THE MANIPULATION OF FEAR IN JULIUS CAESAR'S BELLUM GALLICUM by Kristin Slonsky Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2008 © Copyright by Kristin Slonsky, 2008 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-43525-0 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-43525-0 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. 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Canada DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY To comply with the Canadian Privacy Act the National Library of Canada has requested that the following pages be removed from this copy of the thesis: Preliminary Pages Examiners Signature Page (pii) Dalhousie Library Copyright Agreement (piii) Appendices Copyright Releases (if applicable) For My Family iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 (i) Cicero and Roman Fear in 60 BC 1 (ii) changes in the Roman perception of the Gauls 4 CHAPTER 2. ROMAN FEAR OF THE GAULS IN POLYBIUS' HISTORIES 12 (i) the Gallic sack of Rome 12 (ii) Gallo-Roman interaction in Polybius' Histories 14 (iii) the Gallic ethnography of Polybius 20 (iv) Gallic desperation at the battle of Telamon 36 CHAPTER 3. CAESAR'S USE OF FEAR AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE GALLIC CONQUEST 42 (i) the weakness of the Aedui 44 (ii) the justification in Caesar's internal thought processes 48 (iii) the dialogue between Caesar and Ariovistus 52 (iv) self-fulfilling justification after book one 58 CHAPTER 4. THE USE OF ROMAN FEAR AS A WEAPON IN THE BG 62 (i) Sabinus and the pretense of fear 62 (ii) Ambiorix and the pretense of weakness 73 (iii) the worst Roman defeat in the BG 80 CHAPTER 5. CAESAR THE GENERAL'S USE OF FEAR 88 (i) Caesar's decision to generate loyalty in his army 88 (ii) Caesar'spopularis methods 92 (iii) the effect of leniency on army performance and morale 104 (iv) Caesar's presence and the fear of disgrace 111 CHAPTER 6.CONCLUSION 115 BIBLIOGRAPHY 120 VI ABSTRACT The Bellum Gallicum is Julius Caesar's story of how he transformed himself and his army into an unstoppable force capable of intimidating all political opposition and ultimately defeating Pompey. This study regards the BG as a subtle method of manipulation, which played upon Roman fear of the Gauls to justify Caesar's military campaigns and ultimate goals. The BG is Caesar's record of his manipulation of Roman fear not just of invasion, but also of rebellion and the ensuing destabilization it brought upon the Roman patronage system. It was designed to depict Caesar as the ideal general, whose possession of military knowledge, courage, prestige, and luck has enabled him to defend Roman territory against any threat of invasion and fearlessly put down Gallic insurrection in a manner that surpasses all his rivals. vn LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED BG Bellum Gallicum viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis could never have been finished, or even begun, without the help and support of many people. I would like to show gratitude to my supervisor, Sarah Cohen, for consistently providing excellent direction and thoughtful guidance throughout this arduous process. Special thanks must be given to Peter O'Brien, who bears the most responsibility for transforming me not just into a graduate student, but a passionate Classicist. I am indebted to Michael Fournier, who was kind enough to take the time out of his busy summer to read the beast that had become my thesis. Most of all, I am grateful for my family. My parents, George and Deborah Slonsky, have always been never ending sources of strength, encouragement, and love. If it wasn't for their faith in me, I would never have accomplished half the things in my life. My wingman, Crystle Hug, to whom I owe so much, took me out for sushi, listened to my thesis angst, and never let me forget that there was a world outside my office. Most importantly, she never doubted that I would succeed. I am especially thankful to my brother and lifelong best friend, Mark, whose constant presence in my life has been an undeserved blessing. Thanks also to his wife, Tabitha, who generously offered her home as my soft place to fall. Most of all, thank you Miya Valkyrie Slonsky, my brother's first child, for bringing such joy into our family. IX CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Atque in re publica nunc quidem maxime Gallici belli versatur metus. Nam Haedui fratres nostri pugnam nuper malam pugnarunt et sine dubio sunt in armis excursionesque in provinciam faciunt. Senatus decrevit ut consules duas Gallias sortirentur, dilectus haberetur, vacationes ne valerent, legati cum auctoritate mitterentur qui adirent Galliae civitates darentque operam ne eae se cum Helvetiis coniungerent. Well then, in public affairs for the moment the chief subject of interest is the disturbance in Gaul. For the Aedui—"our brethren"—have recently fought a losing battle, and the Helvetii are undoubtedly in arms and making raids upon our province. The senate has decreed that the two consuls should draw lots for the Gauls, that a levy should be held, all exemptions from service be suspended, and legates with full powers be sent to visit the states in Gaul, and see that they do not join the Helvetii. i) Cicero and Roman Fear in 60 BC In 60 BC, Cicero tells us, the Romans were greatly alarmed with the events taking place within Gaul. The Aedui, Rome's oldest Gallic allies, had been unable to withstand the combined forces of Ariovistus, a Germanic mercenary acting on the instigation of another Gallic tribe called the Sequani, and were defeated at Magetobriga. As a result of this defeat, their preferential status over the other Gallic tribes was forfeited and Roman control over the economic situation in the region was unbalanced. While the Aedui were demonstrating their inadequacy, the Helvetii, a Gallic tribe known to have taken part in the Germanic invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones almost fifty years earlier, were testing the strength of the borders along the province of Gallia Narbonensis with frequent incursions. Although a full scale invasion had not yet taken place, the letter gives the impression that the Helvetii's prior history of invasion and the memory of Rome's sack in Cicero, Letters to Atticus, 1.19.2. H. D. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World, p. 76. 1 387 BC, its greatest humiliation at the hands of Gallic barbarians, had combined to create a tension that was almost palpable. The possibility of another barbarian invasion and the realization that their Gallic allies were incapable of even defending themselves, let alone acting as a protective buffer to Roman territory, apparently produced such a feeling of dread that the senate was compelled to issue a declaration that authorized the emergency mobilization of Rome's forces. The senators bestowed the jurisdiction of the two Gallic provinces on either side of the Alps to the two consuls and authorized immediate troop levies of every able bodied Roman, refusing to apply the usual exemptions to priests and old men. Ambassadors were dispatched to Gallic communities with orders, not to reinforce the borders or attack the Helvetii, but to discourage their inhabitants from mimicking the behavior of the raiders. Several exceptional steps were taken to meet a situation which had not yet actualized as a great crisis. Did the Romans regard the Gauls as the chief threat to their security at this time or was it the susceptibility of their Gallic allies to possible invasion that propelled them to take such extraordinary defensive measures? Granted, a lengthy history of hostile interaction between the two neighboring peoples existed long before the Helvetii ever became a cause for Roman concern. Rome first came in to contact with Gallic tribes in the fifth century when they began to migrate into the Po valley and displace the declining Etruscan civilization, which had dominated the area for centuries. In the early fourth century, a horde of Gauls advanced upon Rome and defeated a Roman army at the river 3 D.