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Hitler's Rise to Power

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Hitler's Rise to Power Key questions -» Wasdemocracy desperately desired in Germanyin 1918,or was its implementation partof a scheme by Germany's wartime leaders (Field MarshalsHindenburg and LudendorfF] to avoida punitivesettlement after Germany'ssurrender? Wasthe constitution established in 1919 a hindranceto successful democraticpractice? What role did economic distress play in polarizing and brutalizing German political life during the period? Howvalid is AJPTaylor's view that "only the GreatDepression put the wind into the sailsof National Socialism"? What elements in Germany after 1918 were either actively hostile or simply apathetic towards the new system? Wasthe riseto powerof a party committed to a totalitarian system a story of the "irresistible rise" of National Socialism? Key concepts Change Consequences Causes Significance Hitler's rise to power The Weimar democratic system, established in Germany after the First World War, preceded the establishment of the single-party National Socialist state, which was effectively consolidated in 1934 when Adolf Hitler became Fiihrer of Germany. National Socialism gained the support of the military, which eliminated domestically the last major obstacle to Hitler's ambition to establish his "Thousand Year (Third) Reich". In explaining the emergence of the "Hitler state", it was common to describe the Weimar Republic "as a troubled interlude between two eras of greater andmore sinister importance: the WilhelminianKaiserreich, which saw the consolidation of a unified Germany, and the Third Reich, whichdestroyed it". Weimarwas seen as "a desperate and grudging experiment in democracy whose decisive failure had consequencesnot only for Germany but the world". Suchinterpretations are linked to a pessimisticview of German history, in which the triumph of National Socialism is accepted as an inevitable and irresistible force welcomed by most Germans. However, at no point prior to the establishment of the one-party state in Germany did the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) achieve support from the majority of the electorate. The highest percentage of votes achieved in March 1933 was 43. 9 per cent - impressive, but short of 164 CHAPTER 4. 1: THE EMERGENCE OF THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE IN GERMANY, 1919-1934 an absolute majority. The Nazis achieved power not because most Germans actively desired it but because of a . ^& combination of circumstances, which calls into question the claim that the NSDAP "seized power", as Nazis later claimed. More recent interpretations emphasize the " Stabiibergabe"- the "passing of the baton" or handover of power - by vested interests in 's Germany that tried to use the Nazis to ' r, counter the rise of the Communist Party (KPD) in the period 1932-1933. 6cc ^onig cto6ettc/ Pessimists and catastrophists see the dec $6cft yocmte/ years 1919-1934 as little more than flee ^d^mocftftall oectnfiigte, a prelude to Hitler's rise to power. ;-»Af?. *t *^W. NQinCKr.,. cettcte unfi ciniQtc 6ct ^oli The British historian AJP Taylor later claimed that "if there had been a strong The captionto this postcard from 1933 reads:"What the kingconquered, the prince democratic sentiment in Germany, Hitler formed, the field marshal defended and the soldier saved and united." would never have come to power ... (Germans) deserved"what they got when they went round crying for a hero. " Germanophobes willingly accepted a simplistic argument that the emergence and coming to Thefigures shown on the postcardabove power of National Socialism was the result of an inherent inability in are,from leftto right,Frederick the Great the German character to appreciate and accept democratic principles. of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, Paul von Such a view adds little to an understanding of the complexity of the Hindenburg,and Adolf Hitler. period: the problems (internal and external) facing the democratic 1 Withreference to the personalities experiment and mistakes made by political parties and individuals shown on the postcard, what was the that brought about Nazi success. As lan Kershaw pointed out, "Hitler intended message ofthis card issued was no in exorable product of a German 'special path' (Sonderweg), no bytheNationaP logical culmination of long-term, trends in specifically German culture and ideology." 