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INTERNATIONAL - Vol.I fjnelfsh Edition. Unpublished Manuscripts - Please reprint - INTERNATIONAL - Vol.I. No.17 ) PRESS 16 1"Dec.1921 CORRESPONDENCE Ctnlra/ Bureau : Berlin SW 48, Fricdrichatruee 22.5, Ill. - Postal address franz Dahlem, Berlin SW 48, Friedrich1traue 22.5, Ill for lnprekorr. - Telegraphic address: lnprekorr. l11:cause i1 woulJ u1he rwise havt been 1nipossible to carry on the wa r beguu by the bourgeoisie. O ur unlimited centra lization POLITICS wa s nu1hi 11g 111 ore than the stri ppiug of the wh ole country in order tu obtain al l the industrial produc1s necessary for carrying un war. As corn raJe Len in r igh1ly s1a1es i11 hi s pamphlet on Is the Russian Revolution 1hr tax in kiud, 1he mi litary measures led 10 military Communism 111 1he ci ti es, and 10 requisitioning in the country, that is 10 a Boureeois Revolution? Kraiu-\ilundering for 1he support of the army and the cities. by Karl Radrk. Wa s 1 iere an _v ot he r poss ibilit y of gett ing a s11Hicient amount (Conclusion.) of met al and of grain which we needed for 1he war? We could 11 01 possibly have leh our li mitt'<l stores oi rnanulaC1ured goods tu 111 .\pril IY18 , in a speech by comrade Lenin, 1he Sow.>I 1he J isrrelion nf th e speculators. And how could we possibl) ~overnment attempted to define our nex t tasks and to point oul :1a vc left grain 10 be ta ken ca re of by the tax in kind , when the wa y which we now designate us "The new economic policy ... we lacktd 1he nccessa r) gov rrnmenl appa ratus for co111pu1ing­ It attempted to cunclude agreemen ts with the cl pitalists and to this tax rnrrcct ly'' The grain st ores of Central Russia (until transfonn private capitalism into c:ipitalism controlled by th e tl: tll Siberia aud the Uk raine did not belong to us) were so proletarian state. Comrade Lenin said that we must learn from small 1h a1 it wa s not possible 10 obtain any !lurplus whatever ; the trust kings how to reconstruct our industries. At the same moreove r th e peasa nt s could receiv e nolh ing in 1eturn for this time the Soviet guv nnment had 10 act in . jusl 1he opposi1e su rpl us 011 the free marl.:et, if th ere was anv . becau~ all th e manner i11 the co unt ry, where the prereq t11 s1tes for Soc1ahs111 111a11ulac111red li(oods were co nliscated. \\.ere not present. 111 order to ob1a i11 grain it had 10 arm Outside of 1he po li1ira l, sl ra teg ic aud economic necessity the workers and the village poor, nml 10 fll rm vi llage co nnni t1ees fur the po liry ol wa r Comm un ism, there wa s another social. al{ainst rent-profit ee ring. Capitali sm wh ic h had been d est r oye<~ psyrholoi:.: ica l fa ctor. If even at the beginning of the revolution by the war had not left us sufficient mean s for th e exchanl!e ot 1he vic1or-class could not lea ve th e materia l sources in the hands manufacture9 . article s fo 1: grain. The Soviet government wa s of th ei r enemy and thus enable 1hc bourgeoisie to lead a life not yet suff1c1ently fortified, a11~ wa s 111 cont rol of too w_e ak of luxurr in a lell'a l 111 a n11 ~ r , how then cou ld lhe proleta.nat have a machine 10 be able to gel gram by means of the ta x 111 kind . possibly done 1l11s at a tune when Ru ssia wa s oue big battle­ The peasants, wh o had thrown off 1he yo ke of the laq!e fie ld. wh en 1h c workers and peasants had 10 undergo so much landowners. the Czar and the bourgeoisie wi1h the aid of th e suifrri ng in order to he l'ictorious in 1h eir fight against 1lw workers, wanted 11 0 restrictions set upon 1heir freedom . The! l 10 11ri:l· o i sie ·~ Wa s 11 possible, at a. ri me when the hungry and desired a free stateless life , with no obligations to the workl·rs I rt·rrn1 g wo111 e11 workers were sew111g ma ts for the a rmy da Y and peasants' government. The grain producers were will inl! ~ nd 11 igl 11 anu 11 11der poor light, 10 permit bea111ifully lit and to ex change their grain onl y for the greates1 po ~s1ble parl of rid1 di splays in the stores to moc k the sulfering fighters b) thoseJoods which were s1il l in the country ; th is wou ld !1a\t' showing them how well 1he bourgeoisie lived and enj oyed life ·~ injur the state, 1he worki11 i1: -cla ss aml the poor villagers. This wa,; impossible! The Sov iet gove rnment had to institute But the "hird class, 1he bourgeoisie did nol want to hcai­ 1he Spa nan man ner of livi ng, because it was the only one which •:nrn·sponded to lhe gral' so ld in roa1 of Soviet Russia . of limi1ations either. It refused to accep1 the rnmpromise w11h 1he Sov :et government, ns .offeri:d by Lenin in 1r11s. Wi1h 1la· \'C1r Cu111111u11i s111 wa s a co 111 radic tion to the structure of aid of the world bourgeo1s1e, 1t had begun th e light lnr . lilt• l ~us si a anJ i1s economi c rela1io11 s. War C.o mmuni~m wa s a co11 · against Soviet Russia. During the s~mmer oi. IQIS .111e un1 1ed t r ~ di.:l io 1 ; as far as 1he land wa s conre rned; in the c i tie~ Russian bourgeoisie declared at one tim e to l. 11huan1a , anothn hawt'ver, 1he possibility of success was 11 01 alt ogether excludt'<l . time to Poland a third time to Est honia. then to 1he Ukra111~ If the 1\ nrld rt.' vo luti on ha d come as ea rl v as ICl!ll , before the and German) ' respectively, that thanks \0 th e protec1 ion ni disa rmin;.: of the European working-class· took place, or even German im~rialism it was not compelled to accepl the co111 - i11 14'10, during· our ad vance towards Warsaw. 1he reconstruct1 011 promise, with the Soviet government. Alter the Czecho-5101ak oi 1h e l ~ 11 ssia n large iuduslries as a wh ole on 1he basis of sta te uprising, particulady aft ~ r the Alhes had defeated Germany, .tl1t ownership and acc o rd i n~ to our economic plans would nol ha Vt' Russian bourgeo1s1e,A>as1ng its hopes upon aid from the A l11e o; . htcn hi s1u ricnll y i111poss1hle. [he Sov iet governme11 t ('Ould then started the most bitter struggle against the Soviet govern111en 1. ha 1e thought of retai 11i11g 1he large industries as a whole 111 It refused to lease its enterprises because it hoped to ret ~ i n its uwn h-ands, because it could ha·:e received the necessary them as its property. In or.der 1? m ~ ke it possible, therefon'. 111achincs from the Eu ropea n workers. [ 1·e11 in case the world 10 orry out the new econon11c pclicy, 11 was necessar ,Y to knork re \'Ol111i o11 had not been vic10rious on a European scale, evt'u the bourgeoisie down not only 111 law but 111 fac1. 11 had 10 he ii we had on ly cou4uered Poland and then stood armed at .1h e knocked on the head in a two years' war. ga it's of German y, it would not ha ve been altogether 11nposs1hk 10 force the bou rgeoisie to accept a compromise with us after We had to prove to the bourgeoisie and to worl~ capi1al we would have got 1cn !_h e means ~f produ~tion from the .wodd 1hal the Russian industries belonged to the proletarian ~late bo urgeoi sie lor our state mdustnes 111 European Russia, 111 and not the bourgeoisie. We had to do this before we could return for concesions in the borderinir regions oi Russia, make use of the bourj{eoisie in the further development of - Siberia. Caucasus and Turkestan- and for the right to develop production. The war mevitably brought about a complete production in these di~nt regions on the basis of concessions. nationalization. This nationalization was brought about not only by the necessity of destroying the ruling cla~s and ending its What would then 'have been the social relations in Russia political power, which waa based upon ecoooll\lc power; .we h.ad under such circum~tauees? All the industries and means of trtJ\4RQr.lation wotdtf tiive bttu in the hsnda of tht workers. to nation•li~e jor o,t'~1er f'lY901\.8 also. w~ b_ad , . ~q. µJl&ol.tahze 138 lnternationaf Prees-C.Orreapondence No. 17 The land wQ.uld have been in the hands of the peasants. The relations determine the political onea, and that economic con­ reconstructed industries would haYe made it possible for the cessions like the ones we grant to the bourgeoiaie, must lead to proletariat to relinquish the requisitions in the country, and to political conceaslous. receive grain partly through fhe tax in kind and partly by This so-called Marxian ABC has nothing in common witli exchanging goods with the state industries.
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