Collins, Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumption in Caesar's Writings, p. 121.

114 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

His ille rebus ita convaluit ut nunc in uno civi spes ad resistendum sit; qui mallem tantis ei viris non dedisset quam nunc tarn valenti resisteret.

All this has made him [Caesar] so powerful, that the only hope of standing up to him rests on one citizen [Pompey]. I really wish that the latter had not given him so much power in the first place, rather than waiting till he was strong before fighting him.305

In eight years of intensive operations in Gaul, Julius Caesar destroyed 800 cities, subjugated 300 tribes, and fought against 3,000,000 men, of whom 1,000,000 were killed and another enslaved. Although these numbers are probably exaggerated, they still reveal the magnitude of Caesar's conquest in Gaul and prove that the victory of the

Roman people over their hereditary Gallic enemies was total. Caesar, the man who did his utmost to incite the interrelated Roman fears of invasion and insurrection at the beginning of the Bellum Gallicum, had now brought about their complete removal. If the scope of Caesar's achievements is any indication, every Roman fear should have been laid to rest by his success, but that is not the case. Caesar, due to the strength of his personality and the overwhelming accomplishments of his dedicated army in Gaul, kept his Roman audience afraid, not of the Gauls, but of him. By the end of the BG, Caesar had effectively replaced the barbarians as the most intimidating threat to his senatorial audience, especially Pompey, whose fear towards him, although unexpected, was not unjustified.

When Caesar began his proconsulship in 58 BC, no one would have foreseen that he would eventually come back from Gaul to fight against his former ally and son-in-law

Cicero, Letters to Atticus, 7.3. Plutarch, Caesar 15.

115 Pompey in a struggle for supremacy. Before he assumed his provincial command, Caesar,

unlike Pompey, had little in the way of military experience. Granted, Caesar had

governed the province of Further Spain in 61 BC, but he was more involved in

reorganizing the civil administration of the region than in conducting campaigns.

Although largely responsible for bringing about the reconciliation between Pompey and

Crassus and thus creating the political alliance known as the first triumvirate in 60 BC, it

is clear that Caesar was the junior member of this group, who acted as the legislative

instrument of the others because he needed both the financial backing of Crassus to settle

the outstanding debts he had accumulated in his career and the powerful endorsement of

Pompey to acquire an important provincial command. After obtaining what he needed

from both men, Caesar went to Gaul determined to win victories that would elevate his

status beyond his political rivals.

After he arrived in his province, Caesar seized every opportunity to win military

glory and thus train his steadily growing army. During his phase in Gaul, Caesar fought

at least one, but more often several, major battles or sieges per year. According to

Appian, Caesar led his army in thirty engagements during the course of his Gallic

campaigns.309 Although this number cannot be confirmed or denied, the fact remains that

later analysts of Roman history believed that Caesar had fought more often and with

more consistent success than any other Roman general.310

The BG is the story of how Caesar transformed himself and his army into a juggernaut capable of cowing his political opponents and ultimately defeating Pompey,

307 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 150. A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 166. Appian, Bellum Civile, 2.150. 310 A. Goldsworthy, Caesar, p. 184.

116 the only man then alive who had the power to match him. This transformation was made possible by a series of victories that showcased Caesar's exceptional generalship and effective control of his army. These victories, however, were not acquired by accident, but actively pursued. Playing upon the Roman fear of invasion, Caesar used the defense of Rome's allies the Aedui, whom he depicted as excessively powerless to resist both the hostile invasion of the Helvetii and the tyrannical control of Ariovistus, to justify his initial campaigns and establish a foothold in Gaul. After these foreign threats were removed, Caesar, with his substantial demands for supplies from the Gallic tribes and the garrisoning of his army on their territory, was able to repeatedly provoke the Gauls into rebelling against him. As I argued in chapter three, Caesar created a cycle of rebellion and suppression that justified his continued presence in the region and allowed him to achieve multiple victories.

Caesar pushed himself to accomplish victories because he wanted them to prove the extent of his greatness, and thus make it impossible for others to deny or leave it unrewarded.311 His subjugation of the rebellious Belgic tribes in 57 BC demonstrated that he possessed the strength of character to personally manage his men and achieve victory, even when his forces were ambushed and outnumbered. His ultimate suppression of the

great Gallic revolt of 52 BC at Alesia revealed the extraordinary measures he was willing to take in order to acquire a total victory for the Roman people.312

When the Roman army suffered its worst setback in Gaul, Caesar managed to transform this defeat into a personal failure of the men involved and thus deflected any

damaging criticism regarding his own leadership capabilities. The disaster at Atuatuca

F. Adcock, Caesar as Man of Letters, p. 23. 312 Caesar, Gallic War, 1.27; 2.23; 7.88.

117 occurred because Sabinus succumbed to the manipulations of Ambiorix, who played

upon the Roman fear of a German invasion to diminish Sabinus' confidence in himself as

a commander and his faith in Caesar. As I argued in chapter four, the use of fear as a

psychological weapon is a highly effective and dangerous method of strategy, one which

only Caesar's presence has the ability to counteract.

Despite the occasional reverse, the BG is, first and foremost, a record of how

Caesar manipulated the Roman fears of invasion and rebellion to create opportunities for

frequent military campaigns and impressive victories, which he would then use to

increase his prestige as a general and to elevate his political standing at Rome. But these

victories would have been unattainable if Caesar had not taken such pains to produce and

develop strong feelings of loyalty in his men. When Caesar first accepted his provincial jurisdiction, he was given command of a professional army roughly composed of four

legions of soldiers, whose loyalty to their general had not yet been secured. But as the

Gallic war progressed, the army witnessed Caesar's willingness to endure hardships and

undergo personal risks for the sake of victory. The men observed Caesar as he exhibited a

greater concern for their welfare and demonstrated a carefulness with their lives, and their

loyalty began to surpass that of a typical Roman army to its commander.

Caesar's generous distribution of campaign spoils to his men no doubt increased

their goodwill, but it was his refusal to inflict harsh punishments of flogging and

execution for petty crimes that had the most dramatic effect on the loyalty of his army.

Caesar abstained from this traditional Roman method of securing discipline because he

wanted his army to fight beyond their powers not out of fear of the penalties he could

deliver, but out of fear of disgracing themselves before his eyes. As I argued in chapter

118 five, Caesar, through various loyalty inducing methods and numerous experiences in the battlefield, transformed the army of the Roman people into a personal weapon under his direct control. In doing so, Caesar became an object of Roman fear, which Pompey had to address.

By the completion of his Gallic campaigns in 50 BC, Caesar's personal fortune and status had been irrevocably changed. Caesar, the man who in 60 BC had spent only five years in some sort of military service, could now boast of greater achievements than any other senator except perhaps Pompey. Unlike before, when he could barely keep his creditors at bay and had to rely on more powerful figures for military advancement,

Caesar had become one of the wealthiest Romans with an extensive network of friends

and clients. His army, whose hearts and minds had been mastered by the strength of his personality and the use of popularis methods, had given him the means to pose a significant threat to his political opponents. But despite all his new found influence,

Caesar was not able to enact his plans after Gaul and achieve a second consulship by fear alone. Caesar had become a threat, but Pompey did not consider him an insurmountable one. Nevertheless, Caesar, reinvigorated by his toils in Gaul and strengthened by a dedicated army at his back, was more than willing to correct Pompey's error in judgment.

Hoc voluerunt: tantis rebus gestis Gaius Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem.

"They would have it so. Even I, Gaius Caesar, after so many great deeds, should have been found guilty, if I had not turned to my army for help."

313 Suetonius, Divine Julius, 30.

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