2 Find out the meaning ofthe phrase "Janus-faced" Inwhat way doesthe Conditions in which the authoritarian state emerged postcard illustrate this characteristic of National Socialism7 1 A discredited parliamentary system that, due to instability and policy errors, produced a high level of disillusionment and frustration 2 The dislocation produced by the First World War of 1914-1918 and the subsequent Paris Peace Settlement, which produced revisionism revisionism, nationalism, and revanchism The desire to alter the terms of what was 3 Economic crises that produced social and economic conditions perceivedas the unjusttreaty settlement causing panic among the population, that is, political extremism afterthe FirstWorld War resulting from economic instability 4 Fear of the Left, which was increasedby the existence of the new revanchism Soviet state and the growth of socialist/communist movements in The desirefor revenge western Europe 5 The collaboration/capitulation of the existing political establishment vested interests or institutions - when vested interests underestimated the Fascists/ Groups or individuals (such as political Nazis in a tragedy of miscalculation leaders, businessmen, and landowners] 6 Semi-legal assumption of power, despite subsequent fascist/Nazi with aninterest in resistingchanges they claims of a "seizure of power" felt would beto theirdisadvantage. 165 AUHTORITARIAN STATES 7 The appeal of the movements/leaders and the skills of these leaders, pragmatism' . -. : - ".:. -""; . .', '.., - -\,,. -.,. in terms of: A'wiltiRgnesstobe flexible andadapt to ; «cu<ftstaRees1ftste^of^t kingngidly . pragmatism EcNigmatK^U^tejati'iciptes^^^' . millenarianism (also referred to as "chiliastic" programmes/promises) millenarianism ^' ;" ^ . propaganda From "mitleFimun'i":lTtetaUyatht6iiisancl years, andgen era lly taken to mean the . paramilitary forces and the use of violence to control promise ofa future period ofprosperity the streets and destroy opponents. under the regime. : ' ^ The emergence of the Nazi regime cannot be reduced to one simple cause: the rise of authoritarian regimes is the result of circumstances leading to popular disillusionment with a preceding governmental Left and Right system. In Germany this disillusionment led to popular demand for Duringthis period"the Left" was a term change in uncertain times, and to the unwillingness of the population to commonly usedto describepolitical defend the preceding regime from overthrow by extremist groups. partiesthat were leftof centre, tending towards communist/socialist beliefs. By contrast, parties such as the German TheWeimar Republic, 1918-1933/34 Nationalists (DNVP)and the NSDAPwere In Germany the "Novembe.r Revolution" of 1918 occurred on 9 November, referred to as the Right and Extreme Right although Kaiser Wilhehn H, by then in exile in HoUand, did not officially respectively. While the IB does not use the abdicate until 28 November. The declaration of a republicby PhUip terms in exam questions, many textbooks Scheidemann, an SPD (SocialDemocratic Party) leader, was followedtwo do use these terms to describe political days later by the signing of an armistice with the Allied powers. stances, in the inter-warperiod especially. The removal of the dynasty and the German defeat produced a vacuum in political life that extremists sought to exploit. Only in January 1919 - Spartacists following an unsuccessful revolt in Berlin led by the Spartacists- was A group of radical socialists, led by Rosa a convention elected to produce a constitution for the new democratic LbRtemburg and Karl Liebknecht, wl^o republic. The holding of the convention m Weimar (at a safe distancefrom madea futileattempt in January1919 troubled Berlin) gave the republic its name and a constitution designedto to establish a Bolshevik-type state replace autocratic and dynastic mle with one based on popular sovereignty. m Germany V -'. ;.' Below is an overview of the sue stages in the life of the short-lived democratic republic, linked to the question of why it failed and was replaced by the National Socialist state. Weimar's existence was plagued by domestic and external problems that allowed outright enemies of Look back over the factors that promoted democratic principles - and those who had never provided more than lip fascism/NationalSocialism, noted above, service to such principles - to subvert the republic. arid find specific detailsofthe rise of ' Mussolini's fascism in the period 1 1919-1926. : . :.,... ...... '.. :: Stage 1:1918-1919 German military leaders later daimed that Germany's defeat in 1918 was Comparethe relative sigraftcfiriGe of the a result of a "stab m the badk" by internal enemies. While it was true that factors promoting the growth ofthe two no Allied armies occupied German soU at the time of the armistice, both extremist movements; Alternatively, Hmdenburg and Ludendorff, the military leaders of Germany, realized that compareand eontrastthe factorsbehind defeat loomed. Weakened by blockade, by its own allies' collapse, by the the emergeneeof the Bolshevikstate in superiorresources of a reinvigoratedAUied enemy after the USA enteredthe Russia,1917-1924, war in April 1917, and by worrying incidents of the breakdown of military discipline
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